Chapter 2 - God
CHAPTER 2
GOD CLEMENT'S philosophical account of God is found chiefly in Book V of the Stromateis. This book begins with an account of faith and hope as ways in which the mind perceives objects invisible to the senses, and goes on to speak of symbols and enigmas and the way in which they hide the truth from the uninitiated. Justification is given for the use of the symbolical style when it is applied to sacred things.
Plato's 'Seventh Epistle' is quoted: 'I must indeed speak to you in riddles, so that if my letter should fall into wrong hands in any corner of land or sea, the reader will not understand it.' Clement goes on to say, 'For the God of the universe, who is above all speech, all thought, and all concepts, can never be committed to writing, being ineffable by his power.' 1
Men get wrong ideas of God because they are slaves to their passions. Passions have as their objects material things, and material things are very far removed from God. Using a simile which Philo had used Clement says, 'But the majority of men, being wrapped round with mortal things just as snails are encased in their shells and being rolled like hedgehogs in a ball around their lusts, think of the blessed and immortal God in the same terms as they think about themselves. But although it is so obvious it has escaped their notice that God has given us thousands of things in which he himself does not participate.' 2
To avoid this mistake men must free themselves from all passions and earthly influence and free their notion of God from anything which is other than bare unity.
We lay hold of the way of cleansing by confession and then the way of vision by analysis, pressing on by analysis to the basis of thought, making a beginning from the things which underlie vision. We take
____________________ 1Strom. v, 65; 11, 369, 24. Plato, Epist. 11, 312D.
2Strom. v, 68; II, 371, 11.
away from physical body its natural qualities, stripping off the dimension of depth, then that of breadth, and after these, that of length. For the point which is left is unity, as it were, with position, and if we remove position from it, unity is perceived.
If then, after removing all that belongs to physical bodies, and the things that are called bodiless, we cast ourselves into the vastness of Christ, and from there we go forward through holiness into the void; if we do these things we shall reach in some way the perception of the Almighty, knowing not what he is, but what he is not. But shape and movement, or standing still, or throne or place, or right hand, or left hand, are in no way whatever to be thought of as belonging to the Father of all things, even if these things are written. But what each of these means will be shown in its proper place. The first cause, then, is not in any place, but above place, and time, and name, and thought. 1
There are three parts to this process -- purification from sin, logical analysis, and union with Christ in holiness. First we must confess our sins and be cleansed from them. Then we must abstract from our notion of a physical object every quality except that of simple unity. Then we throw ourselves into the vastness of Christ and advance through holiness into the void. This brings us to a perception of God, but the mystery remains. We do not know what he is but only what he is not. The first part of the process is called the 'stage of cleansing', and the second is the analysis which leads to the final 'stage of vision'. Analysis and vision are compared respectively with the lesser and greater mysteries. The result of this process is that we know what God is not, but we do not know what he is. We come closest to God in the concept of bare unity, the consequences and descriptions of which are purely negative. We can neither know nor say anything positive about God. God can neither be named nor conceived. He is other than our ideas would suggest. We must therefore deny all the qualities of ordinary things to him until we have the concept of bare unity. Then leaving these things for Christ, and advancing through the unknown void, we reach the concept of God in an unusual way. It is a concept which is not a concept, a knowledge of what God is not and an ignorance of what he is. We must not be misled by the language of the Scriptures about God's right
____________________ 1Strom. v, 71; 11, 374, 4.
hand and left hand and other things because these do not mean what they seem to mean. God is above all these things, outside space and time, beyond the realm of names and concepts.
This passage expresses an element of Middle Platonism which persisted into NeoPlatonism and according to which God can be known only by stripping or abstracting all qualities from our idea of an existing thing. It is found in Maximus of Tyre, 1
Albinus, 2 and later in Plotinus. 3 It is foreshadowed in the simple unity of the first hypothesis in Plato's Parmenides. Clement has expressed this idea in a Christian context. We begin by confession and cleansing from sin. We end in holy union with Christ. In two direct borrowings from Philo which follow, the chief point is not Philonic -- 'The grace of knowledge is from God through the Son.' 4
After quoting Plato to the effect that it is hard to find the Father and Maker of all things and that, having found him, it is impossible to speak about him, Clement gives his most comprehensive philosophical statement about God. 5
(1) 'Indeed this is the most difficult question about God. For since the first principle of everything is hard to find, the absolutely first and oldest first principle is in all respects hard to show, which first principle is the cause of all things coming into being and being.'
It is hard to give an account of God. Any first principle is hard to get at. God is the first of all first principles and the hardest to get at and to describe. This idea goes back to Plato and his account of the ultimate first principle of all things. 6 Plato's first principle is the cause of the existence and being of the forms. 7 It is seen last and with difficulty. 8 It is so difficult to express that Socrates says, 'I am afraid I shall not manage it [the account of the good] and if I have the courage to try, my awkwardness will be laughed at.' 9 It has been shown that these views became axio____________________ 1Max. Tyr. 143, II. οὕτω καì νũνἀ ì ἄφελε τῶ+ ῳ τǹν περιßολǹν ταúτην. Cf. Theiler, p.
57.
2Albinus, X, 5.
3ἄφ , Plotinus, Enn. v, 3. 17.
4Strom V, 71; 11, 374, 23.
5Strom. V, 81-2; 11, 380, 14 to II, 381, 13.
6Rep. 511B.
7Rep. 509 B.
8Rep. 517B.
9Rep. 506B. A. D. Lindsay's translation.
matic for Middle Platonism. Philo describes God as 'the most generic thing'. 1 God cannot be discerned by other things, and it is right that he should not be apprehended by any one other than himself because his pureness, goodness and oldness make him remote from them. 2
(2) 'For how could that be spoken of which is neither genus, nor differentia, nor species, nor individual, nor number, and on the other hand is neither an accident nor that to which an accident pertains?'
God is neither genus, difference, species, individual, number, accident, nor substance. Therefore God cannot be expressed in words. Aristotle asserted that there were five kinds of predicates which could be asserted of a thing. 3 These five predicables were definition, proprium, genus, difference, and accident. The listwas changed by Porphyry, the Neo-Platonist, to genus, species, difference, property, accident, and this list is still maintained by Scholastic philosophers today. 4
Clement's list differs from both of these. He includes individual, which Porphyry also mentions, and distinguishes quantity (number) and substance from genus. These were regarded by Aristotelians as genera or categories.
Such differences are of historical interest. The important things for us are Clement's suppressed premiss which is stated by Aristotle -- 'Whenever a predicate is affirmed of any subject' it must fall under a limited number of predicables -- and Clement's argument that, since none of these predicables can be applied to God, he cannot be expressed in words. Clement is most definite on this point. Strictly speaking, we cannot talk about God.
(3) 'Nor can one correctly describe him as "whole". 5 For wholeness is applied to magnitude and he is the Father of the whole world.'
God is the Father of the whole world but we cannot call him 'whole'. Wholeness is a quality of physical magnitude, a quality of the things which God brings into being.
____________________ 1Leg. All. 11, 21.
2De Praem. et Poen. 6.
3Topica, 1, 8, 2-3.
4G. H. Joyce, Principles of Logic ( London, 1936), p. 121.
5ἀνενδεńς: Prot. 56; 1, 44, 16. Paed. in, 1; 1, 236, 1. Strom. II, 28; II, 128, 8. Strom. II, 68; 11, 371, 16.
Strom. VII, 14; III, II, 9.
(4) 'Nor are any parts to be ascribed to him. For the One is indivisible.'
God is one, indivisible, without parts. This is still another barrier to his being described. Were he the sum of describable parts, we could furnish a kind of description. This proposition is an explicit statement of the important feature of the first hypothesis in Plato's Parmenides -- 'If there is a One, of course the One will not be many. Consequently it cannot have any parts or be a whole.' 1 God is a simple undivided unity. Similarly the First God of Numenius is 'simple and in no way divisible' 2 and Philo says, 'But God is not a compound, not composed of many ingredients, but unmixed with all else.' 3
(5) 'Therefore it is infinite, not merely in the sense that one cannot give an exhaustive account of it, but in the sense that one cannot analyse it into parts and that it has no limit and is therefore without form or name.'
God is boundless or infinite in that he has no dimensions or limit. Consequently he has neither form nor name. Like the bare unity of Plato's Parmenides God is without beginning, end, middle, limits, or shape. Were he to have any of these things he would be more than one. This proposition follows from the indivisible unity of God.
'For the One is indivisible, therefore it is boundless.' Dimensions, limit, form, name would entail divisibility and plurality.
(6) 'If we sometimes name it, we do not do so properly, calling it either the One, or the Good, or Mind, or Being, or Father, or God, or Creator, or Lord.'
The names One, the Good, Mind, the Real or Being, Father, Creator, Lord are not used properly (correctly, literally, exactly) of God. God cannot have a proper name.
A name would not only destroy his unity, but would bring him down into the realm of ordinary limited things. The next chapter (V, 13) begins, 'Everything then which comes under a name is begotten.' 4 Clement emphasises this point as a way of emphasising the fact that God is beyond names and things with names.
____________________ 1Plato, Parmenides, 137A.
2Numenius,περì τἀγαΘοũ, 20 (XXVI).
3Leg. All. 11, 1.
4Strom. V, 83; II, 381, 14.
(7) 'We do not speak as giving his name, but because of our lack we avail ourselves of good names, so that the intellect, not going astray in other respects, may lean on these as supports.' 1
Clement is not here concerned with degrees of truth, nor does he consider these names are nearer the limit of truth than other names. All names are incorrect. A name or names are necessary for discourse. Ethical considerations determine that the names should be good ones. But strictly speaking the names are not names at all. God can have no name.
(8) 'For each by itself does not declare God, but all of them in the mass indicate the power of the Almighty.'
God's 'names' say too much or too little. In so far as he is the abstract One, no name is appropriate. In so far as the One is the first principle of all things and the first cause, no list of names, however imposing, is sufficient. But the names which are used do not apply to God, but indicate the power of God. In so far as anything is predicated of God, it says too much. In so far as anything is predicated of the effects of his power, it says too little.
(9) 'For predicates are applied to things, either from the things which belong to themselves or from their condition in relation to one another. But none of these can be accepted as appropriate to God.'
This is a division of possible predicates into those which apply to a thing in itself and those which apply to it as related to other entities. The first will be those regarded by Aristotle as coextensive with their subject (definition, property), as against those not coextensive (genus, differentia, accident). Clement's division would be species, individual as against genus, difference, number, accident, substance. We cannot speak of what belongs to God in himself, for this would mean a distinction and a duality in the One. We cannot speak of God as having a relation to anything else, because this would mean a loss of remoteness, and a distinction between the One and the One as related to that thing.
(10) 'On the other hand, he is not understood by scientific demonstration, for this depends on prior and more readily known principles, and there is nothing prior to the Unoriginated.'
____________________ 1Cf. Plotinus, Enn. II, 9, 1.
Scientific demonstration or explanation means definition in terms of prior and better known principles. God cannot be described in terms of prior and better known principles, because by definition there is nothing before the Unoriginated.
(11) 'It remains for us to perceive the Unknown by the grace of God and by the Logos alone that proceeds from him. Luke in the Acts of the Apostles refers to Paul as saying, "Men of Athens, I perceive that you are very religious people. For in walking about, and looking at the objects of your worship, I found an altar on which was inscribed, To an Unknown God. Whom therefore ye ignorantly worship, him declare I unto you."' 1
The One, unknown in himself, is understood by what proceeds from him, namely his
Logos. In this passage we pass from philosophy to religion. God transcends logical categories and all the names that might be given him. He cannot be grasped by demonstrative knowledge or logical methods of classification and explanation. Other ways of knowledge being excluded, one possibility is left. It is that we perceive the unknown God by his grace and by the Logos that comes from him. The rest of Book
V is given to this final thought -- the knowledge of God is a divine gift and cannot be obtained apart from his grace. Philosophy may tell us what God is not, and this is important, for it makes possible the removal of false ideas from our minds and from the minds of others. But to perceive God is only possible outside the limits of logical thought. We perceive God by divine grace or else we do not perceive him at all.
Two Problems There are two problems which face an account of God as a transcendent unity. The first is in what way language can be applied to a God who is outside language.
Every thinker who has called God ineffable has nevertheless continued to speak of him. How can this be justified? The second problem is how this abstract entity can yet be the first cause, the creator of everything. The treatment of these two problems by Clement, Philo and Plotinus will be considered.
____________________ 1Acts xvii. 22-3.
Clement's treatment of the first problem is marked by a lack of compromise.
Nothing can be predicated of God and no name can be given to him -- a name and a predicate would destroy both his unity and his transcendence. All the names that are given to him are strictly not his names at all, but props for us to lean on, good names which keep us from going further astray. Clement's uncompromising statement has given trouble to many of his readers, 1 but it is the only consistent account that could be given. The theory of symbolism 2 reaffirms the inexpressibility of divine things. The written word leads to God not by direct description but by symbol and enigma. The first principles of things are veiled in mystery. The Scripture presents itself in a mysterious form. Clement's own writings are full of symbolism. These mysteries can be penetrated and the symbols can be understood by the man who has received God's gift of knowledge. But the penetration and the understanding are mysterious and are not ways of reducing God into logically intelligible terms. What Clement says about God in any positive statement is not to be taken literally, but understood 'gnostically'. Knowledge of God which is purely rational is purely negative. The Stromateis are gnostic notes' which have meaning only for those who have received the gift of divine knowledge. To those who refuse his grace and ignore his Logos, God remains 'the Unknown God'.
The second great difficulty is that of how this abstraction can be 'the cause of all things coming into being' and their Creator. God cannot produce things from within himself, for this would attribute plurality, change, and many other inconsistent things to him. God cannot produce things from a co-existing substratum of matter, for the co-existence of such matter would be inconsistent with his unity and transcendence. There is only one way of creation for such a God, and that is creation ex nihilo. By this the inexplicable mystery of creation is recognised.
'Theism must frankly confess that the kernel of positive meaning in the notion of creation . . . is inexplicable. . . . The gradations
____________________ 1E.g. Bigg: 'It is essentially a heathen conception, and can be developed consistently only on heathen principles', The Christian Platonists of Alexandria, p. 95.
2See ch. 13.
between the infinite one and the finite many, devised by Philo, Plotinus, Spinoza, etc., conduct nearer to the abyss but do not bridge it. . . . The modus operandi of divine creativity is wholly unimaginable and inconceivable. And this inexplicability is inevitable.' 1 Clement is the first person to state and give reasons for the doctrine of creation ex nihilo. In the Protrepticus he denounces idol worship and Stoic philosophy for their veneration of material things. God alone is to be worshipped, for he transcends the universe in power and majesty. 'How mighty is the power of God! His will alone is sufficient to create the world. For God alone has made it since he alone is truly God. Through simply willing, he creates. As soon as he merely wills a thing its existence follows immediately.' 2 God's will is omnipotent, and a sufficient cause of anything's existence. When God wills a thing it simultaneously springs into existence. 'Everything takes place at the same time as he commands it. It follows from his bare intention to give a gift that the gift is fully made.' 3 'What he wills is thereby real and the name for this reality is the world.' 4 The philosophers, says
Clement, learnt from Moses that the world had a beginning and owed its existence to something other than itself. 5 Plato spoke of the difficulty of finding the maker and father of the universe. By this he indicated that God produced the universe as a father a son. The universe owed its existence to him alone and came out of what did not exist. 6 Clement adheres to the Biblical view that God moulded man out of dust,
7 but he does not give any justification for the view that the world was made out of pre-existing matter. 8
For Philo, God is one simple, unique being. He is a simple substance, alone, and unmixed. 9 While he is 'the most generic
____________________ 1Tennant, Philosophical Theology( Cambridge, 1925-30), vol. II, p. 125.
2Prot. 63; 1, 48, 16.
3Paed. 126; 1, 105, 30.
4Paed. 1, 27; 1, 106, 9.
5Strom. V, 92; 11, 386, 21.
6Strom. V, 92; II, 387, 2: ὡς ἄν ἐ ì ἐκ μǹ őντος ὑ . Plato did not mean this, but Clement evidently does.
7Paed. 1, 98; 1, 148, 18.
8Strom. 11, 74; 11, 152, 2: οὕτ εἱ ἐκμǹ őντων ποιοíη οὕτ εἱ ἐξ ὕλης δημιουργοíη gives no indication of Clement's views. He argues against heretics that God has no natural relation to us whether he made us out of nothing or out of matter, because in neither case would we be of the same stuff as God.
9Leg. All. II, 2.
thing' 1 he is nevertheless without qualities. He is in no way comparable with other things, but is simple being, the concept of existence alone being applicable to him. 2
He is the indivisible Monad. We do not even see God from afar off. All we see is that he is a long way from all creation and that he is far beyond the reach of human thought. He cannot be named, spoken of, or comprehended in any way at all. 3
This account is similar to Clement's. But Philo was not prepared to write off religious language in the way Clement does. Philo allows the predication of properties to God and restricts his ineffability to qualities. 4 Properties belong to things in themselves, whereas qualities are held in common with other members of a class. 'He is "without qualities", and nevertheless we may affirm that he is eternal, self-existent, omnipotent, omniscient, perfect; for these predicates belong to himself alone and place him outside of every genus.' 5 If God is ineffable then we cannot predicate of him qualities or properties. If he is incomprehensible then his bare existence cannot be comprehended. If he is unnameable then we cannot (as Philo does elsewhere) speak of 'the most holy name' or the 'name' of God. 6 Clement saw these alternatives and made his choice. Philo had not seen the alternatives.
Philo's account of the origin of the world is indebted largely to Plato's Timaeus, 7 and partly to Stoic writings. He considers the pre-existent matter of the world to have been worked on and ordered by God, 8 describes it after Plato as the mother, fostermother, or nurse of created things, 9 and also gives it the qualities of the Stoic inert matter.
There has been a division of opinion as to whether Philo considered this matter to have been created or not. Bréhier's account shows that despite some isolated and puzzling passages, ____________________ 1Leg. All. 11, 86.
2Quod Deus Sit Immutabilis. XI, 55.
3Somn. 1, 11, 66.
. Cf. ἱ . Cf. Drummond, Philo Judaeus or the Jewish Alexandrian Philosophy, II, pp.
234. Bréhier, Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d,Alexandrie, p. 72. And see Wolfson,
Philo, II, 126ff.
5De Agr. 3, 13. Drummond, op. cit. vol. II, p. 26.
6Decal. 19, 93, 94.
7Cf. Bréhier, op. cit. pp. 78-9.
8De Plant. 2, 5.
9De Ebriet. XIV, 61.
'Creation acts upon matter, but this matter is not the object of a previous creative act. The activity of God remains always that of a demiurge.' 1 The ideas are created without matter and are 'made' whereas earthly things are 'fashioned' 2 out of preexisting matter. Until recently the consensus of opinion has been that Philo did not think of matter as created. 'Primary matter is, for Philo and for Plato alike, uncreated, a kind of eternal being. . . . Philo nowhere speaks of matter as created.'
3 This view has recently been opposed by Wolfson. Philo's account of creation in the De Opificio Mundi has been examined and the evidence shown to be in favour of matter being created by God, '. . . the pre-existent matter out of which the world was created was itself created by God'. 4 But matter was not created ex nihilo, so that it remains true to say with Bréhier, 'The idea which Philo introduces into philosophy is not the idea of creation ex nihilo but that of creation at various levels and through intermediary beings.' 5 Despite disagreement concerning Philo's account of creation it has not been maintained by any disputant that Philo puts forward a theory of creation ex nihilo.
The One of Plotinus is a simple transcendent unity. It is beyond being, 6 essence, and thought (v, 6, 6). It is formless (VI, 9, 3) and neither at rest nor moving (VI, 9,
3). It is everywhere and nowhere (V, 5, 8). It is simple and pure -- unlike a one which is also many and a one which is numerical (V, 5, 4). It is ineffable, nameless, without need, possessions, will or thought (VI, 9, 4-5). It cannot be known because knowledge entails plurality. 7 Though it has no name it is known by its offspring. 8
Plotinus sees clearly the way in which a name would destroy the unity and transcendence of the one and make it merely one thing among other things. He says, 'However, we shall try to designate it as far as possible to ourselves (V, 3,
13).'
Despite the clarity and penetration of Plotinus's account, there appear to be certain inconsistencies. Perception, life, and ____________________ 1Bréhier, op. cit. p. 81.
2Leg. All. 1, 31. ἐ .
3Billings, The Platonism of Philo Judaeus, p. 24.
4Wolfson, op. cit. vol. II, p. 323.
5Bréhier, op. cit. p. 82.
6Enn. v, 5, 6.
7Enn. VI, 9, 4: ἐπιστńμη.
8Enn.
consciousness are attributed to the One (V, 4, 2). It is the power of all things (V, 3,
15-16) and it is identical with the Good (11, 9, 1). These are indications of a readiness to talk about the One which is not consistent with its ineffability.
'However, I will not conceal my opinion', said Inge, 'that Plotinus tells us too much about "the One". The inevitable result is that his successors postulate some still more mysterious principle behind the Monad.' 1
When we turn to Plotinus's account of the One as first cause and producer of all things, we find again an acute awareness of the problems involved. 2 The One is above speech, thought, and sensation, yet it gives these things to us. How can the One give them to us if it does not have them? How can it have them and yet be simple? We can imagine one thing being derived from simple unity, as a ray of light comes from a point of light, but we cannot in this way imagine the derivation of many things from the One. There is a second first principle which is one and many.
The One is all things potentially, while the second first principle is all things actually.
But the notion of potentiality is appropriate to passive matter prior to its reception of form and not appropriate to the One. 'How then can the One produce what it does not possess? It produces not by chance nor by reflection, but it produces nevertheless.'
Plotinus then gives an explanation in terms of power. The One is an infinitely great power. 3 It must have produced everything because nothing else has the power to do this and because what produces must be simpler than the thing it produces.
Plotinus is not as satisfied with this explanation when he has finished as he was when he began. He passes then to the notion of the One as the Good, the final cause of the world of Nous. In Nous are life and intelligence, which are copied from and caused by the life and intelligence which are in the Good.
These explanations, as that in a previous section 4 which describes the emanation of the many from the One as the over____________________ 1Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, vol. II. p. 116.
2Enn. V, 3, 15. A paraphrase of this section follows.
4Enn. V, 2, 1.
flowing of the perfection of the One, do not solve the problem. To say that the One is a great power, is the Good, or is an overflowing perfection, to place a One-many as a second first principle, does not explain the puzzle -- how can a simple Unity produce many things? It is disappointing that despite a clear statement of the problem Plotinus really does imagine that he shows how the many proceed from One. 1
From this comparison of Clement, Philo and Plotinus it would appear that in Clement's treatment of the problems arising from the ineffability and creative activity of the One the most consistent account is given. Clement is more ready to accept the consequences of the ineffability of the One and the inexplicability of the method of creation. It is possible that Clement was less inclined to put forward bad solutions of philosophical problems because the existence of the problem was less painful to him than it was to Philo and Plotinus. He could tolerate incompleteness because he found completeness and consistency in his Christian experience.
____________________ 1Enn. V, 3, 16: 'We have shown elsewhere . . .'.