11. CHAP. XI. Of a Good Intent, Zeal, Prescription, and Custom; all which the superstitious sort are wont to allege agai
CHAP. XI. Of a Good Intent, Zeal, Prescription, and Custom; all which the superstitious sort are wont to allege against the Word.
As touching the signification of the word intent, it signifieth a motion of the mind, whereby we endeavor unto an end by some means; as if a man endeavor by liberal expense or by flattery to attain unto some honors: for such is the nature of things, that many of them are so knit together between themselves, that by one there is a step unto another. For by medicines and potions we come to health; by studies, reading, and masters, unto wisdom.
Wherefore intent is an act of the will; for the property thereof is to move and stir up the mind. And seeing the will perceiveth not the thing that it desireth, before it have a knowledge thereof; it doth neither move nor force the mind before knowledge, which reigneth in the power of intelligence or understanding. The same perceiveth both the end, and those things which further thereunto, and presenteth them to the will. Therefore, intent, stirreth up unto an end, as unto a mark, by those things which are directed unto it.
Let this be the definition thereof. It is a will tending unto an end by some means; and will, which is the general word thereof, is an act of the power that willeth. The difference is taken of the object, that is, of the end, and of
those things which are ordained unto it. As in the history of Judges, Gideon's intent was a motion of his will, to keep in remembrance, by an ephod which he had made, the victory which he obtained. Therefore in his will he comprehended both together, as well the end as the mean.
Intent is divided, into a good intent, and an ill intent: and to a good intent this is chiefly required, that the end itself should be a just and good thing: yet is not this sufficient. For if one should steal, to the intent he would give alms, he doubtless should purpose a good thing: but because the means is naught, therefore the intent cannot be accounted good: but if the end be both unlawful and evil, then shall also the intent be evil. Wherefore that the intent may be good, it behooveth both the end and the means to be honest and just. Howbeit, certain things are of their own nature so evil, as we can never use them rightly. Such are theft, perjury, adultery, and other like; so that the apostles rule must always be firm; that We must never do evil, to the intent that good may come thereof. Wherefore an intent is evil two manner of ways; to wit, either by the naughtiness of the end, or else of the means. But the intent can never be good, unless both the end, and the means be good. Thus far the philosophers and school-divines agree with us. Now let us see how they differ from us.
2. The philosophers think, that the rightness of the end and means, dependeth of man's reason, or natural understanding; as though that should suffice, to know the difference between things just and unjust. But this we deny, and in any wise require faith, and the word of God, as sure rules: which Augustine in many places testifieth, and especially in his treatise upon the 31st psalm, where he saith; Account not thy works good before faith, which (me thinketh) are nothing else, but great strength and hasty speed out of the way: and he which maketh such haste, runneth headlong
into destruction. Wherefore a good intent maketh a good action, but faith directeth that intent; so that when we purpose any work, we must take heed that our heart have regard unto faith, whereby it may direct his endeavors.
The school-divines will easily grant, that faith governeth the intent, and maketh it good. But we differ from them in three respects; [1] first, because we affirm that faith dependeth only of the word of God: but they will have it depend both upon the fathers and councils, which may in no wise be granted them; forsomuch as faith must be constant, and altogether void of error: which two things are not found in the fathers and councils, for they speak one contrary unto another. Fathers do very oftentimes differ from fathers, and councils from councils. And few are the fathers, yea almost none, which have not sometimes erred, and that in most weighty matters.
And very many of the councils have need of correction. Doeth not the holy scripture in express words testify, that All men are liars. [2] The second thing, wherein we cannot assent unto the Schoolmen is, because they affirm, that by a good intent our works are made meritorious, yea and that of eternal life. But how contrary this is unto truth, the nature of merit may teach; of the which I mind not at this present to entreat. [3] Thirdly, we disagree from the Schoolmen, in that they affirm, that the work is made good (as they speak) by a habitual good intent; that is to say, done without any good motion of the heart. They feign that our actions, such as be prayers, reading of psalms, and giving of alms, do please God, although indeed we think nothing upon God at all: and they suppose that this habitual intent, which they place in him, is sufficient enough. So that if thou shalt ask of him that worketh, why he doth so, he may be ready to answer, that he doth them to the glory of God: especially, when in the doing, he hath not a contrary mind, or will repugnant. But this doubtless we may not grant them,
seeing that in this carelessness, whereby we in working think not of God, nor of his glory, the commandment of God is broken, which commandeth us to love God with all our heart, with all our mind, and with all our strength. Wherefore we counsel rather, that this be acknowledged a sin, than to be accounted a good work.
3. But because they perceived, that their sayings are not without absurdity, they added; So that in the beginning of the work itself, there be some thinking of God, and of his glory, in such sort, that the thing purposed be directed unto him. But no man doubteth, that it is needful to have a good beginning of those things, which we do. But afterward, if faith accompany not those things, which we have well begun; and we, while we are working, do not respect God and his glory, we shall run headlong into sin; which ought not to have been dissembled. Further, if we should work, as we ought to do, and as the law requireth, yet should We still (as Christ saith) be unprofitable servants: so far off is it, that we should attribute unto ourselves any merits. Wherefore, while we give over to think upon the honor and glory of God, we fall, neither are such falls to be dissembled; but we must rather crave pardon for them, seeing in their own nature they be sins, although because of Christ they are not imputed as deadly unto the believers. And so let a good intent be joined unto our works, but yet such as is adorned with faith, and let us perform the same, not in habit, but in act.
Wherefore the Lord in the gospel of Matthew the sixth chapter, saith; The light of thy body is thine eye, and if thine eye be single, all thy body shall be light: but if the light that is in thee become darkness, how great shall the darkness then be? These things doth Augustine in his second book of questions upon the gospels, quest. 15. and against Julian in the fourth book, the 20th chapter, judge to be understood of a good intent. And in like
manner writeth he in his tenth Tome, the second sermon, where he treateth upon this place; Let us not do righteousness before men, to the intent we may be seen of them. The intent (saith he) must always be had unto the glory of God, but the desire to have it known unto men, must be laid apart, saving so far as it may appear to appertain to God's honor. And thither tendeth that which was said of Christ; that A good tree cannot bring forth evil fruit, nor an evil tree good fruit, for the tree betokeneth the intent. So as those things being true, which we have said, the act of Gideon done of a good intent, seeing faith did not govern the same, cannot be excused.
4. But now, to declare what is zeal, let us first consider the etymology thereof. The word ζῆλος, that is, zeal, is a Greek word, derived ἀπό τοῦ ζήλου, which signifieth To love, but yet vehemently, so that after love, followeth admiration; and after admiration, imitation, and a grief; if we may not enjoy the thing we love, or else if others be admitted into our company: and this is the proper signification of the word. Wherefore we may thus define it, Zeal is an affection, which abideth in that part of the mind, which lusteth or desireth, after which, by reason of the vehemency, there followeth sorrow, as well because of the concurrence of other things, as for want of the thing that it desireth. But the nature of zeal is not of one sort. For there is one zeal that is good, and another that is bad. Of the good Paul spake, when he said; I am zealous over you with a godly zealously, for I have betrothed you to one man, to present you a chaste virgin to Christ. And in the first to the Corinthians; Desire you then the best gifts. Yea, and God himself, as the scripture often teacheth, hath a most perfect zeal towards us, although affections cannot properly be attributed unto him. But of naughty zeal, Paul unto the Galatians thus speaketh; The false apostles are zealous over them, that they may glory in their flesh, and to lead them from Christ
unto the bondage of the law: and in many other places there is mention made of it.
But the cause why this zeal either good or bad doth come, may thus be assigned: the manner is alike in this affection, as it is in others. Wherefore, even as boldness, lust, and anger be either good or bad, according as they keep or exceed the bounds prescribed by wisdom, so doth it come to pass in zeal. But it must be understood, that according to moral doctrine, prudence cometh by natural use or discipline. But the same in very deed, as it hath respect in this place, cannot be gathered but out of the holy scriptures, through the inspiration of the holy Ghost. Wherefore it shall then be good zeal, when through faith it is bridled by a just and godly knowledge; and it is evil, if it be not restrained by such a knowledge: even as a ship, when the master is present, is preserved; but he being absent, it sinketh. Therefore
Paul unto the Romans spake very wisely, for when as he condemned the zeal of the Jews, he declared the same to be void of knowledge, and by one word noted that to be a vice, yea verily and a dangerous vice, which otherwise might have been an excellent virtue.
And as there is a great difference between good and evil zeal, so the effects which proceed from the one and the other, are of exceeding great diversity. With a good zeal was Christ kindled, when he purged the temple of biers and sellers, by overthrowing their tables and chairs. With the same zeal Phinehas being led, he thrust them both through the bodies, which committed most shameful whoredom. On the other part, what effects proceed of a naughty zeal, we may perceive by Paul, who for zeal's sake persecuted the church of Christ. And in John it is written; The time will come, when they shall think they do God good service, which afflict the faithful people of Christ. Also, Peter kindled with an immoderate zeal, drew
out his sword to strike those which laid hands upon Christ. There is yet another difference between the zeal's, for evil zeal breedeth hatred; but good zeal doth most of all join with charity. For although Samuel worshipped God with very great zeal, yet he mourned too long a time for Saul. And there is nothing more an enemy unto naughty zeal, than is charity; even as self-love is chiefly repugnant unto a good zeal. They also are contrariwise affected, which either be so blockish, as they be not stirred up with any endeavor of good things, or else so corrupt, as they fear not to boast of their sins and wickedness.
5. Wherefore the Nicodemits of our time are to be wondered at, which object the history of Elisha and of Naaman the Syrian, to prove that it is lawful for them, so that they think well in their heart, to be present at ungodly superstitions. For Naaman the Syrian, although he were newly converted, yet he understood that to be sin: and for that he had not as yet profited so well as to depart from his commodities, he desired of the prophet that he would pray for him: which declareth that he judged such a sin to have need of pardon. Wherefore we conclude, that that zeal of the Jews, whereof the apostle giveth a testimony, was in very deed sin. And although it have a show of virtue, yet is it far from it. For as it is plain by moral philosophy, that virtues and vices are one and the same, as touching the things whereabout they be occupied, but in form do much differ: as fortitude and fear, temperance and intemperance, justice and injustice. For one and the self-same affects, when they are by right reason bridled to a mediocrity, and when through vice they either want or exceed, differ not in matter, although the habits or qualities which are occupied about them, are much differing. And that which the philosophers speak of virtues, and of
upright reason, we ought also to transfer unto the holy Ghost, and faith given unto the scriptures.
And although in a good and evil zeal the affect be one and the same; yet is the difference most great, when it is governed by true knowledge and faith, and when it is governed of itself, and wanteth true knowledge. As the water of the sea, and rain water, although they agree together in matter of moisture; yet are they sundered by very many properties and differences.
These things have I therefore alleged, to confute those, which oftentimes defend wicked acts; for that they are done of a good mind and purpose, or (as they say) intent: as though every zeal were sufficient to make the work good. Whose opinion (if it were true) might easily excuse the Jews, in that they killed Christ, and afflicted his apostles. For they believed, that by these means they defended the laws of God, and ceremonies of their fathers. But the apostle saith otherwise, when he attributeth unto them a zeal, but yet a zeal joined with error.
But when error lighteth in matters of faith, it is deadly sin. Wherefore let them well advise themselves what to say, which so stoutly defend works preparatory. Doubtless their meaning is nothing else, but that men, although before justification they absolutely work not good works; yet by reason of a certain upright purpose and zeal of congruity, they deserve grace. Such works, forsomuch as they want true knowledge, which is faith, it followeth, that they be such a zeal as the apostle speaketh of. We deny not, but that God sometimes useth such our wicked works, to bring us at length by them to justification: but that we ourselves through them do deserve justification, it is far from the truth. Nay rather, it oftentimes cometh to pass, that such works are a great let to salvation. For the philosophers and Pharisees being drunken and glutted with those goodly works, were overmuch puffed up;
and for that they were marvelously delighted in themselves, they settled themselves in those works; neither endeavored they to ascend unto the true degrees of righteousness. Wherefore we are admonished by the doctrine of Paul, that we should not straightway give place unto zeal. We must first try and diligently examine it: for oftentimes under the goodly show thereof, lieth hidden very great impiety; as it is manifest in the Jews, which slue
Christ, and persecuted the apostles.
6. The Apostle giveth a rule, whereby we may be able to try and examine our zeal, and that rule is this; to see whether we will be subject unto God, whether we can abide that all things should be attributed unto God, and claim nothing unto ourselves, as the true knowledge of God requireth.
There be a great many in our days, which as it were by a certain zeal, labor to defend worshipping of images, pilgrimages, and other such superstitious acts; unto whom, if a man manifestly declare, that those things are repugnant to the word of God, they will not be subject unto it, but straightway fly to the custom of their elders, and to the helps of human traditions. There be some also, which are moved with a zeal to defend sole life of the ministers of the church: unto whom if a man do show, that the bed of matrimony ought to be undefiled in all men, as it is said unto the Hebrews (and it is written to the Corinthians; It is better to marry than to burn; They which cannot live continent, let them marry; Let every man have his own wife, and every wife her own husband, to avoid fornication ) they will not be subject to this knowledge of the laws of God, but do bring forth the fathers, councils, and human inventions. Whereby is plain, what we are to judge of this zeal of theirs. Doubtless, it is a very evil zeal, and only leaneth unto self-love, and giveth itself unto his own things, and nothing regardeth the things that pertain unto God. Such are the Monks,
which prefer their institutions, rules, and works before all other things which are commonly done of Christians, and much delight in contemning all others, in respect of themselves.
With this blind zeal are the miserable people every-where infected, whom the pastors and preachers ought to succor and help, in discovering their want of knowledge, and setting before them the true knowledge of the scriptures, and that of a singular affection, and true Christian mercy, wherewith they ought thoroughly to be touched in so great dissipation of churches, which of no man can be sufficiently lamented. It were needful to have Jeremiah to bewail the calamities of the church. And from this mercy we should go forward unto prayers, as Paul saith he did: and in imploring the aid of God, we ought to record before God, that which Paul hath written; They have zeal, but not according to knowledge. The very which thing our Savior did upon the cross, when he prayed; Father forgive them, for they know not what they do. Further, seeing we delight in the good moral works of men not yet regenerate, and are sorry that they are not done as they ought to be done, we may thus gather: If these men displease God, and are condemned, which yet of a good intent (as they speak) do these so honest things, when yet notwithstanding they be void of true knowledge; what shall at the length become of us, which being endued with knowledge, live shamefully; yea even against our own conscience? They can pretend a zeal, but we wretches, what excuse shall we make, seeing we profess the gospel?
Howbeit this must not be overpassed, that the Jews, of whom the apostle speaketh, had not, if we shall speak properly, the zeal of God. For there hath not been at any time, nor ever shall be, any true God, which will have the law of Moses to be defended against Christ and his gospel. Wherefore they
abused the name of God, when as they defended not him, but rather their own opinions. As the Turks also, although they boast that they worship and call upon the true God; yet they lie. For there is nowhere such a God, which hath not one Lord Jesus Christ, and the holy Ghost, of one and the same substance with him: which, forsomuch as they take away from the God, whom they worship, they worship their own invention for God, and do fight, and are zealous for it, and not for the true God. But Paul spake according to the accustomed manner of the scriptures, which oftentimes name things, not as they are, but as they seem to be. Seeing therefore that those thought that they were moved with the zeal of the true God, and that they did not for any other cause enter into these zeal's, but for that they thought them to be acceptable unto God; therefore Paul saith, that they had the zeal of God, when yet they were deceived. For if they had been kindled with the zeal of the true God, they would never have resisted Christ.
Wherefore in John the Lord said excellently well unto those, which boasted that they would believe Moses, and not him; If ye believed Moses, ye would believe me also, for he wrote of me. Wherefore Chrysostom hath wisely noted, that Paul gratified the Jews, but yet in words only.
Of Prescription and Custom.
7. We gather out of the history of the Judges, that the right of prescription is no new thing, but hath been planted in the hearts of men by God himself: and for what cause it was found out, I will declare in few words. It may be, that a man unwittingly possesseth the goods of another man: as for example. There is an heir, which succeedeth him that is dead, and among his goods he findeth some things, that were wrongfully held of him, or kept in pawn, while he lived; which he not knowing of, possesseth all those things with a safe conscience: and thus ignorantly and unwittingly he
holdeth other men's goods instead of his own. What then? Shall the heir never seek the just possession thereof? If the right owner never make claim to his own, ought the ignorant to defraud the heir forever, that he should never possess it again as his own? Doubtless, if the owner do never demand again that thing, it must be ascribed to his own sloth, sluggishness, and negligence. Wherefore in detestation of such slothfulness, in the favor of good dealing, and lastly for public quietness sake, the law of prescription hath been devised. This law did Jephtha use against the Ammonites; We have possessed this land (saith he) three hundred years; wherefore dost thou then disquiet and trouble us? Unless there should be some certain time prescribed, within which space, and not beyond, things may be claimed again, the titles of all things would be uncertain: which is exceedingly repugnant to the affairs of men; wherefore this inconvenience is prevented by the right of prescription. And it is defined in the digests, De usu capionibus, law the third; that it is a claim of dominion, through the continuance of possession, during the time appointed by the law. The definition is plain and manifest. But at this day they make a difference between prescription, and that which they call Usucapio; when as nevertheless in the digests, among the old lawyers, there was put no difference. These (so far as I remember) began first to be separated in the time of Antoninus Pius: so as Usucapio takes place in things moveable, and prescription in things immoveable. But thus much by the way.
But in the history of the Judges it is to be noted, that Jephtha did wisely place his arguments: for he used not prescription in the first place, but before all things he objected the law of arms; afterward the gift of the true
God: and the cause being thus confirmed, at the last he used the right of prescription, because a continued possession doth not by itself and alone
prescribe, but it hath need of a good title, and of a good conscience. A good title is, that the thing be orderly and lawfully come by. For he that hath gotten anything by theft or robbery, although he have long enjoyed the same; yet he may not claim it by prescription: but if the title be good, the dealing plain, and a continuance of time had withal, the prescription is firm and good. If we have gotten anything, either by bargain, or by free gift, or by inheritance, or by other like means, the title is good. But besides, there must be good dealing, whereby we may testify in our consciences, that no man's right is injured, and that we know there is nothing that by just means should let us. Wherefore Jephtha had a good title, to wit, the law of arms, and the gift of God. He possessed it also by good dealing, for he was not guilty either of fraud or of robbery, and therefore he very well used the law of prescription.
But the time of prescription in things moveable, is by our civil laws, the space of three years; but in things immovable, ten or twenty years, if ignorance be not the cause thereof. For if the owner shall know the thing to be his, which another man possesseth, and yet so long holdeth his peace, he cannot afterward demand it again, and the law seemeth justly to punish such negligence. But if the owner shall not know of his interest, the time is deferred, namely to thirty or forty years; and this is done, when there is no ignorance in the case, and that one possesseth for himself, and not for another, otherwise it is no prescription. Howbeit, this we must consider by the way, that the ecclesiastical rules touching prescription, do differ from the civil laws. For they (as we have said) appoint thirty years, although the possessor have not dealt well; for they decree, that fraud shall be no let unto prescription. But as we read in the sixth De regulis iuris, in the chapter
Possessor; A possessor which holdeth by ill dealing, prescribeth not by
length of time. For we must have respect to the word of God, and consider with what conscience a man possesseth anything.
8. Now I think it fit to speak somewhat of custom, yet briefly, because the same hath some affinity with prescription. And because our adversaries make much ado about that, and would utterly oppress us with customs, the same ought to be agreeable unto reason, and be lawfully prescribed, as we have it in the Extravagants De consuet, the last chapter. The civil laws assign unto custom the space of ten or twenty years, and the canons thirty or forty years: but most firm is that custom, whose beginning is time out of mind. And it ought to be taken for a sure rule, that whatsoever is repugnant to the word of God, doth by no means prescribe. And therefore, whereas the Papists do plead, that the Communion hath been given to the laity under one kind, by the space of four hundred or five hundred years, seeing that is manifestly against the word of God, they cannot prove that it is prescribed by custom: for such a thing is not as (I may say) prescriptible. For the very which cause, they cannot allege a custom prescribed, as touching the sole life of ministers. For even at the first it was enforced by violence, and it is against the word of God. And yet Hostiensis saith, that The power of custom is so great, as it constraineth priests to sole life: In the distinct. 23rd in the chapter Placuit. Howbeit, as the civil laws decree, That custom which contendeth either with nature or public right, is a naughty custom. But that which I have affirmed, hath foundation in the word of God. For when Christ said to the Pharisees; Ye hypocrites, why do ye break the commandments of God for your traditions sake? For God saith, Honor thy father and thy mother: but ye say; Whoso shall say to his father or mother; By the gift that is offered by me, &c. They might have prescribed unto him custom, but that was not lawful in a thing quite contrary to the word of God.
9. There was a custom in the region of Taurus, to kill such as were strangers and guests. Among the Persians, the custom was never to deliberate upon grave and weighty matters in counsel, but in feasts and drunkenness. The Sauromates had a custom among their cups, that while they were drinking, they sold their daughters. These prescribe not, seeing it appeareth manifestly, that they are naught and vicious: but that custom prescribeth, which is neither against the word of God, nor the law of nature, nor yet the common law. For the right of custom cometh of the approbation, and still consent of the people. For otherwise, why are we bound unto laws, but because they were made, the people consenting and allowing of them?
And this is only the difference between custom and law, that there is a secret consent in the one, and an open consent in the other: wherefore such customs cannot be revoked without danger. Aristotle in his Politics admonished, that Men which have learned to do things with the left hand, should not be constrained to use the right; so that in things indifferent, and of no great importance, custom must be retained still.
There is an old proverb, νόμος και χώρα, that is, Law and country. For every country hath certain customs of his own, which cannot easily be changed: but yet (as I said) when they impugn the word of God, or nature, or common law, they do not prescribe, for then they be not customs, but beastly cruelties. It is well set forth in the digests, De legibus and senatus consultis, In the law De quibus: Custom without reason is of no force. And in the decrees, distinct, the eight, in the chapter Veritate, Augustine saith;
When truth is tried out, let custom give place: let no man be so bold as to prefer custom before reason and truth. And in the next canon Christ said; I am the way, the truth, and the life: he said not, I am custom. Cyprian in his epistle against the Aquarians saith; Let all custom, though never so ancient,
give place unto truth. For otherwise Peter, when he was reprehended by Paul in the epistle to the Galatians, might have pleaded custom; but he rather assented, that custom should give place unto the truth. Cyprian in the same epistle against the Aquarians saith, that Custom without truth is but oldness of error; and the more it is retained, the more grievous it is.
Wherefore let the Papists cease to brag of their customs, which be full both of error and ungodliness.
10. Moreover, for establishing of a custom, it is not sufficient that something be done of some men, or that it be often done; unless it be so done, that it be received into a use and an ordinance to be observed. For there be many things done either unadvisedly, or of necessity; and yet we would not have them to be drawn into a custom. In the digests De itinere and actu privato, laws the first and last: Admit I go through the field once, twice, or thrice; because the high way perhaps is foul: in that I sometimes pass to and fro through thy grounds, do I therefore get a right of lordship or service therein? No verily: neither was it my purpose to pass through thy field to any such end, but I was compelled thereto of necessity. In the decrees, distinction the first, in the chapter Consuetudo, custom is said to be a certain right instituted by manners; which is taken for a law, where law itself faileth. It is requisite, that this should be a law, and made for manners: especially in the first times of the church, when tyrants persecuted Christian religion; and that godly men, through fear, were driven from house to house, and constrained to assemble together in houses and secret places by night. But if we would now in these days worship God after that manner, the church being settled; both we should seem very ridiculous and intolerable. For they did not so, to the intent they might draw it unto a custom, or that it should be an ordinance for others to follow.
Ambrose, when he was a novice yet in the faith, was chosen bishop of Milan; so was Nectarius of Constantinople; and perhaps other: yet is it not lawful for us now to follow the same custom, and to choose a bishop, who neither hath been conversant in the holy mysteries, nor yet hath been baptized; howbeit they did so: they did it in deed, but yet compelled of necessity, because they had not other men both of learning and credit, whom they might oppose against the Arians. So is that easily confuted, which they are wont to bring out of the history of Eusebius, for communicating under one kind: namely, that Serapion sent his boy, and bid him moist the bread in wine. Indeed I might expound that place otherwise; but it shall suffice for this time to say, that it was not so done then, to the intent a custom should be drawn thereof for others to follow. Wherefore custom is not made by examples, but by the assent, approbation, and ordinance of the people: otherwise there are in many places drunkenness, and riots by night; but seeing these things are not allowed of the people, as ordinances to be kept, they have not the force of custom.
11. And that the matter may the better be understood, I will bring a definition of custom, which I found in Hostiensis, in the title De consuetudine; It is an use (saith he) agreeable to reason, and allowed by a general ordinance of them that use it, whose beginning is time out of mind; or else, which is by a just time prescribed and confirmed, so that it be by no contrary act interrupted, but allowed by a contradictory judgment. And this doth Hostiensis think to be a perfect definition. But whereas he saith, that that use ought to be agreeing with reason; that is not enough: but this ought first to be preferred, that it must be agreeable to the word of God. For that is to be accounted for the chiefest reason; and afterward let it be allowed by the institution of the people: for it is not sufficient, if something be done
either rashly, or of necessity, or for some other cause; but it must also be allowed by the assent and institution of the people, and that the beginning thereof be time out of mind, and that it be prescribed by a just and determinate time in the law, being not interrupted by any contrary act.
For if a judge or prince shall give judgment against custom, then custom is broken. As it also cometh to pass in prescription, when a man is cast out of his possession, or when a matter is called into suit of law, and the issue joined, prescription is broken. Also the allowing of contradictory judgment must be had, (that is, that when one part alledgeth the custom, and the other part denieth it) if sentence be given on the behalf of custom, custom is confirmed. But all these things (as I said before) must be reduced to the rule of God's word. Only this seemeth now meet to be added, which is in the Extravagants De consuetudine, chapter 1, that a custom cannot be suffered, if it be burdensome unto the church. Also Augustine complained that in his time, there were such a number of new rites and ceremonies sprung up, that the church was grievously burdened, and that the state of Christians at that time was nothing at all more tolerable, than in old time the state of the Jews.
The same exception do we also take against our adversaries, that the church should not be overburdened. This is their own law; why do they not acknowledge their own words?
12. Paul disputing in the third chapter of the epistle to the Romans of the righteousness of faith, added, that the same hath testimony both of the law and of the prophets: which he therefore saith, because that the doctrine, which he set forth, might seem to be new and lately sprung up. But in the Gospel, newness must specially be shunned, and therefore he testifieth in every place, that the Gospel is ancient, and was ordained of God from the beginning. And at the beginning of the epistle, he wrote, that God promised
the same by his prophets in the holy scriptures. And at this day, the controversy between us and our adversaries is, as touching doctrine; while they affirm, that we bring in new things, and that themselves do cleave fast to the ancient doctrine. But we learn of the Apostle, how this controversy may be determined. Assuredly, that doctrine is old and ancient, which hath testimony from the law and the prophets, that is, of the holy scriptures: but that shall be judged new, whereof there is no mention in them. They erect the Mass, where only one man doth communicate for others that do stand by. This hath no testimony in all the whole scriptures.
We affirm, that the supper of the Lord ought to be common unto the faithful; which is most manifestly showed by the institution thereof, as we have it in the Gospels, and in Paul. These men deliver unto the laity the sacrament of Christ's body, half maimed and imperfect. This doubtless, they not only have not out of the holy scriptures, but plainly against the scriptures. They maintain invocations of the dead, which they are not able to confirm by the scriptures; They drive the clergy from matrimony; They defend purgatory; They retain images; They use strange tongues in the divine service, choice of meats and garments, shavings, anointings, and an infinite number of such like things they obtrude upon us, as necessary to the worship of God, and that altogether without testimony of the scriptures. Let them learn out of Paul, which minding to teach the righteousness that cometh by Christ, saith, that It hath testimony of the law and the prophets, and not that it was devised by himself. But the doctrine of these men advanceth impiety: for they bring in the inventions of men, instead of necessary worshipping of God; which having no testimony out of the scriptures, must of necessity be new.
And the reason why it behooveth in religion to beware of newness, is; for that God commandeth in Deuteronomy, that none should either add too, or take away anything from his customs and commandments. Yea and Plato himself in his laws and common-weal forbad, that nothing should be made new in things which belonged unto religion. No doubt, but the laws of men may be altered, because the form of a common-wealth is sometimes altered.
Neither do those laws which serve for a kingdom, serve also for the government of a Signiory and a Common-wealth of the vulgar people.
Moreover, seeing law-makers are but men, they cannot perceive all things that should be done. And many chances do happen ever among, for the which it behooveth both to amend and change laws. And as in arts, something happeneth in every age for the more perfecting of them: so laws likewise now and then, by success of times are amended, and reduced to a better form. But none of these things takes place in the laws of God. For as touching the Church, she altereth not her form. It is always one manner of common-weal, and nothing is hidden from the understanding of God the author of the laws; he foreseeth all things, neither is his knowledge augmented by the success of time. Wherefore there is no cause why men should attempt to alter anything in his word.