5. § 24. Classification of the Names of God.
§ 24. Classification of the Names of God.
. Holy Scripture calls God by many names, but never proceeds from an abstract concept of God. Never does it elevate the one attribute of God at the expense of the other. Indeed, now the one, then again the other attribute comes more to the foreground, but between all attributes there is complete harmony. It is the intention of Scripture to bring all virtues of God equally to their honour. Just as the person of Christ does not represent a particular one-sided character or temperament and yet is a person full of life and reality, so also God in his revelation is always unfolding all his virtues in harmonious coherence. Nowhere is there any mention of the essence of God in abstracto. The Hebr. word ּתּוִׁשָּיה a rad. ָיָׁשה; existence, being, arab. III to help, to set up, denotes that which endures, is lasting, [79] provides advantage, in concreto especially true wisdom and happiness, Job 5:12,
6:13, 12:16, 26:3 (30:22), Spr. 2:7, 3:21, 8:14 and further only still Jes.
28:29, Mich. 6:9, but in none of these places stands for the essence of God, cf. Delitzsch on Job 5:12. Nor can the N. T. words θεοτης Col. 2:9, θειοτης
Rom. 1:29, μορφη θεου Phil. 2:6, θεια φυσις 2 Petr. 1:4 cf. Gal. 4:8 prove
that there the essence or the nature of God is spoken of in distinction from his attributes, as Polanus wishes, Synt. theol. p. 135. God's essence becomes knowable to us in his revelation, i.e. in his names. The names of God are designations of his ἀρεται, 1 Petr. 2:9. This manner of speaking connects itself with Jes. 42:8, 12. 43:21. 63:5, where the Hebr. ְּת ִּהָלה praise, honour, in the LXX has been translated by ἀρετη, cf. Hab. 3:3. Zach. 6:13.
The congregation has the calling to proclaim God's virtues, i.e. to give him honour for the δοξα, which is displayed in all his works. Of a description of God's essence, apart from the attributes, there is never any mention in Holy
Scripture. In the first period, something of that sort was also not attempted in Christian theology. Under the nomina Dei everything was comprehended that one had to say of God. The names of God were indication not only of the nomina propria but also of the attributes so called later and even of the persons in the Divine essence, Clemens Alex. Strom. V 12. Augustinus, de doctr. chr. I 5. Pseudodion., de div. nom. c. 1 sq. Damascenus, de fide orth. I c. 12. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 13. Catech. Rom. I c. 2 qu. 11. 13. Kleutgen,
Theol. der Vorzeit I2 S. 211 f. Gerhard, Loci Theol. loc. 2. Hyperius, Meth.
Theol. p. 89 sq. c. 3. Polanus, Synt. Theol. Lib. 2 c. 6. Zanchius, Op. II col.
9. 10. Walaeus, Op. I p. 152 sq. Alsted, Theol. did. schol. p. 61. The attributes were then also immediately included in the idea of God; thus e.g. with Irenaeus, adv. haer. I c. 14. II c. 13., 35 etc. Augustinus does indeed speak of God's essentia, but he understands by that the fullness of the being of God and immediately includes all attributes, simplicity, eternity, goodness, wisdom etc. in it. In the confessions, God is also spoken of more than once in that way, without distinction of essence and attributes, and without classification of the attributes, Conc. Lateran. bij Denzinger,
Enchir. symb. n. 355, Conc. Vatic. de fide c. 1. Conf. August. art. 1. Conf.
Gall. art. 1. [80] Scot. art. 1. Belg. art. 1. Conf. Westm. cap. 2. And even later still various theologians do not enter into these distinctions and treat the attributes, without speaking beforehand about the nature of God, e.g.
Thomas. S. Theol. I qu. 3 sq. Ursinus, Tract. theol. p. 46-70.
2. But soon a distinction nevertheless arose. To that end one was led by the question what the attribute was which at once distinguished God from all creatures, what the principal concept was and from which, therefore, one had to proceed in the doctrine of God. Now the Platonic philosophy had already sought that principal concept in being, and Philo had connected this with the name Ihvh, the only name which indicated not an operation or power but the essence of God himself, and therefore often called God ὁ ὠν or το ὀν, Zeller, Philos. V3 356. This circumscription of the essence of God was adopted in Christian theology. Irenaeus describes God repeatedly as absolutely simple, adv. haer. II c. 13. 28 IV 11 and even calls Him inexcogitabilis et insubstantivus, I c. 14, but over against Gnosticism nevertheless lays the emphasis especially on this, that God is the creator of all things and that He has revealed himself in his works, Harnack D. G. I 485 f. On the other hand, with Origenes, de princ. I 1 sq. c. Cels. VI 64. VII 42-51, Athanasius, de decr. nic. syn. c. 11, Damascenus, de fide orth. I c. 2.
4. 9. etc. cf. Harnack D. G. II 119 f. Schwane, Dogm. I 132 II 35, Kattenbusch, Vergl. Confessionskunde I 310 f., God is the one, the being, indeed the one exalted above all being, ὁ ὠν, ὁ ὠν καθ' ἑαυτον, το ὀν, who is being itself, who has being from and through himself. And in the footsteps of Philo all this was derived from or fastened to the name of Ihvh in the O. Test. In the West these determinations were adopted. Augustine repeatedly circumscribes God as summum esse, summum bonum, verum, pulchrum etc. God is a substantia, for what is no substance does not exist,
Enarr. in Ps. 67. But, because the word substantia is often used in contrast with accidentia, which are in the substance and have it as bearer, Augustine, of God, prefers to use the word essentia, quam Graeci οὐσιαν vocant and for which the word natura is also sometimes used, de trin. V 2 VII 5 sq. de civ. XII, 2. de doctr. chr. I 6. With God, after all [81] there is no distinction between substance and accidents; his being is no bearer of the attributes, but these are identical with being itself. God is the highest, best, most beautiful, most perfect being, quo esse aut cogitari melius nihil possit, de lib. arb. II 6. de doctr. chr. I 7. He is Deus, supra quem nihil, extra quem nihil, sine quo nihil est; summa vita, summa veritas, summa beatitudo, summa sapientia, summa essentia, de civ. XII 2. Solil. I 1. And Augustine too appeals for this circumscription of God to the name Ihvh, de trin. V 2. VII 5. de doctr. chr. I 32. We then later find this same circumscription repeatedly again, with Hilarius, de trin. I c. 1 sq. Pseudodion., de div. nom. cap. 1. § 6, who however in cap. 4 § 1 proceeds from the idea of the good and in c. 5 § 1 says that this extends still further than that of being, Anselmus, Monol. c.
28. Prosl. c. 17 sq. Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 8. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 2 art.
3 and qu. 3. S. c. Gent. I c. 16 sq. Bonaventura, Brevil. I cap. 2. Sent. I dist.
8. etc. Petavius, Theol. lib. 1 c. 6. Perrone, Prael. theol. II 81-90. C. Pesch,
Prael. II 46-70. Jansen II p. 26-46. Although this now did indeed become the usual opinion, there were nevertheless some who chose another point of departure. They sought the principal concept with the idea of God not in absolute being, in the esse a se (aseitas), but in infinity; and they therefore preferred to circumscribe the essence of God as an ens infinitum. Thus did
Duns Scotus, who asserted that being could be ascribed univoce, in the same sense, to God and to the creature, but that the distinguishing mark between God and the creature lay in this, that God was an ens infinitum and
the creatures were finite, Sent. I dist. 3 qu. 1. and dist. 8 qu. 3. Further, there were still some Thomists who thought that the proper essence of God lay in the intellectual nature and they therefore circumscribed God as ens intelligens, as e.g. with Gotti, cf. Perrone, Prael. theol. II p. 82. Kleutgen,
Theol. der Vorzeit I2 229.
3. The Reformation brought no change in this conception. People aligned themselves with one or another description. The Reformed, at least in the first period, for the most part adopted the description of Augustine and Thomas. They proceeded from the concept of aseitas or of independentia and often defined God as an ens independens, Zwingli, Op. III 155 sq. IV 81 sq. Hyperius, [82] Meth. Theol. p. 87. Martyr, Loci Comm. p. 39b.
Polanus Synt. Theol. lib. II c. 5. Zanchius, Op. II col. 49 sq. Ursinus, Tract. theol. 1584 p. 46 sq. Alongside this there also occur the descriptions of God as spiritus increatus, spiritus simplicissimus, spiritus a se ipso existens, sometimes further supplemented with the trinitarian formula unus essentia, trinus personis, Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. S. 35 f. Schweizer, Gl. der ev. ref. K. I 244 f. The Lutherans used the definition essentia spiritualis infinita, ens spirituale a se subsistens, spiritus independens, Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K6. S. 73-77. Hase, Hutt. red. § 54. By contrast, Socinianism adopted another standpoint. Disregarding all metaphysical questions, it laid emphasis only on the will of God. The knowledge of God consists only in knowing his will. Religion loses all mysticism and is absorbed into cultus.
God comes to stand ever farther away from world and humanity. In Remonstrantism, rationalism and English deism this is continued, cf. above bl. 15. 16. Against this cold, moralistic concept of God there again came a reaction from the side of philosophy. Spinoza reverted to the idea of being, conceived God as substantia unica, infinita, necessario existens, ens
absolute infinitum, absolute causa prima et immanens, Eth. I prop. 7 sq. and again spoke of a love of God, amor Dei intellectualis, which bestowed the highest blessedness, Eth. V prop. 15 sq. To be sure, rationalism and deism also remained dominant after Spinoza, but around the middle of the 18th century people became more and more weary of this. The great spirits,
Goethe, Lessing, Herder felt themselves attracted to Spinoza, and soon his pantheism made its entry into philosophy. Kant already undermined the foundations of rationalism, although he nevertheless still called himself a deist, Drews, Die deutsche Spekul. I 104. Fichte undertook the struggle against the concepts God and immortality as products of eudaemonism. In his exaggerated moralism God was for him identical with the pure I, with the moral world-order; God was no being, no substance but absolutes Thun,
Thätigkeit; thus in his Wissenschaftslehre 1794, Ueber den Grund unseres Glaubens an eine göttliche Weltregierung 1798, Appellation an das
Publikum 1799. Later he partially retreated from this and aligned himself more closely with Spinoza, Anweisung zum seligen Leben oder
Religionslehre 1806. Schleiermacher displayed an even [83] stronger resemblance to Spinoza. God and world are correlata, Dialektik S. 162. God is the Woher unseres empfänglichen und selbsthätigen Daseins, Glaub. I5 S.
20. Schelling distinguished himself from both in that he took account not only of the spiritual, religion, morality but also of objective nature. It was his aim to raise natural science out of the deplorable condition in which it found itself. And thus he then comprehends both, nature and spirit together; nature is visible spirit, spirit invisible nature; in both he sees a continuous, organic revelation of the Absolute, which is exalted above all oppositions, one, simple, eternal, without praedikaten, unity of the infinite and the finite, of God and world, ἑν και παν, Drews, Die deutsche Spekul. I S. 201 f.
Finally Hegel transformed this system into a logical idealism. Nature and history are a logically necessary self-unfolding of the idea. Everything is rational, everything is embodied thought. Reason is thus the absolute substance, it is God himself. For God is nothing other than the one, living world-idea developing itself to self-consciousness. God is thus in Hegel indeed reason, thinking, spirit, subject, but not in the sense that He would have a life of his own before and outside the world. Ohne Welt ist Gott nicht Gott, the world is an essential moment in the life of God, Drews, Die deutsche Spekul. I 229 f.
4. Nor did opposition to this pantheism fail to appear. A whole series of theistic philosophers arose, in order to demonstrate the untenability of pantheism and to maintain the right of theism. They sought their strength in the idea of absolute personality, connected this with the idea of becoming, and thus introduced into God a theogonic process, whether in a Unitarian
(Jacobi, Herbart, Drobisch, Rothe, Lotze, Ulrici, Carrière etc.), or in a Trinitarian sense (Baader, Schelling, J. H. Fichte, Weisse, Dorner etc.). But this theistic speculation too has had its time. Separation of theology and philosophy, of religion and metaphysics has become the watchword. On the one hand science withdraws more and more from the terrain of religion and of theology; it becomes exact, positive. On the other hand religion too seeks more and more to detach itself from science and to banish all metaphysics and philosophy. [84] For the locus de Deo this has as a consequence that the essence of the Godhead is sought exclusively in the ethically good. The Groningen theology placed the fatherhood and the love in God in the foreground, Hofstede de Groot, De Gron. Godg. 1855 bl. 177 v. Scholten did indeed proceed from God's absolute sovereignty, L. H. K. II4, but the ethical moderns rose up in opposition to his speculative intellectualism and
monistic determinism, and conceived God as Father, Hoekstra, Des Christens godsvrucht 1866 bl. 103 v. Bronnen en grondslagen 1864 bl. 265 v., as the moral ideal, the power of the good, holy power, Hooykaas, God in de geschiedenis 1870. Hooykaas, H. Herderschee, Oort, Van Hamel, Godsd. volg. de beginselen der eth. rigting onder de modernen 1876. In Germany, in the same way, the neo-Kantianism of Ritschl has come forward against the speculative Vermittelungstheologie. Ritschl denies that religion is a legal relationship. According to Duns Scotus, the socin. and the armin. God is the unlimited ruler, who nevertheless treats human beings with fairness, although they have no rights over against Him. Arbitrariness, dominium absolutum is the essence of God and the law of the world; God can do the one just as well as the other. The relationship between God and man is private-law in character, and finds its image in the slaveholder who treats his slave fairly, Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 223-229. According to the orthodox
Protestants God's relationship to the world is determined by justice. Man has a right to eternal life if he keeps God's law and otherwise deserves punishment. This theory is public-law in character; it is derived from the O.
Test., especially from Pharisaism and was taken over by Paul and thus entered into the christ. church, ib. III2 229-245. Cf. also his studies on God,
Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1865 and 1868, now reissued in Gesammelte Aufsätze, Neue Folge 1896. But both representations are wrong. Law and religion stand over against each other. No dualism may be introduced into God between justice and grace. The whole abstract, Areopagitic concept of God must be given up, which places God negatively above the world and assumes no communion between God and man, ib. S. 253. Religion is a moral relationship, and Christianity is the vollendet geistige and absolut sittliche Religion, ib. III2 S. 8 f. The relationship of [85] God and man finds
its image not in the relation of a master to his servant or of the government to its subjects but in that of a father to his child. The family is its model,
III2 90. God must therefore be conceived as love; alongside it no other concept of equal value comes into consideration, ib. S. 255. From that one must proceed at once. The Christian dogmatician should not begin, according to synthetic method, with all kinds of metaphysical abstractions about God as the Absolute, Theol. u. Methaph. 12 f. Rechtf. u. Vers. III2 28. 32, nor also with a so-called theologia naturalis which does not exist, III2
S. 200 f. Theol. u. Met. S. 8 f., nor also with the concept of personality or with the attribute of holiness, III2 255, but at once and entirely with love.
From that everything, creation, providence, reconciliation, justification etc. must be derived, ib. 255. Theol. u. Met. 20. Cf. Kaftan, Das Wesen der chr.
Relig. S. 383. Herrmann, Die Religion im Verhältniss zum Welterkennen und zur Sittlichkeit S. 121 f. Gottschick, Die Kirchlichkeit der s. g. kirchl.
Theol. S. 152 f. And thus every direction is recognizable by its concept of God. In turn God is defined as the being, the absolute being, substance; or as the Sovereign, the Lord, the Supreme Being; or as infinite Spirit, absolute causality, absolute personality; or as the Father, love, goodness etc.
It is so difficult to proceed from the harmony of all God's virtues and to maintain these to the end. Every human being is limited and lays the emphasis on one attribute at the expense of the others; Jansenius saw in God especially truth, François de Sales love, Vincentius goodness, Saint
Cyran omnipotence, Quack, Port-Royal, reprint from the Gids of 1872 bl.
49. And yet it is the calling of theology, after the example of Holy Scripture, to honor all virtues of God equally.
5. But because theology in this way defined the essence of God and made one attribute into the chief concept, it ran the risk of making a distinction
between the essence of God and the attributes that were later added alongside it. In doing so, of course, it could not take the path of polytheism, which made so many divine persons out of the different attributes, as these were revealed in creatures. Plato too gave to the ideas, [86] as archetypes of real things, an existence of their own, independent, alongside God.
Gnosticism defined God as the unknowable and unnameable, but made the Platonic ideas into aeons, which emanated from God and in a descending series removed themselves from God. They were called ἐννοια, νους, λογος, ζωη, σοφια etc. and were the personified attributes of God, emanating from God, presented as divine beings, Iren. adv. haer. I 11. 24.
Philo, under Plato's influence, often represented the divine powers, especially goodness, power, and the logos, as hypostases, Zeller, Philos. der
Gr. V3 S. 358 f. Jewish theology assumed various hypostases, such as metatron, memra, schechina, ruach, bath kol, Weber, System der altsyn. pal.
Theol. S. 172; and in the kabbalah the ten sefiroth or attributes of God were often described as emanations from the Divine essence, Franck, La Kabbale ou la philos. religieuse des Hébreux, Paris Hachette 1873. Ueberweg,
Gesch. der Philos. II § 27. Herzog2 7, 375 f. Dr. Th. Bloch, Gesch. der Entw. der Kabbala u. der jüd. Rel. Philos. Trier Mayer 1894. Later too this gnostic and kabbalistic philosophy has still often exercised great influence.
In Arianism something of this gnosticism still continued to have an effect, insofar as it assumed a gradation among the Divine persons. Monotheism, no longer supported and maintained by the doctrine of the Trinity, easily passes over into polytheism. We hear it daily, that state, science, art, fortune, chance, fate, etc. are by many regarded and venerated as independent powers alongside and in the place of God.
Although Christian theology did not go so far, it nevertheless soon made a distinction between God's essence and attributes. The church fathers had already long spoken of the essence of God in distinction from the three persons, but gradually the word essence was also set over against his attributes. Especially through the struggle against Eunomius this distinction arose. Eunomius in his liber apologeticus repeatedly expressed that the names were an indication of the essence of the thing, τας προσηγοριας εἰναι των οὐσιων σημαντικας, ib. c. 18. Bibl. patr. gr. dogm. ed. Thilo II p. 598.
Over against this Basilius and Gregorius Nyss. asserted that there was not a single name that expressed God's essence, but that there nevertheless were many ὀνοματα, ἰδιωματα, ἐννοιαι, νοηματα, ἀξιωματα, through which χαρακτηρ τις ἡμιν ἐγγινεται του θεου, Bibl. patr. gr. [87] dogm. II p. 42.
And Greg. Nyss. spoke of οὐσια of God as το ἱποκειμενον and of ποιοτητες or ἰδιωματων διαφοραι in relation to that essence, Diekamp, Die
Gotteslehre des h. Gregor. van Nyssa, Münster 1896 I 190 f. As soon as this distinction arose, the question necessarily had to be asked, what belonged to the essence and what to the attributes. Therewith the good path was abandoned. If the church fathers in the description of God proceeded from the name Ihvh and described Him as being, then with that they did not have in view the essence of God in distinction from his attributes, but the whole essence of God as it reveals itself in his attributes. The being that was ascribed to God was thus no abstractum, but a living, infinitely full, concrete being, a summum esse, which at once and in one was identical with summa vita, summa veritas, summa sapientia, summus amor etc., as Augustine repeatedly said, a πελαγος οὐσιας ἀπειρον και ἀοριστον, mare substantiae infinitum et interminatum, Greg. Naz. Or. 38. Damasc., de fide orth. I 9. The description of God as essentia indicated that He was the
comprehending whole of all reality, and absolutely not that He was the abstract being, in the philosophical sense of that word. Baur, Gesch. der
Lehre von der Dreiein. II 644 f., and Ritschl in his studies on God, Jahrb. f. d. Theol. 1865 S. 275-318. 1868 S. 67-133 and S. 251-302 have not kept this difference sufficiently in view. Also in Basilius and Gregorius Nyss. the distinction of essence and attributes still served chiefly, in order over against Eunomius to maintain the incomprehensibility of God's essence.
6. But when the doctrine of the incomprehensibility of God later came to stand in the background, the distinction between essence and attributes acquired another significance. As in creatures between their substance and their attributes, so one also made in God a distinction between his essence and his perfections. This, however, led to all kinds of difficulties. In the first place one came into conflict with one's own point of departure. It was the unanimous doctrine of the whole Christian church and theology, that God's essence an sich was unknowable, that no name and no definition could be given of it and that God could be known only from his revelation, by his own light. Therewith theology [88] from the beginning adopted a positive standpoint and cut off all philosophical speculation at the root. Now, however, it imperceptibly brought philosophy in again. The essence of God was distinguished from his attributes. Of that essence, therefore, something could and had to be said apart from the attributes. The incomprehensibility of God was in fact denied. But there was more. This distinction between God's essence and attributes entailed that that essence could not be defined except in very abstract terms, as ens spirituale, ens infinitum, ens absolutum, without further praedikaten. That might now be a philosophical definition, but that was no longer the Christian, the biblical concept of God.
God never confronted us thus in Scripture. The theological and the
philosophical concept of God resembled each other remarkably. The first chapters of Christian dogmatics gave a schema of concepts that was all too much borrowed from Plato and Aristotle and that was then later supplemented by Christian ideas. Especially when in this century theology took over the idea of the Absolute from philosophy, the mixing of both clearly emerged. It is the merit of Ritschl that he saw that. He was completely right when he demanded that dogmatics should at once proceed from the Christian concept of God. Only he too again was guilty of onesidedness, when on that ground he demanded that God might be conceived only as love. In Scripture, which in its entirety and not merely for a part, e.g. the gospels, the words of Jesus, the sermon on the mount, is the principium of dogmatics, God confronts us in a fullness of attributes. And it is the demand of dogmatics to proceed equally not from one but from all virtues of God. Only then does there come harmony in our knowledge of God and thus also in our whole doctrine and in our whole life. Further, the incorrectness of that distinction between essence and attributes came out in this, that it, once adopted, was nevertheless at once revoked again. By the doctrine of the simplicitas Dei, Christian theology was after all safeguarded against the error of assuming an essential difference between the two. It said in general that there was no distinction. Every attribute is God's essence. God is what he has. In creatures there is a distinction between what they are and what they have; a human being is still a human being, even if he has lost the image of God and has [89] become a sinner. But in God all attributes are his essence itself. God is wholly light, wholly understanding, wholly wisdom, wholly logos, wholly spirit etc. Iren. adv. haer. II 28 IV 11.
In God is the esse quod sapere, quod bonum esse, quod potentem esse. Una eademque res dicitur sive dicatur aeternus Deus sive immortalis sive bonus
sive justus enz., August., de trin. VI 7. Damascenus, I 9. Thomas, S. Theol.
I qu. 2 art. 3. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 42. 51-53. Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. S. 81. God is everything together at the same time and wholly.
Deus habet nullas proprietates sed mera est essentia. Proprietates Dei sunt realiter ipsamet Dei essentia nec ab essentia Dei nec inter se re ipsa differunt. All this was well and beautifully said. Only, why make a distinction that was at once again annulled and presently once again in the doctrine of the simplicitas Dei was shown in its incorrectness? Worse was that others, proceeding from the distinction between essence and attributes acknowledged by all, now also sought an objective and real distinction, and thus more or less made the attributes independent over against the essence.
Thus Gilbert Porretanus made a distinction between the essence, the nature of God, the divinitas and God, Deus; the divinitas was the forma, by which God is God, but not itself God, Divinitate Deus est sed divinitas non est
Deus, Petavius, de Deo I cap. 8, art. Herzog2 5, 168. Duns Scotus did indeed deny that there was a distinctio realis between essence and attributes, but nevertheless said that the attributes were distinguished formaliter from God's essence and from one another, with appeal to Damascenus and Augustinus, Sent. I dist. 8 qu. 4 n. 17 sq. Socinianism spoke of accidentia in God and considered a different conception and description of the attributes necessary for the subject, Fock, Der Socin. S.
427. Many have gone still further and have even assumed an objective distinction in God, at the expense of the simplicity and the immutability of God, Rothe, Theol. Ethik § 38. Martensen, Chr. Dogm. § 85. Vilmar, Dogm.
I 190 f. Dorner, Chr. Glaub. I 181 f. Thomasius, Christi Person u. Werk I3 34 f. Hodge, Syst. Theol. I 371-374. Oosterzee, Chr. Dogm. § 47.
Proceeding further on this line, Doedes first treated those determinations
which are of themselves given with the idea God, such as unity, communicability, incomparability, incomprehensibility, self-subsistence etc., and subsequently the attributes [90] which now in addition accrue to that divine essence, and are only five in number, omnipotence, wisdom, goodness, love, holiness. The Roman Catholic theologian C. Pesch likewise speaks of attributa, substantiae divinae superaddita, Praelect. theol. II 72.
The disadvantage of the separation comes out most strongly in F. A. B.
Nitzsch, who first treats the essence of God with the aseitas, holiness, unity etc., Ev. Dogm. S. 351-367, then the works of creation S. 367-396 and only thereafter the attributes according to the division of Schleiermacher, S. 396423.
For these reasons the distinction between essence and attributes is not to be approved. Of course it is not thereby denied that God is a being, a substance, nor is the use of the word essence disapproved; in the doctrine of the Trinity it is even indispensable. But the rejection of the distinction means that the essence of God is in no respect knowable apart from the attributes, and that no division may be given which makes some attributes appear as given with the essence and others as added thereto. Therefore
Christian theology has at all times rightly taught that the attributes are identical with the essence of God. Each attribute is the Divine essence itself. Therefore it is impossible, with one attribute or one name, to describe the whole essence of God, as has often been attempted, e.g. with the idea of absolute personality or of love. Love is in no greater or lesser degree an attribute of God and a description of his essence than any other virtue or perfection. It stands on an equal line with all attributes, as Nitzsch, Ev.
Dogm. S. 351 f. also rightly remarks. Whether God has still more virtues than those which He reveals to us in creation and dominion can remain an
open question. Spinoza said that a substance, in proportion as it had more reality, also possessed more attributes, Eth. I prop. 9, and that God as the infinite substance therefore also had infinitely many attributes, ib. prop. 11, although only two, thought and extension, are known to us. And Reinhard,
Dogm. S. 100 found it very probable that Gott eine Menge von Eigenschaften besitzen könne, wovon wir gar keinen Begriff haben, weil die unendliche Vollkommenheit in so eingeschränkten Geschöpfen, wie wir sind, unmöglich alle Aehnlichkeiten mit sich hat vereinigen können, cf. also
L. Meijer, [91] Treatises on the divine attributes, Gron. 1783 I 186 v. But however this may be, the calling of dogmatics is to show the harmonious unity of all the virtues which God has displayed in his works.
7. If, accordingly, no distinction can be made between essence and attributes, because every attribute is the essence of God itself, then it still does not follow from that that the distinction also among the attributes mutually is only nominal and subjective, without any ground in reality.
Many, however, have judged thus. Aëtius and Eunomius reasoned as follows: God is simple and without any composition; what is in Him or is predicated of Him cannot differ from his essence; goodness, wisdom, power, etc., especially the ἀγεννησια, are distinguished from the essence neither realiter nor in our thought; whoever therefore names one attribute, e.g. the agennesia, thereby expresses the whole divine essence; the Son therefore also cannot be God like the Father; see Eunomius, Liber apologeticus, Bibl. patr. gr. dogm. ed. Thilo II 581-615. In the Middle Ages many arrived at the same thought. The perfections of God are distinguished from the essence and from one another neither virtualiter nor formaliter
(Duns Scotus), but only in name. The concept of the one is contained in that of the other, involvitur unum in altero. Whoever calls God good, calls Him
therein at the same time just, powerful, etc., Stöckl., Phil. des M. A. II 968.
Also in the Arabic and Jewish philosophy this subjective conception of God's attributes occurs, Stöckl., ib. 18. 27. 60. 88. 268 f., Kaufmann,
Gesch. der Attributenlehre in der jüd. Rel. Philos. des M. A. von Saadja bis Maimuni 1877. Spinoza understood by attribute id quod intellectus de substantia percipit tanquam ejusdem essentiam constituens, Eth. I def. 4.
According as the emphasis is laid on the first or second part of this definition, the judgment diverges whether Spinoza regarded the attributes as subjective conceptions of the understanding or as objective, real properties of the substance, Falckenberg, Gesch. d. neuern Philos. S. 90. The pantheism, which through him found entrance into philosophy, has no place any longer for the attributes of God. God has no being distinct from the world, no proper life any more. His attributes are identical with the laws of the world, Strauss, Gl. I 613. [92] Schleiermacher therefore also defined them wholly subjectively, as etwas Besonderes in der Art, das schlechthinige Abhängigkeitsgefühl auf Gott zu beziehen; their origin lies in the religieuse Dichtung, they are without speculative content, they express neither God's essence, which is unknowable, nor his relations to the world, because God then would have to stand in manifold relations to the world; they are simply subjective conceptions, without objective ground.
And he therefore also treated the doctrine of the attributes not separately but throughout the whole dogmatics, Chr. Gl. § 50.
Against this conception of the names of God it is now, on the ground of God's revelation, to be maintained that very certainly every attribute is identical with the Divine essence, but that for that reason the attributes are nevertheless still distinct. Basil and Gregory of Nyssa taught thus in their writings against Eunomius. They said on the one hand that the attributes did
not differ really, τω πραγματι, since God was simple and exalted above all composition, but on the other hand that they were nevertheless not distinguished only in name, λογῳ. Avoiding these two extremes, they judged that the names of God differed κατ' ἐπινοιαν, that we in our understanding had different ἐννοιαι, ἐπινοιαι, ἐπενθυμησεις of the one and the same Divine essence, and that with the different attributes, such as goodness, wisdom, etc., we thus did not merely use different names, but in doing so really also thought something different. The concepts, therefore, which we place in the names of God, are mutually distinct. The names of God therefore ought not to be mixed or confused with one another; each could be considered by itself. Thus God was very certainly identical with the attributes divinitas, bonitas, sapientia, paternitas, filietas etc., but for that reason these are not equal among themselves in conception. The one attribute is therefore not so involved in the other that we cannot think the one without the other; but each attribute expresses something particular,
Petavius, I c. 7-10. Schwane, Dogmengesch. II2 S. 19-31. Augustine expresses himself still more strongly, that every attribute is God's essence and in so far is identical with every other attribute. Quidquid enim secundum qualitates, nl. of God, dici videtur. secundum substantiam vel essentiam est intelligendum, de trin. XV 5. Deo autem hoc est esse, quod est fortem esse aut justum esse aut sapientem esse etc., de trin. VI, 4, cf. above p. 89. [93] Also the attributes are not mutually different, quae justitia ipsa bonitas et quae bonitas ipsa beatitudo, de trin. XV 8. Eadem magnitudo ejus est, quae sapientia, non enim mole magnus est sed virtute; et eadem bonitas quae sapientia et magnitudo et eadem veritas quae illa omnia; et non est ibi aliud beatum esse et aliud magnum aut sapientem aut verum, aut bonum esse aut omnino ipsum esse, de trin. VI 6. Yes, he says expressly
that these praedicamenta or qualitates, used of God, are properly affectiones of our mind; quidquid horum de Deo dicis, neque aliud et aliud intelligitur et nihil digne dicitur, quia haec animarum sunt, quas illa lux perfundit quodam modo et pro suis qualitatibus afficit, quomodo cum oritur corporibus lux ista visibilis. Si auferatur, unus est corporibus omnibus color, qui potius dicendus est nullus color. Cum autem illata illustraverit corpora, quamvis ipsa unius modi sit, pro diversis tamen corporum qualitatibus diverso eos nitore adspergit. Ergo animarum sunt istae affectiones, quae bene sunt affectae ab illa luce quae non afficitur et formatae ab illa quae non formatur, Serm. 341 n. 8. But however strongly Augustine speaks here, he nevertheless fully maintains that all these praedicamenta are rightly and truly used of God. God is all that He has and that is ascribed to Him in the names. With this simplicitas Dei Augustine is not concerned to take anything away from God, but on the contrary always to conceive Him in the fullness of his being. Therefore he also speaks of the simplex multiplicitas or multiplex simplicitas in God, de trin. VI 4 and he calls God's wisdom simpliciter multiplex et uniformiter multiformis, de civ. XII 18. In later time the distinction of the ratio ratiocinans and the ratio ratiocinata was used, in order to bring the difficulty that presented itself with the doctrine of the attributes to some solution. The distinction of the attributes might on the one hand detract nothing from the unity, the simplicity, the immutability of God's essence, and yet on the other hand could also not be conceived as a subjective, arbitrary, and untrue invention of man. And therefore it was rightly said that this distinction was grounded in God's revelation itself. For it is not we who thus name God. We do not invent those names. On the contrary, if it depended on us, we would be silent about Him, try to forget
Him, and deny all his [94] names. We have no desire for the knowledge of
his ways. We repeatedly set ourselves in opposition to all his names, to his independence, his sovereignty, his righteousness, his love, and we rebel against all his perfections. But it is God himself who reveals all his virtues and lays his names upon our lips. He gives himself his names and maintains them in spite of our resistance. It is of little use whether we deny his righteousness; He shows it to us every day in history. And so it is with all virtues. In spite of us He brings them to revelation. The final goal of all his ways is that his name may shine in all his works and be written upon everyone's forehead, Op. 22:4. Therefore we cannot name Him otherwise than with the many names that his revelation itself puts into our hand. With the simplicity of God this distinction of the attributes is also not in contradiction. For the simplicitas does not designate God as an abstract concept, as the absolute, the being, the idea, etc., but precisely makes known that He is an absolute fullness of being. And therefore God cannot reveal himself to finite creatures otherwise than under many names. The Divine essence is so infinitely rich that no creature can survey it all at once.
Just as a child cannot imagine the value of a large coin but then first gets some notion of it when it is broken down into a number of smaller coins, so also we can form no idea of the infinite fullness of God's essence unless it repeatedly reveals itself to us in another relation and under another point of view, Augustine, tract. 13 in Ev. Joan. Martyr, Loci p. 39. Moor, Comm. I 582 etc. God remains eternally and immutably one and the same, but the relation differs in which He stands to his creatures and these stand to Him.
The light remains the same, even though it breaks into different colors, (Augustine). The fire does not change, whether it warms, illuminates, or burns, (Moses Maimonides). And grain remains grain, even though we call it according to the different relations now fruit, then seed, then food,
(Basil). God is named differently, on account of the varii effectus, which He brings about in the creatures through his always one and the same essence.
In this connection it must be remembered that God can appear in such different attributes and be called with such different names, because there is affinity between [95] Him and his creatures. If this did not exist, all names would be untrue. But now there is in the creatures analogy of what is present in God himself. The names do not merely designate God as cause of things, but they give, however weak and defective, yet some conception of the Divine essence. Thus, indicating God with all these names, we speak indeed imperfectly, finitely, limitedly, humanly, but yet not falsely and untruly. For although knowing and willing, righteousness and grace in God are one and always the same full entire essence, yet God, as it were, spreads out that one rich essence in these many virtues, as if next to and alongside one another, before our eyes. Even if it is always the same essence that meets us in those names, in each name a comprehension is granted to us of what that essence truly is in infinite fullness. In God, according to the essence, holiness and mercy may be the same, yet our conception of both, formed from God's own revelation, is nevertheless different. There is no name that can express God's essence adaequaat; thus many names serve to give us an impression of his greatness that surpasses all. Cf. besides those mentioned, Damascenus, de fide orth. I c. 10. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 3. art.
3 qu. 13 art. 4. c. Gent. I c. 5. Sent. I dist. 2. qu. 1 art. 2. Petavius, de Deo I cap. 7-13. C. Pesch, Praelect. dogm. II 71-76. Zanchius, Op. II 49 sq.
Polanus, Synt. theol. lib. 2. c. 7. Voetius, Disp. I 233 sq. Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 51-53. Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth. K. § 18.
8. As has already been said above, in the earliest period everything that could be thought and spoken of God was summarized under his names. But
the richness of the material made ordering necessary. There came at once some delimitation, because the term names gradually came into use for the nomina propria, God, Lord, etc. Next, the doctrine of the Trinity was soon treated separately, whether before or after the so-called attributes, and in an entirely proper terminology. Further, the distinction between essence and attributes brought with it that the former was separated from the latter, and thus the doctrine of the attributes came to stand alone. The division which now lay most to hand for these attributes and which is also the oldest and first, was that into negative and positive names. As soon as one, after all,
[96] began to reflect on the way in which one had arrived at those names, one saw that they had been obtained from the creatures either via negationis or via eminentiae and causalitatis. We find this division or at least this twofold respectively threefold way, to come to know God, already in Philo and Plotinus, Zeller, Philos. der Gr. S. 355 f. 483. cf. also Herzog2 10, 521.
With the church fathers God was both unknowable and knowable, unknowable according to his essence, knowable according to his revelation; on the one hand only what He is not could be said of God, but on the other hand something positive could nevertheless be predicated of Him in an imperfect and inadequate way. Pseudodionysius, de myst. theol. I 2,
Damascenus, de fide orth. I 2. 4, Erigena, de div. nat. I 78 worked out this thought expressly into a division, into a twofold theology, the apoand the kataphatic. The former indicates the three ways in so many words, when he says that we come to knowledge of God ἐν τῃ παντων ἀφαιρεσει και ὑπεροχῃ και εν τῃ παντων αἰτιᾳ, de div. nom. c. 7 § 3. And scholasticism came to speak of three viae, by which one came to knowledge of God, via negationis, eminentiae and causalitatis, especially since Durandus de S.
Porciano. These three viae were acknowledged in dogmatics down to the
most recent time. Roman Catholics, Lutherans, Reformed have all adopted them and sometimes treated them at length. But they have also been sharply criticized more than once. Spinoza rejected the via eminentiae with the remark that a triangle, if it could speak, would say Deum eminenter triangularem esse, Epist. 60, cf. Xenophanes in Zeller, Philos. d. Gr. I 490.
Kant thought that the way of causality could only be trodden within the circle of the phaenomena. Schleiermacher disapproved of the via negationis and eminentiae and retained only the via causalitatis, Chr. Gl. § 50. 51. cf. further Twesten II 30 f. Strauss, Gl. I 536 f. Bruch, Lehre v. d. göttl.
Eigensch. 83 f. Dorner I 188 f. Vilmar I 190. Doedes, L. v. God 208. Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. I2 228. Lange, Dogm. II 42 f. Hodge, I 339.
Wichelhaus, Die Lehre der H. Schrift vom Worte Gottes u. s. w. 1892 S.
332 f. etc. Now it is certainly true that the names of God existed long before these three viae were devised, that these were born only later from reflection on the names, that the via eminentiae and causalitatis are actually one and thus together as via positionis can be set over against the via negationis; but it is [97] nevertheless just as certain that there is no knowledge of God except from the creatures, that all names of God are borrowed from the creatures, and that all those names either deny something in God or posit something in God in a perfect way of that which is in creatures. Only, in doing so, it may never be forgotten that the ratio cognoscendi is not identical with the ratio essendi. In reality it is not the creature but God who is the first. He is archetype, the creature is ectype. In Him everything is original, absolute; in the creatures everything is derived, relative. God is therefore properly not named after what is in creatures, but creatures are named after what exists in God, cf. above p. 74 v. Keeping this in view, one can nevertheless say that Holy Scripture also treads these two
ways. And everyone who wishes to think and speak about God does so according to the negative or positive relation in which God stands to the world, F. A. B. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. S. 400. To this it is certainly also to be ascribed that the division of the names of God into negative and positive arose so quickly, found such general acceptance, and in fact underlies all other divisions that arose later. This division is already to be found in Philo,
Plotinus and the church fathers, and is then employed by Damascenus, de fide orthod. I c. 4. 9. 12. Anselmus, Monol. c. 15. Prosl. c. 5. 6. Thomas, S.
Theol. I qu. 13 art. 2. Petavius, Theol. dogm. I c. 5. Perrone, Prael. theol. II p. 91 etc. Among the Roman Catholics this division is the most usual, although also some Reformed and Lutherans have adopted it. In that division other distinctions are then also made. Augustinus, serm. 38 de tempore already made the remark that some names of God were used proprie, others metaphorice and still others relative. Accordingly the nomina negativa were again divided into purely negative and relative, and the nomina positiva into propria and metaphorica, Thomas I qu. 13 art. 2 and 3. Alongside this division into negative and positive attributes another arose. Plato already taught that God is good through himself, but the creatures only through μετοχη. In Christian theology this thought, especially with Augustine, has borne ripe fruits. Over against pantheism it was maintained that God's essence is incommunicable and that the soul was no pars Dei, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 90 art. 1. Zanchius, Op. II col. 53 sq.
But it was [98] at the same time taught that all creatures were akin to God and that in particular man was his image and likeness. There was analogy between Creator and creatura. This led to the division of attributa communicabilia and incommunicabilia. These two names were first already in use in the doctrine of the Trinity, for the essence of God, the deitas, was
communicabilis, namely communicated by the Father in generation to the Son, but the persons and the personal properties, e.g. the paternitas, were incommunicabiles, Pseudodion., de div. nom. cap. 2 § 5. Bonaventura,
Brevil. I c. 4. Id. Sent. I dist. 27 p. 1 art. 1 qu. 3 etc. From there these two names were also taken over into the doctrine of the attributes in order to maintain both God's transcendence and God's immanence, Anselmus,
Monol. c. 15. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 13 art. 9. 10. This division now found acceptance especially among the Reformed theologians, without doubt also because it offered a suitable opportunity to combat the ubiquity doctrine of the Lutherans, Sohnius, Op. I 97. Zanchius, Op. II col. 50-51. Polanus,
Synt. Theol. lib. II c. 7 and 14. Mastricht, II 5, 12 etc., and now still in Shedd, Dogm. Theol. I 337 and Gravemeyer, Geref. Geloofsleer, 3e stuk bl.
62 etc. Yet all concede that the communicable attributes in an absolute sense, as they are in God, are just as incommunicable as the others, cf.
Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. S. 52 f. The Lutherans mostly gave preference to another division, namely that into attributa quiescentia and operativa, or immanentia and extra se exserentia, which was also employed in defense of the doctrine of the communicatio idiomatum, Schmid, Dogm. der ev. luth.
K. S. 78. Under the first group (negative, incommunicable, metaphysical, quiescent) there were then usually treated the attributes of unity, simplicity, independence, immutability, eternity, omnipresence. The second group
(positive, communicable, operative, personal) was mostly again divided into attributes of understanding, will and power. The division into attributes of being, of understanding and of will in Bretschneider I 480, Thomasius I 14 f. Vilmar I 195, Oosterzee § 47, cf. Frank I 232 f. Philippi II 23, to which Hase, Lehrb. S. 271 still adds that of feeling, deviates only little from the above-mentioned divisions. By contrast, the division of Schleiermacher
proceeds from another standpoint. The [99] attributes with him are only subjective conceptions and grounded only in the ratio ratiocinans. And thus he divides them according to the relation of God to world, sin and redemption, into such as are present in the feeling of dependence, as the antithesis of sin has not yet arisen in it (eternal, omnipresent, almighty, omniscient), as that antithesis is indeed felt (holy, righteous), and as it is overcome (love and wisdom). In agreement with this many divide the attributes according to the relation of God to the world, and then specifically to the world in general (infinite, eternal, omnipresent), to the ethical world (holy, righteous; grace, mercy) and to the ethical-physical world (wisdom, blessedness), Wegscheider § 60. Böhme, Lehre v. d. göttl.
Eig. 1826. Bruch, Lehre v. d. göttl. Eig. S. 110 f. Lange, Dogm. II 61 f.
Martensen § 47. Luthardt, Komp. der Dogm. § 29. Lipsius, Dogm. § 298.
Grétillat, Exposé de theol. syst. III 220. Hoekstra, Wijsg. godsd. II 92-99 etc.
9. All the above-mentioned divisions apparently differ widely from one another and make use of entirely different names. But in substance they correspond very closely with each other. Whether one speaks of negative and positive, incommunicable and communicable, quiescent and operative, absolute and relative, of properties of the substance and of the subject, in relation to the world and to man, in fact one nevertheless always gives the same order in which the attributes are treated. Against all divisions, therefore, essentially the same objections hold. They all give the appearance that the being of God is divided into two halves, that first the absoluteness, then the personality is treated, that first the being an sich, then in its relation to the creatures is discussed, that the first group of names is obtained apart from the creation and the second group of names from the creatures, and
that thus no unity and harmony of all God's virtues comes about, Frank, Syst. d. chr. Wahrheit I 228 f. Now, however, it is the incontrovertible teaching of Scripture, that God in his hidden being is unknowable and unnameable and that all names of God presuppose the revelation, i.e. the creation. Of the being and life of God outside of and without the creation we know nothing, for the simple reason that we ourselves are creatures and thus are always bound to the [100] creation. Clearly that was formerly seen and expressed with respect to the relative, metaphorical and positive names of God. The relative names such as Lord, Creator, Sustainer, Saviour etc., accrue to God only after and through the creation; no one can be called lord, unless he has servants; men, the servants of God, have come to be in time, and thus God has become our Lord in time, August., de trin. V 16, cf. de ord. II 7. Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 13 art. 7. Anselmus, Monol. 15.
Lombardus, Sent. I dist. 30. Bonaventura, Sent. I dist. 30 art. 1. Zanchius, Op. II 24-26. Polanus, Synt. Theol. p. 192. Of the metaphorical names, to which the anthropomorphisms also belong, it is clear that they presuppose the creation. And the positive names of good, holy, wise etc., therefore have for our consciousness some content, because we perceive ectypes of them in the creatures, Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 12 art. 12. But all these names, though relative, metaphorical and positive, on the other hand nevertheless do indeed make known something in God, which in Him exists absolutely, proprie and thus again also negatively, in another sense than in the creatures. Augustine attempted to show that, although God becomes Lord in time, his being nevertheless is immutable and all change falls only in the creature. That which God begins to be called temporally, which previously was not said, is manifestly said relatively; yet not according to an accident of God, as though something had happened to him, but plainly according to
an accident of that to which God begins to be said relatively, de trin. V 16.
The reverse holds of the second group of names, whether these are called negative, incommunicable, quiescent, absolute or otherwise. For although they deny to God something that is in creatures, they are nevertheless all in a certain sense again also positive, communicable, transeunt, relative. If they were not that, if they were completely incommunicable, they would also be absolutely unknowable and unnameable. That we can think and name them proves that they have been revealed in one way or another by God in his works. The negative names therefore also have a positive content; even if it is the case that we learn to know the eternity of God only from and in time, his omnipresence from and in space, his infinity and immutability only from and amid all the finite and mutable creatures; yet they do give us some, [101] and even important, knowledge of God. Even if we cannot positively comprehend eternity, it nevertheless says so much, to know that God is exalted above all time. And therefore it is incorrect to divide the attributes of God in such a way that on the one side there comes to stand a group that is negative, incommunicable, quiescent, absolute etc., and on the other side one that is positive, communicable, operative, relative etc. For all attributes are both at the same time. All attributes are absolute and all are nevertheless first known from the relation of God to his creatures. And again, we can name God only according to what of Him is manifest in his creatures, but we nevertheless name Him who is the source of all good and the cause of all creatures. More still, precisely because the attributes are identical with the being of God and mutually in God, no division is to be found that would be grounded objectively in the attributes themselves, Doedes, Leer v. God 217. What can be obtained is only a certain order in the treatment of the many names of God. Among these,
those names at once set themselves apart which later were more specifically indicated as names and which as names of address and designation in a broader sense may be called nomina propria. Next, there are names that make known the divine being in all its relations to the creatures and that formerly were mostly called attributes, virtues, perfections etc. The word attributes is for this the least preferable, because it always again makes one think of a being to which the attributes have been added; the name virtues, on the other hand, finds support in Scripture itself, 1 Petr. 2:9. This second group can bear the name of nomina essentialia, because they all make known to us the being of God, not an sich, but as it descends to us in the revelation and communicates itself to us. Finally there is still a third group of names, which all have reference to the self-distinctions in the being of God and which therefore can be called nomina personalia. The most difficult thing now is to bring order into the treatment of the names that belong to the second group. Yet that order is precisely indicated in the relation in which God stands to his creatures. The whole world is a revelation of God. There is no part of the universe in which not something of his virtues is revealed. But there is distinction among the creatures. Not all proclaim all his virtues, and not all with the same [102] clarity. There is rank order and ascent; all creatures display vestigia Dei, but only man is image and likeness of God. He not only shares being with the lower creatures, and life and spirit with the higher; but in this communion with the material and spiritual world he is also in a wholly special way akin to God himself, created as prophet, priest and king in knowledge, holiness and righteousness. Thus God, the source of all being and the archetype of man, is then himself also all that which creatures share. In Him all that is indeed in an original, divine way; in every virtue of God both his absolute
exaltation above and his kinship to the creature is to be noticed; every attribute is in a certain respect incommunicable and in another again communicable. But nevertheless there is from the creature, especially from man, analogy in the divine being. Thus there are then first names by which God reveals himself to us as the One Who Is in the strictest sense: aseitas, immutabilitas, infinitas (aeternitas and immensitas). Second, there are names that make known to us God as the Living One, as Spirit: spiritualitas, invisibilitas, simplicitas. Third, there are names that describe the divine being as perfectly self-conscious, as Light: scientia, sapientia, veracitas.
Fourth, there are names that point us to the ethical nature of that being and designate God as the Holy One: bonitas, justitia, sanctitas. And finally, fifth, there are names in which God appears for us as the absolute power, as Lord,
King, Sovereign: voluntas, libertas, omnipotentia. This division is on the one hand connected with the knowledge of God, which in the so-called proofs for his existence is summarized; and on the other hand points forward to the vestigia and the imago Dei, which have been impressed in the creatures. No knowledge of God except through revelation, and thus always analogical and ectypal; but through that revelation then nevertheless true and pure knowledge of the incomprehensible and adorable being of God!