3. § 22. The Knowability of God. (Cognitio Dei Acquisita.)
§ 22. The Knowability of God.
(Cognitio Dei Acquisita.)
. Although there may be no antithesis between the cognitio Dei insita and acquisita, there is nevertheless undoubtedly a distinction between the two. Often this distinction is conceived in such a way that the first denotes the knowledge of God which is innate to man and accrues to him from his own being, and the second that which, for the increase and extension of the first, comes to man in part from without, from the contemplation of the world. But the difference between the two is not thereby indicated clearly and precisely. For, in the proper sense, there is no knowledge innate, neither of God nor of the world. All knowledge comes from without into man's consciousness. What is innate is only the capacity for knowledge; but this capacity comes to operation and act only through the influence of the world in and around us. The seed of religion does indeed lie in man, but it germinates only in the field of the whole of human life. Just as the eye is brought along by man at his birth but sees the objects only in the light of the sun, so the believer beholds God only in all the works of his hands. Furthermore, it has become clear to us in the previous §
that Christian theology has never understood by the innate and implanted character of the knowledge of God that man at birth brought along any conscious knowledge of God; but it thereby only indicated that the knowledge of God does not need to be imparted to man by coercion or violence, and also not by logical reasoning or compelling proofs, but that it is by nature, spontaneous, of itself proper to man. A man, developing normally, comes without coercion or effort, of himself to some knowledge of God. Therefore the cognitio Dei insita is also not in antithesis with the acquisita, for in a broader sense the first too can be called acquisita. For the revelation of God precedes the cognitio Dei, both insita and acquisita. He does not leave himself without witness. He works with his eternal power and divinity upon man from all sides, not only from without but also from within; in nature and the world of men, in heart and conscience, in prosperity and adversity, God as it were comes to meet man. And man, created after God's image, received the capacity to take up the impressions thereof and thereby to come to some awareness and to some knowledge of the Eternal Being. The cognitio insita, as soon as it is cognitio and thus not only potentia but actus, has never arisen otherwise than under the influence of the revelation of God in and outside man and is therefore in so far always acquisita. For these reasons the distinction between the cognitio Dei insita and acquisita was formerly usually indicated differently. It consisted in these two things. First, in this, that the cognitio Dei innata was obtained of itself, spontaneously, without effort or coercion, whereas the cognitio Dei acquisita was acquired by reasoning and argument, by reflection and proof along the viae causalitatis, eminentiae and negationis; the former was noetica, the latter dianoetica. And second, from that there also flowed this difference, that the first consisted only in principles and was general and
necessary, but the second was more elaborated and developed, yielded more concrete propositions and was therefore also subject to all manner of doubt and contestation. That there is a God stood and stands nearly for all as certain. [46] But the proofs for the existence of God have been found by thought and are therefore alternately despised and highly esteemed, Moor,
Comm. I 41. 44. And thereby the distinction is precisely indicated. It does not lie in this, that the innate knowledge of God would arise from man and the acquired from the world. The moral proof too is derived from the moral consciousness which is within man. In both it is the same and the whole revelation of God, from which the cognitio Dei penetrates into our consciousness. But in the cognitio Dei insita that revelation works upon the consciousness of man and cultivates there impressions and awarenesses. In the cognitio Dei acquisita that revelation of God is thought through by man; his understanding sets to work, his reflection awakens, and with clear, lucid consciousness he seeks by reasoning and proof to ascend from the creatures to God. For man has, in no domain of knowledge, enough with impressions and awarenesses. He is not satisfied with consciousness alone. It is not sufficient for him that he knows. He also wants to know that he knows; he seeks to explain the how and why of his knowing. And hence it is that ordinary, everyday, empirical knowing always seeks to pass over into proper, scientific knowing; that faith raises itself to theology, and the cognitio Dei insita completes itself in the cognitio Dei acquisita.
2. The division into cognitio Dei insita and acquisita is usually applied only to the theologia naturalis. And this is then distinguished from and often set in opposition to the theologia revelata. Already earlier this view has been contested at length, I 219-244. There is no separate theologia naturalis, which, apart from all revelation, could be obtained by man from the
thinking contemplation of the world. That knowledge of God which is summarized in the theologia naturalis is no product of human reason. It presupposes, in the first place, that God himself reveals himself in the works of his hands; it is not man who seeks God, but God who seeks man also through his works in nature. Further, it is not man who, with the natural light of reason, understands and knows this revelation of God; all religions of the Heathen are positive; but on man's side a sanctified understanding and an opened eye are needed, in order to take note of God, the true and [47] living God, in his creatures. And even this is not enough. Even the believer, even the Christian, would not understand God's revelation in nature and would not be able to reproduce it purely, if God himself had not described in his Word how and what he reveals of himself in the whole world. The cognitio Dei naturalis is included in Scripture itself and is therein unfolded at length. Therefore it is also an altogether wrong method that the Christian, in the treatment of the theologia naturalis, as it were divests himself of the special revelation in Scripture and of the illumination of the H. Spirit, discusses it without any Christian Voraussetzung, and thereafter proceeds to the theologia revelata. The Christian, also as dogmatician, from the beginning stands with both feet on the foundation of the special revelation; not only first in the locus de Christo but also in the locus de Deo is he a believer in Christ. But standing thus, he looks around him, and armed with the spectacles of the H. Scripture he sees in the whole world a revelation of that same God whom he knows and confesses in Christ as his Father in the heavens. Then, however, under the cognitio Dei insita and acquisita is not to be understood that knowledge which we obtain from creation apart from the special revelation. From our earliest youth onward God's special revelation in Christ has worked upon us all; we are
born in the covenant of grace and thus as Christians; all manner of Christian influences have formed the knowledge of God which is now our portion, to a much greater extent than the working that has proceeded from God's revelation in nature upon our heart; and in the light of that special revelation we have all also learned to contemplate nature and the world around us. We all owe the knowledge of God from nature to God's special revelation in his
Word. Nature would let us hear voices just as confused as the Heathen, if we had not listened to God's speech in the works of grace and thereby now understood his voice also in the works of nature. But now that revelation of God in nature is also of high value. It is the same God who in nature and in grace, in creation and re-creation, in the Logos and in Christ, in the Spirit of God and in the Spirit of Christ speaks to us. Nature and grace are no antithesis; we have one God, from whom and through whom and unto whom they both are. [48] 3. This applies to both the cognitio Dei insita and acquisita; both we owe to Holy Scripture. It is true that it makes no effort to prove the existence of God. It proceeds from that existence and presupposes that man knows and acknowledges God. It does not consider man to have sunk so deeply that, in order to believe, he beforehand has need of a proof. For he is still bearer of the image of God, God's offspring, and endowed with a νους, in order to observe in the creation God's eternal power and divinity. The denial of God's existence is in the eyes of Scripture a sign of folly, of deep moral decay, Ps. 14:2. Such people are exception, not rule. As a rule Scripture reckons with such as acknowledge the existence of God unforcedly and by virtue of the prompting of their nature. It does not appeal to the reasoning intellect, but to the rational and moral consciousness. It does not analyze and demonstrate, but shows God in all the works of his hands. But it does
do that, then. Heaven and earth together with all creatures, foliage and grass, rain and drought, fruitful and unfruitful years, food and drink, health and sickness, riches and poverty, and all things speak of God to the pious.
There is no part, no little piece of the world, in which his power and divinity is not beheld. To heaven and earth, birds and ants, flowers and lilies man is referred, in order to behold and acknowledge God. Scripture does not reason in the abstract and does not make God into the conclusion of a syllogism, now leaving it to us whether we shall find that proof compelling.
But it speaks with authority, it proceeds theologically and religiously from God, it shows his virtues in his works and it demands that we shall acknowledge God. An ox knows its owner, and a donkey the manger of its lord, but Israel has no knowledge, my people does not understand, Jes. 1:3.
It is certain for it that God reveals himself in the creatures and that He leaves himself without witness to no one, Hd. 14:17, Rom. 1:19. And thus, appealing to the whole creation as a testimony and revelation of God, it contains in germ everything that was later worked out broadly in the proofs and was unfolded dialectically. There is truth in the remark of C. J. Nitzsch,
Syst. der Chr. Lehre, 6te Aufl. S. 142, that Holy Scripture gives us a beginning and analogy of the aitiological proof in Rom. 1:20, of the teleological in Ps. 8; 19; [49] Hd. 14:17, of the moral in Rom. 2:14 and of the ontological in Hand. 17:24, Rom. 1:19, 32. But speaking thus, not in dialectical demonstration but in the language of testimony, not appealing to the reasoning intellect but making an appeal to heart and conscience, to the whole rational and moral consciousness of man, Scripture has never been without power and influence. In this too it is a powerful word, sharp as a two-edged sharp sword, penetrating to the division of soul and spirit, a judge of the thoughts and deliberations of the heart. Even without logical
demonstration and philosophical proof Scripture in this its testimony is powerful, because it is the word of God and finds support in the rational and moral nature of every man. It is God himself who leaves himself without witness to no one. And it is man himself who, because he was created after God's image, in spite of himself must give heed and assent to this testimony. In this light the so-called proofs for God's existence must also be considered. That will preserve us both from overestimation and from contempt of the proofs.
4. Already among the ancient sages, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, Plutarch, Seneca, Cicero, we encounter the proofs that are adduced for the existence of God. From the beauty, the harmony, the motion, the purposiveness of the world, from reason and the innate consciousness, from the importance of religion for state and society, from the agreement of the peoples, one concludes to the existence of a selfconscious, rational, Divine being, Zeller, Philos. der Gr. I4 885 f. II4 771 f.
III3 357 f. IV3 133 f. Christian theology adopted all these proofs and treated them with preference; Augustine added yet one from the general concepts, de lib. arb. II c. 3-15. Münscher—v. Coelln, D. G. I 125-129. It did not disdain the support that was offered to it by pagan science, and, with rejection of dualistic Gnosticism and Manichaeism, saw in nature a work of God. This standpoint of Christian theology is the more noteworthy, because
Christianity was in part hostile over against the cosmos and laid all emphasis on the salvation of man. But nature was and remained for Christian theology, in spite of all asceticism, [50] that penetrated into the church, a creation of that same God who in Christ had revealed himself as Re-Creator and Saviour. Indeed, the value and force of the proofs were very soon overestimated. To be sure, some church fathers express that the
Heathens never came to a pure religio naturalis and that the way of these proofs is very difficult for the sinner, Athanasius, c. Gent. c. 35 sq. But gradually the proofs lose their religious character; they are detached from all moral conditions; the cognitio Dei acquisita comes to stand separately alongside the insita; and Christian theology received more and more the conviction that the truths of the religio naturalis were provable in the same sense as those of mathesis or logika. They were actually not articuli fidei but praeambula ad articulos, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 2 art. 2. c. Gent. I 1013. The ontological argument of Anselm, in his Proslogium, although taken over by some such as Halesius, Bonaventura, Itiner. c. 5, was indeed rejected by most, because we can ascend to God only through the creatures,
Thomas, c. Gent. I 10-12. But otherwise great value was attached to the proofs and much care expended; in the theologia naturalis one stood on rational, scientific ground before and outside faith, Schwane, D. G. III 107 f. And on that same rationalistic standpoint Rome and Roman theology still stand to the present day, Petavius, Theol. I cap. 2. Sylvius, Comm. in totam pr. p. S. Thomae, ed. 4a 1693 I p. 22-26. Theol. Wirceb. 1880 III 1-20.
Perrone, Prael. Theol. II 3-41. Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorz. I2 673 f. II2 668 f. Schwetz, Theol. fund. I § 4-8. C. Pesch, Prael. dogm. II 1-20. Hettinger,
Apol. des Christ. I7 103 f. Jansen, Prael. I 39-51 etc. The Vatican declared that God can be known with certainty from the creation by the natural light of reason, cf. deel I 221.
The Reformation did indeed adopt this theologia naturalis with its proofs, but did not let them precede [faith]; rather, it incorporated them into the doctrine of faith. Calvin proceeded from the semen religionis and then indeed saw in every particula mundi, in the starry heaven, in the human body, in the soul, in the preservation of all things, etc., irrefutable signa and
testimonia of God's majesty, Inst. I 5, 1-10, but then immediately again acknowledges that the [51] semen religionis, although implanted in all in an ineradicable way, can nevertheless be stifled and can bring forth no good fruit; man no longer has an eye to behold God, for that he has need of faith,
I 4, 1. 5, 11-15. This same place is occupied by the theol. naturalis in Ursinus, Tract. theol. 1584 p. 37-44, Martyr, Loci p. 2 sq., Musculus, Loci p. 2-5, Polanus, Synt. theol. II c. 4, cf. Schweizer, Gl. der ev. ref. K. I 156 f.
But soon protest. theol. set out upon the rationalistic path. While the theol. nat. was at first a description, on the basis of Scripture, of what the Christian could know about God from creation, it soon became an exposition of what the unbelieving, rational man could come to know from nature by his own thinking. The theologia naturalis became theologia rationalis. Cartesius found in the innate idea an incontrovertible proof for the existence of God. Voetius still perceived the difference between this rationalistic argumentation and the Reformed doctrine of the theol. nat.,
Disp. V 455-525. But this awareness, in Alsted, Theol. nat. 1623, Mastricht, Theol. II c. 2, Marck, Merch I 1, 14, Turretinus, Theol. El. III qu. 1 e. a., was lost more and more. Rationalism made its entry everywhere. The theologia naturalis became the proper, scientific, demonstrable theology, over against which the theologia revelata came to stand increasingly in the shadow and finally disappeared entirely. The proofs were divided into classes and elaborated at length; one distinguished metaphysical proofs from motion, causality, contingency of the world; physical from harmony, order, purpose of the universe and of particular creatures, such as sun, moon, stars, fire, light, earth, water, animal, plant, man, body, soul, ear, eye, hand, instinct, etc.; historical from the consensus gentium, the societas, arts, sciences, revelation, prophecy, miracle; moral from conscience, freedom,
morality, judgment, reward and punishment, etc., and finally also mathematical proofs, Buddeus, de atheismo et superst., ed. Lulofs, 1767 p.
224-318, and further litt. in M. Vitringa I p. 11 sq. Walch, Bibl. theol. sel. I 676-744, Doedes, Inl. tot de Leer v. God 200-217.
This self-satisfaction of theologia naturalis lasted until Kant. He subjected the proofs to a strict criticism, argued that theoretical reason here had to end with a non liquet [52], Kr. d. r. V. ed. Kirchmann S. 470 f., but built the existence of God on the postulate of practical reason, cf. deel I 447 f. Since then the proofs have fallen into discredit with many philosophers and theologians. Jacobi even considered it impossible to prove God's existence, because God would then depend as a conclusion on the grounds of proof,
Von den göttl. Dingen, Werke III 368. 567 f. As unnecessary for the believer and as useless for the unbeliever the proofs were rejected or despised by Reinhard, Dogm. § 30. Schleiermacher II § 33. Twesten II 19 f. Hofmann,
Schriftbew. I2 62. Beck, Vorles. über die Glaubenslehre I, 63 f. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. I2 102-109. Philippi, K. Gl. II 1-17. Bovon, Dogm. Chrét. I 216. Böhl, Dogm. 16 f. Rauwenhoff, Wijsb. v. d. godsd. 499 v. etc. Others did not go so far, but at least assigned to the moral proof in the sense of Kant an important place, as Köstlin, Die Beweise für das Dasein Gottes,
Stud. u. Kr. 1875 S. 601-655, 1876 S. 7-80. cf. also Herzog2 5, 308. Ritschl, Theol. u. Met. 8 f. Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 200 f. Kaftan, Wahrh. d. chr. Rel.
490 f. The proofs acquired a much greater significance in the philosophy of Hegel; he let them count as God's self-proof in the human spirit and therefore attached great value especially to the ontological proof, Ueber die
Beweise vom Dasein Gottes, Werke XII 291 f. Biedermann regards them as proofs not for the existence of a personal God but indeed of an einheitlichen, absoluten Grund der Welt, Dogm. § 645 f., cf. also Hartmann,
Religionsphil. II 114 f. Paulsen, Einl. in die Philos. 239 f. etc. Herbert Spencer considers the essence of the Absolute unknowable but its existence nevertheless provable, First Principles 5th ed. p. 1-123, especially p. 87-97, cf. Spruyt, Gids April 1886, Molenaar, Bijbl. v. d. Herv. 21 Mei 1885.
Furthermore, from various sides the attempt has been made to present the old proofs in a new form and to maintain them, either as proofs or as grounds for faith in a personal God, Dorner, Gl. I 199 f. Kahnis, Luth.
Dogm. I2 118 f. Lange, Dogm. I 207 f. Ulrici, Gott. u. die Natur 2e Aufl.
431 f. Weisse, Philos. Dogm. I 301 f. Lotze, Mikrok. III3 553 f. Pfleiderer, Grundriss 1886 S. 65. Barry, Die natürl. Theol. 1882. Kennedy,
Gottesglaube u. mod. Weltanschauung 1893. Zöckler, Theol. naturalis 1860.
Fricke, Ist Gott persönlich, Leipzig Wigand [53] 1896. Hodge, Syst. Theol.
I 202. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 222. Bruce, Apologetics 1892 p. 149-163.
Caird, Introd. to the philos. of religion 1880. Flint, Theism, Edinb. 1877.
James Orr, Chr. view of God and the world 1893 p. 104-137. Land, Godg.
Bijdr. 1856 bl. 353 v. Doedes, Inl. tot de Leer v. God 236 v. Leer v. God 50 v. Bruining, The existence of God 1892. Maronier, What we know of God.
1889. Graswinckel, Faith and Freedom 1890 bl. 144-185 etc.
5. The ontological proof occurs in threefold form. The conclusion from the general ideas and forms in the human mind, i.e. from reason, which stands above our individual reason and above the whole world, to absolute reason, the sum-total of all those ideas and forms, the absolutely true and good and beautiful, i.e. to God (Plato, Augustine, Boethius, Anselm in his
Monologium). Or it proceeds from the necessary thinking of the highest, absolute idea, i.e. of God, and concludes from that to the existence of that idea, because otherwise it would not be the absolute, the highest idea, since an idea which at the same time does exist is greater and higher than one
which does not actually exist (Anselm in his Proslogium). Or it sees in the innate character of the idea of God a fact that cannot be explained otherwise than by the existence of God, who has implanted this idea in man
(Descartes). The forms differ, but the proof is one, insofar as it concludes from thinking to being. Now this does not apply with respect to creatures, as everyone acknowledges. For these exist contingently; they can, without any logical contradiction, be thought as non-existing. Thinking and being belong to an entirely different category and are wholly different things.
From the thinking of something, e. g. a winged horse, it by no means follows that that something actually exists. Being is not a product of thinking. No one has meant this, then, by the ontological proof. But the question is whether precisely with the idea of God one may not conclude from thinking to being. To that the answer is, in the first place: yes, but under one condition, namely if God exists. If God exists, then He exists necessarily, and essentia and existentia are one in Him. But this condition was precisely what had to be proved; it had to be shown that God exists,
Schelling, Werke II 3 S. 156 f. In the second place it must be answered that from our [54] thinking, even from our necessary thinking, of the idea of God one nevertheless cannot conclude to the existence of God, because the being of God after all is not, or can be, a product of our thinking of the idea of God. The world of ideas and forms, including also the idea of God, is not to be identified with God; it is something in us. With those ideas the existence of God is therefore not yet given of itself. At most one can conclude from the presence of those ideas in us to the existence of God, but then this is properly not an ontological but a cosmological proof. But the being itself of the idea of God in us, however necessary this may also be, never includes and cannot as such already include the existence of God. The
ontological proof is therefore no proof in the strict sense. It only contains:
1o that the world of ideas and forms, and thus also the highest idea, is not thought by us arbitrarily, but necessarily, and 2o that that world of ideas and forms, and specifically also the idea of God, as soon as we think it, is by us also thought as really existing and must be thought as such. The necessary thinking of the idea of God also entails the necessary thinking of that idea as really existing. But it does not take us further. We remain moving within the circle of thinking. It does not carry us across the chasm from thinking to being. It would do that only then, when from those ideas not as ideas but from the being of those ideas in us one might be allowed to conclude to a being that created and maintained those ideas in us and itself had to be the highest idea; but then it would, as has been said, be no ontological but a cosmological proof, cf. Runze, Der ontol. Gottesbeweis, krit. Darst. seiner
Gesch. seit Ans. bis auf die Gegenwart, Halle 1882. Körber, das ontol.
Argument, Bamberg 1884.
6. The cosmological proof also appears in various forms. The inference from motion to a primum movens, quod a nullo movetur (Aristotle), from the changeable to the unchangeable (Damascenus), from the relative to the absolutely perfect (Boethius, Anselmus), from the series causarum, which cannot be infinite, to a prima causa efficiens (Thomas), from the contingent existence of the world to an ens necessarium (id.), from what does not exist of itself to what exists through itself [55] (Richard Vict.), from the existence of the relative to that of the absolute (Spinoza, Hegel, Hartmann, Scholten) etc. But in all these forms the cosmological proof nevertheless always comes down to the same thing, namely, to the inference from an effect to a cause. In itself this is also a perfectly lawful inference, in spite of the criticism of Hume and Kant; if we are no longer permitted to apply the law
of causality, all science is impossible. But the cosmological proof proceeds from various presuppositions which are not established in themselves and for all. It presupposes, not only that the particular things in the world but that also the entire universe is contingent, finite, relative, imperfect; that a series causarum in infinitum is unthinkable; that the law of causality also applies to the world as a whole. Only when all these presuppositions were correct would the cosmological proof have force. It rightly concludes that, like all things, so also the world as a whole, as composed of those things, must have a cause. But it does not carry us further; it says nothing about the character and nature of that cause. Whoever infers from the world to a cause which itself again needs a cause has done enough to the logical force of this proof. That that cause is infinite, absolute, perfect does not follow directly from the cosmological proof, but flows from other considerations. Thus indeed a series causarum infinita is unthinkable and impossible; there is no one who accepts it; all acknowledge an absolute ground, a first being, whether this bears the name of God or of the absolute, of substance or force, of matter or will etc. If this presupposition is now correct, as it is in fact acknowledged by all, then the cosmological proof brings us one step further, namely, to a cause of the world which exists of itself and is therefore infinite, eternal, absolute. But whether that cause is now also transcendent or only immanent, whether it is personal or impersonal, conscious or unconscious, is hereby absolutely not decided. Many, however, have tried to derive something more from the cosmological proof, whether directly or indirectly. Directly they tried to do this in such a way that they, because an effect cannot contain more than lies in the cause, from the personal, the conscious, the free, the ideas that were in the world, inferred to a personal, conscious, free being, which at the same time [56] was the
highest idea, the absolute reason. This reasoning, however, runs aground on the fact that the relation of cause and effect is then arbitrarily conceived as an emanation and, applied to God, would also demand that He would be material, bodily, indeed even impure and unholy. Others have therefore taken a by-path and reasoned that an infinite, absolute cause, a being that exists from, in and through itself, cannot exist otherwise than as spirit, person, e.g. Dorner, Gl. I 243 f. Kahnis, Luth. Dogm. I2 122. Doederlein,
Zeits. f. Philos. u. philos. Kritik 1886 S. 52 f. But against this the objection holds that by the cosmological proof we know nothing of the inner nature of such a first cause, that we have no right to begin to apply the law of causality again to such a first cause and therefore can determine nothing concerning it. And thus it remains that the cosmological proof leads us at most, namely, with the acknowledgment that an infinite series of causes is impossible, to a first, self-existing, absolute world-cause, Strauss, Der alte u. d. neue Gl. 1872 S. 214 f. Pesch, Die grossen Welträthsel II2 288 f.
7. The teleological proof proceeds from the order and beauty, the harmony and the purpose, which in the world, whether in its entirety, or in particular creatures, starry heaven, elements, earth, man, animal, plant, hand, eye etc., are to be observed, and concludes from that to an intelligent cause.
Although the teleological proof never fails to make an impression and was also mentioned by Kant with respect, yet especially in the present time many objections have been raised against it. First, from the materialistic side it is asserted that there is no purpose in things and that the teleological explanation of nature must make way for the mechanical, e.g. Haeckel, Nat.
Schöpf. 1874 S. 16 f. Lange, Gesch. des Mater. 1882 S. 570 f. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff, 16de Aufl. S. 214 f. Second, pantheism objects that the presence of order and purpose in the world gives absolutely no right to
assume a conscious, intelligent cause, because the unconscious, just as in every human being, so also in the world-whole, works much more wisely and more surely than conscious reflection and deliberate calculation,
Hartmann, Philos. des Unbew. 9de Aufl. 1882 passim. And finally Kant still raised the objection that this proof at most led [57] to a world-former but not to a world-creator, Kr. d. reinen Vern. ed. Kirchmann S. 500. Now against these objections quite a number of other considerations weigh up.
Scripture everywhere acknowledges a purpose in creation, Gen. 1, Spr. 8, Ps. 8, 1 Cor. 3:21-23, Rom. 8:28 etc. The teleological view of the world has been embraced by almost all philosophers, Anaxagoras, Socrates, Plato,
Aristotle etc. and repeatedly presses itself upon every human being, in spite of the misuse that has repeatedly been made of it especially in the previous century. Purposes are to be observed, both in particular phenomena, climate, seasons, temperature of the water, fertilization of plants, blood circulation, organisms, hand, eye etc., and in the world-whole. All atoms obey one law; everything rests on thought, which can be understood by man; the universe is no more to be explained from a chance than the Iliad from a throw of letters. And even the fact that we often cannot demonstrate a purpose proves that we, where we observe it, do so rightly. Moreover, the teleological view of the world does not exclude the mechanical in physical nature; only this latter goes beyond its power and competence when it wants to explain all phenomena in the world, also the conscious and spiritual, from matter and metabolism, Ulrici, Gott u. die Natur 1866, Id.
Gott u. d. Mensch 1874. P. Janet, Les causes finales 1882. Ebrard, Apolog.
§ 74 f. Pesch, Die grossen Welträthsel I2 241 f. 310 f. 788 f. Kennedy, Gottesgl. und mod. Weltanschauung 1893. Doedes, de Leer van God bl. 118 v. etc. If now the presence of order and purpose stood firm for all and in this
time did not itself have such powerful and prolix demonstration needful, then indeed the teleological proof would give us the right to conclude from the beauty and harmony of the world to a conscious being, for an unconscious purpose does not exist. Hartmann has indeed tried to argue the contrary, but his proofs for the purposive operation of the unconscious are therefore not valid, because it is one thing whether a man does something with consciousness and with an intentional purpose, and another thing whether in an unconscious action a purpose can be observed. Instinct works unconsciously, but nevertheless in the unconscious action of instinct a purpose is to be discerned that points back to a being which with consciousness has produced such an instinct. If there is a [58] purpose in the world, it must also have been thought beforehand. Even if it should be true that we also with the teleological proof do not get further than to a world-former, then that proof would nevertheless be of no small significance. Yes, even if this proof did not specifically lead to one intelligent being, but left open the possibility for the existence of many
Divine beings, who together had produced the world, then still the teleological proof would not be devoid of all value. The intelligence would then nevertheless be required in the first cause or causes by the arrangement of the world, and this proof would have delivered what it could deliver.
Only one would then, having by this way come to one or more worldformers, stand before the difficulty how a being that did not produce matter could nevertheless give to that matter form and shape, or also, how more than one being could be prima causa of the world. Logically these objections may still have some value, practically they no longer have any significance for our consciousness. Everything here depends on the presence of a purpose in the world; if that stands firm, thereby the
consciousness of the highest being is given, Pesch, Die grossen Welträthsel II2 305 f.
8. The moral proof finally pays attention to the moral phenomena that occur in man and humanity, conscience, responsibility, remorse, reward and punishment, virtue and happiness, fear of death and judgment, triumph of the good, etc., and concludes from them to a moral being, who created and maintains that entire moral world-order. Some in this connection direct attention more to the conscience, which speaks in every human being, to the moral law, to which everyone feels bound, and conclude from that to a highest, sovereign lawgiver. Others pay attention especially to the disharmony of virtue and happiness, of sin and punishment, and postulate from that a being, who in the hereafter will bring about just harmony. Or one also takes the whole moral world-order into view in its inner connection and in its supremacy above the order of nature and concludes from that to a being, who created that moral order and placed it above the order of nature. Always, however, this argument is based on the ethical phenomena in the human world and thereby arrives at God as the highest moral being. Also against this proof exceptions [59] have been raised. In the first place materialism adduces against it, that the moral, just like conscious life, is not an independent order but has gradually arisen through evolution, appears here thus and elsewhere so, and in the end rests on accidental change of matter, Darwin, Afst. v. d. mensch, hfdst. 4. Hellwald,
Kulturgesch. I3 26 f. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff 462 f. 478 f. And in the second place Fichte taught, that the moral world-order rests and subsists in itself and has no more need of a God above and outside it; and the advocates of autonomous and independent morality have followed him in that, C.
Coignet, La morale indép. Paris 1869. Again, against this materialistic and
autonomous conception all kinds of weighty objections can be raised. It is even being recognized more and more generally, that materialism has not explained the moral phenomena of freedom, responsibility, remorse, etc.,
Du Bois Reymond, Die sieben Welträtsel 1882 S. 84. Carneri, Sittl. u.
Darw. 1877. Weygoldt, Darwin. Relig. Sittl. 1878 etc. And also the morale indépendante has been contested with strong arguments, Caro, La morale indép. Paris 1876. Cramer, Christ. en Hum. bl. 159 v. But this is nevertheless certain, that the premises of this proof themselves first need so much strong support, that it hardly comes to the conclusion. Nevertheless this proof, especially through the influence of Kant, has found with many so much sympathy, that the other proofs have thereby almost entirely been neglected, cf. above bl. 52 and further the litt. on the moral world-order,
Zeller, Vortr. u. Abh. III 1884 S. 189 f. Carrière, De zedelijke wereldorde 1880. Hartmann, Das sittl. Bewustsein 1886 S. 570 f. Christ, Die sittl.
Weltordnung 1894, Traub, Die sittl. Weltordnung 1892, Pierson, Gids Nov.
1895 bl. 248. Yet this proof cannot be called stronger than the others. It even bears a much more personal character than the previous arguments.
Even if in the world around us often little of a moral world-order is to be perceived, in his conscience each person feels, in spite of himself, bound to a moral order, just as strongly as in his understanding to the laws of thinking. This moral order, which each person discovers in his own inner life, does not coincide immediately with the idea of God, also does not compel to the recognition of the existence of God, even allows for whoever wants to escape from it all kinds of exceptions, but nevertheless remains a powerful testimony, that always again [60] leads to the recognition of a holy and righteous being.
9. It is regrettable that these arguments for the existence of God in theology have received the name of proofs. Yet not for the reason mentioned by Jacobi. Although proving is the deriving of a proposition from another, the proving of God's existence is therefore not yet a contradictio in adjecto. Dependence in a proof is something quite different from dependence in reality. The causa cognoscendi is absolutely not the same as the causa essendi. Although the existence of God in a syllogism can be the conclusion, just as in general one can infer from the work to the workmaster, that existence in reality is nevertheless beginning and ground of the being of all things; indeed, as such it is precisely posited in the conclusion. But the name of proofs is for the above-mentioned arguments therefore less well chosen, because it has transferred them into a category where they do not belong, namely into that of logical, mathematical, exact, compelling demonstrations, and thus has deprived them of their ethical and religious character. It now has the appearance as if faith in the existence of God would rest on those proofs and would stand or fall with them. And that would yet be ein elender Glaube, der sich Gott erst beweisen müsste, ehe er zu ihm betete, Kahnis, Luth. Dogm. I 128. But rather the opposite is the case. The existence of no single thing is for us first established on the ground of proofs. Of the existence of ourselves, of the external world, of the laws of thought and morals, etc., we are convinced firmly and certainly before all reasoning and demonstration by the impressions which all these things irresistibly make upon our consciousness. We accept that existence of itself, spontaneously, without compulsion or violence. And so it is also with the existence of God. The so-called proofs may bring about more clarity and lucidity, but the certainty concerning the existence of God is not in the least strengthened by them. This is determined only by faith, i.e. by the
spontaneity with which our consciousness bears witness to the existence of God, which from all sides presses itself upon us. The proofs are therefore also not grounds, but rather products of faith. Faith namely tries to give itself an account of the religious impressions and emotions which every human being receives and carries about in his soul. Faith also works upon the understanding and this gradually seeks to bring order into that chaos of impressions and apprehensions; it rubrics and classifies them and reduces them to a few kinds. Impressions come to us from the world of ideas (ontol. proof), from that of finite, contingent, changeable things (kosmol. proof), from that of beauty and harmony (teleol. proof), from that of the moral order (moral proof). But although they can thus be classified, it must nevertheless never be thought that these four proofs are the only and isolated testimonies which God causes to go forth to us. No, all things speak to the pious person of God, the whole world is a mirror of His virtues, there is nulla mundi particula, in which His eternal power and divinity is not beheld. From within and from without us God's testimony comes to us. He does not leave Himself without witness, in nature nor history, in heart nor conscience, in life nor lot. And therefore that testimony of God is so powerful that it is scarcely denied by anyone. All human beings and peoples have heard something of the voice of the Lord. The consensus gentium, by many still reckoned a fifth proof, is a confirmation of this that God does not leave Himself without witness; it is the answer of humanity to the call of God. These testimonies which go forth from God and which throughout the whole world are directed to the human being, are ordered and ranked in the proofs. They receive through the syllogistic form in which they are clothed no greater force. But as proofs weak, they are strong as testimonies. They are no arguments that compel the understanding of the unbeliever, but signa
and testimonia, which never fail to make an impression on everyone's mind.
Analyzed, isolated, detached from one another and placed next to each other, they can be contested at every point of the reasoning and they stop the believing, which happens spontaneously and of itself. But conceived as testimony and preached as revelation of that God, of whose existence every human being by nature, before reasoning and study, is assured in the deepest of his soul, they are of no small value. For even if it is the case that, thus preached, they meet objections and scruples, thereby they are nevertheless not nullified. Just as no one believes in God's love because everything discovers His love but despite everything that awakens doubt, so also everyone is convinced beforehand of the existence of God; through the proofs he does not [62] come to his faith and through the objections he suffers no shipwreck in his faith. In every domain it is so that in reflection the difficulties first arise, but no one therefore casts away the moral law, the law of thought, religion, art, science as folly, because his thinking does not know how to explain the phenomena which it acknowledges and does not know how to defend against all objections. But nonetheless reflection, although no certainty concerning existence, does bring clarity and lucidity.
The so-called proofs for the existence of God give the believer an account of his own religious and ethical consciousness; they place weapons in his hand with which the opponent, who in any case is not better armed, can be repelled; they are for the Christian a sign that it is one and the same God who reveals Himself in nature and grace and that therefore creation and recreation, physis and ethos, do not stand manichaean and dualistic next to each other; the virtues of God, which there shine in the world, are the same which also glitter in the kingdom of heaven. And together the testimonies, which from God in the world go forth to us and are comprehended in the
so-called proofs, are nothing other than revelation of the Name of the Lord, by which He designates Himself to the ear of His creatures, and by which He gives us the right to address Him. In connection with one another they make us know Him as the Divine being, which by us must necessarily and necessarily as existing be thought, which is the only, first, absolute cause of all creatures, which with consciousness and purposively governs all things, and which above all in the conscientie reveals Himself as the Holy One to each and every one who believes.