Chapter 8 - The Goodness Of Things Other Than God -- Its Diversity
CHAPTER 8
THE GOODNESS OF THINGS OTHER THAN GOD -- ITS DIVERSITY
'BUT there are countless other injunctions which have been found for the gaining of good things and the avoiding of evil things, for there is no peace for the wicked, says the Lord.' 1 In contradiction to his original statement that God alone is good,
Clement has spoken of a second goodness which belongs to things other than God.
This goodness is one thing -- assimilation to God -- but it expresses itself in many ways. It is a multiple and varied kind of goodness, in contrast to the pure unity of God's goodness. There is evidence on every side of the diversity of this kind of goodness. God does not let us rest in a state of wickedness. He constantly reminds us, through his Son, of the right way of life.
The Paedagogus is concerned with practical moral instruction to newly converted Christians. Book 11 tells them, among other things, how to eat and drink and how to behave at banquets, how to laugh and how to sleep, and what sort of clothes, shoes and jewels to wear. Clement denounces gluttony because it mistakes the purpose of eating as pleasure instead of life. Simplicity in food is most suitable. 'We must spurn the different varieties which do us different kinds of harm -- bodily illnesses and stomach disorders -- the sense of taste being perverted by a wretched art, the art of cookery and the futile art of baking cakes.' 2 Gluttons scour the world to find delicacies and cling to matter as fire clings to wood. 3 Clement recommends
'sufficiency, which is set over food measured in just quantity, which nourishes the body in health and gives of its own to its neighbours'. 4 Moderation in drinking is also advocated and the symptoms resulting from neglect of this precept are faithfully described. 5
____________________ 1Paed. I, 94; 1, 146, 7.
2Paed. II, 2; 1, 154, 21.
3Paed. II, 3; 1, 155, 21.
4Paed. II, 7; 1, 158, 8.
5Paed. II, 24; 1, 170, 16.
Luxury in any of its forms is not advised. It draws the attention of the soul away from the things which are its own and it clouds the eye of the soul.
But the belching of those who are submerged in wine, and the retching of those who are clogged with food, the snorting of those who are rolled-in bedclothes, and the rumbling of aching bellies, close in upon the soul's clear-sighted eye, filling the thinking faculty with innumerable phantasies. 1
Book III deals with true beauty and speaks against the beautifying of the body, especially in the case of men. Hairs must not be plucked out, because such a practice would upset the arithmetic of the God who has counted them. The Christian has true beauty and true riches. He is told how and why to have a bath and to take exercise. He and she are told the Christian attitude to a vast number of things like clothes, rings, hair, cosmetics, walking, games, conduct inside and outside church, kissing and the control of the eyes. Luxury is further disparaged as making a practice of falsehood, having no limit, throwing things out of place and being unnatural. Behaviour is to be moderate and sincere, concerned with true spiritual riches.
Having seen the variety of situations to which Clement applies ethical values, it remains to treat, in some system, of the nature of these values. Their diversity and multiplicity presents a serious problem. Different people have pronounced Clement's ethics to be Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic. There is evidence for each of these views, which means that there is also evidence against each of them. This chapter will treat separately of the Platonic, Aristotelian, and Stoic values which Clement recommends, showing the connections within the three groups but not attempting to relate the three with one another. The emphasis is on the diversity of this kind of goodness. In no case does the account given of these three systems of ethics claim to be exhaustive or balanced. Anything but a fragmentary treatment is outside the scope of this work. It must also be remembered that these systems had been blended together in different ways before Clement got hold of them. The Stoics managed to say most of the ____________________ 1Paed. II, 81; 1, 206, 29.
things which other people had said before them. Clement, however, is not merely a syncretist. He reinterprets the ideas which he takes over and gives them a Christian meaning.
Plato Besides determining the framework of Clement's ethics, Plato influences his thought through many subsidiary ideas -- knowledge and virtue, the importance of training and education, the disinterested pursuit of good, the 'tending of the soul' and harmony.
The importance of self-knowledge is emphasised by Clement. 'Therefore it is, as it seems, the greatest lesson of all to know one's self. For if one knows one's self, one will know God. And knowing God, one will become like God.' 1 The beginning of Socratic ethics lay in self-knowledge and the realisation of one's own ignorance.
This is the point in the earlier and middle dialogues behind the frequent refutation of those who claim knowledge. 'The knowledge of one's ignorance', says Clement, 'is the first lesson for those who wish to live rationally.' 2 The man who knows his ignorance seeks, finds, believes, hopes and finally loves. 'Follow God, says Clement,
'stripped of false pretence, stripped of the glory which must pass away.' 3 Selfknowledge both humbles and exalts us. 4 It reminds us that we are human, mortal, and that neither wealth nor fame makes us of any account. It reminds us too that God made us for himself, and in his image. The knowledge of the man who knows the Good was described by Plato as Θεωπíα, νóησις, 5 and also ἒποπτεíα, a term which belonged to the mystery religions. Clement uses these terms to describe the gnost ος in the Theaetetus who, by his vision of divine things, himself becomes divine.
The Platonic identification of virtue with knowledge is explicit in 'reckoning as bad nothing else besides ignorance and action
____________________ 1Paed. III, 1; I, 235, 20.
2Strom. V, 17; II, 336, 25.
3Paed. II, 36; I, 178, 23.
4Strom. V, 23; II, 340, 15 and Strom. VII, 20; III, 15, 8.
5Cf. Völker, Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus, pp. 403, 404.
contrary to right reason', 1 and implicit in the comparison between virtue and the arts. 'For men become honourable and good not by nature but by learning, as they become doctors and pilots.' 2 A defence is here being made of intellectual study. The need for knowledge in addition to faith is asserted. Nothing worth while is gained without hard work. Virtue is no exception to this rule. Unless we are prepared to work as hard in acquiring knowledge of divine and human things as physicians and pilots work in acquiring the knowledge of their art, we cannot hope to be good at the art of living. Our virtue is the result of training. Just as Plato elaborates an extensive and significant system of education for those who are to become wise and virtuous, so Clement insists on a scheme of education for the gnostic. Clement's idea of philosophy as 'knowledge of the Good and of Truth' 3 is also determined by this Platonic theme. Plato describes philosophy as knowledge of the Good 4 and philosophers (as Clement quotes him) as those who love to look on truth. 5 But Clement's teaching on virtue is not purely Platonic and he did not wholly accept the identification of virtue and knowledge. This is seen where he contradicts, for the rational powers are by nature the servants of the will'; 6 and where he compromises, in accordance with Aristotle, 'for there are just two beginnings for all sin -- ignorance and weakness'. 7
That part of man which knows is that which is of supreme importance for ethics.
The soul is the knowing, deathless, unchanging, and divine part of man. The chief business of man is laid down in the Phaedo as the tendance of the soul. 8 With this goes the notion of the practice of death. 'Those who pursue philosophy rightly study to die.' 9 So Clement mentions 'the discipline of the soul and training in the power to follow what has been judged to be right'. 10 The gnostic is 'a stranger and sojourner
____________________ 1Strom. VI, 113; II, 488, 26.
10Strom. VII, 98; III, 69, 29. Quoted as Stoic, SVF, 3, 490.
2Strom. I, 34; II, 22, 20. This is quoted as Stoic, SVF, 3, 225.
3Strom. I, 93; II, 60, 7.
4Rep. VII, 534B, C.
5Rep. V, 475 E; quoted Strom. I, 93; II, 60, 4.
6Strom. II, 77; II, 153, 21.
7Strom. VII, 101; 111, 71, 24f. Cf. Strom. VII, 16; III, 12, 7f. Cf. Plato, Laws IX, 863 C, cited Völker, op. cit. p. 128.
8Phaedo64.
9Phaedo67.
in the whole of life', 1 who despises pleasures and pains alike, 2 having set his hopes on the future, and has anticipated the separation of soul from body by a rational death. The soul is cleansed, by study, from the objects of sense, and kindled so that it may see the truth. 3
His future hopes are not the motive for his right living. His only motive is disinterested love. 4 As Clement says elsewhere,
This then is the first good activity of the perfect man when it is done not because of any usefulness in his own affairs, but because he considers it right to do good. His activity being borne along with enthusiasm becomes good in every act, not being good in these matters and bad in those. But it is settled in a disposition towards good conduct, not for the sake of glory, nor as the philosophers say for good report, not for the sake of reward whether from men or from God, but to bring one's life in accordance with the image and likeness of the Lord. 5
This disinterested goodness was the ideal sought by Glaucon and arrived at by Socrates in the Republic. There justice is among the class of things good for their own sake and also independently good for their consequences. Clement adds to pure disinterest the separate consideration, 'So that if a man loves himself he loves the Lord and confesses to salvation in order that he may save his soul.' 6
Goodness was a harmony for Plato and Clement as it had been for Pythagoras and Heraclitus. The supreme God had a divine harmony 7 which men should keep in time with. The souls of men should be harmonised. 'But as rational creatures we are to tune ourselves temperately, harmoniously relaxing the sternness and high tension of our serious pursuits, not discordantly breaking them up.' 8 There are three parts in the soul and they must be made harmonious. This is for Plato and for Clement justice or the good life. For Plato and for Clement the agreement of works and reason was essential to virtue. 9 The harmony of the body helps
____________________ 1Strom. VII, 77; III, 55, 4.
2Strom. VII, 63; III, 45, 28.
3Strom. I, 33; II, 22, 5. Plato, Rep. 527D, E. Clement uses the words of Plato.
4Strom. VII, 67; III, 48, 9.
5Strom. IV, 137; II, 308, 33.
6Strom. IV, 42; II, 267, 13.
7Prot. 88; I, 65, 31.
8Paed. II, 46; I, 185, 25.
9Strom. II, 4; II, 114, 28.
the mind, says Clement, in argument against the gnostics. He quotes Republic III to the effect that the care of the body is necessary for the harmony of the soul. 1
Aristotle The ideas of end, purpose, function, measure, mean and right reason are predominant in the ethics of Aristotle and appear frequently in Clement's writing. At the beginning of the Nicomachean Ethics Aristotle discusses the ends of different arts. Of all the ends that exist there must be one end which is desired for itself, otherwise there would be an infinite regress. This is the Chief Good, or the best thing of all. As each art has its end and each man his function, so there is an allinclusive end to the science of 'politics', and a function of man as man or 'the Good' of man. This end is ευδαιμονíα 2 which is described, an active life in accordance with virtue, or, if there are more forms of virtue than one, in accordance with the best and completest virtue in a complete life'. 3 This consists of two kinds -- intellectual and moral. 4 It is necessary both to understand what is right and to be able to do it.
For 'that state is virtue, which not merely is in accordance with but which implies the possession of right reason'. 5
Many of the arguments in the Paedagogus are based on the notion of virtue, function, or excellence. Clement speaks of the use of shoes being partly for covering, partly for something else. 6 He shows how the peculiar excellence of each species is indicated by physical propensities and characteristics. 7 He states explicitly the true excellence of man.
For if the proper nature of each thing has its one function, ox and house and dog alike, what are we to say is the proper work of man? He is like, I think, a centaur, the Thessalian figment, fitted together out of rational and irrational, out of soul and body. On the one hand the body works the earth and hastens earthwards, while on the other the soul speeds upwards to God. 8
____________________ 1Strom. IV, 17; II, 256, 19.
2Eth. Nic. 1097b.
3Ibid. 1098a.
4Ibid. 1103a.
5Ibid. 1144b: ο+πΘòς λóγος.
6Paed. II, 116; I, 226, 28: ε+ σις τῶ . Cf. αι+ . Politics II, 7, 15.
7Paed. III, 18; I, 247, 4.
8Strom. IV, 9; II, 252, 10.
For Aristotle, virtue is 'a state of deliberate moral purpose, consisting in a mean that is relative to ourselves, the mean being determined by reason or as a prudent man would determine it'. 1 The right mean sets a limit on human conduct and is the guide to human action. A similar idea is found in Plato (e.g. in the Philebus), but it is more explicit and emphatic in Aristotle. The path of the mean gives to the soul a health similar to that of the body, a balance and equilibrium of parts.
All this is found in Clement. 'The mean must always be our aim.' 2 We should not work too hard, nor should we be lazy. We should not live in luxury, nor be overthrifty; but we should follow the mean between these. The description of the gnostic or perfect man is a development from the notion of virtue, function, purpose, to that of completeness, that which fulfils a function perfectly, 'the best and completest virtue in a complete life'. Such virtue is complete, balanced, perfect.
There is nothing to be added to it. 'Herein I find perfection is understood in many ways in the case of him who excels in every virtue. Wherefore a man is made perfect as pious, as submissive, as self-disciplined, as industrious, as a martyr, and as a gnostic.' 3 The two elements implied in 'right reason' are also found in Clement.
Goodness is the result both of rational knowledge and moral rectitude. Right action is in accordance with right reason and sin is contrary to reason. 4 The distinction between voluntary and involuntary actions is dealt with by Aristotle in Book III of the Nicomachean Ethics. 'Involuntary actions, then, are thought to be of two kinds, being done either on compulsion, or by reason of ignorance.' 5 The importance of the distinction arises especially in the lawcourts, in estimating the guilt of someone who has committed a breach of law. Similarly Clement says, 'What is involuntary is not judged. This is two-fold -- that which happens through ignorance and that which happens through necessity.' 6 The attribution of sin to ignorance of a different, more general kind was an ____________________ 1Eth. Nic. 1107a.
2Paed. III, 51; I, 266, 6.
3Strom. IV, 130; II, 305, 18.
4Paed. I, 101; I, 150, 21. Clement's language is Stoic. Cf. SVF, III, 500.
5Eth. Nic. 1110a.
6Strom. II, 60; II, 145, 10.
Aristotelian as well as a Platonic and Stoic tenet. 1 Aristotelian language is used to describe the free choice which is the basis of faith, 2 and also the virtue of continence. 3
The Stoics The spirit and phraseology of Stoic ethics are generally evident in Clement's writings. His subordinate ethical ideas come largely from this source. They were very widely accepted in the Roman Empire at that time and were strengthened by their absorption of Platonic and Aristotelian elements. It was because Stoicism had this supremacy and had produced many noble characters that Christians such as Clement followed its terminology in expressing their ideas. Moreover, Stoicism was down to earth in a literal and metaphorical sense. It was intelligible to ordinary people in a way which Plato and Aristotle were not. The writings of Cicero, Seneca,
Epictetus, and Marcus Aurelius gave it a greater propaganda effect than any other system of philosophy. Above all, its dogmatism, its connection with a metaphysical background, and its prophetic spirit brought Stoicism nearer to the outlook of Christians such as Clement.
The metaphysical background affords the best starting point. Stoics believed without reserve in providence. Everything that happened was determined by God in his divine plan. 'Nothing at all takes place on earth apart from thee, O God.' 4
Clement also believed that everything was ordered by God. This belief in providence could be regarded as the destruction of morals. If God governs all things, we have no real power of choice. If there exists no power of choice, how can the distinction between right and wrong, good and bad, convey anything? If God makes all things good in the end, how can it matter whether we act rightly or wrongly? Neither Stoic nor Christian reasoned in this way. They said that while your action did not affect the ultimate fulfil____________________ 1Eth. Nic. 1135b; Völker, p. 128.
2Strom. II, 9; II, 117, 15. Cf. Eth. Nic. 1139b: ε+ πποαíπεσις α+ Eth. Nic. πποαíπεσις, cited Völker, op. cit. p. 239, and Stählin, translation III, p. 156.
3Strom. III, 4; II, 197, 4. Eth. Nic. 1146b. Völker, op. cit. p. 292.
4Cleanthes apud Stobaeum, Eclogae, I, p. 25, Wachsmuth.
merit of God's purpose, it affected you. It made all the difference to your happiness whether you swam with the stream or tried to battle against it, whether your life fitted in with the way the universe worked or whether it did not. The end of life was eudaemonia and this was obtained by living in accordance with nature. 'They say that the end is to be happy and everything is done for the sake of this, while the end is not done for the sake of anything. . . . Zeno defined happiness in this way.' 1
'The end, as Zeno put it, was to live harmoniously. . . . For Cleanthes. . . was the first to put it thus -- the end is to live harmoniously with nature.' 2 Elsewhere Zeno is said to be the first to say this. 3 Cicero also claims that Zeno said the end was
'convenienter naturae vivere'. 4 The difference between living harmoniously and living in harmony with nature need not detain us. The way the Stoics understood it, the second contained the first. Clement says, 'Hence also the Stoics have declared that the end is to live agreeably with nature, inappropriately changing the name of God to that of nature, since nature extends also to growing things, to seeds, to trees, and to stones.' 5 We have seen in the preceding chapter how Clement uses the idea of conformity with nature, or harmonious living, as equivalent to the Biblical idea of following God. He attributes importance to 'nature' as the natural condition and natural order of things and as a creating ordering power. 6 He speaks with disapproval of things which are 'contrary to nature' 7 and of doing violence to nature, 8 while he approves of what is 'according to nature'. 9 It is worth noting
Clement's account of Stoic ethics.
On the other hand Zeno the Stoic holds that the end is to live in accordance with nature, Cleanthes that it is to live in agreement with nature, and Diogenes believed that it was rational behaviour, which he believed lay in the choosing of things in accordance with nature. Antipater, his ____________________ 1Stob. Ecl. II, 138, p. 77, Wachsmuth.
2Stob. Ecl. II, 134, p. 75, Wachsmuth: τò ο+ σει ∯ ν.
3Diog. Laert. VII, 87.
4Cicero, De Finibus, IV, 14.
5Strom. II, 101; II, 168, 9.
σις: Paed. II, 84; I, 209, 2, and Paed. II, 87; I, 210, 12.
σιν: Prot.39; I, 29, 17; Paed. II, 129; I, 234, 4 and elsewhere.
8Paed. II, 129; I, 234, 5.
σιν: ibid, I, 234, 7; Strom. VII, 91; III, 65, 11 and elsewhere.
pupil, assumes the end to lie in choosing perpetually and without transgression the things in accordance with nature and in rejecting things contrary to nature. Again
Archedamus describes the end to be choosing the things that are greatest and most important according to nature, the things which cannot be surpassed. Besides these, Panaetius declared that the end was to live in accordance with the impulses given us by nature. In addition to all these, Posidonius said that the end was to live contemplating the truth and good order of the universe and seeking to realise them oneself to the best of one's ability, completely uninfluenced by the irrational part of the soul. And some of the more recent Stoics defined the end thus -- to live in conformity with the constitution of man. 1
This introduces the second element -- virtue. According to Clement, this was Zeno's conception of the end -- 'living according to virtue'. Virtue, according to the Stoics, was 'a harmonious condition which should be laid hold of for its own sake'. 2
According to Clement, it was 'a condition of the soul in harmony with reason in the whole of life'. 3 Here he follows the Stoics thoroughly, accepting also their insistence upon reason as the ruling part of the soul. 'All that is contrary to right reason is sin.'
κον (fitting and due). That which is due is fitting. And obedience is built upon commandments. These, being the same as admonitions and having truth as their goal, guide to the final thing desired, which is thought of as the End.' 5 Clement's definition of virtue as a state of soul which agrees with reason in the whole of life 6 is a Stoic one, as also is his emphasis on virtue as a permanent disposition. 7 Virtue is the result of voluntary choice, not of one's nature. 8 The ἀνταακολουΘíα of the virtues is expounded with a Christian emphasis. 9 Hope, love, hospitality, philanthropy and other virtues are connected. 'It is evident that if we examine these virtues in turn, we can make this observation concerning them all: whoever has one ____________________ 1Strom. II, 129; II, 183, 1.
2Diog. Laert. VII, 89.
3Paed. I, 101; I, 150, 27. SVF3, 293.
4Ibid. I, 150, 21.
5Paed. I, 102; I, 151, 12.
6Paed. I, 101; I, 150, 27.
7Cf. Völker, op. cit. pp. 455-6.
8Strom. VII, 19; III, 14, 9 = SVF 3, 224.
9ἀ σιν ἀ λαις αι ἀπεταí. Strom. II, 45; II, 136, 23.
virtue gnostically, has them all because they go together.' 1 Continence was a special concern of Clement, defined in Stoic terms, and used to cover dealings not only with sexual matters, but also with money, luxury, possessions, sights, speech and evil thoughts. 2
This brings us to the third element. Nothing is good but the good will, i.e. virtue, i.e. living in rational agreement with nature. Things may be good, bad, or indifferent.
The good things are virtues, manifestations of virtue. The bad things are vices.
Everything else is indifferent. 3 But among these indifferent things, some things have great value and are to be preferred. Others have great 'unvalue' and are not preferred. 4 This gives a guide to co κον, action which is appropriate, incumbent or fitting. 5 κοντα some are perfect, some are not perfect. The perfect actions are right and the others are intermediate. 6 Similarly Clement speaks of plain salvation as the result of medium actions, and right salvation as the result of right action. The action of the gnostic is right, that of the believer intermediate, and that of the pagan sinful. 7 There can be no doubt of Clement's acceptance of the general distinction between good, bad, and intermediate. He says, 'Nor indeed is that which is not good at once bad. For there are some intermediate things, and among the intermediate things some are to be preferred, and some are to be not preferred.' 8
Stoic ethics have been largely known for their notion of apatheia, passionlessness.
'They say the wise man is passionless.' 9 'The Stoics place virtue in passionlessness.'' 10 So Clement remarks, In general the Christian is possessed of stillness, quiet, calm, and peace.' 11 He is no longer self-disciplined, but has
____________________ 1Strom. II, 80; II, 155, 1 = SVF 3, 275. Cf. Strom. VIII, 30; III, 99, 16 = SVF, 2, 349.
10Pseudo-Plutarch, De Vita Homeri, II, 134.
11Paed. II, 60; I, 193, 29.
2Strom. III, 59; II, 223, 5.
3Zeno apud Stob. Ecl. II, 90, p. 57, Wachsmuth.
4Stob. Ecl. II, 154f, p. 84, Wachsmuth.
5Stob. Ecl. II, 158, p. 85, Wachsmuth.
6Stob. Ecl. σα.
7Strom σε, α+
SVF3, 515.
8Strom. IV, 164; II, 312, 18 9Diog. Laert. VII, 117.
reached a state of passionlessness. 1 In the face of disease, misfortune, death, he remains unmoved in his soul. 2 The logical background of apatheia is the recognition of the things which are in our power and the things which are not. 3 This distinction is frequently made by Clement, 4 as is also a distinction between the things which are one's own and the things which are alien to one. 'Wherefore in situations not of his own choice, withdrawing himself from distresses to the things which are his own, he is not carried away with the things that are alien to him.' 5 It is because of this recognition that the Stoic of Marcus Aurelius remains unmoved and unshaken, like the rock about which the seas crash and foam. He is like the gnostic who is 'never put out of his proper habit of mind on a sudden change of circumstance. For the possession through knowledge of the good is steadfast and immutable, being the knowledge of things divine and human.' 6
Passionlessness was a virtue for the Stoics because the passions were sinful. These passions come from the irrational part of the soul, not from the ruling rational part.
7 Clement uses the Stoic definition of lust as irrational appetite, 8 and classes it with anger and pleasure as passions. 9 The passions are against the nature of the soul 10 and indicate a sickness of the soul. 11 C ἀ , a compromise which the Stoics had formulated. 12
That virtue must be disinterested was stated more emphatically by the Stoics than by any other Greek philosophers. Virtue is to be gained for its own sake, 'not because of fear or hope or anything beyond it'. 13 Clement says, 'We must, I believe, approach the saving word neither from fear of punishment nor through ____________________ 1Strom. IV, 138; II, 309, 11 10Paed. I, 6; I, 93, 9 11Ibid. I, 93, 12; SVF, 3, 425.
12Strom. VI, 74; II, 468, 31; SVF, 3, 431; see Völker, pp. 528-9.
13Diogenes Laertius, VII, 89.
2Strom. VII, 61; 111, 44, 22.
3ἐφ ε+ +κ ἐφ ε+ ν. Epictetus, Discourses I, 1 and 4.
4Strom. IV, 153; II, 316, 5 and 8; Strom. VII, 16; 111, 12, 6; Paed. 111, 136; 1, 257, 28.
5Strom. VII, 62; III, 45, 6.
6Strom. VII, 70; III, 50, 27.
7SVF, I, 202 and 208; Clement, Paed. III, 53; I, 266, 27; cited Völker, p. 129.
8Strom. II, 119; II, 177, 22; SVF, 3, 391 and 396; cited Völker, p. 130. These points are discussed,
Völker, pp. 129-30.
9Strom. IV, 40; II, 266, 11.
any promise of a gift, but because of the good itself.' 1 'But only well-doing for love and for the good itself is to be chosen by the gnostic.' 2 Love, disinterested love of God, is the gnostic's motive, and this added much to the Stoic doctrine. 3 Clement's ideal character is like the Wise Man of the Stoics. Such men alone have knowledge,
4 are noble, 5 free, kings 6 and priests. 7
Two metaphysical concepts are of importance for the ethics of the Stoics and of Clement. First, the logos spermatikos of the Stoics, or the indwelling Christ of Clement, is the source of all that is good. Its sovereignty in the individual is the condition of right living. It is the source of reason for the Stoic, and of love and grace for the Christian. So Marcus Aurelius speaks of 'the daemon, the particle of himself which Zeus gives to each man as his controller and governor, 8 and Clement says, 'In the soul of the just man, through obedience to the commandments, the ruler of all things mortal and immortal is consecrated and set apart.' 9 Secondly, there is the concept of the two cities, later developed by Augustine. Here Clement is his own witness of the debt.
But I shall pray to the spirit of Christ to wing me aloft to my Jerusalem. For the Stoics say that heaven is truly a city, but those 'cities' here on earth are not yet cities. They are so named but they are not. For a city is an excellent thing, and the citizens a fine body, a mass of men regulated by law as the Church is by the Logos.
For the Church is a city on earth, a city impregnable and not ruled by tyrants, where
God's will is done on earth as it is in heaven. 10
CONCLUSION
The goodness of things other than God is both one thing and many things. The first account of it was 'likeness to God'. The second account produced results too lengthy and various to ____________________ 1Strom. IV, 29; II, 261, 10.
10Strom. IV, 172; II, 324, 24.
2Strom. IV, 135; II, 308, 15.
3Strom. VII, 67; III, 48, 17.
4Strom. VI, 162; II, 515, 28. SVF, 3, 213, 552. See Völker, p. 315.
5Prot + Cf. SVF, 3, 594.
6Strom. II, 144; II, 192, 21; Strom. VII, 22; III, 16, 9. SVF, 3, 618; 3, 591; 3, 655. Cited Völker, p. 509.
7Strom. IV, 158; II, 318, 12. SVF, 3, 604; cited Völker, p. 510.
8Meditations, V, 27.
9Strom. VII, 16; III 12, 16.
recount. How can the two accounts be reconciled? The answer which Clement gives is expressed in a metaphor at the close of the chapter on the End and its definition as likeness to God.
Therefore assimilation to God, so that as far as possible a man may become just and holy with prudence, he adopts as the goal at which faith aims. And he fixes as the End the restoration of the promise which is through faith. From these things spring the sources of those who have defined the end and of whom we have spoken previously. 1
The water which gushes from a deep spring may be diverted into different streams with a common source. The definitions which philosophers have made of the End spring from a common source -- the end of assimilation to God. Assimilation to God is a spring which feeds many streams. Each stream is an end or one of the many things that have been called good. Clement's reference is to his preceding chapters on the opinions of the philosophers concerning 'the End'. He has rejected their accounts, but his writings show that he accepts the values which they recommend.
He accepts them, but not as 'the End'. He accepts them as parts or partial manifestations of 'the End' which is assimilation to God, justice, holiness and prudence. This End is not a simple unity like the goodness of God. The goodness of things other than God has many aspects, but they are all ways of becoming like God and participating in his goodness. 'Haec est summa lex in virtute exercenda: Deum imitare. Hanc saepissime repetit Clemens. Ex hac pendent praecepta omnia.' 2 The philosophers have made the mistake of most Socratic 'victims'. They have confused one case of goodness with goodness itself. They have seen but one spray of the fountain and called it the fountain. They are elsewhere described as tearing the limbs of truth apart and claiming their part to be the whole. This is what they have done with goodness. Consequently they were wrong, but wrong in a way that is useful.
Clement's account of goodness is of the same pattern as his account of God. There is a unity which is simple and unique, one
____________________ 1Strom. II, 136; II, 188, 20.
2P. Hofstede de Groot, Disputatio de Clemente Alexandrino, philosopho Christiano . . . (Groningae,
1826), p. 79. Cited by Völker, op. cit. p. 585.
thing alone. There is a unity which is complex and manifold, one thing and many things. The goodness of God is one thing, unique, simple and transcendent. The goodness of men is one thing (assimilation to God) and many things (all the Platonic, Aristotelian and Stoic values that have been mentioned). As in Part One, the second unity depends on the first unity. The goodness of men, though distinct from that of God, is only good as it participates in the ultimate goodness of God.
PART III TRUTH