Chapter 6 - The Goodness Of God And Its Relation To Evil And The Last Things
CHAPTER 6 THE GOODNESS OF GOD AND ITS
RELATION TO EVIL AND THE LAST THINGS
I. THE GOODNESS OF GOD
GOD is for Clement the only perfect and good God. 1 He is among other things the Good and the first principle of ethics. 2 Though, strictly speaking, no name or quality is appropriate to him, one of the names which the mind uses as a point of support is
'the Good' and the distinctive feature of all the names is that they are 'good names'.
3 To use good names when speaking of the ineffable God is to describe him as good, when direct description is not permissible.
God's goodness is unique and transcendent, yet active and the source of all other goodness. It is unique because God is unique. The reply of our Lord to the rich young ruler, 'There is none good but God', is cited or hinted at twelve times in Clement's writing. 4 Some of these references state explicitly the uniqueness of the goodness of God. 'Being good he is called that which he alone is -- good.' 5 Others state that the God who is good is unique and one. 6 This implies that God's goodness is unique. If his goodness were the same as the goodness of other things then he would not be unique in all respects. Other passages refer to his unique goodness as the sole Saviour of men. 7 Not to know God is to be bereft of goodness and to be dead. To know the one good Father is life eternal and participation in the power of the Immortal. He alone is good. He alone is Saviour. 8 In one place
____________________
1QDS. I; III, 159, 8.
2Strom. IV, 162; II, 320, 17.
3Strom. V, 82; II, 380, 26-7 4Matt. xix. 17. See Stählin, Register, p. 13.
5Paed. I, 71;I, 131, 31.
6Paed. I, 74; I, 133, 9 (against Marcionites) and Strom. VII, 39; III, 3, 8 (against demon-worshippers).
Also Strom. VII, 58; III, 43, 5 and QDS. I; III, 159, 8.
7Strom. V, 63; II, 368, 30.
8Strom. VII, 41; III, 31, 23.
Valentinus is quoted as speaking of the one good God who is revealed by the Son and through whom alone the heart can become pure. 1 There are two ways in which God's goodness transcends the goodness of other things. First, God's goodness is, like all real goodness, intrinsic goodness. He is not good for a purpose, as a means to an end. He is good in himself. Secondly, God's goodness is always active from above. It is as a father, a shepherd, a king, that he does us good. There is a divine order of providence embedded in the world; but this order is only there because
God puts it there, because he ordains that it should be so.The first of these points
(God's intrinsic goodness) is made explicitly in Paed. I, ch. 8, 2 and implied whenever Clement calls God 'the Good' or 'the End'. What does good is better than what does not do good. There is nothing better than what is good. Therefore what is good does good. God is good. Therefore God does good. What is good, in the respect in which it is good, does nothing else than good. Therefore God (who is wholly good) does good in every possible way. God's active goodness is the best kind of goodness, consisting in personal and conscious care and help. But what is good is not called good because it possesses virtue, i.e. because it does good things. Like justice, it is called good because it is good in and through itself. What is expedient is good in a different sense of the word. It is good because it does good.
There are two arguments here which concern the goodness of God.
(i) 'God is good' entails 'God does good in every possible way.'
(ii) 'God does good in every possible way' does not entail 'God is good.'
The first entailment is not reversible. What is good is beneficent but it is not good because of its beneficence. It is good in itself. God is good in an ultimate, intrinsic way.
The second way in which the goodness of God transcends the goodness of other things is in its mode of operation. God's
____________________ 1Strom. II, 114; II, 175, 1. Cf. Hilgenfeld, Die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristentums, p. 297.
2Paed. I, 62; I, 127, 11. The argument is set out in this paragraph. It shows Stoic influence. SVF, 2,
1116.
goodness, by virtue of its perfection, must be active and inspired by personal care and concern for the objects of his beneficence.
It is not that God, in virtue of his essential goodness, remains blessed and immortal, 'neither troubled nor causing trouble'; but because he does good in his own unique way, and, both being and becoming very God and good Father in unceasing beneficence, he remains changeless in the identity of his goodness. For what is the use of good which is not active and never does good? 1
Nor does God do good by necessity, but chooses to benefit those who choose him. 2
His providence is not a menial thing, 3 arranged for our convenience. God is not an obliging underling who endeavours to give satisfactory service. His goodness works from above, not from below. The continuous dispensations of providence are the result of God's pity for our weakness.
The goodness of God is manifest in unceasing love for and vigilance over men, 4 even though they are separate and alienated from him. 5 It is revealed in the Law 6 as well as in philosophy. 7 His unspeakable goodness ever seeks to lead the nature of things on to what is better. 8 'God's unceasing purpose is to save the flock of men. For this reason the good God sent the good Shepherd.' 9 The God of love finds a greater place in Clement's thought than the abstract One. It is God's one work to do good. 10 This does not mean that his positive theology excludes his negative theology. For Clement, both are important and have their different parts to play.
God's goodness is perfect and complete. He alone is wholly good. No man except the God-man has ever possessed perfection in all things at once. Men are perfect perhaps in piety or in patience or in other things. 'But I do not know of any man who has been perfect in all ways at once, while he was still a man, except him alone who for our sakes clothed himself with humanity.' 11 We must strive, as St Paul says, towards the fullness ____________________ 1Strom. VI, 104, II, 484, 23.
10Strom. VI, 159; II, 514, 1.
11Strom. IV, 130; II, 305, 21.
2Strom. VII, 42; III, 31, 31.
∈ιἱκᾮ, ibid. III, 32, 8. Cf. also Strom. VII, 3; III4, 15.
4Strom. II, 43; II, 136, 2.
5Strom. II, 74; II, 152, 16.
6Strom. II, 86; v, 158, 11.
7Strom. VI, 159; II, 514, 6.
8Strom. VI, 154; II511, 8.
9Prot. 116; I, 81, 32.
of Christ. (The charismata are various but it is the one Spirit who worketh all in all.)
A similar idea was later expressed by St Thomas. The goodness of God was for St Thomas a unique and simple unity.
NOW creatures do not acquire goodness in the way in which it is in God: although each imitates the divine goodness according to its mode. For the divine goodness is simple, being as it were all in one.... In yet another way the creature's goodness falls short from God's. For as we have stated, God in his very being has supreme perfection of goodness. Whereas the creature has its perfection not in one thing but in many: because what is united in the highest is manifold in the lowest. 2
The perfection to which our Lord calls us does not amount to complete similarity to God. We are to be perfect as our Father by forgiving sins and injuries and living in apatheia. A doctor, a philosopher, a gnostic may be called perfect, but none of these, however great, is to be accepted as likeness to God. 3 The teaching of the Stoics that virtue is the same in man and God is emphatically rejected. No one has the power or ability to become perfect as God is. 4 The perfection which God wills for us is obedience to the Gospel and life which is above reproach. 5
God is uniquely good, but many powers declare his goodness. 6 It is clear that 'the God of all things is one, alone, good, just, creator, Son in Father', 7 yet 'the wisdom of his instruction takes many forms and many are the ways by which he leads men to salvation'. 8 God's pure and perfect goodness expresses itself in many ways to meet the varying needs of men. 'God is good on his own account and just in this respect on our account, and he is just because he is good.' 9 In this way we are to understand the justice, love, and mercy of God. They come from his goodness, and they find their varying forms because of our varying need.
____________________ 1Strom. IV, 132; II, 307, 17.
2Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 22 (English Dominican translation).
3Strom. VII, 88; III, 63, 9.
4Ibid. III, 63, 10. Cf. also Strom. II, 135; II, 188, 1 and Strom. VI, 114; II, 489, 17.
5Strom. VII, 88; III, 63, 13.
6Paed. I, 74; I, 133, 6.
7Ibid. I, 133, 9.
8Ibid. I, 133, 18. Cf. Strom. VI, 106; II, 485, 19.
9Paed. I, 88; I, 141, 25. 'This respect' refers to the reproof of sins.
Sick, we need a healer, having strayed from the way, we need a guide, blind, we need one who will guide us in the light, and thirsty, we need the spring of life, the taste of which removes all thirst forever. The dead need life, sheep need a shepherd, children need a teacher; but also all humanity needs Jesus. 1
II. THE PROBLEM OF EVIL
Clement makes few attempts to prove the existence of providence. His general attitude is that the questioning of providence should be met with punishment, not with an argument. 2 In one place, however, he presents a deductive argument which excludes the other alternative. Either God does care for all men, or God does not care for all men. That God does not care for all men entails that either he is unable or he is unwilling. The first is untrue, for he is omnipotent. The second is untrue, for he is good and he is not lazy. Therefore it is not true that God does not care for all men. Therefore God does care for all men. 3 On the other hand, the Christian does not come to believe in providence merely from an examination of the world. There is no inductive proof. He admires the creation and therefore believes in providence when he hears of it. 4
Providence means foreknowledge and omniscience as well as the beneficent exercise of power. 'Christ watches our laughter from above.' 5 Again, 'It is, I think, a characteristic of the greatest power to examine thoroughly all the parts, making even the smallest parts its concern.' 6 There is no limit to this providence. All things are for the best. Philosophy must have some purpose in the scheme of the One who knows even the numbers of the hairs of our heads. 7 The wide scope of God's providence is seen particularly in the descent of our Lord to Hades to give those who had died before his appearance on earth the same opportunities as others. 8
The nature of providence, the problem of evil, the suffering of the innocent, the meaning of human suffering -- these great
____________________ 1Paed. I, 83; I, 139, 2.
2Strom. V, 6; II, 329, 12.11
3Strom. VII, 6; III, 6, 19.
4Strom. VII, 60; III, 43, 30.
5Paed. I, 22; I, 103, 18.
6Strom. VII, 9; III, 8, 12.
7Strom. VI, 153; II, 510, 24 8Strom. VI, 48; II, 456, 11.
problems had a special urgency in Clement's century. The Stoics and other philosophers had formed their various answers. The gnostics felt they were driven to their heretical position by these problems. 1 The solutions which they gave made it imperative for the Church to work out a true position. Above all, the problem of evil was a practical difficulty for Clement and other Christians of his time. The sufferings of martyrdom were to some an insuperable objection to the love of God.
How could it be for the best that the living of the good life should be attended with the evils of persecution? How could evil happen in a world controlled by God's providence? Why did not God do something about it, or if he was doing something about it, what was he doing? These two things, therefore, intensified the problem of evil for Clement -- the tragedy of Christian martyrdom and the challenge of gnostic dualism.
Clement raises the problem in Stromateis IV, II. Christians are asked, 'If God cares for you, how can you ever be persecuted and put to death? Does he give you up for this express purpose?' 2 No, says Clement, our Lord does not wish us to suffer in this way, but he did foretell that these things would happen. When we suffer with criminals who have done wrong, their just punishment shows up the injustice of our punishment and makes clear our righteousness. The injustice of the judge who condemns us is no reflection upon God's providence, for the judge must be a free agent and not a mere puppet. 3 In condemning us the judge judges and condemns himself. We are persecuted, not because we have done anything wrong, but because our Christian profession is supposed to be a sin against life. 4
To the further question, 'Why are you not helped when you are being persecuted?'
Clement replies with a question, 'How can Christians be considered to be ill-treated when they are released by death to go to their Lord?' If we had the right attitude
____________________ 1Cf. Hal Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, p. 14: 'Diese drei Punkte, die Verwerfung des Alten Testaments, der Ditheismus und der Gedanke von der Naturverschiedenheit der Menschen, fundamental für jedes gnostisches Denken, bezeichnen in Wirklichkeit die Antwort der Gnostiker auf das
Vorsehungsproblem.'
2Strom. IV, 78; II, 283, 1.
3Strom. IV, 79; II, 283, 11.
4Ibid. II, 283, 18.
we should be grateful to our persecutors for the service they render us. If all had known the truth, all would have rushed at the way of Christ and the way of martyrdom and there would have been no chosen few. Our faith reveals and rebukes the unbelief of men. Socrates knew that death could not hurt him, and we also know that the Lord is our helper, that the souls of the righteous are in the hand of God and there no torment shall touch them.
Basilides, Clement continues, 1 could see no solution to the problem of innocent suffering and claimed that no one who suffered could be innocent. The martyr has sinned unconsciously or in another life, or, if he has not sinned, he has the principle of sin within him, or has wished to sin. 'For', says Basilides, 'I will say anything rather than declare Providence to be evil.' But, Clement objects, what kind of providence is operative in a suffering for sin when the suffering depends on the martyr's choice? If a man chooses to deny his faith and to avoid martyrdom, then the working of providence is subverted and his sins go unpunished. Basilides has deified the devil in attributing the latter's work to providence, and he has called the Lord a sinner by asserting that all who suffer as martyrs suffer because of their sins.
If martyrdom is punishment for sin then the faith and doctrine for which the martyr dies co-operate in his punishment. Such absurdities abound in Basilides' theory.
There is no place in his system for the martyr's faith, his love to God, his steadfast endurance, his right living, or his obedience to the will of God.
1. First Argument. Clement states the problem and gives his answer. God did not will that our Lord and the martyrs should suffer. Yet nothing ever happens which is not God's will.
The only possible solution left, expressed concisely, is that such things happen without the prevention of God. Only this preserves the providence and the goodness of God. We must not think that God actively causes our afflictions. That is quite unthinkable; but we should, be of the conviction that he does not prevent those who cause them. 2
A distinction is here made between what God causes and what happens without God's prevention. It would be inconsistent with God's providence and goodness for him to cause evil. But ____________________ 1Ch. XII. Strom. IV, 81; II, 284, 5 2Strom. IV, 86; II, 286, 11.
it is not inconsistent with the providence and goodness of God for evil things to happen without his prevention. Good things are caused by God. Evil things happen without his prevention.
The validity of this solution was questioned in Clement's day and Clement was aware of the difficulties. In Strom. 1, ch.17 1 he speaks of that account of philosophy which traced it to the theft of divine truth by some power or angel. This theft took place with the Lord's knowledge and without his prohibition. The thief did not act with the benefit of man in view, but providence turned the theft to good account. 2 Clement argues in Stoic manner 3 against those who claim that 'What does not prevent is a cause.' These people claim that any one who does not guard against and prevent a theft, a fire, or a shipwreck is responsible for these things happening. It is admitted that in some cases an active neglect of precaution is culpable. But if one neglects the distinction between not preventing and causing, one must attribute the inflicting of a wound to the shield which did not protect rather than to the dart which struck the body.
The devil, says Clement, being a free agent, 4 stole the truth that is in philosophy.
The Lord saw that the theft would not have harmful results and did not prevent it.
What does not prevent is in no sense a cause; but what does prevent is a cause.
(The shield can be the cause of the man not being wounded; his daemon was the cause of Socrates' conduct.) 'Therefore what prevents is a cause, while what does not prevent judges the soul's choice justly; so that God is never in any way responsible for the evil in our lives.' 5 The causes of sins are choice and desire. 6 Not that any one voluntarily chooses evil, but pleasure deludes one into thinking that something bad is good and desirable. It is in our own power to avoid ignorance, the choice of what is base and pleasant, and the deceptions of the devil. Despite the activity of the devil, 'God orders all things from above for good.' Nothing can oppose
God, nothing can stand against him, for he is the Almighty Lord. The thoughts and deeds of the rebellious are partial and ____________________ 1Strom. I, 81; II, 52, 24.
2Ibid. II, 53, 12.
3SVF, 2, 353
4SVF,2, 353. 4ἀ ∈ ∣∘ς.
5Strom. I, 84; II, 54, 14. 6δθ∈òς... ἀνàíι∣ . Cf. Plato, Rep. 617E.
6SVF,3, 236.
spring from a bad disposition. Though they originate in a diseased condition the universal providence steers them to a healthy conclusion. 1
In criticism of Clement's view it must be said that there is something weak about the idea of non-prevention. For a good God to permit the sin of man to bring untold suffering upon innocent and guilty alike, and yet to do nothing about it, is at least puzzling. God's non-prevention of evil may not be the cause of evil, but it is God who gave man freedom of will. Clement constantly insists upon the wilful revolt of man as the cause of evil and on God's complete dissociation from any of this causality. The judge before whom the martyrs are brought must be master of his own judgement and not a mere puppet. 2 A modern thinker has said, 'Without freedom to choose the evil, or the lower good, a man might be a well-behaved puppet or a sentient automaton, but not a moral agent. But the best possible world implies the existence of moral agents; its crown cannot be the puppet or the automaton.' 3 Yet even when this point is accepted, God, who gives man free will, may yet appear not wholly free from blame.
Two ideas strengthen Clement's account of non-prevention against this weakness.
First, God does all he can to prevent sin by persuasive, non-arbitrary means.
'Everything, then, which did not hinder man's free choice, he made conducive to virtue.' 4 He has made us for righteousness, not for sin. His Son, our Paidagogos, constantly uses every device to turn us from sin, and died on a cross for our salvation. Secondly, after sin has been committed, God is active to modify the effects of man's sin. He uses up evil for good. These two ideas make non-prevention a more adequate theodicy.
2. Second Argument. The transformation of evil into good is the second point of Clement's theodicy. God does not prevent his adversaries from doing evil but 'He uses up for good the wrongs which his adversaries have dared against him.' 5
Clement ____________________ 1Strom. I, 86 II, 55719.
2Strom. IV, 79; II, 283, 13.
3Tennant, Philosophical Theology ( Cambridge, 1925-30), vol. II p. 188.
4Strom. VII, 12; III, 9, 22.
5Strom. IV, 87; II, 286, 16.
quotes Isaiah V. 5: 'I shall destroy the wall and it shall become a trampling-ground.'
This verse refers to the vineyard which produced brambles instead of grapes. God did not destroy it but removed the wall which had protected it. Animals were no longer prevented from trampling the vines under foot. Their trampling, though an act of aggression and destruction, was to have beneficial results. The brambles would be destroyed and the vineyard would be cleared of its wrong contents. God uses the crimes of the enemies of his vineyard for the benefit of the vineyard. For providence, as Clement goes on to say, is a form of correction, which benefits those who experience it.
There are other ways in which God turns evil into good. Philosophy is the result of a crime, wisdom was stolen from God; but God turned the theft to good account.
It is the chief work of the divine providence not to allow the evil which results from wilful revolt to remain useless and unprofitable and to become altogether harmful.
For it is the function of the divine wisdom and virtue and power not only to do good
(for this is the nature of God, so to speak, as that of fire is to heat and that of light is to give light), but also and above all to bring to a good and useful end what has happened through the evils contrived by any, and to use to good account things which appear to be bad, as is the testimony which proceeds from temptation. 1
This passage shows Stoic tendencies. For the Stoics evil was an essential part of the good cosmos. It was impossible and undesirable to remove it. 2 It was logically necessary for evil to exist if there was to be such a thing as good. Good things which were necessary for the world's completeness caused incidentally the existence of evil things. It was good for there to be a mind in the head, but it was bad that this desirable position was also a dangerous and vulnerable one. When things were taken all together it could be seen that they were good. Everything had a reason and, however evil, it had a useful place in the sum of things. 3 Passages in plays might be unpleasant, but they added
____________________ 1Strom. I, 86; II, 55, 22.
2Plutarch, De Stoic. Repugn. 36, p. 1051 A. SVF, 2, 1182.
3Ibid. ch. 35, pp. 1050f. SVF,2, 1181.
pleasure to the whole production. 1 The locus classicus for this idea is the Hymn of Cleanthes -- 'But thou knowest how to make the odd even and to order the unordered. And what is not friendly is friendly to thee, for thus thou bringest all things into one and good from bad.' 2
However, Clement's treatment had another emphasis. The emphasis was on God.
Evil was not regarded as a necessity in the world. 3 It was the result of man's sin and was something seriously undesirable. It was God's great work to ensure that this evil came to a useful end. His work was not merely a cosmic shuffle of the cards like that which Cleanthes' Zeus performed. Evils did not charm themselves away like pieces of a play. The Stoics had tried to justify evil. Clement was concerned to justify God. When Joseph said to his brothers, 'Ye meant it unto me for evil, but God meant it unto me for good', the brothers knew that this did not make their crime against their young brother an act of grace. The thief who stole the truth that is in philosophy is still a thief despite God's good use of his theft. But God can use up evil for good.
Evils can by the power of God become the medicine of salvation. 4 These remarks show what could be shown at greater length -that the use of evil in a good economy meant more in Clement than in the Stoics. There are several reasons for this.
Providence was not for Clement an impersonal necessity but a living, loving God.
Clement had a sense of history as something which moved and had purpose, not as something in one sense static and in another sense circular. As a Christian, with the cross of his Lord before him, he was deeply aware both of the reality of evil and the power of God to overcome it.
3. Third Argument. The third part of Clement's answer is, 'Providence is a disciplinary art (or form of correction), in the case of other people because of their own sins and in the case of the Lord and the apostles because of ours.' 5 The presence of this ____________________ 1Plutarch, De Comm. Not. ch. 14, p. 1065 D. SVF,ibid. Cf. F. H. Bradley account of optimism. 'The world is the best of all possible worlds, and everything in it is a necessary evil.' Aphorisms, p. 3.
2Cleanthesapud Stob. Eclog. 1, p. 25, Wachsmuth.
3Except elsewhere in the restricted sense which concerns natural processes of physical weakness and death. Strom. VII, 61; III, 44, 27.
4Strom. VII, 61; III, 44, 27.
5Strom. IV, 87; II, 286, 17.
explanation of providence is at first bewildering. Clement has argued and goes on to argue against Basilides that martyrs (not only the Lord and the apostles) are not punished for their sins by martyrdom. On examination, Clement's view appears both more complicated and more thoughtful than that of his opponents. Martyrdom does not come to men as God's judgement on their sins. It comes because of the sin and injustice of their persecutors. But when it does come, God does not let even martyrdom pass without beneficial results. The martyr is brought by the discipline of suffering to sanctification. We are brought by the Lord's suffering and that of the apostles to sanctification. Clement quotes 1 Thess. iv. 3-8 which begins, 'For this is the will of God, even your sanctification', and then adds, 'For the sake of this your sanctification, the Lord was not prevented from suffering.' 1
The last Basilidean argument is now destroyed. It might be claimed that the martyr is punished to expiate the sins of a previous existence and will later receive the reward for his conduct in this life. Clement asks, 'Is the punishment the work of providence or not?' If it is not, it cannot bring about expiation. But if it is, then not only expiation but also the actual punishment is the work of providence. The followers of Basilides say that providence is planted in all substances. They must therefore conclude that persecution is not wrong, and that the persecutors of the martyrs are acting rightly; or else they must conclude that persecutions are wrought by the will of God. Such conclusions are absurd.
Clement describes the discipline of God in two later passages. In the first he is again arguing against Basilides. 2 Basilides restricts God's forgiveness to sins which were committed involuntarily and in ignorance, and claims that voluntary sins are punished. This is the kind of forgiveness of which a man is capable, says Clement, but it is not God's forgiveness. Voluntary sins are chastised not to undo the past, as Basilides thinks, but to amend the future. The good God chastises a sinner for three reasons -- for his own improvement, for an example to others, and for the protection of the person who has innocently suffered
____________________ 1Strom. IV, 87; II, 286, 29.
2Strom. IV, ch. 24; II, 316, 5.
at his hands. In the second passage 1 Clement describes the improvement or cure of the individual sinner as a twofold scheme of education. 2 Sin arises from ignorance and weakness. These are the results of our willing either not to learn or not to control our passions. Consequently there are two forms of correction -- first, knowledge and clear demonstration from the Scriptures, and secondly, the training of faith and the discipline of fear. Clement fervently wishes that the heretics will learn and be turned to God by the notes which he is writing. But, if they will not learn, may God chastise them and bring them to repentance. God's chastisements are like those of a father or a teacher and are not punishments. Punishment is a retaliation for past evil and looks back. Chastisement is a means to good and looks forward. 3
Clement makes the training of the Paidagogos the subject of his second main work.
The end of this training is not theoretical knowledge but right living. The Paidagogos both heals the passions and directs behaviour. 4 Medical metaphors are often used.
5 Reproof is the surgery which cuts away the abscess of passion. 6 There are times when it is necessary to wound the insensitive soul and at the cost of a little pain to save it from eternal death. 7 Another medical metaphor is also used. When we are reproved, our spiritual condition is diagnosed.
For as the mirror is not evil to the ugly man because it shows him what he is like, and as the doctor is not evil to the sick man when he tells him of his fever, for the doctor is not the cause of the fever but is the reproof of the fever, so neither is he who reproves ill-disposed to the man who is sick in soul. 8
Origen's account of providence and the problem of evil may be compared with that of Clement. In his work Pronoia und Paideusis Hal Koch showed that the theme indicated by his title is central to Origen's view of the world. The main points of Origen's theodicy may be briefly stated. Evil arises not from the activity of God, not from the matter of which this world is made, not from the devil, but from man's misuse of his unrestricted free ____________________ 1Strom. VII, 101; III, 71, 23.
2Strom. VII, 102; III, 72, 3.
3Strom. VII, 102; III, 72, 20.
4Paed. I, 1, and passim.
5E.g. Paed. I, ch. 8.
6Paed. I, 64; I, 128, 6.
7Paed. I, 74; I, 133, 12.
8Paed. I, 88; I, 141, 19.
will. Evil is an absence of good and is, strictly speaking, unreal. The essence of sin is pride. Moral evil takes place with the foreknowledge of God, who limits its effects and blends it in his economy. It is a necessary element in the totality of the universe and it is logically necessary for the existence of its oppositegoodness. Evil both tests and punishes the sinner. God also chastises sinners for their own good, purifying and training them for the good life. Finally, physical evil is something indifferent, is the result of the soul's sin in its previous existence, and is used by God to train men in his way. It is an exercitium virtutis and points to a more perfect future life. 1
The similarity of this account with that of Clement is marked. Most interesting, however, are the elements which Origen includes and Clement omits. Clement does not speak of evil as something unreal, nor of the necessity of evil, whether it be metaphysical necessity for the completeness of the universe or logical necessity for the existence of its opposite. He rejects sin in a previous existence as an explanation of suffering in this. God does not send us down from a better state to a worse one. God always brings us to something better. These omissions from Clement suggest that his account is more practical, less speculative, and more consistent.
There is much that is not new in the various elements of Clement's theodicy. Like those of Origen, his main arguments can be traced to Platonic and Stoic sources.
What is new is the consistent and essentially Christian system into which they are thought. His use of the Stoic arguments concerning nonprevention is an example of the way in which he weaves standard arguments into his own treatment of a specific problem. Clement's theodicy is written very largely with the problem of martyrdom in mind. For Clement martyrdom was perfection, the triumphal arch through which the Christian went to reign with his Lord, the means whereby, having suffered with him, he should be glorified together with him. 2
____________________ 1For the main points of this summary I am indebted to H. Koch, Pronoia und Paideusis, and especially to his chapter 'Die Theodizee'.
2Strom. IV, chs. 4-19.
III. ESCHATOLOGY
God turns evil into good on earth but his task is not completed here. Clement's account of the problem of evil leads to a discussion of his eschatology. His accounts of death, fire, and 'many mansions' will be examined.
(1) Death There are two kinds of death, 1 spiritual death and physical death. The first kind of death separates the soul from truth, is bad and to be feared. Ignorance of the Father is death. 2 Sin is, according to Scripture, eternal death, the death of the soul.
3 This view may be considered as a kind of conditional immortality. The second kind of death separates the soul from the body 4 and is neither bad nor to be feared. 5
The Lord crucified death into life 6 and martyrs are released by death to go to him. 7
Knowledge anticipates the separation of the soul from the body by a 'rational death' which separates the soul from passions to the service of God. 8 This is similar to the 'practice of death' at which the Platonic philosopher aims. 9
(2) Fire Fire is the most severe form of correction to which the sinner can deliver himself.
When persuasion, threatening, and chastisement have each in succession been used to turn the sinner from his sin, and have each in succession failed, then 'the fire consumes'. 10 But this fire is not death, for the Lord's discipline is a means of averting death. It is an alternative to death. 11 It is one of the many ways a loving
Saviour uses to bring men to salvation. 12 Among the signs which he used in former times were the burning bush and the pillar of fire. The latter was a token of grace and fear.
____________________ 1Strom. II, 34; II, 131, 2.
10Paed. 1, 61; I, 126, 8.
11Ibid. I, 126, 13.
12Prot. 8; I, 8, 28.
2Strom. V63; II368, 31.
3Strom. III, 64; II, 225, 18. Cf. 1 Tim. V.6.
4Strom. VII, 71; III, 51, 18 5Strom. II, 34; II, 131, 2.
6Prot. 114; I, 80, 26.
7Strom. IV, 80; II, 283, 24.
쎻ογ3∣κòς θáνἀιος Strom. VII, 21; III, 51, 18 9Phaedo, 67D.
It was a light to the obedient and a dreaded fire to the disobedient. An allusion concerning the destruction of Sodom connects the destroying fire with the fire of lust. 1 The torch-fires of the mysteries expose the iniquity of such celebrations and point to the punishment which must follow. 2 .
The fire which sinful souls endure is a beneficial one. This is borne out by a Stoic distinction which Clement and others accepted. Fire is of two kinds -- one which gives life like the sun and another which destroys like earthly fire, 3 one intelligent and one mechanical, 4 or, according to Theodotus the gnostic, one intellectual and one sense-perceived. 5 Clement claims that imperfect souls are sanctified by the intelligent non-material fire. 'But we say that the fire sanctifies not flesh, but sinful souls, speaking not of the ordinary fire that mechanically destroys everything it touches, but of intelligent fire that permeates the soul as it passes through fire.' 6
The function of fire is to purify, to test, and to sanctify. But the notion of a cleansing fire is not carefully defined in Clement. It moves between two poles -- the idea of the fiery end of the world and the idea of moral shame. 7 It is hard to say how far the idea is spiritualised; but it is certain Clement gives us the beginning of the idea of Purgatory. However, the later development of this doctrine is completely foreign to Clement, for whom Fire does not have for its goal the punishment of a man for his sins -which is what the Purgatory of the Catholic Church stands for, though the very word shows that this idea is wrong. It seeks rather to destroy the foreign and base elements which have taken root in a man's soul, a painful operation which cannot be carried out without causing suffering. 8
(3) Many Mansions In heaven there are many mansions of varying degrees of glory. They are arranged in an ascending scale and allotted to the ____________________ 1Paed. II, 89; I, 211, 18.
2Prot. 22; I, 17, 17.
3Ecl.26; III, 144, 16.
4Strom. VII, 34; III, 27, 6.
5Exc.81; III, 132, 2.
6Strom. VII, 34; III, 27, 5.
7Anrich, 'Clemens und Origenes als BegrU+00Fnder der Lehre vom Fegfeuer' (Theologische
Abhandlungen. Eine Festgabe... für H. J. Holtzmann. Tübingen und Leipzig, 1902, pp. 97-120).
8Ibid. p. 120.
faithful according to their obedience and manner of life. The gnostic who has attained perfection on earth is already equal to an angel. 1 on his death he soars to the holy mansion and joins the apostles. Enrolment in this elect body is not the result of a peculiar natural property, but of loyalty to the Lord's commands and the quality of one's life. These two things make the gnostic a real presbyter or deacon in a way which no human act can achieve. All may enter by faith the ranks of the elect. All believers may become gnostics. There is only one covenant, one universal gift of salvation, one God, one Lord, one faith, and one elect from Jew and Greek alike. The 'elect of the elect', the four and twenty judges, are chosen because of their perfect knowledge. The three grades of bishops, presbyters, and deacons are imitations of the glory and the economy which await those who have lived in perfection of righteousness. 2 In heaven such people advance in glory through intermediate stages to the perfect man. This final perfection is found in God's holy mountain, the Church above, among God's philosophers, the true Israelites who are guileless and pure in heart. This summit is reached through good works in the likeness of God. Here those who have gained the blessedness of the eighth heaven enjoy the pure vision of unceasing contemplation. other sheep, who are not of this fold, are allotted another fold or mansion, in proportion to their faith, their obedience to the commandments, and their good works. The believer must divest himself of passions in order to reach his appropriate mansion. It is a greater thing to know than to believe and a greater thing to be honoured after salvation than to be merely saved. The believer when freed from passion by much discipline passes to a better mansion, his greatest chastisement being his own repentance for his post-baptismal sins. He is distressed because he has not attained what others have attained and is ashamed of his sins. These great chastisements are explained. 'For the righteousness of God is good and his goodness is just.' The punishments stop when the penalty has been paid and the believer is purified. There ____________________ 1Strom. VI, 105; II, 484, 29. The following treatment is given by Clement in Strom. VI, chs. 13 and 14.
2Cf. Ignatius, Eph. 6 and Trall. 3.
remains, however, a very great abiding sorrow to those who are judged worthy only of the other fold because they have not been glorified.
God's justice is also revealed in his treatment of the heathen to whom he gave the heavenly bodies to be worshipped. In their worship of idols they rejected his gifts and were counted as the dust which the wind drives away and as drops from a jar.
They are outside salvation and are like lifeless limbs that have been torn from the body to which they belong. The mansions are described again at the end of this chapter as 'varied according to the worth of the believers'. There are inferior places in the Church and there are three elect mansions hinted at by the numbers 30, 60,
100 in the Gospel. The perfect inheritance is for those who have attained to the perfect man, according to the image of Christ. Likeness to God, the adoption and friendship of God, the inheritance of lords and gods -- these things belong to him who is perfect according to the Gospel. 1
The 'very great abiding sorrow' 2 of those who do not rise from the lower mansions may appear to limit the final triumph of God's goodness. It seems a frustration of the work of the Paedagogus, which will bring all to one fold and one shepherd. 3 But there is no doubt that for Clement the hierarchy will remain. The bringing of all faithful souls to final unity is maintained by a passage in the Prophetic Eclogues. 4
The Lord will come and the faithful and righteous will be made one. 'For the body is one; all [believers], being of the same stock and having chosen the same faith and righteousness, will be restored to the same unity.' But, even here, there is still a hierarchy, and a system of promotion in the angelic ranks. Vacancies caused by 'first-created' retiring from providential service to contemplation should be filled from the immediately inferior rank. One member of each rank moves up to the next rank to fill the new vacancy. Each rank knows God in its own special way. After a thousand years of learning perfect men may become angels. These angels, after teaching other men to be ____________________ 1Strom. VI, 114; II, 489, 23, which is the end of Strom. VI, ch. 14. Cf. also Strom. IV, 36; II, 264, 7 and Strom. IV, 114; II298, 18.
3Paed. I, 53; I, 122, 1.
4Ecl. 56; III, 153, 4.
angels for a thousand years, may become (it would seem not undeservedly) archangels. 1
God's justice is good and his goodness is just. This principle is applied to three classes of people. The unbeliever is spiritually dead and remains so. He is like the chaff which the wind blows away, or a piece of metal which does not respond to the pull of the magnet and falls to the ground. 2 He is outside salvation, a limb which cannot live because it is separated from the body of Christ. He is in the same plight as a branch torn from the true. vine. The gnostic who on earth has reached perfection soars straightway to heavenly bliss and climbs God's holy hill. There he joins the apostles in uninterrupted contemplation of God. Lastly the believers who have not gone on to perfection undergo a purifying discipline before they take their place in a lower mansion. They are conscious of a 'great abiding sorrow' because they know that, had they so lived as to deserve it, they would be in a better place.
In each of these three classes, whether through the destruction of evil men, the perfection of good men or the just grief of those who were not good enough, the final triumph of God's goodness is complete.
____________________ 1Ecl. 57; III, 154, 8 2Strom. VII, 9; III, 8, 21.