Concerning Human Knowledge
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
Summary of the Argument QuegsTION : Can any certain and unadulterated truth be known naturally by the intellect of a person in this life without the special illumination of the Uncreated Light ?
Pro ET CONTRA Bopy OF THE QUESTION The opinion of Henry of Ghent Scotus's critique of Henry (in six articles)
Article I.
Henry's arguments lead to scepticism.
Article II.
Rejection of scepticism a. Certitude of first principles b. Experimental knowledge c. Knowledge of our own acts d. Certitude of sense knowledge Article III.
Reply to Henry's arguments Article IV.
Concerning Henry's conclusion Article V. _ Solution of the Question
REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS AT THE BEGINNING
Article VI.
To what extent Henry's arguments hold
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[V.
DE COGNITIONE HUMANA ] *
Ultimo quantum ad materiam istam cognoscibilitatis, quaero an aliqua veritas certa et sincera possit naturaliter cognosci ab intellectu viatoris absque lucis increatae speciali tllustratione.
[Pro et Contra] Arguo quod non :
1x De Trinitate, cap. ultimo sexto vel decimo quinto f :
Intueamur inviolabilem veritatem ex qua definiamus qualis esse mens hominis sempiternis rationibus debeat.
Et ibidem, cap. decimo quinto:
Aliis supra nos regulis manentibus vel approbare vel improbare convincimur quando aliquid recte vel non recte probamus vel improbamus.
Et ibidem, cap. decimo septimo:
Artem ineffabiliter pulchram super aciem mentis_ simplici intelligentia capientes.
Et eodem, cap. octavo vel undevigesimo ¢ : In illa veritate ex qua temporalia sunt facta omnia formam conspicimus, atque inde conceptam notitiam tamquam verbum apud nos habemus.
Item, libro duodecimo, cap. secundo ** : Sublimioris rationis est judicare de istis corporalibus secundum rationes sempiternas.
Item, in eodem duodecimo, cap. decimo quarto vel trigesimo secundo tf: Non solum rerum sensibilium in locis positarum stant incommutabiles rationes, etc.
Et quod intelligat ibi de rationibus aeternis vere in Deo, probatur per hoc quod ibidem dicit quod paucorum est
* Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. 1, q. iv (Assisi 137, f. 30v'-331": cf. Vatican ed., VOL. Il, 123-172). t 1x, cap. vi (Migne, P.L., xm, 966).
{~ cap. vii (Migne, P.L., xin, 967).
** xu, cap. ii (Migne, P.L., xLu, 999). tt xu, cap. xiv (Migne, P.L., xLu, roro),
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
[V. CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE]
Finally, on the subject of what we can know, I ask whether any certain and unadulterated truth can be known naturally by the intellect of a person in this life without the special illumination of the Uncreated Light ?
[Pro et Contra] T argue that no such truth can be known? :
[Arg.1].
From [St Augustine] : De Trinitate, BK. xt:
""But we gaze upon the indestructible truth by reason of which we may define perfectly what the mind of man should be according to the eternal reasons".
And again:
""When we accept or reject something correctly, our incontestable conviction arises from other immutable rules above our minds".
And again:
"Grasping by simple intelligence the unspeakably beautiful art that lies beyond the eye of the mind.
. .". And in the same work*+: "In the eternal truth from which all temporal things are made, we behold the form .
. and we have within us like a Word the knowledge of what we have conceived".
[Arg.u].
Also in BK. x1** : "But it pertains to higher reason to judge of these corporeal things according to eternal reasons". fArg. m.
And in the same BK. xuff:
"And not only are there immutable reasons for sensible things posited in place, etc. ..'.
That Augustine here is speaking of the eternal reasons that are really in God is proved by the fact that he says in the same passage that
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ad illas pervenire.
Si autem intelligeret de primis principiis, non est paucorum pervenire ad illa sed multorum, quia omnibus sunt communia et nota.
Item, libro decimo quarto, cap. decimo quinto vel trigesimo quarto,* loquens de injusto qui multa recte laudat et vituperat in moribus hominum, ait : Quibus regulis judicat, etc.
Etin fine ait: Ubisunt illae regulae scriptae nisi in libro illo lucis.
Liber ille lucis est intellectus divinus.
Igitur vult ut in illa luce injustus videt quae sunt juste agenda et quod in aliquo impresso vel per aliquod impressum ab illo videtur, ut ibidem dicit : Unde omnis lex justa in cor hominis non migrando, sed tamquam imprimendo transfertur sicut imago ex annulo, etc. in ceram transit et annulum [MS. ceram] non relinquit.
Igitur in illa luce videmus, a qua imprimitur in cor hominis justitia ; illa autem est lux increata.
Item, xu Confessionum t: Si ambo videmus verum nec tu in me nec ego in te, sed ambo in ea quae supra mentem est incommutabili veritate.
Multae autem sunt auctoritates Augustini in multis locis ad probandum hanc conclusionem.
Ad oppositum :
Rom. 1}:
Invisibilia Dei a creatura mundi per ea quae facta sunt intellecta conspiciuntur.
Istae rationes aeternae sunt invisibilia Dei; ergo cognoscuntur ex creaturis ; igitur ante visionem istarum habetur certa cognitio creaturarum.
* xiv, cap. xv (Migne, P.L., xiu, 1052).
} xu, cap. xxv (Migne, P.L., xxxn, 840). t Rom. 1. 20.
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
it is the privilege of the few to attain them.
For he would not say this if he were speaking of first principles, since the latter are not the privilege of the few but the many, masmuch as first principles are common and known to all.
[Arg. 1v]. Also in Book x1v,* speaking of the unjust man who correctly praises and blames many things in the mores of men, he asks:
"By what norms do they judge, etc... .".
And at the end, he 'adds :" "Where are these rules written except in that book of light.
.".
That "book of light', however, is the divine intellect.
Therefore, he wishes to say that it is in this light that the unjust man sees what justice demands must be done.
And he sees this in something or by something impressed upon him by this light, for as Augustine says in the same place:
"*. .
. whence every just law is transferred to the heart of man not by passing from one place to another, but by being impressed, as it were, even as the image is transferred from the ring to the wax without leaving the ring'.
'Therefore, we see in that light by which justice is imprinted upon the heart ofman.
This light, however, is the Uncreated Light.
[Arg. v].
Likewise, in the Confessions, Bk. xut:
"If both of us see the truth, you do not see it in me, nor do I see it in you, but both of us see it in that immutable truth which is above the mind".
Now there are many other places where statements of Augustine could be found to support this conclusion.
To the contrary :
Romans1+:
'For since the creation of the world, God's invisible attributes are clearly seen .
. being understood through the things that are made.
. .". Now the invisible things of God are these eternal reasons.
Consequently, they are known from creatures.
Therefore, even before these eternal reasons are seen, we have certain knowledge of creatures.
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[Corpus Quaestionis] [Opinio Henrict | In ista quaestione est opinio una talis quod intentiones generales habent inter se ordinem naturalem.
De duabus quae sunt ad propositum, videlicet de intentione entis et veri [MS ubi] loquamur.
Intentio prima est entis, quod probatur per illud De causis,* propositionis quartae:
Prima rerum creaturarum est esse, et in commento primae propositionis : Esse est vehementioris adhaerentiae.
Et ratio est quia entitas est absoluta ; veritas decit respectum ad exemplar.
Ex hoc sequitur quod ens possit cognosci sub ratione entitatis, licet non sub ratione veritatis, et per consequens ipsum quod est verum potest cognosci antequam cognoscatur ipsa veritas.
Haec etiam conclusio probatur ex parte intellectus, quia ens potest concipi simplici intelligentia et tunc concipitur illud quod verum est; sed ratio veritatis non concipitur nisi intelligentia componente et dividente ; compositionem et divisionem praecedit simplex intelligentia.
Si autem: quaeratur de notitia entis, sive ejus quod verum est, dicitur quod intellectus ex puris naturalibus potest sic intelligere verum.
Quod probatur, quia inconveniens est naturam esse expertem propriae operationis secundum Damascenum,} et hoc magis inconveniens est in natura perfectiori secundum Philosophum, 1m De caelo et mundo, + de stellis, quia magnum inconveniens esset stellas habere virtutem progressivam et non habere instrumenta ad progrediendum ; igitur cum propria
* Liber de causis, prop. i, iv.
+ De fide orthodoxa, u, cap. xxiii (Migne, P.G., xcrv, 949). fu, cap. viii (290%, go).
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
[Body of the Question] [ The opinion of Henry of Ghent] One opinion ? regarding this question maintains that a natural order exists among general notions.
Let us discuss two of these which are relevant here, viz. the notion of "'being" and the notion of "'true''.
That "'being"'is the first of these notions is proved from the fourth proposition of the Liber de Causis* : ''The first of created things is being" ; and in the commentary on the first proposition : 'Being is of stronger adherence"'.
The reason for this is that entity is something absolute, whereas truth implies a relation to an exemplar.
From this it follows that a thing can be known as an entity even though its truth value is as yet unknown.
Consequently, the thing which is true can be known before its truth is known.
The way the mind functions provides a further proof.
A being can be grasped by an act of simple understanding, and in such a case the thing which is true is known.
But the truth value itself is known only by an act of judgment.
Simple understanding, however, precedes an act of judgment.
Now if we ask about our knowledge of a being or of the thing which is true, they tell us that the intellect by reason of its purely natural powers can know the "'true"' in this sense.
The proof is this.
It is hardly fitting that any nature exist without its proper activity, as Damascene says.t
'The more perfect the nature in question the less fitting that it should lack such operation, as the Philosopher points out in speaking of the stars in De caelo et mundo, BK..t For it would be highly improper for the stars to have the power of progressive movement and still lack the means necessary for locomotion.
If the proper
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operatio intellectus sit intelligere verum, videtur inconveniens quod natura non concesserit intellectui illa quae sufficiunt ad hanc operationem.
Sed si loquamur de cognitione veritatis, respondetur quod sicut est duplex exemplar, creatum et increatum, secundum Platonem in Timaeo,* videlicet exemplar factum et non factum, sive creatum et non creatum (exemplar creatum est species universalis causata a re, exemplar increatum est idea in mente divina), ita duplex est conformitas ad exemplar et duplex veritas ; una est conformitas ad exemplar creatum et isto modo posuit
Aristotelis, veritates rerum cognosci per conformitatem earum ad speciem intelligibilem ; et ita videtur Augustinus ponere vii® De Trinitate, cap. vii f ubi vult quod rerum notitiam generalem et specialem ex sensibus collectam habemus, secundum quam de quocumque occurrent veritatem judicamus, quod ipsum sit tale vel tale.
Sed quod per tale exemplar acquisitum in nobis habeatur omnino certa et infallibilis notitia veritatis de re, hoc videtur omnino impossibile et hoc probatur triplici ratione secundum istos.
Prima sumitur ex parte rei de qua exemplar est extractum, secunda ex parte subjecti in quo est, et tertia ex parte exemplaris in se.
Prima ratio est talis : Objectum illud a quo abstrahitur exemplar est mutabile.
Igitur non potest esse causa alicujus immutabilis, sed certa notitia alicujus de aliquo sub ratione veritatis in eo habetur per rationem immutabilem ; igitur non habetur per tale exemplar.
Haec dicitur ratio Augustini Octoginta tres quaestionum, quaestio ix,{ ubi dicit quod a sensibus non est * Timaeus, 28. t vu, cap. vi (Migne, P.L., xim, 966). t q. ix (Migne, P.L., xt, 13). coe
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
operation of the intellect, however, is to know the thing which is true, it seems hardly fitting that nature should not endow the intellect with what is prerequisite for such an operation.
But as for knowing the truth itself, they tell us that there are two exemplars, one created, the other uncreated.
This is in accord with Plato, who mentions in the Timaeus * one exemplar that is made, i.e. created, and one that is not made, i.e. uncreated.
The created exemplar is the species of the universal caused by the thing.
The uncreated exemplar is the idea in the divine mind.
Consequently, a twofold truth and _ twofold conformity to an exemplar exists.
One is the conformity to the created exemplar, and it was in this sense that Aristotle maintained that the truths of things are known through their conformity to the intelligible species.3
Augustine, also, seems to hold this view in his work De Trinitate, BK. vi1,t where he maintains that the knowledge of things gleaned from the senses is both of a general and of a particular nature.
In virtue of such knowledge we judge the truth of any occurrence to be such or such.
But it seems wholly impossible that such an acquired exemplar should give us infallible and completely certain knowledge of a thing.
The advocates of this opinion give three reasons for such a conclusion.
The first is based upon the thing from which the exemplar is abstracted, the second upon the subject in which the exemplar inheres and the third upon the exemplar itself.
The first reason runs something like this. The object from which the exemplar is abstracted is itself mutable ; therefore it cannot be the cause of something unchangeable.
But it is only in virtue of some immutable reason that someone can be certain that something is true.
An exemplar such as this, then, provides no such knowledge.
They claim this to be Augustine's argument in his Eighty-three Questions, q. ix,t where he tells us not to look
10!
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expectanda veritas, quia sensibilia sine intermissione mutantur.
Secunda ratio talis est: Anima est ex se mutabilis et passiva erroris ; igitur per nihil mutabilius ea potest ratificari sive regulari ne erret.
Sed tale exemplar in ea est mutabilius quam ipsa anima sit.
Igitur illud exemplar non perfecte regulat animam ne erret.
Requiritur ergo specialis influentia superior.
Haec dicitur ratio Augustini De vera religione *: Lex omnium artium, etc.
Tertio ratio: notitiam veritatis nullus habet certam et infallibilem nisi habeat unde possit verum discernere a verisimili, quia si non possit discernere verum a falso
[MS secundo] vel a verisimili, potest dubitare se falli.
Sed per exemplar praedictum creatum non potest discerni verum a verisimili ; ergo, etc.
Probatio minoris :
Species talis potest representare se tamquam se vel alio modo se tamquam objectum, sicut est in somniis, si repraesentet se tamquam objectum, falsitas est, si se tamquam se, veritas est.
Igitur per talem speciem non habetur sufficiens distinctivum quando repraesentat se ut se vel ut objectum, et ita nec sufficiens distinctivum veri a falso.
Ex istis concluditur quod certam scientiam et infallibilem veritatem si contingat hominem cognoscere, hoc non convenit ei aspiciendo ad exemplar a re per sensus acceptum quantumcumque sit depuratum et universale factum, sed requiritur quod respiciat ad exemplar increatum.
Et tunc modus ponendi est iste:
Deus non ut cognitum habet rationem exemplaris ad quod aspiciendo cognoscitur sincera veritas.
Est enim cognitum * cap. xxx (Migne, P.L., xxxiv, 147).
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
IO! for truth from the senses, for what the senses perceive constantly undergoes change.
The second reason goes like this.
Of itself the soul is changeable and subject to error.
Now a thing which is even more changeable than the soul itself cannot correct this condition or prevent the soul from erring.
But the exemplar which inheres in the soul is even more mutable than the soul itself.
Consequently, such an exemplar does not regulate the soul so perfectly that it makes no mistake. -Some special higher influence, then, is required.
This, they say, is the argument Augustine uses in his work De vera religione* : 'Since the law of all arts'', etc.
The third reason is that no-one possesses certain and infallible knowledge of the truth unless he can distinguish the truth from what has only the appearance of truth, for if he is unable to tell the true from the false or from what appears to be true, he can still be in doubt whether he is being deceived or not.
Now truth cannot be distinguished from what merely appears to be true by means of the aforesaid exemplar.
Therefore, etc.
Proof of the minor:
Such a species can either represent itself as species or, as happens in dreams, present itself as an object.
In the latter case, we have falsity ; in the former, truth.
There is nothing about such a species then that suffices to differentiate the first mode of representation from the second and thus to distinguish the true from the false.
From all this they conclude that if man can know the infallible truth and possess certain knowledge it is not because he looks upon an exemplar derived from the thing by way of the senses, no matter how much such an exemplar may be purified and universalised.
It is necessary that he look upon the uncreated exemplar.
And the way they assume this to take place is this. God does not function as exemplar in the sense that He is the object known so that unadulterated truth is known by looking at Him.
For God is known only under some general (2,322)
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in generali attributo.
Sed est ratio cognoscendi ut nudum exemplar et propria ratio cognoscendi ut nudum exemplar et propria ratio essentiae creatae.
Qualiter autem possit esse ratio cognoscendi et non cognitum ponitur exemplum, quia sicut radius solis quandoquo derivatur quasi obliquato aspectu a suo fonte quandoque directe.
Quod videtur in radio primo modo derivato, licet sol sit ratio videndi, non tamen ut visus in se.
Ejus autem quod videtur secundo modo in radio, sol est ita ratio cognoscendi quod etiam est cognitus. Quando igitur ista lux increata intellectum quasi directo aspectu illustrat, tunc ut visa est ratio videndi alia in ipsa.
Intellectum autem nostrum pro statu viae quasi obliquato aspectu illustrat, et ideo est intellectui nostro ratio videndi non visa.
Ponitur autem qualiter habeat triplicem rationem respectu actus videndi, scilicet lucis actuantis, speciel immutantis, et caracteris sive exemplaris configurantis.
Et ex hoc concluditur ultra quod requiritur specialis influentia, quia sicut illa essentia non videtur naturaliter a nobis in se, ita ut illa essentia est exemplar respectu alicujus essentiae naturaliter non videtur.
Secundum Augustinum De videndo Deum.* In ejus enim _potestate est videri ; si vult, videtur ; si non vult, non videtur.
Ultimo additur quod perfecta notitia veritatis est quando duae species exemplares concurrunt in mente, una inhaerens, scilicet creata, alia illapsa, scilicet non creata ; et sic contingimus verbum perfecte veritatis.
(Arguo contra istam opinionem in se, secundo contra rationes fundamentales adductas vel econverso.
Primum includit quartum articulum, qui est quasi ad hominem * cap. vi (Migne, P.L., xxx, 603).
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
attribute.
But God is the reason why we know inasmuch as He is the sole exemplar and the proper reason for the created essence.
The following example is used to explain how God can be the reason why we know and yet not be known in Himself.
Some sunlight is reflected while other rays come directly from their source.
And even though the sun is the reason why we see something by reflected sunlight, the sun itself is not seen.
But for an object illumined by direct light, the sun is a reason for knowing that is also known.
In similar fashion, then, when the Uncreated Light as it were illumines an intellect by a direct glance, then this Light as seen is the reason for seeing the other things in it.
In the present life, however, this Uncreated Light illumines our intellect indirectly as it were.
Consequently, though unseen itself, it is the reason why our intellect sees.
'Now they claim that the uncreated exemplar is related to the act of vision in three ways, viz. as a stimulating light, as a transforming species, and as the character or exemplar which produces a like form [in the intellect].
From this they conclude further that a special influence is required.
For just as naturally we do not see this essence in itself, neither do we see it naturally as the exemplar of any essence.
As Augustine puts it in his work De videndo Deum*:
"It is in His power to be seen.
If he wishes it, He is seen ; if He does not wish it, He is not seen".
Finally, they add that perfect knowledge of truth results when the two exemplar species concur in the mind, viz. the created exemplar which inheres in the soul and the uncreated exemplar which enters from without.
And it is in this way that we have the word of truth perfectly.
(First § I argue against the opinion in itself ; secondly I refute the reasons adduced in its favour or turn them to my advantage. Under the first heading falls the fourth article.
It is an argumentum ad hominem, as it were, whereas
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et tertium qui est ad rem, secundum includit primum articulum hic et tertium et sextum.
Quintus ergo articulus est solutio quaestionis. ) Contra istam opinionem, primo ostendo quod istae rationes non sunt rationes fundamentales alicujus opinionis verae, nec secundum intentionem Augustini, sed sunt pro opinione Academicorum.
Secundo ostendo quomodo illa opinio Academicorum, quae videtur concludi per istas rationes, falsa sit.
Et tertio respondeo ad rationes istas quatenus minus concludunt.
Quarto arguo contra conclusionem istius opinionis.
Quinto solvo quaestionem.
Sexto ostendo quomodo rationes istae quatenus sunt Augustini concludunt illam intentionem
Augustini, non illam ad quam hic inducuntur.
[Articulus Primus.
Rationes Henrict sunt pro Opinione Academicorum}|.
Primo, istae rationes videntur concludere impossibilitatem certae cognitionis naturalis.
Prima, quia si objectum continue mutatur nec potest haberi aliqua certitudo de ipso sub ratione immutabilis.
Immo nec in quocumque lumine posset certitudo haberi, quia non est certitudo quando objectum alio modo cognoscitur quam se habet.
Igitur nec est certitudo cognoscendo mutabile ut immutabile.
Patet etiam quod antecedens hujus rationis, videlicet quod sensibilia continue mutantur, falsum est.
Haec enim est opinio quae imponitur Heraclito 1v Metaphysicae.* Similiter, si propter mutabilitatem exemplaris, quod est in anima nostra, non posset esse certitudo, cum quidquid ponitur in anima subjective sit mutabile, etiam ipse actus intelligendi, sequitur quod per nihil in anima rectificatur anima ne erret.
[Non Duns] ® (Sequitur etiam quod ipse actus intelligendi cum sit mutabilior quam ipsa anima in qua est, numquam erit verus nec veritatem continebit.)
*eivysrcap. va loro).
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
the third article is ad rem.
The second heading includes the material in the third and sixth articles.
The fifth article, therefore, is the solution to the question.) Against this opinion, in the first [article] I show that these arguments are not a basis for any true opinion.
Neither are they in accord with the mind of Augustine.
Instead they lead to the view of the Academicians.® In the second [article], I show how the view of the Academicians, which seems to follow from these reasons, is false.
In the third, I answer these arguments in so far as they are inconclusive.
In the fourth, I argue against the conclusion of this opinion [of Henry].
In the fifth, I solve the question.
In the sixth, I show how these reasons, in so far as they are Augustine's, prove what
Augustine intended to prove rather than what they are here used to prove.
[Article I. Henry's Arguments lead to Scepticism].
First, these reasons seem to imply the impossibility of any ce1.airn. natural knowledge.
Consider the first.?
If an object is continually changing we can have no certitude about it by any kind of light, for there can be no certitude when an object is known in some way other than the way in which it is. Neither is there any certitude in knowing a changeable thing as unchangeable.
It is also clear that the antecedent of this argument is false, viz. that what the senses can perceive is continually changing.
This is the opinion attributed to Heraclitus in Metaphysics, BK. 1v.* Likewise, if the mutability of the exemplar in our soul makes certitude impossible, then it follows that nothing in the soul could prevent it from erring, for everything inhering in such a subject is also mutable—even the act of understanding itself.§ (It follows further that, inasmuch as the act of understanding is even more mutable than the soul in which it resides, it will never be true nor contain truth.)
104.
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Similiter, secundum istam opinionem species creata inhaerens concurrit cum specie illabente, sed quando aliquid concurrit quod repugnat certitudini, non potest certitudo haberi, sicut enim ex altera de necessario et altera de contingenti non sequitur conclusio nisi de contingenti, ita ex certo et incerto concurrentibus ad aliquam cognitionem, non sequitur cognitio certa.
Idem patet etiam de tertia ratione, quia si species ipsa abstracta a re concurrat ad omnem cognitionem et non potest judicari quando illa repraesentat se tanquam se et quando se tamquam objectum ; ergo quodcumque aliud concurrat, non potest haberi certitudo per quam discernatur verum a verisimili.
Istae igitur rationes videntur concludere omnem incertitudinem et opinionem Academicorum.
Quod autem ista conclusio non sit secundum intentionem Augustini probo.
Augustinus 1 Soliloguiorum * :
Spectabilia disciplinarum quisque verissima esse nulla dubitatione concedit.
Et Boethius De hebdomadibus + :
Communis animi conceptio est quam quisque probat auditam.
Et Philosophus mm Metaphysicaet:
Prima principia sunt omnibus nota.
Ex his tribus auctoritatibus, arguitur sic quod convenit omnibus alicujus speciei, sequitur naturam specificam.
Igitur cum quisque habet certitudinem infallibilem de primis principiis et ultra cuilibet est naturaliter evidens forma syllogismi perfecti
1 Priorum,** scientia autem conclusionum non dependet nisi ex evidentia principii et ex evidentia illationis syllogisticae, igitur cuilibet naturaliter scita potest esse quaecumque conclusio demonstrabilis ex principiis per se notis.
* m1, cap. xi (Migne, P.L., xxx, 893-894). t+ (Migne, P.L., Lxtv, 1311). t ur, cap. i (993°, 4).
** Analytica priora, 1, cap. ii (24°, 22-26),
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
Likewise, according to this opinion, the created species which inheres in the soul concurs with the species that enters from without.
But no certitude is possible where something incompatible with certitude concurs.
For just as we can infer only a contingent proposition from a necessary and a contingent proposition combined, so also a concurrence of what is certain and what is uncertain does not produce certain knowledge.
The same reasoning clearly applies to the third argument.
For if the species abstracted from the thing is a concurrent factor in all knowledge, and if we cannot judge when such a species represents itself as such and when it represents itself as object, then it makes no difference what concurs with such a species.
We shall never have a certain norm for distinguishing the true from what merely appears to be true.
These arguments then seem to lead to the conclusion that all is uncertain, the opinion of the Academicians.
That such a conclusion is not what Augustine intended I prove from the second book of his Soliloquies * : ''Everyone concedes without hesitation that the proofs of the sciences are most true".
And Boethius says in De hebdomadibust:
''A common conception of the mind is that which is conclusive for anyone who hears it".
And the Philosopher in Metaphysics, Bk. u,{ says:
"First principles are known to all. ..".
On the basis of these three testimonies, the following argument is constructed.
Whatever pertains to all the members of a given species, springs from the specific nature itself.
Now since the knowledge of conclusions depends solely upon the evidence of first principles and of the syllogistic inference, then if everyone has infallible certitude about first principles and further, if the form of the perfect syllogism as defined in Prior Analytics, BK. 1,** is naturally evident to everyone, then anyone can know naturally any conclusion demonstrable from self-evident principles.
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Secundo apparet quod Augustinus concedit certitudinem eorum quae cognoscuntur per experientiam sensuum.
Unde dicit xv De Trinitate, cap. xiii vel xxxii * :
Absit ut ea quae didicimus per sensus corporis vera esse dubitemus per ea quippe didicimus caelum et terram et mare et omnia quae in eis sunt.
Si non dubitamus de veritate eorum et non fallimur, ut patet; ergo certi sumus de cognitis per viam sensus.
Nam certitudo habetur quando excluditur dubitatio et deceptio.
Patet etiam tertio quod Augustinus concedit certitudinem de actibus nostris, ibidem xv, cap. xil vel xxxi T sive dormiat sive vigilet vivit, quia et dormire et in somniis videre viventis est.
Quod si dicas : vivere non esse actum secundum sed primum, sequitur ibidem:
Si aliquis dicat, scio me scire, me vivere, falli non potest, etiam quotiescumque reflectendo super primum scitum ; et ibidem : Si quis dicat, volo esse beatus, quomodo non impudenter respondetur, forte falleris, et ibi reflectendo in infinitum scio me velle etc.
Ibidem:
Si quispiam dicat errare nolo, nonne eum errare nolle verum est.
Et alia, inquit, reperiuntur quae contra Academicos valent qui nihil sciri ab homine posse concedunt.
Sequitur ibidem De tribus contra Academicos libris + quos qui intellexerit, nihil eum contra perceptionem veritatis argumenta eorum multum movebunt.
Item eodem XV, cap. viii vel xxxviii ** : Illa quae sciuntur ut numquam excidere possint et ad naturam ipsius animae pertinent cujusmodi est illud quod nos vivere scimus.
(Notandum quod quattuor sunt cognitiones in quibus est nobis necessaria certitudo, scilicet de scibilibus * xv, cap. xii (Migne, P.L., xLu, 1075).
+ cit. (1074). t Libri tres contra Academicos (Migne, P.L., xxxu, 905-958 ** xv, cap. xv (Migne, P.L., xi, 1078). ; secre
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
Secondly, it is clear that Augustine concedes the certitude of those things known through sense experience.
Hence he says in De Trinitate, BK. xv * : "'Far be it that we should doubt about those things which we learn to be true through our bodily senses, for through these we learn the heavens, the earth, the sea and all that are in them''.
If then we are not deceived nor in doubt about the truth of these things, as is clearly the case, we are certain of things known through the senses, for where doubt and deception are excluded, we have certitude.
Thirdly, it is clear that in the same work Augustine also concedes that we have certitude regarding our actions.
'' He is alive whether he be asleep or awake, for it is a part of living also to sleep and to see in dreams''.
And if it be objected that to live is not a second act but a first act,® he adds in the same place : "'If anyone should say, 'I know that I know or that I live', he cannot be deceived, no matter how often he reflect. on this first knowledge".
And in the same place : "'And if one says, 'I am happy', how can one say without being impudent,
'Perhaps you are deceived'? And if I reflect ad infinitum, I know that I will, and so on". And in the same place:
"If anyone says I do not wish to err, will it not be true that he does not wish toerr...". "And other arguments", he says, ''can be found which hold against the Academicians, who maintain that nothing can be known by man". Andinthesame work:
'If anyone has read our Contra Academicos,+ the arguments against the perception of truth given by the Academicians will not move him''.
Likewise, in the same book **:
'"Those things which are known in such a way that they can never slip from the mind but pertain to the nature of the soul itself, of such kind is the knowledge that we live... ".
(Note 1° that there are four kinds of knowledge of which we are necessarily certain, viz. (1) things knowable
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simpliciter ; de scibilibus per experientiam ; de actibus nostris; et de cognitis a nobis ut nunc per sensus ; exemplum triangulus habet tres, etc. ; luna eclipsatur ; vigilo ; illud est album.
Primum et tertium tantum egent sensu ut occasione, quia simpliciter est certitudo si omnes sensus errarent, secundum et quartum tenent per illud, scilicet quod frequenter evenit a non libero habet illud pro per se causa naturali, ex hoc sequitur propositum tam in secundo quam in quarto aliquando additur propositio necessaria.
Itaque auctoritates Augustini dimittas usque ad articulum secundum, qui est ad rem vel qui est solutio).
(Primum est manifestum, tertium conceditur esse per se notum, alias non judicaretur quid esset per se notum.
Secundum et quartum habent infinitas per se notas quibus jungunt alias ex pluribus sensibus).
Sic patet primum quomadmodum rationes illius non concludunt et quod hoc falsum sit et contra Augustinum.
[Articulus Secundus.
Reprobatio Scepticismi].
Quantum ad secundum articulum ut in nullis cognoscibilibus locum habeat error Academicorum, videndum est qualiter de tribus cognoscibilibus praedictis dicendum est, videlicet de principiis per se notis et de conclusionibus, et secundo de cognitis per experientiam, et tertio de actibus nostris, utrum possit naturaliter haberi certitudo infallibilis.
[a. De Notitia Principiorum].
Quantum ergo ad certitudinem de principiis dico sic.
Termini principiorum per se notorum talem habent identitatem ut alter evidenter necessario alterum includat, et ideo intellectus componens illos terminos, ex quo apprehendit
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
in an unqualified sense, (2) things knowable through experience, (3) our actions, (4) things known at the present time through the senses.
An example [of each] :
(1) A triangle has three [angles equal to two right angles], (2) The moon is eclipsed, (3) I am awake, (4) That is white.
The first and third require the senses merely as an occasion, because even if all the senses erred, there would still be certitude purely and simply.
The second and fourth hold in virtue of this proposition : ''Whatever happens frequently through something that is not free, has this something as its natural per se cause".
From this principle certitude follows in the second and fourth cases when the other proposition is necessary.
Therefore you can let the arguments from the authority of Augustine go until the second article, which is ad rem, or to the [fifth article] which is the solution.) (The 1 first is manifest, the third is conceded to be self-evident ; otherwise we could not judge what is self-evident.
The second and fourth have an infinity of self-evident truths to which others are added which are based on the testimony of several senses.) And so the first article is clear, viz. that the reasons
[of Henry] are inconclusive, that his opinion is false and not in accord with the mind of Augustine.
[Article If.
The Rejection of Scepticism].
As regards the second article, lest the error of the Academicians be repeated in regard to any of those things which can be known, we must see what is to be said of the three types of knowledge mentioned above, viz. whether it is possible to have infallible certitude naturally : (1) of self-evident principles and conclusions, (2) of things known by experience, and (3) of our actions.
[a. Certitude of First Principles].
As to the certitude of principles, I have this to say.
The terms of selfevident principles are so identical that it is evident that one necessarily includes the other.
Consequently, the intellect uniting these terms in a proposition, from the
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eos, habet apud se necessariam causam conformitatis illius actus componendi ad ipsos terminos quorum est compositio, et etiam causam evidentem talis conformitatis, et ideo necessario patet sibi illa conformitas cujus causam evidentem apprehendit in terminis.
Igitur non potest in intellectu apprehensio esse terminorum et compositio eorum, quin stet conformitas illius compositionis ad terminos, sicut stare non potest album et album, quin stet similitudo.
Haec autem conformitas 'compositionis ad terminos est veritas compositionis.
Ergo non potest stare compositio talium terminorum quin sit vera.
Et ita non potest stare perceptio illius compositionis et perceptio terminorum, quin stet perceptio conformitatis compositionis ad terminos, et ita perceptio veritatis quia prima percepta_ evidenter includunt perceptionem istius veritatis.
Confirmatur ratio ista per simile per Philosophum Iv Metaphysicae* ubi vult quod oppositum principii non potest in intellectu alicujus venire, scilicet hujusmodi impossibile idem esse et non esse, quia tunc essent opiniones contrariae simul in mente ; quod utique verum est de opinionibus contrariis, id est repugnantibus formaliter, quia opinio opinans esse de aliquo et opinio opinans non esse de eodom, sunt formaliter repugnantes.
Ita arguam in proposito, repugnantiam aliquam intellectionum in mente, licet non formalem ; si enim stat in intellectu notitia totius et partis, et compositio eorum, cum ista includant sicut causa necessaria conformitatem compositionis ad terminos, si stet in intellectu haec opinio, quod ipsa compositio sit falsa, stabunt notitiae repugnantes ; non formaliter, sed notitia una stabit cum
* Iv, cap. iii (1005, 23-24).
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
very fact that it grasps these terms, has present to itself the necessary cause, and what is more—the evident cause, of the conformity of this proposition with the terms that compose it.
This conformity, then, the evident cause of which the intellect perceives in the terms, cannot help but be evident to the intellect. That is why the intellect could not apprehend these terms and unite them in a proposition without having this relationship of conformity arise between the proposition and the terms, any more than two white objects could exist without a relationship of similarity arising between them.
Now it is precisely this conformity of the proposition to the terms that constitutes the truth of a judgment.
Such terms then cannot be combined in a judgment without being true, and so it is that one cannot perceive this proposition and its terms without also perceiving the conformity of the proposition to the terms, and therefore, perceiving the truth.
For what is first perceived evidently includes the perception of the truth of the proposition.
In Metaphysics, BK. 1v,* the Philosopher confirms this reasoning by a simile.
'There he points out that the opposite of a first principle such as "It is impossible that the same thing be and not be'', cannot enter the mind of anyone because then the mind would possess contrary opinions simultaneously.
'This is indeed true of contrary opinions, that is, propositions formally opposed to each other.
For the opinions attributing existence and nonexistence to one and the same thing are formally opposed.
And so in the question at hand, I argue that there is some kind of repugnance existing between intellections in the mind, even though it is not exactly a formal opposition.
For if the intellect possesses the knowledge of ''whole" and of "'part'"? and combines them in a proposition, since they include the necessary reason for the conformity of the proposition to the terms, if the intellect were to think this proposition false, two mutually repugnant acts of knowledge would coexist, even though the
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alia, et tamen erit causa necessaria oppositae notitiae ad illam, quod est impossibile.
Sicut enim impossibile est album et nigrum simul stare, quia sunt contraria formaliter, ita impossibile est simul stare album et illud quod est praecise causa nigri, ita necessario quod non potest esse sine eo absque contradictione.
Habita certitudine de principiis primis patet quomodo habebitur de conclusionibus illatis ex eis propter evidentiam syllogismi perfecti, cum certitudo conclusionis tantumodo dependeat ex certitudine principiorum et ex evidentia illationis.
Sed numquid in ista notitia principiorum et conclusionum non errabit intellectus si sensus omnes decipiantur circa terminos?
Respondeo quantum ad istam notitiam, quod intellectus non habet sensus pro causa, sed tantum pro occasione, quia intellectus non potest habere notitiam simplicium nisi acceptam a sensibus.
Illa tamen accepta virtute sua potest simul componere simplicia, et si ex ratione talium simplicium sit complexio evidenter vera, intellectus virtute propria et terminorum assentiet illi complexioni non virtute sensus a quo accipit terminos exterius.
Exemplum: si ratio totius et ratio majoritatis accipiatur a sensu et intellectus componat istam : Omne totum est majus sua parte, intellectus virtute sui et istorum terminorum assentiet indubitanter isti complexioni et non tantum quia vidit
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
opposition is not precisely formal.
The one act of knowledge would be co-present with the other even though the first is the necessary cause of the very opposite of the second, which is impossible.
For just as it is impossible for white to be at the same time black because the two are formally contraries, so it is also impossible to have the white where you have the precise cause of blackness.
The necessity in this case is of such a kind that it would be a contradiction to have the one [viz. the knowledge of the terms and the proposition] without the other [viz. the knowledge of the conformity between the two].
Once we have certitude of first principles, it is clear how one can be certain of the conclusions drawn from such principles, since the perfect syllogism is evident, and the certitude of the conclusion depends solely upon the certitude of the principles and the evidence of the inference.
But will the intellect not err in its knowledge of principles and conclusions, if all the senses are deceived about the terms?
I reply that so far as this kind of know-: ledge goes, the senses are not a cause but merely an occasion of the intellect's knowledge, for the intellect cannot have any knowledge of the terms of a proposition unless it has taken them from the senses.
But once it has them, the intellect by its own power can form propositions with these terms.
And if a proposition be evidently true by reason of the terms involved, the intellect by its own power will assent to this proposition in virtue of the terms and not by reason of the senses from which it externally received the terms.
'To give an example:
If the notion of ''whole" and the notion of "greater than" be taken from the senses and the intellect form the proposition "Every whole is greater than its part'', the intellect by its own power and in virtue of the terms will assent to this proposition without the shadow of doubt.
And it does not assent to this because it sees these terms verified in some thing, as it does when it
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terminos conjunctos in re, sicut assentit isti:
Sortes est albus, quia videt terminos in re uniri.
Immo dico quod si omnes sensus essent falsi a quibus accipiuntur tales termini vel quod plus est ad deceptionem, aliqui sensus falsi et aliqui sensus veri, intellectus circa talia principia non deciperetur, quia semper haberet apud se terminos qui essent causa veritatis, utpote si alicui caeco nato essent impressae [MS om. miraculose in somniis] species albedinis et nigredinis et illae remanerent post in vigilia, intellectus abstrahens ab eis componeret istam : album non est nigrum, et circa istam non deciperetur intellectus, licet termini accipiantur a sensu errante, quia ratio formalis terminorum ad quam deventum est, est necessaria causa veritatis hujus negativae.
[b. De cognitis per experientiam].
De secundis, scilicet de cognitis per experientiam, dico quod licet experientia non habeatur de omnibus singularibus, sed de pluribus, neque quod semper, sed quod pluries, tamen expertus infallibiliter novit quia ita est et semper et in omnibus, et hoc per istam propositionem qui est quiescentem in anima:
Quidquid evenit ut in pluribus ab aliqua causa non libera, est effectus naturalis illius causae, quae propositio nota est intellectui licet accepisset terminos ejus a sensu errante.
Quia causa non libera non potest producere ut in pluribus effectum non libere ad cujus oppositum ordinatur, vel ad quem ex sua forma non ordinatur.
Sed causa casualis ordinatur ad producendum oppositum effectus casualis, vel non ad illum producendum.
Ergo, nihil est causa casualis effectus frequenter producti ab eo, et ita si non sit libera erit causa naturalis.
Iste autem effectus evenit a tali
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
assents to the proposition "'Socrates is white'', because it saw the terms united in reality.
Indeed, if the senses from which these terms were received were all false, or what is more deceptive, if some were false and others true, I still maintain that the intellect would not be deceived about such principles, because the terms which are the cause of the truth would always be present to the intellect.
And so it would be if the species of whiteness and blackness were impressed miraculously in sleep upon one who was blind from birth and they remained after he awoke.
The intellect could abstract from these and form the proposition ''White is not black".
And it would not be deceived with regard to this proposition even if the terms were derived from erring senses, because the formal meaning of the terms at which the intellect has arrived is the necessary cause of this negative truth.
[b. Experimental Knowledge].
As for what is known by experience, I have this to say.
Even though a person does not experience every single individual, but only a great many, nor does he experience them at all times, but only frequently, still he knows infallibly that it is always this way and holds for all instances.
He knows this in virtue of this proposition reposing in his soul :
''Whatever occurs in a great many instances by a cause that is not free, is the natural effect of that cause".
This proposition is known to the intellect even if the terms are derived from erring senses, because a cause that does not act freely cannot in most instances produce an effect that is the very opposite of what it is ordained by its form to produce.
The chance cause, however, is ordained either to produce or not produce the opposite of the chance effect.
Consequently, if the effect occurs frequently it is not produced by chance and its cause therefore will be a natural cause if it is not a free agent.
But this effect occurs through such a cause.
Therefore, since the latter (2,322)
I1O
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causa, ergo illud est causa naturalis effectus frequenter producti ab eo, quia non est casualis.
Iste enim effectus evenit a tali causa ut in pluribus, hoc acceptum est per experientiam, quia inveniendo talem naturam nunc cum tali accidente nunc cum tali inventum est quod quantacumque esset diversitas accidentium, semper istam naturam sequebatur talis effectus, igitur non per aliquod accidens isti naturae sed per naturam ipsam in se sequitur talis effectus.
Sed ulterius notandum quod quandoque accipitur experientia de conclusione, puta quod luna frequenter eclipsatur, et tunc supposita conclusione quia ita est, inquiritur causa talis conclusionis per viam divisionis, et quandoque devenitur ex conclusione experta ad principia nota ex terminis, et tunc ex tali principio noto ex terminis potest conclusio, prius tantum secundum experientiam nota, certius cognosci, scilicet primo genere cognitionis, quia ut deducta ex principio per se noto, sicut istud est per se notum, quod opacum _interpositum inter perspicuum et lumen, impedit multiplicationem luminis ad tale perspicuum ; et si inventum fuerit per divisionem quod terra tale est corpus interpositum inter solem et lunam, scietur certissime demonstratione propter quid, quia per causam et non tantum per experientiam, sicut sciebatur ista conclusio ante inventionem principii.
Quandoque autem est experientia de principio ita quod non contingit per viam divisionis invenire ulterius principium notum ex terminis, sed statur in aliquo uno ut in pluribus cujus extrema per experimentum scitum est frequenter uniri, puta quod haec herba talis speciei
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
IIO is not a chance cause, it is the natural cause of the effect it frequently produces.
That such an effect occurs frequently through such a cause is a fact gathered from experience.
For once we find such a nature associated at one time with this accident and at another with that, we have discovered that despite the accidental differences, such an effect invariably follows from this nature.
Hence, such an effect is not the result of what is merely incidental to such a nature but is rather the effect of this nature as such.
It should be noted further that at times we experience [the truth] of a conclusion, such as:
"The moon is frequently eclipsed".
Then, granting the validity of this conclusion because it is a fact, we proceed by the method of division to discover the reason for this. And sometimes, beginning with a conclusion thus experienced, a person arrives at self-evident principles.
In such a case, the conclusion which at first was known only by experience now is known by reason of such a principle with even greater certainty, namely that characteristic of the first kind of knowledge, for it has been deduced from a selfevident principle.
Thus for instance, it is a self-evident principle that when an opaque body is placed between a visible object and the source of light, the transmission of light to such an object is prevented.
Now, if a person discovers by way of division that the earth is such an opaque body interposed between sun and moon, our conclusion will no longer be known merely by experience as was the case before we discovered this principle.
It will be now known most certainly by a demonstration of the reasoned fact,}* for it is known through its cause.
Sometimes, however, we experience a principle in such a way that it is impossible to discover by further division any self-evident principle from which it could be derived.
Instead we must be satisfied with a principle whose terms are known by experience to be frequently united, for
IIT
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est calida nec invenitur medium aliud prius per quod demonstretur passio de subjecto propter quid, sed statur in isto sicut primo noto propter experientias, licet tunc certitudo et infallibilitas [read incertitudo et fallibilitas] removeantur per istam propositionem: effectus ut in pluribus alicujus causae non liberae, est naturalis effectus ejus ; tamen iste est ultimus gradus cognitionis scientificae et forte ibi non habetur cognitio actualis unionis extremorum sed aptitudinalis.
Si enim passio est alia res absoluta a subjecto, posset sine contradictione separari a subjecto, et expertus non haberet cognitionem quia ita est, sed quia ita aptum natum est esse.
[c. De actibus nostris]. De tertiis cognitionibus, scilicet de actibus nostris, dico quod est certitudo de multis eorum sicut de primis et per se notis, quod patet tv Metaphysicae,* ubi dicit Philosophus de rationibus dicentium omnia apparentia esse vera, quod illae rationes quaerunt utrum nunc vigilemus an dormiamus, possunt autem idem omnes dubitationes tales omnium enim 'rationum hi dignificant 'esse, et subdit, rationem quaerunt quorum non est ratio; demonstrationis enim principii non est demonstratio.
Ergo per ipsum ibi nos vigilare est per se notum, sicut principium demonstrationis.
Nec obstat quod est contingens, quia sicut dictum est alias ; ordo est in contingentibus, quod aliqua est prima et immediata, vel esset processus in infinitum in contingentibus, vel aliquod contingens sequeretur ex causa necessaria, quorum utrumque est impossibile.
Et sicut * Iv, cap. vi (1011%, 6-13).
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
III example, that a certain species of herb is hot.
Neither do we find any other prior means of demonstrating just why this attribute belongs to this particular subject, but must content ourselves with this as a first principle known from experience.
Now even though the uncertainty and fallibility in such a case may be removed by the proposition "What occurs in most instances by means of a cause that is not free is the natural effect of such a cause'', still this is the very lowest degree of scientific knowledge
—and perhaps we have here no knowledge of the actual union of the terms but only a knowledge of what is apt to be the case.
For if an attribute is an absolute entity other than the subject, it could be separated from its subject without involving any contradiction.
Hence, the person whose knowledge is based on experience would not know whether such a thing is actually so or not, but only that by its nature is it apt to be so.
[c. Knowledge of Our Own Acts].
Regarding the third type of knowledge, viz. of our acts, I say that we are as certain of many of these as we are of the first and self-evident propositions, as is clear from Metaphysics, BK.Iv.* There the Philosopher says to the arguments of those who say that all that appears is true that they look for proofs of whether we are now awake or asleep.
"'All these doubts, however, amount to the same thing, for they all think that there is a reason for everything." And he adds : '"They seek the reason for things of which there is no reason, for there is no demonstration of a principle of demonstration".
According to him, then, the fact that we are awake is as self-evident as a principle of demonstration.
That such a thing is contingent matters not, for as we have pointed out elsewhere, there is an order among contingent propositions.'4
Some proposition is first and immediate.
Otherwise, we should have an infinite regress in contingent propositions or something contingent would follow from a necessary cause, both of
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est certitudo de vigilare, sicut de per se noto, ita etiam de multis aliis actibus a sunt in potestae nostra,/ut 'me intelligere; me audire? let de aliis, qui sunt actus perfecti.
Licet enim non sit certitudo quod videam album extra positum, vel in tali subjecto, vel in tali distantia, quia potest fieri illusio in medio vel organo, et multis aliis viis, tamen certitudo est quod video etiamsi illusio fiat in organo, quae maxime illusio videtur, puta quando actus fit in ipso organo non ab objecto praesente, qualis natus est fieri ab objecto praesente, et ita si potentia haberet actionem suam posita tali positione vere esset illud ibi quod visio dicitur, sive sit actio sive sit passio sive utrumque.
Si autem illusio fieret non in organo proprio sed in aliquo proximo quod videtur organum, sicut si non fieret illusio in concursu nervorum, sed in ipso oculo fieret impressio speciei qualis nata est fieri ab albo, adhuc visus videret quia talis species, vel quod natum est videri in ea, videretur quia habet sufficientem distantiam respectu organi visus quod est in concursu nervorum istorum, sicut apparet per Augustinum xt De Trinitate, cap. ii,* quod reliquiae visorum remanentes in oculo oculis clausis videntur.
Et per Philosophum De sensu et sensato,t{ quod ignis qui generatur ex elevatione oculi violenta et multiplicatur usque ad palpebram clausam, videtur.
Istae verae sunt visiones licet non perfectissimae, quia hic sunt sufficientes distantiae specierum ad organum principale visus.
(Nota: notitia principii est immutabilis a veritate in falsitatem, non aliter, quia simpliciter corruptibilis est ;
* x1, cap. ii (Migne, P.L., xin, 987).
T cap. il (437%, 23-24).
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which are impossible.
And just as our certitude of being awake is like that of self-evident propositions, the same is true of many other acts in our power such as "I understand", or "I hear', and other such acts which are being performed.
For even though there is no certitude that I see white located outside, either in such a subject or at such a distance (for an illusion can be caused in the medium or in the organ or in a number of other ways), still for all that there is certitude that I see even when the illusion is in the organ itself, which seems to be the greatest of all illusions (for instance, when the same kind of act takes place in the organ without any object present as naturally should take place only when such an object is present).
In such a case, if the faculty should act, that which is called vision would truly be present whether vision be action or passion or both.
But if the illusion were not caused in the organ proper but in something near which seems to be the organ, for instance, if the illusion did not take place in the bundle of nerves but in the eye, a species similar to that which naturally results from an object would be impressed.
In such a case there would still be an act of vision, for we would see such a species or what is to be seen therein because it is sufficiently distant from the organ of sight in the bundle of those nerves.
This is evident from Augustine in De Trinitate, BK. x1, c. i1,* because after-images of vision are seen when the eye is closed.
It is also evident from the Philosopher in De sensu et sensato,t because the flash of fire produced by violently elevating the eye and transmitted as far as the closed eyelid is seen.
Although these are not the most perfect, they are true visions, for in this case a sufficient distance intervenes between the species and the principal organ of vision.
(Note 15:
Knowledge of a principle is immutable in the sense that it cannot change from truth to falsity.
It is not unchangeable in the other sense, for it is simply
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sic species intelligibilis, non phantasma, est debilis, sed immutabilis a vera repraesentatione in falsem ; sed objectum licet corruptibile tamen est immutabile a vera entitate in falsam, et ideo est conformativum notitiae sibi seu causativum notitiae sive veritati in essendo, quia entitas vera immutabilis in falsam virtualiter continet notitiam veram immutabiliter, id est, conformem entitati verae.) (Nota: secundum Augustinum verum necessarium sive immutabile est supra mentem, intellige : in ratione veritatis evidentis, quia hanc de se causat in mente, non autem secundum ejus evidentiam subest menti ut possit apparere vera vel falsa, sicut subest verum probabile menti, ut ipsa possit facere illud apparere verum vel falsum, quaerendo rationes hinc inde per quas probetur et improbetur.
Sic intelligendum est quod mens non judicat de vero immutabili, sed de aliis, quia dictatio quod hoc sit verum, quae est actus judicandi, est in potestate mentis respectu probabilis, non autem respectu necessarii, nec tamen minus perfecte asserit de necessario quod ipsum sit verum ; et haec assertio apud
Aristotelem potest dici judicium, sed Augustinus vult judicium esse in potestate judicantis, non quod statim necessario determinetur ab alio.
Sic patet quomodo de conclusione necessaria mens judicat quia non est statim ex se ; ideo non determinat ex se ad evidentiam sui ipsi menti.
Potest etiam mens rationes sophisticas adducere
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
perishable.
Thus the intelligible species, not the image, is weak.
Nevertheless, it is unable to change from a true to a false representation.
But the object, although perishable, cannot change from something true to something false.
As a result, it is able to conform knowledge to itself or to cause knowledge or truth by being what it is, for a true entity, unable to become something false, virtually contains true knowledge immutably, that is, knowledge conformed to true entity.) (Note}®:
According to Augustine, necessary or immutable truth is "above the mind"—understand
"taken precisely as evident truth'.
For what is necessarily and immutably true causes this evident knowledge of itself in the mind, As evident, such a truth is not subject to the mind so that it could appear either true or false in the way that a probable truth is subject to the mind inasmuch as it is in the power of the mind to make it appear true or false by looking here or there for reasons that prove or disprove it. In this way we must understand the statement that the mind judges about other things and not about immutable truth.
For it is only in the case of something probable and not in the case of something necessary that the assertion of its truth—an act of judgment—lies within the power of the mind.
But this does not mean that the mind asserts the truth of a necessary proposition in a less perfect manner.
According to Aristotle, the latter can be called a "judgment", whereas Augustine understands judgment as something that is in the power of the one judging and not as something that is immediately and necessarily determined by a factor beyond one's control.
And so it is patent how the mind "judges" about a necessary conclusion that is not immediately evident of itself and therefore does not force itself upon the mind as something evident.
The mind can even bring up sophistical reasons against the conclusion in question and on the basis of these reasons refuse its assent.
But this it cannot do with something that is
II4
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contra eam per quas dissentiat.
Non sic contra primum notum, 1v Metaphysicae*:
In mentem venire, etc.) [d. De cognitis quae subsunt sensibus].
Sed quomodo habetur certitudo eorum quae subsunt actibus sensus, puta quod aliquid extra est album, vel calidum, quale apparet?
Respondeo: aut circa tale cognitum eadem opposita apparent diversis sensibus aut non, sed omnes sensus cognoscentes illud, habent idem judicium de eo.
Si secundo modo, tunc certitudo habetur de veritate talis cogniti per sensus et per istam propositionem praecedentem:
Quod evenit in pluribus ab aliquo illud est causa naturalis ejus, si non sit causa libera.
Ergo cum ab isto praesente ut in pluribus evenit talis immutatio sensus sequitur quod immutatio vel species genita sit effectus naturalis talis causae, et ita tale extra erit album, vel calidum, vel tale aliquid quale natum est praesentari per speciem genitam ab ipso ut in pluribus.
Si autem diversi sensus habeant diversa judicia de aliquo viso extra, puta visus dicit baculum esse fractum cujus pars est in aqua et pars est in aere, visus semper dicit solem esse minoris quantitatis quam est, et omne visum a remotis esse minus quam sit, in talibus est certitudo quid verum sit et quis sensus erret per propositionem quiescentem in anima certiorem omni judicio sensus, et per actus plurium sensuum concurrentes, ita quod semper aliqua propositio rectificat mentem vel intellectum de actibus sensus quis sit verus et quis falsus, in qua propositione intellectus non dependet a sensu, sicut a causa, sed sicut ab occasione.
Exemplum: intellectus habet istam propositionem quiescentem : Nullum durius frangitur in actu alicujus mollis sibi cedentis.
Haec est ita per * Iv, cap. ili (1005, 15 ff.).
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
II4 first known [viz. a primary principle] according to Metaphysics, BK. 1v).* [d. Certitude of Sense Knowledge].
But how can a person be certain of those things which fall under the acts of the senses, for instance, that something outside is white or hot in the way that it appears to be?
I reply :
Regarding such an object, either the same things appear opposite to different senses or they do not appear so but rather all the senses knowing such an object judge the same about it. If the latter be the case, then we have certitude of this thing perceived by the senses in virtue of the aforementioned principle, viz. ""'What occurs in most instances by means of something that is not a free cause is the natural effect of this thing".
Therefore, if the same change repeatedly occurs in the majority of cases when such an object is presented, it follows that the transformation or image produced is the natural effect of such a cause, and thus the external thing will be white or hot or such as it naturally appears to be according to the image so frequently produced.
But if the judgment of different senses differs in regard to what is seen outside ; for instance, if sight says that the staff which is partly in the water and partly in the air is broken, or if sight says, as it invariably does, that the sun is smaller in size than it really is, or in general, that everything seen from a distance is smaller than it is in reality, in all such instances we are still certain of what is true and know which sense is in error.
This we know by reason of some proposition in the soul more certain than any sense judgment together with the concurrent testimony of several of the senses.
For there is always some proposition to set the mind or intellect aright regarding which acts of the senses are true and which false—a proposition, note, which the senses do not cause but merely occasion in the intellect.
For instance, the intellect has this proposition reposing in it : ""The harder object is not broken by the touch of something soft which
DUNS SCOTUS
se nota ex terminis quod etiamsi essent accepti a sensibus errantibus, non potest intellectus dubitare de illa. Immo, oppositum includit contradictionem.
Sed quod baculus sit durior aqua, et aqua sibi cedat, hoc dicit uterque sensus tam visus quam tactus.
Sequitur, ergo baculum non est fractus sicut sensus judicat ipsum fractum, et ita quis sensus erret et quis non circa fractionem baculi, intellectus judicat per certius omni actu sensus.
Similiter, ex alia parte quod quantum applicatum quanto omnino est aequale sibi, hoc est notum intellectui quantumcumque notitia terminorum accipiatur a sensu errante.
Sed quod idem quantum possit applicari viso propinquo et remoto, hoc dicit tam visus quam tactus.
Ergo, quantum visum sive a prope sive a remotis est aequale ; ergo visus dicens hoc esse minus errat.
Haec conclusio concluditur ex principiis per se notis et ex actibus duorum sensuum cognoscentium ut in pluribus esse ita, et ita ubicumque ratio judicat sensum errare, hoc judicat non per aliquam notitiam praecise acquisitam a sensibus ut causa, sed per aliquam notitiam occasionatam a sensu in qua non fallitur etiam si omnes sensus faliantur, et per aliquam aliam notitiam acquisitam a sensu vel a sensibus ut in pluribus quae sciuntur esse vera quae sciuntur esse vera per propositionem saepe allegatam, scilicet : Quod in pluribus evenit, etc.
[ Tertius articulus.
Solutio ipsius Henrict].
Quantum ad tertium articulum ex istis est respondendum ad illas rationes tres.
Ad primam: ad illud de mutatione objecti, antecedens est falsum ; non enim sensibilia sunt in continuo motu.
Immo permanent eadem in aliqua duratione, nec
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gives way before it".
So evident is this proposition upon analysis of its terms that the intellect could not call it in doubt, even if its terms were derived from erroneous senses.
Indeed, the opposite of this proposition includes a contradiction.
Now both sight and touch attest that the stick is harder than the water and that the water gives way before the stick.
It follows therefore that the stick is not broken as the sense of sight judges.
Hence, in the case of the "broken staff" the intellect judges by something more certain than any testimony of the sense.
And so too with the other cases.
Even though the terms be derived from erring senses, the intellect knows that the measure used to measure remains perfectly equal to itself.
Now the sense of sight as well as that of touch tell us that the identical measure can be applied to a nearby object of vision and to a distant object.
Therefore, the actual size of the object is equal whether seen from near by or from afar.
Sight errs, consequently, when it declares the size to be less.
This conclusion is inferred from selfevident principles and from the repeated testimony of its truth by two senses.
And so when reason judges that the senses err, it does so in virtue of two kinds of knowledge.
The first is a knowledge for which the intellect requires the sense only as an occasion and not as a cause—a knowledge in which it would not be deceived even if all the senses were deceived.
The other is a knowledge acquired by the oft-repeated testimony of one or more senses which are known to be true by reason of the proposition so frequently quoted, viz. '"Whatever occurs in most instances, etc.''.
[Article III.
Reply to Henry's Arguments].
In_ this third article, we must answer the three arguments [of Henry] ?' in the light of what has been said.
As for the first argument (viz. that based on the change in the object) the antecedent is false.
For sensible things are not in continual motion ; indeed, they remain the same for some time.
Neither is this the opinion of
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est opinio Augustini, sed error Heracliti et discipuli sui Cratyli, qui nolebant loqui sed movere digitum ut dicitur 1v Metaphysicae.* Et consequentia non valet, dato quod antecedens esset verum quia adhuc secundum
Aristotelem, posset haberi certa cognito de hoc dato quod omnia continue moverentur.
Non sequitur etiam : si objectum est mutabile, igitur quod gignitur ab eo non est repraesentativum alicujus sub ratione immutabilis, quia mutabilitas in objecto non est ratio gignendi, sed natura ipsius objecti, quod est mutabile, vel quae natura est immutabilis.
Genitum igitur ab ipso repraesentat naturam per se.
Igitur si natura, unde natura habeat aliquam immutabilem habitudinem ad aliquid, illud aliud per suum exemplar et natura ipsa per suum exemplar repraesentatur ut immutabiliter unita, et ita per duo exemplaria generata a duobus mutabilibus, non inquantum mutabilia, sed in quantum naturae, potest haberi notitia immutabilitatis unionis eorum.
(Quamvis non in quantum mutabile significat, si tamen est mutabile, quomodo ejus ad aliud est habitudo immutabilis ? Respondeo : habitudo est immutabilis sic quia inter extrema non potest esse opposita habitudo, nec non esse ista positis extremis, sed per destructionem extremi vel extremorum destruitur.
Contra : Quomodo propositio necessaria affirmatur si identitas extremorum potest destrui?
Respondeo : quando res non est, non est identitas ejus realis ; sed tunc si est in intellectu, est identitas ut est objectum intellectum, et necessaria secundum quid, quia in tali esse extrema non possunt esse sine tali identitate. amen illa potest non esse sicut
* Iv, cap. vi (10117, 4-13).
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
Augustine.
It is rather the error of Heraclitus and his disciple Cratylus, who did not even wish to speak but only move his finger, as Metaphysics, BK. 1v,* relates.
But even if the antecedent were true, the consequence would still be invalid, for as Aristotle pointed out, we could still be certain of this truth, viz. that all things are in continuous motion.
Likewise, it does not follow that just because an object is mutable, therefore the knowledge produced does not represent anything under an immutable aspect.
For it is not precisely this mutability in the object that causes the knowledge ; it is the nature of this mutable object that does so, and this nature is immutable.
Hence, the knowledge produced by it represents the nature itself.
And if it is the nature, this nature may have an immutable relation to something, and then both this nature and the other thing to which it is related, each by its own exemplar, are represented as immutably united.
And so by means of two terms produced by two mutable things (though not in so far as they are changeable, but in so far as they are natures) it is possible to have a knowledge of their immutable union.
(Even 18 though something mutable is not signified in so far as it is mutable, how is it that its relation to another thing is immutable?
I reply that the relation is immutable in this sense, that the opposite relation could not exist between the extremes; neither could this relation be non-existent, given these extremes.
By the destruction of one or both extremes, however, this relation is also destroyed.
'To the contrary:
How can we assert that the proposition is necessary if the identity of the extremes could be destroyed?
I reply: Whena thing is non-existent, it has no real identity, but in such a case, if it is in the mind it has an identity inasmuch as it is an object known, and this identity is necessary only in a qualified sense inasmuch as the extremes cannot exist in thought without possessing this identity.
Neverthe-
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extremum potest esse non intellectum.
Ergo, propositio necessaria in intellectu nostro secundum quid, quia immutabilis in falsam.
Sed simpliciter necessaria non nisi in intellectu divino, sicut nec extrema habent identitatem simpliciter necessario in aliquo esse, nisi in illo esse intellecto.) Patet etiam quod repraesentatum in se mutabile, potest repraesentare aliquid sub ratione immutabilis, quia essentia Dei sub ratione immutabilis repraesentabitur intellectui per aliquid omnino mutabile sive illud sit species sive actus.
Hoc patet per simile, quia per finitum potest repraesentari aliquid sub ratione infiniti.
Ad secundum, dico quod in anima potest intelligi duplex mutabilitas, una ab affirmatione in negationem, et econverso, puta ab ignorantia ad scientiam, vel a non intellectione ad intellectionem.
Alia quasi a contrario in contrarium, puta a rectitudine in deceptionem, vel econverso.
Ad quaecumque autem objecta est mutabilis anima prima mutabilitate, et per nihil formaliter in ea existens tollitur ab ea talis immutabilitas.
Sed non est mutabilis secunda mutabilitate, nisi circa illa complexa quae non habent evidentiam ex terminis.
Circa illa vero quae sunt evidentia ex terminis, mutari non potest secunda mutabilitate, quia ipsi termini apprehensi sunt causa necessaria et evidens conformitatis compositionis factae ad ipsos terminos.
Ergo si anima est mutabilis a rectitudine in errorem absolute, non sequitur quod per nihil aliud a se potest rectificari.
Saltem
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
less, this identity need not exist, even as the term need not be known.
Therefore, the proposition in the mind is necessary only in a qualified sense inasmuch as it cannot become false.
But it would only be necessary in an unqualified sense in the divine intellect, for the terms have an iqentity that is simply necessary in no other form of existence save that which they possess by being known by God.) It is also evident that something can be represented under an immutable aspect even if that which does the representing is something mutable in itself.
For the essence of God is represented to the intellect as something immutable by means of something that is radically changeable, whether the latter be the species or the act of knowing.
This is evident from a similar case, for something can be represented as infinite through what is finite.
As to the second, this changeability of the soul can be understood in a twofold sense : one from affirmation to negation and vice versa, such as from a state of ignorance to a state of knowledge or from a lack of understanding to understanding ; the other from one contrary as it were to another, such as from being right to being deceived, or vice versa.
The soul, however, is changeable with regard to any object only in the first sense of mutability, and there is nothing which exists formally in the soul that will remove this kind of mutability.
But the soul is not mutable in the second sense except in regard to such propositions as are not evident from their terms.
But with those propositions that are evident from their terms, the soul cannot be altered in the second way for the terms which are apprehended are themselves the necessary and evident cause of the conformity of the judgment involving the aforesaid terms.
Therefore, even if the soul is mutable in the sense that absolutely speaking it can pass from the state of being correct to a state of error, it does not follow that it can be set aright only by something other than itself.
At least it can be set aright (2,322)
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rectificari potest circa illa objecta circa quae non potest intellectus errare apprehensis terminis.
Ad tertium, dico quod si aliquam apparentiam haberet, magis concluderet contra opinionem illam quae negat speciem intelligibilem, quae est opinio ponentis istam opinionem hic, quia illa species quae potest repraesentare sensibile tamquam objectum in somniis esset phantasma, non species intelligibilis.
Igitur si intellectus solo phantasmate utatur per quod objectum est sibi praesens et non aliqua specie intelligibili, non videtur quod per aliquod in quo objectum sibi relucet posset discernere verum a verisimili; sed ponendo speciem in intellectu, non valet ratio, quia intellectus non potest uti illa pro se ut pro objecto, quia non contingit uti illa in dormiendo.
Si objicis: si phantasma potest repraesentare se ut objectum, igitur intellectus per illum errorem virtutis phantasticae potest errare vel saltem potest ligari ne possit operari, ut patet in somniis et phreneticis, potest dici quod etsi legetur quando est talis error virtute phantastica, non tamen tunc errat intellectus, quia tunc non habet aliquem actum.
Sed quomodo sciet vel erit tunc intellectus certus quando non errat virtus phantastica quam tamen non errare requiritur ad hoc quod intellectus non erret ?
Respondeo: ista veritas quiescit in intellectu quod potentia non errat circa objectum proportionatum nisi indisposita, et notum est intellectui virtutem phantasticam non esse indispositam in vigilia tali indispositione
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
in regard to those objects about which the intellect cannot err once the terms are grasped.
To the third argument, I say that if it held at all, it would rather be valid against that opinion which denies the intelligible species—the view of the man who has advanced the opposing theory [viz. Henry of Ghent].9
For the species which is able to represent the sensible in dreams as though it were an object would be the sense image or phantasm and not the intelligible species.
Therefore, if the intellect were to use the sense image alone so that the object would be present to the mind through the sense image and not in virtue of any intelligible species, there seems to be no way of distinguishing between what is true and what merely appears to be true by means of something in which the object itself appears.
But if we assume the existence of a species in the intellect, the argument does not hold, because the intellect is unable to use such a species as though it were an object in itself for the simple reason that it is not able to use such a species in sleep.
You may object that if the sense image can represent itself as object, then it follows that the intellect could err by reason of this error in the faculty of the imagination, or at least, as is the case in dreams or with madmen, the intellect could be so bound that it could not operate.
It can be said in reply that if the intellect is bound when there is such an error due to the imaginative faculty, then the intellect does not err for the simple reason that it does not act.
But how will one know or how will the intellect ever be certain that the imagination does not err when the latter faculty must be free of error if the intellect is not to err?
I reply that the following truth reposes in the mind.
''A faculty does not err in regard to an object that is properly proportioned to it unless the said faculty is indisposed".
Now it is known to the intellect that the imaginative faculty is not indisposed during a waking
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quae facit phantasma repraesentare se tamquam objectum, quia per se notum est intellectui quod intelligens vigilat, ita quod virtus phantastica non est ligata in vigilia sicut in somniis.
Sed adhuc instatur contra certitudinem dictam de actibus hoc modo:
Videtur mihi quod videam vel audiam ubi tamen nec video nec audio.
Igitur, de hoc non est certitudo.
Respondeo:
Aliud est contra negantem aliquam propositionem ostendere eam esse veram; aliud est alicui admittenti eam ostendere quomodo sit vera.
Exemplum:
1v_ Metaphysicae,* contra negantem primum principium non _inducit Philosophus istud inconveniens, quod opiniones contrariae simul essent in anima.
Hoc ipsi concederent sicut praemissam, sed inducit eis alia inconvenientia manifestiora eis, licet non in se; sed recipientibus primum principium ostendit quomodo sit notum, quia ita notum est quod oppositum ejus non possit venire in mentem, quod probat quia tunc possent opiniones contrariae simul stare, talis conclusio est ibi magis inconveniens quam hypothesis.
Ita hic, si concedis nullam esse per se notam nolo disputare tecum quia constat quod protervus [MS protervis] et non es persuasus, sicut patet in actibus tuis, quomodo objicit Philosophus 1v Metaphysicae,t somnians enim de aliquo quasi in proximo consequendo sive obtinendo et postea evigilans non prosequeris illud sicut prosequeris vel prosequereris, si ita esses proximus in vigilando ad illud consequendum.
Si autem admittis aliquam propositionem esse per se notam, et circa quamcumque potest potentia indisposita errare, sicut patet in somniis, ergo ad hoc ut aliqua cog- * tv, cap. iii (1005, 25 ff.). fT Iv, cap. v (1010%, 10),
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
state to such an extent that the sense image would represent itself as an object, for it is self-evident to the intellect that when it knows, it is awake, and that, consequently, the imagination is not bound in a waking state as it is in sleep.
But there is still another objection to the aforementioned certitude about our actions.
It runs as follows.
I seem to see and to hear, whereas in reality I neither see nor hear ; consequently, I have no certainty on this point.
I reply that it is one thing to show someone who denies a given proposition that it is true and quite another to indicate to someone who admits the given proposition how it is true.
For example in Metaphysics, BK. Iv,* the Philosopher does not adduce the inconsistency that "contrary opinions would be present in the soul at one and the same time"' against those who deny the first principle [viz. of contradiction], for they indeed would concede this as a premise.
Instead he brings out other inconsistencies which are more manifest to them though they are not more evident in themselves.
But he does show those who grant this first principle how this principle is known.
For it is known in such a way that its opposite could not even enter the mind.
This he proves from the fact that otherwise contrary opinions could exist simultaneously in the mind.
Such a conclusion is, in this case, even more inconsistent than the hypothesis.
So it is in our case.
If you hold that nothing is selfevident, I will not argue with you for it is clear that you are a quibbler and are not to be convinced.
This is apparent from your actions, as the Philosopher indicates in Metaphysics, BK. 1v,t for if you dream of obtaining or going after some nearby object, after you awake you no longer seek it as you would do, or would have done, had you been that close to getting it while awake.
If, however, you admit that some proposition is selfevident and that a power indisposed can err with regard to anything, as is clear in the case of dreams, then from
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noscatur per se esse nota, oportet quod possit cognosci quando potentia est disposita et quando non.
Et per consequens potest haberi notitia de actibus nostris, quod potentia est ita disposita quod illa est per se nota quae apparet sibi per se nota.
Dico tunc ad formam hujus cavillationis, quod sicut apparet somnianti se videre, ita posset sibi apparere oppositum unius principii per se noti speculabilis, et tamen non sequitur quin illud principium sit per se notum et ita non sequitur quin sit per se notum audienti quod audiat, quia circa utrumque potest potentia indisposita errare; non autem disposita.
Et quando sit disposita et quando non, hoc est per se notum ; alias non posset cognosci aliquam aliam esse per se notam, quia non posset cognosci quae foret per se nota, utrum illa cui intellectus sit dispositus vel cui sic assentiret.
[Articulus Quartus.
Contra conclusionem Henrici].
Circa quartum articulum contra conclusionem opinionis arguo sic.
Quaero quid intelligit per veritatem certam et sinceram, aut veritatem infallibilem absque dubitatione, scilicet, et deceptione, et probatum est prius et declaratum in articulo secundo et tertio, quod illa potest haberi ex puris naturalibus.
Aut intelligit de veritate quae est passio entis, et tunc cum ens possit naturaliter intelligi, ergo et verum ut est passio ejus, et si verum igitur et veritas per abstractionem quasi, quia quaecumque forma potest intelligi ut in subjecto, potest intelligi ut in se et in abstracto a subjecto.
Aut alio modo intelligit per veritatem conformitatem ad exemplar, et si ad creatum, patet propositum.
Si autem ad exemplar
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
the fact that something can be recognised as self-evident it follows that a person can tell when a faculty is disposed and when it is not.
Consequently, in regard to our actions it is possible to know that a faculty is so disposed that what appears to be self-evident is actually so.
As to the form of this sophistical argument, then, I say this. Just it appears to the dreamer that he sees, so also the opposite of some self-evident speculative principle might appear to him.
But from this it still does not follow that such a principle is not self-evident.
Likewise it does not follow that it is not self-evident to the hearer that he hears.
For if a power that is indisposed can err with regard to either truth, a power that is disposed cannot.
And it is self-evident when it is disposed and when it is not.
Otherwise, nothing else would be recognised as self-evident, for one could never tell what would be self-evident, or whether this is something to which the intellect is disposed or to which it would assent in this way.
[Article IV.
Concerning Henry's Conclusion}.
In the fourth article I argue against the conclusion of [Henry's] view 2° as follows : What, I ask, is meant by certain and unadulterated truth?
Either it means infallible truth, that is, a truth which excludes all doubt and deception.
And in this case, we have proved and declared already in the second and third articles that such truth is possible on purely natural grounds.
Or by such truth he means truth as an attribute of "being".
In which case, since we can know "'being" we can also know its attribute 'true'.
And if we know "'true"' we can also know truth by a kind of abstraction.
For any form that can be recognised in a subject can also be known in itself and in the abstract apart from the subject.
Or truth is to be understood in still another way, as truth of conformity to an exemplar.
If the exemplar in question is taken to be created, we have what we seek to prove.
If conformity to an uncreated exemplar is meant, why such
12I
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increatum, conformitas ad illud non potest intelligi nisi in illo exemplari cognito, quia relatio non est cognoscibilis nisi cognito extremo; ergo falsum est quod ponitur exemplar aeternum esse rationem cognoscendi et non cognitum.
Praeterea secundo sic:
Intellectus simplex, omne quod intelligit confuse, potest cognoscere definitive, inquirendo definitionem illius cogniti per viam divisionis.
Haec cognitio definitiva videtur perfectissima pertinens ad intellectum simplicem.
Ex tali autem cognitione perfectissima terminorum, potest intellectus perfectissime intelligere principium et ex principio conclusionem, et in hoc compleri videtur notitia intellectualis ita quod non videtur cognitio veritatis necessaria ultra veritates praedictas.
Item tertio, aut lux aeterna quam dicis necessariam ad habendum sinceram veritatem, causat aliquid prius naturaliter actu aut non.
Si sic, aut igitur in objecto aut in intellectu.
Non in objecto, quia objectum in quantum habet esse in intellectu, non habet esse reale, sed tantum intentionale.
Igitur non est capax alicujus accidentis realis.
Sed in intellectu, igitur lux increata non immutat ad cognoscendum sinceram veritatem nisi mediante effectu suo, et ita aeque perfecte videtur opinio communis ponere notitiam in lumine increato, sicut ista positio ; quia ponit esse videri in intellectu agente qui est effectus luminis increatae et perfectior quam esset illud lumen accidentale creatum.
Si autem nihil causat ante actum, aut ergo sola lux causat actum, aut lux cum
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
I2I conformity cannot be recognised unless the exemplar itself is known, for unless the term of a relation is known the relation itself cannot be known.
Consequently, it is false to assume that an eternal exemplar is the reason why we know something when this exemplar itself remains unknown.
Secondly, I argue further that simple intelligence 24 can know by way of definition all that it knows in a confused manner by the simple expedient of discovering the definition of the thing known by way of division.
This definitive knowledge seems to be the most perfect kind of knowledge that pertains to simple intelligence.
From this most perfect knowledge of the terms, however, the intellect can understand the principle most perfectly ; and from the principle, the conclusion.
Intellectual knowledge seems to be complete with this, so that no further knowledge of truth over and above the aforementioned truths seems necessary.
In the third place, either the Eternal Light, which you say is necessary in order to have unadulterated truth, causes something naturally prior to the act or not.
If it does, then this thing is produced either in the object or in the intellect.
But it cannot be produced in the object, because the object, in so far as it exists in the intellect, has no real existence but only intentional existence.
Therefore, it is incapable of any real accident.
If this thing is produced in the intellect, then the Eternal Light transforms [the mind] to know pure truth only through the medium of its effect.
If this be the case, then it seems that common opinion attributes knowledge to the Uncreated Light to the same extent as does this, for the common view assumes that knowledge is seen in the active intellect, which is the effect of the Uncreated
Light, and indeed is a more perfect effect than this accidental created Light would be."?
If this Uncreated Light does not cause anything prior to the act, then either the Light alone causes the act [of knowledge], or the Light
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intellectu et objecto.
Si sola lux, ergo intellectus agens nullam habet operationem in cognitione sincerae veritatis, quod videtur inconveniens, quia ista operatio est nobilissima intellectus nostri. Igitur intellectus agens qui est nobilissimus in anima, concurreret aliquo modo ad istam actionem.
[Non in libro Scoti] *4 (et iterum actus intelligendi non magis diceretur unius hominis quam alterius, et sic superflueret intellectus agens quod non est dicendum, cum ejus sit omnia facere sicut possibilis omnia fieri.
Similiter etiam secundum Philosophum m1 De anima: Intellectus agens correspondet in ratione activi, possibili in ratione passivi; ergo quidquid recipit possibilis ad illud, aliquo modo se habet active intellectus agens).
Et hoc etiam inconveniens quod illatum est ibi, concluditur ex opinione praedicta per aliam viam, quia secundum sic opinantem, agens utens instrumento non potest habere actionem excedentem actionem instrumenti.
Ergo cum virtus intellectus agentis non possit in cognitionem sincerae veritatis, [MS om. lux aeterna utenti intellectu agente non poterit in cognitionem vel in actionem istius cognitionis sincerae veritatis,] ita quod intellectus agens habeat ibi rationem instrumenti.
Si dicas quod lux increata cum intellectu et objecto causet istam veritatem sinceram, haec est opinio communis quae ponit lucem aeternam sicut causam remotam causare omnem certam veritatem, vel erit ista opinio inconveniens, vel non discordabit a communi opinione.
[Articulus Quintus.
Solutio Quaestionis]. Ad quaestionem igitur dico quod propter verba Augustini, debet concedere quod veritates infallibiles videntur in regulis aeternis, ubi potest li in accipi objective, et hoc quadrupliciter : vel sicut in objecto proximo, vel sicut in
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
with the intellect and object do so.
If the Light does so alone, then the active intellect has no function whatsoever in knowing pure truth.
But this seems inconsistent because the latter is the most noble function of our intellect.
The active intellect, then, which is the most noble [faculty of knowledge] ** in our soul, must concur in some way in this action.*4 And the inconsistency here inferred also follows from the aforesaid opinion in another way.
For according to the one who-holds this opinion, any agent using an instrument is incapable of performing an action which exceeds the action of the instrument.
'Therefore, since the power of the active intellect could not arrive at the knowledge of pure truth, the Eternal Light using the active intellect could not produce this knowledge or have anything to do with the act whereby pure truth is known and still have the active intellect function as an instrument.
And if you say that the Uncreated Light causes this unadulterated truth together with the intellect and the object, this is the common opinion which assumes that the Uncreated Light acting as the remote cause produces all certain truth.
Consequently, either this opinion [of Henry] is inconsistent or it is not at variance with the common view.
[Article V.
Solution of the Question].25
As to the question, then, I say that because of what Augustine has said, one should concede that infallible truths are seen in the eternal rules, where the term "in" can be taken in the sense of "in an object".
There are four ways in which this could be done:
(1) either as in a proximate object, or (2) as in that which contains the proximate object, or (3) as that in virtue of which the
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continente objectum proximum, vel sicut in eo virtute cujus objectum proximum movet, vel sicut in objecto remoto.
[Prima Via].
Ad intellectum primi, dico quod omnia intelligibilia actu intellectus divini habent esse intelligibile, et in eis omnes veritates de eis relucent, ita quod intellectus intelligens ea, et virtute eorum intelligens necessaria veritates de eis, videt in eis sicut in objectis istas veritates necessarias.
Ila autem inquantum sunt objecta secundaria intellectus divini, sunt veritates quia conformes suo exemplari, intellectu scilicet divino ; et sunt lux quia manifestae ; et sunt immutabiles ibi et necessariae.
Sed aeternae sunt secundum quid, quia aeternitas est conditio existentis, et illa non habent existentiam nisi secundum quid.
Sic igitur primo possumus dici videre in luce aeterna, hoc est in objecto secundario intellectus divini, quod est veritas et lux aeterna modo exposito.
[Secunda Via].
Secundus modus patet similiter, quia intellectus divinus continet istas veritates quasi liber, sicut illa auctoritas Augustini dicit De Trinitate x1Vv, cap. xv * : quod istae regulae scriptae, scriptae sunt in libro lucis aeternae, id est, in intellectu divino inquantum continet istas veritates et licet ille liber non videatur, videntur tamen illae veritates quae sunt scriptae in libro illo primo, et eatenus posset dici intellectus noster videre veritates in luce aeterna, hoc est, in libro illo sicut in continente objectum?® (et hoc secundum secundum modum vel in illis veritatibus quae sunt lux aeterna secundum quid, sicut in objectis videmus secundum primum modum).
Et alter istorum modorum videtur esse de intellectu * xiv, cap. xv (Migne, P.L., xiu, 1052).
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
proximate object moves [the intellect], or (4) as in a remote object.
[The First Way].
In explanation of the first, I say that all the intelligibles have an intelligible being in virtue of the act of the divine intellect.
In these intelligibles all the truths that can be affirmed about them are visible so that the intellect knowing these intelligibles and in virtue thereof understanding the necessary truths about them, sees these truths in them as in an object.
Now these intelligibles inasmuch as they are secondary objects of the divine intellect are "truths" because they. are conformed to their exemplar, viz. the divine intellect.
Likewise, they are a "'light"" because they are manifest.
And there they are immutable and necessary.
But they are eternal only in a qualified sense, because eternity is characteristic of something really existing, and these intelligibles '"'exist'' only in a qualified sense.
This then is the first way in which we can be said to see in the Eternal Light, i.e. as in the secondary object of the divine intellect, which object is truth and eternal light in the sense explained.
[The Second Way].
The second way is also clear, because the divine intellect contains these truths like a book, as Augustine testifies in De Trinitate, BK. xIv, c. xv*:
"These rules are written in the book of Eternal Light", that is, in the divine intellect inasmuch as it contains these truths.
And although this book itself is not seen, nevertheless those truths are seen which are written in this book.
And to this extent, our intellect could be said to see truths in the Eternal Light, i.e. to see things which are in that book as in something which contains the object.?6
And Augustine's statement in De Trinitate, BK. XH,
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Augustini xm De Trinitate, cap. xiv,* quod ratio quadrati corporis manet incorrumptibilis et immutabilis, etc. Non autem manet talis nisi ut est objectum secundarium intellectus divini.
Sed contra primum modum est dubium.
Si enim non videmus istas veritates ut sunt in intellectu divino, quia non videmus divinum intellectum, quomodo dicemur videre in luce increata ex hoc quod videmus in tali luce aeterna secundum quid, quae habet esse in luce increata sicut in intellectu cognoscente.
[Tertia Via].
Huic respondet tertius modus, qui talis est: illa ut sunt objectum secundarium intellectus divini non habent esse nisi secundum quid ; operatio autem aliqua vera realis non competit alicui praecise enti secundum quid virtute sui, sed si aliquo modo competit sibi, hoc oportet esse virtute alicujus cui competit esse simpliciter.
Igitur istis objectis secundariis non competit movere intellectum praecise nisi virtute esse intellectus divini quod est esse simpliciter, et per quod ista habent esse secundum quid.
Sic ergo in luce aeterna secundum quid, sicut in objecto proximo videmus ; sed in luce aeterna increata videmus secundum tertium modum sicut in Causa proxima cujus virtute objectum proximum movet.
Juxta hoc etiam potest dici quod quantum ad tertium modum videmus in luce aeterna sicut in causa objecti in se.
Nam intellectus divinus producit ista actu suo in esse intelligibili, et actu suo dat huic objecto esse tale et illi tale, et per consequens dat eis talem rationem objecti per quas rationes post movent intellectum ad cognitionem
* xm, cap. xiv (Migne, P.L., xuu, 1011),
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
c. xiv,* that the meaning of "square body" remains incorruptible and immutable, and so on, can be understood seemingly in either of these two ways.
For the meaning of a square body remains incorruptible and immutable only inasmuch as it is a secondary object of the divine intellect.
But there is a doubt about this first way.
We do not see these truths as they are in the divine intellect, because we do not see the divine intellect itself.
How then can we be said to see things in the Uncreated Light—things, which exist indeed in the Uncreated Light as objects known by that intellect, but which we see only in something which is the eternal light in a qualified sense.2?
To this the third way gives the following answer.
[The Third Way].
These intelligibles in so far as they are secondary objects of the divine intellect have existence only in a qualified sense.
But something that exists only in a qualified sense, to the precise extent that it "'exists"' in this way, is incapable of any truly real operation.?8
If such an operation pertains to it at all, it does so only in virtue of something which exists in an unqualified sense.
Therefore, these secondary objects do not enjoy the power to move the intellect, to speak precisely, except by virtue of the existence of the divine intellect, which exists in an unqualified sense and through which the intelligibles have existence in a qualified sense.
And so we see in the eternal light in a qualified sense as in the proximate object.
But according to this third way we see in the Uncreated Light as in the immediate cause by virtue of which the proximate object moves [the intellect].
We can also be said to see in the Eternal Light in this third way inasmuch as this Light is the cause of the object itself.
For the divine intellect produces this intelligible in existence and by its act gives to this object one type of being and to another a second type of being.
Consequently, the divine intellect gives them such intelligible content as they possess as objects of knowledge.
Now
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certam, et quod proprie posset dici intellectum nostrum videre in luce, quia lux est causa objecti.
Apparet per simile: quia proprie dicimur intelligere in lumine intellectus agentis, cum tamen illud lumen non sit nisi causa activa, vel faciens objectum in actu suo, vel virtute cujus objectum movet, vel utrumque.
Ista igitur duplex causalitas intellectus divini, quod est vera lux increata, videlicet quae producit objecta secundaria in esse intelligibili, et quod est illud virtute cujus secundaria etiam objecta producta movent actualiter intellectum, potest quasi integrare unum tertium modum vel membrum propter quod dicamur vere videre in luce aeterna.
Et si objiciatur contra istos duos modos integrantes tertium membrum de causa, quia tunc magis videtur quod diceremur videre in Deo volente, vel in Deo ut voluntas est, quia voluntas divina est immediatum principium cujuslibet actus ad extra, respondeo : intellectus divinus inquantum aliquo modo prior actu voluntatis divinae producit ista objecta in esse intelligibili, et ita respectu istorum videtur esse causa mere naturalis, quia Deus non est causa libera respectu alicujus nisi quod praesupponit ante se aliquo modo voluntatem sive actum voluntatis, et sicut intellectus ut prior actu voluntatis producit objecta in esse intelligibili, ita ut prior causa videtur cooperari illis intelligibilibus ad effectum eorum naturalem, scilicet ut apprehensa et composita causent apprehensionis conformitatem ad se.
Videtur ergo quod contradictionem includit intellectum aliquem talem compositionem formare et compositionem non esse con-
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
it is through their intelligible content that they afterward move the intellect to certain knowledge.
And, properly speaking, it could be said that our intellect sees in the Light, because the Light is the cause of the object.
This is clear from a simile: for we are said to understand properly in the light of the active intellect, although this light is nothing more than the active cause (i.e., that which makes the [potential] object actual, or that in virtue of which the object moves, or both).
The fact then that the divine intellect, the true Uncreated Light, has a twofold causality (viz. that it produces objects in intelligible being and that it is also that in virtue of which the secondary objects produced actually move the intellect)—this fact can supply as it were a third type or mode of interpretation as to how we can be said to see truly in the Eternal Light.
But suppose someone should object to these two ways of supplying a third interpretation on the following grounds. We should rather be said to see in God willing or in God in so far as He is will, for the divine will is the immediate principle of every act directed towards something outside Himself.
I reply that the divine intellect, as far as it is in some way prior to the act of the divine will,?® produces these objects in intelligible being, and thus the intellect seems to be a purely natural cause in their regard.
For God is not a free cause of anything unless volition as an elicited act somehow precedes the thing in question.
Now, inasmuch as the intellect produces objects in intelligible being prior to the act of the will, it would seem to co-operate as a prior cause with these intelligibles in the production of their natural effect—which effect consists in this: Once these intelligibles are grasped and formulated in a proposition they cause the conformity of what is grasped
[viz. the proposition] to themselves [as terms].
Consequently, it seems to involve a contradiction that an intellect should form such a proposition and still not (2,322)
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formem terminis, licet possibile sit illos terminos non componere vel non concipere.
Quia licet Deus voluntarie coagat ad hoc quod intellectus terminos componat vel non componat, tamen cum composuerit, ut illa compositio sit conformis terminis, hoc videtur necessario sequi rationem terminorum quam habent ex intellectu
Dei causante illos terminos in esse intelligibili naturaliter.
Et ex isto apparet qualiter non est necessaria specialis illustratio ad videndum in regulis aeternis, quia Augustinus non ponit in eis videri nisi vera quae sunt necessaria ex vi terminorum, et in talibus est maxima (naturalitas vel) necessitas tam causae remotae quam proximae respectu effectus, puta tam intellectus divini ad objecta moventia quam illorum objectorum ad veritatem complexionis de eis, et etiam licet non tanta sit (naturalitas vel) necessitas ad perceptionem (alius vel) alicujus veritatis quod oppositum contradictionem includat, tamen
(naturalitas vel) necessitas est a parte causae proximae coassistente sibi causa remota, quia termini apprehensi et compositi sunt nati naturaliter causare evidentiam conformitatis compositionis ad terminos etsi ponatur quod
Deus coagat terminis ad hunc effectum influentia generali, non tamen necessitate naturali.
Sed sive sit influentia generalis sive quod plus est necessitas naturalis influendi terminis ad hunc effectum, patet quod non requiritur illustratio specialis.
Assumptum de intentione Augustini patet per ipsum
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
have this proposition conform to the terms even though it is possible that the intellect should not grasp the terms or formulate them in a proposition.
For even though God freely co-operates with the intellect when it combines or does not combine these terms, still once the terms have been formed into a proposition, the conformity of the latter with the terms seems to follow as a necessary consequence from the very meaning of the terms—a meaning which they have by reason of the fact that the intellect of God has naturally produced these terms in intelligible being.
From all this, it is clear why a special illumination is not required in order to see in the eternal reasons, for Augustine assumes that we see in them only such truths as are necessary in virtue of their terms.
Now it is in just such truths that we have the greatest necessity between the effect and both its proximate and remote causes (that is, both on the part of the divine intellect in its relation to the objects which move [our intellect] and on the part of the objects in relation to the truth of the propositions about them).
Even though the necessity of perceiving such a truth is not so great that not to perceive it would include a contradiction, still there is a necessity present which arises from the proximate cause [viz. the intelligibility of the terms] assisted by the remote cause [viz. the divine intellect which gives such ideas their intelligibility].
For once the terms are grasped and formed into a proposition, they are naturally able to make evident the conformity that exists between the proposition and its terms even though it be granted that God co-operates with these terms in producing their effect, not by a natural necessity, but by a general [free] influence.
But whether it be by a general influence, or what is more, by a natural necessity, that God co-operates with the terms in producing their effect, it is quite clear that no special illumination is required.
The assumption as to what Augustine meant is clearly
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1v De Trinitate, cap. xxxv,* loquitur de philosophis dicens nonnulli eorum poterunt aciem mentis ultra omnem creaturam levare et lucem incommutabilis veritatis quantulacumque ex parte attingere qui Christianos multos ex sola fide viventes nondum posse derident.
Ergo vult quod Christiani credita non viderunt in regulis aeternis, sed philosophi vident in illis necessaria multa.
Idem etiam 1x De Trinitate, cap. vi t : Non qualis uniuscujusque hominis mens, etc., quasi diceret contingentia non videntur ibi, sed necessaria et in eodem Iv, capitulo xxxvit arguit contra istos philosophos, numquid quia verissime disputant aeternis rationibus omnia temporaliter fieri propter ea, poterunt in ipsis rationibus aspicere quot sunt animalium genera, quot semina singulorum in exordiis, etc.
Nonne ista omnia non per illam incommutabilem scientiam, sed per locorum ac temporum institutionem quaesierunt et ab aliis experta atque conscripta crediderunt.
Ergo intelligit quod per regulas aeternas non cognoscuntur illa contingentia quae tantum per sensus cognoscuntur, vel per historias creduntur, et tamen specialis illustratio magis requiritur in credendis quam in cognitis necessariis.
Immo, ibi maxime removetur illustratio specialis et sufficit sola generalis.
Contra:
Quid igitur dicit Augustinus xm De Trinitate, cap. xiv ** : quod paucorum est mentis acie pervenire ad rationes intelligibiles, et Octaginta tres quaestionum, quaestio xlvi tf : nonnisi purae animae ad illas pertingunt.
Respondeo:
Ista puritas non debet intelligi a vitiis, quia x1v De Trinitate, cap. xv,tt vult quod justus videt in regulis aeternis quid justum faciendum sit vel quid in his
* tv, cap. xv (Migne, P.L., xi, go2). t rx, cap. vi (Migne, P.L., xm, 966). ft tv, cap. xvi (Migne, P.L., xi, go2).
* x1, cap. xiv (Migne, P.L., xLu, 1010).
* TT q. xlvi (Migne, P.L., x1, 30). t{ XIV, cap. xv (Migne, P.L., xtu, 1052).
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
justified by what he says of the infidel philosophers in De Trinitate, BK. Iv, c. xxxv* : 'Some of them have been able to see through and beyond all creation and with their mind's eye to reach at least in some degree the light of immutable truth, a thing which they ridicule many
Christians, who live meanwhile by faith alone, for not being able to do'.
He wishes to say, therefore, that Christians do not see in the eternal rules the things they believe and yet the philosophers see many necessary truths therein.
And the same with De Trinitate, BK. 1x, c. vif : "Not of what sort the mind of one particular man happens to be, etc."'—as if he were to say : ''It is not contingent but necessary truths that are seen there'.
And in the same work he argues against those philosophers:
"Just because they argue most truly that all that happens in time takes place on account of eternal reasons, are they therefore able to perceive therein how many kinds of animals exist or how many seeds of each there were in the beginning, and soon.
._ Have they not sought all these things not by that unchangeable knowledge, but by the history of places and times, and have they not believed the written experience of others?"
Consequently, he means that contingent truths known by the senses alone or believed on the account of others are not known through the eternal rules. And yet special illumination is required even more for what must be believed than for necessary truths.
Indeed, this special illumination is least needed in the case of the latter ; general illumination alone suffices.
On the contrary, Why then does Augustine say in De Trinitate, BK. xu, c. xiv: "It is only for the few to attain the intelligible reasons with their mind's eye"', and in the Eighty-three Questions, q. xlvi:
"Only the pure of soul reach them"?
I reply that he does not mean by this purity a freedom from vices, for in De Trinitate, BK. XIV, c. xv, he holds that the unjust man sees in the eternal rules what a just man must do and how he must regard
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sentiendum sit. Et 1v libro cap. praeallegato,* vult quod plures non vident veritatem in regulis aeternis sine fide.
Et quaestione eadem,t vult quod nullus potest esse sapiens sine cognitione idearum, eo modo quo Platonem concederent forsan sapientem esse.
Sed ista puritas debet intelligi elevando intellectum ad considerandum veritates ut relucent in se, non tantum ut relucent in phantasmate.
Ubi considerandum est quod res sensibilis extra causat phantasma confusum et unum per accidens in virtute phantantica, repraesentans scilicet rem secundum quantitatem, secundum figuram, et colorem, et alia accidentia sensibilia.
Et sicut phantasma repraesentat tantum confuse et per accidens, ita multi percipiunt tantum ens per accidens.
Veritates autem primae sunt praecise tales ex propria ratione terminorum in quantum illi termini abstrahuntur ab omnibus per accidens conjunctis cum eis. Non enim haec propositio : Omne totum est majus sua parte, primo vera est ut totum est in lapide vel ligno, sed ut totum abstrahitur ab omnibus quibus conjungitur per accidens.
Et ideo intellectus qui numquam intelligit totalitatem nisi in conceptu per accidens, puta in totalitate lapidis vel ligni, numquam intelligit sinceram veritatem hujus principii, quia numquam intelligit praecisam rationem termini per quam est veritas.
Paucorum ergo est pertingere ad rationes aeternas, quia paucorum est habere intellectiones per se et multorum est habere conceptus tales per accidens.
Sed isti pauci non dicuntur distingui ab aliis proter specialem illustrationem sed vel propter meliora naturalia, quia habent intellectum magis abstrahentem et magis perspicacem, vel propter majorem
* Iv, cap. xvi (Migne, P.L., xi, go2). je leos cit.
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
things in their light.
And in the fourth book, in the chapter cited above, he maintains that the philosophers saw truth in the eternal reasons even though they lacked faith.
And in the same question, he holds that no one can be wise without a knowledge of the ideas in the way, for instance, that they would concede
Plato to be wise.
But this purity must be understood of the elevation of the intellect to the contemplation of these truths as they are in themselves and not as they appear in the sense image.
Here we must remember that the sensible thing outside causes a confused sense image, something with only an incidental unity in the faculty of imagination, which represents the thing according to its quantity, colour and other sensible accidents.
And just as the sense image represents things only confusedly and according to an incidental unity, so many perceive only such incidental combinations.
Now, primary truths are primary precisely because their terms are grasped in their proper nature and apart from all that is merely incidental to them. Now this proposition, "The whole is greater than its part", is not primarily true of the whole as realised in a stone or in wood, but of ''whole" in the abstract, i.e. apart from everything with which it merely happens to be joined.
Consequently, the mind which never conceives totality except in an incidental concept such as the totality of a stone or the totality of wood, never really understands the pure truth of this principle, because it never grasps the precise nature of the terms to which the principle owes its truth.
It is only within the power of the few to attain the eternal reasons, because it is only the few that have an understanding of the essentials, whereas the many grasp things merely in incidental concepts such as those mentioned above.
But these few are not said to be distinguished from the others by a special illumination, but by better natural powers, since they have a sharper and more abstractive mind, or be-
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inquisitionem per quam aeque ingeniosus pervenit ad cognoscendum illas quidditates quae alius non inquirens, non cognoscit.
Et isto modo intelligitur illud Augustini mx De Trintate, cap. vi,* de vidente in monte et vidente inferius aerem nubilosum et superius lucem sinceram.
Qui enim tantum intelligit semper conceptus per accidens eo modo quo phantasma repraesentat objecta talia quasi entia per accidens, ipse est quasi in valle circumdatus aere nebuloso.
Sed qui separat quidditates intelligendo praecise eas conceptu per se quae tamen relucent in phantasmate cum multis aliis accidentibus adjunctis, ipse habet phantasma inferius quasi aerem nebulosum, et ipse est in monte inquantum cognoscit illam veritatem et videt verum supra ut illam veritatem superiorem in virtute intellectus increati, quae est lux aeterna.
[Quarta Via].
Ultimo modo potest concedi quod cognoscuntur veritates sincerae in luce aeterna sicut in objecto remoto cognito, quia lux increata est primum principium entium speculabilium et ultimus finis rerum practicarum et ideo ab ipso sumuntur principia prima tam speculabilia quam practica.
Et ideo cognitio entium tam speculabilium quam practicabilium per principia sumpta a luce aeterna ut cognita est perfectior et prior cognitione sumpta per principia in genere proprio sicut dictum est in quaestione illa de subjecto theologiae, et est eminentior alia quacumque.
Et hoc modo cognitio omnium pertinet ad theologum.
Hoc modo sincera veritas cognosci dicitur quia per illud cognoscitur quod est tantum veritas non habens aliquid permixtum non veritatis quia per primum ens, a quo cognito sumuntur principia sic cognoscendi ; aliud autem quodcumque a * 1x, cap. vi (Migne, P.L., xu, 966).
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
cause of greater research which enables one person to know those essences which another equally talented individual does not discover because he does not investigate them.
And in this way we can understand Augustine's statement in De Trinitate, BK. 1x, c. vi,* regarding the individual on the mountain who sees the pure light above and the mist below.
For whoever grasps nothing but incidental notions in the way that the sense image represents such objects, viz. as a kind of accidental aggregate, is like one in a valley surrounded by mist.
But by grasping just what things are of themselves, a person separates the essences from the many additional incidental features associated with them in the sense image.
Such a one, as it were, has the sense image in the mist beneath him, but he himself is on the mountain to the extent that in virtue of the uncreated intellect, the Eternal Light, he knows this truth and sees what is true from above, as a more universal truth.
[The Fourth Way]. And finally, we can concede that pure truths are known in the Eternal Light as in a remotely known object.
For the Uncreated Light is the first source of speculative things and the ultimate end of practical things.
The first speculative and practical principles, then, are derived from it.
Hence, the knowledge of speculative and practical things by means of principles derived from the Eternal Light, where the latter is known,*° is more perfect and prior to knowledge derived from principles from the respective class of things as such, as has been pointed out in the question on the subject of theology.
Such knowledge is more eminent than any other. Now it is in this way that the knowledge of all things pertains to the theologian.
In this way pure truth is said to be known, since truth alone without admixture of anything else is known, for it is known through the First Being.
And once this Being is known, the principles for knowing in this perfect way are derived
DUNS SCOTUS
quo sumuntur principia cognoscendi in genere est verum defectivum.
Hoc modo solus Deus cognoscit omnia sincere quia ut dictum est in quaestione de subjecto theologiae,* solus ipse novit omnia praecise per essentiam suam.
Omnis autem intellectus moveri potest ab objecto alio ad cognoscendum veritatem aliquam virtute ejus.
Et hoc modo cognitio omnium pertinet ad theologum, sicut dictum est in quaestione illa de subjecto theologiae, et est eminentior alia quaecumque.
Cognoscere enim triangulum habere tres ut est quaedam participatio Dei et habens talem ordinem in universo quod quasi perfectius exprimit perfectionem
Dei, hoc est nobiliori modo cognoscere triangulum habere tres quam per rationem trianguli.
Et ita cognoscere quod temperate vivendum est propter beatitudinem ultimam consequendam quae est attingendo essentiam Dei in se, perfectius est cognoscere istud cognoscibile practicum quam per principium aliquod in genere moris, puta per hoc quod honeste vivendum est.
Et isto modo loquitur Augustinus de luce increata ut cognita xv De Trinitate, cap. xxvii, ubi seipsum alloquens ait : Multa vera vidisti et ea quae discrevisti ab ista luce qua tibi lucente vidisti ; attolle oculos ad ipsam lucem et eos in ea infige si potes ; sic enim videbis quomodo distat nativitas Verbi Dei a processione Doni Dei.
Et paulo post:
Haec et alia oculis tuis interioribus lux ista (monstrabit vel) monstravit.
Quae est ergo causa cur acie fixa ipsam videre non poteris nisi utique infirmitas, etc.
* Opus oxoniense, prol. q. iii. t xv, cap. xxvii (Migne, P.L., xi, 1097).
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
therefrom.
But any other thing from which principles of knowing something in kind are derived is defective truth.
Only God knows all things purely in this perfect way, for as we have said in the question on the subject of theology,* He alone knows all things precisely through His essence.
Nevertheless, every intellect can be moved by some object to know that something is true in virtue of Him, and in this way the knowledge of all things pertains to the theologian, as has been said in the question on the subject of theology.
For to know that a triangle has three [angles equal to two right angles], in so far as this is a kind of participation of God and that it has such an order in the universe that it expresses more perfectly as it were the perfection of God,31—this is a nobler way of knowing a triangle has three [angles, etc.] than to know this truth from the notion of a triangle itself.
Similarly, to know that one should live temperately in order to attain the supreme happiness, which consists in attaining the essence of God in Himself, is a more perfect way of knowing this practical truth than to be aware of it through some principle in the class of mores, for instance, through the principle that one is obliged to live uprightly.
And in this manner Augustine speaks of the Uncreated Light as known in De Trinitate, BK. xv, c. xxvii,t where addressing himself, he says:
"You have seen many things and these you have discerned through that Light in which you saw them shining forth to you.
Turn your eyes to the Light itself and fasten them upon it, if you can, for in this way you will see how the nativity of the Word of God differs from the procession of the Gift of God." And a little later : 'This and other things this Light has revealed to your inner eyes.
What then is the reason with fixed glance you are unable to see the Light itself, if it is not indeed your weakness?
. ."
DUNS SCOTUS
[Ad Argumenta Principalia] Ex dictis patet ad omnes auctoritates Augustini ad oppositum ; et secundum aliquem dictorum modorum
'' videndi in"? exponi possunt auctoritates Augustini quae occurrunt de ista materia. i [Articulus Sextus.
Quomodo rationes Henrict concludunt].
De sexto articulo videndum est quomodo tres rationes factae pro prima opinione aliquid verum concludunt in quantum accipiuntur ab Augustino, licet non concludant illam conclusionem falsam ad quam inducuntur.
Ubi sciendum est [quod a sensibilibus, sicut a causa per se et principali, non est expectanda sincera veritas ; quia notitia sensus est circa aliquid per accidens, ut dictum fuit, licet actus sensuum aliqui sint certi vel veri ; sed virtute intellectus agentis, qui est participatio lucis increatae, illustrantis super phantasmata, cognoscitur quidditas rei, et ex hoc habetur sinceritas vera.
Et per hoc solvitur primum argumentum Henrici; et secundum intentionem Augustini non plus concludit.
Ad secundam rationem Henrici dico quod anima mutabilis est ab uno actu disparato ad alium, secundum diversitatem objectorum, propter suam illimitationem et immaterialitatem, quia est respectu cujuslibet entis ; similiter ab actu in non actum, quia non semper est in actu; sed respectu primorum principiorum, quorum veritas nota est ex terminis, et conclusionum evidenter deductarum ex terminis, non est mutabilis a contrario in contrarium, scilicet a vero in falsum.
Regulae enim in lumine intellectus agentis intellectum rectificant, et
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning] From all that has been said, it is clear how the citations from Augustine to the contrary are to be interpreted.
The texts of Augustine concerning this matter can also be explained in terms of one of the aforementioned ways of seeing.
[Article VI.
To What Extent Henry's Arguments Hold].
As to the sixth article, we must see how the three reasons adduced in favour of the first opinion in so far as they are taken from Augustine do prove some truth, although they do not establish that false conclusion for which they were advanced.
Here we must recognise *° that we should not expect pure truth from sensible things as from a primary and essential cause, for sense knowledge has to do with something incidental, as we have pointed out,*4 even though some of the acts of the senses are certain and true.
But the essences of things are known in virtue of the active intellect, a participation of the Uncreated Light, which illumines the imagination and in this way true purity [of truth] results.
In this fashion, the first argument of Henry is solved. And according to the mind of Augustine, it proves nothing more.
To the second reason of Henry, I say that the soul can change in the sense that it has now one act, now another, accordingly as objects differ.
For the soul is not material and is unlimited in the sense that it can know and love anything whatsoever.® Likewise, it can be active or inactive, for it is not always in act.
But with regard to the first principles the truth of which is known from their terms, or with regard to conclusions evidently deduced from the terms, the soul cannot change from one contrary state to another, i.e. from truth to falsity.
For rules %6 known in the light of the agent intellect keep the mind from erring, and even though the intelligible species
DUNS SCOTUS
ipsa species intelligibilis terminorum, licet in essendo sit mutabilis, in repraesentando tamen in lumine intellectus agentis immutabiliter repraesentat, et per duas species intelligibiles cognoscuntur termini primi principii, et ita illa unio est vera et certa evidenter.
Ad tertium dicendum quod concludit contra eum, quia non ponit nisi speciem sensibilem vel phantasma ; non autem concludit de specie intelligibili repraesentante quidditatem.
Dicendum autem, quod si potentiae sensitivae non sunt impeditae, species sensibilis veraciter repraesentat rem ; sed in somno potentiae sensuum exteriorum sunt ligatae, ideo virtus imaginativa, conservans species sensibiles, secundum diversitatem fluxus humorum capitis, apprehendit eas tamquam res quarum sunt similitudines, quia vim rerum habent, secundum Philosophum, De motibus animalium.* Non plus concludit tertia ratio.] * cap. vii (701%, 20).
CONCERNING HUMAN KNOWLEDGE
of the terms is mutable in its being, still in representing in the light of the agent intellect, the intelligible species represents things in an immutable way, and the terms of a first principle are known by two intelligible species and consequently the union [of the terms in a proposition] is true and evidently certain.
As for [Henry's] third argument, we must point out that it is telling against his own position, since he admits of no species other than the sense image or sensible species.
But the argument is not effective where an intelligible species is held to represent the essence.
However, it must be admitted that if the sensitive powers are not impeded, the sensible species truly represents the things.
In sleep, however, the powers of the external senses are bound.
Wherefore, the imaginative power, conserving the sensible species according to the different movement of humours in the head, apprehends those species as the things themselves of which they are but likenesses, for they have the force of things, according to the Philosopher in De motibus animalium.*
The third reason proves no more than this.
— e ae IwoaswuN eee CET IEES
epiereytey rend ew gyi ae oem careers wi egitim ody uoetald i os '
Ee oft 04 oe ager prin gem ni ee mien tu Puan ie oma sig "tals et Dive are setae m, yen ru 'ate sai sie ad oo og aeaee a 'teeta iey wie bei aa are Recetas
THE SPIRITUALITY
AND IMMORTALITY OF
THE HUMAN SOUL
Summary of the Argument Question : Can it be known by natural reason that there will be a general resurrection of mankind ?
Pro ET CONTRA Bopy OF THE QUESTION Part I. A kind of a priori proof of the resurrection
Method of procedure First proposition:
The intellective soul is the specific form of man Proof based on testimony of philosophers
Proof from reason:
(1) An unsatisfactory formulation; (2) Scotus's formulation—(a) proof of the antecedent ; (5) proof of the consequent
Second proposition: The intellective soul is immortal Arguments for immortality Arguments against immortality Scotus's opinion Reply to the arguments for immortality Third proposition: The human soul will not remain outside the body forever Arguments for a resurrection Scotus's opinion Reply to the arguments Evaluation of the a priori proof Part II.
The a posteriori proofs of the resurrection Evaluation of the a posteriori arguments
Part III.
Solution to the Question
REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS AT THE BEGINNING
(2,322)
DUNS SCOTUS
[VI. DE SPIRITUALITATE
ET IMMORTALITATE ANIMAE
HUMANAE| *
Quaero utrum possit esse notum per rationem naturalem resurrectionem generalem hominum esse futuram ?
[Pro et Contra] Quod sic :
Desiderium naturale non potest esse frustra, Commentator secundo Metaphysicae.t Sed homo habet desiderium naturale ad semper essendum et istud desiderium potest esse notum ratione naturali; ergo, etc.
Probatio minoris : quia non fugitur aliquid naturaliter nisi virtute naturalis desiderii vel amoris ad aliud ; sed naturaliter homo fugit mortem.
Hoc patet per experientiam. Patet etiam per Apostolum ad Corinthios ¢ :
Nolumus expoliari sed supervestiri.
Item, naturaliter notum est quod beatitudo naturaliter appetitur.
Hoc patet ex primo Ethicorum** de beatitudine in generali, et ex decimoft de beatitudine in speciali.
Sed notum est per rationem naturalem, beatitudinem non posse esse nisi sempiternam ; ergo notum est per rationem naturalem hominem esse ordinatum ad perfectionem aliquam sempiternam.
Probatio minoris :
Augustinus xu De Trinitate, cap. viii,tt probat illud per rationem sic:
Morientem vita ipsa deserit, si beata ; aut ergo nolentem deserit aut volentem, aut neutrum.
* Opus oxoniense, Iv, dist. xLim, q. ii (Assisi 137, f. 259Vv0—-261r? ; cf. Vives, VOL. xx, 347-59).
+ Averroes, Metaphysica, 1, com. 1. t m Cor. v. 4.
** Ethica Nicomachea, 1, cap. vii (10979, 1ff.), x, cap. vii-viii (1177%, 128s).
TT X, cap. vii-vili (1177%, 12ff.). tt xm, cap. viii (Migne, P.L., xiu, 1022),