Chapter 11 - Logical Knowledge
CHAPTER 11
LOGICAL KNOWLEDGE
KNOWLEDGE
FOR Clement knowledge means two things. It is a thing of the intellect and a thing of the spirit. Knowledge finds truth by logical procedure and classifies things and concepts by reference to a system of thought. It begins with a faith which must inquire and it ascends to the knowledge of God. On the other hand knowledge is a life of the spirit and a growth in virtue. It begins with a faith which is God's power to salvation and goes on to perfection in the contemplation of God. These two kinds of knowledge start, continue, and finish together. They begin with faith and end in the vision of God. Their practices -- logical inquiry and Christian piety -- are interdependent ways of doing the same thing. This inseparability of intellect and spirit is not easy for us to follow and we may divide the two elements in order to understand better what Clement has to say. But in distinguishing the intellectual from the spiritual, the logical from the moral, it must be remembered that 'sa pensé est à la fois toute rationnelle et toute mystique.En lui le théologien et le "spirituel " ne se séparent pas.' 1 Three general definitions of knowledge are given at the beginning of the sixth book of the Stromateis. 2 Two are accepted and one is rejected.
Our knowledge and the spiritual paradise are our Saviour himself, into whom we are now planted after being transferred and transplanted out of the old life into good soil. The change of soil conduces to fruitfulness. The Lord, then, into whom we have been transplanted is the Light and true knowledge.
Now there are two other ways in which the word 'knowledge' is used.
____________________ 1Camelot, Foi et Gnose. Introduction à l'étude de la connaissance mystique chez Clζment d'Alexandrie, p. 58.
2Strom. VI, 2; II, 423, 11.
What is commonly referred to as knowledge, like intelligence and preconception, appears in all men universally in the knowing of particular objects. In it not only the rational but equally the irrational faculties participate. I would never call that knowledge which comes from sense-perception.
But that which is called knowledge in a special sense 1 is characterised by judgement and reason.
Through it rational powers alone will produce cases of knowledge, being directed only to mental objects through the bare activity of the soul. 'That man is good', says David, 2 'who pities those destroyed by error and lends a share of the word of truth, not in a haphazard way', but -- 'he will dispense his words in judgement' -- with careful consideration. This is he who 'has scattered and given to the poor'.
The second definition of knowledge is rejected because, although it is most generally accepted, it deals partly with senseperceived objects and not solely with intellectual objects. Clement did not regard sense-perception as a means of discovering truth. 'The third definition defines knowledge as Plato and other philosophers would. This may be conveniently called logical knowledge. The first definition is peculiarly Christian and defines our knowledge as Christ himself. This may be called spiritual knowledge.
Clement's terminology 3 is, as usual, not systematic, and beyond these three broad definitions there is nothing fixed. He draws on Stoicism, Platonism and mystery religion for his terms. The resulting diversity may be measured from his description of γνωισ as an ἱδíωμα as well as an ἐ íαἐπιωτńμηðεωπíα. For Clement ἐπιωτńμη is rational knowledge or understanding, equivalent often to ἀΠóδειξισ. It is difficult to translate because the word 'science' is now rarely used to distinguish strictly reasoned knowledge from other kinds of knowledge. The word ἐΠΙωτńμη is also appl σις consists of Θíοτις of first principles, and ἐπιστńμη of the Π1íωτισ which follows from these principles. ΘΠιωτρμη is used to describe the vision of the ____________________ 1ἐαιπεéτωσ.
2Ps. cxii, 5 and 9.
3For the greater part of this paragraph I am indebted to Völker's section on the subject in Der wahre
Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus, pp. 303-21.
gnostic. ωισ is not natural θεωπíα but ἐΠοΠτικńΠιωημονικń and καταληΠτικń. ωοφíα is the perfection of knowledge, refers chiefly to the state of the knower and echoes the meanings given to it in the Wisdom literature and the Epistles of St Paul.
LOGICAL KNOWLEDGE
Some account has already been given of Clement's attitude to philosophy and the mental training of the schools. He regarded some acquaintance with logical disciplines as essential to the Christian.
Some people [he says], thinking that they are 'gifted', deign neither to touch philosophy or dialectic nor to learn physical science. They require bare faith alone.
Just as if they expected, after giving no attention to the vine, to pick bunches of grapes immediately from the beginning. The Lord is allegorically called the vine from which, with care and logical husbandry, the fruit is to be gathered. 1
This logical skill is necessary for the interpretation of the Scriptures. We need it to hunt out the meaning of the complicated utterances of Scripture. We need logic again as a defence against the enemies of our faith. 'It is necessary for us to be familiar with the science of refutation for the sake of rejecting the deceitful opinions of the Sophists.' 2 But we need it for the still more important reason that knowledge is directed towards intellectual objects and results from the exercise of rational powers.
This is the meaning of the third definition of knowledge. Knowledge is distinguished by judgment and reason, the work of the rational faculties which are directed solely to intellectual objects through the activity of the soul alone.
(I) Judgement and reason The so-called 'Eighth Book' of the Stromateis provides evidence of the kind of logic which Clement practised. This book is not part of the Stromateis, but is a note-book of extracts which Clement had made. 3 The contents of the book lack continuity
____________________ 1Strom. I, 43; II, 28, 18.
2Strom. I, 35; II, 23,19.
3These and the following critical remarks are based on J. von Arnim, De octavo Clement is
Stromateorum fibro ( Rostock, 1894), p. 12. Cf. Bousset,
but belong to the common field of logic. It appears that the book is based on notes which Clement took from lectures or from written treatises on logic. The notes are not derived from one lecture or course of lectures, nor from the works of one particular school. They were not prepared for publication and were not made public during Clement's life. These extracts show that Clement was interested in logic as an independent discipline. They also show the problems which he considered important. The arguments which are noted in this book are used in different ways throughout the Stromateis.
The contents of the book may be briefly indicated. It begins 1 with a statement of the necessity for, and the nature of, philosophical inquiry. This inquiry is necessary for the discovery of truth. It is, however, neither necessary nor desirable if it does not aim at the discovery of truth, but merely contents itself with argument. The most ancient philosophers, says Clement, were not given to sceptical disputation, and much less are we, whom the Scripture tells to seek and to examine for the sake of finding. It is only the more recent Greek philosophers who quibble incessantly and argue to no purpose except that of their own glorification. The barbarian philosophy rejects wordy wrangling and says, 'Seek and ye shall find; knock and it shall be opened to you; ask and it shall be given you.' When we knock at the door of truth by logical inquiry, the barrier to knowledge is removed. When we ask questions in the Scripture, we receive the gift of knowledge from God. For we only find by seeking, examining, analysing, unfolding, questioning and clarifying. It is impossible not to gain knowledge if we do inquire fully in this way. (There is neither finding without seeking nor seeking without finding.) Those who are conscious of their ignorance should inquire. It is our duty to investigate not only the Scriptures but also common ideas, always working to some useful end. There are hot-headed wranglers and Sophists, but 'it is fitting that the lover
____________________ Jüdisch-Christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandrien und Rom, p. 199. Pohlenz, Klemens von Alexandreia und sein hellenisches Christentum, p. 111. Witt, Albinus and the history of Middle Platonism, pp. 3139. Ernst (De Clementis Alexandrini Stromatum, libro VIII qui fertur, Göttingen, 1910) has been available through the references of Bousset and Pohlenz.
1Strom. VIII, I; III, 80, 3.
of truth should be at the same time a peaceful learner even in his inquiries, proceeding by rational proof to apprehending knowledge, for love not of himself but of truth'. 1
The first logical term discussed and expounded is ἀπóδειξις. The term is not a meaningless sound but is used by all people as referring to some thing. In all discussion we must start from a clear and generally accepted definition of the term to be discussed. Such a definition of demonstration is: 'Discourse, which, from things accepted, produces belief in things disputed.' Demonstration, like belief and knowledge, may be firm and based on understanding, or else based on hope. 2 Real demonstration is the former kind, as the real doctor is the perfect doctor, and the real gnostic the perfect gnostic. 'For, by considering the perfection of the genus, we arrive at the most exact meaning of the terms.' 3 Demonstration draws conclusions from true premisses. Syllogism merely draws appropriate conclusions from premisses which may be true or false. Demonstration depends on first principles which cannot be demonstrated, but must be accepted by faith. Other first principles of demonstration, which come after that which springs from faith, are the things which appear clearly to sense and intellect, things which are simple, unanalysable or primary. 4 One may demonstrate by drawing conclusions from these first principles.
Analysis is the reverse process of demonstration. It follows a train of reasoning back to its source in something believed from itself or something clear to sense and intellect. Every inquiry must start from something previously known. In fact, every inquiry is solved from pre-existing knowledge. This means that when we want to solve a problem we must first find out what the problem is. We must have clear definitions of its terms. If someone asks, Is the foetus an animal?' we must ask,
'What do you call an animal?' for Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics had different ideas as to what animals were. With this discussion and its emphasis on clear starting points, Clement brings his account of demonstration to an end. This account is derived mainly from Aristotelian sources.
____________________ 1Strom. VIII, 2; III, 81, 5.
3Strom. VIII, 5; III, 82, 23.
4Strom. VIII, 7; III, 83, 24.
The refutation of sceptical suspense which follows is from the Stoic tradition. If nothing is certain then it cannot be certain 'that nothing is certain'. If we must always suspend our judgement, then we should suspend our judgement concerning our suspense of judgement. Suspense of judgement, however, has its place. The dogmatic philosopher is quite used to suspending judgement on particular points because of their obscurity or indecisive evidence, or because of his own inability to penetrate the problem. Scepticism, Clement returns to say in chapter 7, 1 is due to two causes -- the nature of the human mind, and the nature of the world which confronts it. On the one hand men seem to be always changing their minds and disagreeing with one another. Life is full of courts and councils which have to decide between conflicting alternatives, and libraries are full of books written by people who are as sure that they are right as they are sure that others are wrong. On the other hand the world is a very complicated place and it is hard to decide about it.
One cannot believe everything nor can one disbelieve everything, and often the evidence is balanced between conflicting views. So we are led to scepticism.
In the chapter 2 between these two references to scepticism Clement gives an account of the kind of definition which he considers so essential. Induction shows that a thing is, division and definition show what it is, and demonstration shows if it is, what it is, and why it is. The definition of man is reached by dividing the genus
'animal' into its species until we reach the simple species which consists of 'man' and nothing else. Disputes often arise simply because people will not define what they are talking about. A definition expounds the essence of a thing -- e.g. 'Man is a rational, laughing animal.' 3 Another chapter deals with names as distinct from concepts and things. 4 Names may be classified in different ways, according to the categories which may apply to them in themselves or in relation to one another. 5
The same name may apply to different things and different names ____________________ 1Strom. VIII, 22; III, 93, 19.
2Ch. 6. Strom. VIII, 17; 111, 90, 9.
3Strom. VIII; III, 93, 12 and 14.
5Aristotle's ten and Xenocrates' two.
may apply to the same thing. Some things have the same definition but different names. Other things have different definitions but the same name. This identity of name may be the result of chance or of deliberate intention and may operate in different ways.
The last chapter of the book deals with causes, and uses both Stoic and Aristotelian terminology. Causes are classified into original (those that start off a causal process), sufficient (those that are by themselves sufficient to produce the effect), cooperating (those that work together and assist in producing the effect) and necessary (those without which the effect could not be produced). 1 The word
'cause' may be predicated of three things -- what is a cause, of what it is a cause, and to what it is a cause. 2 All causes are means 3 to an effect, but all means to an effect are not causes. The murder of her children by Medea is the result of a complicated nexus -- her anger, her jealousy, her love, the departure of Jason, the building of the Argo, the cutting of the trees on Pelion. These things are all means but they are not all causes of the murder. What does not prevent is not active and not a cause, what does prevent is active and cause. ἐνγàπτῶ+ ἐ ν καì δπᾱν τι τò αἵτιον ται. The Aristotelian account of causation is introduced and blended with the Stoic account with which the chapter began. A 'cause' cannot be understood apart from what it effects. Creator, maker, father must create, make, be father to something or someone. The interaction and joint action of causes are discussed. Co-operating causes help something else to produce an effect. Joint causes play a direct part themselves in producing the effect.
Of this logic note-book three things may be said. First that the contents are not Clement's invention but come from an Antiochean source, 4 and a later tradition which mixed Aristotle ____________________ 1Strom. VIII, 25; III, 95, 27.
2Strom. VIII, 26; III, 96, 18.
4Antiochus of Ascalon, Academic philosopher who initiated the dogmatic, eclectic reaction against the scepticism which had dominated the Academy and who was the founder thereby of Middle Platonism.
Chief source for the study of Antiochus Cicero. See Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism, pp.
31-41. R. E. Witt summarises the 8th Book of the Stromateis from a philological point of view and concludes that it has an unmistakeably Antiochean character.
with Stoicism. 1 Secondly, that the contents are Clement's selection and that here as elsewhere obscurity of expression does not imply the absence of penetrating thought. Thirdly, that the contents show where Clement found the logical distinctions which he used to deal with his own specific problems. None of these three points can be fully expounded here; but in connection with the last point three examples might be mentioned. The theory of demonstration gave Clement his key idea of faith, the idea of a co-operating cause as distinct from a sufficient cause enabled him to give philosophy and Christianity a different but real status in the discovery of truth, and the difference between non-prevention and causality was basic to his theodicy.
(2) The objects of thought Clement's account of dialectic shows how he makes logical procedure not merely a technique for the protection of truth but an important part of knowledge. The dialectic, he says, which is common in the schools is the philosopher's gymnastic. It concerns neither reality nor truth but aims merely at the development of argumentative skill. 2 Such a skill can stop people being seduced into heresies, and while philosophy cannot make truth more powerful it can put a fence and wall around it. 3 Dilaectic can confirm what is true by demonstration and can remove doubts. 4 In Strom. I, ch. 28, 5 Clement takes the matter further. The Mosaic philosophy consists, he says, of four parts, the fourth and highest being theology, the vision 6 which Plato ascribes to the really great mysteries, or what Aristotle calls metaphysics. Plato calls dialectic the science which finds the explanations of real things. This is to be acquired not for the sake of sophistical skill but for the sake of being able to say and do what is well pleasing to God.
The true dialectic, 7 then, is linked with the true philosophy. It examines things and tests powers and authorities, rises from them ____________________ 1Pohlenz points out how important this later tradition is for the blending of these elements. Klemens von
Alexandreia und sein hellenisches Christentum, p. 112 (footnote).
2Strom. I, 39; II, 26, II.
3Strom. I, 99; II, 63, 28.
4Strom. VI, 156; II, 512, 9.
5Strom. I, 176; II, 108, 24.
7Strom. I, 177; II, 109, 5.
gradually to the most excellent essence of all, and dares to go beyond to the God of all things. It professes not experience of mortal things, but knowledge of divine and heavenly things. From this there follows an appropriate manner of conduct in speech and action in human relations. Therefore the Scripture is right in wanting us to become such dialecticians, and exhorts, 'Be trustworthy money changers', rejecting some things but holding on to the good.
For this real dialectic is the wisdom which divides the objects of thought and shows purely and clearly the substance of each real thing. Or it is the power which divides the kinds of things, coming down to their most individual characteristic, displaying each real thing to be seen purely as it is.
Wherefore it alone leads to the true wisdom, a divine power which knows things that are as they are, which possesses -what is perfect, and is freed from all passion. It does this not without the Saviour who by the divine word has removed from the eye of the soul the dark film of ignorance which is caused by a sinful way of life and who has given us the best faculty of all 'that we may know well whether we are dealing with man or God'.
We can best understand this very important passage by a comparison with Plato.
There are two aspects of the Platonic dialectic -- its upward movement and its downward movement. The ascent of the soul to the Form of the Good is described most fully in Book VII of the Republic. Plato says, 'So too when any one tries by dialectic through the discourse of reason unaided by any of the senses to attain to what each reality is, and desists not until by sheer intelligence he apprehends the reality of good, then he stands at the real goal of the intelligible world, as the man in our simile stood at the goal of the visible.' 1 There is little difference between this account and that of Clement above. The 'powers' of Clement fulfil the function of the forms of Plato. In both cases dialectic is a rational process which has nothing to do with sense-experience, but concentrates on the essences of things. The dialectician climbs up the hierarchy of the essences, forms, or powers to the highest essence of all -- the ultimate reality, God or the Good.
The downward movement of the dialectic is described by Plato in the Sophist and the Statesman where the aim is to define the 'kind' or 'form' 2 of the sophist or the statesman.
____________________ 1Republic, 532.
2γéνοσ. . .εἵδοσ used interchangeably.
Dividing according to Kinds, not taking the same Form for a different one or a different one for the same -- is not that the business of the science of dialectic? . . .
And the man who can do that discerns clearly one Form everywhere extended throughout many, where each one lies apart, and many Forms different from one another, embraced from without by one Form; and again one Form connected in a unity through many wholes, and many Forms entirely marked off apart. This means knowing how to distinguish, Kind by Kind, in what ways the several Kinds can or cannot combine. 1
This dialectic is the definition of the essence of a particular thing which Clement describes in paragraph (b). It 'shows purely and clearly the substance of each real thing'. This was the science of dialectics as practised in the school of Plato and parodied by Aristophanes. 2 Sophistry, for example, is defined by Plato as 'the art of contradiction-making, descended from an insincere kind of conceited mimicry, of the semblance-making breed, derived from image-making, distinguished as a portion, not divine but human of production, that presents a shadow play of words'.
3 These definitions are in a sense unsatisfactory until the first kind of dialectic has been successfully carried out. They depend for their meaning on the ultimate reality and until that has been seen they are insecure. The ultimate term in the above definition is 'art', and 'sophistry' is defined in terms of 'art'. The meaning of 'art' must then be fixed by defining it in terms of another 'higher' entity, which must also be defined, and so on. No definitions are secure until the Form of the Good has been seen. This is the point behind the upward and downward path described in the Republic. 'Dialectic, treating its hypotheses not as first principles but as literally hypotheses. . . until it comes as far as that which is not hypothesis, to the first principle of everything. This it grasps and then, reversing its procedure, takes hold of that which takes hold of this first principle until it so completes its descent' 4
Another element of dialectic which is most important from the practical point of view is the 'examining' and 'testing' mentioned in (a). An example of this testing is in Book 1 of the Republic. Various definitions of justice are ejected on grounds of in____________________ 1Sophist, 253 ( Cornford translation).
2Aristophanes, Epicrates, frag. II.
3Sophist, 268 ( Cornford translation).
4Republic, 511.
consistency, inability to stand up to the objections brought forward. It is not until much later that a satisfactory definition of justice is reached -- a definition which is in terms of goodness and which is insecure until the Form of the Good has been apprehended. This testing has sometimes been regarded as the whole of dialectic. It is displayed elaborately in the Parmenides and became very popular with Middle and Neo-Platonists. It is linked with analysis in the Republic.
Unless a man can abstract the Form of the good from all else and distinguish it by analysis, unless he makes it run the gauntlet of every proof and is eager to try it by the test not of seeming but of reality and finally, unless he emerges from it all with his principle not overthrown, then will you not say that he does not know the real good? 1
The Form of the Good is reached by analysis by breaking up our common ethical notions until only the notion of goodness is left.
To the Platonic account of dialectic Clement ad κ ἄ σωτñπος, 2 says Clement. None of this process can take place until the veil of ignorance and sin is lifted from the eye of the soul. 'Some men have too bad hearts to have good heads.' 3 Ignorance is the result of a bad way of life. 4 The life must be changed and the darkness of sin dispelled. This is the work of the Saviour. He brings us to a knowledge of ourselves. He alone reveals the Father. 'For no man knoweth the Son but the Father, nor the Father but the Son, and he to whom the Son reveals him.' This is the mystery of Christ revealed according to the ability of those who understand. Those who are men in understanding should distinguish and expound the three-fold sense of Scriptures. 'For the whole Scripture is not to be understood "all alike". It must be approached with the greatest possible dialectical skill by those who hunt for the sequence of divine teaching.' 5
Secondly Clement refers to 'the true dialectic' and 'the true philosophy'. The truth in question is ultimate, essential, Christian truth. There might be and there were in Clement's day many ____________________ 1Repulic, 534.
2Strom. I, 178; II, 109, 21.
3John Smith, Select Discourses ( 4th ed.), p. 12.
4Cf. Eph. iv. 18.
5Strom. I, 179; II, 110, 8.
systems of dialectic leading to different first principles. This showed that consistency was not enough to justify the claims of one system over another and to distinguish it from others. To determine a system, its first principle must be fixed. Clement does this by accepting ultimate Christian truth by faith. Let ABCD be a square figure of a fixed size with diagonals intersecting at a point O. The relations between the angles, sides and diagonals are fixed and invariable. There might be any number of figures of this shape and size in the world. But there would be only one sucn figure where O is 3 inches and 6 inches from the side and bottom of this page and B is 2½ inches and 5 inches from the side and bottom. Similarly there might be any number of systems of dialectics but only one which will follow necessarily from ultimate
Christian truth.
The chief importance of dialectic is that it leads to a knowledge of real things and of God. The ὃνταα,αἱ , αἱ ἰ . For most Middle Platonists the ideas, powers, or forms were ideas in the Divine Mind. For Clement they exist in the Mind of God, i.e. in Christ. The Son is identified with the world of ideas and with the whole universe of truth. This means that the divine revelation comes not: merely from above but from below -- from the objects of thought themselves. These are the parts of his truth which Christ has drawn together. They are the ideas, the powers which he contains within himself.
Whenever the soul knows the essence of anything, it knows a part of the Divine Wisdom, a part of Christ. Hence, even in the humblest knowledge, we receive from God. directly as the light of the sun to our eyes and indirectly as that light is reflected from the objects which we see. This divine origin of knowledge enables us to see clearly the connection between the logical and spiritual. The objects of logical knowledge are, in a sense, divine, and it is their divine origin that makes it possible for them to be part of an experience which is spiritual. The gradual increase of knowledge makes it possible that in the early stages this spiritual character might be missed, while in later stages it becomes increasingly apparent.