Chapter 3 - The Logos
CHAPTER 3
THE LOGOS
1. THE SON AND THE FATHER
'GOD, then, is indemonstrable and consequently cannot be the object of knowledge; but the Son is wisdom and knowledge and truth and whatever else is akin to this.
Indeed, proof and description can be given of him.' 1
In Stromateis IV, 25 Clement describes the happy position of the Christian gnostic who contemplates eternal things. 2 By his divine knowledge he is placed with Christ far above ordinary mortals. Other men are as lifeless shadows when compared with him. Plato is right in calling such a man a god for he contemplates mind. Mind is the place of the ideas. Mind is God. But this knowledge cannot be of God who transcends demonstration and knowledge. 3 It must be of the Son, who can be demonstrated and described. The Son is wisdom, knowledge, and truth, and whatever else is similar to this. 4
This idea of the Son as an intelligible revelation of the Father is expressed in many ways. The Son is the stamp of the Father's glory and teaches us the truth concerning God. 5 The Logos is the image, 6 the thought, 7 and the face of God. 8 He is the light by which we gaze on God. 9 He reveals the Father's nature, 10 and is the imitator of God. 11
The description of the Son as wisdom 12 suggests associations with the Wisdom Literature. In the 'Wisdom of Solomon', an Alexandrine work, Wisdom is identified with the immanent, ____________________ 1Strom. IV, 156; 11, 317, 21. This chapter and the first part of the next chapter are based on this passage of the Stromateis.
10Strom. V, 34; 11, 348, 11.
11Strom. 11, 136; II, 188, 20.
12Strom. VI, 61; 11, 462, 18 et supra.
2Strom. IV, 155; 11, 317, 10.
4Cf. Exc. 7; 111, 108, 1.
5Strom. vii, 58; 111, 43, 1.
6Strom. V, 94; 11, 388, 14.
7Strom. V, 16; 11, 336, 8.
8Paed. 1, 7; 1, 124, 4.
9Prot. 84; 1, 64, 6.
divine power in the world. 1 Clement rejects this. For him wisdom is supplanted by the Son. It is no more a cosmic power than knowledge and truth. All three are united within the Son who is the divine power immanent in the world.
The Logos is the mediator not only of the knowledge but also of the power of the Father. He is the power 2 of God, the arm of the Lord, 3 God's servant. 4 He is the instrument of God, 5 a term which belonged to Middle Platonism. 6 The Son is paradoxically the Father's activity. 7 He is the will of the Father. 8
The Son became flesh not only to be seen 9 but to suffer upon the Cross for the salvation of men. The theme of the Christian gospel constantly recurs. The Son of God had come to save mankind. This was what Augustine later looked for in Platonism and could not find. 10 Platonism could speak of a son, logos, energy, instrument, but it could not say of the Logos that he became man for man's sake, 11 and poured out his blood for man's salvation. 12
Clement's account of the Son is governed by two contrasting themes. The Son is distinct from the Father, yet one with the Father. We have seen that the Son is considered as a Being in some way distinct from the Father. He is the oldest among intellectual objects, from whom we learn of the oldest of all. He is a mediator of knowledge and power between God and man. Clement makes a contrasting emphasis on the unity of the Son with the Father. He is of the Father, God in God, 13 and Almighty God. 14 His unity and his being are inseparable from the unity and being of the Father. 15
____________________ 1See Knox, St Paul and the Church of the Gentiles, ch. III, esp. pp. 68 ff.
10Confessions VII, 9: 'sed quia verburn caro factum est et habitavit in nobis, non ibi legi . . . quod autern secundurn ternpus pro impiis mortuus est et filio unico tuo non pepercisti sed pro nobis omnibus tradidisti eurn, non est ibi.'
11Paed. 1, 74; 1, 133, 25.
12Paed. 1, 43; 1, 116, 6.
13Exc.8; III, 108, 20.
14Paed. III, 39; I, 259, 25.
Paed. II, 75; 1, 203, 22: εȉς ὥν ἑ . Prot. 7; 1, 7, 29: ὁ ἐν τῶ+ őντι ὥν.
2Strom. VII, 7; 111, 7, 11.
3Prot. 120; 1, 85, 7.
4Paed. 111, 2; 1, 237, 2.
5Prot. 6; 1, 6, 26.
6Philo, Cherub. 125. De Providentia, 1, 23: instrumentum autern dei est verburn. Cited Theiler, p. 28.
7Strom. VII, 7; 111, 7, 21.
8Prot. 120; 1, 85, 7.
9Strom. v, 16; 11, 336, 14.
There appears to be a confusion in Clement's description of the first principle and the Creator of the cosmos. Both God and the Logos are described as the ultimate first principle and as the Creator of the cosmos. a.
And God is unbegun, the all-complete first principle (or beginning) of all things and the maker of the first principle. In that respect, therefore, in which he is Being, he is the first principle of physical things; in the respect that he is the Good he is the first principle of ethical things, and again in the respect that he is mind he is the first principle of reasoning and judging. From this also he alone is teacher who is the Logos, son of the Nous which is Father, and who trains mankind. 1 b.
. . . and in the spiritual world that which is oldest in origin, the timeless and unbegun first principle and beginning of all Being, the Son. From him we can search out the still more ultimate cause beyond, the Father of all things, the oldest and most beneficent of all. 2
The confusion might be explained by listing the various meanings of 'first principle' and 'Creator'. (Aristotle distinguishes six kinds of first principle in the Metaphysics. 3
) God and the Son are first principles and creators in different senses of the words.
This is true and justifiable, but the distinction of senses is not always preserved.
Clement both distinguishes and unites the Father and the Son. Clement saw a clear distinction between the Father and the Son and he considered that distinction important. On the other hand he saw a unity of the Father and the Son and he considered that unity important. 'O the Great God! O the perfect child! Son in Father and Father in Son', 4 and 'God in form of man undefiled, servant of his Father's will, the Logos who is God, who is in the Father, who is at the right hand of the Father and with the form (of God) is God'. 5 Clement was concerned to maintain a distinction between Father and Son, to empbasise the transcendence of the former and the immanence and condescension of the latter. But he was also greatly concerned to maintain the unity of the Godhead.
____________________ 1Strom. IV, 162; II, 3:10, 16.
2Strom. VII, 2; III, 4, 5.
3Metaphysics, 1013a.
4Paed. 1, 24; 1, 104, 13.
5Paed. 1, 4; 1, 91, 23.
II. THE SON AND THE WORLD
'All the powers of the spirit become collectively one thing, and come together in the same point -- the Son.' 1 Clement sees in the Son the final point of union of all the powers of the spirit. He has mentioned three powers and indicated their unity by a singular pronoun. The Son is 'wisdom, knowledge, and truth, and whatever is similar to this'. Now Clement proceeds to show how all the powers come together. The powers are equivalent to the ideas of Plato. The man of vision who gazes on them is divine, for Nous is the place of the ideas and Nous is God. 2 The divine vision which Clement describes is that of the Son who is the circle of the powers. Clement does not use the word
'idea' in the philosophical sense except where he is quoting and discussing Plato; 3 but he speaks much of 'powers' and regards them as fulfilling the function of the forms. 4 God embraces all things by his powers 5 and his power passes through all things. 6 The Logos has filled all things with holy powers. 7 The powers are spiritual powers. Each spiritual entity has its appropriate power and province. 8 The Spirit is the strength of the Logos as blood is the strength of flesh. 9 The Holy Spirit who works through prophets and all just men alike is one and the same everywhere. 10
The doctrine of the 'powers' determined the structure of the second hypostasis 11 of Middle and NeoPlatonism. It can be traced back to Posidonius. According to him the cosmos was ordered and governed by a unified system of powers. He explained the existence and nature of things by 'powers' just as Plato had done by "forms" and the earlier Stoics had done by immanent reason or divine fire.
12 The powers were originally natural explanations of physical phenomena. They became, in and after Posidonius, supernatural beings ruling over a world
____________________ 1Strom. IV, 156; II, 317, 24.
10Strom. V, 38; II, 352, II. Paed. 1, 42; 1, 115, 10.
11The One-many or complex unity as distinct from the simple One -- in Plotinus ὁ
12Reinhardt, Poseidonios, p. 11.
2Strom. IV, 155; II, 317, 10.
Ibid. and also Strom. V, 16; 11, 336, 8 where he says: η+ δƓ+ ἱ ἐ ·μα τοũ Θεοũ.
4As Philo did, Op. Mundi, 4-5 5Strom. II, 5; II, 115, 23.
6Prot. 73; 1, 55, 20.
7Prot. 112; 1, 79, 9.
8Exc. II; 111, 110, 20.
9Paed. II, 20; 1, 168, 2.
which imperfectly reflected their superior reality. 1 The demonic powers became intermediary between a transcendent God and the world. They became the subjects of theurgy and magic. They never wholly lost their unifying significance, and it is this unifying significance that Clement emphasises here.
The powers, says Clement, are collectively one thing. They constitute the whole of the divine activity. They are the thoughts and actions of the one God. They converge on the one point. They come together in the end in the Son who is the instrument of all divine activity. Clement speaks of his true dialectic ascending by the powers to the best essence 2 in the same way as Plato's dialectic ascends to the Form of the Good. Philo describes the Logos as the 'idea of ideas'. 3 This convergence together of the powers has three aspects. It is metaphysical, for the being of subordinate powers as well as of the world which they produce derives from the Son who is the power of God. It is ethical, because the purpose served by each power culminates in the one end of divine beneficent activity. It is logical, because the true dialectic ascends from power to power to the essence which is the rational explanation of all things. The Son is regarded by Clement as the efficient final and formal cause of all the powers. The powers are his powers. He works through them.
'But one cannot describe him with a list of his individual powers. The Son is not simply one thing as one thing nor many things as parts, but one thing as all things.' 4
All this means that the Son is no ordinary being. He cannot be described in terms of one idea nor by listing the ideas of his many powers. For he is not simply one thing as one thing. 5 Nor on the other hand is he merely the sum of many different parts. He is one thing as all things. He is all the powers.
He is all the things which the powers produce. They are joined by him as ultimate cause into a unity which is one thing as all things. Clement goes on to emphasise the two sides of the paradox -- all things and one thing. 'All things come from him. For he is the circle of all the ____________________ 1Reinhardt, Kosmos und Sympathie, p. 249.
2Strom. 1, 177; II, 109, 6.
3Op. Mundi, 6.
4Strom. IV, 156; 11, 317, 26.
powers rolled into one and united.' 1 There is no qualifying of either the universality or the unity of the Son. Just as many pieces, say, of clay, can be taken and rolled together into a ball, so all the powers are rolled together in the circle of the Son. In him are concentrated all the powers of the universe. Just as the ball consists of the many pieces of clay related in a special way, so the Son is all the powers rolled into one and unified.
The symbolism of the circle points to the perfect unity of the Son. Aristotle says, 'While in a sense we call anything one if it is a quantity and continuous, in a sense we do not unless it is a whole, i.e. unless it has unity of form. . . . This is why the circle is of all lines most truly one, because it is whole and complete.' 2 The consequences of circularity are stated by Clement. 'Therefore the Logos is called the Alpha and Omega. In him alone the end becomes the beginning and ends again at the original beginning without any gaps. 3 There is no part of the Logos of which it can be said, 'This is the beginning for there is nothing before it', or, 'This is the end for there is nothing beyond it'. There can be no gaps, no breaks in the circle, no incompleteness in the perfection of the Logos. This is why the Logos is called Alpha and Omega. 'I am the Alpha and the Omega, . . . He who is, who was and is to be, the Almighty.' 4 The universal eternal activity of the Logos is a complete unity.
I saw Eternity the other night, Like a great ring of pure and endless light, All calm, as it was bright. 5
The use of the symbols of the circle and the Alpha and Omega is also found in gnostic literature. 6
For Clement the Son is both above and within the world, both one and all. He is the one point in which the powers come together. He is the circle which embraces them all. He is not just the apex of a dialectic, not just 'one as one'. Nor is he just a ____________________ 1Strom. IV, 156; 11, 318, 1.
2Aristotle, Metaphysics, 1016b (Ross translation).
3Strom. IV, 157; 11, 319, 3.
4Revelation, i. 8.
5Henry Vaughan, The World.
6See Amélineau, 'Codex Brucianus' in Notices et extraits des manuscrits de la Bibliothèque nationale et d'autres bibliothhques, tome XXIX, I ( Paris, 1891). Carl Schmidt , Gnostische Schriften (Texte und
Untersuchungen, VIII, Leipzig, 1892), p. 38.
cosmos which is its own deity, not 'many as parts'. He is supreme over the world and yet he is 'one thing as all things'.
These points may be seen again in Clement's account of the Son in Strom. VII, 2. 1 The nature of the Son is described by seven superlatives. He is the most perfect, most holy, most powerful, most princely, most kingly, most beneficent and nearest to the Almighty. He is the highest point of eminence and all things are subject to his ordering in accordance with the will of the Father. He steers the universe on the best course, guided by the 'hidden ideas'. 2 He never leaves his watch tower, 3 is not divided or localised, but present everywhere at all times. In no way circumscribed, he is, in the terms of Xenophanes' pantheism, 4 perfect Mind. He sees, hears, and knows all things, the angels and gods are subordinate to him, and all men are his, though not all know it.
In conclusion two things may be said. The first thing is that Clement shows an awareness of the problems involved in speaking of one thing as all things. He keeps together the emphasis on the Son as the ultimate cause of all things and the emphasis on his presence in and oneness with all things. It is as ultimate cause that the Son embraces all things. The second thing to be noted is the genuine religious feeling which Clement attaches to this notion. It is difficult for us to rouse any feelings whatever towards 'one thing as all things'; but Clement concludes the Paedagogus with a prayer which includes these words:
Grant that we may sing a thankful song of praise to the one Father and Son, Son and Father, the Son who is instructor and teacher, together with the Holy Spirit. All things to the one, in whom all things are, through whom all things are one, through whom eternity exists, whose members we all are, to whom belong glory and the ages of eternity! All things to the Good, all things to the Wise, all things to the just! To him be the glory both now and for evermore. Amen. 5
____________________ 1Strom. VII, 5; III, 5, 20.
2Cf. Numenius, Concerning the Good, frag.26 (XXXII), and Heraclitus, frag. 28 (Bywater).
3Plato, Politlcus, 272 E. When God leaves the helm of the ship of the world, everything goes chaotically backwards until he returns. Cf. A. E. Taylor, Plato, the Man and his Work, p. 396.
οũλος ὁρᾷ, οὐ λος δƐ+ νοεȉ, οὐ ' ἀκοúει. Sextus Math. IX, 144. R.P. 102.
5Paed. in, 101; 1, 291, 7.