2. § 21. The Knowability of God. (Cognitio Dei Insita.)
§ 21. The Knowability of God.
(Cognitio Dei Insita.)
. Just as formerly with religion I 209 v., so it also appeared now with the knowledge of God, that it cannot have its origin except in revelation. If God is not revealed in his creatures, then of itself no knowledge of Him is possible. But if He displays his virtues in the world of creatures, then the knowability of God can no longer be contested.
Naturally, thereby the nature and the measure of that knowledge [25] are not determined. All who teach the knowability of God readily agree that that knowledge is wholly of its own kind and of very limited extent. For, although God is revealed to some extent in his creatures, there remains in Him an infinite fullness of power and life behind, which does not come to light. His knowledge and power do not coincide with the world and do not pour themselves out into it in full. He cannot even reveal himself completely to and in creatures, for the finite does not contain the infinite; no one knows the Father except the Son, Mt. 11:27 cf. Deut. 29:29. Moreover, that which God reveals of himself in and through creatures is already so rich and so deep that it can never be fully known by any human being. We
do not understand the world of created things in so many respects and stand every moment on all sides before riddles and mysteries; how then should we understand the revelation of God in all its richness and depth? But thereby the knowability of God is nevertheless not nullified. The incomprehensibility of God nullifies this knowability so little that it rather presupposes and confirms it; the richness of the divine being, surpassing all knowledge, precisely constitutes a necessary and important element of our knowledge of God. It remains established that God is knowable for us in that same way and in that same measure as He reveals himself to us in creatures.
That there is now a revelation of God in the world can really hardly be denied. In the first place, Holy Scripture leaves us not a moment in doubt on that point. It does not set up an altar for the unknown God, but proclaims that God who made the world, Hd. 17:23, whose power and divinity can be perceived from the creatures by the human νους, Rom. 1:19, who above all created man after his image and likeness, Gen. 1:26, as his offspring, which lives and moves in Him, Hd. 17:28, has spoken to him through prophets and apostles, above all through his Son himself, Hebr. 1:1, and now continually reveals himself to and in him through Word and Spirit, Mt. 16:17, Joh.
14:23 etc. According to Holy Scripture the whole world is a creation and thus also a revelation of God; there is in an absolute sense nothing atheistic.
And this testimony of Scripture is confirmed from all sides. There is no atheistic world, there are no atheistic peoples, there are also no atheistic
[26] human beings. The world cannot be conceived as ἀθεος, because then it could not be the work of God but would have to be the creation of an ἀντιθεος. And now dualism, which has repeatedly appeared in religion and philosophy, has indeed discerned in matter a daemonic principle, but in the
world has nevertheless always acknowledged a connection of idea and matter, a struggle of light and darkness. There is no one who can in an absolute sense and consistently deny the knowability of God, and thus His revelation in the world, wholly and entirely. Agnosticism itself is proof of that, just as scepticism cannot maintain itself except with the help of what it combats. And precisely therefore, because the world is not to be conceived as ἀθεος, therefore there are also no atheistic and religionless peoples.
Indeed this has been asserted by Socinus, Tract. Theol. c. 2, de auctor.
Script. c. 2, Locke, Essay on human understanding I ch. 4 § 8, and by many in this century, e. g. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff16 380 f., Darwin, Afst. des menschen 1884 I 127. But this opinion has been sufficiently refuted and is now almost generally abandoned, Moor, Comm. I 57. M. Vitringa, Comm. I 16. Flint, Antitheïstic theories, 3 ed. p. 250-289, 519-532. Peschel,
Völkerkunde S 260. Zöckler, Das Kreuz Christi 1875 S. 417 f. The wellknown saying of Cicero, that there is no people so barbarous that it believes not in the gods, has been confirmed from century to century. This fact is of great significance. That which all men agree upon by virtue of their nature cannot be false, Cic. de nat. deor. I 17. Opinionum enim commenta delet dies, naturae judicia confirmat, ib. II 2. And so finally there are also no atheistic human beings. There is not so much difference about the existence as about the essence of God. Indeed there is a practical atheism, a life without God in the world, Ps. 14:1, 53:2, Ef. 2:12. But conscious theoretical atheism in an absolute sense is rare, if it ever occurs. The word atheism, however, has often been used in a relative sense, not as a denial of the Godhead überhaupt, but of a particular Godhead. The Greeks accused
Socrates of atheism, Xenophon, Memor. I 1. Cicero counted Protagoras, Prodicus among the atheists, because they denied the popular gods, de nat.
deor. I 42. The Christians were therefore many times accused of atheism by the Heathens, Suicerus s. v. ἀθεος. And the Christians in their turn used that name for those who denied the God of revelation, ib. The Romans have sometimes reckoned Luther, Melanchton, Calvijn among the atheists,
Buddeus, de Atheismo 1747 p. 116 sq. In more recent times J. G. Fichte was openly accused of atheism, because he held the moral world-order itself to be God. And even now the name of atheist is sometimes given to those who know no other power than matter, such as Feuerbach, Strauss,
Büchner, Haeckel, Czolbe, Dühring, cf. A. Drews, Die deutsche Spekulation seit Kant II 235 f. And indeed, if the materialists recognize nothing other than matter and change of matter, then they are atheists and want themselves to be regarded as such. But this almost never occurs.
Taken in an absolute sense, as denial of an absolute power, atheism is almost unthinkable. All finally again recognize a power that is venerated as God. Strauss asks for his universe a piety, as the believer for his God, Der alte u. d. neue Gl2. 141 f. Atheism and materialism repeatedly turns into pantheism, Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff16 3, 70, 71 f., Haeckel, Nat.
Schöpfungsgesch. 20, 32, 64 Id. Der Monismus als Band zw. Rel. u. Wiss.
1893. That comes about because man cannot withdraw from the recognition of a highest power. At the same moment that he denies the true God, he invents for himself a false God. Religion sits too deep in man's nature for that, and the revelation of God speaks too loudly. Even if in some times religious indifferentism and scepticism takes hold deeply and far around itself, as e. g. in the age of Pericles, of emperor Augustus, of the Renaissance, and also in this century, then religion nevertheless always comes up again. Rather does man seize upon the coarsest superstition than that he can in the long run endure the naked, cold unbelief. But we can go
even further. Not only does atheism in an absolute sense almost never occur, but even in that sense it is rare that it would deny a personal God who lays claim to our veneration. Naturalism, hylozoism, pantheism are without doubt directions that repeatedly present themselves. But they are directions, not so much in the religious as in the philosophical domain.
They have never arisen of themselves, spontaneously, but owe their origin to criticism of the religious representations in others. They are not dogmatic but critical; and they therefore always serve only for a time and in a limited circle. A people, a [28] society, a church, a congregation of such naturalists and pantheists is unthinkable and untenable; the pantheists themselves acknowledge this, the religious representation is necessary for the lesser man, but only the philosopher raises himself to the pure concept. From that it follows that belief in a personal God is natural and normal; it arises everywhere of itself and in all men. But atheism, even as denial of a personal God, is an exception. It is philosophy, not religion. There is truth in the sharp word of Schopenhauer: ein unpersönlicher Gott ist gar kein
Gott, sondern bloss ein missbrauchtes Wort, ein Unbegriff, eine contradictio in adjecto, ein Shiboleth für Philosophieprofessoren, welche, nachdem sie die Sache haben aufgeben mussen, mit dem Worte durchzuschleichen bemüht sind, Par. u. Parel. I5 123. cf. Welt als Wille u. Vorst. II6 398, 406,
739. Therefore a certain will is also necessary, in order not to believe in a God, in a personal God. Deum non esse non credit, nisi cui Deum non esse expedit. There are no atheists who are firmly and certainly convinced of their unbelief, even unto martyrdom. Because it is abnormal and unnatural, does not rest on immediate consciousnesses but on mediate proofs and fallible reasonings, therefore it is never certain of its case. The proofs for the existence of a personal God may be weak, they are always still stronger
than those for the denial. To prove that there is no God is even impossible; for that one would have to be omniscient and omnipresent, i.e. oneself would have to be God, cf. Voetius, de atheismo, Disp. I 114-225. G. J.
Vossius, de origine et progressu idol. I c. 3. Leydecker, Fax Veritatis III controv. 3. Turretinus, Theol. El. III qu. 2. Maresius, Syst. Theol. 1673 p.
44. Buddeus, Theses theol. de atheismo et superst., ed. Lulofs L. B. 1747.
Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 198, 242. Flint, Antith. theories3, lecture I, Hoekstra, Des Christens godsvrucht bl. 6. Doedes, Inl. tot de leer v. God. 57v.
2. This naturalness, universality, and necessity of religion and knowledge of God has already early led to the thought that it was implanted in man by nature and inborn. The fact is there, after all, that all human beings from earliest youth onward have consciousness not only of a physical but also of a psychical, spiritual, invisible world. True and false, [29] good and evil, right and wrong, beautiful and ugly are indeed no measurable and calculable magnitudes and cannot be perceived with the five senses, but they are a reality which for our consciousness stands much more firmly than that of matter and of force. Materialism may reckon only with gravity and heat and electricity; but faith and hope and love are still wholly other forces, which have governed humanity and have preserved it from sinking away into bestiality. Augustine has rightly said that the truth of spiritual things is actually much more certain and firmer than that of the visible.
Nihil absurdius dici potest, quam ea esse quae oculis videmus, ea vero non esse quae intelligentia cernimus, cum dubitare dementis sit intelligentiam incomparabiliter oculis anteferri, de immort. an. c. 10 n. 17. de civ. XIX c.
18. The truths of mathematics, of logic, the first principles of ethics, law, religion stand indubitably firm for all. They bear a character of naturalness,
universality, and necessity, which can be denied by no one. They seem, as ideae innatae, to be enclosed in man's nature, to be given with his birth.
The doctrine of innate concepts is already rooted in Greek philosophy.
There it constituted a great problem for thought, how learning is nevertheless possible. For one of two things seemed to be the case: either we already know something and then we can no longer learn it, or we do not know it, but how is it then to be explained that we strive to learn it,
Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. I4 996, II4 823, III 189. Plato solved this problem by his doctrine of recollection; the soul, before its connection with the body, had beheld the ideas in all their beauty and had preserved the images of them deep in its memory. He proved this especially by mathematics, which we can build up entirely out of our mind without help of sensible perception, but otherwise thought that all learning presupposed the praeexistence of the soul, Zeller, ib. II4 639, 643 f. 823 f. Aristotle did indeed regard sensible perception as the way to knowledge, but nevertheless judged that reason potentially brought with it some highest, general principles, which stand firm by themselves, lie at the basis of all proofs, and are acknowledged by all, ib. III 188 f. The Stoics spoke of κοιναι ἐννοιαι, φυσικαι ἐννοιαι, ἐμφυτοι προληψεις, i.e. such concepts as, by virtue of the [30] nature of our thinking, are derived by all from perception, ib. IV3 74 f.
389 f. With all these philosophers there is as yet no question of innate ideas in the strict sense. Plato does not limit recollection to a few innate concepts but extends it to all knowledge; and Aristotle and others do indeed speak of general principles but expressly teach that these are not given as ideas with birth but are found specifically by means of perception and thinking, yet in such a way that every normal human being must then also find them. In the proper sense the doctrine of innate concepts first occurs with Cicero. He
speaks of notiones impressae, cogitationes insitae, innatae and assumes a knowing of all kinds of truths prior to all experience and investigation.
There are according to him semina innata virtutum, Tusc. III 1, 2, notitiae parvae rerum maximarum, which nature planted sine doctrina in our soul, de fin. V 21, 59, an innate knowledge of God, Deos esse natura opinamur,
Tusc. I 16, 36. Nat. D. I 1, 2 etc. Zeller, IV3 659 f.
3. In more recent philosophy the doctrine of the ideae innatae was advanced by Descartes, who was also the first to use this term and thus began to employ idea in a sense unusual up to that time. With Descartes this doctrine was connected with his dualism between soul and body. The cognitio intellectualis cannot be derived from sensible perception; this gives only the occasio, whereby our mind per innatam facultatem forms the representations and concepts, Renati Descartes, Notae p. 185. The cognitio proceeds from a principle of its own, i.e. from ideae innatae. Among those ideae innatae that of God is the chief, which, as it were, is a nota artificis, operi suo impressa. Medit. tertia p. 24. But he conceives the innate character of those ideas in such a way that the soul by nature possesses the power, the facultas, the dispositio, to bring them forth out of itself. The ideas are therefore not actual but potential in our mind, Object. et Respons. p. 102, Notae p. 184, 185. Also according to Leibniz the necessary and universal truths do not come to us from without, but they proceed from ourselves, such as e.g. those of substance, duration, change, cause, the mathematical truths and especially also the idea of God. Together these truths form the natural light of reason. But the innate character of those truths is explained by Leibniz [31] more extensively and more clearly than by Descartes. The latter said only that those ideas were potential in our mind. Leibniz, however, says that they are innately present virtualiter,
comme des inclinations, des dispositions, des habitudes ou des virtualités naturelles et non pas comme des actions. The human mind does not merely have the receptivity to know them, for then all knowledge could be called innate, but it is the source of those truths, it can bring them forth out of itself, les tirer lui-même de son fond. The ideas thus lie, as it were, preformed in the human soul. And this is possible, because there is a representing and thinking without consciousness. They come to consciousness when sensible perception gives occasion for it. This also brings the ideas virtually present in us actually into our mind, cf. Spruijt,
Proeve van de leer der aangeb. begrippen 144, Stöckl, Gesch. d. n. Phil. I 426, Malebranche thought he could explain learning and knowing in man in no other way than by the supposition that we see the ideas in God and that God therefore, as the universal and infinite being, is immediately present in our understanding. In his footsteps the ontologism of Gioberti, Gratry,
Ubaghs e. a. taught that we immediately behold God in our mind as the absolute being and that therefore an intuitive knowledge of God is present in man, Stöckl, Gesch. d. neuern Philos. II 568 f. 620 f. By Kant this doctrine of innate concepts was importantly modified. In connection with the terminology of Wolff he spoke of knowledge apriori and aposteriori, and now taught no innate concepts but indeed innate forms, namely forms of intuition, i.e. space and time, forms of the understanding, i.e. categories, and forms of reason, i.e. the ideas God, virtue and immortality. The idealism of Fichte and Hegel drove this doctrine to such a point that they constructed not only the knowledge of the necessary and universal truths, but all knowledge, and even all being, the whole material world, out of thinking. The grounds on which this doctrine of the ideae innatae chiefly rests are these: Learning, the ability to learn, presupposes that what is
learned is already present in some way in our mind. Reasoning and proof are built on principia that must be established per se and apriori. Experience gives only δοξα, contingent truths; universal and necessary truths can proceed only from the human mind itself. [32] That there are such universal and necessary truths is proved by the consensus gentium. And above all the opposition between soul and body is of such a nature that representations and concepts cannot have their origin in sensible perception; they must either be explained from the human mind or from the Spirit of God, in whom man beholds all ideas. On the other hand the doctrine of innate concepts was opposed by the Socinians, who rejected natural religion, Fock,
Der Socin. 307 f., cf. also Episcopius, Inst. theol. I c. 3, Locke, Essay concerning human understanding I ch. 2-4, Hobbes, de cive c. 14 n. 19 etc.
They appealed to the following considerations: The doctrine of the ideae innatae is completely superfluous, because the origin of those ideas can also be well explained in another way. History teaches that no single representation and no single concept is the same among all men and peoples. Even innate moral principles do not exist; concerning good and evil the greatest possible difference prevails; and the concept of God is so little innate that there even exist atheistic men and peoples. Children, idiots, the insane therefore also know nothing of such innate concepts. All knowledge in man stems from sensible perception; nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu. This refutation of the ideae innatae made much headway in England and France in the previous century. The materialism of this century joined it. The doctrine of innate concepts has generally been abandoned and replaced by the theory of the inheritance of characteristics, Darwin, Afst. v. d. mensch, hoofdst. 3, 4. Spencer, bij Spruyt
Proeve 342. Büchner, Kraft u. Stoff16 S. 344 f.
4. It is important to know what attitude Christian theology has adopted toward this doctrine of the ideae innatae. Prof. Spruyt finds it strange that the scholastics, with rare unanimity, declared themselves against that doctrine, and suspects that for that there must have been a theological reason, which, however, he cannot indicate, Proeve bl. 60. This is indeed the case and will become clear in what follows. Although Christian theology generally assumed that there were truths known not by revelation but by nature, and obtained not by deliberate investigation and reflection but, as it were, involuntarily [33], it nevertheless decisively rejected the doctrine of innate concepts. To be sure, the proponents of the ideae innatae in later times, such as Thomassinus, Theol. dogm. I c. 4, Staudenmaier, Chr.
Dogm. II 57 f. Kuhn, Gotteslehre 2de Aufl. 542 f., Klee, Dogm. II 1-4 and the ontologists such as Malebranche, Gioberti, Ubaghs etc., appealed to some church fathers, but wrongly. Justin Martyr, Apol. II 6 does indeed speak of the idea of God as a πραγματος δυσεξηγητου ἐμφυτος τῃ φυσει των ἀνθρωπων δοξα, but does not further say how he means this ἐμφυτος.
Irenaeus, adv. haer. II 1 sq. does indeed argue against the Gnostics that the world was created by God and reveals Him and makes Him known, but does not mention a cognitio innata. Clement of Alexandria also says that the Father and Creator of all things is known by all by nature and without instruction, ἐμφυτως και ἀδιδακτως, but he himself explains repeatedly that that knowledge is obtained from the contemplation of God's works, Strom.
V 13. 14. Tertullianus lays very strong emphasis on natural knowledge of God. All men, in spite of their idolatry, in danger and distress call upon the one God. And they have not learned this from Moses or the Prophets, but their own soul taught them therein. Animae enim a primordio conscientia
Dei dos est. This is the same among all peoples, adv. Marc. 10. The soul is
by nature Christian, Apol. 17. By that Tertullianus means nothing else than that some truths, such as that of the existence and unity of God, are known not first by special revelation but by nature: quaedam enim et natura nota sunt, ut immortalitas animae penes plures, ut Deus noster penes omnes, de resurr. 3. With more right one appeals to Augustine, who in many respects stood under Plato's influence and also acknowledges this himself, de beata vita 4. Indeed he attaches much more value to thinking than to sensory perception. The senses perceive only changeable things, but reason, although distinct in each human being, sees and knows general, necessary, unchangeable truths. And that is only to be explained by the fact that the reason of each human being sees those general truths in the one general reason, the one unchangeable truth, which God himself is. And thus
Augustine then repeatedly explains that we, just as we see sensible objects by the light of the sun, so contemplate intelligible truths in [34] the light of God, de civ. VIII 7, de trin. XII 15. He is nearer to us than the creatures and easier to find than these, de Gen. ad litt. V 16. He is the veritas super omnia praesidens, Conf. X 41. He even says, Deus et Dominus rerum omnium humanis mentibus, nulla natura interposita, praesidet, de musica VI 1. From this it is clearly evident that Augustine considers it much better and easier to ascend to God by thinking into the eternal truths than by contemplation of external nature. But it may nevertheless not be inferred from this that the soul of man here on earth would already contemplate God directly and immediately and then in this way would come to the knowledge of the eternal truths. For elsewhere he clearly says that the visio Dei is reserved for heaven, de trin. II 17, that here on earth the cognitio vespertina has been allotted to us, de Gen. ad litt. IV 32, that the eternal truths which man recognizes are to be distinguished from God as truth itself, de lib. arb. II 13,
Solil. I 5, that man gradually ascends from the contemplation of nature, from the knowledge of reason and its laws to God, Conf. VII 10. de lib. arb.
II c. 3-13 Cf. Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorzeit, I2 756 f. Schwane, D. G. II2 5467, Gangauf, Aug. Lehre v. Gott dem Dreieinigen 1883 S. 137 f. Spruyt,
Proeve 43-57. Mysticism, however, had in Augustine a powerful support, and it taught that man originally, besides an oculus carnis and an oculus rationis, had also received an oculus contemplationis, which, restored by grace, would already here at moments and in glory perfectly contemplate
God, Bonaventura, Brevil. II c. 12. By Bonaventura the proposition is therefore also contested that omnis cognitio sit a sensu; the soul knows God and itself without the help of the senses, Sent. II dist. 39 art. 1 qu. 2. Yet mysticism in Bonaventura, though on this point deviating from Thomas, remains within the bounds. Quamvis Deus sit praesens, tamen propter caecitatem et caliginem intellectus nostri, in qua sumus, ipsum cognoscimus ut absentem, Sent. II dist. 10 art. 1 qu. 1. The contemplation of God is not given to every human being, but is only a gift of grace, which can raise a Paul thereto, Sent. II dist. 23 art. 2 qu. 3. And even as regards the knowledge of the prima principia, this is indeed called innate in Bonaventura, but he explains in addition, quia lumen illud sufficit ad illa cognoscenda post [35] receptionem specierum sine aliqua persuasione superaddita propter sui evidentiam.... Naturale enim habeo lumen, quod sufficit ad cognoscendum quod parentes sunt honorandi, et quod proximi non sunt laedendi, non tamen habeo naturaliter mihi impressam speciem patris vel speciem proximi, Sent. II dist. 39 art. 1 qu. 2. Although
Bonaventura thus also assumes that there are truths which we do not obtain through sensory perception but through inward contemplation and through communion with God, yet even in him there is no question of innate ideas
in the proper sense, cf. the Freiburg edition of the Breviloquium, 1881 p. 79 sq. 148 sq. Schwane, D. G. III 111 f. Sanseverino, Philos. Christ. Neap. III art. 41. The whole scholasticism unanimously rejected the doctrine of innate concepts. In distinction from that, it taught that the essence of things is the proper object of intellectual knowledge. All knowledge begins with sensory perception. But when this sees the things, then the understanding has the aptitude to abstract the general from them, and indeed first of all the socalled innate concepts. These are thus not brought along ready-made by the intellectus but, in accordance with its nature, abstracted from the perception of sensible things. That also holds for the idea of God. God is not the substance of things but their causa, and therefore He can, from His works, by perception and thinking, be known to some extent in His existence and in His virtues. Innate knowledge exists only insofar as a natural habitus has been implanted in our understanding, to ascend from the finite to the infinite, from the particular to the general, cf. deel I 158 v., and further
Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 2 art. 1, c. Gent. I c. 10, 11. Theol. Wirceb. III 5 sq.
C. Pesch, Theol. dogm. II 10-13, Kleutgen, Philos. der Vorzeit I2 67 f. 587 f., Beilagen, 3tes Heft S. 3-47, Denzinger, Vier Bücher v. d. relig. Erk. II 28 f. The ontologism of Gioberti and Ubaghs was condemned at Rome 18
Sept. 1861 and 21 Sept. 1866.
5. Among the Lutherans the good and true element that lay enclosed in the doctrine of innate concepts could not come into its own. The theologia naturalis, as well insita as acquisita, found little favor with them, cf. already vol. I 222. By the combating of the scholastic doctrine, naturalia adhuc esse integra, [36] Luther allowed himself to be led into an opposite extreme. The image of God was wholly lost. Ratio sine Spiritu Sancto est simpliciter sine cognitione Dei. Homo in rebus divinis nihil habet quam tenebras. Properly
speaking, for man there has remained only the aptitudo passiva, i.e. the possibility of being saved. For the rest, his understanding, will, inclination are limited only to the civilia; in the spiritual he is wholly blind and dead.
Luther does indeed acknowledge that God still reveals himself in his works, creation is a Larve Gottes; but man no longer knows Him from it. Luther even sometimes goes so far that he calls sin essentia hominis, and that man is nihil quam peccatum; expressions which one certainly must not unfairly press and force, but which nevertheless are of significance for his view of the cognitio Dei insita and acquisita, Köstlin, Luthers Theol. II 244 f. 287 f.
367 f. The same negative standpoint is taken by the Lutheran symbols, ed.
Müller5 522, 585, 589, 594; and some theologians such as Flacius and Chemniz went so far that they rejected the whole cognitio Dei naturalis,
Zöckler, Theol. Natur. 1860 S. 64. But soon one nevertheless returned from this one-sidedness. Luther himself often spoke differently, and saw and praised in nature a work of God, Zöckler, ib. 60 f. Melanchton taught a cognitio Dei both insita and acquisita; there are traces of God in all his works, but these would be insufficient, nisi etiam insita esset menti quaedam notitia seu προληψις de Deo, Corpus Ref. XIII 137 sq. And this example is followed by the later theologians. Gerhard, Loci Theol.
Prooemium § 17, Loc. II c. 4, Quenstedt, Theol. did. polem. I 250 sq., Hollaz, Exam. Theol. p. 187 sq., Calovius, Isag. ad S. Theol. c. 4, Buddeus, de atheismo 1767 p. 225 sq. etc. discuss the theologia naturalis and defend it expressly against the Socinians. Later it was even treated separately by some, such as Jaeger et al. The cognitio Dei insita was now variously defined by the Lutheran theologians, as a facultas or dispositio or habitus or perfectio or lumen congenitum et habitui analogum. But on this all were agreed, that it did not consist in a species impressa, which would already be
present in man prior to all use of reason, Hollaz 189, Quenstedt 253, Calovius 77. Therefore Descartes' doctrine of the ideae innatae was rejected, Hollaz 195, and likewise the mystical doctrine of the inner light
[37] and of contemplation, ib. 198-220. And over against that the theologia insita was then conceived as a natural aptitude and inclination implanted in the intellectus humanus, to come sine discursu et mentis ratiocinatione to knowledge of God and to give to this an undoubted, firm and certain testimony, Hollaz 188-190, Quenstedt 253. Ante sensualem perceptionem nihil est in intellectu, quoad idealem rerum repraesentationem, est tamen aliquid in intellectu, quoad notitiam habitualem, Hollaz, Ex. theol. 193.
Quenstedt, Theol. did. pol. I 260.
The Reformed, from the beginning, adopted a friendlier attitude toward the theologia naturalis. Calvin distinguished between a general and a special grace and explained from the former all the good that has still remained even in sinful man, cf. my address on De Algem. Genade bl. 27 v. He also definitely assumed that a sensus divinitatis had been implanted in the human spirit, and indeed naturali instinctu. God has implanted in all numinis sui intelligentiam, cujus memoriam assidue renovans, novas subinde guttas instillat, Inst. I 3, 1. He also calls this semen religionis, and explains from it the universality of religion, ib. The conviction that there is a God is naturaliter ingenita; it can never be eradicated, I 3, 3. But yet scarcely one in a hundred is found, qui conceptum in suo corde foveat, nullus autem in quo maturescat, I, 4, 1. And to that semen religionis there now comes the revelation of God in his works, so that aperire oculos nequeant quin aspicere eum cogantur, I 5, 1. There is no little piece of the world, nulla mundi particula, in which not at least some sparks of his glory are seen to shine forth, I 5, 1. First of all man himself as a microcosm is an
officina innumeris Dei operibus nobilis, I 5, 3, 4, but then further the whole of nature, which can piously even be called God, 1 5, 5. Cf. II, 2, 18 and comm. on Ps. 8; 19; Hd. 17:27, 28. Rom. 1:19. Hebr. 11:3. And thus all
Reformed symbols and theologians speak. Ursinus, Tract. Theol. 1584 says that God reveals himself to man cum notitiis de se menti hominum impressis, tum creaturis omnibus tanquam speculis et documentis suae divinitatis propositis p. 35, and among the notitiae nobiscum nascentes he also counts the sensus that there is a God, as the universality of religion proves, p. 39. Zanchius, Op. III 636 sq. rejects both Plato and Aristotle and teaches with the [38] Stoa and Cicero, that the κοιναι ἐννοιαι nobiscum nasci, non autem usu comparari; children immediately know that three is more than two, that there is a distinction of good and evil, etc. Polanus,
Synt. Theol. p. 325 understands by the recta ratio the vera notitia voluntatis et operum Dei, ut et ordinis judiciique divini, a Deo menti humanae inscripta; whose author is the Logos, whose form and norm are the principia naturalia, and which is increased by the contemplation of God's works; cf. further P. Martyr, Loci Comm. p. 2 sq. Maresius, Syst. theol. p. 41. H.
Alting, Theol. elenctica 1654 p. 2 sq. Leydecker, Fax Verit. Loc. 3 contr. 1.
Alsted, Theol. polem. 1620 p. 185-187. Turretinus, Theol. El. I qu. 3 n. 2.
Moor, Comm. I 41 etc. And yet, notwithstanding that the theologia insita was so powerfully advocated, Cartesius' doctrine of the ideae innatae was decisively rejected by Voetius, Disp. V 477-525. He accuses Cartesius especially of three things, that he uses the word idea in an unusual sense and thus falsifies it; that he does not clearly say what is to be understood under that idea Dei innata, whether it belongs to the theologia insita or acquisita, whether it is a facultas or actus, an ens reale or ens intentionale, etc.; and that he deprives the knowledge that comes to us through the senses
of its value and certainty. In what sense the theologia insita is then to be understood is clearly defined by Voetius. It is a facultas seu vis seu aptitudo facultatum rationalium, seu lumen naturale in eo, quod intellectus veritatem principiorum potest sine ullo labore, praevio studio aut ratiocinatione comprehendere, et positis ponendis (cognitione scil. terminorum) de facto sic comprehendit, ex naturali quadam necessitate et insito sibi pondere in hunc veritatis sensum atque assensum dilatus et inclinans; in the same way as the will by a natural disposition pursues the good and the eye of itself beholds the light and the visible, Disp. I 141 cf. V 516, 525. The wellknown saying: nihil est in intellectu quod non prius fuerit in sensu is then also recognized as truth insofar as the world around us, on the one side or the other, as direct object or as product or as part or as antithesis, etc., is necessarily required in order to bring us to conscious knowledge, ib. V 525.
6. From all the above-mentioned, the reason becomes clear to us, [39] why Christian theology so unanimously rejected the doctrine of the ideae innatae. It was the fear of rationalism and mysticism that guided it in this. If man already at his birth brought with him in his mind a perfectly clear and distinct knowledge, whether of all the ideas (Plato), or of God (Cartesius), or of being (Gioberti), then he thereby became independent of the world; he could produce perfectly pure knowledge out of his own mind and was sufficient unto himself; he could even dispense with the revelation which God had given in his word; better and more clearly than in nature and Scripture he found perfect knowledge in his own mind. Yes, more still, by the doctrine of the ideae innatae an unquenchable chasm was dug between spirit and matter, between soul and body. The visible world was then not a creation and revelation of God, no embodiment of divine thoughts; from it the eternal truths, intellectual knowledge could not be derived; man found
these only, through self-reflection and recollection, when he separated himself from the world and withdrew into his own soul-life. And indeed the danger is hereby indicated, which always threatens from the side of the ideae innatae. The dualism of Plato has in Neoplatonism and thereby again in the Christian, specifically the Roman church led to a mysticism which indeed at first on the lower steps of meditation made use of the revelation of God in nature and Scripture but then, having risen higher to contemplation, could indeed dispense with all those external aids and had in the inward word, the spiritual light, the vision and communion of God in the inmost existence of the soul perfectly enough. And the dualism that in more recent philosophy arose again through Cartesius and the doctrine of the idea Dei innata connected therewith has with Leibniz and Wolff first, thereafter with Kant, Fichte and Hegel led to a rationalism that constructed the whole world of being out of the immanent thought of the human mind. Now it is clear as day that Scripture will know nothing of such an αὐταρκεια of man and of such a contempt for body and world. It teaches that man in soul and body is bearer of the image of God and that through his body he is akin and connected to the whole visible world. But this bond is no slave-chain; on the contrary, the world in which man is placed leads him [40] not away from God but up to God; it is a creation of God, a mirror of his virtues, a manifestation of his thoughts. There is, according to the beautiful word of Calvin, nulla mundi particula, in qua non scintillae saltem aliquae gloriae ipsius emicare cernantur, Inst. I 5, 1. And because Christian theology understood that, therefore it unanimously rejected the doctrine of innate concepts. And then there were added the objections, drawn from psychology and history, which against this doctrine were advanced, among others, by Locke. Empiricism defended, over against mysticism and
rationalism, a precious truth. For, if these directions asserted that the essence, the idea of things could not come to us from sensible perception but could arise only in God (Malebranche), in the soul through ἀναμνησις
(Plato) or through thinking out of man's own mind (Cartesius-Hegel), then they too thereby had a good intention. God is indeed the sun of spirits. In his light we see the light. The Logos enlightens every man, coming into the world. But yet it is true that we here on earth do not see face to face, that we walk in faith, and see through a mirror in a dark reason. Only through contemplation of God's revelation in nature and Scripture do we come to knowledge of God, Rom. 1:19, 1 Cor. 13:22, 2 Cor. 3:18. There is here on earth no direct, immediate knowledge of God and of his thoughts to be obtained, but only a mediate, per speculum and in speculo. The feeling of the mystics, rationalists and ontologists is therefore not theistic but pantheistic; it confuses the lumen rationis with the lumen Dei, the general truths in us with the ideas in the consciousness of God, our logos with the Λογος του θεου. And over against that Christian theology set the doctrine of Holy Scripture, that all our knowledge of God, since his essence in itself is unknowable for us, is obtained through mediate revelation and bears an analogical character. In fact, then, no single man comes to the knowledge of the prima principia and to the thought of God apart from the world. The little child, that is born unconscious, gradually receives all kinds of representations and ideas from the environment in which it is brought up.
With the first man this may by the nature of the case have been otherwise; all who are born after him have come to conscious and clear knowledge, both of visible and invisible things, not each on his own occasion and by his own reflection, but through their parents and through their circle of life.
Therefore there is no knowledge of the invisible, except under the symbol
of the visible. Whoever lacks a sense also receives no representation of the phenomena corresponding thereto. A blind man does not know what light is and therefore also does not understand that God is a light, otherwise than only negatively and by contrast. Therefore there is also in law and custom, in religion and art so much difference among men and peoples possible.
This would be inexplicable if the ideas in the proper sense were innate and had been implanted immediately by God himself in our mind. Now, however, we see that all men indeed have the capacity of speech but nevertheless speak very different languages; that all indeed have an idea of God but clothe it in all kinds of representations; that there are men who in their heart say that there is no God; that the distinction of good and evil is everywhere known but the content of both is determined very divergently; that concerning right and wrong, concerning beautiful and ugly the opinions differ very far from one another. In one word, there is not a single religious or ethical truth that ubique, semper et ab omnibus has been acknowledged; there has never existed a theologia naturalis in an actual sense, any more than a natural law and a natural morality.
7. Therewith, however, only the one side of the truth has been shown.
There is still a reverse side, which is of no less importance. For it cannot be denied, that just as objectively the light of the sun, so also subjectively the eye is necessary in order to see. That human beings in fact learn, and acquire knowledge from their environment, is certain; but it presupposes that they bring with them a capacity, an aptitude and inclination to learn.
Language is taught to us by the people among whom we are born, but it presupposes in every human being a disposition and an inclination to speak.
Thus it is in every domain, in religion, art, morality, law, science etc. The semina scientiarum lie by nature in the human being. All science proceeds
from general principia, which stand firm by themselves and of themselves.
All knowledge rests in faith. All proof presupposes in the end an ἀρχη ἀποδειξεως. There are logical, mathematical, philosophical, ethical and thus also [42] religious and theological principia, which indeed are very general and abstract, but which nevertheless are accepted by all human beings and in all centuries and which bear a character of naturalness and necessity. The laws of thought are the same for all; the doctrine of numbers is everywhere the same; the distinction of good and evil is known to all; there is no people without religion and knowledge of God. This is not otherwise to be explained than by the assumption of principia per se nota, κοιναι ἐννοιαι, veritates aeternae, which have been imprinted by nature upon the human spirit. With religion one must, whether one will or not, always again go back to a semen religionis, a sensus divinitatis, an instinctus divinus, a cognitio insita. Scripture itself goes before us in this. It binds the human being as strongly as possible to the objective revelation in nature and grace, but it acknowledges at the same time, that the human being is God's image and offspring, that he possesses in the νους a capacity to see God in his works and that he bears the work of the law written in his heart, Gen. 1:26,
Hd. 17:27, Rom. 1:19, 2:15. Yet everything depends on understanding well this originality of the κοιναι ἐννοιαι. They have been designated in various ways and one has spoken of ἐμφυτος, ingenitus, insculptus, insitus, inborn, in-created, implanted etc. And no one uses those words in a literal sense; as soon as these expressions are thought through, almost all hasten to declare that they do not mean that these ideae innatae are at once brought along with birth fix und fertig and are present in consciousness as species impressae. In that sense there are then also no inborn concepts. God does not let the human being come into the world adult in any respect but lets
him be born as a helpless and needy child. And that child would perish, if it were not fed and cared for by its environment. Yet in the child the future man already lies hidden. And thus it is in the intellectual, ethical and religious domain. Cognitio Dei insita does not mean that the human being immediately, by God himself, is equipped with a sufficient knowledge and no longer has any need of revelation. It does not indicate that he is capable, on his own, of deriving any conscious, clear and true knowledge of God from his own spirit. But it indicates that the human being possesses both the potentia (aptitudo, vis, facultas) and the inclinatio (habitus, dispositio), in order in the [43] normal course of development and in the midst of the environment in which God granted him life, of himself and without compulsion, without scientific reasoning and proof, ἐμφυτως και αδιδακτως, to come to some firm, certain, indubitable knowledge of God.
The words ἐμφυτος, ingenitus, inborn etc. thus do not intend to express that which a human being is born with, but they only wish to make known that the knowledge of God is born from the human being himself by a natural way, without scientific reasoning. They are not to be understood as opposita of the doctrine that the human being is born as tabula rasa, without a definite, material content in his consciousness; but they are opposed to the opinion that the human being was first brought externally, by a particular revelation, by scientific proof, as it were artificially and by compulsion, to knowledge of God. Thus those expressions have always been meant in Christian theology. They therefore alternated with ἀδιδακτως, φυσει, vi insita, sine praevio studio, sine discursu operoso etc. Dei cognitio nobis innata dicitur esse, in quantum per principia nobis innata de facili percipere possumus Deum esse, Thomas in Kleutgen, Phil. der Vorzeit I 348.
Therefore Locke's remark is also incorrect, that, if under ideae innatae only
the capacity of knowledge were understood, then all knowledge could be called inborn. For the cognitio Dei is therefore called insita or innata, because every human being with normal development must come to it. Just as a human being, opening the eyes, of himself beholds the sun and by its light the objects, so must the human being by virtue of his nature, as soon as he hears that there is a God, that there is a distinction of good and evil, etc., give his assent to that. He cannot do without that. He accepts those truths of himself, without compulsion or proof, because they stand firm by themselves. Therefore the knowledge of God is called inborn, and the expression of an inborn potentia or facultas was unsatisfactory. There is expressed on the one hand, over against the doctrine of the ideae innatae, that the knowledge of God is not brought along by the human being clear and ready but comes about mediately, through the operation of revelation in his consciousness, and on the other hand there is indicated over against empiricism, that that revelation of God speaks so loudly and powerfully and finds so deep an echo in everyone's mind, that it can be called as it were natural and in-created to the human being. And hereby theology has not only done full justice to Scripture, but also to psychology and history.
Revelation is there from God in all his works, not only outside but especially also in the human being. Of nature, from which God is known, the human being himself constitutes the principal part. And from that whole nature, both outside and in him, the human being receives impressions and sensations, which in his consciousness, prior to all reasoning and proof, cultivate the awareness of a Supreme Being. It is God himself, who leaves himself without witness to no human being. Cf. I 16. 157v. 212v., and further still Kleutgen, Theol. der Vorzeit I2 587-792. Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 195. Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 197. Mc Cosh, The intuition of the mind,
inductively investigated, 1860. John Caird, An introduction to the philos. of religion 1880 p. 39. 160. Lotze, Mikrok. III 580 f.