17. CHAP. XVII. Whether God be the Author of sin; out of 2 Sam. 16:22.

17. CHAP. XVII. Whether God be the Author of sin; out of 2 Sam. 16:22.

CHAP. XVII. Whether God be the Author of sin; out of 2 Sam. 16:22.

Look in Judg. 3:9 and 9:24, and 2 Sam. 2:27, and 1 Kings. 22:21, and in Rom. 1:23.

It remaineth now, that we entreat of the question; Whether God be the author of sin? For as well the curse of Semei, as the defiling of David's concubines, may seem at the first view to proceed from God. For as touching the curse, David himself said, that it came from God. And as touching the adultery of David's concubines, it was spoken by Nathan under the person of God. Wherefore it may very well be called in controversy, whether God be the author of sin. And truly there are very many and strong arguments of both sides: a good part of them I will recite, unto the which all the rest may be referred. [1] God cannot truly and rightly be said to be the cause of sin. Excellent is the sentence of Augustine, in his book of 83 questions; God is not the author of anything, whereby a man becometh the worse: But no man doubteth that men are the worse through sin, Therefore God cannot properly be called the author of sin. It is not likely, that God will deform man: artificers desire to adorn their works. [2]

Further, God himself generally in the scripture professeth himself a revenger of sins. If he be a revenger, he is no author; for then he should punish his own. If he were truly the cause of sin, he should condemn that which he made, which thing is absurd. [3] Thirdly it is said, that He loveth those things which he made, and hateth nothing that he hath made. But he testifieth that he did hate sin, therefore he doth not enforce to sin. To hate and to love are contrary; wherefore both cannot be spoken of one thing, at one and the self-same time. If he hate sin, then he loveth it not; but if so be it were of God, it should be beloved: for God loveth those things which he made. [4] If God were the cause of sin, he in the bringing forth of sin, should sin; he that stealeth, is a thief; he that committeth murder, is a mankiller: but far be it from God, that he should be either said to sin, or to be a sinner. What is else to sin, but to stray from the right end? But God is infinite, and cannot be lead away from the end by another greater force. He is not ignorant, that he can stray from the end; for he is most wise. And that he himself should cause others to sin, it seemeth to be absurd.

[5] Let us consider what is done among these natural things created by God. There be many efficient causes; it seemeth that every efficient cause coveteth to make that like unto itself, whereabout it worketh. Fire, if it take hold upon wood, so worketh, as those things, whereupon it worketh, may be made like unto itself; a man doth procreate a man. Thus in things created do agents work; why shall we not say, that in God's doings, his endeavor is to make like unto himself; and that therefore he sinneth not? The holy scriptures teach us the same; they bring in laws which stir up good works, but sins at no time. [6] If God should provoke sin, or would it to be done, he should seem to be a hypocrite; he should closely and secretly do another thing, then he openly pretendeth. [7] Jeremiah spake of false prophets; They

ran, but I sent them not; they prophesied, and I spake not with them; namely, that they should speak this thing. [8] Oseas saith; Thy salvation, O

Israel, is of me, thy perdition is of thyself. But no man is ignorant that sin is the cause of perdition. If perdition were of Israel, then sin also: but salvation, and whatsoever goeth before salvation, is of God. If salvation and perdition, being the effects, be thus distinguished; the causes also must be distinguished, the one to be of God, and the other of man. Sin shall proceed of men, and virtues of God. [9] More manifest is that which is written in the eight chapter of John, where Christ speaking of the devil, saith; When he speaketh lies, he speaketh of his own: if of his own, he hath no need to be stirred up of another. [10] And again, This is the condemnation of man, that light came into the world, but they loved darkness more. [11] James testifieth, that God tempteth no man. But by temptation, men are provoked unto sin: wherefore if God were the cause of sin, it might not be said, that he tempteth not any man. It is concupiscence whereby we be tempted, and that is not of God, but of the world.

2. [12] In the second of Paralipomenon, the last chapter, there is a special place, where the cause of the destruction of Jerusalem is given and ascribed to the sins of the people: and in such sort it is so disproved, that God is the author of sin, as God testifieth that he would it otherwise: wherefore the cause must not be laid upon God. He sent his prophets (saith he) betimes in the morning, but they hardened their heart. [13] Christ wept over the city of Jerusalem; he was sorry for the overthrow thereof. If the effect displeased him, much rather did the cause: he wept, because they so sinned, as they deserved utter destruction. If Christ wept, who not only was man, but very

God also, he was displeased with sins: therefore God is not the author of sin. [14] Neither can it be affirmed, that God is the cause of sin, unless we

will charge him with tyranny, in that he condemneth men for their sins, because they have done wickedly, whom yet after a sort he hath led unto wickedness. Tyrants are wont to set forth laws, and then to provide cunningly that their subjects may commit something against those laws, whereby they may punish them. [15] Moreover, the scripture attributeth unto God the judgment over all flesh: but how shall he judge the world of sin, if he himself have been the author of sin? In the third chapter to the Romans; If our righteousness do set forth the righteousness of God, is God unjust for punishing? That it may be perceived how absurd a thing it is, that our sins should make to the glory of God: for if they make to the glory of God, why doth he condemn them? If the reason be there of force, it more strongly concludeth in this place. If God be the cause of sin, how shall he judge the world? [16] Also there will seem to be in him two wills, and those one contrary to the other: but in God there is only one will; if there should be more, they would be one against another, as touching one and the selfsame thing; so that he would have us both not to do, and to do the self-same things. [17] We will demand, to what purpose are so many exhortations, persuasions, and callings to do well, in the holy scriptures? All these things will seem to be vain. To what end did Christ give warning unto Judas, if he would be betrayed of him? These speeches may seem to be done as it were in game. But God dealeth gravely and earnestly in those things, which he dealeth with men. [18] Also there would follow a great absurdity; for the differences between good and evil, and between virtue and sin, would be taken away. God should be appointed the author of both; whereas he being the sovereign good, there can proceed nothing but goodness from him. If a man should detest murder, adultery, and incest, he would say; it is a good work. The matter would be brought to such a pass, as good would be called

evil, and evil good: yea rather there would be no difference at all betwixt them. For through the will of God, whereby he forbiddeth and commandeth anything, we judge of good and evil: but by this means we should be void of all judgment.

[19] In like manner would be taken away the judgments of our consciences. We read in the epistle to the Romans, that we have cogitations, which shall defend and accuse one another in the judgment of the Lord. If this other opinion were true, we will gather, that we should not accuse ourselves, but God the author. [20] There is plenty of excuse for the wicked, they will say; Wherefore need I to repent for this thing, seeing God himself is the author of it? Repentance will be taken away, and a window opened unto great mischiefs. [21] Wherefore shall we give thanks unto God, because he hath delivered us from our sins? But sin was good; It had been all one to have lien still in sin; [22] We will not lament our sins, but rather rejoice in them, for it is the work of God; it is meet that we should rejoice for the works of God. If God himself be the author of sin, praise and rejoicing will follow; but not sorrow. [23] Much will be drawn away from the estimation of God, if he should be put the author of sin. [24] That saying also, which they show, might be brought; namely, that God would have all men to be saved. If he will have them to be saved, he useth good means; he encourageth not men to sin: for sins do lead men to perdition. Many more reasons might be brought, but for this time we will content ourselves with these.

3. Let us see on the other part, what things they be that might affirm God to be the cause of sin. [1] In the first chapter to the Romans it is written; that Seeing the idolaters knew God, and would not worship him as God, therefore (as meet it was) he gave them up unto a reprobate sense, and unto

shameful lusts. If he gave them, he also provoked and moved them. [2] In Exodus it is written, that God had hardened and dulled the heart of Pharaoh, so that he would not hearken, when Moses commanded him in the name of God to let the people depart. [3] In the sixth of Isaiah, He is said to blind the people, that they should not see. [4] When we pour out our prayers before God, we desire him that he Lead us not into temptation, but that he will deliver us from evil. To what end should we thus pray, if these things should not sometimes be? No man entreateth, except for those things which may be, or which do hang over his head, or which he feareth will come to pass.

They are wont to say, that God doth and willeth these things, not as they be sins, but in respect that they be punishments to chasten him that hath sinned. But it is hard to appoint the punishment and fault to be all one thing, seeing the nature of punishment and fault is diverse. A fault ariseth from the will, whereas punishment is laid upon us against our will. If it be committed voluntarily, then it is no punishment. To affirm a thing to be voluntary, and yet unvoluntary, can hardly be made to agree. [5] That, which is the cause of a cause, may also be called the cause of the effect: but no man doubteth but that God hath given us a will, inclinations, properties and effects, whereby we are provoked to sin. If God be said to be the cause of these things, why dare we not say that he is the cause of sins? [6] That which removeth the impediments, if the thing afterward happen, or the effect follow, it shall be called the cause of sin. What doth chiefly let sins? Even grace, and the good spirit of God: except these keep us back, we shall rush headlong into most grievous crimes. Who can remove grace, or take away the spirit, but only God which gave them? If he remove the lets, no doubt but he is some cause of sins. [7] Also, he that ministereth an occasion of anything, he seemeth to be an author thereof: although he be not the

chiefest cause, if he give an occasion he shall not fail to be called author.

God knew the hardness of Pharaoh's heart, and he knew that he being not holpen by the spirit, would be provoked to sin. So The law is said to increase sin, if it be not proposed to the regenerate: for we always bend ourselves unto that which we be forbidden, and covet that which we be denied. God commandeth [Pharaoh] to let the people go; what is this, but to offer an occasion that he might be the more hardened? We cannot deny but that God doth minister occasions: yea, and he not only giveth occasions, but we can also show commandments wherein he commandeth sin. [8] We have in the history of the kings, that Ahab was a wicked prince; that God determined to punish him in battle; he would have him brought to this by the flatteries and false persuasions of false prophets. God is brought in to talk with the spirits; Who can seduce Ahab? There stepped forth an evil spirit which said; I will be a lying spirit in the mouth of the false prophets.

God alloweth and commandeth it; Go thy ways, do so. He giveth encouragement; It shall be so.

[9] Further, we cannot deny, but that sin is a certain human action: but every deed, as it comes in act, dependeth of the first principle of all things.

God is (as the Philosophers acknowledge him) Primus actus, the first agent.

Unless he be the upholder, there can be no agent: wherefore sin dependeth on God, as upon the cause efficient. [10] Sins for the most part be motions; and motions have an order, so as the inferior dependeth upon the superior: therefore the cause of sin, so far-forth as it is a motion, is directed unto his own mover. [11] Augustine hath certain testimonies of this thing, and confirmeth it also by some places of the scripture. In his book De gratia & libero arbitrio, the twelfth chapter, he saith; that There is no doubt, but that God worketh in men's minds, to make their wills incline, either to good

according to his mercy, or unto evil according to their merits; by his judgment undoubtedly which sometime is open, sometime secret, but evermore just. In the beginning of that chapter he saith; Who can but tremble at these horrible judgments of God, whereby he worketh what he will in the hearts of the wicked, yielding to everyone according to his deserts? And he addeth; He verily worketh in the hearts of men the motions of their will, and by them he doth those things that he will do, who nevertheless cannot will anything unjustly. This he proveth by the scriptures. In the first of Kings we have the history of Roboam, who hearkened not to the counsel of the ancients, that he should deal mildly with the people. But it is said, that this turning away was of the Lord, to the intent he might establish the saying of Ahia the Silonite. Wherefore (as Augustine expoundeth it) that naughty will was of the Lord. He alledgeth another place, out of the second book of Chronicles, the 21st chapter. God stirred up the Philistines and Arabians against Joram, which followed idolatry; God was minded to punish him. Undoubtedly the motions of the minds in the Philistines and Arabians were wicked against Joram, insomuch as they invaded other men's countries, and were infected with cruelty; and yet God is said to have stirred them up. In the same history of kings, there is speaking of Amasias, which provoked Joash the king of Israel unto battle.

Yea and Joash himself, and also the prophet of the Lord discouraged him from the purpose; but he being carried with ambition, hearkened not unto the godly admonitions: which thing nevertheless came from God, who would that he should be delivered into his hands, because he followed the idols of Edom.

4. [12] We read in the 14. chapter of Ezekiel; If the prophet be deceived, I have seduced him; and I will stretch forth my hand, and will smite him. He

entreateth of the false prophets, which ever between whiles vainly fed the people. [13] Jeremiah saith in the fourth chapter, that God deceived the people. [14] In the 63. chapter of Isaiah the prophet complaineth;

Wherefore hath God so seduced the people, or made them to err, that they should depart from him? [15] Solomon saith in his Proverbs; Even as the violence of waters, so is the kings heart in the hand of God. Undoubtedly

Pharaoh was a king, therefore he inclined his will unto what part he would.

[16] Nebuchadnezzar was a king, therefore he inclined his will unto which part he would. [17] In the 104th psalm, it is said of the Egyptians, that God turned their hearts, so as they hated the children of Israel: they seemed before to love the Israelites. [18] In the second epistle to the Thessalonians, the second chapter; Because men cast away the love of the truth, therefore

God sent them strong illusions, that they might give credit unto lies. It is written in the eleventh chapter of Joshua, that None made peace with the children of Israel, among all the nations of the Chanaanites, save only the Gabeonites. For God encouraged their heart to fight against the Israelites.

And it is added, unto what end; namely, that they should be weeded out by them. Assuredly, he did animate them, that they should not desire to have peace, but rather to have war. [19] Moreover, he that would an end, seemeth to will those things, which serve unto the end; and by the same will he would those means which crave an end. The physician, willing to heal a sick man, seeth that cutting, or searing, or else a bitter potion is fit, and even these he will use for recovery of health. When God would that a testimony unto the truth should be given by the martyrs, and that Christ should die, he also would those things that should procure this end; namely, the vexation of the saints, and cruelty of kings and people: for it behooved to attain unto that end by these kind of means. [20] In the prophets, especially in Isaiah,

kings are said to be in the hand of God, like rods, hammers, and axes; which comparisons have no place, if it were not understood, that God moveth the hearts: for they be not moved, unless they be driven forward.

[21] Also when God was displeased with the people of Israel, he stirred up the heart of David to number that people by the poll; which thing was wicked. It is to small purpose, if thou wilt say that in the book of Chronicles is read, that Satan provoked him: for Satan can do no more than God giveth him leave. Whether God did it by himself, or by Satan, thou seest that David was stirred up by the will of God, unto that which was not lawful.

They are wont to excuse this matter, that God permitteth, but not helpeth.

We say, it is not enough; for the offense is still left in our minds. [22] God as yet seemeth after some sort to will sin; he knoweth, that a man cannot stand by himself. If some blind man should walk before us, and we should see him ready either to stumble against a stone, or to fall into a ditch; and we are present, we may help him, but we will not, we suffer him to go on: now when he falleth, shall not we after some sort be said to be guilty of his fall? For thou wouldest have him fall, if thou diddest not stay him when thou mightest.

[23] And that which yet is more grievous; if so be that an old impotent man were leaning upon his staff, and so after a sort were going, and if some man should take away his staff whereunto he leaned, although he enforced him not to fall, should he not after some sort be called the author of the fall?

God taketh away his spirit from weak men, who without this be not able to go; doth he not after some sort seem to be the cause of their fall?

Wherefore, that which they bring, will be a weak defense, when they say that God forsaketh men. [24] While we would seem to excuse God, we lay as grievous things unto him; to wit, that he is no more a God; and while we

shun the smoke, we fall into the fire. If any things be done besides the will of God, whether he will or no; if there be any effects, whereof he is not the cause: he is not then the universal cause of all, nor yet God. But he compelleth not to fall; the excuse will not serve. [25] Admit there be some good man of the house, whose family behaveth itself very ill: if he be reproved, he will excuse himself, saying; I bad them not, I commanded them not: that excuse shall not be counted lawful; for he ought not to permit that which he could have hindered. Many times the good man of the house cannot let wicked acts, but the power of God is invincible. There be no wills so evil and corrupt, but he can amend and make them good. [26] Anselmus in his book De casu diaboli, the 91st chapter; Why (saith he) do we account it absurd, that God doth particular actions by a naughty will, seeing we know, that he maketh sundry substances, which are brought forth by a dishonest action? As when a child is procreated by adultery. [27] That adultery is evil, no man doubteth, but that child is the creature of God. This seemeth twice to be affirmed in the Acts of the apostles. In the second chapter Peter saith of Jesus the son of God; that The Jews had taken him, and delivered him to be slain by the determinate will and counsel of God.

Afterward in the fourth chapter, when the church gave thanks unto God, it prayeth on this wise; Against thy holy son Jesus, both Herod and Pontius

Pilate, with the gentiles and people of Israel, gathered themselves together, to do those things that thy hand and thy counsel had determined to be done.

With these arguments, whereunto others might be added, I will hold myself content.

5. Now that we have set down the reasons for each part, there remaineth that the question itself be expounded. I find three opinions; the first is to be detested, namely of the Libertines, which say, that God is all wholly the

cause of sin: and so say, as they affirm, all sins to be excusable, and not to be reproved, because they be the works of God: and if any fault should be, they would lay it upon God. This one thing they endeavor; namely, to take away from all men the feeling of sin. If any man have committed murder, it is not he (say they) that hath committed it, God hath done it. And unless that a man so think, they say, that he is imperfect, and cannot allow of all God's works. What can be more wickedly imagined? The devil could not have found out a readier way to hell. Let these men go to perdition, seeing we cannot mend them: let us pray unto God that he will take away these pestilent persons out of the church. The second opinion is of certain learned men, who mislike not that sense, which the scriptures appear to have at the first sight. They say, that God hardeneth, that he punisheth sins with sins; and finally, they grant him to be the cause of sin: but they add, that these actions, seeing they proceed from the very corrupt nature of men, so far forth as they be of God, have a respect to justice; and that men be not excused, because they be inclined unto these things: they lay not the blame unto God, who doth his part rightly. If (say they) it cannot be comprehended by reason, how he doth justly, and we unjustly; we must refer ourselves to the judgment of the scriptures. There be many other things, which by man's reason we cannot know, which nevertheless we do believe. The third opinion is of them, which interpret all these places of the scripture by the words; He suffered, He gave leave, He permitted, or according to the Greek; He did not hinder it, and such like. So they think that all dangers are avoided.

6. But what my judgment is, I will not be loath to declare; afterward your own selves shall judge. And that the matter may be the more easily known, it shall be good to examine it the more deeply: and somewhat I will say, of

Evil, under which general word, sin is contained. Evil is a certain privation, of good I mean; yet not of every good, but of such a good thing as is requisite for the perfection of every creature, which I say belongeth to the perfection of the thing despoiled. For if we take away sight from a stone, it shall have no hurt: for that quality of nature is not meet for it. Evil being a privation, cannot consist without good: for it must have a subject. A subject seeing it is a substance, is a good thing; wherefore evil cannot be but in good: even as blindness is a privation of sight, it hangeth not in the air, but it sticketh in the eye. So may it be showed by many other examples. But not to depart from that which we have in hand; sin itself depriveth man's action of dutifulness and obedience towards the word of God. These things ought to be in action; but when we sin, action is bereft of those good things. And action, seeing it is a certain thing, it is in his own nature good; wherefore evil cannot be but in good. Moreover, evil is not desired for itself, but men do sin in consideration of good; for unless there appeared some likeness of good, they would not depart from goodness. So great therefore is the power of good, as evil cannot be except in good, and unto good. Wherefore rightly have the wise men said, that we may grant, there is the chiefest good; but not affirm that there is the chiefest evil, which can deprive good altogether: for then it should destroy it self. It might have no subject wherein it should be, nor yet outward show, whereby it should be desired. To speak now of evil; it is distinguished into punishment, and fault. Fault is called that which we commit against the law of God; punishment is that which is laid upon us for sin: and that also hath a privation of some commodity; as when God sendeth sickness, sickness is the privation of health, and hath place in the body of a living creature. He sendeth famine and bareness, which is the privation of fertility; and it is in the earth itself: this (I say) belongeth unto

punishment. But sin taketh place in the mind only: punishments doubtless may both be in the mind, and in the body. There is added a third member, which is so a punishment, as it is also sin: as original sin is, so is the natural corruption left after baptism. These things thus concluded, I put forth a certain sentence or proposition to be confirmed, the which hath two parts.

The first is, that God is not by himself and properly the cause of sin. The second is, that there is nothing done in the world, no not sins themselves, without his will, determination, and providence.

7. To prove the question, it behooveth to confirm it as touching both parts.

Let us speak of the first; that God by himself is not the cause of sin. Unto this purpose serve the arguments in the first place. But I add, that when good or evil are opposed, as Habit and Privation; the habit by itself doth never bring in privation. Light itself doth always illuminate, it never bringeth in darkness. Wherefore if we put good and evil as contrary privatives, evil shall not be of good. God is the chiefest good, let us then put him to be the habit: wherefore by himself and properly, he maketh no privation. But I said that he is not the cause of sin by himself and properly.

These words I have added, because, if we will speak less properly, he may be said after some sort to be either the beginning, or the cause of sin: not indeed the proper cause; but that cause, which of the philosophers is called removing or prohibiting. I will make the matter plain by similitudes. The sun is altogether bright, the proper effect thereof is to make light; yet after some manner it may be said to make darkness, not in that it shineth, but in that it is moved, and departeth from one place to another. For bodies be round, therefore when it departeth, it cannot always by reason of the motion, give light to that place from whence it went, but shadows do come

between: so then after some sort it is said to make darkness by the departure thereof; because bodies are so ordered, and it self is moved.

So likewise it happeneth as touching some ruinous house; it is held up by a prop, some man approaching removeth the prop, the stones and buildings through their own weight fall down from the top; which things have in themselves the causes of their coming down: yet notwithstanding, he which taketh away the prop, is said after a sort to cause the fall: for he removeth the stay which letted the ruin. In like manner God, in his own nature is good, yet in respect that he is just, he will punish sinners; he taketh away his grace, and after some sort may be called the cause of those things which afterward be naughtily done; yet not the true cause: for that proper cause is inward, that is to wit, the naughty will of them. But why he sometimes taketh away his spirit from men, a reason may be yielded; when they sin, he removeth his grace from them, not only to the intent he may punish, but that the excellency of his favor may be known: and to let us understand, that that which God giveth, he giveth it freely, and that it is not of nature. For if we should always have [his grace] and after one and the self-same manner, as if God would not at some time stack his strength, we would attribute unto our own power the good things that we do. But thus it is, to the intent we may acknowledge our own infirmity, and pray the more fervently for preservation and increase of the heavenly gift. But when the grace and favor of God is justly taken away from us, sin doth naturally follow: neither is there need of any other efficient cause; I mean, there needeth no other cause, to come from our infected and corrupt affections.

This appeareth by the similitudes alleged, if the sun be removed, darkness doth follow; not through any efficient cause, but by itself. If the habit be removed, privation is straightway present of his own accord. If one so

hurteth his eye, as the sight be lost; blindness doth immediately follow: neither is it needful to seek any other thing that worketh. Which seeing the Manichees perceived not, they erred most shamefully: they would not attribute the cause of evil unto the good God; but they saw that there were many evils, and they judged that evils could not be without a true cause: whereupon they affirmed that there be two beginnings. And because they saw a great power to be both in evil, and in good, they brought in two gods; one good, and another bad. Of these we read much in Augustine. But that evil, which is sin, cometh, if the spirit of God be taken away: for then man is left unto himself. But whether is he so left, as God doth no more anything concerning him, or his sin? That this may be understood, I will declare three sorts of working, which we may perceive in God towards his creatures: not that other works of his cannot be showed, but because these three do most of all serve unto the matter we have in hand.

8. Some action of God is general, seeing by his providence he cherisheth, sustaineth, and governeth all things in their conditions, qualities, and inclinations, as they stood at the beginning when they were created. And thus is the order of nature preserved; which thing is excellent to be known.

We see that heaven retaineth his own nature: surly it hath many things to be marveled at. We see that the nature of fire is vehement, of air is pleasant, of water is flowing: we see also the metals, the trees, the works of artificers, which things assuredly be wonderful. All these are governed by God; yea, and if he should withdraw his hand from them, they would fall to nothing.

Profitable doubtless is the consideration of his divine government.

Oftentimes doth God exhort us in the psalms, to magnify him for these works. In the first to the Romans it is written, that The Gentiles by these creatures did know God, and a kind of his everlasting force, working,

government, and godhead, in such sort, as Aratus said; We are in very deed the linage of God. We have an excellent example of this work in our selves.

The soul which is not seen, is indivisible, yet it moveth and quickeneth the whole body. Even so all creatures do retain their properties and inclinations.

9. Secondly, another work of God is, whereby the creatures are not only preserved and ruled, but do also obey the counsels of God. For God useth the actions of all things, even of men, and of evil men: he useth them (I say) for the establishment of his purposes. When he favoreth his own, he giveth them plentiful increase of fruits; the rain falleth early and late. But if he will of his justice punish the wicked, nothing cometh well to pass; there is given a heaven of brass, and an earth of iron: if the fruits be ripe, they perish in one night. These things must not be ascribed unto fortune. When we know not the cause, we take it to be fortune; whereupon the poet saith,

A goddess Fortune we thee call, And place thee high in heavenly stall.

Wherefore we must not occupy ourselves alonely in a general consideration of things of the world, but we must weigh the use wherein they serve the providence of God; whereas sin cometh of proper causes, I mean of our own will, and corrupt affections, yet doth the same serve God also. A similitude; There be many poisons in the world, they have many and dangerous qualities; yet the physician occupieth them, and the magistrate rightly useth them. The physician by tempering of the poisons, healeth the sick: the magistrate at Athens gave poison for the taking away of such as were guilty. So was Socrates compelled to drink hemlock. Although therefore poisons are evil, yet may the magistrate and the physician use them well for the safety of the common-wealth, and preservation of the sick. Even so God ruleth sins (which have their proper causes corrupted) for

the performing and bringing forth of his counsels to act. I might also use another similitude; Those things which seem to be done of us by chance in the world, do most of all serve the providence of God. For the Lord saith in the law, Exodus 21, and Deut. 19. If two shall go together into the grove to hew wood, and the axe flieth out of one of their hands, and he is smitten therewith that stood next him, and is slain: this he did unwittingly, he shall not be guilty of death. For God delivered him [thereunto] and that for just causes delivered he him of a determinate purpose; we understand it not, he knoweth it. Even so they which offend, indeed they do as they would, they have determined with themselves what they will do: but yet God useth these actions. So by the curse of Semei, God would have the patience of David to be thoroughly known unto all men, and would open his judgments against his adultery and murder: but this man meant to show his hatred against David. God doth that which he will, as touching those crimes which men of another purpose committed; not to the intent they might obey the will of God, but their own corrupt lusts.

And to return to the testimony now alleged. He that heweth wood, this he would do, but the axe hitteth another man, and the hitting serveth the counsel of God. Jerome upon the twelfth chapter of Jeremiah writeth, that Nothing happeneth rashly and without providence, whether it be good or evil; but that all things come to pass by the judgment of God. Wherefore creatures be certain instruments in the hand of God; he useth them according to his own purpose. But yet these instruments be not all after one sort; for some there be which have no knowledge, nor sense, nor will, and yet nevertheless they do service unto God. But there be others, which perceive, understand, and will those things which they do, and yet they do it not always of purpose to serve God: yea rather they oftentimes unwillingly

and unwittingly do that which God appointeth. Wherefore we will say, that as well living creatures, as not living creatures; things having sense, and having no sense; Angels good and bad, and generally all creatures be the instruments of God, which he useth according to the consideration of his providence. He did use the Assyrians, Chaldeans, Persians, Greeks and Romans, for punishment of the wicked Hebrews: he did use also the devil against Saul and against Job. But it is further to be considered, that when

God useth creatures, especially the reasonable creatures, and evil creatures, such as be evil men and devils; he doth not so use them, as though they did nothing themselves; for even they themselves fulfill their own naughtiness, but God useth it [to purpose.] God dealeth not with these as with stones, which have no sense at all; they will, they know, and they have sense: and when wicked men, and the devil do naughtily, and are moved by their own proper lust, they do service unto the providence of God. They perceive doubtless, and will, not that their mind is such as they would serve God, for they seek their own. Neither are they so moved by the superior cause, as they use not withal their own naughtiness.

10. But thou wilt say, that If God after this manner, have recourse as the chiefest cause unto these actions, and that evil men as the next causes do them, it shall be all one work of God, of the devil, and of naughty men. This indeed must not be denied; but yet this work cometh far otherwise from the superior good cause, then from the next cause which is corrupt. This work, as it is of the devil, and of wicked men, is evil. It draweth infection from the wickedness of the devil, and of naughty men; which being evil trees, cannot bring forth good fruit. But God, the very best, and chiefest cause, as he concurreth with these actions, doth them rightly and in due order. Even as both God and the devil would Jerusalem to be destroyed, but yet in sundry

respects; God, to the intent he might punish the obstinate; the devil, that he might fulfill his cruel hatred against mankind. Christ was to be delivered unto the cross, which also was done; and this work, as it proceeded from the hatred and malice of the Jews, was evil: but the self-same, in as much as God, through that most holy action, would have mercy upon mankind, had goodness. Wherefore it is said in the Acts of the apostles; that They did those things against the Son of God, which his counsel and hand had determined. Yet must those things which they did against Christ, merely be called evil; because they have both their name and nature from the next cause, although that God rightly used them according to his own providence. The devil and God exercise Job in a far sundry respect; also the Sabees, and other robbers spoiled his substance for the satisfying of their own hatred: so did the devil. But God did it to prove his patience, and to testify his good will towards the godly, by a joyful deliverance. Wherefore the works were all one, but the purposes were diverse. For which cause, when Job said (The Lord hath given, and the Lord hath taken away) he praiseth God, as the chiefest cause, without whose providence these things were not done, and whose providence used all things to a good end; yet doth he not praise the robbers, and the devil. So did David also behave himself; he commended not Semei, he said not that those cursing's were of their own nature good: but turned himself to the providence of God. The work was wicked, yet in some respect it may be called the work of God; because he ruled it and used it. Also it is said in the prophet; Cursed be he that doth the work of the Lord negligently: and the work of the Lord he calleth the affliction of the people, whereby the wicked overpressed them.

Wherefore, the wicked cannot excuse their sins, in respect of this use of God: for they have the cause of those sins in themselves. And even as God's

good use of these things excuseth not sinners, so on the other part, the naughtiness of sinners doth not contaminate the good use and providence of God, who can exceedingly well use the things which be done amiss.

Augustine in his Enchiridion ad Laurentium, chapter 101 declareth, that It may be, that God and man would one and the same thing; and that God in so willing, doth rightly; but that man doth sin, although he will those things which God willeth. He bringeth an example. The father of a wicked son sickeneth, the will of God by his just judgment is, that he should die of that disease, the ungracious child also would the same; but to the intent he may the sooner come unto the inheritance, and be free from the power of his father: God willeth justly, but the child ungodly. And on the other side (he saith) that It may be, that a man would the thing that God would not, and yet that as well he as God willeth rightly. Admit that the father, which is sick, have a good child; God would that the father should die: the child thorough an honest affection would it not, for he is desirous to have his father live; they will diversely, and yet they both will justly. It consisteth only in the purpose of the will; for thereof dependeth oftentimes goodness and naughtiness. But there ariseth a doubt; If that one manner of work depend both on God and man, and that it draw naughtiness from the infection of man, and that it hath some goodness, in respect that God useth it, so as nothing may escape God or his providence, wherefor doth

Zechariah in the first chapter complain; I was but a little angry with my people, but they helped forward unto evil; that is, they passed the bounds.

That which they sin, seemeth to exceed the providence of God; so as they did more than God had decreed. We answer, that It must not be understood, that they did more, than that thing might serve to the use of God's providence: for there can be nothing at all done besides the will of God and

his decrees, which be most firm. Augustine in the same Enchiridion ad Laurentium, 102nd chapter, saith; The will of God is invincible, how then are they said to have exceeded? Not the bounds of the eternal decree, but the just measure of victory. There be certain bounds, limits, and laws, which ought to be kept by conquerors. They exceeded that which became them, but that they could do more than providence would use, it must in no wise be granted.

11. The third kind of the works of God we call that which is proper unto the saints; for thereby he most mercifully bringeth many things to pass in them: for he reigneth, he liveth, and he worketh in us both to will and to perform. Otherwise in nature we be certain barren trees, we are blind, we will no good things. The judgment is corrupted, the will and choice is corrupt in those dregs of original sin: but God, by his spirit, fashioneth his chosen anew. We have from the beginning a nature given according to the similitude of God, whereunto should be agreeable, to will, to choose, to do these things and those things. But in that we cannot do good of ourselves, it hath proceeded of corruption: but in that we will rightly, and do serve God by an obedience begun, it is of the supernatural grace of God. Wherefore the first kind of God's works, which belongeth to the universal providence, serveth not to the question now in hand. The second kind of working and the third belong unto this.

12. Although therefore that God do govern even sins and evils; yet he is not properly said to be the efficient cause. Augustine in his twelfth book De civitate Dei, the seventh chapter, speaketh very well as concerning a naughty will, when he saith; An evil thing hath no efficient, but a deficient cause. And if any will search out this efficient cause, it is even like as if he would see the darkness with his eyes, or comprehend silence with his ears:

which being privations, it is no need that they should have efficient causes.

Yet nevertheless, they be things known unto us; for there is all one sense of things that be contrary. The sight seeth not other than bright things, the ear heareth not other than noises, and yet by these senses we know even these things; not by the use of them, but by the privation only. A naughty will doth God use, to the ends appointed: not because he is not able, unless it be by these means, to attain to that which he will; but so it pleased him to declare his wisdom and power, that he might show himself able to do something mediately [as they say] and immediately: and that it maketh no matter unto him, whether the instruments that he useth be good or bad.

Wherefore let us seek out what is the deficient cause of evil actions, and among the rest we shall find wicked affections and inclinations, which seeing they fall away from the word of God, and from right reason, it is no marvel if things that be faulty, proceed there-from. These be the inward causes of sin, but they be rather deficient than efficient causes. The devil also is said to be the cause of sin: for we read in the book of wisdom; By the devil death entered into the world, therefore sin also: for death is the effect of sin. But yet the devil cannot be called the proper and absolute cause of our sin: the reason is; for that such is the nature of every proper and perfect cause, that the same being put, the effect doth of necessity follow. But in the devil it is not thus; for although he sometime suggest evil things in the mind of the godly, yet nevertheless sin doth not always follow.

For many godly men do valiantly resist him, and when sin followeth not, he cannot be called the absolute and perfect cause thereof. In deed, he provoketh men, but yet not so, that sin must of necessity follow.

I might bring another reason. Let us imagine that the devil himself had not revolted from God, and that man had been created, man could yet of his

own nature have sinned, and have had the cause of sin in himself: but the suggestion of the devil could not have been the cause thereof, when he was not as yet alienated from God: so that he is no perfect nor full cause of sin, but a persuading and alluring cause. We have therefore showed from whence sin hath his deficient cause; namely, from our own corruption. Yet nevertheless God doth govern and rule sin itself; he doth not idly look on, but he doth the part of a judge and governor: and he leaveth not all things without guiding. But after what sort is he said to govern sin? Even as touching time, manner, form, and matter; to wit, that it is carried sometimes rather against this man, and sometimes rather against that man. Our corruptions lie hidden within us, but God suffereth not the same at all times to break forth, nor yet so long as the wicked would: he bridleth sins, and sometimes interrupteth them. Further, he bringeth to pass, that our wickedness shall rather bend unto one part, than unto another; as the rage of Semei was more bent against David, than against another man. And the providence of God is showed rather at one time than at another; God directed the power of Nebuchadnezzar rather against the Hebrews, than against their neighbors.

13. There is also a certain other thing to be considered of in sins, when they break forth into act. God himself putteth us in mind of some things, which in their own nature be good: and yet because such things fall into the wicked, they be taken in ill part, and be occasions of sinning; so as the sins which lay hidden before, do break forth. But yet these suggestions, either inward or outward, cannot be properly called the causes of sin, seeing those causes be within in men: yet may they be called occasions. But of occasions, some be given, and some taken; in like manner as they distinguish Scandalum, that is, an offense. An offense taken, is the occasion

of an offense, not on the behalf of him that giveth it; for he doth that which is profitable, but an ill man doth ill interpret this: that is, an offense taken.

So Christ saith of the Scribes and Pharisees; Let them alone, they be blind, and leaders of the blind. The apostle taught, that men ought to do well; if others were offended, the fault remained not in them. An offense given, is when we do those things which we ought not to do. But in God it is not so; he suggesteth some things, that of their own nature are good, the which falling into an evil nature, become occasions of sinning.

14. The matter must be made plain by examples. Some godly man seeth a man sin, he cometh to him, he diligently warneth him to beware: that which is put in mind is good, but it happeneth into a naughty mind, which then beginneth more and more to break forth into the hatred of virtue, and to wax cruel against the godly. This admonition was an occasion that these things should break out into act; God suggested by the godly man that which in nature is good, wherefore he is said to do rightly, for he doth that which was his part to do. But unto evil men, good things are made occasions of sinning, yea and of more grievous sinning, than if perhaps they had not been ministered. Howbeit this is the difference between God and us; that we, while we suggest good things, are ignorant whether the party will become the worse; but God is not ignorant. For example; God sent Moses and Aaron unto Pharaoh, he commandeth that he should let his people go: this suggestion in his own nature being good, Pharaoh taketh in ill part, and began to be the more cruel. If this suggestion had fallen into a godly man, he would have said; It is meet I should obey God: and because it is his will that I should let the people go, I will in any wise do it; for I can challenge no right over them longer than he will himself. But Pharaoh, when he heard these words, began to blaspheme, saying; Who is this God? And he brake

out into cruelty. The same will we declare by other examples and testimonies of the scriptures. Not only that admonition given unto Pharaoh by Moses and Aaron is a good thing, and is applied outwardly by God; and he which was evil, used the same naughtily: but we have the self-same thing in the seventh chapter to the Romans; The law is holy and spiritual, but it hath wrought in me concupiscence and death. The commandment of God in his own nature is unto life, but the filthiness [of sin] taketh an occasion by those things which are suggested. Neither is this done outwardly alone, but sometimes also God worketh it inwardly by good cogitations: for whatsoever things are good, we must always think that they be of God. Pharaoh, which came after the death of Joseph, began to cast thus in his mind; We must take heed that the common-weal suffer no detriment. This cogitation was good, and it proceeded from God; but it lighted into an evil mind, therefore it was wrested against the Hebrews: for he said; The people of the Hebrews will increase, and when occasion is offered, will subdue us: wherefore let them be destroyed. He set forth an edict, that all the men children of the Hebrews should be thrown into the river. The first cogitation was good, but through his naughtiness it turned unto evil. Nebuchadnezzar said; It is not the part of a good prince to be idle, but he must exercise the power which he hath. The cogitation was good, but he turned himself unto foreign nations, and armed not his power as he ought to have done, against the wickedness of his own people. The same prince

(as we read in Daniel) being in his hall, reckoned with himself the victories which he had, and the greatness of empire which he had gotten. These thoughts were good; for we should weigh with ourselves the benefits of God, but they lighted into an evil mind: he straightway thought with himself, that he had established the kingdom by his own power: therein he

sinned against God. Also the sons of Jacob weighed with themselves, that Joseph was beloved of his parents, that he had divine dreams put into him by God; this was a good thought, for we must behold the works of God even in others, much more in our own selves. If they had rightly used that cogitation, they should have given thanks to God, but they turned it to envy, they devised how to rid him away, and to sell him. Undoubtedly God, who suggesteth these good things, seeing he knoweth of the doing of them, he doth not there let the occasions of evils: he suffereth them to be done; for he is at hand with his providence, and governeth them. Wherefore by Pharaoh he would be glorified, by Nebuchadnezzar he would punish the Israelites, by the brothers selling of Joseph, he would have him to be honored with great benefits in Egypt, and to feed the household of Jacob. Semei saw

David to be cast forth, and the kingdom to be given unto Absalom: he said; These be the judgments of God. That cogitation was good, it fell into an evil mind, he abused the same, he spake contumeliously against David, he followed his own wrath and revenge. Absalom having gotten the kingdom, was put in mind that he should hearken unto the counsel of the wise, that many eyes do see more than one eye. The cogitation was good, but it fell into an ill mind; and he judged that counsels, so they be profitable, though otherwise they be wicked and dishonest, should be harkened unto. The first suggestion that was good, he used naughtily: God suffered it, he would not let it, he ruled it, that the sin of David might be punished, and that the hatred of God towards sin might be showed. Now I think that the matter is evident.

15. But it is demanded, that Seeing God knoweth that wicked men will abuse these inward and outward motions, although they be good, wherefore doth he suggest them? The reasons of his own counsels are known to

himself; but yet two reasons are set before us. The first is, that his justice may appear the more: for to behold the justice of God we are blind. But by making comparison it is known; namely, by unrighteousness, whereof in God there can be none seen: but in devils and corrupt men we see it. The second is, that the boldness of men may be restrained: for many would say;

If God should put into our mind's good cogitations, we should have a will and power to do good things. Behold, good cogitations are given, the which, while they fall into a corrupt nature, except it be restrained, sin

(through our own fault) doth arise even of things be they never so good: of occasions (I mean) taken, but not given. And so I understand the words, which Augustine hath in his book of Grace and Free-will; namely, that God doth sometime incline our wills, either unto good or unto evil; because if the things, which he suggesteth, do light upon good men, they are inclined unto good; but if they fall into ill men, they are inclined unto evil. And so I understand that which he writeth against Julianus the fifth book, and 3rd chapter; that God worketh not only in the bodies of men, but also in their minds. So likewise I understand those things which Zwingli (of godly memory) a learned and constant man, did sometimes write; that Men are other whiles by God's providence provoked to sin: and that one and the self-same action cometh both from God, and from wicked men; justly from him, and unjustly from them. And thus I understand those places of the scriptures, wherein it is said, that God gave them up to a reprobate sense, that He stirred them up.

16. Certainly a permission is there, but something that is more ample is showed by these effectual speeches. And we grant, that there is a permission; for if God would resist, these things should not be done: therefore he permitteth; howbeit we must understand, that permission is a

certain kind of will. In deed it is not the efficient will, but yet it is a kind of will. For as Augustine saith in his Enchiridion ad Laurentium; God permitteth either willingly or unwillingly: doubtless unwillingly he doth not, for that should be with grief, and there should be a power greater than himself: if it be with his will, he permitteth; permission is a certain kind of will. But thou demandest, that If he will it any way, wherefore doth he forbid it? On the other part I would demand; If he would it not at all, how cometh it to pass that it is done? For the will of God is invincible. Paul saith; Who can resist his will? God willeth, and that which he willeth, he willeth justly. They which sin, do will unjustly that which they will. That same Julianus, against whom Augustine disputeth, held, that there was a bare permission in those things; to the intent we might understand, that God doth nothing at all: and he said, that God doth rather suffer, and that this belongeth to his patience. Augustine answereth; Not only to his patience, but also to his power: because he ruleth sin, and thereof he worketh what he will. And he alledgeth a place unto the Romans; If God, willing to show his wrath, and make his power manifest, did suffer with great lenity the vessels of wrath, &c. Hereby indeed we see, that he suffereth; but that mention is also made of his power. In the first epistle of Peter the fourth chapter, it is written; Wherefore let them that suffer, according to the will of God, commit their souls unto him. So that he attributeth the afflictions of the Christians to the will of God. But they cannot suffer, unless there be a doer.

If he would the suffering, he would the doing: for suffering proceedeth from a doer. This will is a permission, but yet such as belongeth also unto the will.

This did Augustine show in his Enchiridion ad Laurentium, the 100th chapter, where he treateth upon that place of the psalm; Great are the works

of God, searched out upon all the wills of them. He followeth the Greek translation. The Hebrew text hath, Unto all the will of them. He writeth; that So far as belonged to them, (he entreateth of sinners) they did that which God would not. This could they not by any means bring to pass, as touching his power: for even in this, that they did against his will, his will was wrought upon them; therefore great are the works of the Lord. He addeth, that by a marvelous and unspeakable means, even that which is done against his will, is not done without his will: for unless he suffered it, it should not be. Neither doth he suffer it unwillingly, but willingly: neither would he, being good, suffer ill to be done; but that he being almighty, of that evil, can make good. The will of God concurreth both to good things, and to evil; but after a sundry manner: to evils, indirectly: he suffereth them to be done. He suggesteth good things, but because they happen into evil men, sins do ensue. But as for the good things, he not only suggesteth them, but he bringeth them to pass. Yet he ruleth and governeth sin also, that it may not rage against every man, neither at all times, nor beyond measure.

Those evils lurk within us, but when they break forth, they cannot escape the providence of God. But good things (as I have said) he not only letteth not, but he bringeth them to effect, he worketh together with us, and he sweetly bendeth our will, that we may be glad to do those things that did mislike us.

Wherefore the respect of general providence is one; the respect of using of things, though evil, is another; and the respect of things, which he doth in us that be regenerate, is another. So understand I, that Pharaoh was hardened by God, and that also he hardened himself: for he had in himself the cause of obduration. But God is said to have hardened, by reason of suggesting and governing: further, because he so ruled sin, and used the

same to his own glory. And Paul saith, that he raised him up for to declare his power. So understand I the vessels of wrath to be prepared unto destruction. By what means? They be of themselves, of their own naughtiness, of their own corrupt nature prone unto sin. In like manner it may be said, that they after a sort are prepared by God; because through his good suggestions, wickedness breaketh forth: and while it breaketh forth, it is yet in the hand of God to apply the same as he will, one way or another; for God with a good will doth that, which we do with a most perverse mind.

Permission is a kind of will, but yet not absolutely: for the will of God properly is the cause of things. It is not as man's will is, we will many things, which we bring not to pass. What is then the cause why God would not have sin? It is, for that sin is among those things which have no need of a cause efficient, but of a deficient cause. Therefore sin doth not properly come under the will of God. And if that God be put as the cause, not efficient but deficient, shall we say that God doth fail in himself? No; but he is said to fail, because he doth not hinder, nor resist, nor cause to relent.

What manner of will shall this be? A will not to hinder, a will not to mollify, a will not to illuminate.

17. Neither for all this, doth God, either by suggesting anything, or by not letting, constrain the will; neither can the devil do this. For if the will should not work of his own accord, it were no will; but rather an unwillingness. It may as ill be ascribed unto the will to be compelled, as to the fire that it should not be hot. Wherefore our nature and will being so corrupt, if the favor of God be withdrawn; of his own accord, and by itself, it inclineth to evil. The which nevertheless, from the time of his beginning was not evil: but because it is brought forth of nothing, and is confirmed and sustained by the grace and power of God; if that be withdrawn which

confirmeth it, straightway it will to worse of his own accord. But if man's will be not constrained to evil, neither is evil of his own creation, but only is said to sin by depravation; what shall we say as touching the sin of the first man? In him nature was good, grace and the help of God was not wanting, and yet nevertheless he sinned. Here we say, that we must judge one thing, as concerning the first man; and another as touching our nature, which we have now corrupted. God bestowed upon him many gifts, but yet he so made him, as he might stand; he might also fall. No doubt but God, if he would, might have made him so perfect, as he could not have sinned. Which the state of the blessed saints doth declare; for the holy spirits in the heavenly habitation, and we when we shall be there, shall be so confirmed, as we shall not be able to sin anymore: otherwise it would be no perfect felicity; it should be joined with a fear of falling. But yet he did not this unto Adam; and whereas by his prescience or foreknowledge he knew that he would fall, he might have kept him there-from; but he would not, but would suffer him to fall, and by his eternal decree had Christ to be the remedy of his fall. The rest of the things concerning that state, we cannot more particularly declare, because we have not the perfect knowledge thereof. Let us return to our own state; the which is such, as before the renewing by Christ, we were not able to will any good thing, but of necessity to lie in sins, neither might we lift up our selves: so far is it off, that we should be able to stand upright, as it was granted unto the first

Adam.

But although God, as we said, is not properly the cause of sin; yet must he not be drawn out of his throne, but that he also ruleth sins, and maketh a remedy for them. And this we may be assured with our selves, that there can be nothing done either of us, or of any creature, besides the will of God.

But yet let us not hereby excuse our sins, as though we would obey the will of God by committing of sin. We must accuse ourselves, seeing we have the originals of sin in us. As concerning the will of God, we must follow that which the scripture teacheth; and we must not depart from his law. And when we otherwhile depart from him, we must weigh with our selves, that the motion of turning away from God, and of the inclination to allurements of this world, is a thing proper unto our will being now corrupted, not as it was instituted by God. Wherefore there be deficient causes of this motion; but an efficient cause which hath God a worker together with us, we must not seek. Whereupon we note in the book of Genesis, that it is not said that darkness was made of God; The darkness (saith he) were upon the face of the deep, yet God did so order them, as they should prevail by night: they were privations. So this motion of turning away from God, seeing it forsaketh, and depriveth men's actions of convenient goodness, a cause surly it hath, but the same is deficient.

18. These things being declared, there remain three things to be spoken of: the first shall be of the guiltiness of sins, or bond unto punishment: the second of the subject of deformity and privation; that is, of the act itself of man's will: the third is (which also is commonly received) that sin is the punishment of sin; and whether under these three considerations it may be said, that sin dependeth on God. As for the first, we must understand, that the deformed and naughty act, is in some respect the groundwork unto the punishment that is due; for The reward of sin (saith the Apostle) is death: and when we sin, there groweth a bond, whereby we must suffer punishment for the wickedness committed. That guiltiness is said to arise through the justice of God, in consideration that he will yield to everyone that which belongeth unto him: but the bond ariseth not, except that sin be

or have been; so as by sinning we give a just occasion of the bond unto punishment. Wherefore, if by sin we understand the guiltiness and the bond, we doubt not but these things are of God, as of the efficient cause. Howbeit, these things ought not properly to be called sin, seeing they belong unto justice, yet sometimes they are so called; as when we say, that God doth remit, blot out, and forgive our sins: for he bringeth not to pass that they be not, nor have not been (and undoubtedly there remain evil motions in us) but the bond of suffering punishment, for the wickedness committed, is taken away, which (as we have said) belongeth unto justice, and is a good thing.

19. Secondly, let us consider of the subject itself, unto which the deformity of sin doth cleave; and of this, if we speak as the thing is, we shall not be afraid to say, that God is the cause, seeing the action itself is a certain natural thing. And whatsoever is, in respect that it hath a being, is brought forth, not by creatures alone, but by God: for All things (saith the scripture) were made by him. This universal particle comprehendeth all things, whatsoever they be, by what means so ever they be, and how far forth so ever they be. Augustine in his book De moribus monachorum, about the beginning saith; that The catholic church believeth, that God is the author of all natures and substances. What he understandeth by nature, he declared a little before, by these words; Nature is nothing else, but that which is understood to be some certain thing in his kind. Wherefore as we now, by a new name, of that which is Esse, to be, do call essence, which many times also we name substance; so they in old time, which had not those names, instead of essence and substance, called it nature. Seeing therefore the motions of our minds be certain things, there is no doubt but after this manner they depend of God. God assuredly worketh as the highest

cause; the creatures work together with him. Wherefore Anshelmus in his book De casu diaboli, wrote, that Even the evil willing of the devil, so far forth as it is to will, dependeth on God. And the thing itself is not wicked, but in respect that he himself doth naughtily will it. And that the same act is something, hereby it appeareth; because it is in the general word or predicament of action: wherefore as it is something, it is of God, and is a creature. Yea and Augustine in his ninth book De trinitate, and tenth chapter, said, that The accidents of the mind are better than the accidents of the body; by reason of the worthiness of the subject. Wherefore the form or beauty, as it is in the mind, is more excellent, than as it is outwardly found in the body. Also the soul itself, being a soul, how ill soever it be, is yet more noble than any body. Seeing therefore the deeds of the mind

(whereunto afterward, through our own fault, there cleaveth privation) so farforth as they be things, are not brought forth without God.

Anshelmus in the place above cited, saith, that God himself is the bringer forth of things, and that not alonely of substantial things, but also of accidental, universal, and particular things, yea, and of the evil motions of the will: for the power of God is infinite. Wherefore there is nothing can be brought forth whatsoever it be, but is under his action; for if anything could escape the same, then should it not be infinite, then should it not fill all things? Neither might our will break out into act, unless that high supreme will wrought together with us. Augustine in his treatise De vera religione, the 34th chapter, writeth thus; that The very being itself, be it never so little, is good; for the chiefest being, is the chiefest good. And a little after he saith; The chiefest beauty is the chiefest good, the least beauty is the least good, yet is it good. So as, if that action, which we speak of, do by any means pertain to the being, it is of some goodness. Wherefore, if we dispute

of sin, we must distinguish it, and we must see what is therein of the positive, as they reason in the schools: and the first subject itself must be considered; and on the other part, to see what defect and privation cleaveth thereunto. But in the very same privation, since we see a defect, the deficient cause thereof must be sought, and not the efficient cause. But that which is there found positive, hath need of an efficient cause; and the sum of all efficient causes is God.

20. But here ariseth no small doubt. There be certain sins, called sins of omission [or negligence,] and there seemeth not to be grounded the very act and work of will, whereunto either defect or privation should cleave; howbeit whatsoever is there, it seemeth to be privation. A man is said to omit his duty, because he doth not that which he ought to do. As for example; If a man love not his neighbor, if one come not to the congregation to hear the word of the Lord, and to participate the sacraments; here in this sin, there seemeth only a privation to be, without any certain act, whereupon this should be grounded. Some answer, that even in this place also, we are to seek a nature or action, a work or a thing, that is the groundwork unto privation: and they say, that it is the will which maketh defect. For even that same sinning will, as it is a nature, is kept in his order by God; but not in respect that it sinneth. This saying may be borne withal. But in searching the matter more narrowly, it seemeth otherwise unto me; and I see even in those sins of omission, that there is an act. For the same omitting of our duty, is sometimes done by contemplation; and then that corrupt person hath a will not to love his neighbor, hath a will not to go to the holy assembly.

Wherefore we see here, that the act of will, and that same action thereof, which is the action of nature, doth depend of God; deformity and privation

doth not so. But sometime they be omitted, because a man doth not think of those things, I mean not, of a contempt. Here, say I, that although there be no action there of that kind, yet is there another, which contendeth with right reason. He is not mindful of the holy congregation, because he will walk about for his pleasure, or else use some pastime; and those actions be adversaries to right working. Or if that be no action at that instant, yet was it a little before. For example; Overnight he would feed like a glutton, afterward he could not rise early to be present in the holy congregation.

Wherefore in the sins of omission, we shall find an action, either proper to that kind; or else another striving with the good motion of the will, either which is then presently retained, or else that went before.

21. God then is the cause of all things; and inferior things, according to their own nature, receive the moving of the first cause. Wherefore, if sin be drawn, it is drawn by the nature of the second causes. I will make the matter plain by a similitude; In living creatures we have that power which hath his name local motion, and it moveth beasts either to walk or to run; and those creatures are moved according as they receive their moving from that local motive power: but if a leg be defective, be out of joint, or crooked, that motion hath halting in that course joined therewith; but that halting, as it is a moving, cometh from the moving power of the soul; as it is faulty and lame, it dependeth of the faultiness of the leg which was broken. And thus it is as touching that continual moving, wherewith God stirreth his creatures.

There is indeed a common influence, and it is received in things according to the quality of them: so the subject of deformity or privation is of God; and the moving of God sometime passeth through the mind corrupted, whereupon the fault of the action is not of God, but is drawn from the next cause. But what it is that God there doth, and how he governeth that

deformity, is declared before: now we treat of the act which breaketh forth from our will. Wherefore it is rightly said, that the privation of righteousness followeth not the work of our will, and the motion thereof, so far forth as it is in the kind of nature, but as it is in the kind of moving.

Augustine in his seventh book De civitate Dei, the 30th chapter saith; that God doth so govern his creatures, as he permitteth them to exercise and work together with him their own proper motions. For God dealeth not alone, but (as I said before) the wicked men, and the devil also do use their naughty endeavor in working. But when we say, that the act itself (which afterward through our own fault is evil) is brought forth by the chiefest cause, that is by God; and by us, that is, by our will: how shall we understand this? Whether that God do it wholly, or we wholly? Or whether it be partly from him, and partly from us? And here we draw this producement to the very act of our will. We answer; If consideration of the whole be referred unto the cause, we must speak after one sort; if it be referred unto the effect, after another sort. If the whole be referred to the cause, so that we understand our will to be the whole cause of the action, that it be able by itself to work without God, it is not true: for unless God would assent thereunto, it should not be able to bring forth action. So God, although by his absolute power he might perform the work itself by himself, yet as the course of things is, he will not deal alone, but will have the creature to be a doer together with him: by this means are neither the will nor yet God, said to be the whole cause. But if it be referred to the effect it self, God and the will are the full cause; for God and the will make the whole effect, although they be joined together in action. I will show the thing by an example; For bringing forth of an action, we have a will and an understanding, and our will maketh the whole effect, and our understanding

is the cause of the whole effect; but the one is nigh, the other further off.

And so is it of the will and of God; the will doth all, and God doth all; but one is the first cause, and the other is the second.

22. As touching the third point, the sin which followeth is sometimes said to be a punishment of the sin that went before; and so God is said to punish sins with sins. Then if the sins, which follow, be weighed as they be punishments, they after a sort be attributed unto God; not that God doth instill new naughtiness, or that he driveth men directly unto sinning; but when he hath withdrawn his gifts, then doth sin follow, whereby the mind is destroyed. And those destructions, and those wounds of minds, as they be punishments, they come unto us by just desert. Hereof we read in the first chapter to the Romans; that God gave them up unto a reprobate sense, as we have declared before. And that sin hath the respect of punishment, insomuch as it corrupteth nature, it is manifest. Augustine saith, and it is usually received; Thou hast commanded Lord, and truly so it is, that every sin is the punishment of him that sinneth. This also do the Ethnics acknowledge, Horace saith; The Sicill tyrants yet could never find,

Than envy, greater torment of the mind.

Those evil affections do dry up the bones, made feeble the strength, and do afflict the minds; yet this is justly done: for God is just and righteous in all his ways. But if we be deprived of grace, we have deserved the same.

23. Wherefore we conclude this question of ours, and say; that, To speak properly and plainly, God is not the author of sin; neither would he sin to be. And yet is not God said to be the unperfecter, or the weaker; because he cannot make sin: for that is not imperfection and impotency, but perfection.

These things cannot God do, because he is the chief good, and the chief

perfection: nay rather, he establisheth laws against sins, he crieth out against them, and he punisheth them. And marvel not, when I said that God cannot properly will sin; for then might he turn away men from himself, then should he deny himself to be God. Paul saith unto Timothy; God cannot deny himself. By which reason Barnard in his little book De praecepto & dispensatione was moved to say, that God can undo somewhat of the precepts in the second table, but not of the first table. Of the second he did relinquish something, as when he willeth Abraham to kill his son; so likewise while he commanded the children of Israel that they should carry away other men's goods: but whatsoever things be of the first table cannot he remitted. If God would not be loved and worshipped, he should deny his own self. If he be the chiefest good, should we not love and worship him?

And some allege this reason; that The good things which belong unto our neighbors, be particular; and God can take away any private good thing, to put a greater in place. But those things which appertain to the worshipping of him, have respect to the universal good, and therefore cannot be taken away. Augustine in his book which is entitled Confutatio catholica quorundam sibi falso impositorum, the third chapter saith; Whatsoever is condemned in any man, is far from the author of nature. In the same place;

That opinion is to be detested, which holdeth God to be the author of any naughty deed, or of any naughty will.

24. Now have we generally declared the proper causes of sin; but to show them particularly, we say that the cause of sin is man's will, his understanding, his depraved sense, his licentious appetite, the show of good which offereth itself (for nothing is desired of us, but in respect of some good.) Here withal the corruption remaining of original sin, from thence as out of a standing puddle, do always breath out evil affections. A cause also

is our own infirmity and ignorance, also the suggestion of the devil and of naughty men; who nevertheless are able to prevail no further than God doth give them leave. There be ill examples also, sin itself is the cause of sin; for some prodigal men stealeth for the satisfying of his lust. Wherefore seeing there be so many true causes of sin, we must not make God to be author, to the intent we may excuse ourselves. Now it may appear, that the wicked opinion of the Libertines must be condemned, who excuse all manner of sins. They which make God to be the cause of evil, but yet not so as we should be excused, seem not well to expound this question. In like manner is it of them, which allow but of a bare permission.

First therefore (to gather all into few words) we have said, that God is not properly the author of sin; secondly that God, when he will, doth justly withdraw from us his grace, which should be the hindrance of sin.

Moreover, we have showed that God doth so govern sins by his providence, as they shall not rage any further than he permitteth; and in no otherwise than may be expedient for his providence. We have declared that God doth sometimes suggest both inwardly and outwardly, such things as in their own nature be good; but if they fall into corrupt men, they become occasions taken and not given of sins. Also that God doth not let, but permit sins; and that the same permission is not altogether without the will of God. Further, that seeing sin is a falling away and privation, it hath no need of an efficient, but of a deficient cause. Further, that our motion of turning away from God, is proper unto our will, as it is corrupted, not as it was instituted by God. We said also, that the guiltiness dependeth on God; and then, that the action which is the subject of deformity, cometh as well from God as from us, in the kind of the cause. And we showed, that sins are punished with sins. And last of all, we reckoned up the true causes of sins.

25. But now hereafter we will examine the former reasons alleged. They which denied God to be the cause of sin, as we also say, used these reasons.

In the first, Augustine said in the 83rd book of questions, quest. 3. A man is not made the worse, by having a wise man to be author: neither is he therefore [the worse] by having God to be author. I grant it; for man became not the worse, in respect that God gave a law; for by his law, he commanded not evil: neither is man become the worse, as touching the natural act which God bringeth forth; but he becometh the worse by reason of his backsliding, whereof we ourselves have deficient causes in our selves. Wherefore the devil, wicked men, our own sensuality, and especially the corruption of our own will do make us the worse. And so it is granted that we are not made the worse by God or by man. The second reason;

Fulgentius saith, that God is no revenger of the things, whereof he himself is the author. We grant the argument; God doth not revenge that act, as it is a natural thing, as it dependeth of him; neither [doth he revenge] his own government which he useth, but the naughtiness which proceedeth from us, and which cometh from our own selves. The third reason; God hateth not those things which he maketh, but he hateth sin. The reason is firm. But the doubt is, that if he verily hate sin, why he doth not forbid it, seeing he may.

Scarcely can human reason discern God's perfect hatred against sin, seeing he taketh not the same quite away. Doubtless it is a difficult thing.

Howbeit it cometh oftentimes to pass, that something which displeaseth, is, for some good end and purpose, not taken away; whereof there are plenty of examples in the state of man's life. There happeneth some man to be diseased in the body, whereby the corruption breaking out, there ariseth a grievous sore in some member; notwithstanding that this be very painful unto him, yet because he knoweth that it will turn to the benefit of his body,

he suffereth the pain, neither doth he stop the sore. Also among the good corn there springeth up cockle and darnel; it displeaseth, yet are they not quite rid away, because men stand in fear, least the corn should be plucked up. So might we say of God, he hath his ends; namely, that not only his goodness, but also his righteousness may be declared: and therefore he hateth sins; yet not so, but that he will accomplish by them such an end as he hath prescribed.

Other arguments; If he did make sin, he should be a sinner; and if he would induce us to sin, he should do against his own nature: for natural things working, endeavor to make that which they do, like unto themselves.

These arguments be firm. Neither is the action of God and working together of the creature, that is, of man's will, so to be affirmed, as if we ourselves apply not our own lewdness. God might seem to deal hypocritically, if he should on the one part command good things; and on the other part should will sin. I answer, that the argument would be of efficacy, if it might be said that God poureth in new lewdness: but in that he governeth sin, he worketh nothing against his law. Moreover, we must distinguish as touching the will of God, what respect it hath towards the commandments, and towards men.

The commandments written we say are the will of God, for they express his nature and property: but if we mark how the will of God is towards men, and do say, that God would equally further all men to the keeping of his commandments, and that he giveth his grace equally unto all men, this must not so be allowed: for God hath his elect, and hath others also whom by his just judgment he overskippeth, and leaveth to sin and destruction. The Lord saith; I will have mercy upon whom I will have mercy: that is, Upon whomsoever it liketh me, I will have mercy. But they say that Men have free will, whereby they be able to keep the law of God, if they will

themselves; and that there is no difference to be put in the help of God and grace, which is not given to all men after one sort. But I affirm that there is free will in God, he is free in his election, and in distributing of his graces: but his freedom dependeth not of us, who shall verily be free, if the son will make us free.

Wherefore in the law or commandments, God showeth what his property is, and what he judgeth to be right: but as touching the favor, wherewith he favoreth particular men, to keep those commandments, the question is otherwise. It was said, in the second of Chronicles; God rose up early, and sent his prophets unto them, wherefore he is no cause of sin. It is most true;

God did so; but yet those suggestions, which in their own nature are good, fell into men, which were naughty of nature; who through their own lewdness were made the worse by those admonitions: for by their own fault they were stirred up to sin. God gave that warning, to the end he might spare his people; and the warnings were such, as being received, they brought pardon with them. But yet we must not say, that it was the determination of God to save them wholly at that time; for he upon just cause did withdraw his grace from them, and they of themselves, neither could nor would obey the admonitions of the prophets. The son of God wept for the destruction of Jerusalem: and this happened for sin; wherefore

God will not that sins should be. I grant, that sins are not done properly by the will of God. Why then did he weep? He was now our neighbor, and the evils of his neighbors could not choose but make him sorrowful: also he knew that sin was against the will of God, although he were not ignorant that it could not be done without his will.

26. It is written in the prophet Hosea; Thy perdition cometh of thyself, O Israel, but thy salvation cometh of me. The sentence is most true: for seeing

that sins proceed from ourselves, as from the proper causes, perdition also is of ourselves. The guiltiness or bond to abide the punishment, may be said to come from God: but that (as we said before) is not properly called sin, but belongeth unto righteousness. John the eight; The devil, when he speaketh a lie, speaketh of his own. It is most true; God instilleth not malice into him, but yet he is wont to use his falsehood, even as he doth other things. We read in Jeremiah; They ran, and I sent them not. In that place there is no speaking of the providence of God, but of the lewd dealing of false prophets, which feigned themselves to have received the word from God, their own conscience bearing them record that God spake not unto them. They said, that they had dreamed dreams, and they vainly babbled that God had revealed some things unto them, when as nevertheless they lied, and knew that they did lie. Wherefore no reproaches ought to be laid against God for this matter, as though it should not be lawful unto him by his providence to use their lies.

This is the condemnation of them, that light came into the world; but men loved darkness more than light: wherefor God is not the cause, but they which loved darkness. We grant the argument; The will of man, of his own proper naughtiness, hath in it the motion of turning away from light to darkness. It was said; that God tempteth no man: but if he were the cause of sin, he should tempt men. As touching that place, understand it after this manner. It is not there spoken of every kind of temptation, otherwise the word should not be true. For God sometime tempteth his people, not that his own knowledge may be augmented, but that men may know him; and that others also may see how great things God hath wrought in them, and what grace he hath bestowed upon them. Also there is a certain kind of temptation to be desired: as in the psalm David saith; Tempt Lord or prove

me, examine my reins and my heart. Neither must we forget that which we affirmed; namely, that God doth sometimes suggest inwardly and outwardly, things which in nature be good, and are received according to the disposition of men; neither must these kinds of temptations be removed from God. But James speaketh of inward lusting, whereby properly are suggested evil things, which provoke us to do against the law of God.

Neither doth such lusting depend on God, except so far forth as he doth not resist it: even as also he doth not always hinder the devil.

It was added; that God might seem to deal tyrannically: whereto we answer, That he doth not properly stir up men unto sin; but yet he useth the sins of wicked men, and also guideth them, least they should pass beyond their bounds. It is added; How should he judge the world? For if he were author of sin, he should judge himself. We say that God shall justly judge the world: for what wickedness soever men do, they do it against the law of God, they do it willingly, and of their own accord, not by constraint: and The spirit of God shall reprove the world of judgment, of sin, &c. Besides this it was inferred, that by this means it would follow, that there be wills in God one repugnant to another. We answer, that in God, as concerning his nature, there is but one absolute and only will, which is the essence and nature of God: but yet, if we consider moreover the sundry objects, it may be called manifold. In respect of his commandments it is just, good, and one only: but in respect of men, some it promoteth, and other some it justly depriveth of God's favor. But they be no repugnant wills, because they be not occupied about one thing. Certainly such things as be repugnant, it behooveth that they be referred to the self-same subject. A father hath two sons; his will is, that the one should attend unto learning, and the other not.

But be there two wills of the father? No forsooth; it is but one, and he doth rightly, so he do it upon good consideration.

Moreover James, in the fourth chapter saith; Ye say, We will go into such a city: ye ought rather to say; If God will, we will do this or that thing.

Wherefore the will of God is, not only as touching the law and commandments; but it is also concerning those things, which be daily done of men. And that will belongeth not to the commandments: for these things are not contained in the Decalogue, and they after a sort be things indifferent. Very well did Augustine write in his Enchiridion unto Laurence, in the 102nd chapter; The omnipotent God, whether through his mercy he have pity upon whom he will; or through his judgment shall judge whom he will; doth nothing unjustly: neither doth he otherwise than with his will.

Afterward it was said; If he should be a cause of sin, to what end tend so many warnings, and so many obtestations of his, by the son of God, by the prophets and apostles? We say, that these things are not done in vain; nay rather, they bring profit and utility. First they which admonish, rebuke, and exhort, do obey the commandments of God, who would this to be done. But thou wilt say; It will not profit me, the event must be committed unto God.

Further, these things do profit the saints, which are predestinated; though it appear not presently, yet in some case they have their fruit: doubtless they make the ungodly the less excusable. Of this matter read in the book of Augustine De correctione & gratia; for these things were also objected to him.

27. It was argued, that If the matter should be on this wise, all difference between good and evil would be taken away; all things without exception should be the works of God, as the Libertines do say. We grant, that if God were verily the cause of sins, the Libertines should say rightly, but their

opinion is detestable. The judgment of consciences would be taken away, inward accusations, and repentance would be dispatched, a window would be opened unto mischiefs, giving of thanks would be withdrawn; for we would delight in sin, and a great deal of the estimation of God would be lost. All these things be most true, but they make not against us; for we affirm not God to be truly the cause of sin. Lastly was brought forth, that God would have all men to be saved: if he will this, he useth good means, not evil; therefore he is not the cause of sin. We most plainly confess, that God is not properly the cause of sin: but yet out of this place I affirm with Augustine in his Enchiridion the 103rd chapter, that the sentence must not be so absolutely understood, as though there were not some, which God would not have to be saved. This sentence (saith he) is thus meant; God hath his elect among every state and condition of men; so in this respect, he accepteth not the person. He calleth kings and private men, bond men and free men, man and woman. And excellently well doth this interpretation agree with the place of Paul. He had commanded to pray for princes: but some man might have thought, that the condition of them was such, as salvation should be repugnant therewith. In no wise (saith he,) God hath his elect among every kind of men.

The like reason he bringeth there, out of the 23rd chapter of Matthew; Ye tithe mint and rue, and every herb; that is, all kinds of herbs that are among you, not which be in India and Europe: for how could they tithe herbs of all the world? From which opinion disagreed not he that was author of the book De vocatione gentium, which they attribute unto Ambrose. For he saith, that God hath his generality; wherefor he judgeth that this general proposition must so be restrained, as if it were said, that God would have them to be saved, which belong unto his flock and number: even as, when it

is said; All shall be taught of God: And again; All flesh shall see the salvation of God. Another way, whereby Augustine understandeth this place, is even there also; We understand (saith he) that none shall be saved, but such as God will have to be saved. As if thou shouldest say; A Grammarian is at the city of Tigurie, which teacheth grammar unto all: he saith not, all the citizens, but that there is none which is taught grammar, whom he teacheth not.

And so likewise he understandeth [that place,] He lighteneth everyone that cometh into this world; that is, How many soever be lightened, are lightened by this word. But that he would all men absolutely to be saved, he saith it is not true. For in the eleventh of Matthew it is written; Woe be to thee Chorazin, Woe be to thee Bethsaida: for if the miracles that were done in the city of Tyre and Sidon, had been done in you, they had long ago repented of their wickedness in sackcloth and ashes. Christ would not show forth the power of miracles among them, who (he said) would have repented, if they had been showed forth. And he addeth; Expound it which way ye will, so we be not compelled to believe that God omnipotent would have something to be done, and is not done: when as the truth speaketh, that All things, whatsoever he would have done in heaven and earth, he hath done: and surly what he would not, that hath he not done. And thus much touching the arguments made unto the 1st part.

28. Now let us take their arguments, which affirm God to be the cause of evil. In the first to the Romans it is said, that God gave them up to a reprobate sense. The interpretation is easy; he gave them up to the desires of their own heart, as afterward he himself expoundeth it: wherefore these desires were first evil. What did God? Verily he permitted them to obey their own naughty desires; he himself did not evil, but, in leaving them

destitute of his grace, forthwith wicked desires took place in them; privation of itself followed: howbeit God used their naughty desires to the performance of his justice, namely, in punishing of them. Of the hardening of Pharaoh's heart, it is sufficiently declared before. In the sixth chapter of Isaiah, when God saith by the prophet; Blind thou the heart of this people, that they hearing may not hear, and seeing may not understand, &c. This is two ways to be expounded. Jerome for interpreting of these words, taketh a place out of the 11th chapter to the Romans, where it is said of the Ethnics and Hebrews; The Gentiles were in times past unbelievers, when ye did believe, but now they have obtained mercy, through your unbelief. While the Gentiles believed not, the Jews seemed to have the true worship: and on the other side, when preaching was afterward offered unto them, and they believed not, the apostles forsaking them, turned to the Gentiles: and so they were to become unbelievers, to the end that the Gentiles might be admitted unto grace. Thus did God use the incredulity of the Jews, and therefore he added; that God did shut up all under unbelief, that he might have mercy upon all. Wherefore that same blinding of the unbelievers was, to do service to the providence of God, which the prophet foreshoweth.

Another interpretation there may be, and that more commodious. God's mind was, that Isaiah should be sent to preach; but least he might be discouraged afterward, when he should see their obstinacy, and that they were offended at the word, God telleth him before, that the same would come to pass. The word of God of itself hath not this, but he justly withdrew his spirit and grace from them. This word of thine (saith he) will be an occasion taken, through which they shall become more blind, and be turned away from me. This must be understood as touching the greater part; for there were some good men among them. Unto this end it is declared,

that this should come to pass, that they by perishing, might make manifest the justice of God; who of his just judgment would make this their blindness to do him service. But that the blindness came of God, we must not understand it otherwise, then as touching outward things; for he offered them his word by Isaiah.

29. Another place; Lead us not into temptation. It is so spoken, as though God doth lead some into temptation, and by that means is the cause of sin.

This sentence of the Lord Augustine in his book De natura and gratia, the 58th chapter interpreteth; To the intent we may resist the devil, we pray that the devil may fly from us, when we say; Lead us not into temptation.

Therefore also are we warned, as it were by a grand captain exhorting soldiers, and saying; Watch and pray, least ye enter into temptation.

Wherefore Augustine in that place referreth these things unto the temptation of the devil, who is able to bring nothing to pass further than God will give leave. And in the 67th chapter of the same book he addeth; Two manner of ways we provide against the diseases of the body; namely, that either they may not happen at all; or else if they do come, that we may quickly be delivered of them. Thus when we say, Lead us not into temptation, we desire that God may turn away sin, that it happen not: but if we have fallen, and committed sin, we pray him that he will remit and forgive it. The same author against the two epistles of Pelagius, in the fourth book and ninth chapter, by the testimony of Cyprian writeth, when it is said; Lead us not into temptation, that we be warned of our infirmity and weakness. For it is said by the Lord; Watch and pray, least ye enter into temptation: the reason is added; For the spirit is ready, but the flesh is weak: let us not be insolently puffed up. In this place, temptation is ascribed to the flesh, and to weakness; so as God is excluded from being author.

In his book De bono perseverantiae, and sixth chapter, he saith, that Cyprian bringeth in that particle in these words; Suffer us not to be led into temptation: for he seeth that the devil can do no more than God hath given him leave to do. And God, as touching his own people, bringeth to pass, that he shall not prevail: but as touching the wicked, if he have the over hand, God cannot be blamed; unless he will say he is to be blamed, for that he hindered not, and that he ruleth evils, and useth them according to his providence. Here we objected, that it can hardly be, that the punishment and the fault should be all one. For it is called sin, in that it is voluntary; but punishment is always laid upon men against their wills. And how agreeth it, that voluntary and not voluntary should be all one? We answer, that we may consider our will as touching sin two manner of ways; one way, as sin proceedeth from thence, and is brought to effect by means of the same, and in that respect it is called a voluntary thing; another way, sin is considered as it is in the mind or will, and deformeth it, and after this sort it cannot be voluntary: for no evil men would have their mind to be polluted, wounded, or destroyed. Wherefore sin, as it is brought forth from the will, being the effectual cause, is voluntary; but as it bringeth in blemish or deformity, it is done against the will: for we would be all perfect. It was added; God is the cause of the cause of sin, therefore also the cause of sin. By what things do we sin? By the will and affections, the which God hath brought forth; therefore he is also the cause of the last effect. We answer, that sin dependeth not of the will and affections, as they were made by God; but as they are now corrupted: I showed an example before of halting.

30. Besides we said, that God removeth his grace and holy spirit, which do hinder sins, and therefore, &c. This we grant, but we add, that he doth justly remove his spirit. Indeed the removing of that which letteth is a

cause; but yet that is not the proper cause: for there do also rest in us inward causes of evil. He giveth occasions; It is true, he suggesteth both outwardly and inwardly, but yet good things; the which, men through their own lewdness do use amiss. But he not only giveth occasions, but he also gave out his commandments. He said unto the devil; Go forth, do this: hereof will I note a few things. The prophet, by the figure Prosopopoeia, doth as it were bring in God to sit upon a seat like a judge: he would that Ahab should be slain, he seeketh who shall deceive him. Whereunto tendeth this inquisition? It putteth us in mind, that this should else-where be sought; because it is not in the nature of God, to deceive. The end is there set forth by his justice; he willeth that Ahab should now be slain. Divers ways are devised, this spirit showed one way, and that spirit another way: to the intent we may understand, that the providence of God hath innumerable ways, whereby he can punish men.

Those ways were there propounded, but not put in practice; because the providence of God was not minded to use them. A spirit stepped forth, who said; I will deceive him. Hereby it is gathered, that devils are prompt and ready to deceive; and when they do deceive, it is of their own doing. In the mean time we be taught, that those spirits be able to do no more than God doth give them leave: and in respect that he will use them, they be executioners [appointed] of God. Wherefore God said; Go forth: this is the imperative mood. If we respect the end, it was to slay and punish Ahab. But this leave was given, to the intent that the devil should exercise his naughty will, and deceive. And God used the sin of the devil, and would not hinder his work, nor yet let Ahab, but that he should believe the false prophets.

Augustine, in his book of the 83. questions, quest 53. noted three things; The first is, that that which God did against Ahab, he did it by judgment;

secondly, that he did it by an angel, and not by himself; thirdly, he saith not by every manner of angel, but by an evil angel; ready of his own nature to deceive.

It was said, that sin is a motion, and a certain action, and that the first mover is God: nothing is concluded, but that the subject of sin, that is, the act itself, hath will to be the nearest cause, and also God himself, in respect it is a natural thing. The saying of Augustine De gratia & libero arbitrio the 21st chapter, is expounded of the inclination unto good by himself, and unto evil indirectly. Also the dealing of Roboam, and the stirring up of the Philistines, and that Amazias would not hearken unto the warnings of the king of Israel's prophet, appertaineth to the justice of God: God was minded to punish them. As touching the words of Ahia the Silonite, for performing whereof, &c. These things were not done, because they were foretold; but foretold, because God foresaw that they should be. And to the end that they might so be, he appointed them for punishments of the wicked; and he knew how he would use them, and his reasons were allowed of God. It is written in the 14th chapter of Ezekiel; If the prophet be deceived, it is I that have seduced him. Here have we nothing else, but that the sin of the false prophet may be two ways considered. As it proceedeth from the will of an ill prophet, so it displeaseth God; and therefore he said he would punish it: but if afterward the use of it should be weighed, that God by such seducing would be revenged of the people, then he did justly withdraw his grace from them further, he used that seducement, which properly and by itself may not be ascribed to God.

31. There was brought a place out of the 21st chapter of the Proverbs, where it is said; that The heart of the king is in the hand of God, and he inclineth the same which way soever he will. The proposition is general;

Which way soever he will, he inclineth the same. Here is no exception; therefore as well unto good things, as unto evil things. In the twelfth of Job, it is said; that God doth take away the hearts of them that be rulers of the earth, and that he maketh them stagger like drunken men. And how these things must be understood of inclination, I have declared. Wherefore I understand this sentence of Solomon no otherwise, then those words of saint Augustine, in his book De gratia & libero arbitrio; to wit, that he inclineth our wills unto good or evil, according to his good pleasure.

Another argument was out of the 105th psalm, where it is said; God turned their heart, so as they hated them. What manner of turning that is, which he made in their hearts, Augustine doth teach very well in the same place; it was no good heart that God made evil. But such is the goodness of God, that he useth both angels and men; and when they be evil, he piketh good things out of them. He increased the Israelites with children and with wealth; these things were good: wherefor God, by doing good unto the Hebrews, turned the heart of the Egyptians unto hatred; for hatred ariseth through other men's felicity. Wherefore God turned their heart, which naturally was evil, unto a hatred against the Hebrews; not by making of their heart evil. Ye see therefore that I feigned not, when I said that God suggesteth either inwardly or outwardly, such things as in their own nature be good; but through our fault do come occasions of sinning, but yet occasions taken, not given. And the occasions which be offered, be not the furthest removed causes, as is the fir tree hewn upon mount Pelion; but they be immediate occasions, which stir up our desires: even as the Hebrews happiness was the immediate occasion, why the Egyptians envied them.

Isaiah the 63rd chapter; Wherefore hast thou made us to err, Lord? Which saying Jerome interpreteth of God's loving kindness. God did not

straightway punish their sins; wherefore they began to contemn his judgments: God did suggest this his mercy in them, which was good; but through their fault, it was drawn to contempt. They may also be the words of the wicked, which cast upon God the cause of their sins. Or else the godly, when they think themselves, by the just judgment of God, to be forsaken of his grace; and afterward, they acknowledging their sins, speak after such a sort: doubtless not in blaming of God, but in marveling at his judgments. But howsoever thou understand it, God is exempted from the fault. It is written in the fourth of Jeremiah; Thou, O Lord, hast seduced thy people. Jerome answereth, saying; Those things, which were now spoken, seemed unto the prophet to be repugnant to the other words, which were spoken in the third chapter before: where God declared unto him, that Jerusalem should be called the seat of God, and that all the heathen should flock about it. But now God said, that The heart of the king, and of the princes should quail, the priests and people should be astonished: and therefore the prophet cried; Thou saidest, we shall have peace, but behold the sword. But the times (saith Jerome) must be distinguished; for those things, which were first spoken, were to be fulfilled after the captivity of Babylon: and that calamity, which was showed of afterward, was even at the doors.

32. Joshua saith, that God hardened the hearts of those nations of the Canaanites, that they should not make peace with Israel; because God was minded to cast them out before his people: and therefore he seemeth to be the cause of sin. We answer with Augustine, out of the eight chapter, De gratia & praedestinatione: it is also entitled The book De voluntate Dei;

What is it to harden? That he will not mollify: What is it to blinden? That he will not illuminate: what is it to enforce or reject? That he will not call.

Which he speaketh, not of the general calling; but of that which is effectual; God poureth not in new hardness, which is not in the heart. Wherefore it may be said, that God hardened those nations; because he would not make them relent, whereby they might have made peace with the Hebrews: nevertheless, they were already to be destroyed, by reason of their own sins.

But it is further objected, that no creature is appointed to perdition. God created not man, to the intent he would cast him off. And Jerome upon the prophet Abacuk, the second chapter is alleged; Although that the soul, by reason of the naughtiness thereof, be made a habitation for the Chaldeans; yet by nature it is the tabernacle of God. And no creature endued with reason is hereunto made, that it should be a habitation of the devil. Indeed these words doth Jerome speak. But if thou understand him absolutely, he is against the scripture, which speaketh otherwise. It saith, that The potter hath power of one lump, to make one vessel to honor, and another to dishonor.

And it is said of Pharaoh; To this purpose have I raised thee, that I might show forth my power. God suffereth the vessels, prepared unto destruction, to the intent he may make his power manifest. It is also said by Solomon in the 16th of Proverbs; that The ungodly man is made for the day of wrath. In the epistle of Jude, there is mention of certain men, which were before ordained to this judgment, or to this condemnation.

But true it is, that this decree of God, before it be put in execution, hath just cause of condemning any man. For sins are committed in the meantime, for the which they that should be condemned, are condemned: yet is it the decree of God, that he calleth them not effectually; and surly that decree is just. But as touching Jerome himself, I answer; that the reasonable creature is not made, to the end he should be compelled to sin; for he sinneth through his own fault: yet it is in the decree of God, not to hinder that fault

of his. I answer further with Zwingli, in his little book De providentia Dei, the sixth chapter; [Hereof] it would follow, that God doth procure theft, and such other things. He saith; proceed yet further, and thou mayest say, that this is done for the declaration of his justice. Then we see, to what end the reasonable creature is made; even that on the one side the goodness of God, and on the other side his severity may be declared. What wise man is there, that would ordain a thing to any such end, as he knew he could not attain unto? God fore-knoweth all things, he knoweth that the wicked shall be dammed; it shall not therefore be said, that he maketh those to salvation which shall be condemned.

Another argument was; If God would the end, he also would the means to come by that end. I grant; for he would that the patience of martyrs should be, therefore he would that persecutions should be. He would undoubtedly, but not after one manner; for that which is good, he would for itself sake: the persecutions which be done by tyrants, he would after a sort, that is, for some other consideration; he would suffer them, not hinder them; he would use those things. Where I say, that he would those things after a sort, it must not be inferred, that therefore he would them falsely, or like a subtle sophister. John saith; He that is born of God doth not sin; that is to say, against the holy ghost, and without repentance. And seeing such a one doth some way sin, it must not be said, that he doth sin sophistically and falsely; for there is no such consequent: for he sinneth in very deed, and not sophistically and falsely. In like manner, the law of it self is holy; and yet after a sort, it is the cause of wrath and damnation: but yet not falsely nor sophistically; for so Paul himself speaketh, and that truly. Wherefore it followeth not, that God would after a sort, therefore he would that thing falsely and sophistically. But if God would those things, which be unto an

end; and sins after a sort, because he hath determined not to let them, and is minded to use them: then his will being immutable, there shall follow an unavoidable necessity. I answer, that there shall be a necessity, but no constraint; and if our will be forsaken by the grace of God, it is in the necessity of sinning.

Verily, the providence of God, as touching his decrees, is as the iron and the adamant. For Zechariah as touching the chariots and empires, which should succeed after him; They went (saith he) through mountains of iron.

The decrees of God are most steadfast. And Christ said; Those whom my father hath given me, none can pluck out of my hands. Yet there is somewhat, that may seem to withstand this saying. It is written in the 68th psalm; Let them be wiped out of the book of the living: wherefore if they be wiped out, who were written in before, the will seemeth not to be constant.

Read Augustine upon that place; A man commonly saith, Quod scripsi scripsi; What I have written, that have I written: and will God wipe out that which he hath written? How then are they said to be wiped out? The kind of speech is according to the hope of them. In very deed, they were not registered, but they thought themselves to be registered. But there be some, which refer blindness and hardening of hearts to foreknowledge only.

Howbeit, there is not a bare prescience of these things, but there is a certain will of God, whereby God cannot foreknow things to come, unless they be such as shall come to pass. And those things that shall be, or be, cannot come to pass, or be, unless that God, with some kind of will, will have them to be, or to come to pass. Wherefore there is some will of God that precedeth fore-knowledge: he hath a will, not to let things; and he hath a will to use them according to his predestinated counsels.

33. Another argument; These tyrants Nebuchadnezzar, Sennacherib, and others, were in the hand of God, as a staff and rod; and therefore God seemeth to be the cause of sin. Indeed it is true that they were as a rod; and when they had executed their office, they were thrown into the fire: yet were they not without sense and perceiving, but were moved forward by their own naughty will, and therefore are justly punished. For there is two kinds of instruments, as I declared before. Howbeit this is no beguiling; that God will use these things, and yet command that they shall not be done.

These men do them of a naughty will, but God useth their naughtiness. Men also can use well the naughty actions of their adversaries, and many times they do use them without any crafty dealing, even to the intent they may take heed to themselves, and may show patience. Sometime God useth sins, to punish the sinners themselves: yea rather, he useth them so always, for because sin is always a punishment of the sinner. And otherwhile he useth them for the punishment of others.

Another argument was; that God put into the heart of David to number the people. Indeed, the scripture speaketh after this manner. These kind of speeches we hear not in the poets, but in the word of God: Plato might banish poets out of his common weal, but we may not drive out scriptures, which speak on this wise. But how these things must be understood, I have declared before. God withdrew his help from David, he hindered him not; he would use that work for punishing of the people. But it is objected; If God withdraw his grace, he doth it justly. I grant it, yet notwithstanding he doth the same: further, he useth the devil also. In the book of Chronicles it is said, that the devil set on David; therefore God also did it, insomuch as he gave the devil leave. But they object against that, which we have oftentimes spoken; namely, that grace being removed from us, sin doth creep on of

itself, seeing our own will, of itself inclineth unto it, even as darkness doth naturally come, after the light is gone. God (say they) is even as the sun, because his light shineth in every place; but there be men, which convey themselves into corners; but if his lightening be in every place, into what corners should men go where that light is not? The divine scripture saith otherwise: for it saith of him that abused the talent; Take it away from him,

&c. David prayeth; Take not away thine holy spirit from me: wherefore God meant to use the sin of David for punishment of the people. And Aeschylus the tragical poet, is by some unjustly accused, who saith; that God, if he will destroy and take away any, he giveth the causes and occasions, seeing the scripture so speaketh, which can speak against the laws of Plato, but not against the laws of God. For it saith, that the sons of Helie did not hearken to their father, because the will of God was to destroy them: and that Roboam would not give ear unto the elders, because the turning away was of God.

It was said, that If the matter should be thus, then God should not be the cause of all things, if he be not the cause of sins. It followeth not; for although God be not the cause of sin, yet he governeth the sins, which be committed, he useth them, and maketh the very ground-work, so far forth as it is a natural thing. But it behooveth (say they) that sin be voluntary. If we speak of actual sins, it is true; but of original sin, it is not true. Also the first motions which be sins, are not voluntary. And Barnard in his treatise of free will, setteth down certain degrees of man's nature. Men that be blessed in the heavenly habitation cannot sin; it was in Adam, not to have sinned: after sin committed, we cannot choose but sin. So be the damned, so be the reprobate and wicked. But the godly and regenerate are able not to give place unto sin, and bring to pass that sin shall not altogether reign in them;

and this they have of the spirit of God. Whereby it appeareth by this distinction, that the sin of the damned is of necessity; and yet sin nevertheless. For although it be a thing of necessity, yet it is voluntary; but not so voluntary, as we be able of ourselves to make choice of the other part, which is contrary thereunto: for we cannot have the choice on the other part, but through the same spirit of God. Sins are justly punished, but there is no respect had what thou art able or not able, but whether that which thou doest, be done against the law of God or no.

And God doth injury unto no man. Wherefore this objection is not of force, if we respect God. If one see a blind man to be falling, and doth not stretch forth his hand to help him, or setteth him not up again, it seemeth to be cruelty: God seeth a man ready to fall, he putteth not forth his hand, it seemeth to be cruelty. In whom? In men; because the law is prescribed unto them: God is not subject to these laws. This answer maketh Zwingli in his book De providentia, and in his book De falsa & vera religione, where he entreateth of merit. And although God bestow not so large gifts upon the reprobate, as he doth upon others; yet he giveth them many things. The preaching of the Gospel is set forth unto them, many other things giveth he unto all men, although he hath not mercy upon all unto salvation: God may do with his own what he will. These, thou sayest, reject his mercy. Jerome saith upon Jonah; God is merciful and pitiful of nature, ready to save those by his mercy, whom he cannot by his justice; but we cast away his mercy, which is offered. I grant it, insomuch as it is offered us by general preaching: nevertheless, God doth not change their wills; that he can do this, who denieth? If he will not, it is upon just cause that he will not.

Augustine De bono perseverantiae, the fourth chapter, saith; that In one and the self-same thing, we see a difference of God's judgment; and in diverse

things we see one judgment. There were two twins in the womb of Rebecca, before they had done either good or evil, yet is said; I have loved Jacob, and hated Esau. Some labored in the vineyard a whole day, others labored but one hour only, and yet received all one reward.

As for the instance of the goodman of the house, whose sons and servants do offend; I (saith he) enforce them not. The goodman of the house is rightly accused, because he hath a law: but God hath no law prescribed unto him, he himself hath prescribed to himself, that he will do nothing unjustly: but his will is the chief rule of justice. God forsaketh the reprobates, and is also forsaken by them, and he doth rightly. But in that he leaveth such as leave him, that is testified in the second book of Chronicles, the 15th chapter. The prophet Azarias, the son of Obed, saith unto king Amazias;

Seeing that ye forsake him, he will forsake you. God is everywhere by his essence and his power, but in those that are his, by favor, grace, and ready help. He leaveth not the wicked in the two former sorts, but in the third.

There was alleged the sentence of Anshelme De casu diaboli; If God (saith he) by a dishonest work, such as is adultery, do bring forth a child; why cannot that will of God, by a naughty will bring it forth as it is a natural thing? We grant that the subject may be brought forth of God; but afterward it behooveth to consider the defect in itself.

34. It is read in the acts, that they came together against Christ, to do whatsoever the hand and counsel of God had decreed; and that Christ was delivered by the determined counsel of God. Touching the death of Christ, the will of God hath another meaning towards Christ, then it hath towards the Jews. As touching Christ, God would that he should bear the cross, according to obedience and charity, because he is our redemption; and the divine nature brought to pass in him, that he did bear it. The Jews should

deal so cruelly, God permitted them; but in that permission there was a will, not to hinder their naughty will, that he might use the same, and that redemption might follow. By this it appeareth, that he could have letted it, if he would; Could not my father (saith Jesus) give me eleven legions of angels to fight for me? He used that sin to redeem us. Many good things were offered by God unto the Jews; such were the preachings, miracles, and reprehensions which he used, but through their default, they were taken in the worse part: wherefore they are left even in the necessity of sinning.

Where shall now be free will? It is lost. Augustine in the thirty chapter of his Enchiridion to Laurence saith, that After man had sinned, he lost himself, and his freewill also: he saith so twice in that chapter, and elsewhere also; and we have it in the second book of Sentences the 25th distinction. But Barnard saith, that it is not lost. These fathers disagree not if they be rightly understood; for Augustine taketh free will for free power of choosing things contrary, this or that. And while we be not regenerated, we cannot truly do acceptable things unto God, unless we be restored by the son of God; because free will, as touching those things doth not remain in us. Whereas Barnard saith, that free will remaineth, what is his meaning?

He meaneth, that although men sin, they are not compelled, they have a consent, they are willing: and such free will remaineth. And he himself expounds himself, when he setteth down three sorts of liberty. He hath free will, from compulsion; from sin, when his will is regenerate; from misery, when he shall come into the kingdom of heaven. We have no freedom from misery in this life, from necessity we have; by necessity, he meaneth compulsion. This appeareth out of Barnard, for he placeth a freedom of will in God; he of necessity is good, and yet this taketh not away his free will.

The angels, and holy men in the heavenly country cannot sin, yet they have

a free will. Also he granteth a freedom unto the devil, and damned souls; and yet they cannot be good: but the evil which they will, they will it of their own accord, not that they be able to do the contrary.

The same author saith; It is grace which preserveth, and free will which is preserved. By what means? It taketh health willingly, that is, it assenteth, it consenteth: but he saith not that it consenteth of itself, nay rather he alledgeth the place of Paul; that We cannot of ourselves think a good thought, much less give our consent thereto: And; God worketh in us to will and to perform. God (saith he) without us, setteth before us good cogitations, by preventing us; afterward he changeth the will: he changeth

(saith he) the affection, that the same being changed, the consent may follow. Wherefore he saith; that God doth four things in us; first, he stirreth up, by sending in good cogitations; secondly, he healeth, that is, he changeth the will; thirdly he confirmeth, that is, he leadeth to the act; fourthly, he preserveth, that we may not feel the want, that we may persevere, and that the good work may be accomplished.

35. To be brief, we also affirm that God, as concerning sin, is (as Epiphanius saith) ἀναίτιον πάντων κακῶν, that is, clear from the cause of all sin; because properly, he is not the cause, and yet he sleepeth not. This word also signifieth unblameable. God cannot be drawn into law by us; what he doth, he doth justly. And for our part we add, that it is a general opinion, and must still be retained in the church; that There is nothing done in the world, be it good or bad, without God's providence. Human actions cannot pass out of the bounds of God's providence, seeing All the hears of our head are numbered. If sparrows, being small silly birds, of the least estimation, do not light on the ground without the will of God; what shall we say of man's doings, the which so far excel? Divine providence hath an

exceeding great scope; albeit it deal not all after a sort towards good things, and towards bad; yet are they not done without the providence of God, which is God's divine will, whereby things be mightily and very well governed, and directed to their own proper ends. Neither ought it to be any offense unto us, that he leaveth some evils in the world; for although they be against particular natures, yet they be available for common commodity.

If all evils were taken away, we should be destitute of many good things: wherefor it is said, that There would be no life of lions, if there were no slaughter of sheep, wherewith the lions be fed: neither would there be patience of martyrs, unless the cruelty of tyrants were permitted by God.

That which Plato writeth in the second book De Republica, seemeth to be against this doctrine of ours: he saith, that God is author but of few things unto men, because there be many evils amongst men, and God is the cause of none of them: whereby he seemeth to straighten the providence of God into a narrow room. If he mean the cause effectual, and speak of sins, we do grant it: and yet in the meantime providence is not in a profound sleep. But Plato in the same place hath, that, which must not be granted generally of the godly: for he denieth, that God cometh unto men in the likeness of strangers: but angels were entertained by Abraham and Lot in guest wise.

Whereas he saith, that God cannot be changed, as touching his substance; it is true: but that he appeared sometimes in certain forms, it must be granted.

He talked with Moses out of the burning bush; he declared himself upon mount Sina by voices; he exhibited himself unto the prophets by sundry likenesses. I think that Plato meaneth those vile changes, which the poets speak of; that he was changed into a swan, an eagle, or a bull: which things must in no wise be attributed unto God.

36. But whereas I said, that all things, whatsoever they be, are ruled by the providence of God; and that Platos saying can be no let, it seemeth not sufficient. For Damascene also is against it, who saith in his second book, the 29th chapter; that Those things, which be not in us, are subject to the providence of God: for he addeth, that the things within us are not of God's providence, but belong to our own free will. But shall not therefore our actions, which he saith are within us, be in the providence of God? Let them believe this that will; for I believe it not. He addeth that which is more hard; namely, that The choice of doing things is in us, but that the perfection and accomplishment of good things is the work of God together with us. Who will say, it cometh from us, if we choose to be done such things as are good? The apostle saith, that God worketh in us, to will and perform. And whereas Damascene taketh away these things from divine providence, I like it not. He distinguisheth providence, into good pleasure and permission; these I am not against, I affirm both: namely, that providence not only ruleth good things, but that it also bringeth them to pass; and that it permitteth evil things, but yet not so as it permitteth them all wholly to themselves: for it useth them.

And he distinguisheth that same permission or good pleasure, and saith, that one is a dispensing and instructing permission; because it turneth to the discipline of saints, if they be left without help for a time. Sometime it is called a full grown permission, and as it were without hope of recovery; as when men, through their own default, perish and become past amendment.

Even we also say, that God leaveth his elect for a time, but others forever.

Moreover he saith; that God by an inward cause will have men to be partakers of salvation; but that he will afterward punish them when they offend. He calleth it a following will, as though it doth follow by our own

default. I [for my part] say, that the will of God is of one sort, but that the objects be diverse. There is a chosen sort, whom he will have to be saved; and there be reprobates also, whom he will for their sins to be punished. But yet we must not there make a stay, he will show his power in them.

Wherefore I affirm, that providence is universal, whatsoever Damascene saith. Of which mind Augustine also is in the 58th sentence, saying; that There is nothing done, either visibly or sensibly, which is not either commanded or permitted from the invisible or perpetual palace of the high

Emperor: and so he excepteth nothing from the providence of God.

37. These be the things, that I thought meet to be spoken of concerning this matter. There remain many other things, but an end must be had. Indeed

I know, that the reverend man Philip Melanchthon, whom I love and honor, seemeth to say otherwise: but here I appeal to the same man himself, in his old common places; read ye those things which be there, concerning predestination and free will. He saith, that the word [free will] which peradventure I would not have said, is most strange unto the divine scriptures, and from the judgment and meaning of the spirit. Further he saith, that Platos philosophy, in the beginning of the church, subverted piety. In the conclusion of that place; If we come (saith he) to our own inward and outward doings, those being referred to God providence, all things do come to pass even as they be appointed. But in outward actions, if they be referred unto will, there is a freedom [in us.] If we shall consider the inward good things, which God doth require, there he saith is no freedom: if our inward affects begin to pass measure, they cannot be staid. The same thing saith Ambrose upon Luke, and it is often alleged by Augustine, that Our heart is not in our own power. There be others also, which disagree not from them; of which number are Zwingli and Luther, the noble instruments

of reformed religion; likewise Oecolampadius, Bucer, and Calvin: and I might allege others, but I strive not to bring many witnesses. I said, that to speak properly, God is not the cause of sin: and that there is nothing done in the world, be it good or evil, without the providence of God. But and if I have not hit the mark I shot at; I am sorry for it. If any man shall by any sufficient proofs show this opinion to be ungodly, or hurtful to good conversation, I am ready to alter the same. I have discoursed the more at large hereof, because it is a thing of great importance: and it falleth out oftentimes in the holy scriptures. And things are better understood, which be set down to the full; than such as are declared here and there by piecemeal.

We have added these few things out of the like place upon the first of Samuel, the second chapter.

38. Now there resteth, that we speak of the very will itself of God. First of all I grant, that the distinction, which the schoolmen use to make, misliketh me not, when as they affirm, that the will signified is one, and the will effectual, or (as others write) the well pleasing will is another. The will signified is that, which showeth what we ought to do, or what we ought to avoid; for thereby we gather the judgment and ordinance of God, and that consisteth in the law, in the commandments, promises, threatening's and counsels: moreover to this kind of will belongeth that saying; Thou art the God that wouldest not iniquity: and that saying also; Thou hast hated lying and iniquity: and all those testimonies; by which it can be showed, that God would not have sins. And how I pray you can God be willing that sins should be, seeing he hath made a law against them; seeing he most severely punisheth them; seeing he hath planted in the minds of godly men the abhorring of sins; seeing for the taking away of sin he suffered his own

well-beloved son to be put to death upon the cross? But we must note, that against this will of God, which is called the will of the sign, many things be committed and done. The number is great of wicked men, which contend against the law of God, which disquiet preachers, which slay the prophets; yea which in times past killed the son of God himself. Neither must we omit, that this is truly so named, and indeed the will of God, seeing Christ saith; He that doth the will of my father, the same is my mother, my brother and my sister. And it is written in Deuteronomy; What other thing will God, but that thou love him, and walk in his ways?

Moreover, the other will of God is that, which is called mighty, effectual, and according to his good pleasure, which by no power can be vanquished and overcome; seeing it is written thereof, that Whatsoever he would, that hath he done. Of this will Paul saith; Who is able to resist his will? And surly, if there might be anything done against God's will and mind, it would be weak and feeble. These two wills are so distinct, not as if they were two things and faculties which be placed in God; seeing that act appeareth to be most absolute. But forsomuch as God doth not always reveal his general and whole counsel unto men (for that is not needful, seeing it hath been enough for him to show that which is sufficient for obtaining of salvation) thereof it coms, that these two wills do differ. For what he hath by any means declared, that must be referred to his signified will; and whatsoever he hath kept to himself, as secret and hidden, that appertaineth to his well pleasing will. But to the end that this may be the easilier understood, it is meet to be showed by plain and notable examples. God commanded

Abraham, that he should go to sacrifice his only son Isaac; certainly in this precept was contained his signified will: for God showed Abraham, that he would only make a trial of his obedience; and showed him not, that he

would afterward let the sacrificing of Isaac; which prohibition doubtless did follow afterward; neither was his well pleasing will made manifest before.

Wherefore we may decree, that his well pleasing will, and his signified will is all one; but is in sundry wise called, according as it is known or unknown unto us.

Besides this, it was said unto Hezekiah; Set thine house in order, seeing thou shalt now die. Certainly, there was no other way in the king but death, considering the force of his disease, and course of nature; and his death was the will of God, as it might be perceived both by a natural sign, and by the words of the prophet. Yet, because God, of his mercy, had decreed, upon his repentance and tears, to prolong life for many years; this will of his was as well effectual as well pleasing. Also by his signified will destruction after forty days was denounced unto the Ninevites, when as nevertheless God, by his well pleasing will, minded to forgive them being penitent. This will is joined with the other; for they which fall from the one, do light upon the other: and they which reject that will of God, whereby he publisheth his law, his promises, his threatening's and counsels, do run into that, whereby sinners suffer punishment for their wicked offenses.

39. Wherefore Augustine in his Enchiridion unto Laurence, the 101st chapter, very well saith; That which God will have done, is in any wise done, either of us, or upon us: of us, when we live well; upon us, when we receive punishment for sins committed. And in the 102nd chapter he saith, that Sinners do as much as in them lieth against the law of God; but as touching his omnipotency they cannot. Yea, and Gregory wrote in his morals, the 11th chapter, and sixth book; Many do the will of God, when they endeavor to change the same: and in resisting, they unwittingly obey the counsel of God. Also Joseph answereth his brethren with this saying;

You sold me indeed, but God's purpose was to send me before you into Egypt, that I might prepare for you both food and safety. Moreover, this is the same will, whereby God doth predestinate his elect unto eternal life; the which, as it is unknown unto us, so the same being most mighty, cannot be weakened. By this distinction of God's will, we understand sufficiently what answer we ought to make, when it is objected unto us, that God made man a living soul, and therefore would not that he should perish. For we say, that this is true as touching his signified will; for he offered unto man a law, promises, threatening's, and counsels: which things, if he had embraced, he had surly lived. But if we have respect unto that other mighty and effectual will, doubtless we cannot deny, but he would have men to perish. For as we read in the 16th of Proverbs; God made all things for his own self, even the ungodly to an evil day. And Paul teacheth us, that God is like unto a potter, and that he maketh some vessels to honor, and some to dishonor. And this is also the same will, whereby God ruleth, governeth, and moderateth the naughty desires and sins of men at his own pleasure, as it hath been said before. By this will, God delivereth the wicked into a reprobate sense, sendeth in the Chaldeans to lead away his people into captivity, addeth efficacy unto illusions, would have the wicked to be seduced, and is said to harden them.

40. But seeing these things are expressly read, and that we oftentimes light upon them in the holy scriptures, we must diligently consider, how they should be understood. The common sort think, that whereas it is written, that God doth blind, doth harden, doth deliver, doth send in, doth be guile; nothing else is meant thereby, but that he suffereth these things to be done. After the which manner, very many of the fathers do interpret those speeches, being led doubtless by this reason; that they thought it a wicked

and blasphemous thing, if God should be accounted the author of sin; and they would not that men should cast upon God himself the causes of their sins. Which counsel of theirs, I very well allow, and confess (together with them) that these things be done by the permission of God: for seeing he can inhibit sins to be done, and yet doth not let them, he is rightly said to permit or suffer them. Wherefore Augustine very well saith, in his Enchiridion unto Laurence, the 98th chapter, that There is no mind so wicked, but that God can amend the same, if he will: but not to prohibit, when thou canst, is to permit. And the same author against Julian, in the fifth book, the ninth chapter showeth, that There be many evils, which God would not permit, unless he were willing thereunto.

But there must be somewhat else also brought besides permission, if we will duly satisfy those places of the scripture, which are objected. For they which say, that God doth only permit, they cannot altogether exclude his will; because he permitteth the same either willingly or else unwillingly: unwillingly I am assured he doth not, because none may compel him; it followeth therefore, that he doth willingly permit those things to be done.

Neither must we imagine, the same will of permission to be stack in God; for in God there is nothing that is not perfect and absolute. Wherefore it must of necessity be determined, that God doth not only permit sin, but also after a sort willeth it; yet not in respect that it is sin, (for his will is always of necessity carried unto good) but in that it is a punishment of wickedness done before: for in that respect, although it be sin, yet it goeth under the form of good. So do princes and magistrates other whiles set lions and wild beasts upon ill men, and encourage elephants against enemies; yet they made not those kind of beasts, but they cause the fierceness and cruelty of

them to serve their use. So God useth the labor of tyrants, when he will take just punishment of any people.

Wherefore the king of Babylon is called the hammer, staff, and saw of the Lord's hand, when God would by his violence, chastise the people of Israel.

For that king, notwithstanding he was the mightiest prince, was not able of his own force to afflict the children of Israel: nay rather, he was rebuked of arrogancy, because he sometime ascribed that thing to his own strength: for God declareth, that he himself was the very author of so great destruction.

And Job, when he was so grievously vexed by the Sabees, by the Chaldeans, and also by the devil, and deprived in a manner of all his goods, he no less godly than wisely said; The Lord gave, and the Lord hath taken away. And that he might the more evidently show, that this happened by the will of God, he added; Even as it pleased the Lord, so it is come to pass: for he saw that God used the Sabees, Chaldeans, and the devil as instruments.

And in the second book of Samuel, the 24th chapter, it is said, that God stirred up David to number the people: which act in Paralipomenon is attributed to the devil. Both with sayings be true, because God, by the ministry and work of the devil provoked him to do it. For even as Solomon saith; The heart of the king is in the hand of God, he inclineth the same which way soever he will: certainly, not by instilling of new evil, as we have oftentimes said before; but by using of the same which he hath

[already] found, either to the punishment of sins, or else to the performance of his other counsels. Therefore, when it is written, that God doth either harden or make blind, we must believe that he not only forsaketh and leaveth; but that he also applieth his will.

41. Neither must we pass it over, that in the seventh and eight of Exodus, it is written, that God hardened the heart of Pharaoh, when nevertheless in

the eight chapter it is written, that Pharaoh himself hardened his own heart, either of which is certainly true. For first Pharaoh had in himself the originals of so great an obstinacy, and he willingly, and of his own accord set himself against the word of God. But on the other part (as I have declared before) God provided, that the same his obstinacy should be openly showed, and did moderate and govern it according to his own pleasure. We must not think, that God doth so rule the world, as he should sit like an idle man in a watch tower, and there do nothing: or that he suffereth the world and inferior things, to have scope to wander at will, as doth a horse which hath the rains at liberty. Neither is that true, which is alleged by some, that God neither willeth nor nilleth those evils or sins; as if he thought not upon them at all. Even as if one should ask me, whether I would the French king should hunt this day or no, I might rightly answer, that neither I would it, nor would it not, seeing the matter pertaineth nothing unto me. But as touching God, it cannot rightly be answered so; seeing what things soever are in all the world, they do belong to his care and providence.

But I would that these men did weigh with themselves, by what testimony of the scripture they be able to confirm that permission of theirs, which they so obstinately retain. I am not ignorant, that they allege for themselves, that which is said in the 81st psalm; I permitted them to their own hearts lust.

But if we confer with the true Hebrew text, it will appear more feeble, and of less proof than they be aware of. For the verb Schillach in the Hebrew, is in the conjugation Piel, which by the force of the conjugation signifieth, A vehement action; neither is it convenient, that we should abate the force thereof, through expounding of it by the word Permission. Nay rather, it agrees with the phrase of Paul, wherein it is said in the epistle to the

Romans, that God delivered the wicked to a reprobate sense: and it is rather showed, that God cast away the wicked, than permitted them. But whereto did he permit them, or cast them off? Verily to their own wicked desires; as who saith, they should be wholly possessed and governed by them. And in this sense is that Hebrew word oftentimes used in the scriptures. In Genesis it is showed, that God cast man out of Paradise; and who would there interpret the word Cast out [by the word] Permitted, seeing he rather drove and thrust them out from thence? Moreover, in the 19th chapter the angels say, And the Lord hath sent us out to destroy Sodom: in which place, To send forth cannot be the self-same that is to Permit. And it is written in Ezekiel; It brought forth the branch: while notwithstanding a vine doth not permit the branch to come forth of it, but doth rather enforce it to bud out.

Wherefore let the interpreter beware, least in that place he interpret the Hebrew verb Schillach, by the verb of permitting.

42. Neither must we pass it over, that the holy scriptures no less attribute the permission of God unto good things than unto evil. For the apostle in the sixth chapter to the Hebrews, when he entreated of good things, saith; If God shall permit. Julian the Pelagian (as appeareth out of Augustine, in the third chapter of the fifth book which he wrote against him) was of the opinion, that when it is said in the scriptures, that God delivereth or blindeth; it must only be understood, that he leaveth or permitteth. But contrariwise, Augustine saith, that God doth not only permit, but (as the apostle taught) He declareth his wrath and power. Furthermore, Julian writeth, that such speeches are hyperbolical or excessive speeches: but Augustine affirmeth that they be proper. Julian interpreteth, that these which are said to be delivered to their own lusts, were infected before with these diseases: wherefor, he addeth; What need was it, that they should be

delivered to them? It was enough that they were suffered to wallow and rest in them. Unto this Augustine saith; Doest thou think it all one, to have desires, and to be given over unto them? For the ungodly be given over unto their naughty lusts, not only that they may have them, but that they may be altogether had and possessed of them. Wherefore the same father added;

Even as God dealeth in the bodies of wicked men, by vexing and punishing them; even so he worketh in the minds of them, by driving of them unto sins. And in the same place he entreateth of the history of Semei, where

David saith; The Lord commanded him to curse me. The Lord (saith Augustine) justly inclined the will of Semei (being evil through his own fault) to rail upon David: and the cause is showed; For the Lord shall reward me good for this rebuke.

The same Augustine also in his book De gratia & libero arbitrio writeth, that God doth work in men's minds, inclining them as well unto good as unto evil, oftentimes by his secret judgment, yet sometimes by his manifest judgment, but evermore by his just judgment. Whereunto add, that how and for what cause he doth these things, it is exceeding hard to express. But yet this is most certainly to be determined, that these evils, so far forth as they come of God, be not sins; but are things just and good: but in that they proceed either from the devil, or from men; of good right they ought to be accounted sins. The Manichees, when they could not unwrap themselves out of this doubt, did feign, that there were two beginnings of things, whereof the one should be good, but the other evil. But we teach, that there is one God, the author of all good things; we say, that sins sprang up by the departing of Adam from God, and yet that those sins are tempered and ruled by the will and pleasure of God. Whereupon we conclude, that the very actions themselves, that is, the subjects of sins; be of God; and that he,

when he thinketh it meet, doth withdraw his grace and succor, and that afterward he ruleth and bendeth the naughty lusts of men, which way soever it shall please him: and that seeing he useth the sins of men to the punishment of other sins, it cannot be said, that he by no means at all would them.

But of the sin of Adam the question is the more difficult, because there was no fall of his went before, which should be punished by God with a latter sin. Yet unto this we answer, that the action of his, that is, the subject of deformity and unrighteousness was of God; but the privation or defect came of the free will of Adam, whom God created uncorrupt, free and perfect; but yet not so, that he might not revolt and do amiss. Neither was the grace of God, whereby he should be kept back from falling, so great, as it did firmly establish him. And it cannot be doubted, but that God would that Adam should fall; otherwise he had not fallen: and he would have him fall, doubtless not in respect of sin; but that he might use that fall to make manifest his power, and the immeasurable riches of his goodness: and that he might show himself able, not only to make man pure and perfect; but to restore him also, being fallen and perished. And for that cause he sent his son to die for mankind upon the cross. Wherefore Gregory cried out; O happy fault, which deserved to have such a redeemer!

43. But this must be diligently marked, that God doth sometimes allow those things, whereas yet it pleaseth him not that they should be done. Not as though there be two wills in him; for he hath but one will only, whereof notwithstanding there be diverse objects: for he considereth our mind and determination, the which oftentimes he alloweth. But on the other part, he hath before his eyes, the order of his providence, the which by all means he willeth to be sound and steadfast. Therefore, he sometimes inspireth in our

hearts, things which in their own nature should be good; yet for all that he will not have those things to be brought to an end, because they serve not to the order of his providence. So we say, that the prayer of Christ, wherein he desired to escape death, pleased God, although he would not fulfill the same. Neither did Christ, with a lewd or corrupt will, but with a righteous and good will, will that which he desired. But the providence and predestination of God remained immoveable, whereby he had decreed, that at the very same time he should be fastened upon the cross for our salvation. Wherefore we must religiously and godly meditate many things; but when we understand that God will not have those things to be done, our cogitations must be applied to his will. But to entreat of this thing with more perspicuity and plainness, let us first of all determine, that man's will ought after some sort to be made conformable to the will of God; for otherwise it should not be right: for that which is right must agree with the rule of God. Yet is it not of necessity, that what God would have to be done, should please us all manner of ways; because it is requisite sometimes, that the same should displease us, and that rightly, and without sin. Which thing the better to understand, it shall be showed by examples.

Moses heard, that God would root out his people; he otherwise would, and sorrowed exceedingly: and that it might not be, he resisted it by prayer.

Also Samuel knew that Saul was rejected, yet he did not forthwith settle his mind upon that will of God; but he heavily took the fall of that king, and for that cause he wept along time. And Jeremiah understood that Jerusalem should be destroyed, and he lamentably bewailed the ruin thereof. Here some say, that the decree or pleasure of God, is either known to us, or else unknown. When it shall be manifest unto us, we ought to bend our will unto him; but if it be hidden from us, we have a law revealed, which we may

safely follow. Indeed these men say somewhat, but yet this saying of theirs doth not fully satisfy. For Jeremiah and Christ knew very well, that by the decree and will of God Jerusalem should be utterly destroyed; yet nevertheless they wept for the cause, and in weeping they sinned not.

Moreover, it cometh oftentimes to pass, that even by the very works of God we know his will; wherein yet, we must not straightway repose ourselves: for sometimes it happeneth, that the son seeth the father die, which son if he be godly, he understandeth withal, that God's will is, that he should die.

Shall he not therefore be sorrowful, and desire that his life may still be prolonged? What shall then be done, when such things do happen? Verily we must consider what is meet for the will of God, and what is convenient for our will.

Truly it agreeth with the will of God, that he should work according to his goodness and righteousness, to the end he may benefit the good, and punish the wicked: and it is fit for our will, that it should do those things which be agreeable thereunto. Also, what things are agreeable to our nature, we shall perceive by the constitution thereof; that is, by the law of nature and of God; and otherwhile also by an inward inspiration of the spirit: and thus, albeit we do in very deed disagree from the will of God, yet as touching the form and efficient cause, we agree with the same. For as much as God sometime, willeth two things at once, namely to punish a city, a nation, and our parents; and also that we for that cause should mourn: neither are these things repugnant one with another. In times past God willed Sodom and Gomorrah to be destroyed, which thing he declaring unto Abraham,

Abraham was many ways sorrowful, and he entreated for them which should be destroyed; neither are we to think that Abraham poured out his prayers without the spiritual inspiration of God.

44. Furthermore, to these things this also must be added; namely, that the things which we know that God would, may be two ways considered. First simply and absolutely; in which respect we must do those things, which be agreeable to our will or nature rightly instituted: or else we must behold them, with a just comparison unto the divine providence, whereunto if we confer them, they must wholly rest thereupon; because (as Augustine in his

Enchiridion saith) that It is a wicked thing to strive against the providence of God. Briefly it is our part in all things, to will that which God would we should will, and that to a right end; that is, with a good purpose: or (as men commonly speak) with a right intent; although as touching the matter, it behooveth not that that should always like us, which seemeth meet unto

God. But if thou demand what those things be, which agree with our nature well instituted? I answer, things holy, honest and just. Wherefore the apostle said to the Philippians; Whatsoever things be true, honest, just, pure, profitable, of good report; if there be any virtue, or if there be any praise, those things think upon and do. And therefore David, when he determined to build the temple, although God would not have it done; yet was David's will allowed as just and right. Our of doubt, the good king knew that God was willing to have a temple built into him, and he understood that it should be done at Jerusalem; wherefore his will dissented not from godliness.

Moreover, seeing he was a child of God, and was stirred up by his spirit, no doubt, but God inspired him with that will.

Neither must we mark what God doth outwardly, but consider what he doth within us, and then we must follow that. He worketh in us both to will and perform; indeed not always a perfection of the work, or a will that is perfect and sound: neither are these two always so joined together, as he worketh at once both to will and to perform. For sometime he only worketh

to will, and granteth not, that the thing which we will, shall come to effect.

And not only our will ought to be conformable to the will of God, but also our understanding: for we ought to understand those things only, which God would reveal unto us, and no further. No man therefore hath said; I will understand those things which God himself knoweth. These things are largely entreated of in the first book of sentences, the 48th distinction; and in Augustine's Enchiridion.

Another discourse of the same argument.

I affirm the cause of man's sin to be the will or the free will of our first parents, who fell of their own accord, and obeyed rather the suggestion of the devil than the commandment of God; from whom afterward was derived original sin unto all the posterity: whereupon we have vice and corruption enough in our own selves. Wherefore God instilleth not in us a new naughtiness unto sinning, neither doth he bring in corruption; and therefore

I do affirm our wills to be the causes of sin, and not God.

But the scripture saith in the epistle to the Romans, that God delivered up the Ethnics unto a reprobate mind, and unto vile affections. And in the second of Samuel it is said, that God stirred up David to number the people.

And in the same history David said, that God commanded Semei to curse David. In the same book the twelfth chapter, God said unto David by the prophet; I will take thy wives, and give them to thy neighbor, and he shall sleep with them: for thou didst it secretly, but I will do this thing before all

Israel, and in the open sun light. It is said by others, that these speeches must be referred unto the permission; which thing I do not absolutely deny: for God, if he would, might have let these mischiefs, but he would not hinder them. Howbeit I add, that such a permission must not be granted,

whereby some may affirm, that God dealeth so idly, and so leaveth the government of things, as he doth nothing about sins themselves.

[1] First, he taketh his gifts and his grace from certain men, because they abused the same; which grace being removed, and that justly, for a punishment of their former sins, men being destitute of that help, do fall into more grievous crimes. And that God doth sometime withdraw his grace, David knew well enough, when he sometime said; Turn not thy face from me, nor take away thine holy spirit from me.

[2] Secondly, God doth punish sins with sins; as it appeareth in the epistle to the Romans, and in the places now alleged. And sins, so far forth as they be punishments, do belong unto justice, and in that respect are good.

Wherefore it is not unfit for God, thus by sins to punish former sins.

[3] Thirdly, he ruleth and governeth sins themselves; for he suffereth them not to rage so far out of measure, as the evil will of man desireth: he restraineth them, he keepeth them back, neither doth he suffer them to rage against every man, and at all times: also, he directeth them to the performance of his counsels; namely, to the trial of just men, and to the scourge of the wicked, and such like purposes. Wherefore the scripture saith, that fierce and cruel tyrants are in the hand of God, as staves, hammers, and saws.

[4] Fourthly, God sendeth in other occasions, which if they should light upon good men, they would provoke them unto good things: but because they light upon evil men, they are by those men's fault, soon taken in evil part, and are made occasions of sin. So Paul saith, that By the law sin was increased. And the words of God, spoken unto Pharaoh by Moses, were an occasion to express out of him blasphemies and hardness of his heart.

Which thing God saw would come to pass, yet did he not restrain his own

word, when he knew that Pharaoh would become the worse thereby; who nevertheless had the naughtiness in his own self, and took not the same of God.

[5] Fifthly, since that the defect of sin is only in human actions, the which are deprived of right government; the very action of man cannot be sustained, preserved, and stirred up, without the common influence of God, by which all things are governed and preserved: for truly is it said; In God we be, we live, and are moved. Therefore the defect, which properly is sin, proceedeth not of God: but the action, which is a natural thing, wherein the defect sticketh, cannot be drawn forth, but by the common influence of God.

These be the things, which I said that God doth by his providence and government about sins; although he be not the true and proper cause of sins.

By which interpretation we may rightly understand, what those speeches of the holy scriptures, and sayings of the fathers do mean, wherein God seems to be made the cause or author of sin.

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