15. § 34. The Destiny of Man.
§ 34. The Destiny of Man.
. Although Adam was created in God's image, he nevertheless was not so at once in the fullest sense, and he was not so only in himself. Only then does the image of God stand before us in its entire richness, when we also include in it the destiny of man, both for this and for the future life. In 1 Cor. 15:45-49 Paul sets the two covenant heads, Adam and Christ, over against one another and compares them, not so much, as in Rom. 5:12-21 and 1 Cor. 15:22, with respect to what they brought about, as rather with respect to their nature and person. The comparison here descends to the deepest level and penetrates to the root of the difference between the two.
The whole Adam, both before and after the fall, is set over against the whole Christ, both after and before the resurrection. The first man is by virtue of creation ψυχη ζωσα, ψυχικος, ἐκ γης χοικος; but the second man is through his resurrection πνευμα [546] ζωοποιουν, πνευματικος, ἐξ οὐρανου, cf. W. Lütgert, Der Mensch aus dem Himmel, Greifswalder
Studien, H. Cremer zum 25 j. Prof. dargebracht u. s. w. Gütersloh 1895 S.
207-228. Although Adam was created in God's image, he was, because
earthly from the earth, dependent on the earth; he had, after all, need of food and drink, light and air, day and night, and thus did not yet have a pneumatic, glorified body, raised above all those needs; his psychical body had not yet fully become an organ of the spirit. As such Adam stands below
Christ: Adam is the first, Christ is the second and last, who presupposes Adam and follows upon Adam; Adam is the lesser and lower, Christ is the greater and higher; Adam therefore pointed to Christ, he was already before the fall a type of Christ; in the creation of Adam Christ was already reckoned with; the whole creation, also that of man, was infralapsarian; the natural is first, thereafter the spiritual. What Paul here sets forth broadly and deeply is grounded in Gen. 1-2 itself. Man, though πνευμα and bearing in himself a breath of life, became, like the animals, a living soul. He received fruit of herb and tree for food, Gen. 1:29, a paradise for a dwelling-place,
Gen. 2:8v., a woman for a help, Gen. 2:18v., a commandment for a guideline, Gen. 2:16, 17, a threat of punishment in case of transgression,
Gen. 2:17. From everything it appears that the first man, however highly placed, did not yet have the highest. There is a very great difference between the psychical and the pneumatic, between the status integritatis and the status gloriae. After the resurrection belly and food will be done away, 1
Cor. 6:13, but with Adam both were present; in heaven the children of God will no longer marry but will be like the angels, Mt. 22:30, yet Adam had need of the help of a woman. Adam therefore stood not at the end but at the beginning of the way; his condition was a preliminary and temporal one, which could not remain so, and had to pass over either to higher glory or to a fall into sin and death. For upon the transgression of the commandment stood death, but thus, by contrast, upon the keeping of it stood life, and indeed eternal life. For not only does the conscience of us all testify that in
keeping God's commandments there is great reward and that the transgression of them brings punishment, but Holy Scripture also repeatedly expresses this; it comprehends all [547] salvation, bound to the doing of God's commandments, under the name of life, of eternal life, and in both the covenant of works and the covenant of grace it acknowledges for man only one highest ideal, and that is eternal life, Lev. 18:5, Ezech. 20:11, Ps.
19 vs. 12, Mt. 19:17, Luk. 10:28, Gal. 3:12. Thus Adam still stood at the entrance; he did not yet have this reward, eternal life, but had to acquire it; he could still err, sin, fall, die. His relation to God was such that he could increase more and more in his communion, but could also still fall away from it. This peculiar relation is in Scripture perhaps in one place compared with a covenant. In Hos. 6:7 the Lord says of Israel and Judah that they, in spite of all the labor expended upon them ְּכָאָדם ָעְברּו ְבִרית, LXX ὡς ἀνθρωπος, Vulg., sicut Adam. The translation: like a man, is pressed by the objection that precisely of men in general it is said that they transgressed the covenant; and the rendering: like a man's (covenant), would in any case require that the word כאדם was placed not after the subject ֵהָּמה, but after the word to be determined ְבִרית. And thus only the translation: like Adam, remains. There is then enclosed in it that the commandment given to Adam was in the essence of the matter a covenant, because it, like that of God with Israel, intended to grant Adam eternal life in the way of obedience.
This is now further strengthened by the parallel that Paul draws in Rom.
5:12-21 between Adam and Christ. Just as the obedience of one man, namely Christ, and the grace bestowed in him brought for humanity acquittal, righteousness, and life, so also the one transgression and offense of the one man is for humanity the cause of condemnation, sin, and death. It is with Adam as with Christ. We stand in fact to him in the same relation.
He is a type of Christ, our head, from whom, on account of his transgression, guilt and death come to us. He is the cause of the death of us all; we all die in Adam, 1 Cor. 15:22. Here too the relation of Adam to God is a covenant relation, but now not so much described from the side of God, as rather from the side of those who under Adam as head are included in that covenant. [548] 2. In Christian theology this rich thought of Scripture has not always come sufficiently into its own. The naturalistic view located the image of God only in the disposition, the nuda potentia, the freedom of the will, the formal personality, and even regarded death as natural. The image of God, or at least the likeness, consisted much more in that which man had to acquire by his own exertion of strength than in that which was bestowed upon him immediately at creation. Over against this, the supranaturalistic view swung to another extreme and ascribed to the status integritatis an entirely supernatural character. Not only was the justitia originalis held to be a donum supernaturale, immortality regarded as a special beneficium conditoris, and all susceptibility to suffering and pain denied to Adam, Aug. de civ. XIV 26. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 97 art. 2; but some, such as Greg.
Nyss., Joh. Damasc., Böhme e. a. judged that man before the fall, because immortal, had no need of food, Petavius, de sex dier. opif. c. 7; excretion would in any case have taken place without any indecentia, Thomas, S. Th.
I qu. 97 art. 3; man's food, according to most church fathers, scholastics, Roman, Lutheran, Remonstrant, and also according to some Reformed theologians such as Zwingli, Musculus, Martyr, Zanchius, Junius, Piscator etc., would have consisted only of plants and not of meat; generation would have occurred without any sensual lust, and the children would not have been born speechless and in need of help and would have grown up very
quickly, Aug. de pecc. mer. et rem. I 37. 38. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 20.
Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 98 art. 1; many went still further and thought that procreation would not have occurred at all per coitum, Aug. Retract. I 10.
Greg. Nyss. de hom. opif. 16. 17. Damasc, de fide orthod. II 30; man was first created androgynous, the creation of the woman is already a proof of the fall, the Jews in Weber, Syst. 202 f. Erigena, de div. nat. II 6. 10. 23. IV 12. Böhme, Oetinger, Baader, Schelling, Lange, Dogm. II 324 f. Delitzsch,
Bibl. Psych. 102 f. Hofmann, Weiss. u. Erf. I 65 f. Schriftbew. I2 403 f. etc.; the woman therefore was actually not the image of God and partook of human nature, cf. in Aug. de trin. XII 7. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 93 art. 4. qu.
99 art. 2. Bonav. Sent. II dist. 16 art. 2 qu. 2. dist. 20 art. 1 qu. 6. Gerhard,
VIII [549] c. 6. Quenstedt, II p. 15. Jansen, Gesch. des deutschen Volkes VI 1888 S. 395-397. Even by Origenes, c. Cels. I 32. 33. de princ. II 9, corporeality and all inequality among men were derived from a fall of the praeexistente souls, or else a wholly different body than ours was ascribed to man before the fall, cf. the Ophites in Hagenbach, D. G. § 62, Böhme,
Ant. Bourignon, Baader etc. And in connection with all this paradise was often conceived very idealistically or even allegorically; the animals would not have died, wild and unclean animals would not have been there, the rose had bloomed without thorns, the air was much purer, the water much softer, the light much brighter, e.g. Luther on Gen. 3, cf. Strauss, gl. I 700 f.
Yet it was acknowledged by all that Adam did not yet possess the highest.
In the probationary commandment, the freedom of choice, the possibility of sin and death, this was naturally implied. Augustine in particular made a clear distinction between the posse non peccare and posse non mori, which Adam possessed, and the non posse peccare and the non posse mori, which with glorification would have been bestowed upon the first man in case of
obedience and is now granted by grace to the elect, de civ. XXII 30. de corr. et grat. 11. Enchir. 104-107. de Gen. ad litt. III 2. VI 25. Op. imp. c. Jul. V 58. VI 5 etc. Augustine even spoke of that relation in which Adam originally stood as of a covenant, testamentum, pactum, de civ. XVI 27; and the translation of the words כאדם by: as Adam, led many to a similar view,
Marck, Histor. Parad. II 6, 7. In substance, therefore, the doctrine of the later so-called covenant of works is already found among the church fathers. In the state of Adam, as it was conceived by scholasticism, the Roman, the Lutheran theologians, all the elements are enclosed which were later specifically summarized by the Reformed in the doctrine concerning the foedus operum, cf. Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 19. 20. Of the relation in which believers through Christ come to stand to God, the name covenant is often used in Scripture. Already Zwingli and Bullinger seized upon these thoughts of Scripture in order to defend the unity of Old and New
Testament against the Anabaptists, cf. later with the doctrine of the foedus gratiae. When now, after the example of Scripture, the Christian religion was presented as a covenant, Paul with his parallel between Adam and Christ gave occasion to think also of the status integritatis as a covenant. In distinction from the foedus gratiae this was then called the foedus naturae or operum. Covenant of nature it was called, not as though it would flow forth of itself and naturally from the nature of God or that of man. But it was called so, because the foundation on which the covenant rested, i.e. the moral law, was known to man by nature, and because it was established with man in his original state and could be kept by man with the powers bestowed upon him in creation, without supernatural grace. When later the name gave rise to misunderstanding, it was preferably replaced by that of foedus operum, covenant of works; and it bore this name because eternal
life in this covenant was obtainable only in the way of works, i.e. of the keeping of God's commandments. This covenant was now, as a parallel of the foedus gratiae, taught and developed by the Reformed with particular predilection. It already occurs with Ursinus, Catech. major qu. 9. Olevianus, de subst. foed. grat. 1585 I § 8. 9. II § 5. Polanus, Synt. Theol. VI 33.
Junius, Theses theol. c. 25. Wollebius, Theol. Christ. I c. 8, etc., in this country for the first time with Trelcatius, Loci Comm. 1587 p. 276.
Gomarus, Oratio de foedere Dei 1594. Trelcatius Jr. Instit. Theol. 1604 p.
131. Cloppenburg, Disp. de foedere Dei 1643. Coccejus, Summa doctr. de foedere 1648 and further with all theologians, e.g. Mastricht, Theol. III c.
12. Marck, Historia Parad. 1705 II c. 6 sq. Moor, III 52-108, M. Vitringa, c.
8. Comrie, Verhandeling over het verbond der werken before his edition of Boston, Beschouwing van het verbond der genade 1741. Brahe, Aanm. over de Walch. artikelen, 1758 bl. 123v. Examen van het Ontw. v. Toler. 10e
Sam. J. van den Honert, Voorrede voor Ursinus' Schatboek bl. 112-144 etc.
The confessional writings do not mention it in so many words; but in substance it is nevertheless already contained in art. 14 and 15 of the Ned.
Gel., where it is taught that through Adam's transgression of the commandment of life the whole human nature has been corrupted, in Lord's
Day 3 and 4 of the Heid. Cat., where man is said to have been created after God's image, in order that he would live with God in eternal blessedness, but is also called wholly corrupted through Adam's fall, and in cap. 3, 2 of the Canones Dordr., where it is said that the corruption of Adam passes over to us "according to God's righteous judgment"; formally the covenant of works was included in the Irish Articles, in the Westm. Confessie and in the Walcheren Articles 1693. Furthermore, the doctrine of the foedus operum later also found entrance among some Roman Catholics, Scheeben II 500.
Pesch, Prael. III 136 and Lutherans, such as Pufendorf, Jaeger, Buddeus, Instit p. 527 e. a., cf. Vitringa II 242; on the other hand it was opposed by Episcopius, Instit. theol. II c. 2. Limborch, Theol. Christ. III c. 2. J. Alting on Hebr. 8:6 and Op. V 392. Venema, Korte verdediging van zijn eer en leer
1735. N. Schiere, Doctrina test. et foed. div. omnium 1718 p. 491 sq. and others. Rationalism wanted to know nothing of it, and even van Oosterzee,
Chr. Dogm. § 75 saw in it only a juridical artifice. Nevertheless it was taken up again by Dr. Kuyper, Heraut 161 v. Hodge, Syst. Theol. II 117-122. Dr.
Vos, De Verbondsleer inde Geref. Theologie 1891.
3. Against the doctrine of the covenant, as it has been developed in Reformed theology, it can certainly be objected that it has descended far too much into details and has been treated far too scholastically. The later theologians did indeed still defend the doctrine, but they no longer felt its meaning and its theological and religious importance; the soul was out of it, and the attack was therefore easy. But the doctrine of the covenant of works rests on a Scriptural foundation and is of outstanding value. All higher life among rational and moral creatures bears the form of a covenant. Covenant is, in general, an agreement of persons, whereby they voluntarily, for the warding off of some evil or for the obtaining of some good, obligate and bind themselves toward one another on definite conditions. Such an agreement, whether entered into tacitly or expressly stipulated, is the ordinary form for the living together and working together of human beings among themselves. Love, friendship, marriage, and all social cooperation in commerce, industry, science, art, etc. ultimately rests on the foundation of a covenant, i.e. on mutual fidelity and all kinds of moral, generally recognized, obligations. It can therefore not surprise, that also the highest, richest life of man, i.e. religion, bears this character. In Scripture the
covenant [552] is the fixed form in which the relation of God to his people is represented. And also where the name does not occur, we nevertheless always see both, as it were, in conversation with one another, negotiating with each other, God inviting man to repentance, reminding him of his obligations and binding himself to the granting of all good. Later, with the doctrine of the covenant of grace, the biblical concept of ְבִרית will be set in the light. Here let it be enough to recall this general notion. Even if the name covenant for the religious relation of Adam to God should never occur in Scripture, not even in Hos. 6:7; yet the religious life of man before the fall bears the character of a covenant. The Reformed were never so narrow as to insist on the name, if only the matter stood firm; the vocabulo dubitetur, re salva. But behind the combating of the name was mostly that of the matter hidden. And this can neither nor may be surrendered, because covenant is the essence of true religion. For, in the first place, God is
Creator, man creature; and thereby an infinite distance is posited between the two; there seems between the two no communion, no religion, to be possible; there is only distinction, distance, removal endless. If God remains standing above man in his sovereign loftiness and majesty, then no religion is possible, at least no religion as communion with God; then the relation between the two is completely expressed in the names lord and servant; then the image of the potter and the clay is still far too weak to indicate that relation, for the clay still has a being and thus rights independent of and over against the potter, but man has nothing that he is or has outside of and over against God. If therefore there shall truly be religion, if there shall be communion between God and man, if the relation of both, though indeed also but yet not only, shall be that of a lord to his servant, of a potter to his clay, but also that of a king to his people, of a father to his son, of a mother
to her child, of an eagle to his young, of a hen to her chicks, etc.; i.e. if not one single relation, but all and various relations of dependence, subjection, obedience, friendship, love, etc. among men in religion have their example and attain their fulfillment [553] there, then religion must bear the character of covenant. For then God must descend from his loftiness, bow himself down to his creature, communicate himself to man, reveal, bestow; then He, who dwells in the high and exalted and eternal, must also dwell with him who is of a humble spirit, Isa. 57:15. This now is nothing other than a covenant. If religion is called a covenant, then it is thereby indicated as the true, genuine religion. No single religion has ever understood that; all peoples either draw God down pantheistically into the creaturely or raise
Him deistically endlessly above it; in neither case does it come to true communion, to covenant, to genuine religion. But Scripture maintains both;
God is endlessly great and condescendingly good; He is Sovereign but also Father; He is Creator but also archetype; He is in one word the God of the covenant. In the second place it is clear that a creature over against God can bring along and possess no single right. That is by the nature of the case impossible. A creature as such has everything that it is and what it has to thank its Creator for; it has no claim over against God; it can boast of nothing; it has absolutely no rights or demands; there is never any talk of merit in the creature over against God and there can be no talk of it; the relation of Creator and creatura cuts off all merit of the latter in principle and entirely. This holds not only after but just as well before the fall. Also then man was creature, without claim, without rights, without merit. When we have done all that which is commanded us, then we are still δουλοι ἀχρειοι, Luke 17:10. Now, however, the religion of Holy Scripture is of such a nature that man therein, as it were, can nevertheless assert rights over
against God. He has, after all, freedom to come to Him with prayer and thanksgiving, to address Him as his Father, to trust in Him in all need and death, to desire all good from Him, to expect even salvation and eternal life from Him. This is now possible solely and only thereby, that God in condescending goodness gives rights to his creature. All right of creatures is a bestowed good, a gift of grace, undeserved and unowed; all reward is on God's side out of grace; there is no meritum de condigno nor also de congruo possible. [554] True religion can therefore be nothing other than a covenant; it has its origin in condescending goodness, in the grace of God.
This character religion bears both before and after the fall. Religion is one, just as the moral law and the destination of man. Covenant of works and covenant of grace differ not in the final goal but only in the way that leads to that final goal. In both there is one Mediator, then of union, now of reconciliation; in both there is one faith, then in God now in God through Christ; in both there is one hope, one love, etc. Religion is always essentially the same; it differs only in forma. In the third place: man is a rational and moral being. Thus God has created him, and thus He therefore also treats him; He maintains what He created. God therefore does not compel man, for compulsion is in conflict with the nature of a rational creature. He does not treat him as an irrational creature, as a plant or an animal, as a stick and a block, but He proceeds with him as with a rational, moral, self-determining being. He wills that man be free and in freedom, willingly, in love serve Him, Ps. 110:3. Religion is freedom, is love, which does not allow itself to be compelled. And therefore it must from the outset also bear the form of a covenant, in which God appears not compelling but counseling, admonishing, warning, inviting, entreating, and in which man serves God not by compulsion or violence, but willingly, with his own, free
consent, moved by love to reciprocal love. Religion is in the ground of the matter not a duty but a privilege. It is not a work by which we are advantageous to God and bring Him something, and have claim to reward.
But it is grace, to be allowed to serve Him. God is never obligated in us, we are always obligated in Him for the good works that we do, art. 24 Ned.
Gel. On his side always the gift, on our side always and only the thanks.
And therefore religion is not thinkable otherwise than in the form of a covenant; therein it first comes to its full realization. Such a covenant God then also concluded with the first man. The splintery elaboration of this doctrine be set wholly aside. But the matter itself stands firm; after man had been created after God's image, God pointed out to him his destination and the way in which he alone could reach it. For, the moral law man could know without extraordinary revelation, it was written in his heart. But the probationary command is positive, it is not given with the nature of man itself, it could only become known to him because God communicated it to him. Neither did it speak for itself that the keeping of that command bestowed eternal life. In that sense the foedus operum is no foedus naturae.
At first this was not yet so clearly seen, cf. Gomarus, de foedere. But gradually it was clearly taught, that God in no single respect was obligated, to grant to man, who kept his law and thereby did nothing other than what he was bound to do, the heavenly blessedness and eternal life; there is here no natural connection between work and reward, Coccejus, de foedere II 23 sq. Burman, Synops. Theol. II 8, 2, 4. Marck, Hist. Parad. p. 479.
Cloppenburg, Exerc. theol. VI disp. 5. de foed. I 8 sq. Witsius, Oec. foed. I 4 § 10-23. Leydecker, Fax Verit. p. 399 sq. Ex. v. h. Ontw. v. Tol. IX 227 v.
261 v. X 288 v. 318 v. Brahe, Aanm. over de vijf Walch. art. bl. 125 v. And that is the truth that lies in Rome's doctrine of the donum superadditum.
Eternal life is and remains an undeserved gift of God's grace. But because Rome does not know the doctrine of the covenant of works, it infers from this gift of grace of eternal life, that also the image of God in man must be supernatural, and now by that supernatural power bestowed in the image of God it nevertheless again earns eternal life ex condigno. Under the appearance of honoring grace, it thus again introduces the meritoriousness of good works. The Reformed, however, maintained on the one hand, that the image of God in man was natural, and that man, who was the image of God, could know the moral law without supernatural revelation, and could keep it without supernatural power. And on the other hand they held, that a higher state of blessedness than that in paradise on earth, by the nature of the case could never be merited but only could be bestowed by God's free disposition. And these two thoughts they united in the foedus operum. This rests on a free, special, gracious disposition of God; it proceeds from Him;
He establishes all parts of it, condition and fulfillment, keeping and reward, transgression and punishment; it is monopleuric in origin; it is added to the creation after God's image. Man on his part, because created after God's image, rests therein and sees in this [556] covenant a way to higher blessedness opened to him. The foedus operum thus does justice to both: the sovereignty of God, which includes the dependence of the creature, the unmeritoriousness of all his works, and the grace and lovingkindness of God, which nevertheless wills to grant to the creature a higher blessedness than the earthly. As the probationary command stands to the moral law, so the covenant of works relates to the creation after God's image. With the probationary command the whole moral law stands or falls; with the covenant of works the whole image of God in man stands or falls. The
covenant of works is the way for man created after God's image and not yet fallen to the heavenly blessedness.
4. The covenant of works therefore includes yet another beautiful thought.
It not only realizes the true, full idea of religion; it also expresses that man before the fall, though created after God's image, did not yet possess the highest. On this point there is chiefly a difference with the Lutherans. With them, creation after the image of God is the realization of the highest idea of man; the ideal is fully attained in Adam; a higher state is not possible.
Adam had nothing to become, but only to remain what he was; he partook of the full gratiosa inhabitatio S. Trinitatis. He therefore also did not stand under a law that commanded him to do something positive; the law that applied to him had only a negative content; only sin first brought him under the dominion of the law. Hence it is that among the Lutherans the original state, as also among the church fathers, is often depicted very exaggeratedly; and that the state to which believers are raised in Christ is, in the essence of the matter, thought to be equal to that of Adam before the fall. With the believer, for the Lutheran everything concentrates around justification; if someone partakes of this, then he has enough, he is completely satisfied and blessed. Salvation coincides entirely with forgiveness; there is no need to connect this backward with eternal election and forward with the whole Christian life, the good works, and eternal life; neither predestination nor perseverance are necessary here; the Lutheran believer enjoys in the present and has enough in that, Luther bij Köstlin,
Luthers Theol. II 361. [557] Schneckenburger, Vergl. Darst. des luth. u. ref.
Lehrbegriffs, I 90 f. 120 f. II 185 f. Vilmar, Dogm. I 340, Frank. Syst. d. chr. Wahrh. I 375.
Different, however, are the Reformed, who walked in the footsteps of Augustine. According to them Adam did not have the highest. The highest is namely material freedom, and consists in no longer being able to err, sin, die; in being raised absolutely above all fear and anxiety, above all possibility of falling. This highest the believers receive immediately out of grace through Christ. They can no longer sin, 1 Joh. 3:9, they can no longer die, Joh. 3:16; they immediately have through faith eternal, inalienable life; theirs is the perseverantia sanctorum, they can no longer be lost. Christ therefore does not bring his own back into the state of Adam before the fall;
He acquired and bestows much more, namely also that which Adam would have received if he had remained standing. He places us not at the beginning but at the end of the way which Adam had to traverse; He fulfilled not only passive, but also active obedience, delivers not only from guilt and punishment but also at once out of grace bestows the right to eternal life. Adam, however, did not yet have this highest; he did not yet have eternal life; he did receive the posse stare, but not the velle stare; indeed the posse si vellet but not the velle, quod posset; he had the posse non errare, peccare, mori, but not yet the non posse errare, peccare, mori.
He still was in the possibility of sin and death, and thus also still in some fear and anxiety; his was not yet the perfect, unchangeable love that excludes all fear. And rightly therefore the Reformed said that this possibility, this being a changeable good, this still being able to sin and die was no part, no piece, no content of the image of God, but its boundary, its limitation, its circumference, Heppe, Dogm. der ev. ref. K. 181. Shedd,
Dogm. Theol. II 104. 150. Therefore it was necessary that the image of God be unfolded, completely overcame and annihilated this possibility of sin and death, and shone in imperishable glory. As a consequence of this conception
of the status integritatis, the Reformed, in distinction from others, observed a praiseworthy sobriety in the description of the paradisal state. Adam was not Christ, the natural was not the spiritual, the [558] paradise was not heaven. However much, then, naturalism is to be resisted, which fails to recognize the power of sin and deems death natural; on the other side supranaturalism is no less to be avoided, which lets the image of God consist in a supernatural addition to nature. Sin, according to the Reformed, has corrupted and destroyed everything, but, because it is no substance, it has not been able to change the essence, the substance of creation. Man as a sinner has still remained man; and so also all other creatures, earth, heaven, nature, plant, animal, in spite of the curse of sin and the dominion of corruption, have remained essentially and substantially the same. As we saw above with religion, so it is also with everything else: sin has taken away no substance, grace gives back no substance. The materia of all things is and remains the same, but the forma, bestowed in creation, was deformed by sin, in order in grace to be reformed again wholly and entirely, Voetius,
Disp. I 776. This serious and yet so healthy conception of the paradisal state by the Reformed comes out on numerous points. Against the Lutherans and Remonstrants they defended that Adam, besides the probationary command, was indeed also bound to the moral law. He was not exlex, even though he also fulfilled it without any compulsion, willingly and out of love. That moral law was known to Adam by nature and therefore did not need, like the probationary command, to be revealed in a special way. In essence it is like the ten commandments, but nevertheless bore another form, for the law given on Sinai presupposes sins and therefore speaks almost always negatively: thou shalt not, and the moral law before the fall was much more positive. But precisely because the moral law with Adam by the nature of
the case was wholly positive, it did not make the possibility of sin clear to Adam's consciousness. With the commandments there therefore had to come a prohibition, with the moral laws a definite law; with the commandments, whose naturalness and reasonableness Adam saw, a command that in a certain sense was arbitrary and accidental. In the probationary command the whole moral law was for Adam set on one throw; it embodied for him the dilemma: God or man, his authority or one's own insight, unconditional obedience or independent investigation, faith or doubt. It was a dreadful test, which opened the way to an eternal salvation or to an [559] eternal perdition. Against the Cocceians the Reformed maintained that to that moral law the sabbath command also belonged; man before the fall did not yet enjoy the eternal, heavenly sabbath; just as to the alternation of day and night, so he was also subject to that of six-day labor and rest on the seventh day; day of rest and working days were therefore also distinguished before the fall; the religious life also then required its own form and service and day alongside the life of culture. The magical, theosophical opinion that the two trees in the garden possessed in themselves the power to kill or to make alive, whether then by nature,
Thomas, Suarez, Pererius, Reinhard, Dogm. 279. 289, or in a supernatural way, Augustinus, Bonaventura; whether already with the one-time,
Bellarminus, the gr. pr. hom. c. 14 or with repeated use, Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 97 art. 4, cf. also Heraut 941; was by the Reformed, even though some such as Pareus, Rivetus, Zanchius, Op. III 501 at first still assumed an effect of eating the fruit also on bodily life, with ever greater unanimity and decisiveness rejected, Calvijn, on Gen. 2:9, 3:22. Inst. IV 14, 12. 18. Marck,
Hist. Parad. I c. 17. Litt. bij M. Vitringa II 220 sq. This conception, to be sure, is in agreement with the Roman doctrine of the sacraments but
therefore also has for the Reformed great objection; it makes life and death independent of the ethical condition, i.e. of whether or not one obeys God's command; it presupposes that man after the fall would nevertheless have remained alive, if he but ex opere operato had eaten of the tree of life; it implies that eternal life, at once or more slowly, could be effected in man by eating a physical fruit, and thus fails to recognize the distinction between the natural and the spiritual. Therefore the Reformed saw in the tree of life rather a sign and seal of the covenant of works, which in a sacramental way bestowed life. Likewise, by the Reformed all theosophical speculations about a male virgin, about the absence of sexual desire, about a magical generation as in conflict with Scripture were unanimously rejected, Marck,
Hist. Parad. p. 279 sq. And just as the creation of the woman does not already presuppose a certain fall of Adam, so after the entrance of sin no nova species has been added in the plant or animal kingdom; wild and creeping animals, according to Voetius, were not first created after the fall but already on the sixth day, Disp. V 191. And finally Calvin, on Gen. 1:29,
9:3 and most Reformed, cf. Heidegger, de libertate christianorum a re cibaria 1662. Voetius, Disp. IV 387. V 194. Coccejus, S. Theol. XX 17.
Marck, Hist. Parad. p. 341. Moor, III 35-38 etc., judged that the eating of flesh had also been permitted to man before the flood and before the fall.
That Gen. 1:29 does not speak of that intentionally cannot, as argumentum e silentio, be of service; in Gen. 1:30 only the plant world is divided between man and animal; but of man's dominion and right over the animal world there is no mention there; these are already bestowed on man in Gen. 1:28 and certainly, especially also with a view to the fishes, include the right to kill and use animals. Immediately after the fall God himself makes animal skins and Abel brings an offering, which certainly also was accompanied by
a sacrificial meal. Kreophagy moreover has certainly been in use before the flood, and would, if God had first given the right thereto in Gen. 9:3, before that time have been unlawful and sinful. Gen. 9:1-5 gives no new command but renews the blessing of creation; the new is only the prohibition to eat the flesh with its soul, i.e. with its blood. The ground for the prohibition,
Gen. 9:5-7, to kill a man, is not present with the animals; they are, after all, not made after God's image. And finally it is not to be seen why precisely after the fall and after the flood the use of flesh would have been permitted by God to man; conversely one would expect that the right and the dominion of man after the fall would have been limited; that the use of flesh, in order to counteract becoming wild, would have been abolished; that vegetarianism would much more have been deemed in agreement with the condition of man entering after fall and flood than kreophagy, cf.
Zöckler, Lehre vom Urstand 273 f. Köhler, Bibl. Gesch. I 33 f. Reformed theology could in all these questions judge so soundly, because it was deeply penetrated by the thought that Adam did not yet have the highest.
Sin without doubt has a cosmic significance; it works, as is evident from death, also into the physical, and has brought the whole earth under the curse. Without it the development of humanity and [561] the history of the earth would have been wholly different, even though it is also the case that we can form no conception of that. But yet on the other hand the status integritatis is not to be identified with the status gloriae; from the latter one may not conclude to the former; Jes. 11:6, 65:25 are just as little applicable to the condition before the fall as Mk. 12:25, Luk. 20:36, 1 Cor. 6:13 etc.
The forma has been changed, but the materia of man, plant, animal, nature, earth is the same before and after the fall. All essential constituent parts that are now present also existed before the fall. The distinction and inequality
of man and woman, of parents and children, of brothers and sisters, of relatives and friends; the manifold institutions and relations in social life such as marriage, household, upbringing etc.; the alternation of day and night, working days and day of rest, labor and relaxation, months and years; the dominion of man over the earth through science and art etc.; they have undoubtedly been modified by sin and changed in form, but nevertheless they have their principle and foundation not in sin but in creation, in the ordinances of God. Socialism and communism, also of many Christian sects, rightly fights against the dreadful consequences of sin, especially also in the social sphere; but it does not stop there, it also comes into conflict with the nature of things, with the ordinances of creation, and thereby always bears not a reformational but a revolutionary character.
5. Finally, in the doctrine of the foedus operum there is still a third thought enclosed, which is of the richest religious and ethical significance.
Adam was not only created; as man he was in himself incomplete; something was lacking to him, which no lower creature could make good to him, Gen. 2:20. As man alone he was thus also not yet the fully unfolded image of God. The creation of man after God's image is on the sixth day only then completed, when God creates both, man and woman, in union with each other, cf. אותם Gen. 1:27, after his image. Yet this creation of man and woman together after God's image is also not the end but the beginning of God's way with man. It is not good that the man; it is also not good that man and woman are alone. Over them both God [562] immediately pronounces the blessing of multiplication, Gen. 1:28. Not the single human being, and not man and woman together, but the whole of humanity is only then the fully unfolded image of God, his son, his race. The image of God is far too rich for it to be able to be realized wholly in one single human child,
however richly gifted. Only in a humanity with millions of members can it be unfolded in some measure in its depth and richness. Just as the vestigia
Dei are spread over many, many works, both in space and time; so the imago Dei is only to be drawn life-size in a humanity whose members exist both after and alongside one another. But just as the cosmos is a unity and in man receives its head and lord; just as the vestigia Dei scattered through the whole world are gathered together in and raised up to the imago Dei of man; so also that humanity in its turn is to be thought of as an organism, which precisely as such is only then the fully unfolded image of God. Not as a heap of souls on a piece of ground, not as an incoherent aggregate of individuals, but as created out of one blood, as one household, as one family, humanity is the image and likeness of God. To that humanity there also belongs its development, its history, its ever expanding dominion over the earth, its progress in knowledge and art, its subjection of all creatures.
This too is all unfolding of the image and the likeness of God, after which man was created. Just as God has not revealed himself once at creation but continues and increases that revelation from day to day and from century to century; so also the image of God is not an unchangeable magnitude, but it explains itself and unfolds itself in the forms of space and time. It is a Gabe and Aufgabe at the same time; it is an unmerited gift of grace, which was already immediately granted in creation to the first man, but it is at the same time principle and seed of an altogether rich, glorious development. Only humanity in its entirety, as one perfect organism, gathered together under one head, spread over the whole earth, as prophetess proclaiming the truth of God, as priestess dedicating itself to God, as queen ruling the earth and the whole creation, only it is the fully finished image, the most speaking and most striking likeness of God. Scripture teaches all this clearly, [563]
when it says that the church is the bride of Christ, the temple of the H.
Spirit, the dwelling of God, the new Jerusalem, where all the glory of the nations is brought together. For indeed thereby the status gloriae is depicted, which now will be reached through sin; but religion, moral law, final destiny is essentially the same in covenant of works and covenant of grace.
In both it is about a kingdom of God, about a holy humanity, in which God can be all in all. Only one point in this representation still requires some further discussion. Humanity is not to be thought of as a perfect organism, unless it is connected and gathered together in a head. In the foedus gratiae
Christ occupies that rank, He is the head of the church; in the foedus operum that place was taken by Adam. Already Eve was therefore created out of Adam, in order that he would be principium totius speciei and the unity of the human race would be rooted in the unity of its origin. The woman is thus very certainly indeed partaker of human nature and of the image of God and she represents both in her own way and according to her own nature; but she is partaker of both not over against but alongside others and in connection with the man; she is ἐκ ἀνδρος, δια τον ἀνδρα, δοξα ἀνδρος, she is not without the man; and also the man, though head of the woman and εἰκων και δοξα θεου because he in the first place is bearer of dominion, is nevertheless also not complete without the woman, he too is not without the woman, for she is the mother of all living, 1 Cor. 11:7-12,
Ef. 5:22 v. Above all, however, Paul points out to us this unity of humanity, when he sets Adam over against Christ, Rom. 5:12-21, 1 Cor. 15:22, 45-49.
Humanity is not only physically out of one blood, Hd. 17:26; that would not be enough for humanity, for it also holds true of all those animal species which in the beginning were created. Moreover, Christ, the antitype of Adam, is not our progenitor; we have not physically proceeded from Him,
but He himself is out of Adam, as far as the flesh is concerned. In this respect Adam and Christ are not alike. But the agreement lies in this, that humanity in an ethical sense stands to Adam in the same relation as to Christ. In the same way as Christ is cause of our righteousness and our life,
Adam is that of our sin and our death. God reckons and judges in one man the whole human [564] race. This now the Reformed have expressed in their doctrine of the foedus operum. Therein first, not merely the physical, but the ethical unity of humanity comes into its own. And this is necessary for humanity as organism. In general the architectonic law everywhere demands the monarchical system. A work of art must be governed by one thought; a sermon must have one theme; a church is completed in the tower; the man is the head of the family; in a kingdom the king is bearer of authority; the human race as one organic whole, as an ethical Gemeinschaft, is not conceivable without a head. In the foedus operum Adam occupied that place. The probationary command proves that he occupied an altogether exceptional position; he was progenitor not only, but also head, representative of the whole human race; his act was decisive for all. Just as the fate of the whole body rests with the head, which for all members thinks and judges and decides; just as the well-being of a family depends on the man and father; just as a prince can be for blessing or for curse for thousands and millions of subjects; so the fate of humanity has been laid in the hands of Adam. His transgression has become the fall of his whole race; but his obedience would also have been life for all his descendants, as the antitype Christ proves. If we could not without our knowing in Adam be subjected to condemnation, we also could not apart from our doing in Christ be adopted unto grace. Covenant of works and covenant of grace stand and fall with each other. One and the same law holds for both. On the basis of
physical descent an ethical unity is built, which makes humanity, corresponding to its nature, appear as one organism and binds its members most closely together not only by bonds of blood but also by participation in blessing and curse, in sin and righteousness, in death and life.
6. From this a new light falls upon the question of the propagation of the human race. At all times opinions about this were divided. The praeexistentianism of Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, Philo and the later Jews found among the Christians entrance only with a few, Orig., de princ. I 6, 2.
8, 3. II 9, 2. c. Cels. I 32. 33. Henry More, Mysterium [565] pietatis 1660.
Kant, Relig. ed. Rosenkranz 44 f. Schelling, Werke I 7 S. 385 f. Müller, Sünde II5 99 f. 504 f. Scripture also offered not the least ground for it; our soul is absolutely not conscious of such a pre-existence and sees in the body so little a prison and place of punishment, that it shudders at death; it is rooted moreover in a pagan dualism of spirit and matter, destroys the unity of the human race and effaces the distinction between man and angel. In contrast, between traducianism and creationism in Christian theology the dispute remained undecided. The former had in ancient times many advocates, such as Tertullianus, de an. 19. 27, Rufinus, Makarius,
Eunomius, Apollinaris, Gregorius Nyss., and according to Hieronymus even maxima pars occidentalium, but later it was, with a few exceptions, embraced only by the Lutherans, by Luther himself, who however was first a creationist, Köstlin, Luthers Theol. II 365, and then by Melanchton,
Gerhard, Loc. VIII c. 8. Quenstedt, I 519. Hollaz, Ex. 414. Philippi, K. Gl.
III 103. Vilmar, Dogm. I 348. Frank, Chr. Wahrh. I 400. Delitzsch, Bibl.
Psych. 106 f. Cremer in Herzog2 14, 27 etc. Creationism was in ancient times defended by Clemens Alex., Strom. IV 26. Lactantius, Inst. III 18.
Hilarius, Pelagius, Cassianus, Gennadius, Theodoretus, Athanasius,
Gregorius Naz., Cyrillus Alex., Ambrosius etc. Hieronymus already spoke of it as ecclesiastical doctrine. Greek, scholastic and Roman theologians are therefore all creationist, Lombardus, Sent. II 17. 18. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 90 and 118. c. Gent. II 86-89. Bellarminus, de amiss. gr. et statu pecc. IV 2.
Scheeben, Dogm. II 172 f. Kleutgen, Philos. II 583 f.; and only a few, such as e.g. Klee, Dogm. II2 313 f. show sympathy for traducianism. The Reformed also chose, with few exceptions, such as Sohnius, Op. II 563.
Martyr, Loci p. 81 and in modern times especially Shedd, Dogm. Th. II 22.
75. III 250, for creationism as party, Calvin on Hebr. 12:9. Zanchius, Op. III 609. Polanus V 31. Voetius, Disp. I 798. Moor II 1064 III 289. Marck, Hist.
Parad. II 4 § 7-9 etc. Some prefer to leave the question undecided, Aug. de anima et ejus orig. de Gen. ad litt. X. Epist. 166 ad Hieron. Retract. II 45.
46, Gregorius Magnus, Leo Magnus, Isidorus, Chemniz, Buddeus, Musculus, Piscator, Maresius, or seek a mediation, Leibniz, Theod. I 91.
Rothe, [566] Ethik § 136. Ebrard, Dogm. I 327 f. Indeed traducianism and creationism in strength of arguments weigh pretty well against each other.
Traducianism appeals to the creation of Eve, of whose soul there is no separate mention and who therefore is called ἐξ ἀνδρος, Gen. 2:21, 1 Cor.
11:8; to the manner of speaking of Holy Scripture, that the descendants are included in the loins of the fathers and have come forth from their hip, Gen.
46:26, Hebr. 7:9, 10; to the word ידע, to know, which would at the same time indicate a spiritual act; to the completion of creation on the seventh day, Gen. 2:2; to the fact, that the animals also can bring forth their like,
Gen. 1:28, 5:3, 9:4, Joh. 3:6, and especially also to the inheritance of sin and of all kinds of psychic properties. Creationism on the other hand finds support in the creation of Adam's soul, Gen. 2:7; in many texts such as Pred. 12:7, Zach. 12:1, especially Hebr. 12:9, cf. Num. 16:22, 17:16, of
which even Delitzsch, Bibl. Psych. 114 says: eine klassischere Beweisstelle für den Creatianismus kann es kaum geben; and then above all in the spiritual, simple, indivisible, immortal nature of the soul. And just as traducianism and creationism in arguments stand pretty well equal, so are they both equally unfit for the solution of the difficulties. Traducianism explains neither the origin of the soul nor the inheritance of sin. As regards the first, it must either come to the doctrine that the soul of the child already previously existed in the parents and forefathers, thus to a kind of praeexistentianism; or that the soul is potentially included in the seed of man or woman or of both, i.e. to materialism; or that it is produced by the parents in one way or another, i.e. to creation, now not by God but by man.
And as regards the second, traducianism can contribute nothing here to explanation, because sin is not material and no substance but a moral quality, moral guilt and moral corruption. Equally powerless creationism stands over against these problems. Even if it conceives the creation of the soul as organically as possible, and even if it says with Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 17: creando infundit eas Deus et infundendo creat; yet it is at a loss with the question, when the soul is created in the embryo, cf. e.g. Polanus V 31. Bucanus VIII 26, and how the anima rationalis then nevertheless replaces the anima vegetativa and anima sensitiva that already earlier ensouled the embryo, cf. Thomas, S. Th. I qu. 118 art. 2. c. Gent. II 59. 68.
And original sin can by creationism only be explained in such a way, that the soul, first created pure by God, is defiled by the body, which however makes sin material, Lombardus, Sent. II dist. 31; or that God, at the same moment that He creates it, also declares it guilty and makes it unclean,
Voetius, Disp. I 1097. Turretinus, Th. El. IX 12. Moor III 289. No wonder, that therefore many Pelagians and Romanists precisely on the ground of
creationism denied original sin in a positive sense. Gangauf, Met. Psych. des h. August. 259. Oswald, Relig. Urgesch. 155 f. 163 f. 189 f. Arguments and objections therefore do not decide the choice between traducianism and creationism; they would rather compel one, to end with a non liquet.
7. All the more remarkable is it that Greek, Roman, and Reformed theologians almost unanimously declared themselves for creationism, while traducianism found acceptance only among the Lutherans. This cannot be accidental; there must be a reason for it. And that reason lies in the different conception of the nature and the destiny of man. For, in the first place,
Lutheran theology places the image of God only in certain moral properties, in the justitia originalis. As always, so also here it limits its view to the ethical-religious and feels no need to bring this into connection with the whole cosmic being and to conceive it as a link in the entire counsel of God. Thereby now the nature of man comes into its own neither over against the angels nor over against the animals. For if man possesses this image of God, then he is pretty well like the angels; the difference, in comparison with what they have in common, is of no significance; the angels too bear the image of God. And if man lacks this image of God, then he sinks down to the animals, becomes a stick and a block; what then still distinguishes him from the animals has, theologically and religiously, so little value that it almost no longer comes into consideration; the great distinction lay, after all, in the image of God, and that he has totally lost.
The boundaries between man and angel and between man and animal are thus not sharply drawn here; the justitia [568] originalis is the one and all, everything else in man is subordinate and theologically almost of no value.
But for that reason it is now also a matter of indifference for Lutheran theology how man comes into being; or rather, that which man has in
common with the angel, namely the image of God, the justitia originalis, that must and that can arise only by creation, that is in the absolute sense a gift; but all that man otherwise possesses is propagated in the same way as in the animals. But Roman and Reformed theologians, even if they sometimes still called the angels image of God, sought from the beginning the image of God in the whole, and wholly distinctive nature of man. It consisted very certainly also in the virtues of knowledge, righteousness, and holiness, but these then even in men still bore again another character than in the angels; and it consisted not only in those virtues but further in all that is human in man. It thus consisted also in this, that the πνευμα in man from the outset was organized for the connection with a σωμα, and that his σωμα from the start was constituted with a view to the πνευμα. Before and after the fall, in the status integritatis and corruptionis, in the status gratiae and gloriae, always and remains man essentially distinguished from angel and animal. If he has the image of God, he does not become an angel; if he loses it, he does not become an animal; he always and eternally remains man and in so far also always and eternally God's image. And this now is maintained sufficiently only in creationism. Because man exists as an entirely peculiar kind of being, therefore he also comes into being in an entirely special way.
He is related to angel and animal and yet essentially distinguished from both; in his dying he differs from both and therefore also in his origin;
Adam's creation is different from that of the animals and also different from that of the angels. Creationism alone sufficiently maintains the specific peculiarity of man; it wards off both pantheism and materialism and respects the boundaries between man and animal.
In the second place, it follows from the Lutheran conception of the image of God, that the moral unity of the human race must recede behind physical
descent. Through the fall human beings in and with the whole image of God have also lost all spiritual and moral unity. Natural religion, morality, etc. is of scarcely any significance. Only physical [569] descent holds them together, and this is at the same time the cause of their moral corruption.
Sin, which has robbed the human being of all religion and morality and the whole image of God, can therefore also not in an ethical way but only through physical descent become the portion of all. It is indeed no substance, although Luther et al., especially Flacius, arrived at very strong expressions, but it is nevertheless in the first place a stain, a corruption, that has affected the whole human being and precisely kills all that is religious and ethical in him. But Roman and Reformed theology said over against that, although each in its own way, that the unity of humanity was not only of a physical but also of an ethical nature. Physical descent, after all, is not enough; then the animal species too would already form a unity. Agreement in moral virtues without more is also insufficient, for then the angels among themselves and these with human beings would also form a unity. Animal species are indeed physically from one blood, but they are no corpus morale; and angels are indeed a unity but not related in blood. The distinctiveness of the human being thus requires that the unity of humanity be both physical and ethical. And because original sin is not physical but only ethical, therefore it can also only be built on the ethical, federal unity of humanity. Physical descent is not sufficient for its explanation and runs the danger of materializing it. The so-called realism e.g. of Shedd does not satisfy, neither for the explanation of sin from Adam, nor for the explanation of righteousness from Christ. There is yet another unity among human beings needed, in order to cause them to appear together as a corpus morale, organically connected and with one another also ethically solidary
in an upright manner. And that is the federal unity. On the basis of the physical an ethical unity must be erected. Adam as progenitor is not enough, he must also be covenant head of the human race, just as Christ, although in a physical sense not our progenitor, nevertheless precisely as Covenant Head can bestow righteousness and salvation upon his church.
And this moral unity of the human race is now only to be maintained with creationism. It bears, after all, a character of its own, is distinguished both from that among animals and from that of the angels, and thus also comes about in a [570] peculiar way, through physical descent and through a creative act of God, both in connection with one another.
In the third place, finally, Lutheran theology, by virtue of its conception of the image of God, concerns itself little with the destiny of man. Adam had everything that he needed; he only had to remain what he was; the distinction between the posse non and non posse peccare is of little importance; the perseverantia is not a higher good, bestowed in Christ upon his own. And thus Adam had nothing higher to acquire for his descendants; he had only to hand down what he had; traducianism is sufficient for that; for covenant of works and creationism there is no place. But again the Roman and Reformed theology proceeded from another thought. The destiny of man lies in heavenly blessedness, eternal life, the vision of God.
But this he can reach only in the way of obedience. There is no proportion between this obedience and that life. How then can that heavenly blessedness nevertheless be bestowed upon man as a reward for his works?
Rome says: because in the image of God a supernatural grace is granted to him, which can make him earn eternal life ex condigno. The Reformed says: because God establishes a covenant with man and wills to bestow eternal life upon him, not according to the worthiness of his works but
according to his own gracious decree. Both, however, agree in this, that the destiny of man lies in eternal life, that this is attainable only in the way of moral obedience, and that God has placed the decision in this matter for the human race into the hands of Adam. And therefore both also came to creationism. For to that it was indeed necessary, both that all men were included in the covenant head Adam and that they at the same time themselves remained persons, individuals, men with independence and responsibility. Physical descent alone would have made that the sin, which we received from Adam, would be a fate, a natural process, an illness, which proceeds outside our will and thus outside our guilt. But that is not sin. And also the righteousness, which Christ, the last Adam, bestows upon us, does not bear that character. Both presuppose a federal relation of humanity to its heads. And thus now [571] creationism maintains that each man is an organic member of the great whole, and at the same time that he occupies in that great whole a place of his own, independent. It holds fast the unity of the whole human race and at the same time the independent significance of each individual. Men are not specimens, not numbers of a kind; they are also not individuals standing loosely next to one another like the angels. They are both together, parts of the whole and individuals, living stones of the building of God. Creationism preserves the organic, both physical and moral, unity of humanity and at the same time it respects the mystery of personality. Each man a member of the body of humanity and yet at the same time a thought of God of his own, with an eternal significance and an eternal destiny! Each man himself an image of God and yet that image unfolded in full only in the whole of humanity! By virtue of this unity, now indeed the whole of humanity fell in Adam, its progenitor and head; but this fall is nevertheless no fate, no natural process; on the
contrary it rests on a sovereign decree of God. And this decree, however sovereign, is nevertheless so little arbitrary, that it rather presupposes the physical connection of humanity, brings about and maintains its ethical unity, and can reveal and set in the light, in the most glorious manner, not only the strictness of God but also the riches of his grace. For when Adam falls, Christ stands ready to take his place. The covenant of grace can replace the covenant of works, because both rest on the same ordinances. If we could not be condemned in Adam, we would not be able to be acquitted in Christ. Thus, however the first man may choose, creation will not miss its destiny. The cosmogony in Genesis at once passes over into geogony and this into anthropogony. World, earth, humanity are one organic whole. They stand, they fall, they are raised up with one another. The vestigia Dei in creation and the imago Dei in man may be destroyed and mutilated by the sin of the first Adam; they come, through the last Adam and through his recreating grace, to an all the more glorious revelation. The status integritatis, through the fall or apart from the fall, prepares the status gloriae, in which God will lay his glory upon his creatures and will be all in all.
PROJECT GUTENBERG EDITOR'S
REMARKS.
E very effort has been made to provide in this file a faithful reproduction of the original version. In the original, æ is rendered as ae, œ as oe; this spelling has been maintained here.
Here and there spacing or punctuation has been silently corrected. The numbers of paragraphs 27-33 have also been restored as indicated in footnote []. In chapter V, § 29 (The Creation) a paragraph 11 is missing in the original. The numbering is reproduced unchanged here.
Any possible typographical errors in the Greek have been reproduced unchanged. Clear typographical errors in the Hebrew have been corrected, and where necessary the diacritical marks have been silently improved or supplemented.
Overly obvious printing and spelling errors in the original have been corrected as follows.
Corrections.
Pag. 33: "mesnchen" replaced by "menschen" (All people cry out in spite of).
Pag. 44:: "Au" replaced by "An" (John Caird, An introduction to the philos. of religion).
Pag. 67: "schepter" replaced by "scepter" (his seat, throne, footstool, rod, scepter, weapons).
Pag. 71: "accomodeeren" replaced by "accommodeeren" (then He must descend to us, accommodate Himself).
Pag. 71: "anthopomorphisms" replace with "anthropomorphisms" (Who therefore contests the right of the anthropomorphisms).
Page 82: "sum" replaced by "zum" (Anweisung zum seligen Leben oder Religionslehre).
Page 85: "menseh" replaced by "mensch" (The relationship of God and man finds its image).
Pag. 93: replace "qnas" with "quas" (quia haec animarum sunt, quas illa lux perfundit).
Pag. 95: "heiligbeid" replaced by "heiligheid" (In God, according to the essence, holiness and mercy may be the same).
Pag. 105: "חאדון" replaced by "האדון" (alternating with האדון, which in turn is reinforced).
Pag. 107: "ְלַעֵּלם" replaced by "ְל ֹעָלם" (where one read ְל ֹעָלם, to conceal).
Pag. 107: "ΙΙΙΙΙΙ" replaced by "ΠΙΠΙ" (the four letters written as ΠΙΠΙ, or also according to Diodorus Siculus).
Pag. 110: "oorsponkelijk" replaced by "oorspronkelijk" (the name Ihvh originally, according to its derivation).
Pag. 110: "onstond" replaced by "ontstond" (Through shortening the form arose).
Pag. 116: "Dent." replaced by "Deut." (Ex. 23:17, Deut. 10:17, Jos. 3:13).
Pag. 141: replace "359" with "369" (Hoornbeek, Socin. conf. I p. 368369).
Pag. 160: "quotve" replaced by "quot ue" (quot nascantur culices, quot ue moriantur).
Pag. 163: "condionata" replaced by "conditionata" (The knowledge of the futura conditionata therefore precedes).
Pag. 169: "Cristus" replaced by "Christus" (the foolishness of the cross, 1 Cor. 1:18, in Christ).
Pag. 177: "good" replaced by "good" (a good friend etc.).
Pag. 181: " ֹאֶרך ַאַּפַים" replaced by " ֹאֶרך ַאַּפִים" (long-suffering, ַרּו or ֹאֶרך
Pag. 183: "ָאֲהָבה" replaced by "ַאֲהָבה" (The Hebr. ַאֲהָבה is not rendered by ἐρως).
Pag. 185: "Relionsgesch." replaced by "Religionsgesch." (Smend, Altt.
Religionsgesch. 333 f.).
Pag. 187: "there" replaced by "altar" (the tabernacle and the altar by anointing).
Pag. 204: replace "zich selbt" with "sich selbst" (die das ewige Eine empfindet, sich selbst zu gebären).
Pag. 218: replace "condionata" with "conditionata" (and that in voluntas absoluta and conditionata).
Pag. 222: "ַחָּגדּול" replaced by "ַהָּגדּול" (Jes. 1:24, ָהֵאל ַהָּגדּול ַהִּגּבֹור, whose name is Ihvh Zebaoth).
Pag. 222: „ַ ֹס" replaced by „ַ ֹּכ" (whose name is Ihvh Zebaoth, Jer. 32:18,
Pag. 235: "waar-whereby" replaced by "whereby" (the spoken word, whereby He creates all things).
Pag. 250: "schepter" replaced by "scepter" (reflection of God's majesty, scepter of his majesty).
Pag. 261: "voooreerst" replaced by "vooreerst" (They appealed first of all to a series).
Pag. 262: "doordoor" replaced by "thereby" (He thereby of God as the unborn one).
Pag. 268: "also also" replaced by "also" (in order to represent the truth to some extent, even if imperfectly).
Pag. 271: "alleng" replaced by "allengs" (But allengs οὐσια was used in another sense).
Pag. 271: replace "Aristoleles" with "Aristoteles" (what Aristotle had called).
Pag. 275: "ontplooing" replaced by "ontplooiing" (in humanity to its full unfolding).
Pag. 282: replace "vruchbaar" with "vruchtbaar" (the thought that God is fruitful).
Pag. 283: "de" replaced by "des" (And therefore He is not brought forth by the will of the Father).
Pag. 307: "de" replaced by "der" (for the doctrine der Trinity).
Pag. 322: "nitgegeven" replaced by "published" (and was published by the Jesuit Sirmond in 1643).
Pag. 326: replace "praedestinatia" with "praedestinatio" (that the entire praedestinatio is grace).
Pag. 341: "Salmur" replaced by "Saumur" (Synt. thesium in acad.
Saumur).
Pag. 362: replace "iufralapsarische" with "infralapsarische" (yet again proceed to the infralapsarian order).
Pag. 376: "natnur" replaced by "nature" (They fought with his nature).
Pag. 383: replace "menigmanl" with "menigmaal" (after all, Scripture also speaks "menigmaal").
Pag. 383: "Christns" replaced by "Christus" (does the election of Christ logically precede ours).
Pag. 384: "Ezeeh" replaced by "Ezech" (Jer. 29:14, 51:45, Ezech. 11:17, Hos. 11:1).
Pag. 388: "materalistisch" replaced by "materialistic" (seeks either materialistically the origin of things).
Pag. 413: "volumtate" replaced by "voluntate" (sempiterna et immutabili voluntate res quas condidit).
Pag. 415: replace "antonoom" with "autonomous" (made man autonomous and independent of God).
Pag. 418: "creatunr" replaced by "creature" (the final destination of all creature).
Pag. 423: "natunr" replaced by "nature" (for love and admiration of nature).
Pag. 429: "מלאן" replaced by "מלאך" (The Hebrew מלאך simply means messenger, envoy) Pag. 443: "bleeds" replace with "bloeds" (no community of blood).
Pag. 450: "spitsvoudige" replaced by "spitsvondige" (to all sorts of subtle questions).
Pag. 453: "ּׁשרת" replaced by "ׁשרת" (Likewise the Hebrew ׁשרת is rendered by both Greek words).
Pag. 458: " ֹתהּר ָו ֹבהּו" replaced by ֹתהּו ָו ֹבהּו (The earth is now indeed described to us as ֹתהּו ָו ֹבהּו).
Pag. 458: "ְת ֹהום" replaced by "ְתהֹום" (thereby explained, that he was a ְתהֹום).
Pag. 460: "ִה ֹלִחים" replaced by "ֱא ֹלִהים" (this word proves that with ַרּו
ֱא ֹלִהים one does not mean the wind).
Pag. 479: replace "admit" with "admitted" (She has wholeheartedly admitted that the view).
Pag. 488: replace "personal men" with "personal names" (and personal names as folk names are meant).
Pag. 488: "see" replaced by "sees" (Therefore she refrains from every attempt).
Pag. 491: "Peutateuchs" replaced by "Pentateuchs" (Authentie des Pentateuchs I 306).
Pag. 494: "1S60" replaced by "1860" (Powell, Evidences of Christianity 1860).
Pag.
495:
"phvsiologisch" replaced by "physiologically"
(morphologically and physiologically diverge far too strongly).
Pag. 496: "onhouden" replaced by "onthouden" (to refrain from a judgment).
Pag. 504: "ֵגן" replaced by "ַגן" (in which the court or garden, ַגן, LXX παραδεισος, according to Spiegel).
Pag. 506: "Armonie" replaced by "Armenie" (much more northerly, namely high up in Armenie).
Pag. 508: "ִבִדמּות" replaced by "ְּבֵהמֹות" (that God created man ְּבֵהמֹות ֱא ֹלִהים, and ְּבֶצֶלם ֱא ֹלִהים).
Pag. 516: replace "ze" with "zu" (ohne übernatürliche Hülfe zu leben vermochte).
Pag. 520: "natu-turalibus" replaced by "naturalibus" (man in puris naturalibus).
Pag. 522: "verkijgen" replaced by "verkrijgen" (only to be obtained in an ethical sense).
Pag. 562: "ge-created" replace with "created" (created out of one blood).
Pag. 570: "creatism" replaced by "creationism" (for covenant of works and creationism there is no place).
Expressions such as "afteleiden", "toetelichten" etc. have been silently changed into "af te leiden", "toe te lichten" etc.