14. § 33. The Essence of Man.

14. § 33. The Essence of Man.

§ 33. The Essence of Man.

. The essence of man lies in this, that he is God's image. The whole world is a revelation of God, a mirror of his virtues and perfections; each creature is in its own way and in its own measure an embodiment of a divine thought. But among all creatures only man is the image of God, the highest and richest revelation of God and at the same time thereby the head and the crown of the whole creation, imago Dei and compendium naturae, μικροθεος and μικροκοσμος together. Even Heathens have acknowledged this truth and called man God's image. Pythagoras in Cicero, de senect. c.

21. Plato, de Leg. IV 713 C. de Rep. III 415 A. X 517. Ovid, Met. I. Cicero, de Leg. I 8. Seneca, de cons. ad Helv. 6 and others express it clearly and distinctly, that man or at least his soul is created after God's image, that he is akin to God and is his offspring, cf. Pfanner, Syst. theol. gent. 1679 p.

189 sq. And not only that, but almost all peoples have traditions of a golden age, an aurea aetas. Among Chinese, Indians, Iranians, Egyptians,

Babylonians, Greeks, Romans etc. one encounters accounts of an earlier time, in which man lived in innocence and blessedness and stood in

communion with the gods. They were sung by the poets, Hesiod, Op. et dies 109 sq. Ovid, Met. I 89 sq. Verg. Georg. I 125 sq. Aen. VIII 315 sq. and by the philosophers acknowledged in their truth, Plato, Pol. 272 A. cf. J. G.

Friderici, diss. de aurea aetate quam poetae finxerunt, Lips. 1736. Lüken, Traditionen des Menschengeschl. 1869. Zöckler, Lehre v. Urstand des

Menschen 1879 S. 84 f. Oswald, Relig. Urgesch. der Menschheit 1887 S. 37 f. E. L. Fischer, Heidenthum und Offenbarung, Mainz 1878. Zöckler, Bibl. u. Kirchenhist. Studien, 1893 V 1 f. Yet Holy Scripture first sets this doctrine of man's being the image of God in the true, full light. The first creation narrative reports that God after deliberate consultation created man

‎‏‏ְּבַצְלֵמנּו ִּכְדמּוֵתנּו‎, κατ' εἰκονα ἡμετεραν και καθ' ὁμοιωσιν, ad imaginem et similitudinem nostram, Gen. 1:26, 27. Further, in Gen. 5:1 and 9:6 it is repeated again that God created man ‎‏‏ְּבֵהמֹות ֱא ֹלִהים‎, and ‎‏‏ְּבֶצֶלם ֱא ֹלִהים‎; Psalm 8 sings of man as lord of what is created, [509] and Eccl. 7:29 recalls that God made man ‎‏‏ָיָׁשר‎. Otherwise the O. Test. speaks little of the status integritatis; Israel was more than any other people a people of hope; its eye was directed not to the past but to the future. Even the N. Test. speaks relatively seldom about the image of God, after which man was originally created. Directly we find mention of it only in 1 Cor. 11:7, where the man is called εἰκων και δοξα θεου, and Jas 3:9, where it is said of men that they are καθ' ὁμοιωσιν θεου γεγονοτας; while Luke 3:38 calls Adam the son of God and Paul with a heathen poet says: του γαρ και γενος ἐσμεν, Acts

17:28. Indirectly, however, Eph. 4:24 and Col. 3:10 are also of great significance here; there is there mention of the καινος or νεος ἀνθρωπος, which believers must put on; and of this it is said that he was created in accordance with God, κατα θεον, κτισθεντα, in righteousness and holiness of the truth, and is renewed unto knowledge κατ' εἰκονα του κτισαντος

αὐτον. There lies here in 1o that the new man, which believers put on, was created by God; 2o that this new man is made in accordance with God and after his image, and 3o that that accordance comes to expression specifically in the righteousness and holiness as fruit of the known truth.

This, however, refers back to the original creation in so far as the words of which Paul makes use are clearly borrowed from it; and as the second creation according to the whole doctrine of Scripture is no creatio ex nihilo but a renewal of what existed; and as the ἀνακαινουσθαι of the believer clearly describes this creation as a renewal. Eph. 4:24 and Col. 3:10 therefore have as their underlying thought, that man was originally created after God's image and is now in the re-creation renewed after it. But Scripture does not only relate to us the fact of the creation of man after God's image, it also explains to us its meaning. The two words ‎‏‏צלם‎ and ‎‏‏דמות‎, εἰκων and ὁμοιωσις, are certainly not identical, but an essential, material distinction is nevertheless not to be indicated between them. They are used promiscuously and alternate with one another without definite reason. In Gen. 1:26, cf. 5:3 they both stand; in Gen. 1:27 and 9:6, cf. Col.

3:10 only image stands; in Gen. [510] 5:1, Jas. 3:9 only likeness. The distinction that exists between the two comes down to this: ‎‏‏צלם‎ means image, both Urbild and Abbild, ‎‏‏דמות‎ means likeness, both Vorbild and Nachbild. Der Begriff von ‎‏‏צלם‎ ist starrer, der von ‎‏‏דמות‎ flüsziger und so zu sagen geistiger; in jenem übewiegt die Vorstellung des Urbilds, in diesem die Vorstellung des Ideals, Delitzsch, op Gen. 1:26. The likeness is a further determination, a strengthening and completion of the image. Likeness is in itself weaker and broader than image; an animal does have some traits of likeness and correspondence with, but is nevertheless no image of man.

Image expresses that God is archetype and man is ectype; likeness adds to it

that that image corresponds in every part with the original, Augustine, quaest. 83 qu. 74. Thomas, S. Theol. I. qu. 93 art. 9. Gerhard, Loci theol.

VIII § 18. Polanus, Synt. Theol. V 10 etc. Just as little as between these two concepts, is there an essential distinction between the prepositions ‎‏‏ב‎ and ‎‏‏כ‎, which are used herewith. These too alternate with each other; in Gen. 5:1 ‎‏‏ב‎ stands with ‎‏‏ְדמּות‎, in verse 3 likewise and at the same time ‎‏‏כ‎ with ‎‏‏ֶצֶלם‎; in the N. T. κατα stands with εἰκων, Col. 3:10, but also with ὁμοιωσις, Jas. 3:9.

Nothing can therefore be built on this; only it can be said with Delitzsch: bei ‎‏‏ב‎ denkt man sich die Urform gleichsam als Gussform, bei ‎‏‏כ‎ als vorgehaltenes Muster. There therefore exists no ground, with Böhl, Dogm.

154 f. to derive from that preposition ‎‏‏ב‎ that the image of God is a sphere and element in which man was created, cf. against that Kuyper, De

Vleeschwording des Woords, 1887 bl. VIII v. Daubanton, Theol. Stud. 1887 bl. 429-444. Besides these words, Scripture offers for the content of the image of God the following data. First, it is clear that the words image and likeness do not express something in God but in man, do not indicate the imago increata but the imago creata. The intention is not that man is created after something in God that bears the name of image and likeness, so that e.g. thereby the Son would be indicated; but man is so created after God that he is his image and likeness. Next, this creation after God's image is in no respect limited, neither on the side of the archetype nor on that of the ectype. It is not said that man is created only after some virtues or also after one person [511] in the divine being, nor also that man only for a part, after the soul or after the understanding or after holiness alone, bears God's image and likeness. Rather the whole man is image of the whole Godhead.

Third, the meaning of the image of God is further explained to us by the Son, who in an entirely unique sense is called λογος, υἱος, εἰκων, χαρακτηρ

του θεου, John 1:1, 14, 2 Cor. 4:4, Col. 1:15, Heb. 1:3, and to whom we must again be made like, Rom. 1:29, 1 Cor. 15:49, Phil. 3:21, Eph. 4:23 v.,

1 John 3:2. The Son now bears all these names, because he is God from God and light from light, partaking of the same essence and the same virtues with the Father. He is thus called not on account of a part or piece of his being, but because he corresponds absolutely with the Father. This in its turn also holds for man. Like the Son, so man as such, wholly and entirely, is God's image. He does not merely bear, he is the image of God. Yet of course with this difference, that what the Son is in an absolute sense, man is in a relative sense. The former is the eternal, only-begotten Son; the latter is the created son of God. The former is the image of God within, the latter outside the divine being. The former is the image of God in a divine, the latter in a creaturely way. But thus man is then also in his measure image and likeness of God. Finally, fourth, it is also indicated here and there in what that image manifests itself and comes forth outwardly. Nowhere is the full content of that image of God unfolded. But Gen. 1:26 clearly indicates that that image of God comes to expression in his dominion over all that is created, cf. Ps. 8, 1 Cor. 11:7. The portrayal of the paradisal state in Gen. 1 and 2 shows that that image of God also includes the accordance with the will of God, cf. Eccl. 7:29. And the re-creation after the image of God or Christ is chiefly placed in the putting on of the new man, who inter alia consists in righteousness and holiness of the truth.

2. Concerning the content of the image of God, at first all sorts of differences of opinion prevailed in the Christian church. It was now located in man's body, then in his rational nature, or in his freedom of will, then again in his dominion or also in other moral virtues such as love, righteousness, etc., cf. passages in Suicerus s. v. εἰκων. Petavius, de sex

dier. opif. [512] II c. 2. Münscher-v. Coelln I 339 f. Hagenbach § 56. But gradually two conceptions nevertheless come to stand clearly alongside and over against one another, both of which appeal to the distinction of ‎‏‏צלם‎ and ‎‏‏דמות‎. Some, namely, such as Clemens Alex., Strom. II c. 22. Origenes, de princ. III 6 e. a. observed that Gen. 1:26 does indeed say that God wills to create man according to his image and likeness, but that according to verse

27 He in fact creates him only according to his image, i.e. with a rational nature, in order that man might now acquire the likeness with God himself in the way of obedience and at the end receive it as a reward from God's hand. Others, on the contrary, were of the opinion that man, together with the image, i.e. the rational nature, also immediately received the likeness as a gift, and that he, having lost this through sin, regains it through Christ,

Irenaeus, adv. haer. V 16, 2. Athan. c. Ar. II 59 c. Gent. 2. de incarn. 3. The first conception, which one could call the naturalistic, found support in the doctrine of freedom of will, by which one could not conceive holiness as a gift of God bestowed upon man immediately, but only as a good to be acquired by man himself in the way of moral effort, Harnack II 134 f. Many therefore also taught that the first man was created in a state, not of positive holiness but of childlike innocence, Tertull., de an. 38. Theoph., ad Autol. II 24. 27. Iren. adv. haer. IV 38. To such statements Pelagius later appealed, when he located the essence and the original state of man in moral indifference, in nothing but formal freedom of choice. The image of God consists only in the naturalis possibilitas perfectionis bestowed by God, which is inalienable and therefore is still now the portion of every human being. God bestows the posse, but ours is the velle, August. de gratia Christi

I 3 sq. Later this conception found acceptance among the Socinians, who considered the image of God to be located only in dominion, Fock, Der

Socin. 484; among the Anabaptists, who said that the first man, as a finite, earthly creature, was not yet the image of God but could first become it through regeneration, Menno Simons, Werken 125. 126. 180, cf. Erbkam,

Gesch. der prot. Sekten 461. Cloppenburg, Op. II 144 sq.; among the Remonstrants, Conf. V 5. Apol. conf. ib. Episcopius, Inst. theol. IV 3, 7.

Limborch, Theol. Chr. II 24, 5; among the Rationalists and Supranaturalists, [513] Wegscheider, Inst. theol. § 99. Bretschneider, Dogm. § 115. 116.

Reinhard, Dogm. § 70; and among many more recent theologians, Dorner, Gl. I 515. Lange, Dogm. II 298 f. Müller, Sünde II 457 f. Beck, Lehrw. I 186 f. Chr. Gl. II 328 f. Martensen, Dogm. 139. Kahnis, Dogm. I 432.

Zöckler, Lehre v. Urstand des Menschen 1879 S. 40 f. 333. Grétillat, Theol. syst. III 464 S. Hofstede de Groot, Gron. Godg. 89v. Doedes, Leer der

Zaligheid § 24. Ned. Geloofsbel. 145. Heid. Catech. 69 enz., who all let the status integritatis consist in a state of childlike innocence. Usually all these theologians do still hold fast to the historical truth of such an original state.

But in substance, in the conception of the image of God in the first man they agree entirely with those who, separating the idea from the fact, deny the reality of the status integritatis and locate the image of God only in free personality, in the rational or moral nature, in the religious-ethical disposition, in the destination of man to communion with God, Kant, Relig. ed. Rosenkranz 27 f. Fichte, Die Bestimmung des Menschen 1800. Hegel,

Werke XI 183 f. Schleiermacher, Gl. § 59-61. Strauss, Gl. II 72.

Biedermann, Dogm. II 562 f. Lipsius, Dogm. § 420. 440. Ritschl, Rechtf. u.

Vers. III3 314. Nitzsch, Ev. Dogm. 306 f. Bovon, Dogm. Chrét. I 132. 139.

Scholten, L. H. K. I 304v. II 67v. Imperceptibly this conception then leads on to the doctrine of evolution, according to which the essence of man is located not in what he was or is but in that which he can become in endless

development through his own exertion of power. Paradise lies not behind but before us. A developed ape deserves preference over a fallen man.

Originally bearing the image of orang-utan and chimpanzee, man gradually raised himself from a state of crude brutality to that of noble humanity, cf. litt. deel I 236.

3. It needs no demonstration that Holy Scripture stands in direct opposition to this doctrine of evolution. The Christian churches have therefore almost unanimously rejected the naturalistic, Pelagian conception of the image of God and of man's original state. Apart from the arguments for the Darwinian hypothesis already refuted earlier, there are in fact also no direct, historical proofs for the animal [514] state of man, as evolution imagines it. The bones and skulls of men that have been found have, upon closer investigation, all proved to be derived from beings completely like us in nature. As far back as we can go in history, we discover a condition of fairly high civilization, in China, India, Babylonia, Egypt; and every proof is lacking that the peoples there have developed out of an animal state. The appeal to the so-called primitive peoples, who moreover are also not stripped of all civilization, is of no force. For it is unprovable that they stand closer than the cultured peoples to the original state of man. Rather, there is ground to believe that they, separated from humanity, have gradually declined into a state of barbarism. For none of those peoples has been able, by its own means alone, to raise itself out of that condition. They all bear the character of degenerates, who, like branches torn off from the tree, without new vital force from without, wither away and disappear,

Waitz, Ueber die Einheit des Menschengeschlechts und den Naturzustand des Menschen 1859 S. 334 f. Peschel, Völkerkunde, 5te Aufl. 135 f.

Zöckler, Gesch. der Bez. II 744 f. Vigouroux, Les livres saints IV 171 s.

The question concerning the primitive state of man is therefore actually not a historical but a philosophical question; for that state precedes all historical testimonies. The answer that one gives to that question is determined by the thought that one forms of man. The more this being is now conceived, the more it becomes impossible to let the history of man begin with an animal, barbarous state. Life, consciousness, language, religion, morality, etc. are not to be explained from evolution, but presuppose a distinct origin, a creation out of nothing. Even in the theology of the moderns this still comes out. To be sure, they deny the creation according to God's image and the status integritatis; but when it comes to the most critical point, the idea of creation suddenly emerges again. Consciousness is something specifically human; or at least religion has its own, original principle in man; or, if evolution is accepted here as well, then one nevertheless stops at the ethical and maintains its independence; the moral life or the moral disposition is sui generis and sui originis, [515] Hoekstra, Wijsg. Godsd. I 1v. 14. 213v. etc. But this position between creation and evolution is an untenable standpoint. It has repeatedly been adopted by all kinds of Pelagian directions in the Christian church, because one had objections both to creation and to evolution and thus sought a mediation. The first man was not an animal, but also not a perfect, holy man; he was an innocent child.

He was neither positively good nor positively evil, but he stood between both, was morally indifferent, could do the one and the other. Actually he was nothing, potentially he was everything, pious and godless, holy and unholy, good and evil. The disposition, the posse, has arisen by creation, but everything that is now built upon that potential foundation is man's own will and work. Now there lies in this representation, as we shall see in the following paragraph, indeed something true, insofar as the first man did not

yet have the highest and thus indeed had to develop. But apart from this, it is nevertheless for many reasons wholly unacceptable. In the first place,

Scripture clearly teaches that man, both psychically and physically, was created adult, in virili aetate, August. de Gen. ad lit. VI c. 13, 14.

Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 17. The narrative in Genesis about the first humans is very simple, but the condition of those first humans is not that of simple, innocent children but of adult, well-conscious and freely acting beings. The creation according to the image of God, Gen. 1:27, Pred. 7:29,

Ef. 4:24, Col. 3:10, the blessing of multiplication, Gen. 1:28, the divine approval, Gen. 1:31, the probationary commandment, Gen. 2:17, the naming of the animals, Gen. 2:19, the utterance concerning Eve, Gen. 2:23,

24, the manner of the temptation, Gen. 3:1v., and the attitude of Adam and Eve after the fall, Gen. 3:7 v. prove abundantly that the first humans were created not indifferent but positively good. The only counter-proof could be derived from the fact that shame was lacking in the first humans. And this has therefore always been brought forward by the opposing party as a very powerful argument. This, however, cannot be valid for that reason, because the sexual life before the fall was very well known to the first man, Gen.

1:27, 28, 2:23, 24, and shame is derived not from the awakening of sexual life, but specifically from the fall. Secondly, this representation suffers from [516] half-heartedness and makes the problem that lies here still more complicated. Half-hearted it is, insofar as it on the one hand embraces evolution and yet, having arrived at a certain point, again embraces creation. It wants to know nothing of a creation of actus, but nevertheless assumes creation of potentiae. It speaks of Fähigkeit ohne Fertigkeit; and considers the creation of a child, both in the physical and in the psychological sense, simpler and more reasonable than that of an adult. This

is now in itself already absurd, for whoever lets the potentiae arise by creation and not by evolution can in principle no longer have any objection against the doctrine of the justitia originalis and the status integritatis. But it also makes the matter more difficult to conceive besides. A potency does not develop of itself, without more, into actuality. Max Müller rightly said: wenn wir es versuchen wollten, uns den ersten Menschen als Kind geschaffen und allmählich seine physischen und geistigen Kräfte entfaltend zu denken, so könnten wir nicht begreifen, wie er nur einen Tag ohne übernatürliche Hülfe zu leben vermochte, Vorles. über die Wiss. der

Sprache I3 Leipzig 1875 S. 410. In the same spirit Schelling expressed himself: Ich halte den Zustand der Cultur durchaus für den ersten des

Menschengeschlechts u. s. w., Werke I 5 S. 286 f. 6 S. 57 f. II 1 S. 238 f.

And J. G. Fichte also said: Es drängt sich die Frage auf, wenn es nothwendig sein sollte, einen Ursprung des ganzen Menschengeschlechts anzunehmen, wer erzog denn das erste Menschenpaar? Erzogen mussten sie werden—ein Mensch konnte sie nicht erziehen. Also ist es nothwendig, dass sie ein anderes vernünftiges Wesen erzogen, das kein Mensch war, es versteht sich bestimmt nur so weit, bis sie sich selbst untereinander erziehen konnten. Ein Geist nahm sich ihrer an, ganz so wie es eine alte ehrwürdige

Urkunde vorstellt, welche überhaupt die tiefsinnigste, erhabenste Weisheit enthällt und Resultate aufstellt, zu denen alle Philosophie am Ende doch wieder zurück kommen muss, Grundlage des Naturrechts 1796. In order to avoid one miracle, many miracles must be assumed. Thirdly, this representation rests on the error that there can be no innate holiness.

Holiness, so one says, is always the fruit of struggle and effort. If Adam was created positively holy, he was necessarily good and his freedom was lost, e.g. Rothe, Theol. Ethik [517] § 480 f. Thus one comes to the point of

feigning a condition between good and evil, holy and unholy, an indifferent state, which precedes the moral in bonam or malam partem, and out of which man must then develop by free decision of the will in the one or the other direction. Man is then deprived of all intellectual and ethical content, and the image of God is placed in the pure, naked, merely formal personality, Nitzsch, Syst. der chr. Lehre S. 211. Müller, Chr. Lehre v. d.

Sünde I 154 f. 493 f. Kahnis, Dogm. I 432. Thomasius, Dogm. I 110 f.

Beck, Glaub. II 333. Doedes, Leer der Zaligheid bl. 55v. Such a concept of personality, however, is a mere abstraction, to which nothing corresponds in reality. No man is conceivable without definite qualities of understanding and will. A complete indifference of the will, without character, without inclination to one side or the other, is simply an impossibility. Just as in nature only a good tree can bear good fruits, so also in ethical life the good nature precedes the good works. Operari sequitur esse. Scripture therefore also teaches that holiness both in creation and re-creation is a gift of God.

Whoever has it can further unfold it in word and deed; but whoever lacks it can never acquire it. And finally this representation falls short with respect to the righteousness of God, who has allowed his creature to be tempted beyond ability; with respect to the seriousness of the temptation, which then becomes a cunning deception; with respect to the character of the fall, which ceases to be a dreadful guilt and changes into a non-imputable misfortune and an almost unavoidable fate. It wipes out the boundaries that exist between the status integritatis and the status corruptionis and lets man retain undisturbed even after the fall the image of God, which consists in something purely formal. It conceives the relation between the formal (the personality, the freedom of the will) and the material (the religious and ethical life) just as loosely and dualistically as Rome represents this

between pura naturalia and donum superadditum, only with this difference, that holiness in Rome is a fruit of the gratia and in Pelagius and his own a product of arbitrariness.

4. Alongside and over against this naturalistic conception of the image of God there came to stand another representation, which we can call the [518] supranaturalistic one, above p. 512. It did not arise from the distinction between ‎‏‏צלם‎ and ‎‏‏דמות‎, although this was later also brought into connection with it. Nor is it built on the interpretation of Gen. 1 and 2, for many acknowledge that it does not occur there, or at least not literally. But it is derived from the idea of the status gloriae that gradually arose in the Christian church, to which believers are elevated by Christ and his Spirit,

Joh. 1:12, Rom. 8:14-17, 1 Cor. 2:7v., Ef. 1:15v., 2 Petr. 1:2v., 1 Joh. 3:1, 2 etc. cf. Scheeben, Dogm. II 272-281. Gradually this status gloriae, under Neoplatonic influence, was conceived as a condition that far surpassed the state of nature not only in an ethical but also in a physical sense. Since the fourth century, in the Christological controversies, this thought came so much to the foreground that the deity of the Son and of the Spirit was proved especially by the fact that they were for human beings the authors of their deification. The essence of the status gloriae comes to lie more and more in the visio Dei per essentiam, in the deiformitas, deificatio, in the not merely moral but physica participatio divinae naturae, in the Verschmelzung mit Gott, cf. above 152v. And to this doctrine of the status gloriae there now came still that of the meritoriousness of good works. The gratia infusa, which was bestowed in baptism, was decidedly necessary but also put the human being in a position to do such good works as could merit ex condigno eternal salvation, the visio Dei per essentiam. From these two thoughts, the mystical conception of man's final destiny and the

meritoriousness of good works, the Roman doctrine of the donum superadditum was born. Alexander Halesius was the first who brought it into a definite formula. The heavenly blessedness and the beholding of God, which is man's final destiny and was this also for Adam, cannot be merited ex condigno except by such good works as are in accordance with that final destiny, i.e. as, like it, bear a supernatural character and thus proceed from a supernatural principle, the gratia infusa. The justitia, which Adam now of himself as a human being, as an earthly being, possessed by creation, was by the nature of the case not sufficient for that. And thus also to Adam, in order to reach his final destiny, a [519] supernatural grace had to be bestowed, namely the gratia gratum faciens, the image of God. Haec autem sublimatio creaturae rationalis est supranaturale complementum; et ideo nec consecratio nec adoptio nec assumptio hujusmodi fit per aliquam proprietatem naturae sed per donum superadditum naturae, consecrans naturam, ut sit templum, assimilans Deo, ut sit filius sive filia, confoederans

Deo sive uniens per conformitatem voluntatis, ut sit sponsa; hoc autem fit a Deo mediante gratia gratum faciente, Halesius, S. Theol. II qu. 91 membr. 1 art. 3. This doctrine found general acceptance among the scholastics,

Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 95. Bonaventura, Brevil. II c. 11. 12. V c. 1, and the comm. of Thomas, Bonav. Duns Scotus on Sent. II dist. 29; was taken up in the Catechismus Romanus, I 2 qu. 18, 3, later against the Reformers, Bajus,

Jansenius, Quesnel defended and maintained, Bellarminus, de gratia primi hominis, Denzinger, Enchir. n. 881 sq., and forms one of the most important and most characteristic loci in Roman theology, cf. e.g. Becanus, Theol.

Schol. I tract. 5. Casini, Controv. de statu purae naturae, printed as appendix ad librum II de opif. sex dierum of Petavius, Theol. dogm. ed. 1868 IV p.

587-653. Theol. Wirceb. VII p. 145 sq. Perrone, Prael. theol. III 166-182.

Kleutgen, Theol. II2 6-151. 507-615. Scheeben, Dogm. II 239-514. Id.

Natur u. Gnade 1861. Schäzler, Natur u. Gnade. Oswald, Relig. Urgesch. der Menschheit 1887 S. 1-61. Simar, Dogm.3 S. 326 f. C. Pesch, Prael. III 76-111. Möhler, Symb. § 1 etc. Although, however, there is agreement in the main matter, there is nevertheless all manner of difference on subordinate points. Some, such as Halesius, S. Theol. II qu. 96 m. 1.

Bonaventura, Sent. II dist. 29 art. 2 qu. 2. Albertus Magnus, Duns Scotus, Biel and others, asserted that the supernatural gift of the gratia gratum faciens was distinct from the justitia originalis, which the human being immediately possessed by nature through creation, and was also bestowed temporally later than this. According to them the human being was first created with the justitia originalis; by this he was put in a position to merit the gratia gratum faciens ex congruo; and when he had received this, he could thereby acquire heavenly blessedness ex condigno. But Thomas objected to that, because the gratia gratum faciens would then also rest on merits, as a personal gift to Adam could not have been lost or acquired by him for all his [520] descendants, and then also could not be bestowed in baptism on small children without merit; therefore Thomas taught that Adam at the moment of creation simultaneously with the justitia originalis also received the gratia, S. Theol. I qu. 100 art. 1. Sent. II dist. 20 qu. 2 art.

3. dist. 29 qu. 1 art. 1. Trent avoided a decision in this point of dispute between Franciscans and Dominicans and only declared that Adam had lost the justitia and sanctitas, in qua constitutus fuerat, sess. V 1. Although later theologians mostly followed Thomas and in fact and temporally let the justitia originalis coincide with the gratia gratum faciens; ideally and logically the conception nevertheless remained the same. Roman theology has a twofold conception of the human being: the human being in puris

naturalibus, without supernatural grace, is indeed sinless, but has only a natural religion and virtue, and has his destination on earth; the human being, endowed with the donum superadditum of the image of God, has a supernatural religion and virtue and has his destination in heaven. But with this twofold idea of the human being one was not yet finished. For as soon as one considered what belonged to the one and what to the other idea of the human being, one became embarrassed with various gifts bestowed on the first human being. The immortalitas and the impassibilitas could not in the strict sense be called natural, for they were not properties of Adam's earthly body as such and could be lost. On the other hand, they also could not be a consequence of the gratia gratum faciens, for then the human being in puris naturalibus, without the donum superadditum, would have been susceptible to death and suffering, and death would then not be a punishment for sin. The same is the case with the concupiscentia. The struggle between flesh and spirit is according to Rome natural; the subjection of the flesh to the spirit is thus something supernatural, not already given with creation itself; but it nevertheless also cannot first be due to the gratia gratum faciens, for then a sinless human being without donum superadditum would not be possible. Therefore between the two ideas which Rome forms of the human being, a third had still to be inserted. And thus, according to Rome, a human being is conceivable and possible with dona naturalia, [521] praeternaturalia and supernaturalia. There is a threefold righteousness, a justitia naturalis, praeternaturalis and supernaturalis. No wonder that some, such as Berti, Norisius and others, could not conceive of such a human being who was endowed only with dona naturalia and praeternaturalia; according to God's potentia absoluta such a human being would indeed be possible, but according to his potentia

ordinata not; the visio beatifica is in fact proper to the human being by nature, saltem quoad inclinationem et appetitum, Perrone, III 167. Oswald,

Relig. Urgesch. 52 f. Pesch, Prael. III 109. But even if the conceivability and possibility of a human being in puris naturalibus is maintained, there is still all manner of difference in the doctrine of the image of God. Some distinguish image and likeness in such a way that the first comprises the dona naturalia, the second the supernaturalia; others, such as the Catech.

Rom., let both refer to the dona supernaturalia. Halesius, Bonaventura, Thomas etc. thought with the justitia originalis of the justitia naturalis and indicated the justitia supernaturalis as gratia gratum faciens; but the Catech.

Rom. and most later theologians speak precisely of the dona superaddita as justitia originalis. The immortalitas, impassibilitas, the liberum arbitrium, the temperatio concupiscentiae are now derived from a divinum beneficium, then again from the imago or from the similitudo, and are also reckoned to the justitia originalis, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 95 art. 1. Sent. II dist. 19 qu. 1 art. 4. Pesch, Prael. III 89 sq. The Catech. Rom. places everything alongside each other and brings it to no unity: Adam was susceptible to no death and suffering divino beneficio; his soul was created according to God's image and likeness; moreover, concupiscence was restrained and subjected to reason; and finally God added to that still the justitia originalis and the dominion, I 2 qu. 18, 3. And with all that there then still comes the difference over the nature of the gratia gratum faciens, over its relation to the Spirit of God, to the soul and its faculties, to the theological virtues, to good works etc., cf. later the locus de gratia. Enough, to show that the Roman doctrine concerning the image of God is also in itself not yet worked out and for that reason too cannot satisfy theological thinking.

5. In the first place, however, this doctrine is built on an incorrect [522] conception of man's final destiny. The status gratiae and gloriae, in which the church of Christ shares here and hereafter, is described in Holy

Scripture in the most beautiful way, as a sonship of God, as communion in the divine nature, as the beholding of God, as eternal life, as heavenly blessedness, etc. On this there is no difference between Rome and us; no eye has seen, no ear has heard, it has not ascended into the heart of man, what God in the N. Test. dispensation of the covenant of grace has prepared for those who love Him, 1 Cor. 2:9. But Rome conceives this final destiny of man, which has been realized by Christ, as a Neoplatonic beholding of and a mystical fusion of the soul with God, cf. above 152v. and 518. And this is not the doctrine of Holy Scripture. For all those benefits which Christ has acquired for His own are not first bestowed upon them in the state of glory but are in principle their portion already here on earth, 1 Cor. 2:9 and yet also, according to Rome, do not include the beholding of God per essentiam. The sonship of God is a fruit of faith, Joh. 1:12, Rom. 8:14v.

Gal. 4:6, 1 Joh. 3:1, 2. Eternal life is already enjoyed here and consists in a knowing of God in the face of Christ, Joh. 3:16, 36, 17:3. Christ is and remains the way to the Father, to the knowledge and the beholding of God,

Mt. 11:27, Joh. 1:18, 14:6, 1 Joh. 3:2b. The visio Dei is only to be obtained in an ethical sense, Mt. 5:8, 1 Joh. 3:6. Even participation in the θεια φυσις is not something future only, but is an end which the bestowal of God's promises already here on earth intends, 2 Petr. 1:4, and again ethically vermittelt, Hebr. 12:10. Secondly, nowhere in Holy Scripture is it taught that this status gloriae, which already takes its beginning on earth in the status gratiae, is supranaturalis and superadditus in the Roman sense.

Certainly this state of grace and glory goes very far beyond all thought and

imagination of man, 1 Cor. 2:9, 13:12, 1 Joh. 3:2. But one should consider that according to 1 Cor. 2 it is the wisdom of the world, the spirit of the world, the psychical man, vs. 6, 8, 12, 14, for whom these benefits of God are a mystery; and this psychical man is the man who lets himself be guided only by the animal life, deprived of the πνευμα ἐκ θεου, and therefore [523] is darkened in his understanding. Added to this is that what God bestows and will bestow upon believers also for them themselves remains an undeserved gift of grace, which again and again disposes them to admiration and worship. And then it must also not be forgotten that Christ not only acquired what Adam lost but also what Adam would have acquired in the way of obedience. Therefore the treasure of salvation of the covenant of grace goes very far beyond all our thoughts; but there is not a word about its being a superadditum, which originally did not belong with our human nature. Thirdly, the conclusion is incorrect which Rome derives from these benefits of grace in Christ for the state of Adam before the fall. Rome reasons thus: if the status gloriae for restored man consists in conformity to God, then it must also have consisted in that for the first man. And if that status gloriae is now not attained by believers except through the status gratiae, then this also holds for Adam before the fall. The connection between the status gratiae and gloriae consists according to Rome in this, that man in justification receives the gratia infusa and by virtue of that does good works, which merit eternal life ex condigno. All this Rome transfers to the first man. He too had as final destiny the status gloriae; he could not attain this except through the status gratiae; to Adam therefore a gratia was bestowed, by which he could merit eternal life ex condigno. Just as that status gloriae is, so also that gratia by virtue of its nature is supernatural, elevated above the psychical man, and thus a donum superadditum. This

reasoning of Rome is correct, insofar as it concludes from the image of God in restored man to that in the first man. There is indeed no more than one image of God. It is also correct, insofar as it assumes that the final destiny for Adam was no other than what the believer now receives through Christ, namely eternal life. There is really only one ideal for man. But it is incorrect, because it posits between gratia and gloria a connection of meritoriousness and further also applies this to Adam. The meritorious value of the bona opera can only be treated later. Here it is only pointed out that even if the Roman conception of man's final destiny were correct, it still gives no right to conceive the [524] gratia in an adequate, supernatural sense. For such a connection is also possible, that God binds to certain works certain promises and gifts, without these therefore in the strict sense, ex condigno, being merited by them. Of such a nature was the promise of eternal life to Adam in case of obedience, as the Reformed taught in their doctrine concerning the foedus operum, cf. § 32. There was a merit ex pacto, not ex condigno. The good works of man are never worth the heavenly glory, they never weigh against it. Rome, however, introduces the meritoriousness of good works, both in the believer and in Adam, and therefore falls short with respect to grace. Grace with Rome changes entirely in character. It stands not in ethical but in physical opposition to nature. It presupposes not sin and guilt, but only a lower nature. It makes on the one hand everything into grace and thereby precisely makes it so that there is no grace at all. For the gratia is with Adam and with the believer indeed grace, but in no other sense than that in which life, understanding, wisdom, power, etc. are grace. There is no reason to call only the donum superadditum grace; that Adam was created and received understanding and will was then equally grace, even if there is also a quantitative difference in

the gifts of grace. And thus actually everything becomes grace, which in the first moment is bestowed by God upon man in creation or re-creation. But also only in that first moment. For as soon as he has received those first gifts, man himself according to Rome goes to work by that gratia; and everything that he now further receives, he receives as wages for his merits.

Even eternal life is no longer a gift of grace of God but a worthy, fitting, adequate wage for the work of man. Only it can still be called a gift of grace, because the power which made man capable of meriting was grace.

Just as formerly the Pelagians said: the posse is from God, the velle is from man. Fourthly, above 520-521 it has been indicated that the Roman doctrine of the donum superadditum has led and must lead to a threefold conception of man. For Rome there is not one idea and one moral law and one destiny for man; but as in the other creatures, so also in the world of men the hierarchy and the ordering of ranks continues. There [525] is in the abstract a homo with justitia naturalis, another with justitia praeternaturalis, a third with justitia supernaturalis conceivable. The first of these three men is actually still little elevated above the animal; he is subject to the concupiscentia, to the natural opposition between flesh and spirit, to the susceptibility to bodily suffering and temporal death. But he still has in his will the power to do the good, to not let the concupiscentia pass over into sinful deeds, and thus to lead a well natural but yet sinless life. To this image man after the fall is fairly similar. Although original sin is still often conceived not only negatively but also positively, it is nevertheless weakened more and more, in proportion as the physical opposition of nature and grace replaced the ethical antithesis of sin and grace. According to many it consists only negatively in a loss of that donum superadditum, which was bestowed upon the first man by the good pleasure of God, e.g.

Oswald, Relig. Urgesch. 59, 137 f. Man without that donum superadditum thus remains complete in his kind, perfect, and however difficult it may be, especially in the long run, yet if he wills even a sinless man. And hence with Rome the mild judgment concerning the children dying unbaptized and concerning the heathen, who have made a good use of the light and the power of nature. They have no guilt and thus no punishment, receive a poena damni, no poena sensus. As such a homo naturalis, however, God did not create the first man. He at once gave him a justitia praeternaturalis in addition, and therefore Adam also, abstracted from the actual donum superadditum i.e. the gratia gratum faciens, was elevated above the concupiscentia, suffering and death, also as regards the body. This is a second idea of man, which is possible and capable of existing; such a man would then have been able to keep God's commandments without struggle from the side of the flesh (donum integritatis), but his righteousness would nevertheless have remained natural and would not have merited the visio

Dei per essentiam. This second conception of man is now once more raised a step higher by the addition of the donum superadditum, by which a man arises with justitia supernaturalis. As through the whole Roman system, so we also encounter here in the doctrine of the image [526] of God the opposition between the natural and the supernatural, between the human and the divine, between the earthly and the heavenly and within both domains then again all kinds of gradations. There is all manner of rank and class and estate in the ethical and religious. Not all stand and elevate themselves equally high. If God is the center, the creatures group themselves in ever wider circles around Him. The homo naturalis is farthest removed from Him, then the homo praeternaturalis, thereafter the homo supernaturalis. And in the last class there is again all manner of distinction

and degree. There are clerici and laymen, monks and ordinary people, praecepta and consilia, lower and higher morality. Highest stands the mysticus, who already here on earth by meditation and asceticism and oratio brings it to contemplatio. And above men stand again the angels, arrayed in all kinds of orderings of rank. Everything rises upward, toward

God; it approaches Him ever more. The fusion of the soul with God is the highest blessedness. Therefore in Rome there is a place for all; it reckons with each one's capacity and suitability; it has a different ideal for the different men; it does not set the same moral and religious demands upon everyone. Pierson has rightly laid emphasis on this; only he regarded as principle and essence what was only consequence and phenomenon, Gesch. van het R. Kath. I 24v. Against this in the ground Neoplatonic, Areopagitic philosophy it is that the Reformation, resting on Scripture, has proceeded.

Scripture does not know such a physical opposition of the natural and the supernatural. It knows only one idea of man, one moral law, one final destiny, one priesthood, which is the portion of all believers. Fifthly, it appears clearly from this that the reason why Rome teaches the justitia praeterand supernaturalis does not lie in this, that otherwise the losability of the justitia originalis cannot be explained. Roman theologians indeed constantly bring this objection against the doctrine of the Reformation; the justitia originalis belongs to the essence of man or not; if the former, then it is unlosable or, if it nevertheless is lost, then man loses in it a part of his essence and he ceases to be a complete man. But however much this objection is repeatedly made; not in order to evade it has Rome come to the doctrine of the donum superadditum. Rome retains [527] exactly the same difficulty. For Adam also had a justitia naturalis. And this justitia naturalis is indeed natural, flowing forth from the principia and powers of the natural

man, without supernatural help (even if not, without the general help of God's preservation), and it is nevertheless losable and is by many in fact lost. And nevertheless even the most deeply fallen sinner, deprived of all justitia naturalis, still remains man. The losability and the factual loss of the justitia originalis therefore can absolutely render no service as an argument against its natural character. If that were the case, then the justitia naturalis, which Rome teaches, would also have to bear the name of supernaturalis.

The question between Rome and us is a wholly different one. Losable is the justitia originalis, because it is an accidens, not a substantia. But among the accidentia, which all as such are losable, Rome again makes a distinction between what is naturaliter accidens and what is supernaturaliter accidens, e.g. Benschop in De Katholiek CX p. 56. According to us the whole justitia originalis is an accidens naturale; according to Rome the gratia gratum faciens is an accidens supernaturale. Why? Not, to make the losability possible and clear. But because man without it remained a defective creature. Rome teaches expressly that it was for God, given once that He wished to create a being consisting of soul and body, of spirit and matter, impossible to create these two, soul and body, without supernatural help in complete harmony, just as little as He can make a square circle. Flesh and spirit strive per se with one another, and God cannot prevent strife between those two elements without supernatural grace. Bellarminus says it clearly, that man consists of flesh and spirit, and thus partly has propensio ad bonum corporale, partly ad bonum spirituale, and that ex his diversis vel contrariis propensionibus existere in uno eodemque homine pugnam quandam. Further he now teaches, divinam providentiam initio creationis ut remedium adhiberet huic morbo seu languori naturae humanae, qui ex conditione materiae oriebatur, addidisse homini quoddam donum insigne,

justitiam videlicet originalem, qua veluti aureo quodam freno pars inferior superiori et pars superior Deo facile subjecta contineretur, de gr. pr. hom. c.

5, cf. c. 7. Here it is clearly expressed that the flesh by its nature stands over against [528] the spirit. Matter is a power over against God, which indeed is not per se sinful as in Manichaeism, but nevertheless is of very low order, moves in an entirely own direction and of itself entices man to struggle and to sin. Indeed that power is so great that the ratio alone cannot, or at least cannot except with great difficulty, control the motus animi. For that a special, supernatural grace is needed. As in the philosophy of Plotinus, matter is a creature that stands very far from God, is by nature hostile to all that is spiritual and therefore must be powerfully restrained. Sixthly finally,

Rome's doctrine of the donum superadditum brings with it a peculiar conception of Christianity. The Christian religion with Rome indeed also serves to deliver from sin; but in the first and principal place it nevertheless extends to bestow back upon man that gratia which was bestowed upon Adam as a donum superadditum but was lost by him. This gratia was as necessary to man before the fall as it is now to us, and was then just as supernatural as now after the fall. According to Rome grace is thus a donum supernaturale per se and not per accidens, not only on account of sin,

Bellarm. de gr. pr. hom. c. 5. Sin has brought no change in the nature of the gratia. Perhaps it has been increased by sin. But it was before and after the fall completely the same, namely an elevatio supra naturam. That is its character and essence. Christianity therefore may also still be

Erlösungsreligion; in the very first place it is no reparatio but elevatio naturae; it serves to raise nature above itself, to deify man. For that purpose with Adam the gratia gratum faciens served, for that purpose now

Christianity serves. This grace is therefore then and now the same; that is,

what is proper, what is essential in Christianity has absolutely not become necessary through the fall; it was already necessary before the fall.

Christianity as elevatio naturae was also already with Adam before the fall.

The reception of the gratia infusa is now bound besides to praeparationes, specifically also to faith in two dogmata, the Trinity and the incarnation, cf. part I 518v. Well then, so it was also with Adam. He already knew both before the fall, Becanus, Theol. schol. I tr. 5 c. 2 qu. 2. Simar, Dogm. 332.

Pesch, Prael. dogm. II 89 etc. Thomas, S. Theol. II 2 qu. 2 art. 7, qu. 5 art.

1. The incarnation is therefore [529] also per consequentiam before the fall and without sin necessary. In other words, in order that man become like

God, God must become man. This law held as well before as after the fall.

Now the incarnation brings with it reconciliation only as something subordinate. But the center of gravity with Rome lies not in satisfaction and forgiveness of guilt, but in the incarnation of God and in the deification of man, cf. part I 220v. 276v.

6. By the Reformers this doctrine was unanimously rejected, but chiefly for this reason, because it led to a weakening of original sin. The opposition was directed especially against the thesis of scholasticism: supernaturalia amissa, naturalia adhuc esse integra. And from that one concluded back to the image of God. If man through sin, through loss of the image of God, was wholly and entirely corrupted, then it must also have belonged to his nature. And thus Luther said, justitiam non esse quoddam donum, quod ab extra accederet, separatumque a natura hominis sed fuisse vere naturalem, ut naturae Adae esset diligere Deum, credere Deo etc., in Genes. III. But the Reformers also had to continue to make a distinction between what of the image of God had remained and what of it had been lost. For that they used the names of substantia, essentia and dotes, dona, even supernaturalia dona.

The Apol. Conf. calls the knowledge, the fear of God in Adam dona, and the Form. Conc. speaks of dotes in paradiso naturae concreatae, Müller, Die symb. Bücher der ev. luth. K5 S. 80. 81. 580. The Lutheran dogmaticians did call the image of God natural, insofar as human nature without that image could not be pure and it was created at once together with it. But they denied that the image of God was natural in that sense, that it would proceed of itself as such from human nature and thus would constitute an inalienable, essential constituent part of it; and some, such as Gerhard,

Quenstedt e. a. also expressly called the supernaturalis Dei favor, the gratiosa s. trinitatis inhabitatio and the suavitas et delectatio flowing from it expressly by the name of dona supernaturalia, Gerhard, Loci theol. VIII c.

1-3. Quenstedt, Theol. did. polem. II 1-48. Hollaz, Ex. theol. 461-488.

Likewise Calvin distinguishes between the substantia animae and its dotes, Inst. I 15, 2 and says with [530] Augustine, naturalia dona fuisse corrupta in homine per peccatum, supernaturalibus autem exinanitum fuisse; indeed he even calls these latter adventitia, praeter naturam, II 2, 12. And many

Reformed theologians in the same sense distinguish between qualitates naturales and dona supernaturalia, Maccovius, Loci Comm. 405 sq.; the immortalitas is by many derived not from Adam's nature but from the gratia

Dei, Zanchius, Op. III 497. Polanus V 29. Junius, Op. I 211. Bucanus, Theol. XI 12. Maccovius p. 409. Even the old distinction of image and likeness was adopted by many and also applied in this sense, Zanchius, Op.

III 486. Martyr op Gen. 1:26. Alsted, Theol. schol. 281. Yet it soon became clear that the Protestants, even where they still retained the expression dona supernaturalia, nevertheless understood these in another sense than the Roman Catholics. With the latter the intention is this, that a man is very well conceivable and possible without these dona supernaturalia; indeed

that man then, as a rational moral being, also has some knowledge of God, of the moral law, of righteousness. But there is an essential difference between the knowledge, the love, the righteousness in a natural and in a supernatural sense, between the homo naturalis and supernaturalis, between the man and the Christian, between the world and the church, between nature and grace. Grace is not merely a restoration but an elevation, supplementation of nature, an elevatio, sublimatio naturae. This now was in principle contested by the Reformation. And therefore it had to come and it also in fact came to the doctrine that the image of God was by nature proper to man and that he, without that image, could exist only in natura impura, as a sinner. But now among the Reformers there was also still difference in the conception of the image of God. In the first period some Lutherans also still placed the image of God in the being of man and in the substance of the soul, Luther in Köstlin, I 121, Melanchthon, Hemming, Selnecker in Heppe,

Dogm. d. d. Prot. I 338 f. But Lutheran theology nevertheless proceeded from another thought. Its subjective, soteriological character had to lead to seeking the image of God only in the moral qualities which the first man received and whose loss made man into a stick and a block in religious and moral respect. Luther often laid all the emphasis on the [531] gifts and let the image of God be absorbed in them, Köstlin II 358 f. Heppe I 345. The confessional writings speak in the same spirit, Müller S. 80. 576, and likewise the theologians, Heerbrand, Hunnius, Gerhard VIII c. 1. Quenstedt

II 3-10, 17-23. Hollaz, p. 464 sq. etc. Indeed the Lutherans do not deny that also the essence of man expresses quaedam θεια sive divina; but the proper image of God is located only in the justitia originalis with the immortalitas, impassibilitas, dominium and conditio felicissima connected with it. For only the Son is essentially and substantially the image of God, Hebr. 1:3; in

man it is a perfectio accidentalis, losable and lost, Rom. 3:23, and only in the believer renewed and restored, Rom. 8:29, 2 Cor. 3:18, 5:17, Ef. 4:24,

Col. 3:10. The Reformed, however, from the beginning also included the essence of man in the image of God. Heppe, Dogm. 169. 170 asserts wrongly, that Calvin and Zanchius did not teach thus. Calvin indeed makes a distinction between the substantia animae and its dotes, but says expressly that the image of God consisted in that tota praestantia, qua eminet hominis natura inter omnes animantium species, and that it further, proinde, also consists in the integritas, Inst. I 15, 2. II 12, 6, cf. in Gen. 1:26, 9:6, Jak. 3:9.

And with this all the Reformed agree, Zanchius, Op. III 486. 677 sq.

Ursinus, Catech. qu. 7. Martyr, Loci C. 46 sq. Polanus, Synt. Theol. V 34.

Synopsis XIII 36. Leydecker, Fax Verit. p. 395 etc. Only Coccejus, S.

Theol. XVII § 12-24 again proposed another opinion and taught that the soul and its properties were indeed presupposition, but not content of the image of God; they were, as it were, the canvas on which the image was painted by God, but this itself consisted only in the gifts according to 2 Cor.

3:18, Ef. 4:24, Col. 3:10, cf. also Heidegger, Corp. Theol. VI 119. Braun, Doctr. foed. I 2, 15, 5 v. Others expressed it thus, that the image of God consisted antecedenter in natura spirituali, formaliter in sanctitate, consequenter in dominio, Turretinus, Theol. El. V qu. 10 § 6. Ryssenius,

Theol. 178. Witsius, Oec. foed. I 2, 11. Brakel, Red. Godsd. X 25. Most, however, one continued to speak of the image of God in a broader and in a narrower sense. Thereby in Reformed theology the bond was held fast between the physical and the ethical nature of man, and thus further [532] between nature and grace. In addition, there soon came in Reformed theology yet another distinction, which was worked out especially in the doctrine of the foedus operum. This gave answer to the question, not what

Adam was, but what Adam had to become. Only in these three points, the image of God in a broader sense, the image of God in a narrower sense, and the unfolding or destination of the image of God, i.e. in the doctrine of the covenant of works, is the locus de imagine Dei to be treated fully.

7. Between Rome's doctrine and that of the Reformation concerning the image of God there is a deep difference, which extends over the whole of theology. This difference does not lie in the expression justitia originalis.

For although this term is used by the Roman theologians in different senses, yet the latter also sometimes designate thereby the justitia supernaturalis, above p. 519. Originalis can be called the justitia in the first man, because his positive conformity with the law of God is proper to him from his origin onward, because as such it is to be distinguished from the justitia habitualis and actualis, and because in Adam it was the principle and the root of his actual righteousness. Indeed, since Thomas there was also no difference about this, that the justitia originalis also for the whole of humanity, if Adam had remained standing, would have been the source of its actual righteousness, for Adam received it not as persona privata but as persona publica. The whole dispute turned on whether that justitia originalis was now naturalis or, at least in part, supernaturalis. The Reformers asserted the former. By that they did not mean to say that that original righteousness flowed of itself from human nature, taken in the sense of the connection of spirit and matter, nor either that it might not be called a gift, even of God's grace in a broad sense; but they only maintained with that expression that the image of God, the original righteousness, was inseparable from the idea of man; that it was the normal state, the harmony, the health of man; that without it man cannot be a true, perfect, normal man. If man loses that image of God, then he loses no substance and he indeed remains man, but

he becomes an abnormal, sick, spiritually dead man, a sinner; then something is lacking to him which belonged to his kind and nature, like

[533] sight to the blind man, hearing to the deaf man, health to the sick man. With Rome man can lack the justitia supernaturalis and yet be a good, true, perfect sinless man, with a justitia naturalis, which in its kind is without any defect. But according to the Protestants that cannot be. There is no status medius between man as image of God and man as sinner. He is son of God, his offspring, his image, or he is child of wrath, dead in sins and trespasses. When man receives that image of God, this perfect righteousness, again through faith in Christ, then that is indeed a donum supernaturale but supernaturale per accidens; he receives back what belongs to his being, like the blind man who becomes seeing again. This doctrine now is grounded on Holy Scripture, which nowhere at the creation of man speaks of dona supernaturalia; Rome therefore also does not appeal to Gen.

1:26, 31, Eccl. 7:29 etc., but to the representation of the N. T. of the status gratiae and gloriae, which however can in no way serve as proof. Scripture everywhere proceeds from the fact that man is akin to God and is his offspring; service of, love to, communion with God is no donum superadditum but originally, by nature, proper to man. God claims man wholly, with understanding, heart, soul, body and all powers for his service and for his love. The moral law is one for all men, in all times, and holds the moral ideal equally high for all. There is no lower and higher righteousness, no twofold morality, no double kind of duties. The original righteousness is so natural that it also, according to most Roman theologians, would have been inherited by Adam's descendants in case of his obedience, and that the Heathen even now by nature do the things that are of the law, Rom. 2:15. If then also against this reformational doctrine it

is objected that it is in an antinomy, because it on the one hand calls the justitia originalis naturalis and yet on the other hand amissibilis and accidentalis, Benschop in de Katholiek CX p. 43, also Strauss, Glaub. I 708.

Lipsius, Dogm.

§ 434, then this objection flows only from misunderstanding, Philippi, Kirchl. Gl. III 408. Natural the original righteousness is called, not because it consists in a certain substance or essence, but because it is a natural property or quality. Just as health belongs to the nature of [534] man but for that reason is nevertheless losable, so it is also with the image of God. Both, Rome and the Reformation, agree in this, that the original righteousness is no matter, no spiritual substance, as the Manicheans teach, but an accidens, a qualitas.

And the difference is only whether it is naturally accidental or, at least for a part, supernaturally accidental, de Katholiek, ib. pp. 56-60. Rome teaches only of the justitia naturalis that it is naturally accidental; the Reformation teaches it of the whole justitia originalis. But therefore also, as was already said above, Rome's objection against the doctrine that the image of God is natural entirely falls away; for it itself acknowledges that the justitia naturalis is natural and yet losable and thus can no longer bring this objection against the doctrine of the Protestants. Rome's doctrine has therefore also not arisen from the objection that the naturalness of the original righteousness is not to be reconciled with its losability, but it owes its origin to a wholly different series of thoughts, namely to the Neoplatonic conception of the Christian ideal of life. It is that Neoplatonism that has been rejected by the Reformation on the ground of Scripture. And in doing so it has guarded itself against all Manichaeism. Through sin man has lost no substance. In this sense man is still man even after the fall. But through the loss of the original righteousness he has lost the harmony, the health of

his nature, has become wholly and entirely a sinner; his nature in the sense of substance, essence has remained, but the moral qualities naturally proper to him have been lost, cf. Scholten, L. H. K. I 309v. This beautiful conception of the image of God and of the original righteousness has now come into its own still better in the Reformed church and theology than in the Lutheran. Here the image of God is restricted to the original righteousness, and thus has been wholly lost together with it. The separation between the spiritual and the worldly, between the heavenly and the earthly is here drawn through so sharply and divided into two hemisphaeria, that the connection of nature and grace, of creation and re-creation is wholly misunderstood, cf. part I 222v. The supranaturalistic representation of the image of God is here not yet wholly overcome; it stands loose alongside and above nature, and the loss of it has indeed as a consequence that man

[535] in spiritual things is wholly deaf and blind, but in earthly things he is still capable of much good and to a certain extent independent of the grace of God in Christ. The Reformed, however, by their distinction of the image of God in a broader and narrower sense have most purely maintained the connection of substance and quality, of nature and grace, of creation and recreation. Indeed this distinction too has often been conceived still all too mechanically, and it ought to be developed further organically. But here it has nevertheless been expressed most clearly that the image of God in the narrower sense was most closely connected with that in the broader sense; that both components made up the full image of God; that not something in man but man himself, the whole man, was image of God; that sin, which caused the image of God in the narrower sense to be lost and that in the broader sense to be corrupted and destroyed, has affected the whole man, and that accordingly grace in Christ also restores the whole man and is of

the greatest significance for his whole life and labor, also in family, society, state, art, science etc.

8. In the treatment of the doctrine of the image of God, therefore, in accordance with Scripture and the Reformed confession, this thought ought to stand in the foreground, that man does not bear or have the image of God, but that he is the image of God; as man he is son, likeness, offspring of God, Gen. 1:26, 9:6, Luk. 3:38, Hd. 17:28, 1 Cor. 11:7, Jak. 3:9. Two things are enclosed herein; first, that not something in God, some virtue and perfection with the exclusion of others, nor also one person, e.g. the Son with the exclusion of Father and Spirit, but that God himself, that the whole

Godhead is the archetype of man. Indeed it has often been taught, that man has been made specifically after the Son or after the Christus incarnandus,

Clemens Alex. Strom. V 14. Tertull. de resurr. carnis c. 6. Osiander, in Calvijn, Inst. I 15, 2. II 12, 6. Hofmann, Schriftbew. I 290. Thomasius,

Christi Person u. Werk I3 126. Beck, Gl. II 329. Schoeberlein in Herzog2 4, 7. Martensen, Dogm. § 72. Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych. 70 etc. But Scripture says that nowhere. It repeatedly expresses, that man has been made after God's image, that we have not been created after Christ but that He has become like us, Rom. 8:3, Phil. 2:7, 8, Hebr. 2:14, [536] and that we now, recreated after the image of Christ, again become like God, Rom. 8:29, 1

Cor. 15:49, 2 Cor. 3:18, Phil. 3:21, Ef. 4:24, Col. 3:10, 1 Joh. 3:2, cf. above 511. Much better, therefore, is it to say, that the threefold being of God is the archetype of man, August. de trin. XII 6. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 16.

Thomas, S. Theol. I qu. 13 art. 5, cf. above p. 311, although in the psychological tracing of the trinitarian moments in the human being all caution is also to be observed, Calvijn, Inst. I 15, 4. Comm. in Gen. 1:26.

Synopsis pur. theol. XIII 7. Quenstedt, Theol. did. pol. II 4. Hollaz, Ex.

theol. 466. On the other side, from the doctrine that man has been created after God's image, it follows that that image extends over the whole man.

There is nothing in man excluded from the image of God. All creatures display vestigia Dei, man is imago Dei. And he is that wholly and entirely, in soul and body, in all faculties and powers, in all states and relations. Man is the image of God, because he is and insofar as he is truly man, and he is man, truly, essentially man, because and in that same measure as he is the image of God. But naturally, just as the cosmos is an organism and thus in some creatures more and in others less clearly reveals God's virtues, so also in man as organism the image of God comes out more clearly here than elsewhere, in the soul more than in the body, in the ethical virtues more than in the physical powers. Yet this detracts nothing from the truth, that the whole man is God's image. Scripture would not be able and permitted to speak of God in a human way and to transfer all human properties to God, cf. above p. 66, if God had not first made man wholly and entirely after his image. And it is the task of Christian theology, to point out this image of God in the whole being of man. Compare herewith my Beginselen der

Psychologie, 1897, which treat some subjects from the doctrine of man more broadly than the space here permits.

First of all, the image of God is demonstrable in the soul of man.

According to Gen. 2:7 man was formed from the dust of the earth by the inbreathing of the ‎‏‏ִנְׁש ַמת ַחִּיים‎, and thus he became a ‎‏‏ֶנֶפׁש ַחָּיה‎, ψυχη ζωσα. The breath of life is the principle of life, the living soul is the essence of man.

[537] By both, Scripture assigns to man a distinct, independent place and avoids both pantheism and materialism. The names ‎‏ַ‏רּו‎ and ‎‏‏ֶנֶפׁש‎, πνευμα and ψυχη, which in Scripture designate the invisible constituent of man, set this clearly in the light. Trichotomism, which in principle is rooted in the

dualism of Plato and in the Christian church repeatedly found entrance with gnostic and theosophical tendencies, sees in this two particular substances.

But wrongly. Hebr. 4 vs. 12 and 1 Thess. 5:23 no more give an enumeration of the essentially different constituents of man than e.g. Luk. 10:27 and thus prove nothing. Soul and spirit in Scripture repeatedly stand in parallelism and alternate with one another. Now body and soul, then body and spirit, constitute the essence of man, Mt. 10:28, 1 Cor. 7:34, Jak. 2:26. The psychical activities are alternately ascribed to the spirit and to the soul, Ps.

139:14, Spr. 19:2 and Spr. 17 vs. 27, Ps. 77:7, 1 Cor. 2:11, Num. 21:4 and Job. 21:4, 1 Sam. 1:10 and Jes. 54:6, Luk. 1:46 and 47 etc. Dying is called both the surrender of the soul, Gen. 35:18, 1 Kon. 17:21, Mt. 20:28, Hd.

15:26, 20:10, and of the spirit, Ps. 31:6, Mt. 27:50, Luk. 8:55, 23:46, Hd.

7:59. Sometimes the spirit and sometimes the soul is immortal, Pred. 12:7, Mt. 10:28; and the dead are called souls, Op. 6:9, 20:4, and spirits, Hebr. 12 vs. 13, 1 Petr. 3:19. But although not essentially distinct, they are nevertheless by no means identical. Spirit is man, because he did not, like the animals, come forth from the earth, but the breath of life was breathed into him by God, Gen. 2:7; because he has his principle of life from above, from God, Pred. 12:7; because he has a spirit of his own, distinct from the Spirit of God, Gen. 41:8, 45:27, Ex. 35:21, Deut. 2:30, Richt. 15 vs. 19,

Ezech. 3:14, Zach. 12:1, Mt. 26:41, Mk. 2:8, Luk. 1 vs. 47, 23:46, Joh.

11:33, Hd. 7:59, 17:16, Rom. 8:16, 1 Cor. 2:11, 5:3-5, 1 Thess. 5:23, Hebr.

4:12, 12:23 etc.; because as such he is akin to the angels, can also think spiritual, heavenly things, and if need be can also exist without a body. But soul is man, because the spiritual constituent in him from the first moment onward, in distinction from the angels, is oriented to a body, is organized for a body; because through that body he is bound to [538] the earth and

also for his higher life to the sensible and external; because he can ascend to the higher only from out of the lower; because he thus is a sensible, material being and as such akin to the animals. Man is an animal rationale, un roseau pensant; standing between angels and animals, akin to both and distinct from both, in himself uniting and reconciling heaven and earth, the invisible and the visible things, with one another. And precisely as such he is image and likeness of God. God is most certainly spirit, and in so far the angels too are akin to Him. But sometimes there is also mention of his soul, and throughout the whole of Scripture all those peculiarly psychical affections and activities are also ascribed to God, which are essentially proper to man.

In Christ God assumed not the nature of angels but that of men. And therefore it is precisely man, in distinction from the angels, who is image, son, offspring of God. The spiritualitas, invisibilitas, unitas, simplicitas, immortalitas of the human soul are traits of the image of God. This image itself is expressed in this, that he has a πνευμα, which from the outset has been organized into ψυχη.

Secondly, the faculties of man also belong to the image of God. While the spirit is the principle and the soul the subject of life in man, according to Holy Scripture the heart is the organ for his life. It is first the centre of bodily life, but then further, in a figurative sense, the foundation and source of all psychic life, of affections and passions, of desire and will, even of thinking and knowing. From the heart are all ‎‏‏ּתֹוְצאֹות ַחִּיים‎, Spr. 4:23. This life, which has its origin in the heart, then divides into two streams. On the one hand, that life is to be distinguished which comprises all impressions, perceptions, sensations, observations, deliberations, thoughts, knowledge, wisdom, has, particularly in its higher form, the νους as organ, and embodies itself in the word, the language. And on the other hand, from the

heart all the affections, passions, impulses, inclinations, attachments, desires, and decisions of the will take their origin, which must be guided by the νους and express themselves in the deed. Also in all these psychic faculties and activities of man, traits are to be seen of the image of God.

Already the diversity and richness of those powers points back to God.

[539] The lower a creature stands, the less richly organized it is, and thus also the less akin to and susceptible to the highest good, which God is. Even the angel stands, in this respect, below man. Precisely because man is so wonderfully richly organized, he can, in the richest way, as it were from all sides, in all His virtues and perfections, become conformed to God as the highest good and enjoy Him. Augustine even saw in heart, understanding, and will (memoria, intellectus, voluntas) an analogy of the trinitarian being of God. Just as the Father gives life to the Son and the Spirit and the Spirit proceeds from the Father through the Son, so it is also in man that the heart, the memoria, the deep, hidden life of the soul, grants existence to intellectus and voluntas and, in particular, also causes the will to follow in order upon the understanding. Rationalism and Pelagianism detach understanding and will from the heart, and seek in both together the whole, full being of man; mysticism, despising the conscious, willing life, withdraws into the depth of the mind; the Greek church and theology places both, head and heart, unvermittelt alongside each other; but the theology of the West, under the guidance of Augustine, has avoided all these errors; it has seen that the doctrine of God and of man stood in the closest connection; in the Trinity it therefore held fast to the unity of essence, the distinctness of the three persons, the filioque, and correspondingly it also taught in psychology that the deep, hidden life of the soul came to revelation only through the

cognitive and the appetitive faculty, and that, under these two, the latter was guided and governed by the former.

9. Thirdly, the image of God reveals itself in the virtues of knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, with which man was created at once. For a regulated treatment, above one ought first to have spoken separately about the nature and the faculties of the soul, but this is intended only as a logical distinction. Man was not created as a neutral being with merely indifferent potentiae, but he was created at once physically and ethically mature, with knowledge in the understanding, righteousness in the will, holiness in the heart. For man, goodness consists in moral perfection, in complete [540] conformity with the law of God, in a holy and perfect being as God himself,

Lev. 19:2, Deut. 6:5, Mt. 5:48, 22:37, Ef. 5:1, 1 Petr. 1:15, 16. That law is one and the same for all men; Scripture knows no twofold mankind, no twofold moral law, no twofold moral perfection and destiny. If man is created good, then he must be created with the justitia originalis. This, on the one hand, is not to be conceived as childish innocence, but it also may not be exaggerated, as if the status integritatis were already equal to the status gloriae. Adam's knowledge was a pure but nevertheless a limited one and susceptible of increase; he did not walk in sight but in faith; he knew not only intuitively but also discursively; he did not know the future except through special revelation, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 94 art. 1-3. And likewise it was with his righteousness and holiness; they were his property from the beginning, for otherwise he would never have been able to do any good work. Good fruits presuppose a good tree; operari sequitur esse. But that inborn righteousness and holiness nevertheless had to be preserved by man, unfolded, and converted into deeds. Not as if Adam, equipped with the necessary gifts, now had to set to work himself in his own power, without

and outside God. The justitia originalis was a free gift of God and it was also maintained in him from moment to moment by the providence of God.

It is not conceivable for a moment without communion with God. Just as the Son already before the fall was Mediator unionis, so also the H. Spirit already then was the craftsman of all knowledge, righteousness, and holiness in man. Some church fathers argued this with Gen. 2:7 and then said that man was first formed by the Logos and that thereafter the breath of life, i.e. the H. Spirit, was breathed into him, cf. Kleutgen, Theol. II 541 f.

Thomasius, Christi Person und Werk I3 155. This exegesis was incorrect, but it is perfectly true that man also in statu integritatis possessed the virtues of knowledge and righteousness only through and in the H. Spirit. To be sure, there is a great difference between the indwelling of the H. Spirit in man before sin and in the state of sin. Now that indwelling is indeed supra naturam, because the H. Spirit, as it were, must come to man from outside and stands in direct [541] opposition to his whole sinful nature. With Adam, however, that whole opposition did not exist; his nature was holy and therefore did not need, as with believers, to be made holy; it was from the outset suited for the indwelling of the H. Spirit. Therefore this was also natural with Adam. No truly good, perfect man is conceivable without the communion of the H. Spirit. There is no homo naturalis in the Roman sense, standing between fallen, sinful man and perfect man, created according to God's image. Whoever is man, man in the full, true sense, he is and must be the image of God, son of God, offspring of God, living in communion with Him through the H. Spirit. And thus man also before the fall was totius sacrosanctae trinitatis domicilium, pulcherrimum Spiritus Sancti templum.

Fourthly, the body of man also belongs to the image of God. Philosophy, which does not know revelation or rejects it, always falls back again into

empiricism or rationalism, into materialism or spiritualism. But Scripture reconciles both. Man has a πνευμα, but that πνευμα is psychically organized, and must by virtue of its nature dwell in a body. It is man's essence, to be bodily, sensuous. Therefore, if not temporally then yet logically, first his body is formed from the dust of the earth and thereafter the breath of life is breathed into him. He is called Adam after the earth, out of which he has been formed. He is and is called dust, Gen. 2:7, Ps. 103:14,

Job 10:9, 33:6, Jes. 2:22, 29:16, 45:9, 64:8, ἐκ γης χοικος, 1 Cor. 15:47. The body is no prison, but a wondrous work of art of God almighty and, just as much as the soul, constituting the essence of man, Job 10:8-12, Ps. 8,

139:13-17, Pred. 12:2-7, Jes. 64:8; it is our ἐπιγειος οἰκια, 2 Cor. 5:1, our σκευος, i.e. our serving organ, our instrument, 1 Cor. 12:18-26, 2 Cor. 4:7, 1

Thess. 4:4, and the members of the body are the ὁπλα with which we fight in the service of righteousness or of unrighteousness, Rom. 6:13; it belongs so essentially to man, that it, although by sin violently torn loose from the soul, is nevertheless in the resurrection united with it again. The nature of the union of soul and body is incomprehensible, but it is much closer than occasionalism or the harmonia praestabilita or the systema influxus imagines it; it is not ethical but [542] physical; it is so intimate, that one nature, one person, one I is the subject of both and of all their activities. It is always the same soul, which sees through the eye, thinks through the brains, grasps with the hand, walks with the foot. Although not present in every part of the body secundum totalitatem virtutis, it is nevertheless present in all members secundum totalitatem essentiae. It is one and the same life, that flows through the whole body, but in each member works and manifests itself in its own corresponding manner. Now this body too, which is so intimately connected with the soul, belongs to the image of God. Indeed,

this is not to be thought in such a way that God himself has a material body, as the Audians supposed; nor also, that God, creating man, had assumed a body, as Eugubinus taught; nor also, that God had created man after the Christus incarnandus, as Osiander judged. God, after all, is πνευμα, Joh.

4:24 and has no body. The human body does not, in its material substance, as σαρξ, but indeed in its organization as instrument of the soul, in its perfectio formalis, form part of the image of God, Augustinus, de Gen. ad litt. VI 12. Greg. Nyss., de hom. opif. c. 8. Thomas, S. Th. I qu 93 art. 6. S. c. Gent IV 26. Petavius, de sex dier. opif. II 4, 7 sq. Gerhard, Loci VIII 3.

Calvijn, Inst. I 15, 3. Polanus, Synt. Theol. p. 328. Zanchius, Op. III 677 sq.

Bucanus, Inst. theol. VIII 13. Synopsis pur. theol. XIII 13. Mastricht, III 9, 30. Just as God, although being πνευμα, is nevertheless Creator of a material world, which may be called his revelation and appearance, and this revelation attains its climax in the incarnation, so also the spirit of man as soul is disposed toward the body as its appearance. The incarnation of God is the proof that not the angel but man has been created after God's image and that his body forms an essential constituent of it. Creation has from the beginning been so arranged and human nature has at once been so created, that it was capable and suited for the highest conformity to and for the most intimate indwelling of God. God could not have become man, if he had not first made man after his image. And precisely because the body as organ of the soul also belongs to the essence of man and to the image of God, therefore it originally also shared in immortality. [543] God is not a God of the dead but of the living, Mt. 22:32. Death is a consequence of sin, Gen.

2:7, 3:19, Rom. 5:12, 6:23. This immortality, however, did not yet consist in Adam in the non posse mori, in the eternal, incorruptible life, but only in the posse non mori, in the not dying in case of obedience. It was not

absolute but conditional, it depended on an ethical condition. It is therefore not correct, to say with the Pelagians, Socinians, Remonstrants etc., that man was created mortal and that death is given of itself with the material organism and thus is the normal, natural condition. But yet on the other hand there is an essential difference between the not dying of Adam, so long as he remained obedient, and the not being able to die, which he would have received as reward for his obedience. Just as the knowledge, righteousness and holiness in Adam was still devoid of the donum perseverantiae, so immortality was not yet one with the eternal, inalienable life. The human nature of Adam was so created, that it, in case of transgression of God's commandment, could die and had to die. Adam was still earthly out of the earth, only Christ is the Lord out of heaven; the natural is first, thereafter the spiritual. Through this body man was now bound to the earth but could he also exercise his dominion over the earth.

Dominion over the earth is, just like immortality, a part of the image of God. Indeed the Socinians went much too far, when they placed in dominion the whole essence of man and the entire content of the image of God; but nevertheless Gen. 1:26 clearly teaches, that that dominion is most closely connected with the creation after God's image and is directly given.

It is no external addition, it does not rest on an additional, special disposition; but man, who is image of God, is thereby at the same time exalted above all other creatures and appointed as lord and king over them all. And finally, to the image of God also belongs the dwelling in paradise,

Gen. 2:8-15. Holiness and blessedness belong together; the conscience of us all testifies, that there ought to exist a connection between virtue and happiness; the ethical and the physical, the moral and the natural order in the world, essence and appearance, spirit and matter may form no

antithesis. For fallen man therefore there is fitting an earth, [544] which lies under the curse; the ungodly is awaited hereafter by a place of darkness, the righteous shall one day walk in the light of God's countenance; the not yet fallen and yet still earthly man dwells in a paradise.

10. Thus the whole human being is the image and likeness of God. He is it as to soul and body, as to all faculties, powers, and gifts. Nothing in the human being is excluded from the image of God; it extends as far as the human extends; it is the human in the human being. The human is not the Divine itself, but it is nevertheless the finite, creaturely imprint of it. All that is in God, his spiritual being, his virtues and perfections, his immanent self-distinctions, his communication and revelation in creation; it all finds its, be it then also finite and limited, analogy and likeness in the human being. There lies a deep truth in the representation of the kabbalah, that God, who is the Infinite in himself, reveals himself in the ten sefiroth or attributes and that these together constitute the Adam Kadmon, Franck, La

Kabbale 1843 p. 179; human nature is among the creatures the highest and most perfect revelation of God. And that it is absolutely not according to its pneumatic side alone, but equally according to its somatic side; it is it precisely as human, i.e. as psychic nature. God and world, spirit and matter are according to the teaching of Scripture no oppositions. There is in matter nothing contemptible and nothing sinful. The visible world is just as much a beautiful, rich revelation of God as the spiritual. In the former he displays his virtues just as much as in the latter. All creatures are embodiment of his

Divine thoughts and all display vestigia Dei. But all these vestigia, in the spiritual and in the material world spread alongside one another, are comprehended together in the human being and thus mutually connected and raised higher, that they clearly form the image and the likeness of God.

The whole world rises upward, closes itself off, completes itself, receives its unity, its goal, its crown in the human being. In order to be the image of God, the human being therefore had to be a summary of the whole of nature. The Jews said that the material for the human body had been gathered together by God from the different lands of the earth, Weber,

System 202 f., cf. a Frisian [545] myth in Dr. J. te Winkel, Gesch. der Ned.

Lett. I 28. In this strange form a true, beautiful thought was expressed. The human being is as spirit akin to the angels and ascends to the invisible things; but he is also citizen of the visible world and connected to all bodily creatures. There is in the human body not a single substance which does not occur in the nature around him. Thus the human being is the unity of the material and the spiritual world, the mirror of the universe, vinculum, compendium, epitome totius naturae, μικροκοσμος, and precisely thereby also image and likeness of God, his son and heir, μικροθεος. He is the prophet, who declares God and proclaims his virtues; he is the priest, who with all that is created dedicates himself as a holy offering to God; he is the king, who in righteousness leads and governs all things. And in all this he points to One, who in an even higher and richer sense is the revelation and the image of God, to Him, who is the only-begotten of the Father and the firstborn of all creatures. Adam, the son of God, was a type of Christ.

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