Chapter 13 - Symbolism
CHAPTER 13
SYMBOLISM
'So it seems to me that gnostic ability produces three final results. First, the gnostic knows things, secondly he fulfils the commands of the Logos, and thirdly he can hand on the hidden things of truth in a way that shows reverence to God.' 1
To complete the account of knowledge we shall examine the third ability of the gnostic -- his ability to hand on to others 'the hidden things of truth'. We shall consider first the 'hidden things' and the justification which Clement gives for hiding truth. Then we shall consider the gnostic tradition' by which these things are handed on.
I. HIDDEN THINGS
The most important parts of truth are 'hidden'. Some are not written down at all but are reserved for the oral instruction of the initiated. Others are written in an enigmatic and obscure way. The Lord did not reveal to the many the things which belonged to the few. He revealed these things to the few by word of mouth and not in writing. 2 On the other hand what has been written about ultimate things is expressed in a mysterious form. In Scripture there is enigma, allegory and symbol.
Some things are clear, unveiled, and convey definite moral teaching, but other things are expressed in riddles and parables and there is need of an interpreter. The Paidagogos teaches us clear and definite moral precepts; but we need a Didaskalos to handle the riddles and symbols. 3
In Strom. v Clement examines many examples of symbolism and gives reasons for its use. 'Therefore one may say that all who have spoken of the divine nature, barbarians and Greeks, have hidden the first principles of things and handed the truth down in ____________________ 1Strom. VII, 4; III, 5, 5.
2Strom. I, 13; II, 10, 3.
3Paed. III, 97; I, 289, 15-26.
riddles, signs, allegories, metaphors, and similar figures.' 1 Four reasons are given for its use.
(1) Moral. Bad people cannot understand the truth. It is desirable that they should not have a chance to misunderstand it. Their parodies would offend the righteous and mislead others who might otherwise be led into a right way of life. Truth has a sacredness which must not be profaned by evil men. Clement says this symbolically.
Therefore, the method of concealment is truly divine and, because of the pure and holy teaching which it shuts away in the sanctuary of truth, is most necessary for us. The Egyptians signified this by the places they called 'adyta', and the Hebrews signified it by the veil of the sanctuary. Entry was permitted only to those who were consecrated, that is, dedicated to God, circumcised in the lusts of the passions because of their love to the one God. To Plato also it seemed not right for the impure to touch the pure. 2
Truth is too precious a pearl to cast before swine. It must be hidden from all except those whose faith and manner of life qualify them for knowledge. 'For it is their wish that the really genuine philosophy and the true theology should be the possession only of those who often draw near to them and who have proved themselves in faith and the whole of their lives.' 3
(2) Traditional. If the truth is veiled in symbols, interpreters will be needed. These interpreters will hand On a tradition which they have received. They will choose the people to whom they hand it on. Tradition and secrecy work together to keep the truth from those who would corrupt it. Personal supervision will make the pupil more industrious and save him from much misconception. 'It is also their intention that we should need an expositor and teacher. For they thought that in this way several things would be accomplished. We should be more energetic in the pursuit of truth, those who were worthy would be benefited; and in learning from those whose knowledge was really good there would be no danger of misunderstanding.' 4
(3) Power of suggestion. The truth by being veiled possesses ____________________ 1Strom. V, 21; II, 340, 5.
2Strom. V, 19; II, 338, 27.
3Strom. v, 56; II, 364, 8.
4Strom. v, 56; IX, 364, II.
greater powers of suggestion and makes a more vivid impression on the minds of its recipients. 'Moreover all things that shine through an interposed medium show forth the truth in a grander and more venerable form, like fruits which are seen through water and forms which are seen through veils. . . . For complete illumination shows up the defects of a thing.' 1 Fruit that is old and wrinkled looks fresh and splendid when placed in water. Bodies that are veiled not only gain a touch of mystery but hide their defects of form. In the same way, the defects of an idea are hidden and it is given a more impressive form when it is concealed in a mysterious saying.
(4) Variety of interpretations. Not only are symbols more impressive but they can say several things at once. Ordinary language in its effort to describe these things would take more than one proposition: 'forms which are seen through veils which add more allusions to them. . . . Besides, clear things can be understood in one way only. It is possible to receive several meanings at once when we receive sayings with a hidden meaning. In such circumstances the inexperienced and unlearned man falls into error. But the gnostic understands.' 2
A few examples of symbolism may be considered. ' "According to the grace", he says, "which is given to me, as a wise master builder, I have laid the foundation.
Another builds thereon gold and silver, precious stones." This is the superstructure of knowledge on the foundation of faith in Jesus Christ.' 3 This is an intelligible interpretation. Another is more difficult, though eminently laudable. ' "One must not sail on land", is a Pythagorean proverb. It shows that taxes and similar rents, being a lot of trouble and also uncertain, are to be deprecated. Therefore the Word says that tax gatherers will be saved with difficulty.' 4 The meaning of this proverb is,
'Don't take unnecessary risks! Don't try to get rich quick!' The risks which are inevitable at sea can be avoided on land. If you take on the insecure though lucrative job of collecting taxes, you are asking for trouble.
Not only verbal symbolism but also pictorial symbolism is ____________________ 1Strom. v, 56; II, 364, 15.
2Strom. V, 56; II, 364, 17.
3Strom. V, 26; II, 342, 10.
4Strom. V, 28; II, 344, 3.
used. A chapter is devoted to the symbolism of the Tabernacle and its furniture, from which chapter the following example is taken.
The covering and the veil were variously adorned with the colours of the hyacinth, purple, scarlet and yellow. So it was hinted that the nature of the elements contained the revelation of God. For the purple is from water, the yellow from earth; blue is like air, being dark, even as scarlet is like fire. 1
Another chapter is given to symbolism in numbers, geometrical ratios and music.
This begins, As then in astronomy we have Abraham as an example, similarly in arithmetic we have the same Abraham. For, having heard that Lot has been taken prisoner and having numbered his own home-born servants at 318 (τιη), he attacks and captures a very large number of the enemy. They say then that the figure for 300 (τ) is in its shape the type of the sign of the Lo ς). 2
Geometrical symbolism is illustrated: 'For the expression "wooden squares" signifies security in that the square shape forms right angles in all directions.' 3
Symbolic expression and interpretation is perhaps the part of Clement's thought which is most foreign to modern minds. These things seem at first to savour of the occult and weird, to lack justification, or to seem unnecessary and trivial. What was the point behind this symbolism? One minor point was that, particularly in Alexandria, Christian converts came from a background of which it was a normal feature. It was an inevitable part of their mental machinery. The main point which underlies all the examples is that there are connexions in the world other than those normally seen. These connexions take the form of likenesses, proportions, harmonies. They all point out unities in apparent diversities. They show that the world is a complex unity of far greater complexity than is normally seen. They give point to such studies as astronomy -- 'This science makes the soul
____________________ 1Strom. V, 32; II, 347, 7.
2Strom. VI, 84; II, 473., 20. Cf. Epistle of Barnabas, ch. IX.
3Strom. VI, 86; II, 475, I.
particularly quick to understand, of clear insight into truth, and capable of refuting falsehood. It enables the soul to find agreements and relations so as to hunt out likeness in unlike things.' 1 Mondésert says,
At the basis of symbolism, as Clement understands it, there is a profound idea which in their own way the very excesses of the method of interpretation underline.
This idea is the relatedness of all things among themselves, the intelligible bond which sets them in order, and brings them together again, which makes them one beneath their multiplicity, one by their cohesion and their unity. 2
II. THE GNOSTIC TRADITION
The gnostic understands riddles, allegories and symbols. He understands the unseen unity to which they all bear witness. Consequently he alone can teach others the meaning of the mysterious text of Scripture. In doing this he becomes a link in the chain of tradition which stretches back to our Lord and the apostles.
This knowledge has come down to us through being handed down verbally from the apostles by a continuous succession of a small number of men. 3
We dare to say, for such is the gnostic belief, that the true gnostic understands everything, embraces everything, and grasps firmly even what is difficult for us.
Such were James, Peter, John, Paul, and the other apostles. For the prophecy is full of knowledge because it was given by the Lord and then again explained by the Lord to the apostles. 4
The knowledge which the gnostic possesses comes to him through this tradition. 5 It is an unwritten inheritance but written, as foretold by the prophet, on the heart. The tradition is called the 'gnostic tradition' 7 because it hands on knowledge. The ancients did not write because they did not want to use up precious time which might be spent in teaching. 8 We need a teacher to explain
____________________ 1Strom. VI, 90; II, 477, 14.
2Mondésert, op. cit. p. 151.
3Strom. VI, 61; II, 462, 28.
4Strom. VI, 68; II, 466, 5.
5Strom. VII, 55; III, 41, 4.
7Strom. V, 63; II, 368, 14; Strom. I, 15; II, 11, 19 and elsewhere.
8EcL. 27; III, 144, 26.
the Scripture to us. The Scripture expresses things in parables or likenesses because the Lord came in the likeness of what he was not. He was not of this world but came as belonging to it. 1 He led men hence to the world of spiritual things and essential truth by means of parables. The real meaning of a parable is different from its apparent meaning. The whole Gospel story may well seem a parable to the ignorant. When Scripture is elucidated and expounded it declares that 'the very agony suffered by the flesh, which the Lord had assumed, is "the power and the wisdom of God" '. 2 When the riddles and parables of the books of the prophets are expounded we find that his suffering was foretold.
Hermas 3 was told to write in a book what the elect should know. He wrote the letters well enough, but could not group them into syllables. Faith, says Clement, reads the individual letters clearly, but only 'the gnostic exposition' reads the syllables. 4 The new book of which Isaiah spoke is the heart of the gnostic. 5 The Saviour taught the apostles the unwritten interpretation of Scripture and this has been handed down from them and written by the power of God on our new hearts. 6
Clement gives an example of a gnostic exposition of the Ten Commandments. 7 The number ten represents in many ways the whole creation of God. The first and second commandments emphasise the unity and sovereignty of God. 8 The fourth commandment speaks of the seventh day, which is Christ, our true rest. Some cosmological arithmetic follows. The father whom we are to honour (fifth commandment) 9 is God and the mother is divine knowledge and wisdom. Adultery means idolatry, murder means destruction of the truth, and theft means taking what belongs to someone else, particularly the honour and the truth that belong to God. 10
____________________ 1Strom. VI, 126; II, 495, 22.
10Strom. VI, 507,8.
2Strom. VI, 127; II, 496, 9.
3Herm. Vis. II, I, 3.
4Strom. VI, 131; II, 498, 2.
5Strom. VI, 131; II, 498, 11.
6Strom. VI, 131; II, 498, 15.
7Strom. VI, ch. 16; II, 499, 12.
8Strom. VI, 137; II, 501, 9 and 14.
9Strom. VI, 146; II, 506, 28. Strom. II, 507, 8.
CONCLUSION
Knowledge differs from faith as a complex unity differs from a simple unity. Faith is a simple act of acceptance or perception. Logical knowledge is a complex process of reasoning which grasps the unity of the intellectual world. According to Plato it is the ability to see things as a whole 1 that distinguishes the dialectician. Spiritual knowledge is growth in Christ, an awareness of God's universal presence and union with him in love. Symbolism shows the hidden connections between things and points to their underlying unity. Knowledge is always a complex unity, as faith is a simple unity. Faith reads the letters, while knowledge reads the syllables.
____________________ 1Rep.537.
CONCLUSION
AT the beginning of this study we noted two patterns -- the one and the one-many, the transcendent and the immanent. These two patterns were blended, to make one basic antithesis of the transcendent one and the immanent one-many. This antithesis has recurred in each part of Clement's thought. God, the transcendent unknowable one, is distinguished from the Son, the immanent one-many. The goodness of God transcends in its simple purity the varied goodness of created things. The truth which is the sacred and unique possession of the Christian Church transcends the manifold complexity of all other truth as it has been grasped by the minds of men. Faith, which is the simple assent, decision, perception of the soul, transcends the vast complexity of knowledge.
In each case, however, the antithesis breaks down, and the one is not completely severed from the one-many. 'The Son is in the Father and the Father is in the Son.'
'Both are one -namely God.' Goodness in created things consists in being like God and in nothing else. The distinction between the exclusive truth of the Christian tradition and other truth is balanced by the claim that all other truth depends for its validity on Christian truth. Faith and knowledge also interact and depend on one another.
The reasons for the presence of the antithesis in Clement's thought may be set out.
Clement emphasises the transcendence of the one and the immanence of the onemany. God's being is transcendent, unlike all other things, and far from the ways of men. God's being is immanent, 'closer than breathing, nearer than hands or feet', binding all things together by his sustaining power. The goodness of God is pure, holy, and unchanging; the goodness of men is manifold and faltering. Virtue in God and man is not the same thing. On the other hand, man's goodness forms a complex unity and is everywhere the same thing -- likeness to God. The truth of Christianity is exclusive, for the Gospel is
not just another religion, nor a new syncretism. Its truth is unique, precious, mysterious, guarded by a sacred tradition of holy men. It cannot be tampered with, nor twisted to suit a passing fancy. On the other hand, the whole universe of truth is one. Christ said, 'I am the truth', and to know anything is to know him. The systems of truth which men have known are not outside him but are partial apprehensions of his eluding greatness. Faith is the decision of the soul to take its stand with Christ and not to acquiesce in syncretistic tolerance. The Christian's faith signifies his acceptance of salvation from sin and the trust of his whole life to his
Lord. The Christian's knowledge sees the relation of this faith to all that is true and good. By knowledge he goes on to perfection, to see God face to face. The reason for the presence of this antithesis in each part of Clement's thought is that he felt it necessary to say of God, goodness, truth, and men's grasp of truth, that they were both one, simple and transcendent, and also one, many and immanent.
The reasons for the breakdown of the antithesis in Clement's thought may also be set out. He wished to maintain that the one was distinguished but never divided from the one-many. Marcion and gnostic dualists separated the transcendent good
God from the creator of the world and the Father from the Son. Clement maintains against them the unity of Father and Son, of the transcendent God with the creator of the world. Heretical gnostics divided the goodness of God and those who were born his elect from the inevitable involuntary badness of most men. Clement maintains that there is no such division among men; that all men are free to choose virtue and all may participate in the one goodness which is of God. Heretical gnostics and also the 'simpliciores' divided the unique Christian truth from the rest of truth and faith from knowledge. Against both parties Clement maintains that all truth is one and that faith and knowledge cannot be separated. His answer to those who have in each case divided and not merely distinguished is the same. 'Neither is faith without knowledge, nor the Father without the Son.' 1
Clement realises the impossibility of reconciling by logical ____________________ 1Strom. v, 1; 11, 326, 8.
means the one and the one-many, the transcendent and the immanent. But he refuses either to divide the one from the other or to lessen the contrast between the two sides of the paradox. The gnostics had taken the first way and Neo-Platonism was to take the second. Proclus begins his Elements of Theology with six propositions which pretend to cover the problem.
(1)Every many in some way participates in unity.
(2)All that participates in unity is both one and not one.
(3)All that becomes one does so by participation in unity.
(4)All that is unified is other than the one itself.
(5)Every many is posterior to the one.
(6)Every many is composed either of unified groups or of henads. 1
The ordered conciseness of Proclus is but a façade which screens the irreconcilable contrast between the one and the one-many. Clement has chosen the better way of setting out the contrast in the most striking terms, and yet refusing to slide into dualism. God is at once transcendent and immanent. When Isaiah saw the Lord
'high and lifted up' he learned at the same time that 'the whole earth was filled with his glory?'. 2 When a later prophet wrote, 'Seek ye the Lord while he may be found, call ye upon him while he is near', he added these words from the Lord, For as the heavens are higher than the earth so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts.' 3 Nothing is to be gained and everything is to be lost by whittling down either the transcendence or the immanence of God.
Clement was able to avoid the two errors of his contemporaries because he had no need to avoid the paradox. It was resolved for him in the Christian gospel -- 'The kingdom of heaven is at hand.' This statement is as paradoxical as any could be and the greatness of the gospel is realised only as the intensity of the paradox is appreciated. Clement drew on the gospel message of the coming of the kingdom in Christ and the teaching that 'this is life eternal that they might know thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom thou hast sent'. The believer is made one in Christ who is all things. He exchanges the life of ____________________ 1Proclus, Elements of Theology, A.1.
2Isa. vi, 1 and 3.
3Isa. lv, 6 and 9.
earth for the life of heaven. In his experience of unity with Christ he appreciates the mystery of the union of the Father with the Son and the unity of all things in the Son. In living a good life he lays hold of the first part of the two-fold End or hope, the second part of which is the eternal goodness of God. God's eternal goodness produces and unites with itself whatever good there is in human lives. By knowledge the true gnostic anticipates on earth the vision of God face to face and the continuous enjoyment of his presence. In each case the anticipation of heaven is a present experience of unity where there would otherwise be division and disunity. In each case (and they are all aspects of the one process) man meets God, not by the effort of his own being, virtue or reason, but by God's coming to him in Christ. It is Christ, not the faith of the believer, who makes all things one. It is
Christ who enters men's hearts and renews their image of God's goodness. It is Christ who is the light and true knowledge, who removes the blindness and darkness from men's minds, and who is the truth and the face of God on which they gaze.
APPENDICES
APPENDIX A
CLEMENT'S AESTHETIC
THIS appendix will set out briefly the main points in Clement's aesthetic.
Art copies reality. It produces something distinct from and inferior to the real thing. 'The picture is indeed like. Let art be praised but let it not deceive men by posing as truth.' 1
'The Parian stone is beautiful but it is not yet Poseidon. The ivory is beautiful but it is not yet the Olympian Zeus. Matter is always in need of art but God is in need of nothing. Art has come forward and matter puts on form, and while the richness of its substance makes it convertible for gain, it is reverenced solely on account of its form.' 2 Art reproduces the form or shape of an object.
Art does not merely copy or represent things. It is powerful and deceitful. It tries to pass itself off as the real thing and it is often successful. The story is told of a man who had intercourse with a statue of Aphrodite. Art deludes in two ways, encouraging either sexual licence or idolatry. 'But art deceives you with another kind of witchcraft if it does not lead you to passionate desire -- it leads you to reverence and to worship images and pictures.' 3 Of its power Clement says, 'The art of the craftsman is effective, but not so that it can deceive reason or those who live according to reason.' 4
But he is not sure of this. 'Sing us, Homer, the beautiful song. . . . Stop the song, Homer! It is not beautiful. It teaches adultery and we are entreated not to defile even our ears. For we are those who bear about the image of God in this living and moving image of our humanity.' 5 The devotees of art in their sensuality 'have done violence to man and have obliterated by shame the divine image in which he was made'. 6
____________________ 1Prot.57; I, 45, 15.
2Prot.56; I, 44, 14.
3Prot.57; I, 45, 13.
4Prot.57; I, 45, 5.
5Prot.59; I, 46, 9.
6Prot.61; I, 47, 14.
The second form of delusion, idolatry, is the height of folly. Images are made of gold, wood, stone or earth. 'I have made it my practice to walk on the earth, not to worship it.' 1 Also, 'You have made heaven a stage. For you the Divine has become a drama.' 2 But God is far above all this. 'For the skill of man makes houses and ships, and cities and pictures. But can I tell you all the things that God makes? Look at the whole universe -- that is his work.' 3 God created it by the bare act of willing. We cannot make him who made us. Let us remember his transcendent position. Clement (unlike Plato) will have no representations of God at all, except the spiritual one which is in the heart of man.
Certain kinds of music are censured and here again art is not merely representative. 'For the varied charms of the broken melodies and the mournful measures of the Carian muse are destructive of character, dragging it down to passion, through the uncontrolled and evil art of music.' 4 Lack of harmony in the music destroys the harmony of the soul.
There is a true beauty which is likeness to God, and is spiritual, unchanging and invisible. 'But that man with whom the Logos dwells lives not in varied fashion nor does he forge false features. He bears the form of the Logos -- he is made like God. He is beautiful -- he does not beautify himself.
This is the true beauty -- for it is God. That man becomes God, because he wills what God wills.' 5
Ornaments and luxurious dresses are to be avoided, for they are a form of error, taking the image for the reality. Just as a man may be devoted to the true beauty, so he may be devoted to its image.
'Those men who set themselves towards the image of beauty, namely the love of ornament, and not towards true beauty, and who again practise idolatry under a fine name, are to be sent far from truth, as those who with opinion and not with knowledge deal in dreams about the nature of beauty.' 6 'Our life ought to be anything but a parade.' 7 This account of true beauty, which is God, explains the contra____________________ 1Prot.56; I, 44, 20.
2Prot.58; I, 46, 5.
3Prot.63; I, 48, 12.
4Paed. II, 41; I, 182, 16.
5Paed. III, 1; I, 236, 21.
6Paed. II, 106; I, 220, 15.
7Paed. II, 108; I, 222, 13.
diction in the passage quoted concerning Homer's beautiful song which is not beautiful.
No adequate assessment of the above points is possible here. It is worth noting certain parallels with Plato's aesthetic. Note (1) is like Republic X, 595-608, Notes (2) and (3) like Republic 111, 401 and Note (4) like the Symposium, 211 if we accept Taylor's identification of ἀဗ1τò τò καλóν andἀγαθóν.
1 The views are parallel, not identical.
____________________ 1Taylor, Plato, the Man and his Work, p. 231.
APPENDIX B
NEGATIVE THEOLOGY
IN his recent work on Clement 1 Völker has raised certain objections to Clement's negative theology.
He claims that Clement's interpreters may be divided into two opposed groups (pp. 93-6). One group has recognised him as a philosopher and the other has recognised him as a theologian. The former group has attached importance to his negative theology. The latter group has considered the negative theology to be an unassimilated borrowing from pagan philosophy. Völker attaches himself to the second group. This controversy, as formulated by Völker, rests upon an over-simplification of Clement's thought. Clement is not either a philosopher or a theologian. He is both. The task he set himself was to bring together Greek philosophy and Christian theology, so that if either group were right he has failed. Clement's philosophical account of God is an important part of his thought. It is not, however, the sum of his opinions concerning God.
V+00F6lker objects that the negative theology is interpolated and unassimilated in the body of the text (p. 94). This is not the case with the account of Book V which forms the climax of this book. It is true that there are many isolated references to these ideas, but these are never without point.
Völker's example, ἔ ũ έ áδα, 2 is not well chosen. It comes from a chapter of the Paedagogus which is directed against those who consider that the just is not good. Clement's chief point is that God is one and that the Marcionites are wrong in teaching two Gods. Yet Völker describes the above statement as merely an exegetical statement (p.
91).
Völker's next objection is that this part of Clement's teaching is not original, but is borrowed from Philo and has parallels in contemporary pagan philosophy (p. 94). The evidence
____________________ 1Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus.
2Paed. I, 71; I, 131, 18 cited Völker, p. 91.
for the dependence on Philo is not given extensively, but seems to consist of the fact that Clement uses certain expressions which Philo also used: τòν ὅντως μóνον ὅντα, τò ἀ
. The passage quoted above as an example of isolated reference is also described as a Philo reminiscence (p. 91). It is rather more like a famous passage of Plato than it is like the passage of Philo which it is said to resemble. 1 The passage from Philo is also a direct contradiction of one of the steps of Clement's reasoning in the chapter concerned. (Is it likely that Clement would be reminiscent of ὅ καì ἀγαθοũ κρετττον 2 ἀ +ν 3 ) There is no doubt that Clement has many passages which derive from Philo, as Stählin's footnotes to the text show. But these do not include the chief statements of Clement's negative theology, and are not, in any passage of importance, merely borrowed, but always developed in a way that is Clement's own. Völker comments on this in reference to Abraham's vision from afar off (p. 93). The third objection made by Völker is that these passages are inconsistent with Clement's thought as a whole (p. 95). No such inconsistency exists. The philosophical account is preparatory, clears away false conceptions, and shows that positive knowledge of God is not possible without Divine help. Völker finds no inconsistency, no lack of assimilation and no lack of originality in Clement's account of the true
Gnosis. Many elements different in origin are brought, he says, into an original unity, out of which Clement's gnosis grows. This gnosis is something completely new in the history of Christian piety, the first Christian Platonism, and an important development in Christian mysticism (pp. 442 and 608). Where Völker's research has been concentrated he finds consistency and originality in Clement. At the conclusion of his work he goes so far as to say that Clement never borrows anything from Philo without critically examining it and restating it from his own point of view (p. 623).
____________________ 1Paed. I, 71; I, 131, 18 is more like Republic VI, 509 D than it is like Philo, De Praemiis 40, V344, pp.
16 ff.
2Philo, loc. cit.
3Paed. I, 63; I, 127, 12. The alleged reminiscence is on p. 131; 'ultro bonus' was a Marcionite attribute of God. See Harnack, Marcion, das Evangelium Vom fremden Gott, p. 86.
Lebreton, whose attention has been given to the doctrine of the Trinity, finds in Clement's theology, both philosophical and revealed, not inconsistency, but consistency at a new and deeper level. 1
Son effort d'ailleurs ne tend pas seulement comme celui des apologistes, à rapprocher l'hellénisme et le christianisme par un concordisme artificiel, mais bien à les pénétrer intimement l'un par l'autre pour atteindre la source profonde d'où l'un et l'autre dérivent, c'est-à-dire la Vérité première . . . une théologie plus profondément hellénique que celle des apologistes mais aussi plus profondément chrétienne.
____________________ 1RSR, 1947, pp. 55, 57.
APPENDIX C
PSEUDO-DIONYSIUS AND MAXIMUS CONFESSOR
CLEMENT appears to have received attention in the Eastern Church in the sixth and seventh centuries, in the works of pseudoDionysius, Maximus the Confessor and others. It is tempting to believe that Clement did come into his own at this period and that his writings did, as he foretold, 'find someone to understand them'. In this way the presence of Clement's main ideas in later theology, notably that of Aquinas, could be attributed to a stream of influence which passed through pseudo-Dionysius and others. The evidence does not justify this view.
(1) The one citation of pseudoDionysius appears to be genuine. 'And if the philosopher Clement is of the opinion that the more important types in the visible world may be called παραδεíγματα When compared with other things, yet his discourse does not proceed in regular, definite and simple terms.' 1 Who is the philosopher Clement? Maximus Confessor and Pachymeres the Paraphraser say specifically of this passage that the philosopher is Clement of Rome. Maximus adds,
'He did not explain where the holy Clement said these things.' 2 Most commentators have followed this view and attributed it to a pseudo-Clementine source. There have been dissenting voices. As early as 1654 one Albertinus maintained that the philosopher was Clement of Alexandria. 3 He was arguing against Baronius who claimed that the person in question was a Platonic philosopher Actius Clemens whom the younger Pliny mentions. Albertinus quoted a passage from Stromateis
VIII in support of his claim. In the middle of the last century Hipler asserted that there was only one Clement who could and would be called a philosopher and he was the writer of the Stromateis. Hipler also quotes Stromateis VIII as ____________________ 1Dion. Areop. Migne, S.G. 3, col. 824; Frag. 52; III, 225, 13.
2Migne, S.G. 4, col. 329.
3For the rest of this paragraph I am indebted basically to vol. III of Stählin text, Introduction, pp. 66-7.
evidence of Clement holding the opinion which Dionysius mentions. Stählin accepted his arguments, though he recognised that the citation from Stromateis VIII was not to the point.
PseudoDionysius in his role of an intimate of the apostles could never have heard of Clement of Alexandria. To admit such an acquaintance would destroy his alibi.
The philosopher could only be the Clement of Philippians IV, who had long since been identified with Clement of Rome. Maximus and Pachymeres, writing as if pseudo-Dionysius was not 'pseudo', had no alternative but to describe the 'philosopher' as Clement of Rome.
It appears probable, however, that for pseudoDionysius Clement of Rome was identified with Clement of Alexandria, the former adding some philosophical works to his expanding list and the latter exchanging his historical identity for a much more exalted one.
This identification is suggested by the fact that Clement the philosopher had the personal identity of the Roman and the philosophic characteristics of the Alexandrine. For pseudoDionysius as for Plato in the Timaeus παραδεíγματα were the patterns from which the world was made, the universal forms or ideas. For pseudo-Dionysius they existed in God alone. Clement of Alexandria used the word to describe the examples of historical people or things which we should follow. 1
They had an earthly existence. (The Platonic universals within the Logos of God were described as 'powers' or 'ideas'.) To such a view pseudo-Dionysius is bound to reply, And if the philosopher Clement is of the opinion that the more important types in the visible world may be called παραγμαӄα relatively to other things, yet his discourse does not proceed in regular, definite and simple terms. But even if we admit the truth of his opinion, we must remember the Scripture which says, 'I did not show these things unto thee that thou mightest follow after them', but that, through such knowledge of these as is suited to our faculties, we may be led up (so far as is possible) to the Universal Cause. 2
____________________ 1There is one example of the technical use -- the city of Plato is a παρáδειγμα laid up in heaven. Strom.
IV, 172; II, 325, 5.
2Migne, S.G. 3, col. 824. Rolt translation, slightly modified.
Clement has used παρáδειγμα in its non-technical sense of moral example and has consequently brought the παραδҵíγματα too close to earth for pseudo-Dionysius, who uses the word in its technical sense. Pseudo-Dionysius wrongly imagines that Clement is also using the word in its technical sense. This is not a foolish mistake, for the Platonic παραδεíγματα were patterns to guide the creator in making the things below. They were the 'exemplars', the perfect condition of each earthly class of things. Clement's use of the word in its ordinary sense to describe the illustrious examples of those who have gone before also includes the notion of 'exemplar'.
Again, the merging of the two Clements on this point is not foolish. Clement of Rome's Epistle to the Corinthians is concerned largely with pointing out the examples of saints and heroes of old. He does not use the word οαρáδειγμα and pseudoDionysius could have no quarrel with the statements in this Epistle; but the ideas are the same as those concerning παρτεíγματα in the Stromateis.The second thing which pseudoDionysius tells us about the 'philosopher Clement' is that 'his discourse does not proceed in regular, definite and simple terms'. There are no '
Clements' in the first five centuries who have a better claim to this description than
Clement of Alexandria. We are therefore justified in accepting the possibility that '
Clement the philosopher' was both Clement of Rome and Clement of Alexandria. a.
Clement of Rome was the only admissible contemporary of pseudo-Dionysius. b.
Clement of Alexandria possessed the opinions and literary characteristics attributed to ' Clement the philosopher'.
Maximus Confessor in his Scholia does not contribute anything to our knowledge of the philosopher Clement. 1 He confirms what has been said of the objection of Dionysius -- Clement brought the παραδεíγματα down out of the mind of God and into the world. Maximus expands the views of Clement on lines which he does not claim to belong to Clement. To clarify what Clement
____________________ 1Migne, S.G.4, col. 329. The order of the verses in the text which Maximus is using differs in one respect from the text of Dionysius which we have in Migne. This does not alter the general sense.
has said he expounds a certain theory which puts purely intelligible things at the top of a vertical line and purely sensible things at the bottom, but then fills in the intervening part with relatively intelligible and relatively sensible objects. The great
Dionysius were thoughts in the mind of God. Clement rather followed the opinion which says that intelligible things have
God's ideas as their causes but sensible things come from the working of form on matter. It seems perhaps that the blessed Clement said this; but sensible things are not properly called παραU+03δεíγματα. 1
Maximus gives us all the existing references but three to what he calls Clement of Alexandria's 'Concerning Providence'. This work is not listed by Eusebius and it savours too much of the systematising and defining practice of Proclus and later
NeoPlatonism. Except for the account of God in abstract terms there is nothing in the fragments which violently contradicts anything that Clement said and the metaphysic is similar; but the abstract terminology and the defining technique do not come from an original work of the Stromatist. It could perhaps be a note-book of quotations which Clement had compiled; but if this is so, the quotations are from one source, for they are uniform in style and doctrine. Everything points to the work being that of a later writer who attributed it to Clement.
The description of the author of the work indicates a confusion between Clement of Alexandria and Clement of Rome. Two fragments ascribe it to Clement of Rome, one referring to "the Roman Clement' 2 and the other to ' Clement, the holy and apostolic teacher'. 3 Another ascribes it to 'the most holy and most blessed Clement, presbyter of Alexandria, the Stromatist'. 4 This seems almost to protest too much.
Maximus Confessor is unambiguous in his account of the author as 'the most holy Clement presbyter of Alexandria', 5 and 'the Stromatist'. 6 Maximus quotes from the sixth book of the Stromateis a passage ____________________ 1Migne, S.G.4. col 329. 4, 332.
2Cod. Ambros. Graec.1041, III, 221, 6.
3Anastasios Sinaites, Quaest.96; III, 220, 26.
4N. le Nourry, Apparatus ad bibl. patrum, I, col. 1336; III, 220, 4.
5Maximus Confessor, Opp. ed. Combefis. II, p. 144; III, 219, 15.
6Ibid. II, p. 152; III, 220, 12.
which is not in that book but which is similar in style and content to passages from the 'Concerning Providence'. This passage is ascribed to ' Clement the real philosopher of philosophers'. 1 This emphasis on the authorship of Clement of Alexandria can be best explained by the existence of a confusion between him and Clement of Rome.A similar confusion appears in the description of the author of a book of theological definitions. This work is variously described as a work written by Clement and as a work compiled by Clement from other sources. The author is variously described as Clement, Clement of Rome and Clement of Alexandria. 2
CONCLUSIONS
Clement of Alexandria and his works were possibly known by pseudo-Dionysius and probably known by Maximus.
He was not known sufficiently by either to have influenced their thought. Pseudo-Dionysius misunderstands the one point he quotes and Maximus quotes from a spurious work.
He was confused by some writers with Clement of Rome. Maximus insists on his separate identity in a way which reflects acquaintance with and disapproval of the confusion.
____________________ 1Maximus Confessor, Disput. c. Pyrrho, ed. Combefis. II, p. 176; III, 220, 20. Maximus speaks highly of Clement because Clement's opinions are useful to Maximus's argument.
2Introduction to vol. III of Stählin text, pp. 57-60.
APPENDIX D
ST THOMAS
IT is worth while to note the similarities between Clement's account of God and that given by St Thomas. In the Summa Contra Gentiles 1, XIV-XXXIV, we find many of the points of Clement's doctrine mentioned or developed. 'Now in the treating of the divine essence the principal method to be followed is that of remotion. For the divine essence by its immensity surpasses every form to which our intellect reaches; and thus we cannot apprehend it by knowing what it is. But we have some knowledge thereof by knowing what it is not.' 1 We distinguish God from all other things taking them group by group, e.g. from accidents and from bodily substances.
This knowledge will not be perfect 'because we shall not know what he is in himself'.
2 By this method we find that God is unchangeable and therefore eternal, that in God there is no passive potentiality, no matter, no composition (i.e. parts), nothing violent or beside nature, and that God is not a body. 3
'From what has been laid down we are able to conclude that God is his own essence, quiddity or nature.' 4 This is argued: 'If a thing were not its own essence, there must be something in it besides its essence; and consequently there must be composition therein. Now it has been shown that in God there is no composition.
Therefore God is his own essence.' Several arguments, including this one, are used to show that in God existence and essence are the same. 5 This is foreign to Clement. He did not regard 'existence' or 'being' as a positive attribute of God. But the argument brings out the important similarity. The identity of God's existence and essence is linked with his bare unity. God is one. If his existence and essence were not the same, he would not be one.
____________________ 1Summa Contra Gentiles I, XIV.
2Ibid.
3Ibid. I, XV-XX.
4Ibid. I, XXI.
5Ibid. I, XXII.
There is no accident in God. The divine being cannot be specified by the addition of any substantial difference. God is not in any genus. He is not the formal being of all things and not the form of anything. This is similar to Clement's doctrine. The divine perfection is defined and proved on several grounds, e.g.:
And just as excellence and perfection is in a thing according as that thing is, so every defect is in a thing according as that thing in some sense is not. Now just as God has being wholly, so is not-being wholly absent from him, since according as a thing has being it fails in notbeing. Therefore all defect is removed from God and consequently he is universally perfect. 1
Similarly Clement refers to God as τò ὅλου.
There is a difference from Clement in the section concerning the predication of terms to God. These are of two kinds: 'whatever terms denote perfection absolutely and without any defect whatever are predicated of God and of other things; for instance, goodness, wisdom, and so forth'; also 'those which express these perfections together with the mode of super-eminence in which they belong to God are said of God alone, for instance, the sovereign good, the first being and the like'.
However, 'the mode of super-eminence in which the aforesaid perfections are found in God cannot be expressed in terms employed by us, except either by negation, as when we say God is eternal or infinite, or by referring him to other things, as when we say that he is the first cause or the sovereign good'. 2 The divergence is tempered by the assertion that nothing is predicated univocally of God and other things. 3 This limitation with what has been said above makes it logically possible for St Thomas to predicate things of God after he has shown that none of the predicables can be applied to God. But this is not very satisfactory. What is said will not be pure equivocation, or we would learn nothing of God from it. There would be no point in saying 'God is good' if we only knew the meaning of 'good' as applied to men and not to God. The final statement on the matter is that 'terms applied to God and creatures are employed analogically'. 'Wherefore he is
____________________ 1Summa Contra Gentiles I, XXVIII.
2Ibid. I, XXX.
3Ibid. I, XXXII.
said to be named from his effects', 1 i.e. 'God is good' means that God is the cause of goodness.
We may set out the main points of agreement between Clement and St Thomas in their accounts of God.
Clement
ST THOMAS
God is one.
God is his own essence.
God is not a genus.
God is not a genus.
God is indivisible, without parts.
God is without composition.
God is in himself unknown.
God is in himself unknown.
We 'know' by analysis what God We 'know' by remotion what is not.
God is not.
God is inexpressible.
Nothing is predicated univocally
of God and other things.
God is first cause.
God is first cause.
God is τò ὅλου, perfect.
God is universally perfect.
We understand him by the Logos We predicate of him analogically, that proceeds from him. the effects of the cause.
This shows the general agreement in structure between Clement and St Thomas on these points. The differences include Clement's refusal to speak strictly of God as τò ὅ λυ or Being. Clement is more insistent on the inexpressibility of God. We may
'perceive' God by the Logos that proceeds from him, but we cannot strictly predicate qualities of his effects analogously of him.
____________________ 1Summa Contra Gentiles I, XXXIV.
SELECT BIBLIOGRAPHY
TEXT Stählin O. Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte. Vols. 12, 15,
17,39 ( Leipzig, 1905-36).
Migne J. P. Patrologia Graeca. Vols. 8-9 ( Paris, 1857).
SELECTIONS FROM TEXT WITH TRANSLATION
Butterworth G. W. Clement of Alexandria ( London, 1919).
Casey R. P. The Excerpta ex Theodoto of Clement of Alexandria (Studies and Documents, 1,
London, 1934).
Caster M. Clément d'Alexandrie, les Stromates: Stromate I (Sources chrétiennes, Paris, 1951.
Hort F. J. A. and Mayor J. B. Clement of, Alexandria, Miscellanies, Book VII ( London, 1902).
Mondésert C. Le Protreptique, Introduction et Traduction (Sources chrétiennes, Paris, 1942).
Mondésert C. Clément d'Alexandrie, les Stromates: Stromate II (Sources chrétiennes, Paris, 1954).
Sagnard F. Clément d'Alexandrie, Extraits de Théodote (Sources chrétiennes, Paris, 1948).
TRANSLATIONS
Stählin 0. Des Clemens von Alexandreia ausgewählte Schriften aus dem Griechischen über setzt
(Bibliothek der Kirchenväter, 11 Reihe, Band 7, 8, 17) 19) 20, München, 1934-8).
Wilson W. Clement of, Alexandria ( Ante-Nicene Christian Library, vols. IV and XII and parts of vols. XXII and XXIV, Edinburgh, 1882 and 1884).
CLASSICAL TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS
Albinus. Epitomé. Ed. and trans. P. Louis P. Louis ( Paris, 1945).
Aristotle. Works. Translated under editorship of J. A. Smith and W. D. Ross (12 Vols., Oxford,
1908-52).
Pseudo-Aristotle. De Mundo. W. L. Lorimer ( Paris, 1933).
Corpus Hermeticum. Ed. A. D. Nock et A. J. Festugière (2 Vols., Paris, 1945).
Maximus Tyrius. Ed. Hobein ( Leipzig, 1910).
Numenius. Studie over den wijsgeer Numenius van Apamea met uitgave der fragmenten (Académie
Royale de Belgique, Classe des Lettres, Mémoires, 2e série, tome XXXVII, fasc. 2, Brussels, 1937).
Philo. Ed. Cohn-Wendland-Reiter (7 vols., Berlin, 1896-1930).
Plato. Ed. J. Burnet ( Oxford, 1900 f.).
---- The Republic of Plato, translated by A. D. Lindsay ( London, 1935).
Plotinus. Les Ennéades, texte établi et traduit par E. Bréhier (6 vols., Paris, 1924-36).
Plutarch. Moralia, with an English translation by F. C. Babbitt and H. N. Fowler ( London, 1927 f.).
Proclus. The Elements of Theology. E. R. Dodds ( Oxford, 1933).
COLLECTIONS
Adam J. Texts to illustrate a course of elementary lectures on Greek Philosophy after Aristotle (
London, 1901).
Arnim H. von. Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta (4 vols., Leipzig, 1905-24).
Jackson J. Texts to illustrate a course of elementary lectures on Greek Philosophy from Thales to Aristotle ( London, 1901).
Ritter H. and Preller L. Historia Philosophiae Graecae et Romanae ( 9th ed., Gotha, 1913).
PATRISTIC TEXTS AND TRANSLATIONS
Origen. Die griechischen christlichen Schriftsteller der ersten drei Jahrhunderte. Vols.. 2, 3, 6, 10,
22, 29, 30, 33, 35, 38, 40, 41 ( Leipzig, 18991941.).
---- Origen on First Principles. G. W. Butterworth ( London, 1936).
---- Origen Contra Celsum. H. Chadwick ( Cambridge, 1953).
Tertullian. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum (4 Vols., Vienna, 1890-1942).
All other Patristic works cited from Migne Patrology.
REFERENCE WORKS
Anrich G. "Clemens und Origenes als Begründer der Lehre vom Fegfeuer" ( Theologische
Abhandlungen. Eine Festgabe . . . für H. J. Holzmann. Tübingen und Leipzig, 1902, pp. 97-120).
Armstrong A. H. An Introduction to Ancient Philosophy ( London, 1947).
Bailey C. The Greek Atomists and Epicurus ( London, 1928).
Bardy G. Clément d'Alexandrie ( Paris, 1926).
Békés G. De continua oratione Clementis Alexandrini doctrina (Studia Anselmiana 14, Rome,
1942).
---- Pura Oratio (Studia Anselmiana 18-19, Rome, 1947).
Bernays J. Zu Aristoteles und Clemens (Gesammelte Abhandlungen, I. Bonn, 1885).
Bevan E. R. Stoics and Sceptics ( Oxford, 1913).
Bigg C. The Christian Platonists of Alexandria ( 2nd ed. Oxford, 1913).
Billings T. H. The Platonism of Philo Judaeus ( Chicago, 1919).
Bousset W. Jüdisch-Christlicher Schulbetrieb in Alexandrien und Rom (Göttingen, 1915).
Bréhier E. Les idées philosophiques et religieuses de Philon d'Alexandrie ( Paris, 1908).
---- La philosophie de Plotin ( Paris, 1928).
Buri F. Clemens Alexandrinus und der Paulinische Freiheitsbegriff (Zürich and Leipzig, 1939).
Butterworth G. W. "Clement of Alexandria and Art" (JTS, 1916).
---- "The Deification of Man in Clement of Alexandria" (JTS, 1916).
Camelot T. Foi et Gnose. Introduction à l'étude de la connaissance mystique chez Clément d'Alexandrie ( Paris, 1945).
---- "Les idées de Clément d'Alexandrie sur l'utilisation des sciences et de la littérature profane"
(RSR, 1931).
---- "Clement d'Alexandrie et l'utilisation de la philosophie grecque" (RSR, 1931).
Capitaine W. Die Moral des Clemens von Alexandrien ( Paderborn, 1903).
Casey R. P. "Clement and the Two Divine Logoi" (JTS, 1924).
--- "Clement of Alexandria and the Beginnings of Christian Platonism" ( Harvard Theological
Review, 1925).
Cornford F. M. From Religion to Philosophy ( London, 1912).
---- Plato's Theory of Knowledge ( London, 1935).
---- Plato's Cosmology ( London, 1937).
---- Plato and Parmenides ( London, 1939).
Cognat J. Clément d'Alexandrie, sa doctrine et sa polémique ( 2nd ed. Paris, 1859).
Daehne A. F.
Clementis Alexandrini et de vestigiis neoplatonicae philosophiae in ea obviis commentatio historica theologica ( Leipzig, 1831).
Davidson W. L. The Stoic Creed ( Edinburgh, 1907).
Decker A. Kenntnis und Pflege des Körpers bei Clemens von Alexandria ( Innsbruck, 1936).
Dodds E. R. The Parmenides of Plato and the Origin of the Neoplatonic "One ( Classical Quarterly,
1928).
Drummond J. Philo Judaeus or the Jewish Alexandrian Philosophy (2 Vols., London, 1888). de E. Faye Clément d'Alexandrie, Étude sur les rapports du christianisme et de la philosophie grecque au IIe siècle ( Paris, 1898).
---- OrigĒne, sa vie, son œuvre, sa pensée ( Paris, 1923-8).
---- Gnostiques et gnosticisme ( 2nd ed. Paris, 1925).
---- Origen and his Work, trans. F. Rothwell ( London, 1926).
Festugière A. J. La Révélation d'Hermès Trismégiste: I. L'astrologie et les sciences occultes ( 2nd ed.
Paris, 1950): II. Le Dieu cosmique ( 2nd ed. Paris, 1949): III. Les doctrines de l'Âme ( Paris, 1953).
Gronau K. Das Theodizeeproblem in der altchristlichen Auffassung (Tübingen, 1922).
Harnack A. von. Marcion, das Evangelium vom fremden Gott ( 2nd ed. Leipzig, 1924).
Héring J. Étude sur la doctrine de la chute et de la préexistence des âmes chez Clément d'Alexandrie ( Paris, 1923).
Heussi C. "Die Stromateis des Clemens Alexandrinus und ihr Verhältnis zum Protreptikos und Paedagogos" ( Zeitschrift für wissenschaftliche Theologie, 1902).
Hicks R. D. Stoic and Epicurean ( Cambridge, 1910).
Hilgenfeld A. Die Ketzergeschichte des Urchristentums ( Leipzig, 1884).
Inge W. R. The Philosophy of Plotinus ( 3rd ed. London, 1929).
Jonas Hans. Gnosis und spätantiker Geist, I (Göttingen, 1934).
Knox W. L. St Paul and the Church of the Gentiles ( Cambridge, 1944).
Koch Hal. Pronoia und Paideusis: Studien über Origenes und sein Verhältnis zum Platonismus ( Berlin and Leipzig, 1932).
Koch Hugo. "War Klemens von Alexandrien ein Priester?" ( Zeitschrift für die neutestamentliche Wissenschaft, 1921).
Laemmer H. Clementis Alexandrini de γῳ doctrina ( Leipzig, 1855).
Lazzati G. Introduzione allo studio di Clemente Alessandrino ( Milan, 1939).
Lebreton J. "La théorie de la connaissance religieuse chez Clément d'Alexandrie" ( RSR,
1928).
---- "La théologie de la Trinité chez Clément d'Alexandrie" ( RSR, 1947).
Marsh H. G. "The use of MYΣTHPION in the writings of Clement of Alexandria" ( JTS,
1936).
Meifort J. Der Platonismus bei Clemens Alexandrinus (Heidelberger Abhandlungen zur
Philosophie und ihrer Geschichte, Heft 17, 1928).
Merk C. Clemens Alexandrinus in seiner Abängigkeit von der griechischen Philosophie (
Leipzig, 1879).
Merki H. "OM0ωΣIΣ U+0096Eῳvon der platonischen Angleichung an Gott zur Gottähnlichkeit bei Gregor von Nyssa" (Freiburg, Switzerland, 1952).
Molland E. Clement of Alexandria on the Origin of Greek Philosophy (Symbolae Osloenses, fasc. XV-XVI, Oslo, 1936).
The Conception of the Gospel in the Alexandrian Theology ( Oslo, 1938).
Mondésert C. "Le symbolisme chez Clément d'Alexandrie" ( RSR, 1936).
---- Clément d'Alexandrie. Introduction à l'étude de sa pensée religieuse à partir de l'Écriture ( Paris, 1944).
---- "Vocabulaire de Clément d'Alexandrie: le mot ς'" ( RSR, 1954).
Munck J. Untersuchungen über Klemens von Alexandria ( Stuttgart, 1933).
Patrick J. Clement of Alexandria ( Edinburgh and London, 1914).
Pohlenz M. Vom Zorne Gottes (Göttingen, 1909).
---- Klemens von Alexandreia und sein hellenisches Christentum (Göttingen Nachrichten,
Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 1943).
Prümm K. "Glaube und Erkenntnis im zweiten Buch der Stromata des Klemens von Alexandrien" ( Scholastik, 1937).
Quatember F. Die christliche Lebenshaltung des Klemens von Alexandreia ( Vienna,
1947).
Reinhardt K. Poseidonios ( Munich, 1921).
Reinhardt K. Kosmos und Sympathie ( Munich, 1926).
Reinkens H. J. De Clemente presbytero Alexandrino homine, scriptore, philosopho, theologo liter (
Bratislava, 1853).
Rüther T. Die Lehre von der Erbsünde bei Clemens von Alexandrien (Freiburg, 1922).
---- Die sittliche Forderung der Apatheia in den beiden ersten christlichen Jahrhunderten und bei
Klemens von Alexandrien (Freiburg, 1949).
Shorey P. Platonism, Ancient and Modern ( Berkeley, Cal., 1938).
Soury G. Aperçus de philosophie religieuse chez Maxime de Tyr, platonicien éclectique ( Paris,
1942).
Taylor A. E. Plato, the Man and his Work ( 6th ed. London, 1949).
Tengblad E. Syntaktisch-stilistische Beiträge zur Kritik und Exegese des Clemens von Alexandrien (
Lund, 1932).
Theiler W. Die Vorbereitung des Neuplatonismus ( Berlin, 1930).
Tollinton R. B. Clement of Alexandria. A Study in Christian Liberalism (2 vols. London, 1914).
Ueberweg-Praechter. Die Philosophie des Altertums ( Berlin, 1926).
Völker W. Das Vollkommenheitsideal des Origines (Tübingen, 1931).
---- Fortschritt und Vollendung bei Philo von Alexandrien ( Leipzig, 1938).
---- Der wahre Gnostiker nach Clemens Alexandrinus ( Berlin and Leipzig, 1952).
Wagner W. Der Christ und die Welt nach Clemens von Alexandrien (Göttingen, 1903).
Winter F. J. Die Ethik des Clemens von Alexandrien ( Leipzig, 1882).
Witt R. E. Albinus and the History of Middle Platonism ( Cambridge, 1937).
--- "The Hellenism of Clement of Alexandria" ( Classical Quarterly, 1931).
Wolfson H. A. Philo (2 Vols. Cambridge, Mass., 1947).
Zahn T. Supplementum Clementinum. ( Erlangen, 1884).
Zeller E. Die Philosophie der Griechen ( 6th ed. Leipzig, 1920).
Ziegert P. Zwei Abhandlungen über T. Flavius Clemens Alexandrinus. Psychologie und
Logoschristologie (Heidelberg, 1894).