9. § 28. The Counsel of God.
§ 28. The Counsel of God.
. Up to this point we have dealt with the divine being, as it is and exists in itself. Not in the sense as though we thought and spoke about God apart from his revelation in nature and Scripture. For we cannot speak of God except on the basis of his revelation; if we ventured to take his names upon our lips, we spoke of him as Christians, instructed by his Word.
But nevertheless we dealt with God, as he, according to his revelation, exists in himself. And we came to know him as the eternal being, which at the same time is the highest being and the highest life, as summum esse, mere essentia and at the same time as ipsissima ἐνεργεια, actus purissimus, totus actuosus; he always works. Now we descend to his works. Those works are the creatures, opera ad extra. But before we can contemplate these, the question arises: What is the connection between God, as he exists in himself, and these his works? And that connection is indicated in the Counsel of God, which comprises the opera essentialia ad intra, i.e. the decrees. These are not described to us in Scripture in the abstract, but are set before our eyes in history itself. God is Lord of the whole earth and shows
that from day to day in the creation, preservation, and government of all things. And so it is also with election and reprobation. These are not portrayed in the O. T. as eternal decrees, but they confront us on every page as facts in history. From the beginning the human race divides into two, into the holy line of Seth, Gen. 4:25, 26, 5:1-32 and that of Cain, increasingly alienating itself from God, Gen. 4:17-24. When both races mingle and increase in unrighteousness, Noah alone finds grace in the eyes of the Lord,
Gen. 6. After the flood the blessing is pronounced over Shem and Japheth, the curse, on the other hand, over Canaan, Gen. 9:25-27. From the line of Shem Abraham is chosen, Gen. 12. Of his sons it is not Ishmael but Isaac who is the son of the promise, Gen. 17:19-21, 21:12, 13. Among Isaac's sons Esau is hated and Jacob loved, Gen. 25:23, Mal. 1:2, Rom. 9:11, 12.
Of the sons of Jacob each receives a rank and task of his own, and Judah [314] receives the primacy, Gen. 49. While all other peoples are temporarily passed by and walk in their own ways, Israel alone is chosen by the Lord to be a people of possession. This election, בחר, ידע, Hos. 13:5, Am. 3:2, did not take place because of Israel's worthiness but only according to God's merciful love, Deut. 4:37, 7:6-8, 8:17, 9:4-6, 10:15, Ezech. 16:1v. Am. 9:7 and this love is from days of old, Jer. 31:3. It had as its object Israel as people and nation, although thousands broke the covenant and there is a distinction between Israel according to the flesh and according to the promise, Rom. 2:28, 29, Rom. 9-11. And it had as its goal that Israel would belong to the Lord, would be his people and possession, and would walk in holiness before his face, Ex. 19:5, Deut. 7:6, 14:2, 26:18, Ps. 135:4, Mal.
3:17. Within the circle of Israel there is then repeatedly mention of a special election to a dignity or service, as e. g. of Jerusalem and Zion to be a dwelling of the Lord, Deut. 12:5, 14:23, 1 Kon. 11:30, 2 K. 21:7, Ps. 78:68,
70, of Moses to be mediator of the O. Covenant, Ex. 3, of Levi to the priesthood, Deut. 18:5, 21:5, of Saul and David to be king, 1 Sam. 10:24, 2
Sam. 6:21, of the prophets to their office, 1 Sam. 3, Jes. 6, Jer. 1, Ezech. 13, Am. 3:7, 8, 7:15, above all of the Messiah to be Redeemer of his people, who is the Israel, the servant of the Lord par excellence, Jes. 41:8, 42:1,
44:1, 45:4 etc. Yet although this election in the O. T. appears mostly as fact in history and thus coincides with the calling itself, yet it rests on a foreknowledge and predestination of God. In general the O. Testament teaches that God creates, preserves, and governs all things by the word and with wisdom, Ps. 33:6, 104:24, Job 38, Spr. 8 etc., so that everything rests on God's thought. But it is also expressly said that God knows the future and proclaims it beforehand, Jes. 41:22, 23, 42:9, 43:9-12, 44:7, 46:10,
48:3v., Amos 3:7. In prophecy he makes known beforehand the things which and as they shall happen, Gen. 3:14v. 6:13, 9:25v. 12:2v. 15:13v.
25:23, 49:8v. etc. The days of a man's life are all already determined beforehand and written in God's book, before even one has come into view,
Ps. 139:16, 31:16, 39:6, Job 14:5. The righteous are written in the book of life, as the citizens of a [315] city or a kingdom are recorded, and have therein the assurance that they will have a share in the life in communion with God in the theocracy of Israel, Ex. 32:32, Ps. 87:6, Ezech. 13:9, Jer.
17:13, Ps. 69:29; in Jes. 4:3 and Dan. 12:1 this is further developed in such a way that those who are written down unto life will have a share in the theocratic salvation in the future. Here the New Test. thought is prepared, that the book of life contains the names of the heirs of eternal life. And all things happen according to the counsel of God. With him are wisdom and power, counsel, ֵעָצה and understanding, Job 12:13, Spr. 8:14, Jes. 9:5, 11:2,
28:29, Jer. 32:19. By that he always chooses the best ways to attain his goal,
needs no one's counsel, and is terrible, far exalted, above the counsel of the holy ones and of all who are around him, Jes. 40:13, Jer. 23:18, 22, Ps. 89:8.
God's counsel is his definite thought, his fixed decision concerning all things, Jes. 14:24-27, Dan. 4:24. That counsel is indeed hidden, Job 15:8 but comes to reality in history itself. For according to that counsel everything happens, it exists forever, no one can resist it, Jes. 24 vs. 24-27,
46:10, Ps. 33:11, Spr. 19:21; and over against it the counsel of the enemies is destroyed, Neh. 4:15, Ps. 33:10, Spr. 21:30, Jer. 19:7.
2. The N. Test. sets this counsel of God in a much clearer light. Not only are all His works known to God from eternity, Hd. 15:18 (cf. however the variae lectiones), but everything happens according to the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God. The N. T. word βουλη denotes the will of God as resting on counsel and deliberation, and is therein distinguished from θελημα, the will as will, cf. Ef. 1:11 βουλη του θεληματος. Such a counsel of God precedes all things. It encompasses everything, Ef. 1:11, also the sinful deeds of men, Hd. 2:23, 4:28, cf. Luk. 22:22. God has determined beforehand the dwelling-place of the peoples both in time and in extent, ὁρισας, Hd. 17:26. God's will becomes manifest also in the perdition of Judas, Joh. 17:12, in the giving over of the Gentiles, Rom. 1:24, in the rejection of Esau, Rom. 9:13, in the hardening of the ungodly, Rom.
9:18, in the raising up of Pharaoh, Rom. 9:17, in the enduring of the vessels of wrath prepared for destruction, Rom. 9:22, in the being set [316] (κειμαι) of Christ not only for a rising again but also εἰς πτωσιν, Luk. 2:34, for a κρισις, Joh. 3:19-21, for a λιθος προσκομματος και πετρα σκανδαλου, 1
Petr. 2:7, 8, cf. 1 Thess. 5:9, Judas vs. 4. But above all the βουλη του θεου nevertheless has reference to the work of redemption, Luk. 7:30, Hd. 13:36,
20:27, Hebr. 6:17. And the N. T. is rich in words, to describe this counsel of
God more closely. It speaks of εὐδοκια, good pleasure, good will, Mt.
11:26, Luk. 2:14, 10:21, Ef. 1:5, 9, Phil. 2:13, 2 Thess. 1:11; προθεσις, purpose, Rom. 8 vs. 28, 9:11, Ef. 1:11, 3:11, 2 Tim. 1:9; προγνωσις, foreknowledge, Rom. 8:29, 11:2, 1 Petr. 1:2; ἐκλογη, election, Mk. 13:20,
Hd. 9:15, 13:17, 15:7, Rom. 9:11, 11:5, 28, 1 Cor. 1:27, 28, Ef. 1:4, 1 Thess.
1:4, 2 Petr. 1:10, Jak. 2:5; προορισμος, Rom. 8:29, Cor. 2:7, Ef. 1:5, 11; cf. also Hd. 13 vs. 48 where it is said that as many believed, ὁσοι ἠσαν τεταγμενοι εἰς ζωην αἰωνιον, i.e. not as if they had made themselves fit or had been subjectively predisposed but as having been ordained, appointed to eternal life; and also still Ef. 2:10, where of the good works of the believers it is said that God προητοιμασεν them. The words are thus distinguished: προθεσις indicates that God in the work of salvation does not proceed according to arbitrariness or chance but according to a fixed plan, according to an unchangeable purpose; ἐκλογη modifies this thus, that that purpose does not encompass all, but that it is a προθεσις κατ' ἐκλογην,
Rom. 9:11, an electing purpose, so that not all but many come to salvation; προγνωσις attends to the persons, who in this electing purpose of God are the object not of His nuda praescientia but of His dilectio practica; while finally προορισμος looks more to the means, which God disposes, in order to bring these known ones to the destination determined for them. Προθεσις certitudinem eventus indicat, προγνωσις personarum singularitatem, προορισμος mediorum ordinem. The election is certa per προθεσιν, determinata per προγνωσιν, ordinata per προορισμον, Turretinus, Theol. El.
IV qu. 7. The eternity of this purpose does not of itself already lie enclosed in the preposition προ, with which the words are compounded, but is nevertheless clearly expressed in Ef. 3:11, 2 Tim. 1:9, cf. Mt. 25:34, 1 Cor.
2:7, Ef. 1:4. It has indeed been asserted that Paul in Rom. 9 does not deal
with the absolute sovereignty and the eternal decree [317] of God, but only with a Verhalten Gottes, das in der Zeit, in der Geschichte seine Ursachen wie seine Wirkungen hat, W. Beyschlag, Die paulin. Theodicee Röm. IXXI, 2te Aufl. Halle 1895. Dr. van Dijk, The doctrine of election according to the N. T., Studiën ond. red. van de la Saussaye, Valeton en Van Dijk IV 3e stuk. Buhl, Der Gedankengang von Röm. 9-11, Stud. u. Kr. 1887 S. 295322. Kübel, Herzog2 12, 158. But this assertion is refuted by Rom. 9. For the προθεσις κατ' ἐκλογην clearly precedes the facts of history; the history thus serves to cause that purpose, which already existed, to remain firm,
Rom. 9:11. To Sarah a seed of promise is promised long beforehand, v. 9.
Before the children of Isaac were born, God had already said that the greater would serve the lesser, vs. 11. Verses 15-18 teach that election does not have its causes in works but solely and only in the will of the One calling. Very certainly Rom. 9 speaks of an acting of God in time, but the cause of that acting falls outside time, lies only in God's will and good pleasure. To that is added that the causa electionis elsewhere also is clearly ascribed only and exclusively to God's grace, love, good pleasure, Mt.
11:25, Luk. 12:32, Ef. 1:5, 9, 11, 2 Tim. 1:9, 10. It is even not correct, with Rom. 9:21, either exclusively with supralapsarianism to think of the massa incorrupta or with Augustine and infralapsarianism only of the massa corrupta. Paul here does not at all think of this distinction. What he wishes to say is only this, that God has the absolute right, to give to His creatures that destination which seems good to Him, cf. Jes. 10:15, Jer. 18, Mt. 20:15.
From the standpoint of absolute right a creature has nothing to say against his Creator. Paul refutes all objections against election not by this, that it is righteous and equitable, but with an appeal to the sovereignty and the absolute right of God. Just as the N. T. expresses the eternity of election
more clearly than the O. T., so it also conceives that election more individually and personally. While in the O. T. the people of Israel appears as the object of election, here they are particular persons, who are chosen in Christ, together form His body and bear the name of εκλεκτοι, Mt. 24:31,
Luk. 18:7, Hd. 13:48, Rom. 8:33, Ef. 1:4, Tit. 1:1, 2 Tim. 2:10, 1 Petr. 1
[318] vs. 1, 2, 9 etc. Above all this also appears from the book of life, in which the names are written of the heirs of eternal life, Luk. 10:20, Hebr.
12:23, Phil. 4:3, Op. 3:5, 13:8, 20:12, 21:27, 22:19. Finally it is the clear doctrine of the N. Test. that election has its goal, not in an earthly life in Canaan, nor also in an eminent place in the kingdom of God, but specifically in the heavenly salvation. To be sure, within the congregation there is again an election to one or another office or service, e.g. of the apostles, Luk. 6:13, Joh. 6 vs. 70 etc., but the proper election has as its goal holiness, Ef. 1:4, sonship, Ef. 1:5, salvation, 2 Thess. 2 vs. 13, eternal life,
Hd. 13:48, conformity to Christ, Rom. 8:29, Joh. 17:24, the glorification of God, Ef. 1 vs. 6, 12. Also in Rom. 9 Paul does not deal with a higher or lower place in the kingdom of God, but he makes a distinction in Israel itself between children of the flesh and children of the promise. He speaks specifically of vessels for honor and of vessels for dishonor, κατηρτισμενα εἰς ἀπωλειαν. He sets mercy and hardening over against one another, and in vs. 14 and 19 he lets objections come to speech, whose seriousness precisely presupposes the doctrine of such a sovereign election.
3. Also outside the Christian religion, manifold conflict has been waged over predestination and freedom of the will. Philosophy has alternately arrived at a pantheistic determinism or at a deistic doctrine of freedom. The Jews also ascribe to man, even in the state of sin, freedom of the will,
Weber, System 223. In Mohammedanism a conflict has been waged over
predestination and freedom of the will, which in many respects is analogous to that in the Christian church. In Islam God is the absolute omnipotence, the absolute arbitrariness, over against which man is completely passive.
Against that, in the second century of the Hedjra, resistance arose on the part of the Motazelites, who defended the free will, contested predestination, and regarded not omnipotence but justice as the essence of God, Houtsma, De strijd over het dogma tot op El-Ash'ari, Leiden 1875.
Kuenen, Volksgodsd. en wereldgodsd. 1882 blz. 40 v.; cf. also the conflict in the school of Ramanuja in India, which has often been compared with that of Gomarists and Arminians, Saussaye, Rel. gesch. I [319] 448. In the Christian church, in the first period, over against the pagan fate and the gnostic naturalism, all emphasis was laid on the moral nature, the freedom, and the responsibility of man, and therefore the doctrine of Scripture concerning the counsel of God could not come into its own. Man was indeed corrupted by sin in greater or lesser degree, but nevertheless remained free and could accept the offered grace of God. An absolute predestination and an irresistible grace was not taught; the counsel of God consisted in the praescientia and the determination of reward or punishment dependent thereon. God gives over to unbelief those of whom he foreknows that they will not believe, and He elects those whose merits He has foreseen, Justinus, c. Tryph. § 141. Iren. adv. haer. IV 29. Tertull. adv. Marc.
II 23 etc., cf. Münscher—v. Coelln I 356 f. Hagenbach, § 48 and 57.
Calvijn, Inst. II 2, 4, 9. This has essentially remained the standpoint of the Greek church. Man has been weakened and made mortal by sin. Yet he can still will the natural good and also accept or reject the offered grace (gratia praeveniens). If he accepts it, then he is supported by that grace (gratia cooperans), and must persevere to the end, for he can still always fall away.
Those who accept the grace and persevere, God has foreknown and destined for salvation. The others, although He voluntate antecedente wills the salvation of all, He leaves lying in their fall and destines them to destruction, Damascenus, de fide orthod. II 29, 30. Conf. orthod. qu. 26-30.
In the manner of expression Pelagius joined himself to the older writers, but he nevertheless taught, by failure to recognize the doctrine of redemption always simultaneously maintained by the church fathers, something essentially new, Harnack, D. G. III 183. Sin with him was no habitus or state, but only an act, which leaves human nature with its free will completely uninjured. Grace consists in this, that God by creation bestows on man the posse in natura and further in the law and the teaching and the example of Christ offers him an auxilium divinum; this gratia per Christum, however, is bestowed secundum merita upon such as use their free will well. Predestination finally was nothing but a foreseeing by God of the free acts and merits of men and the corresponding [320] fore-determination of reward and punishment. Properly speaking, therefore, there is no predestination on God's side, neither to grace nor to salvation; it depends entirely on the praevisio of the good deeds of man. Only, Pelagius came into a great difficulty with infant baptism, for this was bestowed without any merits; and he could not rescue himself from that except by all manner of evasions and inconsistencies. The doctrine of Pelagius was somewhat softened in what in the Middle Ages was so called semipelagianism of John
Cassian, abbot in Marseille, pupil of Chrysostom and well acquainted with the Greek patres. This one did indeed teach that sin had corrupted human nature. But man was not dead, but sick. He was like a sick person who cannot heal himself but nevertheless can take the medicine to himself and can desire healing; like someone who, having fallen into a pit, cannot save
himself but nevertheless can grasp the rope thrown to him. The sinful man therefore cannot merit grace, but can indeed accept it, and, supported by it, persevere. And God bestows that grace upon those of whom He has foreseen that they would accept it and would persevere in it; so also with children and peoples. He withholds it, on the other hand, from those of whom he foresees the opposite. And herein consists predestination and reprobation; it depends on the praescientia Dei concerning the attitude of man toward the offered grace. Nostrum est velle, Dei perficere. Cf. G. J.
Vossius, Historia Pelagianismi 1618, better edition 1655. Wiggers, Pragm.
Darstellung des Aug. u. Pelag. 1831-33. Wörter, Der Pelag. nach seinem Ursprunge und seiner Lehre, Freiburg 1866. Munscher-v. Coelln I 371 f.
Harnack, D. G. III 151 f. Schwane, Dogm. II2 512 f. Möller, art. Pelagius in Herzog2.
Long before the Pelagian conflict Augustine taught predestination. He came to it through his study of the epistle to the Romans,
Reuter, Augustin. Studien 1887 S. 5 f., and in this wished to give nothing other than the doctrine of Scripture, de dono pers. c. 19. He already gave it in his quaestiones ad Simplicianum of the year 397 and then developed it more broadly in his writings de correptione et gratia 427, de praedestinatione sanctorum and de dono perseverantiae 428 or 429.
Augustine makes a distinction between praescientia and praedestinatio. The former is broader than the latter. Praedestinasse est hoc praescisse, quod
[321] (Deus) fuerat ipse facturus, de dono persev. 18. de praed. sanct. 10.
19. Predestination is nothing other than praescientia scilicet et praeparatio beneficiorum Dei, quibus certissime liberantur quicunque liberantur, de dono pers. 14. This predestination takes place not according to merit or worthiness but out of sheer grace; not only to faith, non eliguntur quia crediderunt sed eliguntur ut credant, de praed. sanct. 17. For all men were
alike, a massa damnata, de civ. XIV 26. de praed. sanct. 8. de nat. et gr. 4. 8 etc. Above all this comes out in the predestination of young children, of whom some perish without baptism and others are preserved through baptism, de praed. sanct. 12. Enchir. 98. Predestination has its sole cause in the sovereign will of God, in his absolute freedom of power. He owes no one anything, and can justly damn all, but according to his good pleasure
He makes the one vessel unto honor and the other unto dishonor, de praed. sanct. 8. Alongside predestination, therefore, reprobation comes to stand.
Augustine more than once reckons this to predestination. He speaks of a praedestinare ad aeternam mortem, de an. et ejus orig. IV 10. de civ. XXII
24, of praedestinati ad sempiternum interitum, in Joh. Ev. tract. 48, of mundus damnationi praedestinatus, ib. 111, of Judas as perditioni praedestinatus, ib. 107 etc. The text 1 Tim. 2:4 was therefore explained by Augustine in a limited sense and in different ways, Enchir. 103. de corr. et gr. 14. Most often, however, predestination is taken as foreordination unto salvation. With the good, predestination is necessary; with the evil, praescientia is sufficient, although this too is again not conceived as purely passive, but as active. For God does not ordain in the same way unto destruction and unto the means leading thereto, namely the sins, as He ordains unto salvation and unto the means that serve thereto. Predestination, namely, with Augustine is always a praedestinatio adaequata, i.e. unto salvation and therefore also unto grace. To the praedestinati belong also those who now do not yet believe or are even not yet born. But their number is fixed and unchangeable. In time they come to Christ, receive baptism, faith, and above all also the donum perseverantiae. For this is bestowed only upon the praedestinati. Whether someone is predestined, he can know only from this, that he perseveres to the end [322] . For God has
received into the church some who are not elect and do not persevere, so that the praedestinati would not exalt themselves and would not seek false rest, de corr. et gr. 13. Why God now preserves only some and lets others perish, is a mystery. Unjust it is not, for He owes no one anything.
Reprobation is an act of justice, just as predestination was an act of grace.
In both God makes his virtues manifest, de civ. XIV 26, cf. Wiggers, I 290 f. Schwane II2 557 f. Baltzer, Des h. Aug. Lehre über Prädest. und Reprob.
Wien 1871. Rottmanner, Der Augustinismus. München 1892.
4. Pelagianism was condemned at the same time as Nestorianism at the council of Ephesus 431. The struggle between the followers of Augustine,
Prosper, Hilary, the anonymous writer of the vocatione omnium gentium, Lucidus, Fulgentius and others, and the Semipelagians, Cassian, Faustus of Reji, the unnamed writer of the much-discussed book Praedestinatus, which arose in the fifth century and was published by the Jesuit Sirmond in 1643,
Gennadius, Vincentius of Lerinum and others, first came to a decision at the Synod of Orange 529. Here, on the one hand, it was clearly taught that the whole man has been corrupted by the sin of Adam, can. 1. 2, has of himself nothing but mendacium et peccatum, can. 22, and that both initium and augmentum fidei is to be ascribed not to ourselves, to our natural powers, to our free will, but to grace, to the infusio, operatio, inspiratio, illuminatio of the H. Spirit in us, who bends (corrigens) our will from unbelief to faith, can. 3-8. But on the other hand, of free will it is only said that it has been weakened by sin, infirmatum, attenuatum, can. 8. 13. 25, that all the baptized by the grace received in baptism, Christo auxiliante et cooperante, can and must fulfill, si fideliter laborare voluerint, what belongs to salvation, can. 13. 25; and furthermore there is complete silence about absolute praedestinatio, gratia irresistibilis, the particularity of grace. This
indecisiveness worked harmfully. This came out clearly in the Gottschalk controversy. Many already then stood on a semipelagian or pelagian standpoint, Hinkmar, Rhabanus, Erigena, and achieved victory at the [323] synod of Quierzy 853. But there were also numerous learned men who absolutely could not reconcile themselves to the condemnation of Gottschalk and the pronouncements of Quierzy. To these belonged
Prudentius, Remigius, Ratramnus, Lupus and others; they defended a gemina praedestinatio; the praedestinatio ad gloriam is without any merit, does not take place on account of praevisa fides, merita, but is the cause of the praedestinatio ad gratiam, fidem, merita etc.; the praedestinatio ad damnationem, however, does not in that way include the praedestinatio ad peccata, but is, at least as reprobatio positiva, dependent on the praescientia and permissio of sins. Hence 1 Tim. 2:4 was still understood in a restricted sense, not of all men head for head but was taken of many or of all kinds of men, and it was considered absurd that Christ would have made satisfaction for all men, thus also for the Heathen, who never hear of Him, and even also for the man of sin, the antichrist. On this standpoint stood also still the synod of Valence 855. Cf. H. Schrörs, Der Streit über die Prädest. in IX Jahrh. Freiburg 1884. Niemeijer, De strijd over de leer der praedest. in de
9de eeuw, Gron. 1889. Schwane, D. G. III 428 f. Denzinger, n. 283 sq. And this is in the main also still the standpoint of scholasticism. The praedestinatio ad mortem is preferably not named by this name, because then it so easily gets the appearance that it, as a means, brings with it the praedestinatio ad peccata, but it is usually treated under the name of reprobatio; sometimes this is then distinguished into negative and positive; the former is ante praevisa merita and an act of sovereignty, but the latter is dependent on and follows upon the praescientia and the decree to permit
sins. Hence 1 Tim. 2:4 is still taken in a restricted sense, and a benevolentia Dei universalis, and a general satisfaction of Christ is not yet taught,
Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 40 and 41 with the comm. of Thomas, Bonaventura, Scotus, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 19 and 23. c. Gent. III 163.
But nominalism, the rejection of the Reformation and Jesuitism have removed the Roman church and theology more and more from Augustine and Paul. Rome did not heed the call to reform with impunity and at Trent established the following dogma: 1o through sin the liberum arbitrium is indeed viribus attenuatum et inclinatum, [324] but not amissum et extinctum, Trid. sess. 6 cap. 1 and can. 5; man can before the justificatio still do many natural things, which are absolutely not sin but truly good, ib. can. 7. 2o. To the good in a supernatural sense, to faith, hope, love, to the justificatio, to the acquiring of eternal life, the natural man, deprived by original sin of the dona superaddita, is not able. For that he needs more than the vires naturae and legis doctrina, namely the divina gratia, the praeveniens Spiritus Sancti inspiratio, ib. can. 1-3. 3o. This gratia divina is bestowed upon the children of believers in baptism, and in adults consists in this, that God calls them objectively through the gospel and subjectively touches their heart per Spiritus Sancti illuminationem. This grace is unmerited, praeveniens, gratia gratis data, ib. cap. 5. 4o. This grace, however, is not irresistible. It indeed rouses man, helps and moves him, and makes him fit to turn to his justificatio, and to free consent to grace; but he can both recipere and abjicere the inspiration of the H. Spirit, ib. cap. 5. If he accepts this grace, and, aroused and moved by it, cooperates with God and by the seven praeparationes makes himself fit and prepares himself, se disponat ac praeparet, for the justificatio, then he receives this in baptism by grace and only according to a meritum ex congruo so called by
scholasticism, ib. cap. 6 and 8 and can. 4. 5o. The gratia infusa of the justificatio remains resistible and losable, but accepted and preserved, it enables one to do good works and according to a meritum ex condigno to merit eternal life, ib. c. 9-16. 6o. In accordance with this Rome has decisively rejected Augustine's doctrine of absolute praedestinatio. Yet in doing so it has always avoided the name of Augustine, made a caricature of his doctrine among his adherents and condemned this. The abovementioned book Praedestinatus represents it as if in the fifth century in Gaul a sect of ultra-praedestinatians had existed, and reproduces Augustinism in paradoxical propositions, which no follower of Augustine has ever taught,
Harnack III 225 f. And likewise in Gottschalk, Bradwardina, Wiclif, Hus, Bajus, Jansenius, Quesnel under a false name genuine Augustinism has been condemned, Denzinger Enchir. § 477 sq. 881 sq. 966 sq. 1216 sq.
Harnack III 628-640. [325] The Tridentinum expresses itself very cautiously about praedestination. On the one hand it seems to teach an election, for it says that no one in this life may determine se omnino esse in numero praedestinatorum, for only from special revelation can one know quos Deus sibi elegerit, VI cap. 12 and can. 15. 16. But on the other hand it expressly teaches that Christ was sent, so that omnes adoptionem filiorum reciperent, that He has made satisfaction for all, VI cap. 2 and 3, that man can accept or reject grace, keep or lose it, and condemns the doctrine: justificationis gratiam non nisi praedestinatis ad vitam contingere; reliquos vere omnes qui vocantur vocari quidem sed gratiam non accipere utpote divina potestate praedestinatos ad malum, ib can. 17, as if this latter were taught by anyone and in that way! The church leaves these two series of pronouncements unreconciled alongside one another; but theology has always and in all kinds of ways attempted an agreement. First, almost all
Roman theologians teach that God voluntate antecedente wills the salvation of all and therefore also has let Christ make satisfaction for all; this voluntas antecedens even extends to children dying unbaptized and to the Heathen.
But according to his voluntas consequens, which takes account of the good or bad use that men make of their freedom and of grace, God does not will the salvation of all. Praedestinatio is here from the beginning already made dependent on praescientia. Next, there has gradually arisen among them and been generally accepted the distinction between the praedestinatio complete and incomplete sumpta, adaequata and inadaequata. By the former is understood praedestination both ad gratiam et ad gloriam; by the latter that which has reference to one of the two. The intention of this distinction is that the praedestinatio ad gratiam and that ad gloriam are not inseparably connected; one can partake of the praedestinatio ad gratiam and have received the grace of faith and of justification and yet lose this again and thus be deprived of the praedestinatio ad gloriam. This separation was unknown to the medieval theologians, Anselmus, Lombardus, Thomas etc., is still contested by some but penetrates further and further. Now as to the praedestinatio ad primam gratiam, this is called by all, in [326] opposition to Pelagianism, unmerited, Rom. 9:16, Joh. 6 vs. 44; it does not take place ob praevisa merita; also it is, in opposition to Semipelagianism, preceding the will of man, gratia praeveniens, praecedens. Because now the praedestinatio ad primam gratiam is the beginning of the praedestinatio completa or adaequata, it can be said that the whole praedestinatio is grace and unmerited, because it is gratuita in causa, while among the Thomists it is gratuita in se. But this does not exclude that this praedestinatio ad primam gratiam and to every following grace would not follow a certain order; according to Molina God has by the scientia media foreseen that
some men would make good use of the grace offered each time and has accordingly decided the distribution of grace. He has also foreseen that the saints by their prayers or by merita de congruo would acquire grace for others, and accordingly decided to grant it to these. Someone cannot merit for himself the praedestinatio ad primam gratiam, but the saints can for others, and above all Christ is causa nostrae praedestinationis. The praedestinatio ad gloriam is according to the Augustinians and Thomists such as Sylvius, Thoma, Salmanticenses, Gonet, Gotti, Billuart, Alvarez,
Lemos, Goudin etc., and also according to Bellarminus and Suarez indeed absolute; God has first decided to grant salvation to some before and apart from all merits and then decided to work them by grace in such a way that they could merit that salvation by their works. But the Molinists, Molina,
Valentia, Vasquez, Tanner, Lessius, Becanus, Petavius, Lapide etc. defend the praedestinatio ad gloriam post praevisa merita. Finally, as to reprobatio, the Augustinians and Thomists are divided; some attach themselves entirely to Augustine, are infralapsarian and let the decree of rejection follow upon original sin and upon this alone, so that reprobation is a justa derelictio in eadem massa (Gonet, Gotti, Gazzaniga); others distinguish between a negative but absolute decree, not to grant salvation to some, and another decree, to withhold grace, to permit sin, and to punish (Alvarez, Estius,
Sylvius, Salmanticenses); still others understand by the decree of rejection nothing but the will of God to permit that some [327] through their own fault perish (Billuart, Goudin), cf. C. Pesch, Praelect. II 217 sq. Jansen,
Prael. III 171 sq. But over against them stand the Molinists, who wholly reject the so-called reprobatio negativa, i.e. an absolute, sovereign decree preceding sin, and teach that God voluntate antecedente wills the salvation of all, and further accept only a reprobatio positiva, i.e. a decree of God to
punish eternally those whose sin and unbelief He has foreseen. Reprobatio is thus in every respect post praevisa merita, and then according to some such as Hinkmar still only a praedestinatio of the punishment for the ungodly, but not of the ungodly for the punishment. Cf. Bellarminus, de gr. et lib. arb. II c. 9-15. Becanus, Theol. schol. I tract. 1 c. 14-16. Petavius, de
Deo, 1. X. Theol. Wirceb. ed. 3 Paris. 1880 III 181-285. Billuart, Summa S.
Thomae, the whole Tom. II. Daelman, Theologia I p. 199-316. Schwetz, Theol. dogm. II § 121. C. Pesch, Prael. II 165-226. Jansen, Prael. theol. II 135-177. Simar, Dogm. p. 556-576 etc.
5. The Reformation went back to Paul and Augustine and found in the confession of God's sovereign election the power to oppose the Pelagianism of the Roman church. All Reformers were unanimous in this. Luther taught and defended predestination in the early period just as strongly as Zwingli and Calvin. Nor did he ever retract it, even though it is also the case that later, against the Anabaptists, he laid more and more emphasis on the revelation of God in word and sacrament, J. Müller, Lutheri de praedest. et lib. arb. doctrina 1852. Schweizer, Die protest. Centraldogmen I 57-94.
Köstlin, Luthers Theol. I 165 f. 286 f. II 32 f. Weber, Luthers Streitschrift de servo arbitrio, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1878 S. 229-249. Max Staub, Das
Verhältniss der menschl. Willensfreiheit zur Gotteslehre bei Luther u.
Zwingli, Zurich 1894. Melanchthon at first taught completely the same, Loci Comm. 1521, cap. de hominis viribus adeoque de libero arbitrio, and also in his comm. on Rom. 9, but from 1527 onward and in the later editions of the Loci from 1535 on and in the Conf. Aug. variata of 1540, came to an ever further deviation from predestination and to an open confession of synergism, Schweizer I 381 f. This synergism, like the universalism of Sam. Huber, was decisively rejected by the genuine
Lutherans, such as Flacius, Wigand, [328] Amsdorf, Hesshusius et al., Frank, Theol. der Concordienformel IV 152. Art. Synerg. in Herzog2. And the Formula concordiae expressed as strongly as possible that man by nature is incapable of any spiritual good and that faith in the absolute sense is a gift of God. This ought to have led to also accepting absolute predestination. But in Luther from the beginning there nevertheless dwelt a somewhat different spirit than in Zwingli and Calvin. With him the confession of predestination rested only on anthropological grounds, on the deep corruption of sin and the impotence of man. If only man had no merit and depended solely on grace, enough seemed to have been done. Luther therefore avoided more and more the speculative doctrine of predestination, the voluntas beneplaciti, the hidden God, held to the administration of word and sacrament, to which grace is bound, and placed the universal saving will of God, voluntas signi, increasingly in the foreground. He silently looked on at Melanchthon's change with respect to this doctrine, and remained with the doctrine of justification by faith. Predestination had no independent theological significance; it was of secondary importance. The synthetic method in this doctrine was opposed; one followed the analytic, from below upward; one did not derive it from the idea of God but only from the condition of man, Schweizer, I 398. 445. 466. Hence the synergism of Melanchthon was indeed still opposed, but gradually predestination itself was also set aside. Hesshusius already brought in against Calvin and Beza, that their doctrine introduced a fatum and made
God the author of sin 1560-61. Marbach in 1561 at Strassburg opposed Zanchius. Andreae did indeed still teach an election whose cause lay only in God's grace, but otherwise held to the preaching of the gospel and remained with the second causes, faith and unbelief, Schweizer, I 477 f. The Formula
concordiae teaches as decisively as possible the servum arbitrium but leaves absolute and particular predestination alone and holds to the universal and earnest will of God in the gospel. It does not deny election, it also does not call praescientia to its aid, it still agrees with the ubi et quando visum est
Deo of the conf. Aug.; election is unconditional and has its cause only in God's will. But it identifies election and [329] predestination, it makes reprobation depend on praescientia; and after it has taught election, it immediately adds, out of fear of all kinds of danger or misuse, that one must not attempt to speculate about that hidden decree, but that one must contemplate the counsel of God in Christ, in the gospel, whose preaching is universal and earnest, and that the cause of perdition is only man's unbelief.
God wills that all be saved; He wills no one's sin and no one's death. After the Formula concordiae, especially also in the struggle against Huber's universalism, there arose among the Lutherans, such as Gerlach, Hunnius,
Lyser, the conception that God voluntate antecedente wills the salvation of all, but voluntate consequente only the salvation of those whose faith and salvation he had foreseen. Toward the end of the century an ever more decisive distinction is made between praescientia and praedestinatio, predestination is equal to election, and is dependent on Christ's merit, the cause of rejection lies in man's sin. The Saxon visitation articles of 1592, drawn up by Hunnius, and the writings of Hunnius de providentia dei et aeterna praedestinatione 1597 and de libero arbitrio 1598 teach this clearly.
Mediation is sought in the earnestness with which the natural man can make use of the means of grace, Schweizer I 526-585. Heppe, Dogm. d. d. Pr. II 1-79. But with this doctrine the Lutherans could not remain standing. When at the Synod of Dordrecht the Remonstrants had been condemned, they felt themselves more and more drawn to these. Although the Reformed always
distinguished between Lutherans and Remonstrants, the former judged more and more that in the Remonstrants their own doctrine was condemned, Schweizer, Centr. II 206 f. The Lutheran theologians of the 17th century approached the Remonstrant confession. They first teach a voluntas Dei antecedens, which caused Christ to die for all, wills the salvation of all and then offers the gospel to all, and thereafter a voluntas consequens, which actually resolves to grant salvation to those, quos in Christum finaliter credituros esse praevidit, and prepares perdition for those who finaliter resist grace, Quenstedt, Theol. did. polem. III p. 1-74. Hollaz,
Examen theol. p. 585-649. Gerhard, Loci theol. loc. VII Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. 196 f. In 1724 Mosheim declared, [330] that the 5 articles of the Remonstrants contained the pure Lutheran doctrine, Schweizer, II 210.
Pietism, rationalism, supranaturalism and the whole intellectual tendency of the eighteenth century was not favorably disposed toward the doctrine of predestination; the voluntas antecedens entirely displaced the voluntas consequens; and under predestination nothing else was understood than the general decree of God, to save men through faith in Christ, Wegscheider,
Inst. theol. § 147. Bretschneider, Dogm. III 127 f. Reinhard, Dogm. 439 f.
Herder considered it a good fortune that the struggle over grace was buried in the stream of oblivion and exclaimed: Verdorren müsse die Hand, die ihn je daraus hervorhebt, Vom Geist des Christ. 154. Leibniz still exerted himself to unite freedom of the will with predestination, Tichler, Theol. des
Leibniz I 357 f. But Kant openly stated that man still had a moralische Anlage and thus could do what he must, Religion, ed. Rosenkranz 50 f.
6. While the Lutherans more and more abandoned the original standpoint of Luther and of the whole Reformation, the Reformed have remained faithful to it; the cause of the schism is therefore not to be sought with
them. Zwingli taught predestination as decisively as possible, not only on anthropological grounds but also especially on theological grounds, derived from the being of God, Anamnema de Providentia, Opera IV 79 sq. Calvin still spoke very softly and modestly in the first edition of his Institutes, but through his study of the Epistle to the Romans, April 1538-1541 in Strasbourg, came to an ever more decisive confession, both with respect to man's unfreedom, II c. 2, and with respect to election, III c. 21 sq. Although guarding himself against the paradoxes of Luther and Zwingli and sometimes presupposing predestination more than teaching it, e.g. in the Catech. Ecclesiae Genev. with preface to the coetus of East Frisia, in Niemeyer Conf. Ref. 123 sq., he nevertheless advocated it with force where it was denied and contested. He defended it against Alb. Pighius of Kampen in his writing: Defensio sanae et orthodoxae doctrinae de servitute et liberatione humani arbitrii 1543. Against Bolsec he wrote de aeterna Dei praedestinatione 1552. Against Rome he directed his Acta Synodi
Tridentinae cum antidoto 1547. And he did not rest, [331] before his doctrine had found acceptance in all Reformation Switzerland, particularly in Zurich, where Bullinger advocated a moderate, infralapsarian conception,
Schweizer, Centr. I 255-292. Through Calvin the doctrine of predestination has been incorporated into the confession of all Reformed churches. Yet from the beginning there has been great difference in the manner of presentation, both in the confessions and among the theologians. Apart from the Repetitio Anhaltina of 1579 in Niemeyer, p. 638, the confessio
Sigismundi of 1613, ib. 650, the colloquium Lipsiense of 1631, ib. 661 sq.
664 sq., which reproduce the Reformed doctrine only impurely, there is among the confessional writings an unmistakable difference. The Catechismus Genevensis of Calvin does not speak at all about
predestination; the Heidelb. Catechismus makes only brief mention of election, q. 52, 54; the Anglican confession speaks only of praedestinatio ad vitam and gives as its object eos quos (Deus) in Christo elegit art. 7; the Confessio Helv. II of Bullinger art. 10 and the Conf. Scotic. I art. 8 speak approximately in the same spirit; the Confessio Gallic. art. 12 and Belgica art. 18 and the Formula cons. Helv. 4-6 are decisive but sober and infralapsarian; the strictest and most Calvinistic are the consensus
Genevensis, the canones of Dordrecht, the Lambeth articles drawn up by Dr. Whitaker 1595, in Schaff, Creeds of Christ. III 523, the Irish articles of 1615, ib. 526, the Westminster Confession c. 3. And likewise there is great distinction among the theologians. There were always those who, out of fear of misuse, treated the doctrine of predestination "a posteriori, from below upward," Trigland, Kerck. Gesch. 79, 84, 85 v. 92 v. 99. They preferred the method of ascending from the effect to the cause, from the fruit to the root, and of concluding from faith and conversion to election and then applying this to comfort and assurance, rather than deriving predestination and election a priori from the idea of God. To these belonged especially Bullinger, Ursinus, Olevianus, Boquinus, Hyperius, Sohnius et al., Heppe Dogm. des d. Protest. II 1-79, Gooszen, in his two works on the Heidelb. Catech. 1890 and 1893. Dr. van 't Hooft, De Theol. van H.
Bullinger 1888, cf. my art. Calv. en Geref., Vrije Kerk, Febr. 1893. But this is no difference in kind and in principle. All the theologians mentioned have repeatedly clearly [332] and unequivocally testified their agreement with the Calvinistic doctrine of predestination, Trigland, Kerck. Gesch. 59-79.
Schweizer, Centr. I passim, cf. II 110. Conversely, the Calvinists also at all times desired sobriety and caution in the treatment of this doctrine. Calvin did not bring it up in the catech. Genev. Dordt, canones I 12, 14 and
Westminster, conf. c. 4 § 8 warn against vain and curious investigations.
Many theologians in the first period treated the doctrine of election not in the locus de Deo but in the locus de salute, Calvin himself, Inst. III c. 2124. Martyr, Loci Comm. 1580 p. 229. Sohnius, Op. I 256. II 42. Musculus,
Loci Comm. cap. 24. Heid. Catech. q. 54. Conf. Belg. art. 16. Gall. art. 12 etc. They thus first follow the order of the apostle Paul, who from the doctrine of sin and of grace in Rom. 9-11 ascends to election and also in Eph. 1:3 proceeds from the blessings of Christ. But just as Paul, having arrived there, then also a priori derives all benefits of salvation from election, Rom. 8:29 v. Eph. 1:4 v., so among the Reformed the analytical method gradually gives way to the synthetic. The life of faith was indeed the condition under which the confession of election arose, but the fact of election was nevertheless the source of all salvation, fundamentum ac prima causa bonorum omnium. This was the conviction not only of Calvin, but also of Melanchthon, Hemming, Bucer, Olevianus etc., in Heppe, Dogm. d. d. Prot. II 12. 20. 27. 70. Musculus says expressly: we treat election after faith, not as though it would only then follow upon it, but in order that from there, as from the stream, we might look up ad ipsum fontem, Loci p. 534.
The systematic order and the theological interest required that predestination be treated in the locus de Deo. Thus it had already been done by scholasticism, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 40, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 23; thus it was done in part also still by the Lutherans, Gerhard loc. VII; and thus it became the usual order among all the Reformed, Hyperius, Meth.
Theol. p. 182. Beza, Tract. Theol. I 171 III 402. Polanus, Synt. IV c. 6-10.
Zanchius Op. II 476. Junius, Maccovius, Maresius, Mastricht etc., whether it was then treated with the doctrine of the attributes of God or also in a separate locus after the Trinity. This difference in order is in itself not
principial and need not be so. [333] But nevertheless it is not accidental that the a priori order has mostly been followed by the Reformed, and, on the other hand, the a posteriori order, which treats predestination at the entrance or in the middle of the locus de salute, has gradually come into use among the Lutherans, the Remonstrants, the Roman Catholics, and most newer dogmaticians. Even then, however, the difference does not consist in this, that the Reformed derive predestination in a speculative manner from an a priori, philosophical, deterministic concept of God and the others adhere to the revelation of God in Christ. For even the strictest Calvinists wish to give in the locus de Deo and in that de decretis nothing other than the doctrine of Scripture, the content of God's revelation. But among the Reformed predestination has not only an anthropological and soteriological, but especially also a theological interest. In it the matter is not first of all the salvation of man but the honor of God. With the synthetic, a priori order too a deep religious interest is involved. The assertion that this order would presuppose a nominalistic concept of God and would offer a dry, lifeless dogma, as some think, e.g. Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1868 S. 107-110.
Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. I 55. Doedes, Ned. Geloofsbel. 185, 203 v. de Cock, Is de leer der absolute praedest. uitgangspunt of resultaat van de leer der Geref. Kerk. 1868, is therefore devoid of all ground. Dry and abstract the doctrine of predestination can be treated just as well in the middle as at the beginning of dogmatics. Truly, saving faith is needed, not only to confess election, but also all other dogmas, also those about God, the Trinity, man, etc. If this consideration were decisive, then all dogmas would have to be moved to after the locus de salute. Dogmatics, however, does not describe the truth as it subjectively comes to the consciousness of believers, but as God has objectively presented it in his word, cf. deel I 49,
50. The synthetic method alone sufficiently maintains the religious interest of the honor of God, cf. Kübel, Herzog2 12, 145 f.
7. Among the Reformed there soon arose yet another difference, that of supraand infralapsarianism. It is rooted in principle already in the struggle of Augustine against the Pelagians. With these. [334] the order of the decrees was as follows: 1o. the decree to create man, 2o. to send Christ on the basis of the foreseen but not previously determined fall, to have Him make satisfaction for all, to have Him preached to all, and to grant to them all a gratia sufficiens, and 3o. on the basis of foreseen faith and perseverance on the one hand and of foreseen unbelief on the other side to elect some to eternal life and to destine others for eternal punishment. With Augustine the order was quite different. Sometimes he also brings reprobation under the praedestinatio, above 321, but even when he does not do that, he conceives the praescientia not negatively and passively but actively. The will of God is after all rerum necessitas, the Gen. ad litt. VI 15; what happens contra Dei voluntatem still does not happen praeter ejus voluntatem; permission is to be thought positively, nec utique nolens sinit sed volens, Enchir. 95. 100. The supralapsarian representation, that reprobation is an act of God's sovereignty, is already contained here. Most of the time, however, Augustine speaks, with respect to the fall, of God's praescientia and permissio, de civ. XIV 11. de trin. XIII 12 etc. The decree of creation and of permission of the fall is then the first; and upon that then follows the second decree of election and rejection. These both presuppose the fallen human race, the massa corrupta, Enchir. c. 98 sq. de corr. et. gr. 7 sq. Augustine is therefore in his representation usually infralapsarian; he does not go back behind the fall; he sees in rejection an act of God's justice.
Bonus est Deus, justus est Deus. Potest aliquos sine bonis meritis liberare,
quia bonus est; non potest quemquam sine meritis damnare, quia justus est, c. Jul. III c. 18. But Augustine also does not place the decree of election and rejection further forward. Only original sin precedes it. This is sufficient for rejection. Actual sins remain, in the decree of rejection, out of account, although they are taken into consideration in the determination of the degree of punishment. Augustine came to this order through what Paul says of Jacob and Esau, Rom. 9:11 and through the lot of unbaptized children dying very early, Enchir. c. 92-99. de civ. XVI 35, de dono pers. c. 8 sq. c.
Julianum IV c. 8. Yet, although original sin is a sufficient reason for rejection, it is also with Augustine not the last and deepest cause. To the question why God [335] rejected some, elected others; and also, why He has definitely rejected these and elected those, there is no answer but the will and good pleasure of God. He has mercy on whom He will and He hardens whom He will, Enchir. 95. de praed. sanct. 8. 9. de corr. et gr. 8.
Finally there then follows a third decree concerning the means that lead to the end. With rejection Augustine does not draw the line through. Indeed he teaches that God also acts positively and actively in sin; God is peccatorum ordinator, Conf. I 10; He judged it good that sin should exist, Enchir. 27. 96. de civ. XXII 1; He punishes sin with sin, c. Jul. V 3. de gr. et lib. arb. 21; but he represents rejection mostly negatively as a praeterire et derelinquere, and usually does not reckon it to the praedestinatio, but identifies this with election and then subsumes both, election and rejection, under the providentia. By contrast, there is indeed a praedestinatio to the means unto salvation. The praedestinatio or election is namely with Augustine always a praedestinatio ad gloriam, and this now of itself brings with it the praedestinatio ad gratiam. The election therefore did not take place because of foreseen faith or foreseen good works; it also did not take place because
of Christ. But it is election to the final end and thus to the means i.e. Christ, who Himself also is predestined, and thus to the calling, baptism, faith, the gift of perseverance; the praedestinatio is a preparation of grace. Those therefore who are elected come, along the way of grace in Christ, infallibly to heavenly salvation, de corr. et gr. 7. 9. 13. de praed. sanct. 10. 19. de dono pers. 18. Many followers of Augustine therefore later came to the doctrine of the gemina praedestinatio, above 323. Alongside the praedestinatio ad gloriam there came to stand, coordinated, a praedestinatio ad mortem. This, however, could nevertheless not be conceived in the same sense as that; and therefore it was distinguished into reprobatio negativa and positiva. The reprobatio negativa then precedes the fall and is an act of sovereignty; it no more took place because of merits than election did,
Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 41. 1; it includes the voluntas permittendi aliquem cadere in culpam and is causa derelictionis, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 23 art.
3, cf. however Daelman, Theol. I 296-303, Billuart, Summa S. Thomae II 459 sq. And thus many Thomists taught, Alvarez, Salmanticenses, Estius,
Sylvius etc., that negative [336] reprobation preceded the fall and was purely an act of God's free power and good pleasure, Pesch, Prael. dogm. II 217 sq. Only, this supralapsarian reprobation was conceived wholly negatively, as the decree of God, not to elect some men, to let them fall and thereafter to destine them to eternal punishment (reprobatio positiva). In substance now Luther, Zwingli, Calvin and all supralapsarian Reformed have taught nothing else. The Roman Catholics do represent it differently, and lay to the charge of the Praedestinatians in the fifth century, of Gottschalk, Bradwardina, Wiclif, and especially of the Reformers, that they taught a praedestinatio ad peccata and made God the author of sin,
Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et stat. pecc. II c. 2 sq. Petavius, de Deo X c. 6
sq. Möhler, Symbolik § 12. But this happens only in order to maintain their own semipelagian standpoint and to bring it into agreement with Augustine and Thomas. The modifications that the Reformers have introduced into the doctrine of Augustine and Thomas are, apart from the doctrine of the assurance of salvation, subordinate and do not touch the essence of the matter. With them they taught that election did not take place ob praevisa merita, but was the source of faith and good works; that the praedestinatio ad gloriam infallibly brought with it that ad gratiam; that the reprobatio negativa was not to be explained as an act of justice but had to be conceived as an act of sovereignty, preceding sin; that this reprobatio negativa brought with it the decree to permit sin, and to leave some lying in their fall; and that the reprobatio positiva took that sin into account. But to that they now often added, that the concepts of praescientia and permissio, though in themselves not wrong, could not or might not be conceived purely passively and, if this happened, in any case offered not the least solution, and that the distinction of reprobatio negativa and positiva had little value. Thereby all three Reformers came to the so-called supralapsarian representation of the doctrine of praedestination, according to which the two decrees of election and rejection are to be regarded as acts of God's sovereignty, preceding those concerning the fall, sin, and redemption in Christ. Calvin in particular often intentionally remains with the proximate causes of salvation and perdition and then reasons in an infralapsarian way. A reprobate [337] should not seek the cause of his punishment in God's decree but in the corruption of his nature, which is his own fault, Inst. III 23, 9. Elect and reprobate were both equally guilty, but God is merciful toward the former, righteous toward the latter, ib. III 23, 11. Under the clay, Rom. 9:21, are to be understood the fallen men, of whom God elects some and leaves others
over exitio suo, cui natura obnoxii sunt omnes, comm. on Rom. 9:21, de aet. praedest. C. R. XXXVI 287. The fall in Adam is propinqua reprobationis causa, comm. on Rom. 9:11. God hates in us nothing but sin,
C. R. ib. 295. 315. And of this representation, quod ex damnata Adae sobole Deus quos visum est eligit, quos vult reprobat, Calvin says, sicuti ad fidem exercendam longe aptior est, ita maiore fructu tractatur.... sicuti non solum ad pietatem potius conducit, sed magis videtur mihi theologica, plus convenable à la chrestienté et aussi pour plus édifier, C. R. XXXVI 317.
But this nevertheless does not satisfy Calvin. Sin may be the proximate cause of rejection, it is not the last, C. R. ib. For it cannot be represented thus, that God decided to create man without a prior plan, then looked on and waited what man would do and thereafter only, knowing this beforehand, proceeded to election and rejection. The praescientia and the permissio give no solution, for God, knowing the fall beforehand, could have prevented it; He has therefore voluntarily permitted it because He judged this good, Inst. I 18, 1. II 4, 3. III 23, 6-8. C. R. ib. 359. XXXVII
291. 294. Therefore Adam's fall, sin in general and all evil is not only foreseen by God but also in a certain sense willed and determined by Him, ib. There must therefore, though hidden for us, be a reason why God has willed the fall; there is yet an altius Dei consilium, which precedes the fall,
C. R. XXXVI 288. When Pighius then also objects to Calvin, that on his standpoint discretionem inter electos ac reprobos priorem fuisse hominis lapsu in mente divina, then Calvin does indeed answer, that Pighius confuses the causae proximae et remotae, that every reprobate must seek the causa proxima in his own sin and that also on the other standpoint equal objections remain in existence, but he does not reject Pighius' inference; there is an arcanum Dei consilium, which precedes the fall, C. R. XXXVI
296 sq. Rejection as well as [338] election has its last and deepest cause in God's will, Inst. I 18, 2. III 22, 11. III 23, 1, 2, 7, 8. C. R. XXXVI 278, 317. etc. With Calvin therefore the supralapsarian representation alternates with the infralapsarian, Rivetus, de praed. et elect. nomine et objecto, Op. II.
Twissus, Vind. gr. 1652 I 105 sq. Petavius, de Deo X c. 6 sq. Kreyher, Die Erwählungslehre Zw. u. Calv. Stud. u. Krit. 1870, 3tes Heft. Later supralapsarianism was taught by Beza, Tract. theol. I 171-205. 360 sq. III 402-407. Piscator, de gratia Christi. Polanus, Synt. IV c. 7-10. Ferrius,
Specimen schol. orthod. c. 26. Withaker, Op. I 692. Perkins, Works I 761806. Twissus, Op. I 35, sq. Gomarus, Op. 1664 I 428 sq. II 24 sq.
Maccovius, Loci C. c. 25. Voetius, Disp. I 354 sq. Heydanus, Corpus theol.
I loc. 3. Burman, Synopsis I c. 38 § 13 sq. Wittichius, Theol. pacif. § 255 sq. Comrie, Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. VI and VII, especially p. 376 ff. Kuyper,
Heraut 584.
According to the supralapsarian conception, a knowledge of God of all possibilities precedes all decrees, scientia simplicis intelligentiae.
According to the rule quod ultimum est in executione, primum est in intentione, God in his first decree established the end, for which He would create and govern all things, namely, in the eternal blessedness and in the eternal punishment of certain possible men, creandi et labiles, to reveal His virtues, specifically His mercy and His justice. In order that these virtues might be revealed, a second decree had to determine that there would exist a humanity in so pitiable and miserable a condition that it could be the object of that mercy and justice. In order that such men might come to be, it had to be determined in a third decree that a man would be created, adorned with God's image and head of humanity, and that that man permissione efficaci would fall and would drag all his descendants along in his fall. And
finally God had to indicate in a fourth decree how His mercy would be shown to the elect in the appointment of a Mediator, in the gift of faith and in preservation unto the end, and how, on the other hand, His justice would be revealed in the reprobate in the free withholding of the saving grace of God and in the handing over to sins. Election and reprobation in this order of the [339] decrees preceded not only faith and unbelief, renewal and hardening, but also the fall and creation. However, one objection at once presented itself here. It was established Reformed doctrine that the election of Christ and of the church took place in one decree, in connection with each other, and thus had as its object the Christus mysticus. But in the supralapsarian order the election of the church is detached from that of Christ and separated from it by the decree of creation and fall. Comrie attempted to meet that objection, Ex v. 't Ontw. v. Tol. VII 346v., and he therefore taught that the elect are elected before the decree of creation and fall to union with the Christ. This union is so intimate and indissoluble that, when those elect will fall, as is afterwards determined in the decree, Christ who was elected as Head, will now also be elected as Mediator of reconciliation. Thus Comrie perceived that the election of the church as the body of Christ could not be separated from that of Christ as Head of the church. And so he placed the election of both before the decree of creation and of the fall. Election thus now, with the possible men, also received a possible Christ as its object. The churches, however, had always had objections to this supralapsarian conception. It has been included in no single confession. At the synod at Dordrecht there were indeed a few adherents of this view, especially Gomarus and Maccovius, Acta syn.
Dordr. Sess. 107, v. d. Tuuk, Joh. Bogerman, bl. 224 v., Kist en Royaards, Archief v. Kerkgesch. III 1831 bl. 505 v. The delegates of South Holland
and Friesland also preferred no decision in this question. But all the judgments of domestic and foreign theologians, even those of Geneva, were infralapsarian. And the synod defined the electio as that decree of God, quo.... e universo genere humano, ex primaeva integritate in peccatum et exitium sua culpa prolapso.... elegit, Can. I 7. It did not condemn supralapsarianism, it left the private opinion of Gomarus as it was but did not accept it, van der Tuuk bl. 227 v. Only the synod at Westminster in cap.
3 of its confession deliberately left this question undecided and chose no party between infraand supralapsarianism.
And furthermore infralapsarianism found support among the theologians in Martyr, Loci C.
232 sq. Zanchius, Op. II 485 sq., who are wrongly counted among the supralapsarians by Vitringa [340] II 41, Bogerman in van der Tuuk bl. 226,
349, Polyander, Rivetus, Walaeus, H. Alting, Molinaeus, Wendelinus, Spanheim, Fr. Turretinus, Heidegger etc., especially also Maresius, who in various writings defended infralapsarianism against Voetius, and others, cf. also Walch, Bibl. theol. sel. II 1024 sq.
8. Yet this milder form of the doctrine of predestination also soon found opposition. In the century of the Reformation it was already contested by Erasmus, Bibliander, Pighius, Bolsec, Trolliet, Castellio, Ochinus e. a. The Socinians wholly denied predestination, taught only a decree of God to grant eternal life to those who keep his commandments and to punish the others, and sacrificed even God's omniscience to the freedom of the human will, Socinus, Praelect c. XIII. Crell, de Deo et ejus attrib. c. 32. Fock, Der
Socin. 653 f. In this country it met with objections from many, such as Coolhaes, Duifhuis, Coornhert, Sybrants, Herberts, Wiggerts and then especially from Arminius. He understood by predestination the eternal decree of God, to save in and for and through Christ those of whom He
foresaw that they would believe by virtue of the gratia praeveniens and would persevere by virtue of the gratia subsequens, and to punish the others, who would not believe or persevere, Arminii Opera 1629 p. 119,
283, 389 etc. Arminius still intended to maintain the necessity of grace and faith as a gift; and his followers attempted the same in their remonstrance of the year 1610 art. 3 and 4, in Scholten L. H. K. II 458. But this grace was nevertheless always resistible, art. 4, 5, and the general will of God to save all men, the general satisfaction of Christ, the general offer of the sufficient means of grace, and the objection of the then nevertheless always fixed and certain praescientia Dei with respect to who would and would not believe, necessitated laying the decision more and more in the hands of man,
Scholten II 472 v. In the later remonstrant writings this comes out clearly, in the letter of Episcopius to the Reformed abroad, in the second remonstrance of the year 1617, in Schweizer, Centr. II 89 f. 106 f., in the confession and apology of the confession in Episcopius, Opera II 69 f. [341] 95 f., in the dogmatic works of Uytenbogaert, Instruction in the christ. doctrine, 2nd ed.
1640, Episcopius, Opera I 410 sq. Limborch, Theol. Christ. II c. 18 sq. and IV. Remonstrantism prepared rationalism. It was indeed condemned at the synod of Dordt, but as a spiritual tendency it found entrance more and more in all churches and countries in the 17th and 18th century. It even received support from the Reformed side in the school at Saumur. Here Amyraldus taught a double decree. God first decreed in general that all without distinction who believed in Christ would be saved; but by his praescientia knowing that no one could believe of himself, He added to the first, general and conditional decree a second, particular and absolute decretum, to grant to some the grace of faith and to save them, Traité de la prédestination
1634. Synt. thesium in acad. Saumur. 1665 pars II p. 107 sq. cf. Rivetus,
Opera III 828-852. Spanhemius, de gratia univers. 18. 40. Examen v. h.
Ontwerp v. Toler. VI 195 v. VII 314 v. 450 v. Schweizer, Centr. II 225 f.
Scholten L. H. K. II 612 v. Walch, Bibl. II 1028. The first, general decree, if it meant anything, entirely pushed the second aside. In spite of the condemnation in the Formula consensus of 1675 can. 4-6 it broke through and led in Pajon to denial of the gratia efficax. In all Reformed churches an Arminian direction gained ground. All the directions and sects that arose in the 17th and 18th century, neonomianism, deism, quakerism, methodism etc. showed weaker or stronger affinity with Arminius. Only a few theologians held out here and there, such as Comrie, Holtius and Brahe in this country, Boston and the Erskine's in Scotland, and especially also
Jonathan Edwards 1703-1758 in America.
Deeper study of nature, history, and man has, in this century, demonstrated the untenability of deistic Pelagianism. And in its place there has arisen a pantheistic or materialistic determinism, more ethically or more physically tinged. Naturally, despite an appearance of agreement between this determinism and the doctrine of predestination, there is a principled distinction. In pantheism and materialism there is no place at all for a counsel of God; there remains only room for an unconscious fate, a blind nature, an alogical [342] will. Yet many have understood and explained the ecclesiastical doctrine of predestination in such a deterministic sense,
Biedermann, § 847 f. Strauss II 362 f. 462 f. Scholten, L. H. K. passim, especially II4 453-605, De vrije wil, 1859 bl. 385 v. Hartmann,
Religionsphilosophie II 174 f. 216 f. 271 f. From this standpoint it is said: so gewiss jeder Mensch zum Bösen nicht bloss prädisponirt sondern auch prädeterminirt ist, so gewiss ist auch jeder zum Guten nicht bloss prädisponirt sondern prädeterminirt.... so gewiss es keinen schlechthin
Verworfenen giebt, so gewiss keinen schlechthin Erwählten, denn auch der Verworfenste trägt die Gnade in gewissem Grade in sich und auch der
Begnadeste ist nicht vom aktuellen Bösen eximirt, Hartmann, ib. 217. In substance Schleiermacher also agrees with this, Chr. Gl. II § 117-120; for although he proceeds from the church doctrine and holds fast to the revelation in Christ, yet he distinguishes election and reprobation only with respect to time; there are no reprobates in the strict sense, everyone would, under other circumstances, already have been converted here, or comes later to conversion. All thoughts of earlier and later times return in more recent theology. First, many try to evade the whole doctrine of predestination by the remark that eternity is not a time before time, that the decrees of God therefore cannot be conceived as ready and finished many centuries beforehand, but that the whole predestination with election and reprobation is nothing other than the eternal immanent acting and ruling of God revealing itself in time; the decrees are nothing other than the facts of history itself, Schweizer, Christl. Glaub. II 254 f. Lipsius Dogm. § 540. In this way, however, the whole distinction between eternity and time, between God and world, is erased and theism is exchanged for pantheism. Therefore others do indeed assume an eternal decree of God, but one that consists in nothing other than the voluntas antecedens, whereby God sincerely wishes and wills the salvation of all. In history, however, this general decree becomes, at least temporally, particular. For God proceeds historically in carrying it out. The object of election is not individual persons, but the congregation. God calls peoples, and He does so successively, according as, in the course of the ages, under His guidance they have become receptive and ripe for the higher religion of [343] Christianity. And among those peoples He also calls the particular persons again successively and in
connection with their people, their disposition, their upbringing. The election of the one people and of the one man is therefore not at the expense but for the benefit of others. Not all can be the first. The peoples and persons now temporarily passed over, i.e. reprobated, come later in this life or probably after this life to true conversion. In any case there is no decree of reprobation on God's side that would exclude certain persons from salvation; at most, on man's side a lasting resistance and a positive hardening is possible, which causes him to be eternally lost, Martensen §
206 f. Lipsius § 541-548. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 112 f. Luthardt, Komp. der Dogm. § 32 f. Nitzsch, Evang. Dogm. 607. Still others go a step further and teach that to that general decree there is added yet another particular decree, in which God determined to save those whose faith and perseverance He has foreseen and known in advance, and, on the other hand, to punish the others eternally. But all agree in this, that they ascribe the decision for eternity to the power of man. Yet again in different ways.
The power to accept or reject grace belongs, according to the one, to man already from creation or from the pedagogical guidance of God's general providence, J. Müller, Dogm. Abhandl. 243 f. Id. Lehre v. d. Sünde II 313 f.
Nitzsch, Syst. d. Chr. Lehre § 144. Kübel in Herzog2 12, 161, cf. 15, 112.
Ebrard, Dogm. § 325. 344, also Ch. de la Saussaye in mijne Theol. van ch. d. l. S. 64v.; according to the other, from the gratia praeparans and antecedens, which is bestowed upon man in baptism or in the preaching of law and gospel, Kliefoth, Acht Bücher von der Kirche 1854 cf. Müller,
Dogm. Abhandl. 247 f. Sartorius, Lehre v. d. h. Liebe I3 174 f. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk II3 278. 286. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. § 40. 41.
Dorner, Glaub. III 703-724. Lipsius § 541; or else the reconciliation is sought in this, that grace is bestowed upon those who make good use of the
natural powers of the will and with earnestness investigate God's word, etc., Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. IV 1, S. 72 f., cf. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. II 511. Finally, predestination in the Augustinian sense is still taught by some, such as Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 535 s. Shedd, [344] Dogm. Theol. I 393 s. Strong,
Syst. Theol. New-York 1890 p. 171 s. Böhl, Dogm. 124 f. 527 f. etc. It is noteworthy that in America the Lutheran churches, united in the Missouri synod, have approached Calvinism, Dieckhoff, Der missour.
Prädestinatismus u. die Concordienformel, Rostock 1884, whereas the Cumberland Presbyterian Church has modified the Westminster confession in an Arminian spirit, Schaff, Creeds III 771. In the revision of the Westminster confession, which was brought up for consideration some years ago in Scotland and America, many also raised objections against the doctrine of election and reprobation, the perdition of children dying in earliest infancy and of heathens, and in general against the one-sided proceeding of the confession from the sovereignty of God with disregard of His universal love.
9. By the counsel of God is to be understood his eternal decree concerning all that in time shall be or shall happen. Scripture proceeds everywhere from the fact that all that is and happens is the realization of God's thought and will, and finds its model and foundation in God's eternal counsel, Gen.
1, Job 28:27, Spr. 8:22, Ps. 104:24, Spr. 3:19, Jer. 10:12, 51:15, Hebr. 11:3, Ps. 33:11, Jes. 24:24-27, 46:10, Spr. 19:21, Hd. 2 vs. 23, 4:28, Ef. 1:11 etc.
It is already the privilege of man, to act after deliberation and counsel. With a rational being, thought, the intention, precedes the deed. Much more is this the case with the Lord our God, without whose knowledge and will nothing can come into existence. Among Christians, therefore, there can also be no difference about the existence of such a counsel of the Lord.
Only pantheism, which acknowledges no life and consciousness in God of his own, distinct from the world, can raise objection against that. But for that reason this is placed before the choice, either to deny the logos in the world and to derive it from a blind will, or to acknowledge the logos in the world but then also to assume in God a consciousness which contains the ideas of all things. The logos in the world presupposes the logos in God.
There could be no thought in the creation, if it had not been created with understanding and with wisdom. This thought of the Lord which is embodied in the creation is further not to be conceived as an uncertain notion, of which the realization remains doubtful [345]; it is no nuda praescientia, which receives its content from the creatures; no plan, design, intention, of which the execution can be frustrated. But it is both at the same time, an act of God's understanding and of his will. Therefore
Scripture speaks of counsel, of the thoughts of his heart, Ps. 33:11, of counsel of his will, Ef. 1:11, of predestination and preordination, Hd. 2:23,
4:28, Rom. 8:29; God speaks and it is, He commands and it stands. The counsel of God is of such a nature, that in its time it necessarily brings about the execution. It is efficacious, Jes. 14:27, Ps. 115:3, 135:6, unchangeable, Jes. 46:10, Ps. 33:11, Hebr. 6:17, Jak. 1:17, independent, Mt.
11:26, Ef. 1:9, Rom. 9:11, 20, 21. Yet there is between the decree and the execution a distinction just as between God's being and his works outward.
The decree of God is an opus ad intra, immanent in the Divine being, eternal and standing outside time. Indeed it has been objected against this, that eternity cannot and may not be thought of as a time before time, and that the counsel of God and his election therefore also may not be understood as a decree that was taken ages beforehand. This remark is also correct in itself. Eternity is essentially distinct from time. The counsel of
God is no more than generation an act of God in the past; it is an eternal act of God, eternally completed and eternally continuing, outside and above time, Martyr, Loci Comm. p. 230b. It is no fruit of all kinds of reasoning and consideration, so that God would first for a time have been without decree, undecided, without will, as Scaliger rightly remarked, Moor, Comm. in Marck. I 900. Vitringa II 13. Heppe, S. 101-102. And it is just as little to be conceived as a plan that lies ready somewhere and now waits for execution. But the counsel of God is the eternally active will of God, the willing, decreeing God himself, not something accidental in God but one with his being. God cannot be thought of as not willing, as undecided,
Maccovius, Loci Comm. 129. Mastricht III 1, 28. Turretinus, Theol. El. IV 1, 7. Examen v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. 6e Sam. 164-166. But thereby the counsel of God nevertheless remains maintained as an opus ad intra, determined by nothing but by God himself, distinct from the works of God in time, Hd.
15:18, Ef. 1:4.
The content and object of this counsel of God are all things, [346] which are and will happen in time, in one word the world-idea, the κοσμος νοητος.
This world-idea stands in close connection with the being of God, but may nevertheless not be identified with the being of God and thus also not with the Son, the Logos. It stands to the being of God in the same relation as the Weltbewusstsein to the self-consciousness of God. The self-knowledge of God does not exhaust itself in the world, any more than his power or any of his virtues. But the world is indeed a suitable instrument, to bring all God's virtues to revelation in a creaturely manner. The world-idea is so conceived by God, that it can radiate his glory and can bring his perfections to contemplation according to the measure of the creature. It is a mirror, in which God displays his image. It is the creaturely reflex of his adorable
being; finite, limited, inadequate but nevertheless true and faithful imprint of his self-knowledge. In relation to the world itself this counsel of God is therefore both causa efficiens and causa exemplaris. Causa efficiens, for all creaturely being can of course come into existence only through and as a consequence of the decree and the will of God. The decree is the womb of all things, Zef. 2:2. All that is, finds its last, deepest ground in the good pleasure of God, in the εὐδοκια του θεου. Higher we cannot climb. Why all things are and are thus, finds for us its last answer in the Deus voluit, in his absolute sovereignty. But the counsel of God is also causa exemplaris of all that is and happens. We think the things, after and as they are. For God the things are, after and as they have been thought by Him. Just as Moses had to make the tabernacle according to the pattern, shown to him on the mountain, Hebr. 8:5, just as every πατρια in heaven and on earth is named from the Father, Ef. 3:15, so all that is temporal is an image of the eternal, all that is being a shadowing of the thought, and in the deepest ground all that is and happens a reflection of the Divine being. Although objection has been made to it, because the world-idea does not coincide with God's being, yet the word of Thomas can be understood in a good sense, Deus secundum essentiam suam est similitudo omnium rerum, S. Theol. I qu. 15 art. 1. qu.
44 art. 3, cf. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 36. Polanus, Synt. p. 268. Gomarus, Theses Theol. IX § 28-30. Amesius, Medulla Theol. I 7. 13 sq. Heidegger,
Corpus [347] Theol. V 12. Turret. Th. El. IV 1, 7. Mastricht III 1, 28. Moor I 903 sq. Therefore this counsel of God is not to be thought otherwise than as a single, simple decree. At the Westminster synod there was discussion about whether one would speak of decree in sing. or in plur. The confession uses the word only in the singular. And indeed the world-idea in the Divine consciousness is one simple conception. Just as Minerva comes forth
wholly grown from Jupiter's head, just as genius suddenly and at once grasps the idea of a work of art, so in the self-consciousness of God the world-idea is eternally completed. But just as an artist can carry out his conception only gradually, so God spreads the one thought of his counsel piece by piece in time before the eyes of his creatures. The world-idea is one; but, realizing itself, it unfolds itself in all its richness in the forms of space and time. In creatures and in a creaturely manner, that is outside himself, God can reveal his love and thus all his virtues in no other way than in the forms of length and breadth, of depth and height, Ef. 3:18, 19.
Thus alone do we learn to know something of God's manifold wisdom and of his unsearchable riches. But thus the one, simple and eternal decree of God also unfolds itself in time before our eyes into a multiplicity of things and events, each of which in turn points back at a moment to the one decree of God and makes us, in a human manner, speak of many decrees of God.
This manner of speaking is not to be disapproved, provided only that the unity of the decree in God and the unbreakable connection of all particular decrees is maintained and acknowledged.
10. In the counsel of God, first of all that decree is to be distinguished which formerly was generally designated by the name of providentia. The word προνοια, providentia, providence, originally means nothing else than foreseeing, providing beforehand, deliberating beforehand. Thus the word was also at first understood in theology. The providence of God was therefore reckoned among the decrees and discussed under the will of God.
It was then defined as ratio ordinis rerum in finem, i.e. as that act of God's intellect and will whereby He from eternity has ordered all things to an end established by Him. As such a ratio ordinis it is indeed to be [348] distinguished from the execution in time, i.e. from the exsecutio ordinis,
which more particularly bore the name of gubernatio, Boethius, de consol. phil. IV pr. 6. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 35 n. 1. Thomas. S. Theol. I qu. 22 art. 1. c. Gent. III 77. And thus the providentia is conceived as a decree of God, besides by many Roman theologians, Petavius, de Deo VIII. Theol.
Wirceb. III p. 175 sq. Perrone, Prael. II 233 c. Pesch, Prael. dogm. II 158, also in the first period by many Reformed theologians, Ursinus, Explic.
Catech. qu. 27. Zanchius Op. II 324, 436. Maresius, Syst. theol. IV § 19.
Conf. Helv. II art. 6, cf. later on the government of God. In this sense the providentia is a consilium or decretum, according to which, as according to the exemplar, God in time preserves and governs all things. But later the name providentia has come most into use for the act of preservation and government itself, as Zwingli, Calvin, Polanus, the Synopsis etc., already treat it in that sense after the creation. The name matters less, but it is of importance that the decree of God includes all things, not only the determination of the eternal state of rational creatures (praedestinatio), but the ordering and arrangement of all things without distinction. And this was formerly indicated by the name providentia. Predestination therefore did not come to stand by itself separately, but was connected with the decree of God concerning all things and was only a particular application thereof. As Zwingli expressed it: est autem providentia praedestinationis veluti parens; predestination is providence itself, insofar as it is related to the eternal lot of men and angels. The Reformed expressed this, in closer adherence to Scripture, which does not speak of προνοια, by the counsel of God. This includes all things and thus in the first place has reference to the world in its entirety. Everything, also in unconscious nature, is and happens according to the counsel of God. Underlying all things are his ordinances. Heaven and earth, light and darkness, day and night, summer and winter, sowing and
harvest etc. are both in their unity and in their diversity ordered by Him who is wonderful in counsel and great in deed, Gen. 1:14, 26, 28, 8:22, Ps.
104:5, 9, 119:90, 91, 148:6, Job 38:10 v., Jes. 28:29, Jer. 5:24, 31:25 v., 33:20, 25. Insofar now as the counsel of God has irrational nature as its object, it is, except by the Manicheans etc., almost unanimously acknowledged. And also [349] there is still great unanimity when such a counsel and ordering of God is assumed in a more special sense for rational creatures. The creation of the human race, Gen. 1:26, the division of the peoples, Gen. 11, the determination of their times and their dwelling, Hd.
17:26, the difference between peoples and men in gift, disposition, rank, station, wealth, condition etc., Deut. 32:8, Spr. 22:2, Mt. 25:15; even the inequality within the congregation in all kinds of gifts, 1 Cor. 4:7, 12:7-11,
Rom. 12:4 v. find their deepest cause in the will of God. All being and all diversity of being is only to be explained from his good pleasure. The ground of the existence and of the thus-existence of all things rests only in God. That something is and that it is precisely this and not something else; that there is manifold being and life; that there is endless diversity among creatures in species, kind, duration, rank, station, possession etc. is only
God's good pleasure. And this good pleasure does not presuppose but creates its object. If the animals could speak and contended with their
Creator because they are not, as we are, men, everyone would consider that absurd, says Augustine, de verbis apost. sermo 11, cf. Calv. Inst. III 22, 1.
And indeed nothing befits any creature other than to acquiesce in the good pleasure of God. There is in fact only a choice between these two, that the creature either be its own maker and thus cease to be creature, or that the creature remain creature from the beginning to the end and thus have to thank God alone for its existence and thus-existence. As soon, however, as
that counsel of God was also extended to the moral world, opposition has arisen from all sides. Here the counsel of God had its end, this was the special domain of man, here man appeared as the creator of his own lot. In order to maintain freedom, responsibility, guilt etc., Pelagius distinguished between the natural and the moral world, between the posse and the velle and withdrew the latter from the counsel and providence of God. And all
Pelagianism aims to make the moral world for a part or in its entirety independent over against God. This attempt, however, deserves to be rejected in itself and wholly in general already. First, it is in conflict with Scripture. For although Scripture maintains the moral nature of man at all times as strongly as possible, it never seeks to do so by making a dualistic separation [350] between natural and moral world and withdrawing the latter from God. God's counsel extends over all things, also over the moral, over evil as well as over good. Next, such a separation is in fact impossible.
The world-idea is one organic whole. Physis and ethos stand in the closest connection and at every moment interpenetrate each other. Distinction there is very certainly; but separation there is nowhere; there is no point in creation to be indicated where the counsel and government of God ends and the independent will and act of the creature begins. Above all in this century the historical and organic view has driven out and condemned this Pelagian separation at every point. But further, this dualism would withdraw the greatest and most important part of the world from God's counsel and deliver it into the hands of chance and arbitrariness. Yes, not only from God's counsel and will, but even from his knowledge the world is then for a great part withdrawn. If God and his creature can be thought of only as competitors and the one can preserve his freedom and independence only at the expense of the other, then God must be more and more limited in his
knowing and willing; Pelagianism banishes God from the world, it leads to deism and atheism, and sets the arbitrariness, the folly of man upon the throne. Therefore the solution of the problem must be sought in another direction, namely, in such a way that God, because He is God and the world is his creature, by his infinitely great knowing and willing does not destroy but precisely creates and maintains the independence and freedom of the creatures.
11. With the providentia generalis and specialis, however, Pelagianism does not yet raise itself in its full strength; it acknowledges this to a certain extent. But then it acts in a combative manner especially when the eternal state of rational creatures, the particular decree of praedestinatio, comes under discussion. Now praedestinatio is only a further application of the counsel, the providentia of God. Just as no separation can be made between the natural and the moral world, so no boundary can be indicated between what relates to the temporal and what relates to the eternal state of rational creatures. Yet Pelagianism has here exchanged praedestinatio for praescientia and [351] defined predestination as that decree of God whereby
He has determined eternal salvation or punishment for those whose persevering faith or unbelief he had foreseen beforehand. However generally this conception has now been accepted in the Christian church—it is, after all, shared by the Greek, Roman, Luth., Remonstr., Anabapt.,
Methodist. church etc.—it is nevertheless decisively contradicted both by Scripture, and by religious experience, and by theological thinking. First,
Scripture teaches clearly and plainly that faith and unbelief, salvation and perdition are not merely an object of the nuda praescientia Dei, but are determined by his will and decree. The προγνωσις in Rom. 8:29, 11:2, 1
Petr. 1:2, cf. Hd. 2:23 is not passive foreknowing, not a state of
consciousness but, like the hebr. ידע Hos. 13:5, Am. 3:2 etc., a selfdetermination of God preceding the realization in history, to enter into a definite relation to the objects of his foreknowledge; it stands in the closest connection with the προθεσις, προορισμος and ἐκλογη and is an act of his εὐδοκια. Second, it is the teaching of Scripture that faith cannot arise from the natural man, 1 Cor. 2:14, that it is a gift of God, Ef. 2:8, Phil. 1:29, 1
Cor. 4:7, and that it therefore does not precede election but presupposes it and is its fruit and operation, Rom. 8:29, Ef. 1:4, 5, Hd. 13:48. Third, it is the unanimous testimony of all religious, Christian experience, that salvation both in an objective and in a subjective sense is solely and only
God's work. In doctrine someone may be Pelagian, in the practice of the Christian life, in prayer above all, every Christian is Augustinian. Then he excludes all boasting and gives God alone the honor. Augustine therefore rightly said that the faith of the ancient church in God's grace had expressed itself not so much in the opuscula as in the prayers, de dono pers. 23, cf.
Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 16. Fourth, the praescientia Dei is nevertheless of such a nature that its object is foreknown as indubitably certain, and then it is equal to praedestinatio; if, however, the object is totally contingent and arbitrary, praescientia also cannot be maintained. According to the Greek,
Roman and Lutheran churches, and even according to the Remonstrants in their remonstrance, who all seek to evade praedestinatio by praescientia, the number of those who believe and [352] will be saved is just as fixed and certain as according to Augustine and the Reformed. Augustine said: certus est praedestinatorum numerus qui neque augeri potest neque minui, de corr. et gr. 13. And thus it is taught by Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 40. Thomas, S.
Theol. I qu. 23 art. 6. 7, cf. qu. 24 and all Roman theologians, even though they differ in this, that some derive that certainty of the outcome more from
the will, and others, such as Molina e. a., more from the knowing of God, Perrone, Prael. theol. II 249. Pesch, Prael. theol. II 205. Jansen, Prael. theol. dogm. III 143. The Lutheran theologians later did indeed make praedestinatio depend on praescientia but nevertheless never called the certainty and unchangeableness of the outcome into doubt, Gerhard, Loci
Theol. loc. VII § 212 sq. Quenstedt, Theol. did. polem. III p. 20. Hollaz, Examen theol. p. 641. Scripture spoke in many places, Dan. 12:1, Mt.
24:24, 25:34, Joh. 10:28, Rom. 8:29-30, 1 Petr. 1:2-4 too clearly and too strongly for this unchangeableness to be able to be denied. Both formaliter and materialiter, both as to quantity and quality, the number of those who are saved stands immovably fixed according to the confession of all
Christian churches. But if this is acknowledged and conceived, praescientia is one and the same with providentia and praedestinatio. God has foreknown who would believe, and knows that eternally and unchangeably.
Thus these in time also will certainly and infallibly come to faith and to salvation. For freedom in the sense of chance and arbitrariness, on this standpoint there remains nowhere any room. Praescientia includes praedestinatio. If one says, like Castellio, in Schweizer, Centrald. II 278, that God has foreknown the contingent precisely as contingent, then one falls back into the line of thought of Augustine and can thereby just as well bring freedom into agreement with praedestinatio. The question is precisely whether the free, contingent as such can be known eternally as certain and infallible. If yes, then Augustine is right and the whole doctrine of praescientia is unnecessary. If no, then one must go further and also deny praescientia; then the outcome of world history must remain absolutely contingent and as such incalculable and unknowable. Cicero already saw this and therefore also denied praescientia, cf. above 208v. Later the
Socinians, the Remonstrants, Episc. Inst. [353] theol. IV sect. 2 c. 18.
Vorstius in Scholten II 492 and many theologians in more recent times followed him, who, for the maintenance of creaturely freedom, have assumed a self-limitation of God in his knowing, willing, and being able,
Weisse, Philos. Dogm. § 509. Martensen § 115. 116. Rothe, Ethik § 42.
Dorner, Gl. I 319 f. Hofstede de Groot, Inst. theol. nat. ed. 3 p. 183 e. a., cf.
Scholten, L. H. K. II 490. Yet the Christian churches have not dared this consequence. All confess the providentia and the praescientia Dei.
Everything happens in time as it is eternally known by God. The end result and the ways and means leading to it are fixed in God's praescientia. Thus considered, the doctrine of praedestinatio is not a confession of the Reformed church alone, not a private opinion of Augustine and Calvin, but a dogma of the whole of Christendom. There is difference in the name by which it is called; in the manner in which it is presented; but in substance there is agreement, i.e. all Christian churches and theologians confess that everything is and happens and turns out as God eternally knows it. In that sense Augustine could rightly say: praedestinationis hujus fidem, quae contra novos haereticos nova sollicitudine defenditur, nunquam ecclesia
Christi non habuit, de dono pers. c. 23; and Prosper: praedestinationem Dei nullus catholicus negat, in Perrone II 249. All Christian churches have brought it up in the confession to a greater or lesser degree. Yes, it can be said, whether one thinks Pelagian or Augustinian, the matter about which one thinks nevertheless remains the same. History does not change. The facts and the connection of the facts in world history exist as they are, independently of the false or true conception that we form of them,
Schweizer, Ref. Dogm. I 73. The distinction lies only herein, that the Reformed, with Scripture in hand and with Augustine as an example, did
not remain standing with the second causes, but dared to ascend to the first cause, i.e. the will of God, and therein alone have been able to find rest for their thinking and life. The doctrine of praedestinatio has its invincible power and strictness in the facts of world history, as they are explained by God's word as the execution of his eternal counsel. It is itself not hard and strict, but terrifyingly serious are the facts on which it is built, Hodge, Syst.
Theol. II 349. And Pelagianism therefore does not satisfy, [354] because at every point of life and of the history of humanity it collides with the tremendous reality. It is a superficial varnish that indeed deceives man but does not change reality.
12. Yet Pelagianism, although in general it has already proved untenable, resumes its attack at every particular point in the doctrine of predestination.
In the first place it assumes a voluntas or decretum Dei antecedens and conditionatum, in order to offer a sufficient grace to all fallen human beings. For this it appeals to various texts of Holy Scripture, Jes. 5:3, Jer.
51:9, Ezech. 18:23, 32, 33:11, Mt. 23:37, Joh. 3:16, Rom. 11:32 and especially 1 Tim. 2:4 and 2 Petr. 3:19. Pelagians, Semipelagians, Roman
Catholics, Lutherans, Remonstrants, among the Reformed the Amyraldists and all universalists of earlier and later times assume such a first general decree. This decree, however, immediately comes into conflict with reality.
Through all centuries only a small portion of humanity has been acquainted with the gospel. In fact, grace in the history of humanity is not universal but particular. To be sure, various attempts have been tried, to bring this fact into agreement with the general decree. The Pelagians have erased the boundary between nature and grace and have also found in the lex naturae a way to salvation. Many Roman Catholic theologians judge that grace is bestowed or will be bestowed upon all who make a good use of the light
and the power of nature. The old Lutherans said that grace in the time of Adam, Noah and the apostles, Rom. 10:18 had been universal but had again been limited only by the sin of human beings. And more recent theologians have come to the doctrine that the gospel of grace will still after death be preached to all infideles negativi. But all these hypotheses go outside
Scripture and cannot nullify the fact of the particularity of grace. If this fact, however, stands firm, the question arises, why the gospel is preached to one and not to another? Why is one born in a Christian, and another in a heathen land? The Pelagians and Semipelagians also attempted to justify this with the consideration that God also with this [355] praedestinatio ad primam gratiam had taken account of the natural merits of the human being and the use that he had made of his natural powers. But Augustine refuted this praedestinatio ad primam gratiam ob praevisa merita ex voluntate naturali sufficiently, by pointing to the children, who had no such merit and of whom some died baptized and others unbaptized. The Roman Catholic church has therefore also always combated this point in Pelagianism, held fast to the gratia praeveniens and called the first grace unmerited, cf. in Denzinger, n. 171. 679. In actual fact Pelagianism encounters in the case of children an insurmountable objection. The praedestinatio ad primam gratiam, i.e. being born in a Christian land or later becoming acquainted with the gospel is wholly unmerited and unconditional. Here at the beginning, at the first decree, predestination cannot be conceived otherwise than as absolute and inconditional. Why one becomes acquainted with the gospel and another remains deprived of it, one thus is placed in the possibility of becoming eternally blessed and the other not, cannot be answered from the human being. Everyone must here, whether he will or not, acquiesce in the will and the good pleasure of God.
Secondly, Pelagianism seeks to maintain itself with the praedestinatio ad gratiam efficacem. Reality teaches that not all who hear the gospel accept it with a true faith. Whence this distinction? Pelagianism says that the gratia, which is bestowed upon all, is in itself sufficiens, and that now the will of man decides whether that gratia will be and remain efficax or not; with Pelagianism there is thus in fact no decree any longer after that of the universal offering of grace. From now on everything is left to the decision of man. God has done his part; He gave the posse; man possesses the velle.
But no single Christian confession has dared to adopt this Pelagian standpoint. All have, in a weaker or stronger sense, taught a gratia efficax, a donum fidei, and thus have also distinguished a second decree in predestination. Only then did the question arise, to whom this gratia efficax, this gratia habitualis, infusa, i.e. the true faith, was bestowed. On this point all manner of confusion prevails. But yet in Rome, among the Lutherans, among the Remonstrants, etc., the doctrine has gradually arisen that the grace of faith is bestowed [356] upon those who make good use of the gratia prima, i.e. the preaching of the gospel, the illumination of the H.
Spirit, etc., and do what is in their power, quod in se est. To be sure, this is no meritum ex condigno, but still a meritum ex congruo. God binds himself in the distribution of the gift of faith to the earnestness of human striving.
The praedestinatio ad ulteriores gratias is a decree, not of God's sovereignty, but of his justice or equity. It is equitable that God should bestow faith and forgiveness upon whoever has done his best. Yet this conception too is in conflict both with Scripture and with reality. Indeed man is obligated to faith and conversion and is also admonished thereto by the preaching of the gospel. But from the obligation no conclusion can be drawn to the power; from the du sollst there by no means follows the du
kannst. How would sinful and corrupt man also possess the power to accept or not accept the gospel and to make or not make good use of the gratia prima? From where would he derive that power, from himself, from the operation of the Logos, from the grace of baptism? The advocates of the gratia sufficiens offered to all are themselves at a loss about it. And Scripture teaches as clearly as possible that man is wholly unwilling and powerless, that faith is an unmerited gift of grace, that salvation also subjectively is God's work. Nature and grace may stand in relation; there is between the two an essential distinction and no gradual transition; of a meritum ex congruo there is mention neither in Scripture nor in reality.
Little children enter, the wise and the intelligent go away, and tax collectors and sinners go before the Pharisees into the kingdom of heaven.
Thirdly and lastly, Pelagianism still seeks to maintain its position with the praedestinatio ad gloriam. Even if someone truly believes and has thereby received forgiveness and the right to life, it is absolutely not certain that he will preserve that faith and thus obtain salvation. Therefore, with God a third decree is still necessary, namely, to grant salvation to those whose perseverance in the faith to the end He has eternally foreseen. But in an intensified sense all the above-mentioned objections herewith return. The decree of God becomes wholly conditional and loses the character [357] of a will and a decree; it is nothing but a wish, the fulfilment of which is wholly uncertain; God looks on passively and assumes a waiting attitude; man decides, arbitrariness and chance sit upon the throne; even with believers the final outcome is still wholly uncertain; at every moment a falling away of the saints is possible. The separation of the praedestinatio ad gratiam from that ad gloriam is furthermore wholly in conflict with Scripture; it makes it so that the chain of salvation, Rom. 8:29, can be
broken at every point; it dissolves the one work of re-creation into a series of human deeds and actions, which stand loose, without coherence, alongside one another and lack all continuity. And finally, with this doctrine the whole work of God in the salvation of sinners is misunderstood and denied; Scripture always and everywhere lays the strongest emphasis on the faithfulness and unchangeableness of God, on the eternity of his covenant, on the firmness of his promises; but of all this there is, with Pelagianism, no longer any mention. The Lord does not know those who are his; his covenant and his lovingkindness do indeed totter from moment to moment; sheep are indeed snatched out of Jesus' hand; it is not true that God glorifies all whom He has known, called, and justified. Pure, consistent Pelagianism is the complete overthrow of all Christianity and religion. Therefore it has also been accepted by no single Christian church. However much the doctrine of predestination, through semi-Pelagian intermixtures, has become impure in the Roman and the Lutheran church, it is nevertheless confessed by all. Predestination is essentially a dogma of the whole of Christendom.
13. The word predestination, προορισμος, has, however, been used in Christian theology in very different senses; at one time it had a broader, at another a narrower meaning. From a Pelagian standpoint it is nothing other than the decree to grant eternal salvation to those whose faith and perseverance God has foreseen, and to destine others, whose sins and unbelief He foresaw, to eternal punishment. Creation, fall, Christ, the preaching of the gospel and the offering of grace to all, persevering faith and unbelief precede predestination, are not included in it but fall outside it; it itself is nothing other than the destining to eternal life or to eternal [358] punishment. Here predestination has the narrowest sense, but it also
depends entirely on the nuda praescientia Dei, is uncertain and not worthy of the name of predestination; not God but man makes history and determines its result. This opinion has been refuted more than sufficiently and need not be discussed further, cf. also Perkins, Works I 788 v. Twissus,
Op. I 669 sq. But the important difference between infraand supralapsarianism deserves broader treatment. This in fact consists in nothing other than a narrower or broader definition of the concept of predestination. Augustine, namely, restricted the word in a twofold sense.
First, he let the decree of predestination follow upon that of creation and the fall; and second, he usually took the word in bonam partem, identified preordination with election and preferred to designate the decree of reprobation by the name of praescientia. Predestination says what God does, namely the good, but praescientia looks to what man does, namely the evil, de dono pers. c. 17-19. de praed. sanct. c. 10. With this usage scholasticism in general aligned itself, Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 40, Thomas,
S. Theol. I qu. 23, the Roman, Denzinger, Enchir. 279. 285. 296. Trid. VI can. 6, and Lutheran theology, Müller, Symb. Bücher S. 554. The infralapsarians among the Reformed in the same way let the decree of creation and fall precede that of election and reprobation; but while most here after the fall had no objection to also including reprobation under the praedestinatio and thus speaking of a gemina praedestinatio, Turretinus,
Theol. El. IV 9. 6, others judged it better to restrict the word predestination to election, and to treat reprobation separately alongside it under its own name, Hyperius, Methodus Theol. 183 sq. Martyr, Loci C. 231-233.
Zanchius, Op. II 479. Keckermann, Syst. theol. 1603 p. 296. Pareus on Rom. 8:29, 30, ed. 1609 p. 562. If now the word praescientia is not taken in a Pelagian sense and reprobation is not withdrawn from the will of God, as
with the later Roman Catholics and Lutherans, then this is a difference in name but not in the matter itself, Mastricht, Theol. III 2, 24. Turretinus,
Theol. El. IV 7, 4. Stapfer, Wederl. Godg. V 466 v. But characteristic of the infralapsarian view is that creation [359] and fall in the decree precede election and reprobation. By contrast, by supralapsarianism predestination is so expanded that it also includes creation and the fall within itself as means that lead to the final end, the eternal state of rational creatures.
Both representations of predestination, both the supraand the infralapsarian, have in the Reformed church and theology always been acknowledged alongside one another. The Dutch confessional writings are infralapsarian, but no ecclesiastical assembly, not even that of Dordrecht, has ever made things difficult for a supralapsarian. The Lambeth Articles of 1595, incorporated in the Irish confession of 1615 cap. 3, and the confession of Westminster intentionally leave the question undecided. The Reformed theologians have always granted civil rights to both representations, Voetius, Disp. V 602-607. Twissus, Op. I 50. Spanheim, disp. de praedest. § 8. 9. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. VII 296. 383 v. Spanheim used to say that he was supraon the chair, in the instruction of the congregation infralapsarian, Ex. v. h. Ont. v. Tol. VII 296. And indeed both stand on Reformed foundations. On the one side the supralapsarii teach just as decidedly as the infralapsarii, that God is no author of sin, but that this has its cause in the will of man. God as the Almighty may have determined the fall and also exercise his regiment in and through sin; He remains holy and righteous, man falls and sins voluntarily, through his own fault. Cadit homo, providentia Dei sic ordinante, sed suo vitio cadit, Calv. Inst. III 23, 8.
And also the supralapsarii have not arrived at their representation through philosophical thinking, but they gave it, because they considered it more in
agreement with Holy Scripture. Just as Augustine came to his doctrine of praedestinatio through the study of Paul, so the doctrine of Scripture concerning sin led Calvin to his supralapsarianism. In that, according to his own declaration, he gave no philosophy but the truth according to the Word of God, Inst. I 18. III 21-23. And on the other side the infralapsarian
Reformed fully acknowledge that God did not foresee the fall and sin and the eternal punishment of many by a nuda praescientia but included and determined it in his decree, Turretinus, Theol. El. IV 9, 6. Over the decrees themselves and their content there is thus no difference at all. Both deny
[360] free will, reject faith as cause of election and sin as cause of reprobation, and thus combat Pelagianism; both ultimately rest in the sovereign good pleasure of God. There is only a difference concerning the order of the decrees. The infralapsarian adheres to the historical, causal; the supralapsarian prefers the ideal, teleological order. The former takes the concept praedestinatio in a narrower sense and lets creation, fall, providentia precede it; the latter includes under predestination all other decrees. There the emphasis falls on the multiplicity, here on the unity of the decrees; there all decrees have to a certain extent a proper, independent significance, here the preceding ones are all subordinated to the final decree.
14. The appeal to Scripture does not bring this dispute to a solution. For while infralapsarianism is supported by all those passages where election and reprobation relate to the fallen world and are presented as acts of mercy and justice, Deut. 7:6-8, Mt. 12:25, 26, Joh. 15:19, Rom. 9:15, 16, Ef. 1:412, 2 Tim. 1:9, supralapsarianism seeks its strength in all those texts which express God's absolute sovereignty, especially also in relation to sin, Ps.
115:3, Spr. 16:4, Jes. 10:15, 45:9, Jer. 18:6, Mt. 20:15, Rom. 9:17, 19-21.
The fact that each of the two representations rests on a certain group of texts and in doing so does not sufficiently allow another to come into its own, already proves the one-sidedness of both. Infralapsarianism deserves praise for its modesty; it offers no solution but remains with the historical, causal order; it seems less harsh and takes more account of the demands of practice. It does not satisfy, however, because reprobation no more than election is to be understood as an act of God's justice. Faith and good works are not the cause of election, and so sin is not the cause of reprobation either; this lies only in God's free good pleasure; the decree of reprobation therefore always in a certain sense precedes the decree to permit sin.
Moreover, if God took the decree of reprobation only after that of the permission of sin, the question always arises again: but why then did He permit that sin? Did that permission consist in a nuda praescientia, and is the fall in fact a frustration of God's [361] plan? But that a Reformed person, even if he is an infralapsarian, can and may never say. He must nevertheless also in a certain sense include the fall in God's decree and have it determined beforehand. But why then did God decree the fall permissione efficaci? Infralapsarianism has no answer to this except only God's good pleasure, but then says the same as supralapsarianism. Reprobation is not to be explained as an act of God's justice, for the first sin is in any case permitted by God's sovereignty. Infralapsarianism, going back, nevertheless ends up again with supralapsarianism; if it would not want this, it would have to take refuge in the praescientia. And then finally there is added still, that it places the decree of reprobation after the fall, but where somewhere?
Did God decide to reprobate many only after original sin; does this come into consideration with the decree of reprobation only, and does God not at all, with this dreadful decree, take account of the peccata actualia? If
reprobation must be reduced to God's justice, why then is it not rather placed, not after the entrance of original sin only but after the completion of the peccata actualia by each human being to be reprobated in particular?
That indeed Arminius did teach, who also included under it the sin of foreseen unbelief. But that of course did not do for a Reformed theologian.
Reprobation then depended on the nuda praescientia, i.e. on man; the sinful acts of man then became the last and deepest cause of reprobation, and therefore one remained quite arbitrarily with the decree of reprobation immediately after the fall. But in fact it therefore taught, in relation to all peccata actualia, exactly the same as supralapsarianism; reprobation does indeed not precede original sin but nevertheless precedes all other sins.
Infralapsarianism seems to be gentler and fairer, but upon deeper reflection this proves not to be much more than appearance.
Supralapsarianism therefore undoubtedly has this in its favor, that it refrains from all vain attempts to justify God, and in both reprobation and election rests in God's sovereign, incomprehensible but nevertheless always wise and holy good pleasure. And yet it is, if not more, then at least equally unsatisfactory as infralapsarianism. It assumes the appearance of a solution, but in fact provides it at no single point and in no respect. [362] First of all, the revelation of all God's virtues is without doubt the final goal of all
God's ways, but it will not do, with supralapsarianism, immediately to include in this final goal the manner in which hereafter this gloria Dei will come to revelation in the eternal state of his rational creatures. For that eternal state, both of blessedness and of perdition, is not the final goal itself, but a means, to bring all God's virtues to revelation in a creaturely manner.
For it cannot be said that God could not have revealed his honor in the salvation of all, if this had pleased Him. It is also not correct that God in the
eternal state of the lost reveals exclusively his justice, and in that of the elect exclusively his mercy. Also in the church, which was purchased by the blood of the Son, his justice becomes manifest; and also in the place of perdition there are still sparks of his mercy. The final goal of all God's works is and must be his glory; but the manner in which this glory will shine is not thereby given of itself; this has been determined by his will, and although God also for that has had wise and holy reasons, we cannot say why He has willed precisely this means, why He has determined the perdition of many and not the preservation of all. Moreover, supralapsarianism in this runs up against the objection that it gives to the decree of election and reprobation only possible men and, as Comrie added to it, a possible Christ as object. Indeed this latter element has been removed from the supralapsarian representation by others, Kuyper, De vleeschwording des Woords bl. 202v. But thereby the principle has not been removed, from which this error arose. If election has only possible men as object, it logically brings with it that of a possible Christ, since the election of the church and her Head cannot be separated. But apart from this, the election and reprobation, which has only homines creandi et labiles as object, is not yet the actual, but only a preliminary decree.
Supralapsarianism must presently nevertheless proceed again to the infralapsarian order. For after first possible men have been elected and reprobated, there follows thereafter the decree, to create these possible men in reality and to let them fall, and then there must nevertheless again follow the decree now to elect in part and to reprobate in part those men who are no longer thought merely in the [363] idea as possible but now also thought in the decree as actually existing. The logical order in supralapsarianism thus leaves everything to be desired. Properly it is distinguished from
infralapsarianism only in this, that it, in the manner of Amyraldism, lets a decree concerning possibilities precede the infralapsarian series of decrees.
But what is such a decree concerning possible men, of whom it is absolutely not yet established whether they will actually be? Homines possibiles are infinitely many in the consciousness of God, who will never be. The decree of election and of reprobation thus has non-entia as object, and not definite persons known to God by name. Finally, there is still this difficulty connected with supralapsarianism, that it makes eternal punishment in the same way and in the same sense an object of God's will as the eternal life of the blessed, and that it makes sin, which leads to that eternal punishment, in the same way and in the same sense a means as redemption in Christ is a means to eternal blessedness. On this there is among the Reformed no difference, that sin and punishment are willed and determined by God. It is also completely true that words such as permissio and praescientia in fact provide nothing toward a solution of the difficulties.
The questions nevertheless remain precisely the same: why has God, foreknowing everything, created man so that he could fall and did not prevent the fall? Why did He let all fall in one? Why does He not have the gospel preached to all and does He not grant faith to all? In one word, if God foresees and permits, He does that volens or nolens. The latter is impossible. Thus the permissio is a permissio efficax, an act of his will. Nor is the concept of permissio without any value or force over against the accusation that God is the author of sin, for he who lets someone sin and go lost, while He could have prevented it, is just as guilty as he who incites him to sin. But on the other hand there is also on this no difference, that sin, although not being praeter Dei voluntatem, nevertheless is and remains contra ejus voluntatem; that it is not only a means to come to the final goal,
but that it is a disturbance of God's creation, and that the fall of Adam therefore was no progress but most certainly a fall. And this too is indeed
[364] established, that thinking may disapprove the words permissio, praescientia, praeteritio, derelictio, but that no one can provide other, better words. Even the strictest supralapsarian cannot do without those words, neither in the pulpit nor in the lectern, Frank, Theol. der Concordienformel
IV, 148. 272. For even if one may assume that there is a praedestinatio ad mortem; of a praedestinatio ad peccatum no one among the Reformed has dared to speak. All without distinction, Zwingli, Calvin, Beza, Zanchius,
Gomarus, Comrie etc. have maintained that God is not the author of sin, that man was not created unto damnation, that in reprobation also the strictness of his justice came out, that reprobation is not the causa, the principium, but only the causa per accidens, the remotio principii is of sin, that sin is not the causa efficiens but indeed the causa sufficiens of reprobation etc. Therefore supralapsarianism is, and fortunately so, always inconsistent; it begins with a bold run-up, but soon recoils backward and falls back into the infralapsarianism first rejected. Among the proponents of supralapsarianism this comes out clearly. Almost all hesitate to let the reprobatio in its entirety and without any restriction precede sin. The Thomists distinguished between reprobatio negativa and positiva; the first preceded creation and fall, the second followed upon it, cf. above 326. This distinction also repeatedly returns among the Reformed theologians, be it also in a more or less modified form. Not only is it acknowledged by all that the decree of reprobation is to be distinguished from the condamnatio, which is the execution of that decree, takes place in time and has sin as cause, Beza, Tract. theol. I 176. Polanus, Syst. theol. p. 251. 254. But in the decree of reprobation itself many make a distinction between a preceding,
more general decree of God, to reveal in some homines creabiles et labiles his virtues, specifically his mercy and justice, and a following, definite decree, to create those homines possibiles also in reality, to let them fall and sin and to punish their sins, Beza, I 173. 176. 177, cf. III 403. Piscator bij
Twissus, I 51-52, Perkins, Werken I 763. Twissus, I 71. Maccovius, Loci Comm. p. 222. 237. Voetius, Disp. V 602 sq. Mastricht, Theol. theor. pract.
III 2, 12. Ex. v. h. ontw. v. Tol. VII 375v. Moor II 66. 67. [365] 15. Thus neither supralapsarianism nor infralapsarianism has succeeded, with this problem, in giving the solution and in allowing the all-sidedness of Scripture to come into its own. In part this can be explained from the onesidedness of which they both are guilty. First of all it is not correct, as was already said just now, to define the finis supremus of all things as the revelation of God's mercy in the elect and of his justice in the lost.
Certainly the glory of God and the manifestation of his perfections is the final end of all; but the double state of blessedness and misery is not included in that final end and relates to it as means. It is absolutely not to be proved that with this final end of God's glory that double state had to be given. If he brings opera ad extra into being, he can thereby never mean anything else than the honour of his name. But that he seeks that honour in this way and in no other way depends only on his free sovereignty. Apart from this, however, it is also not true that God's justice would come to revelation only in the miserable state of the lost and his mercy only in the blessedness of the elect, for also in heaven his justice and holiness shine forth, and also in hell there is still something of his mercy and lovingkindness. In the second place it is incorrect to represent the misery of the lost as the goal of praedestinatio. Indeed sin is not to be reduced to a nuda praescientia and permissio Dei. Fall and sins and eternal punishment
are included in the decree of God, and in a certain sense willed by God. But then yet always only in a certain sense and not in that same way as grace and salvation. In these he has a good pleasure, but sin and punishment are not his delight, his joy. When he makes sin subservient to his honour, he does that by his omnipotence, but it is against its nature. And when he punishes the ungodly, he does not rejoice in their suffering in itself, but he celebrates therein the triumph of his virtues, Deut. 28:63, Ps. 2:4, Spr. 1:26,
Klaagl. 3:33. If therefore on the one hand, with a view to the all-embracing and unchangeable character of God's counsel, there is no objection to speaking of a gemina praedestinatio, yet the praedestinatio in the one case is not of the same nature as in the other. Praedestinatio est constitutio finis et ordinatio mediorum ad finem; cum aeterna [366] damnatio non sit finis hominis, sed tantum extremum, ideo reprobationis genus non proprie praedestinatio constitui potest. Pugnant enim haec inter sese, ordinare ad finem et ordinare ad damnationem. Omnis enim finis sua natura est optimum quid et perfectio rei; damnatio autem est extremum malum et summa imperfectio, ita ut impropria sit locutio, qua dicitur, Deum nonnullos homines praedestinasse ad damnationem, Keckermann, Syst. theol. 1603 p. 296, cf. Twissus I 53 A. However strongly and however frequently Scripture then also says that sin and punishment are determined by God; the words προθεσις, προγνωσις, προορισμος it nevertheless uses almost exclusively of the praedestinatio ad gloriam. In the third place it is also for another reason less correct to coordinate the praedestinatio ad mortem aeternam with, and to set it equally as final end as, the praedestinatio ad vitam aeternam. The object of election is not merely some human beings, just as of rejection, but in election the human race under a new Head, namely Christ, is object, and thus by the gratia not only some
individuals but the human race itself with the whole cosmos is saved. And in this salvation of the human race and of the world not merely some virtues of God come to revelation, so that alongside that an eternal perdition would still be necessary in order to reveal his justice, but in the completed kingdom of God all virtues and perfections of God come to unfolding, his justice and his grace, his holiness and his love, his sovereignty and his mercy. And this status gloriae is thus the proper direct, though also to his honour subordinate, goal which God aims at with his creation. In the fourth place supraand infralapsarianism erred in that they placed everything that preceded the final end as means among themselves in a subordinated relation. Now the means are of themselves subordinate to the final end but therefore not yet to one another. Creation is not merely a means for the fall, and this not merely a means for grace and hardening, and these again not merely a means for blessedness and misery. It must indeed be considered that the decrees are as rich in content as the whole world history, for this is the unfolding of those. Who would now be in a position to summarize this world history in a logical schema of a few concepts? Creation, [367] fall, sin, Christ, faith, unbelief etc. do not at all stand only in a relation of means to one another, so that the preceding can as it were fall away when the following has been reached. They are not subordinated to one another but also coordinated, as Twissus I 71 already remarked. Creation has truly not taken place only for this, that the fall could enter, but it gave to a world the appearance that will remain also in the state of glory. The fall did not occur only for this, that there would be a creatura miserabilis, but it maintains as fact its significance with all the consequences that have proceeded from it.
Christ has not merely become a Mediator, which would have been sufficient for the reconciliation of sin; but God has also ordained him as Head of the
church. The whole world history is not a means that falls away when the end is reached, but works through and leaves fruits behind in eternity. And election and reprobation themselves do not run here on earth as two straight lines alongside one another, but in the unbelievers there is much that does not flow from rejection and in the believers there is much that is not to be credited to election. On the one hand both presuppose sin and are acts of mercy and justice, Rom. 9:15, Ef. 1:4, and they are both nevertheless also acts of divine free sovereignty and sovereignty, Rom. 9:11, 17, 21. Likewise
Adam is also before the fall already a type of Christ, 1 Cor. 15:47 v. and yet the incarnation is always in Scripture built on the fall of the human race,
Hebr. 2:14 v. Sometimes Scripture speaks so strongly that rejection is completely coordinated with election and eternal punishment is by God equally aimed at as goal as eternal blessedness. Luk. 2:34, Joh. 3:19-21, 1
Petr. 2:7, 8, Rom. 9:17, 18, 22 etc., but sometimes the mors aeterna falls away entirely in the description of the future; the end will be the triumph of the kingdom of God, the new heaven and earth, the new Jerusalem, where
God will be all in all, 1 Cor. 15, Op. 21, 22; everything is subordinate to the church as this is to Christ, 1 Cor. 3 vs. 21-23; rejection is wholly subordinated to election. Therefore finally neither the supranor the infralapsarian representation of praedestinatio is able to take up into itself the full rich truth of Scripture and to satisfy our theological thinking. What is true in supralapsarianism is that [368] all decrees together form a unity; that there is a final end to which everything is subordinate and subservient; that sin did not come into the world unthought-of and unexpected for God but in a certain sense is willed and determined by him; that creation was already immediately designed for re-creation and with Adam before the fall already reckoned on the Christ. But what is true in infralapsarianism is that
the decrees, though one, are nevertheless also distinguished with a view to their objects; that in those decrees not only a teleological but also a causal order is to be noticed; that creation and fall do not merge into this, that they are only means for the final end; that sin above all and in the first place has been a disturbance of creation and in and for itself can never have been willed by God. In general the formulation of the final end of all things, namely that God reveals his justice in the reprobate and his mercy in the elect, is yet all too simple and too sober. The status gloriae will be so indescribably rich and glorious. We expect a new heaven, a new earth, a new humanity, a restored creation, an ever continuing development never again disturbed by any sin. And toward that creation and fall, Adam and Christ, nature and grace, faith and unbelief, election and reprobation, all together, each in its way, cooperate, not only after but also alongside and with one another. Yes, the present world with its history is also in itself already a continuing revelation of God's virtues. It is not only a means for the higher and richer revelation that comes, but also in itself of value. It therefore remains and continues to work also in the future dispensation and will give to the new humanity continual material for the worship and glorification of God. Therefore among the decrees, just as among the facts of world history, there is not only a causal and a teleological, but also an organic order. We can in our limitation only place ourselves at the one or at the other standpoint; and therefore the proponents of a causal and those of a teleological worldand life-view come into conflict with one another at every moment. But for God that is wholly different. He surveys the whole.
All things are eternally present in his consciousness. His counsel is one single simple conception. And in that [369] counsel all particular decrees stand in that same connection in which the facts of history a posteriori now
partly appear to us and once will appear to us fully to stand. That connection is so rich and complicated that it is not to be rendered in a single word of infraor supralapsarian. It is both causal and teleological; the preceding works into the following but the future also already determines the past and the present. There is rich, all-sided Wechselwirkung. As in an organism all members cohere and mutually determine one another, so the world is a work of art of God, of which all parts are organically connected among themselves. And of that world both in its length and breadth the counsel of God is the eternal idea.
16. From this it becomes clear, in what sense reprobation is to be reckoned as belonging to predestination. If one attends only to the fact that the counsel of God comprehends all things, then there is every right to speak of a gemina praedestinatio. Sin also, unbelief, death, and eternal punishment stand under the government of God. Not only does it in fact avail nothing, whether one here prefers to speak of praescientia and permissio rather than of praedestinatio. But Scripture also testifies in this matter as decisively and firmly as possible. It is true that it makes little mention of rejection as an eternal decree. All the more, however, does it let it appear as an act of God in history. He rejects Cain, Gen. 4:5, curses
Canaan, Gen. 9:25, drives Ishmael out, Gen. 21:12, Rom. 9:7, Gal. 4:30, hates Esau, Gen. 25:26, Mal. 1:2, 3, Rom. 9:13, Hebr. 12:17, lets the Gentiles walk in their own ways, Hd. 14:16; even within the circle of revelation there is often mention of a rejection by the Lord of his people and of particular persons, Deut. 29:28, 1 Sam. 15:23, 26, 16:1, 2 Kon.
17:20, 2 Kon. 23:27, Ps. 53:6, 78:67, 89:39, Jer. 6:30, 14:19, 31:37, Hos.
4:6, 9:17. But in that negative rejection there also appears many a time a positive action of God, consisting in hatred, Mal. 1:2, 3, Rom. 9:13,
cursing, Gen. 9:25, hardening and obduracy, Ex. 7:3, 4:21, 9:12, 10:20, 10:27, 11:10, 14:4, Deut. 2:30, Jos. 11:20, Ps. 105:25, 1 Sam. 2:25, Joh.
12:40, Rom. 9:18, in bewilderment, 1 Kon. 12:15, 2 Sam. 17:14, Ps.
107:40, Job 12:24, Jes. 44:25, 1 Cor. 1:19, in blinding and stupefaction, Jes.
6:9, Matth. 13:13, [370] Mk. 4:12, Luk. 8:10, Joh. 12:40, Hd. 28:26, Rom.
11:8. God's government extends over all things and also in the sins of men he has his hand. He sends a lying spirit, 1 Kon. 22:23, 2 Chr. 18:22, incites
David through Satan, 2 Sam. 24:1, 1 Chr. 21:1 and tests Job, cap. 1, calls Nebuchadnezzar and Cyrus his servants, 2 Chr. 36:22, Ezra 1:1, Jes. 44:28,
45:1, Jer. 27:6, 28:14 etc., and Assyria the rod of his anger, Jes. 10:5v. He delivers Christ over to his enemies, Hd. 2:23, 4:28, appoints him for a fall and rising, for an odor of death and of life, for a judgment and for a stone of stumbling, Luk. 2:34, Joh. 3:19, 9:39, 2 Cor. 2:16, 1 Petr. 2:8. He gives men over to their sins, Rom. 1:24, sends a power of delusion, 2 Thess. 2:11, raises up Shimei to curse David, 2 Sam. 16:10, cf. Ps. 39:10, a Pharaoh to show his power, Rom. 9:17 and the man born blind, to reveal his glory, Joh.
9:3. Certainly in all these works of God man's own sin may not be overlooked. In God's hardening man hardens himself, Ex. 7:13, 22, 8:15,
9:35, 13:15, 2 Chron. 36:13, Job 9:4, Ps. 95:8, Spr. 28:14, Hebr. 3:8, 4:7.
Jesus speaks in parables, not only in order that but also because the unbelievers neither see nor hear, Mt. 13:13. God gives men over to sin and the lie, because they have made themselves worthy of this, Rom. 1:24, 2
Thess. 2:11. And it is a posteriori that believers see in the iniquities of the enemies the government and the hand of the Lord, 2 Sam. 16:10, Ps. 39:10.
But nevertheless in all this the will and the power of God also become manifest. In all this he displays his free sovereign sovereignty. He creates the good and the evil, the light and the darkness, Jes. 45:7, Am. 3:6, the
ungodly for the day of evil, Spr. 16:4, does all that pleases him, Ps. 115:3, deals with the inhabitants of the earth according to his good pleasure, Dan.
4:35, inclines every heart as he wills, Spr. 16:9, 21:1, directs everyone's course, Spr. 20:24, Jer. 10:23, makes from the same clay vessels for honor and for dishonor, Jer. 18, Rom. 9:20, has mercy on whom he wills and hardens whom he wills, Rom. 9:18, appoints to disobedience, 1 Petr. 2:8, writes down for judgment, Jud. 4, and has not written many names in the book of life, Op. 13:8, 17:8. These manifold, strong [371] statements of Scripture are confirmed every day in the history of mankind. The defenders of reprobation have therefore always appealed to those dreadful facts, in which history is so rich, Calvijn, C. R. XXXVII 289 sq. There is so much that is unreasonable in nature, so much undeserved suffering, so many disasters without cause, so unequal, incomprehensible distribution of lot, so crying a contrast of joy and sorrow, that for everyone who reflects only the choice remains, either with pessimism to explain this world from the blind will of an accursed God, or on the ground of Holy Scripture in faith to acquiesce in the sovereign and free, but always nevertheless, however incomprehensible, wise and holy will of him, who once will cause the full light to rise over these riddles of life. The acceptance or non-acceptance of a decree of rejection therefore does not have its cause in a smaller or greater measure of love and compassion. The difference between Augustine and Pelagius, Calvijn and Castellio, Gomarus and Arminius does not lie in this, that the latter were so much gentler and dearer, more genial and more compassionate people. But it lies herein, that the former accepted Scripture in its entirety, also in this its doctrine; that they were theistic and always wanted to be, and also in these moving facts of life recognized the will and the hand of the Lord; that they dared to look reality in all its dreadfulness in
the face. Pelagianism strews flowers on the graves, makes of death an angel, sees in sin a weakness, holds discourses on the usefulness of adversities, and deems this world the best that is possible. Calvinism is not served by such superficial babbling and trifling. It tears the blindfold from its eyes, it does not want to live in an imagined delusion, it accepts the seriousness of life in its full depth, it stands up for the rights of the Lord of lords, and bows down in humility and adoration before the uncomprehended, sovereign will of God almighty. And thereby it appears in the ground to be much more merciful than pelagianism. How deeply
Calvijn felt the seriousness of what he said, appears from his decretum horribile, Inst. III 23, 7. Entirely unjustly has this word been made into a reproach to him. It does not plead against Calvijn, it pleads for him. The decretum as doctrine of Calvijn, is not horribile; [372] but reality is dreadful, which is the revelation of that decree of God, which is thus taught by Scripture and history, which for every thinking man, whether he follow
Pelagius or Augustine, remains completely the same, and which by no delusional representations can be annulled even in the least. And in the midst of that dreadful reality Calvinism now brings not this solution but indeed this consolation, that in all that happens it recognizes the will and the hand of an almighty God, who at the same time is a merciful Father.
Calvinism gives no solution but causes man to rest in him, who dwells in an inaccessible light, whose judgments are unsearchable, whose ways are untraceable. In that Calvijn rested. Testis enim mihi erit Dominus, cui conscientia mea subscribet, sic me stupenda haec ipsius judicia quotidie meditari, ut nulla me plus aliquid sciendi curiositas sollicitet, nulla mihi de incomparibili ejus justitia obrepat sinistra suspicio, nulla me obmurmurandi libido prorsus titillet, de aet. praed. C. R. XXXVI 316. And in that rest of
mind he awaited the day, in which he would see face to face and would receive the solution of these riddles, Inst. III 23, 2. C. R. XXXVI 366.
17. However much rejection, on the one hand, may with full right be reckoned to predestination, it nevertheless is not, in the same sense and in the same manner, content of God's decree as election. The advocates of the gemina praedestinatio have also at all times acknowledged this. When it concerned the sovereignty of God, the definite and unambiguous testimonies of his word, the facts of history that cannot be erased, then they were as unyielding as the apostle Paul and wanted to know nothing of yielding or mediating. Then they sometimes came to harsh statements, which can hinder the Pelagian-minded heart of man. Thus Augustine once said that God could not be accused even if He had wanted to damn some who were innocent. Si humanum genus, quod creatum primitus constat ex nihilo, non cum debita mortis et peccati origine nasceretur et tamen ex eis creator omnipotens in aeternum nonnullos damnare vellet interitum; quis omnipotenti creatori diceret: quare fecisti sic? de praed. et gratia 16. And some theologians, [373] also among the Reformed, have spoken in the same spirit. Whoever has some sense of the incomparable greatness of God and the nothingness of the creature; and whoever in addition considers how we can many a time look upon the heaviest suffering of man and animal with the most indifferent mind, above all when it is serviceable to our own interest, to art, or to science; he loses the courage to attack Augustine or others harshly for such a statement, let alone to call God to account. If it is a matter of right, solely and only of right, what right can we assert over against Him who called us forth out of nothing and bestowed everything that we have and are? But nevertheless, although for a moment one can speak thus over against someone who thinks he may accuse God of
injustice, almost all the Reformed, with Calvin at their head, have in the end decisively and with indignation rejected such a dominium absolutum, above p. 212 v. The cause why God has willed the one or the other, has elected this one and rejected that one, may be wholly unknown to us. His will is always wise and holy and good and has had for all things his righteous reasons. His power is not to be separated from his righteousness, Calvin, C.
R. XXXVI 310. 361. Provided only that the right and the honor of God were first acknowledged, all the Reformed advised the most cautious and tender handling of the doctrine of predestination, and warned against vain and curious investigations. Nos ergo nimis acutos esse non convenit; modo ne interea, quod Scriptura clare docet ac experientia confirmat, vel negemus verum esse vel tanquam Deo minus consentaneum carpere audeamus,
Calvin, ibid. 366. Zwingli, Op. VIII 21. Beza, Tract. theol. I 197. Martyr, Loci C. III c. 1. Westm. conf. bij Schaff, Creeds III 610. Can. Dordr. I 12.
14 enz. Although God knows those who are his and the number of the elect is called small, bene sperandum est tamen de omnibus, neque temere reprobis quisquam est annumerandus, Conf. Helv. II bij Niemeyer, Coll.
Conf. 482. Piscator, Aphorismi 1614 p. 223. Zanchius, Op. II 497 sq.
Furthermore, all maintained that sin, though not praeter, was nevertheless very much contra Dei voluntatem. Indeed it could not be the cause, the causa efficiens and impulsiva, of the decree of rejection, for it itself after all followed in time upon the eternal [374] decree and would, if it were itself the cause, have had to cause all men to be rejected. But it was nevertheless causa sufficiens, and of the eternal punishment determined the causa meritoria. For there is a distinction between the decree of rejection and rejection itself. The former has its final and deepest cause only in God's will; but rejection itself takes account of sin. The decree of rejection
realizes itself through man's own guilt, Polanus, Synt. 251. Twissus, Vind. gr. I 273 sq. Perkins, Werken I 769. Turretinus, Theol. El. IV 14. Synopsis pur. theol. XXIV 50. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. VII 445. Heppe, Dogm. 132.
Therefore this decree is also no fatum, which drives man forward against his will; no sword of Damocles, which hangs threateningly above his head.
It is nothing other than the divine idea of reality itself. In the decree lie causes and effects, condition and fulfillment, lies the whole connection of things chained together precisely as we behold that in reality. Sin, guilt, misery, punishment have in the decree that same nature and that same mutual relation as in the world of things itself. We see that decree, which has not been revealed to us beforehand, gradually unfold in its whole fullness in history; with us it is and must be the pure reflex in our consciousness of reality. We think the things after they are. But with God the decree is the eternal idea of reality, as that gradually unfolds in time. His thoughts of things precede their being. And now the decree of rejection says only that that whole, sinful reality, that whole world-history in the mutual connection of its events, has its final cause, not in itself—how could this also be?—but outside itself in the thought and in the will of God. The decree changes nothing in reality; this is and remains completely the same, whether one follows Augustine or Pelagius; but it makes the believer confess that also that dreadful world, for which the Manicheans introduce an αντιθεος, pessimism a blind accursed will, and many a fate or chance, is there according to the will of Him who now makes us walk in faith but once in the day of all days will justify himself before all creature. Completely incorrect, therefore, is the representation as if the counsel of God in general and the decree of rejection in particular were a single, bare, [375] volitional determination concerning someone's eternal lot. It must not be represented
thus, as if for a man only the end were determined and he now, whatever he may do, were driven there by force. The decree is as unsearchably rich as reality. It is the main artery of all being. It comprehends in a single conception the end with the ways, the goal with the means. It is no transcendent power which from above at will, now and then, intervenes in reality and drives it on toward the end. It is the divine, immanent, eternal idea, which displays its fullness in the forms of space and time, and what with God is one unfolds successively in length and breadth for our limited gaze. The decree of rejection therefore also does not lie loose alongside all other decrees, nor alongside that of election. Sin and grace, punishment and blessing, righteousness and mercy do not lie dualistically alongside each other in reality, as if the rejected one were visited only with sin and punishment, the elect exclusively with grace and blessing. For believers still sin daily and stumble in many things. Are these sins of believers now an outflow of election? No one will assert it. Indeed those sins are again made by God serviceable to their salvation and all things work together for good to the one called, Rom. 8:28. Yet to that end those sins are not in themselves and by nature suited, but only because God as the Almighty can still cause the good to proceed out of the evil. The sins therefore are no means unto salvation, such as regeneration, faith. They are no praeparatio gratiae but, considered in themselves, negatio gratiae, Becanus, Theol. schol. I tr. 1 c.
14 qu. 3 n. 12-20. Therefore the law also still has significance for believers; therefore they are admonished to make their election sure with fear and trembling; therefore there is also among believers sometimes mention of temporal hardening and rejection. But also conversely the reprobati share in many blessings, which do not as such flow to them from the decree of rejection but from the goodness and grace of God. They receive many
natural gifts, life, health, strength, food, drink, cheerfulness etc., Mt. 5:45,
Hd. 14:17, 17:27, Rom. 1:19, Jak. 1:17 etc., God does not leave himself without witness to them. He endures them with much longsuffering, Rom.
9:22. He has the gospel of his grace proclaimed to them and has [376] no pleasure in their death, Ezech. 18:23, 33:11, Mt. 23:27, Luk. 19:41, 24:47,
Joh. 3:16, Hd. 17:30, Rom. 11:32, 1 Thess. 5:9, 1 Tim. 2:4, 2 Petr. 3:19. The Pelagians infer from these places that it is God's proper, essential will that all men head for head be saved, and that therefore there is no preceding decree of rejection. These texts do not teach that. But they do acknowledge this as the will of God, that also with the reprobati all means of grace are employed toward their salvation. These media gratiae now do not as such flow forth from the decree of rejection. They can be misused for that; they can serve to render man inexcusable, to harden him and to aggravate his judgment, just as the sun can warm but also scorch. But in themselves, by nature, they are no media reprobationis but media gratiae ad salutem,
Synopsis XXIV 54 sq. Heppe p. 134. 135. Election and rejection may therefore issue in a final and total separation; here on this earth they cross each other, as it were, time and again. That points to the fact that both, in and for themselves, are no end-goal and have been no causa finalis for God.
Both are means for the gloria Dei, which is the final goal and thus the deepest ground of all things. Beginning and end, reason and goal of all being is therefore something good. Sin and punishment can never have been willed by God in themselves and for themselves. They conflict with his nature. He is far from godlessness, and He has no pleasure in afflicting. He does not do it from the heart. They therefore can only have been willed by God as means for another, better, greater good. Indeed there is great difference between election and rejection. All that God does, He does for
his own sake. Election too has its cause and goal only in God. But in the work that He brings to pass through election, He delights. Therein his own virtues shine back to Him. The new creation is a mirror of his perfections.
But that which He carries out according to the decree of rejection is not directly and in itself the object of his good pleasure. Sin is not itself a good.
It becomes a good only because it, and insofar as it, contrary to its nature and despite itself, is compelled by divine omnipotence to the exaltation of God's honor. It is indirectly a good, because it is subjected, subdued, overcome and thus shows God's greatness, power, righteousness. For [377] herein his sovereignty finally comes out most brilliantly, that He knows how to lead the evil still to the good, Gen. 15:20 and makes it serviceable to the salvation of the church, Rom. 8:28. 1 Cor. 3:21-23, to the glory of Christ, 1 Cor. 15:24v., Ef. 1:21, 22, Phil. 2:9, Col. 1:16, to the glory of his name, Spr. 16:4, Ps. 51:6, Job 1:21, Joh. 9:3, Rom. 9:17, 22, 23, 11:36, 1
Cor. 15:28.
18. Thus predestination finally issues in election; in this it reaches its end and comes to its full reality. In its highest form it is the decree of God concerning the revelation of his virtues in the eternal, glorious state of his rational creatures, and the ordering of the means leading thereto. Even so, reprobation must not be forgotten. Only over against this dark reverse side does election itself come forth in the most glorious light. It is of gripping seriousness that even on this highest terrain, where it concerns the eternal weal and the eternal woe of rational creatures, the day rises out of the dark night, the light is born out of the darkness. It seems that the law holds everywhere, that many are called and few chosen. There lies a deep truth in the proverb, that the death of the one is the bread of the other. Darwin's doctrine of the survival of the fittest has a general validity and is in force
through the whole creation. Thousands of blossoms fall off, in order that a few might ripen into fruit. Millions of living beings are born and only a few remain in life. Thousands of people labour in the sweat of their face, in order that a few might be able to bathe in luxury. Wealth, luxury, art, science, all that is high and noble is built on the foundation of poverty, privation, ignorance. Never and nowhere does it proceed in the world toward the uniform distribution of the socialists. There is no equality on any terrain. Everywhere there is election alongside and on the foundation of reprobation. The world is not arranged according to the Pharisaic law of work and wage; merit and wealth have nothing to do with one another. And also on the highest terrain it is only divine grace that makes a distinction.
Like all decrees, so also election has its deepest cause in the good pleasure of God. The Pelagians of every sort have [378] always wanted to conceive these decrees as acts of God's justice, in which he proceeded according to the merit of man. God allows himself in his decrees to be determined by the foreseen behaviours of the creature. He offers salvation to all. He grants faith to him who makes good use of this offer by his natural or also by granted supernatural power. He saves him who perseveres in faith unto the end. Now there is indeed among the decrees a certain order; they encompass both the end and the means. To the prayer of his children God has in his decree bound the hearing. If he has decreed to give rain in the drought, he has at the same time determined that his people will pray to him for it and that he will give the rain as an answer to their prayer. In his decree he has laid a connection between sunshine and warmth, sowing and harvest, laziness and poverty, knowledge and power etc., and so also between sin and punishment, unbelief and perdition, faith and salvation. The harmony between the phenomena and events in the real world is a perfect imprint of
the harmony in the world of the thoughts and decrees of God, Edwards, Works II 514. Scripture often remains with these causae secundae, and the Reformed too have fully acknowledged their significance. But these second causes are therefore not yet the last and deepest cause. And one cannot evade the investigation into that. From all sides the questions press themselves upon us. Why is there such a connection between the phenomena and events among themselves, as we repeatedly observe in the world? An appeal to the nature of things is no sufficient answer, for that nature too is from God and determined by him. Science can ascertain that, but it presupposes what is and does not know why it is and must be so. Why there is causality among the creatures among themselves, why each creature is what it is, why there is such endless diversity among the creatures, in character, nature, genus, species, power, intellect, wealth, honour etc.; within the circle of the created there is no cause to be found for it. And so also among the rational creatures; why some angels are destined for eternal glory and of the others the fall and perdition is foreseen and determined; why precisely that human nature which Christ assumed was deemed worthy of this honour; why the [379] one human being is born within, the other outside Christianity; why the one has so much advantage over the other in character, disposition, inclination, upbringing; why the one child dies early and is taken up into heaven as a child of the covenant and the other outside the covenant enters death without grace; why the one comes to faith and the other not; they are all questions to which no creature can answer. The decrees of God are not to be understood as acts of a justice that acts according to work and merit. Above all it appears clearly with the angels that the last cause of their election and reprobation must lie in the will of God. For even if one calls in the praescientia, saying that God has foreseen
the perseverance of some and the fall of other angels, then this praescientia nevertheless precedes their creation. Why then did God create those angels whose fall he foresaw? Why did he not give them sufficient grace to remain standing, as with the others? There is here a reprobation that rests solely and exclusively on God's sovereignty, Bellarminus, de gr. et lib. arb. II c. 17.
Twissus, Vind. gr. I 76. On the other side election is not in itself always an act of mercy or to be explained as such. In the election of Christ and of the good angels there is no question of sin and thus of mercy. And the election of human beings is indeed an act of mercy, but yet not to be explained from mercy alone. For then God would have had to be merciful to all, since all were miserable. And thus reprobation was indeed an act of justice but not to be explained from justice alone, for then all would have been reprobated,
Twissus, Vindic. gr. IV 111 sq. Mutually the decrees may thus stand in connection, but they themselves as acts of God are not conditional, but absolute, acts of God's absolute sovereignty. There has been laid by God a causal connection between sin and punishment, and he maintains that in everyone's conscience; but the decree of reprobation finds its deepest cause not in sin and unbelief, but in the will of God, Spr. 16:4, Mt. 11:25, 26,
Rom. 9:11-22, 1 Petr. 2:8, Op. 13:8. So also there is a causal connection between faith and salvation, but the decree of election is not caused by foreseen faith; rather election is the cause of faith, [380] Hd. 13:48, 1 Cor.
4:7, Ef. 1:4, 5, 2:8, Phil. 1:29. Even Christ cannot be regarded as causa electionis. Indeed this expression is susceptible of a good interpretation.
Thomas rightly says that Christ is the cause of our praedestinatio, not considered as act or decree, but with a view to its end and goal. Sic enim
Deus praeordinavit nostram salutem, ab aeterno praedestinando, ut per Jesum Christum compleretur, S. Theol. I qu. 24 art. 4. And thus also by
some Reformed there was spoken of Christ as causa or fundamentum electionis, or of our election per en propter Christum, Hyperius, Meth.
Theol. p. 193. Conf. Belg. art. 16. Conf. Helv. II art. 10. Martinius at the Synod of Dordrecht 1618/19, sess. 65. 67. Maresius, Syst. Theol. IV § 41.
Christ is indeed causa or fundamentum electionis, insofar as election is realized in and through him; he is also the causa meritoria of salvation, which is the goal of election; he is also the mediator and the head of the elect. The decree of election is also taken with a view to the Son, out of love to him, Heidegger, Corpus Theol. V 31. The church and Christ are together, in one and the same decree, in communion with and for one another, chosen, Ef. 1:4. But therefore Christ as mediator is not yet the causa impulsiva, movens, meritoria of the decree of election. In that sense Christ has indeed been called the cause of election by many Romanists, by the Remonstrants, in their declaratio circa art. 1 de praedest., bij M. Vitringa II 55, by the Lutherans, Form. Conc. bij Müller S. 705. 720. 723, Quenstedt
III 17. 31 sq. and by many more recent theologians, Hofmann, Schriftbew. I 229, Meyer on Ef. 1:5, Kübel in Herzog2 12, 156 etc. But the Reformed have rightly contested this, Martyr, Loci C. 236. Polanus, Synt. VI 27.
Voetius, Disp. II 267. Twissus, Vindic. gr. I 139 sq. Turretinus, El. IV qu.
10. Moor II 18 sq. For Christ is himself object of praedestinatio and therefore cannot be its cause. He is a gift of the love of the Father and this therefore precedes the sending of the Son, Joh. 3:16, Rom. 5:8, 8:29, 2 Tim.
1:9, 1 Joh. 4:9. The Son has not moved the Father to love, but the electing love has arisen from the Father himself. And thus Scripture teaches everywhere that the cause of all decrees does not lie in any creature but only in God [381] himself, in his will and good pleasure, Mt. 11:26, Rom.
9:11v. Ef. 1:4v. And precisely therefore the doctrine of election, both for the
unbeliever and for the believer, is such an unspeakably rich comfort. If it went according to right and merit, then all were lost. But now that it goes according to grace, there is also hope for the most miserable. If work and wage were the standard in the kingdom of heaven, then it would be opened for no one. Or also if according to the doctrine of Pelagius the virtuous man were chosen for his virtue and the Pharisee for his righteousness, then the poor tax collector would be excluded. Pelagianism is so mercilessly hard.
But to confess election, that is, to recognize in the most unworthy of human beings, in the most deeply sunken, still a creature of God and an object of his eternal love. Election does not serve, as it is so often preached, to repel many but to invite all to the riches of God's grace in Christ. No one may believe that he is a reprobate, for each is seriously and urgently called and is obliged to believe in Christ unto salvation. No one can believe it, for his life itself and all that he enjoys is a proof that God has no pleasure in his death.
Nor does anyone actually believe it, for then he would already have hell on earth. But election is a source of comfort and strength, of humility and meekness, of confidence and decisiveness. The salvation of man lies unshakably fixed in the gracious and almighty good pleasure of God.
19. And this glory of election appears even more beautifully when we finally pay attention to its object and goal. In earlier dogmatics that object was usually specified. Angels, human beings, and Christ were treated as its object. Concerning human beings there is no difference; whether before or after faith, whether before or after the fall, all assume that human beings are the proper object of predestination and of election. This is not to be understood in the sense that human beings, peoples, generations, or also the church in general, without further determination and in contrast with the individuals and particular persons, would be the object of election, as
Schleiermacher, Gl. § 119. Lipsius § 525 f. Ritschl, Rechtf. u. Vers. [382] III2 112-130 et al. assert. For this representation is a mere abstraction, since humanity, people, generation, church exists only in particular persons; it is also contradicted by Scripture, for this teaches a personal election, Mal. 1:2,
Rom. 9:10-12 Jacob, Acts 13:48 ὁσοι, Rom. 8:29 ὁυς, Eph. 1:4 ἡμας, Gal.
1:15 Paul; the names of the elect are written in the book of life, Isa. 4:3, Dan. 12:1, Luke 10:20, Phil. 4:3, Rev. 3:5 etc. But yet it is true that those elect in Scripture are not considered separately and atomistically, but as one organism. They are the people of God, the body of Christ, the temple of the H. Spirit. They are therefore chosen in Christ, Eph. 1:4, to be members of his body. Both, Christ and the church, are thus included in the decree of predestination. Therefore Augustine already said: sicut ergo praedestinatus est ille unus, ut caput nostrum esset, ita multi praedestinati sumus, ut membra ejus essemus, de praed. sanct. c. 15, cf. de corr. et gr. c. 11. de dono pers. c. 14. The synod of Toledo 675 spoke in the same spirit, in Denzinger n. 232, and scholasticism treated at length the predestination of Christ, especially in connection with Rom. 1:5, Thomas, Sent. I dist. 40 qu. 11. III qu. 10. S. Theol. III qu. 24. S. c. Gent. IV c. 9. Petavius, de incarn. verbi lib.
XI c. 13. 14. The Lutherans, however, denied this, because they conceived predestination as election out of sin to salvation by the mercy of God,
Quenstedt, Theol. did. polem. III p. 18. 43. But all the more did the Reformed bring out that Christ also had been ordained by God and together with the church was the object of God's election. There was even still a difference over whether Christ was object of predestination only or also of election. Some, such as Calvin, C. Ref. XXXVII 714. Gomarus, Op. I 430.
Marck. VII 5. Moor, II 55. Kuyper, Heraut 286. 287 said that Christ was destined to be mediator, in order to bring salvation for his own to pass; the
election of human beings thus logically preceded the preordination of Christ to be mediator. But others, such as Zanchius, Op. II 535 sq. Polanus, Synt.
IV 8. Synopsis 24, 24. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Thol. VII 344-353. Heppe, Dogm. der. w. ref. K. S. 125 f. Kuyper, Uit het Woord II 314 also regard Christ as object of election, [383] since he was destined not only to be mediator but also to be head of the church; the election of Christ then logically preceded that of the church. Now it is undoubtedly true that Christ is ordained to be mediator, in order to do all that was necessary for the salvation of man; and it is equally certain that Christ is not chosen by the compassion of God out of sin and misery to glory and salvation. But Scripture nevertheless speaks many times also with respect to the Messiah of God's election, Isa. 42:1,
43:10, Ps. 89:4, 20, Mt. 12:18, Luke 23:35, 24:26, Acts 2:23, 4:28, 1 Pet.
1:20, 2:4. This election rightly bears that name, because the Son from eternity has been designated by the Father to be mediator, and above all because the human nature of Christ out of sheer grace and without any merit has been destined for union with the Logos and for the office of mediator. But by this Christ is only object of predestination, since this, in distinction from election, precisely includes the ordering of the means to the end. Scripture, however, on the other hand says just as strongly that the church is chosen in and unto Christ, to bear his image and to behold his glory, John 17:22-24, Rom. 8:29; Christ is not only destined to be mediator but also to be head of the church; all things are created through him but also unto him, 1 Cor. 3:23, Eph. 1:22, Col. 1:16 v. Not as though thereby Christ became the ground and the foundation of our election. But the election of the church is the very first benefit to the church; and this benefit too already takes place in communion with Christ, and has not as ground but precisely as goal that all other benefits, regeneration, faith, etc. are communicated by
Christ to the church. In this sense the election of Christ logically precedes ours. But however one might also think this logical order, all the Reformed said that Christ and his church together, that the Christus mysticus, was the proper object of election. Uno et indiviso decreto omnes, Christus et nos, electi sumus, Mastricht, Theol. theor. pract. III 3, 8. Heidegger, Corpus
Theol. V 30. Yet even here they did not stop. In agreement with Augustine, Enchir. 100, the Scholastici, Thomas S. Theol. I qu. 23 art. 1 ad 3 and in contrast with the Lutherans, Quenstedt III p. 18, 43, they also included the angels in the decree of predestination [384]. Scripture gave occasion for that, 1 Tim. 5:21, 2 Pet. 2:4, Jude 6, Mt. 25:41, and this example of Christ taught that election does not always presuppose a state of sin and misery.
However much then the ἐκλογη in Scripture is as a separation out of the peoples, Gen. 12:1, Deut. 7:6, 30:3, Jer. 29:14, 51:45, Ezek. 11:17, Hos.
11:1, Acts 2:40, Phil. 2:15, 1 Pet. 2:9 etc. and the number of the elect is often regarded as very small, Mt. 7:14, 22:14, Luke 12:32, 13:23, 24; in that ἐκκλησια the world is nevertheless saved. Not some human beings out of the world, but the world itself is the object of God's love, John 3:16, 17,
4:14, 6:33, 12:47, 2 Cor. 5:19. In Christ all things in heaven and on earth are reconciled with God; under him they are all gathered together into one,
Eph. 1:10, Col. 1:20. The world, created by the Son, is also destined for the Son as its heir, Col. 1:16, 2 Pet. 3:13, Rev. 11:15. And thus it is not an accidental and arbitrary aggregate, but an organic whole, which in election has been known by God and in redemption has been preserved by Christ.
Reconciliatus mundus ex inimico liberabitur mundo. Ecclesia sine macula et ruga ex omnibus gentibus congregata atque in aeternum regnatura cum
Christo, ipsa est terra beatorum, terra viventium, Aug. de doctr. chr. III 34, cf. Perkins, Werken I 770. Twissus, Vind. gr. I 312. And precisely because
the object of election is a perfect organism, therefore it itself is not to be thought otherwise than as a firm and definite decree of God. In an aggregate the number of parts is wholly indifferent. But all that exists organically rests on measure and number. Christ is chosen by God to be Head, the church to be his body; and together they must grow up to a perfect man, in whom each member occupies its own place and fulfills its own task. Election is the divine thought, the eternal plan of that temple which he builds in the course of the centuries and of which he himself is the Artist and the Builder. To the building of the temple everything is subordinated and serviceable. Just as all decrees of God run out into that of election, so the whole history of world and humanity cooperates toward the coming of the kingdom of God.
Even those who are not citizens in that kingdom, says Calvin, in salutem nascuntur electorum, C. R. XXXVI 360. Polanus, Synt. 252. [385] Creation and fall, preservation and government, sin and grace, Adam and Christ, each in its own way contributes to the bringing about of this building of God. And this building itself is erected to the honor and to the glorification of God. Παντα γαρ ὑμων ἐστιν, ὑμεις δε Χριστου, Χριστος δε θεου, 1 Cor.
3:21-23.
CHAPTER V. On the World in its Original State.
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