VI The Spirituality and Immortality of the
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
[VI. THE sPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE
HUMAN SOUL]
I ask : Can it be known by natural reason that there will be a general resurrection of mankind ?
[Pro et Contra] Proof that it can be known! :
{Arg. 1]. A natural desire cannot be in vain.t Man, however, has a natural desire to live forever, and it can be known by natural reason that such a desire exists.
Therefore, etc.
Proof of the minor:
Where a natural aversion for something exists, it is only because of a natural desire or love for something else.
But man has a natural aversion for death.
This is evident both from experience and from what the Apostle says to the Corinthianst:
''We do not wish to be unclothed, but rather clothed over''.
[Arg. u].
Also, it is naturally known that we seek happiness by our very nature.
This is clear from Nicomachean Ethics, Bk. 1,** with regard to beatitude in general and from Nicomachean Ethics, BK. x,{ f for beatitude in particular.
But from natural reason it is known that beatitude must be eternal.
Hence, it is known from natural reason that man is ordained to some eternal perfection.
Proof of the minor : Augustine {{ proves it thus:
'And if life quits him by his dying, how cana blessed life remain with him?
And when it quits him, without doubt it either quits him unwillingly, or willingly
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Si nolentem, quomodo est vita beata, quae ita est in voluntate, quod non sit in potestate ? Si autem volentem, quomodo beata vita erit quam finire voluit qui habebat ?
Si dicas quod neutrum, nec velle, nec nolle, sed nec illa beata est vita quae talis est ut quem beatum facit amore ejus indigna sit.
Item, naturaliter notum est quod tota species non caret fine suo, quin illum in aliquo individuo consequatur.
Sed naturaliter notum est beatitudinem esse finem speciei humanae ; ergo et hominem posse consequi illam saltem in aliquo individuo ; sed non potest eam consequi in ista vita propter multas miserias quae concomitantur vitam istam utpote varietas fortunae, infirmitas corporis, imperfectio scientiae et virtutis, et instabilitas et fatigatio in exercendo actus perfectionis, in tantum ut nulla operatio, quantumcumque in principio delectabilis, possit continue esse delectabilis, imo per ipsam fastidiendo delectabile erit cessare ab ipsa ; et notum est per rationem naturalem operationem beatificam non esse fastidiosam, nec potest a sola anima separata haberi, quia in hoc homo non consequeretur finem suum ; -ergo habebitur in alia vita a toto conjuncto, et per consequens ad minus videtur per rationem naturalem concludi in quibus homo ad finem suum pertinget.
Item, per rationem naturalem notum est quod omnis species quae est de integritate universi, est perpetua, quia totum integrum est perpetuum; sed homo est species perfectissima, saltem inter ista inferiora.
Nos enim aliquo modo sumus finis omnium, secundo Physicorum.* Ergo, etc.
* m1, cap. ii (194", 35)
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
or neither.
If unwillingly, how is the life blessed which is so within his will as not to be within his power? And whereas no one is blessed who wills something that he does not have, how much less is he blessed who is quitted against his will, not by honour, nor by possessions, nor by any other thing, but by the blessed life itself, since he will have no life at all.
But neither is that a blessed life which is such as to be unworthy of his love whom it makes blessed''.
[Arg. m1].
Furthermore, it is known naturally that an entire species cannot fail to attain its end.
At least the end must be achieved in some individuals.
But it is naturally known that beatitude is the end of the human species.
Therefore, it is naturally known that at least some individual can attain it.
But he cannot attain it in this life because of the many concomitant miseries such as the vicissitudes of fortune, bodily infirmity, imperfect knowledge and virtue, instability and fatigue in the exercise of even the most perfect acts, inasmuch as no operation, be it ever so delightful in the beginning, can continue to be delightful.
Furthermore, when such an operation causes what is delightful to become distasteful, it will no longer be performed.
Now it is known by natural reason that the beatific vision is not something distasteful.
Neither is it something that the soul can possess alone in separation from the body, for in this way man would not attain his goal. Consequently, this end will be attained in another life by the whole man, body and soul together.
It seems, then, that natural reason can reach this conclusion at least in regard to those ways by which man will attain his end.
[Arg. 1v].
Furthermore, by natural reason it is known that every species required for the integrity of the universe, is eternal.
For the universe as an integral whole is eternal.
Now man is the most perfect species, at least among terrestrial beings, for, Physics, Bk. 1,* ""we are in some way the end of all things".
Therefore, etc.
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Oppositum :
Augustinus, xu De Trinitate, cap. ix,* loquens de vita immortali vel sempiterna dicit:
Hac utrum careat humana natura, nec parva questio est.
Humanis quippe argumentationibus hanc invenire conantes, vix pauci, magno praediti ingenio, vacantes otio, doctrinisque subtilissimis eruditi, ad indagandam solius animae immortalitatem pervenire potuerunt.
Item, Act. xvii,f dicitur de quibusdam Atheniensibus audientibus Paulum, qui dicebant quoniam novorum daemoniorum videbatur annuntiator esse, quia Jesum et resurrectionem annuntiabat eis ; et tamen illi Athenienses erant philosophi, multum vigentes ratione naturali; patet de Dionysio converso, qui fuit unus eorum ; ergo istud quod videbatur eis ita remotum a veritate, non videtur esse bene notum per rationem naturalem ; unde omnia quae adducit ibi Paulus, non sunt nisi quaedam persuasiones ut patet ibi.
Item, Act. xxvi,f cum diceret Paulus:
Si passibilis Christus, si primus ex resurrectione, etc.
Festus magna voce dixit : Insanis, Paule.
{Corpus Quaestionis] [Pars Prima : Ratio quodammodo a priori] Hic manifestum est quod si aliqua ratio ostendat resurrectionem, oportet quod accipiatur ex aliquo, quod est proprium hominis, ita quod non conveniat aliis corruptibilibus.
Hoc autem non est materia etiam incorruptibilis, nec forma aliqua destructibilis, quia etsi talis sit in homine, et excellentior omni forma bruti, tamen ex
* xm, cap. ix (Migne, P.L., xin, 1023). t Acts, xv. 18. t loc. cit. xxv1. 23-24.
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
To the contrary :
[Arg. 1]. Augustine, speaking of the life that is eternal and immortal in De Trinitate BK. xm, c. ix,* says:
"Whether human nature can receive this... is no small question...
Assuredly, of those who endeavour to discover it from human reasonings, scarcely a few, and they endowed with great abilities and abounding in leisure, and learned with the most subtle learning, have been able to attain to the investigation of the immortality of the soul alone''.
[Arg. 1]. Furthermore, in Acts xvii, it is related that certain Athenians listening to Paul said:
'' 'He seems to be a herald of strange gods', because he proclaimed to them Jesus and the resurrection".
Nevertheless, these Athenians were philosophers whose forte was the use of natural reason, as is clear from the case of the convert
Dionysius, who was one of them.
But it does not seem that what appeared to them to be so far from the truth is known adequately by natural reason.
Hence, it is evident here that what Paul adduces in this connexion is meant to be nothing more than a kind of persuasive form of argumentation.
[Arg. m1]. Furthermore, when Paul said in Acts xxvi,t "that Christ was to suffer, that he first by his resurrection [from the dead was to proclaim light to the people and to the Gentiles .
. .] Festus said with a loud voice, 'Paul, thou art mad !' "
[Body of the Question] [Part I. A Kind of A Priori Proof] This much is clear, if any argument proves the resurrection, it must be one based on something that is proper to man and does not belong to other perishable things.
But such a thing would not be matter, not even incorruptible matter.2 Neither is it some form that can be destroyed.
For even if such a form exist in man and
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illa non potest sumi ratio sufficiens ad probandum resurrectionem totius ; ergo oportet quod accipiatur a forma specifica hominis vel ab operatione conveniente homini secundum illam formam.
Isto modo procedente ex tribus propositionibus concluditur propositum, et si omnes illae essent ratione naturali notae, haberemus propositum.
Sunt autem istae : "Anima intellectiva est forma specifica hominis" ; secunda, "Anima intellectiva est incorruptibilis" ; ex quibus sequitur quod forma specifica hominis est incorruptibilis.
Additur tertia, quod "forma hominis specifica non remanebit perpetuo extra suum totum" ; sequitur ergo quod aliquando redibit totum idem.
Ista reditio iterata, vocatur resurrectio secundum Damascenum lib.
IV, cap. xix*: Resurrectio secunda est ejus, quod dissolutum est, surrectio.
De istis tribus propositionibus, qualiter notae sunt, videamus per ordinem.
[Propositio I, Anima intellectiva est forma specifica hominis].
De prima dicitur quod est ratione naturali nota, quod ostenditur dupliciter : uno modo per auctoritates Philosophorum, qui hoc asserebant, et nonnisi tanquam ratione naturali notum ; alio modo adducendo rationes naturales, ex quibus hoc concluditur.
De primo:
Aristoteles definit animam uu De anima,t quod est actus corporis physici, organici, etc.
Et in principio tertii,{ dicit de parte autem animae, qua cognoscit et sapit, ubi videtur ponere animam intellectivam partem saltem subjectivam animae prius definitae in communi.
Item, omnes philosophi tamquam differentiam ejus propriam communiter posuerunt in definitione hominis
* De fide orthodoxa, tv, cap. xxvi (Migne, P.G., xctv, 1220).
T UL, cap. i (412%, 28). t m, cap. iv (429%, 10).
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
indeed, one even more excellent than any brute form, still this would not provide an adequate argument for the resurrection of man asa whole.
Hence, the argument must be based upon that form which is specific to man or upon some operation which man enjoys by reason of this form.
[Method of Procedure].
The method used to establish the thesis is to proceed from three propositions.
If all three of these can be known by natural reason, the proposed conclusion will follow.
The three propositions are these : (1) The intellective soul is the specific form of man ;
(2) The intellective soul is incorruptible.
From these two it follows that the specific form of man is incorruptible.
To these a third is added:
(3) The specific form of man will not remain forever outside the composite.
Hence it follows that at some time the same composite will be restored.
This second return Damascene calls the resurrection* : "The resurrection is the second rising of what has been dissolved''.
Let us consider these three propositions in order and see to what extent they are evident.
[First Proposition.
The intellective soul is the specific form of man].
'This first proposition is said to be known by natural reason and is proved in two ways.
'The first proof is based upon the testimony of philosophers who assert this as something known by natural reason alone.
The other proceeds from natural arguments which lead to this conclusion.
[Proof based on the testimony of the philosophers].
As to the first, Aristotle defines the soul in the De anima, BK. I1,{ as "'the act of the natural organised body"', and so on.
And in the beginning of BK. m,{ he speaks of ''the part of the soul with which the soul knows and thinks .
. .", where he seems to make the intellective soul at least a subjective part, of what he has previously defined as the soul in general.
Furthermore, all philosophers commonly assign "rational" as the difference that properly defines man,
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rationale, per rationale intelligentes animam intellectivam esse partem essentialem ejus.
Nec breviter invenitur aliquis philosophus notabilis, qui hoc neget, licet ille maledictus Averroes in fictione sua m1 De anima,* quae tamen non est intelligibilis, nec sibi, nec alii, ponat intellectivam quamdam substantiam separatam mediantibus phantasmatibus conjunctam ; quam conjunctionem nec ipse nec aliquis sequax potuit explicare, nec per illam conjunctionem salvare hominem intelligere.
Nam secundum ipsum homo formaliter non esset nisi quoddam animal irrationale excellens, per quandam tamen animam irrationalem et sensitivam excellentiorem aliis animabus.
De secundo: ad propositum non invenitur faciliter ratio a priori neque a posteriori, nisi ex propria operatione hominis, siquidem forma innotescit ex propria operatione, sicut materia ex transmutatione.
[1. Ratio Inadaequata].
Ex operatione ergo intelligendi arguitur propositum sic: intelligere est propria operatio hominis ; ergo egreditur a propria forma ; ergo intellectiva est propria forma hominis.
Sed ista ratio patitur instantiam quia intellectus ad intelligere se habet secundum eos tantum passive, et non active ; ergo ista propositio, propria operatio est a propria forma, non probat intellectivam esse propriam formam hominis, siquidem ab ipsa non est ista operatio secundum eos, sed ab objecto intelligibili vel secundum aliquos a phantasmate.
[2. Ratio Scott].
Ideo ex illa opinione, formo * iI, com. 5.
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
meaning by "rational" that the intellective soul is an essential part of man.
In fact, to put it briefly, no philosopher of any note can be found to deny this except that accursed Averroes in his commentary on De anima, BK. m1,* where his fantastic conception, intelligible neither to himself nor to others, assumes the intellective part_of man to be a sort of separate substance united to man through the medium of sense-images. But neither he nor his followers to the present day have been able to explain this union.
Nor can it be maintained that in virtue of such a union man himself understands, for according to him, man as such is nothing more than a kind of irrational animal which excels the other animals by reason of an irrational sensitive soul that is more excellent than other souls.
[Proof from reason].
As to the second, it is not easy to find either an a priori or an a posteriort argument, unless it be{based_on a function \proper to man, for the form is known from its proper function, even as matter is known from the existence of change. or Ane Unsakigaciowy Formulation).
One argument 4 based on the function of the intellect that is used to establish the proposed conclusion is this. To understand is a function proper to man.
Therefore, it has its source . in the form proper to man. The intellective fc form then is that proper to man.
Awe This argument, however, is open to criticism inasmuch as those who propound it admit that the in only a passive jand not annie revere atoutechiutcllertinad
Hence, this proposition "'A function that is proper proceeds from the proper form"' really does not prove that the intellective part is the proper form of man, for this operation does not proceed from the form but according to them § it is caused by the intelligible object, or according to the view of others it proceeds from the sense image.® [2. Scotus's Formulation].
I put this argument, then,
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rationem aliter sic:
Homo intelligit formaliter et proprie; ergo anima intellectiva est proprie forma hominis.
Antecedens videtur satis manifestum secundum auctoritates Aristotelis tertio De anima,* et primo Ethicorum,t quod intelligere est propria operatio hominis.
Operatio autem ut distinguitur contra actionem seu factionem formaliter inest operanti, et non est ab ipso in alterum.
Consimiliter decimo Ethicorum{ in intelligere ponit felicitatem hominis, et manifestum est quod illa felicitas inest formaliter homini ; ergo et illa operatio in qua consistit.
Sed tentandum est probare antecedens per rationem contra protervum si neget, et hoc intelligendo in antecedente intelligere proprie dictum per quod intelligo actum cognoscendi transcendentem totum genus sensitivae cognitionis.
Probatur ergo illud antecedens uno modo sic. Homo cognoscit actu cognoscendi, non organico ; ergo intelligit proprie.
Consequentia patet ex ratione jam posita, quia intellectio proprie est cognitio transcendens totum genus sensationis; omnis autem sensatio est cognitio organica ex secundo De anima.
Antecedens hujus enthymematis probatur, nam organum determinatur ad certum genus sensibilium ex m De anima,** et hoc ideo quia consistit in media proportione extremorum illius generis.
Sed aliquam cognitionem experimur in nobis quae non competit nobis secundum tale organum, quia tunc determinaretur praecise ad sensibilia determinati generis, Cujus oppositum experimur, quia cognoscimus
* I, cap. ili, passim.
} Ethica Nicomachea, 1, cap. vii (1098%, 7).
¢ X, cap. viii (11784, 21), ** iI, cap. V-xil, passim (416°, 328s; 424%, 25-26).
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
in another form.
Man formally and properly understands ; therefore, the intellective soul is the proper form of man.
[a. Proof of the antecedent].
The antecedent seems to be clear enough according to the testimony of Aristotle in De anima, BK. m1,* and Nicomachean Ethics, BK. 1,f since to understand is the proper operation of man.
Now an operation, in contradistinction to an act of fashioning something or to an action, is formally in the one who performs the operation and is not produced by the agent in something else.
Similarly Aristotle in Nicomachean Ethics, BK. x,t makes man's happiness consist in understanding.
Now it is clear that this felicity is formally in man.
Consequently the operation in which this felicity consists must also be in man formally.
Nevertheless, we should try to prove the antecedent by reason lest some contentious individual deny it. Now in the antecedent, I take ''to know" or "to understand"?
"adsl in the proper sense of the term as an Act of knowledge |' phe which transcends every type of sense knowledge. abet [First proof |. One way of proving this antecedent, then, is this. Man knows by an act of knowledge which is not organic ; hence he knows or understands in the proper sense of the term.
The consequence is evident for the reason already given, since intellection properly speaking is a knowledge which transcends all sense knowledge.
All sensation, however, is organic knowledge as Aristotle shows in De anima, BK. u.
There eee cedent of this lenthymeme is proved from the fact that "every organ is determi o a certain kind of sensible,' and this because it consists in a balance between two extremes.8 But wade experience in ourselves 3 some knowledge which we do not have in virtue of some limited precisely tothe sensibles of some determined
Bs eB ee ay oaite ol wnat We actualy
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per talem actum differentiam cujuscumque generis sensibilium ad aliud, quod non est aliquid illius generis ; ergo cognoscimus utrumque extremum.
Patet ista consequentia secundum Philosophum sic arguentem I De anima * de sensu communi.
Sed hic instatur primo, quia cognitio organica est, quae inest secundum determinatam partem corporis ; illa autem de qua arguitur, quod per illam distinguimus sensibilia a non sensibilibus, inest toti primo, et ideo non est per aliquod organum proprie loquendo ; tamen non transcendit totum genus cognitionis sensitivae secundum perfectionem, quia inest primo toti, et per consequens ita est materiale, sicut illud quod inest toti per partem ; ita enim passio totius est materialis, sicut quod inest toti per partem.
Secundo negatur assumptum quod ille actus non inest secundum aliquod organum, quia inest secundum organum phantasiae ; cujus probatio est, quia illo laeso impeditur cognitio.
Nec probatio illa de determinatione organi ad certum genus concludit, quia phantasia extendit se ad omnia sensibilia.
Sed prima instantia exclusa est per quoddam ibi tactum, quia per illum actum discernimus totum genus sensibilium ab aliquo extra totum genus illud ; nec illa probatio, quod impeditur iste actus laeso organo phantasiae concludit ; hoc enim est propter ordinem istarum potentiarum in operando, non autem quia intellectio exerceatur mediante isto organo.
Aliter probatur antecedens principale, quia aliqua * De anima, m1, cap. i (425%, 30 ff.).
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
experience.
For by such an act we know precisely how one kind of sensible differs from another, and conquently we know both extremes.
This consequence is evident from the Philosopher, who uses this argument in De anima, Bk. 11,* in regard to common sense.
But to this some object, first of all, that organic knowledge is that which is present in some determinate part of the body, whereas the aforesaid knowledge by which we distinguish sensibles from things that cannot be perceived by the senses, is present in the body as a whole and for this reason is not had in virtue of some organ in the proper sense of the word.
For an attribute of the whole is as material as something which exists in one of its parts.
Nevertheless, this knowledge does not transcend in perfection the whole class of sense knowledge since it is primarily in the body as a whole and hence is just as material in character_as the knowledge in only a part of the whole. { Secondly, |they deny the assumption that this act of knowledgeis not present in virtue of{some érgan\because it is there by reason of the organ of the jmagination.
Proof for this is found in the fact that when this organ is damaged, such knowledge is no longer possible.
Neither is the proof from the limitation of the organ to a certain kind of sensible conclusive, because the imagination extends to all sensibles.
The first objection, however, has already been excluded by what was treated above, for through this act of knowledge we discern the difference between the whole class of sensibles and something that is outside the class as a whole.
Neither does the argument that this act is impeded by damage done to the imagination prove anything.
For this is due to the functional relation that exists between these powers and not because the act of understanding is exercised through the medium of an organ.
| on at mee [Second proof].
Another proof for the principal anteNN ad cedent is based on the fact that we possess some/immaterial
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cognitio immaterialis est in nobis ; nulla sensitiva potest esse immaterialis ; ergo, etc.
Istud vocabulum immateriale est frequens in usu Philosophi in proposito, sed videtur ambiguum.
Potest enim ad propositum tripliciter intelligi ; vel immaterialis, quia incorporea, hoc modo, quia non per partem corpoream et organum, et tunc istud est idem cum propositione jam posita de non organica.
Vel alio modo immaterialis, quia nullo modo extensa, et tunc plus dicit quam non organica ; etsi enim omnis organica sit extensa, quia recipitur in extenso, non tamen sola, quia si reciperetur in toto composito primo, cum illud sit extensum, adhuc operatio esset extensa.
Tertio modo potest intelligi immaterialitas ejus in comparatione ad objectum, ut scilicet respiciat objectum sub rationibus immaterialibus, utpote in quantum abstrahitur.ab hic et nunc et hujusmodi, quae dicuntur conditiones materiales.
Si autem (proferetur vel) probaretur immaterialitas secundo modo, plus haberetur propositum quam ex probatione ejus primo modo.
Sed non videtur sic posse probari, nisi ex conditionibus objecti, quod respicit ille actus, nisi forte ex reflectione, quia experimur nos reflecti super actum istius cognitionis ; et quantum non est super se reflexivum, et ideo ab objecto istius actus fit finaliter probatio antecedentis.
Sic:
Habemus in nobis aliquam cognitionem objecti sub illa ratione sub qua non potest esse ejus aliqua cognitio sensitiva; ergo, etc.
Antecedens probatur, quia experimur in nobis quia cognoscimus actu universale ;
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
I4I ———————} # knowledge. | No sense knowledge, however, can be immaterial ; therefore, etc.
This word "immaterial"? is frequently used by the Philosopher in this connexion, but it appears to be ambiguous.
'There are three relevant ways in which it can be understood.
(a) Either this knowledge is immaterial because it is incorporeal in the sense that it is not an operation that involves a corporeal part or organ.
In this sense, the present proposition is the same as that previously posited with regard to non-organic knowledge.
(6) Another way in which this knowledge could be immaterial would be that it is not extended in any way.
Tnthis caseftauch torelis asserted than the fac that it is not organic.
For although everything organic is extended inasmuch as it is received into something extended [viz. the organ], this_ , this is not the only reason.
It would still be extended if it were received immediately by the composite as a whole, because the composite is itself extended.
(c) Immateriality can be understood in a third sense, namely with reference to the_object, inasmuch as this knowledge considers t under immaterial aspects, as for instance, abstracting from the "here and now" and such like, which are said to be material conditions. Tf we would prove this knowledge to be immaterial in the second sense and not merely in the first our proposed conclusion would follow all the more.
But it seems that the only way we could do this would be from the conditions which characterise the object of such an act (unless perhaps we could do so on the basis of reflection, since we experience ourselves reflecting on this act of knowledge, for what has quantity is not capable of reflecting upon itself.)
At any rate the proof of the antecedent ultimately rests upon the object of this act.
The proof is as follows.
We_possess some knowredge of an object under an aspect it could not have as an pip Da ense knowledge ;_ therefore, etc.—Pri anteceden € experience in ourselves that we (2,322)
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et experimur quia cognoscimus ens, vel qualitatem [MS quantitatem] sub ratione aliqua communiori quam sit ratio primi objecti sensibilis, etiam respectu supremae sensitivae.
Experimur etiam quod cognoscimus relationes consequentes naturas rerum, etiam non sensibilium.
Experimur etiam quod distinguimus totum genus sensibilium ab aliquo quod non est illius generis.
Experimur etiam quod cognoscimus relationes rationis, quae sunt secundae intentiones, scilicet relationem universalis, generis et speciei et compositionis, et aliarum intentionum logicalium.
Experimur etiam quod cognoscimus actum illum quo cognoscimus ista, et illud, secundum quod inest nobis iste actus, quod est per actum reflexum super actum rectum et susceptivum ejus.
Experimur etiam quod assentimus complexionibus quibusdam sine possibilitate contradicendi vel errandi, utpote primis principiis.
Experimur etiam quod cognoscimus ignotum ex noto per discursum, ita quod non possumus dissentire evidentiae discursus, nec conclusionis illatae ; quodcumque istorum cognoscere est impossibile cuicumque potentiae sensitivae, ergo, etc.—Si quis autem proterve neget istos actus inesse homini, nec se experiri istos actus in se, non est ulterius cum eo disputandum, sed dicendum est sibi quod est brutum ; sicut cum dicente, non video colorem ibi, non est disputandum, sed dicendum sibi, tu indiges sensu quia caecus es.
Ita quod quodam sensu, id est, perceptione interiori, experimur istos actus in nobis ; et ideo si quis istos neget, dicendum est eum non esse hominem, quia non habet istam visionem quam alii experiuntur.— Assumptum, scilicet quod nullus istorum actuum potest inesse secundum aliquam potentiam sensitivam, probatur, quia actu universale cognoscitur sub tanta indifferentia
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EF TT BE aN
ee :
{know the actual universal} (ii) We experience that we ~ now being or quality under a more general notion than
" that characteristic of the primary object of even the highest sense faculty.
(iii) We experience that we also know relations/that follow from the nature of things, even syhen the latter aja ual capable ovine parcened by ie senses, (iv) We experience that we dis ireuish the whole class of sensible objects from what is not such.
(v) We experience that we know conceptual relations, which are second intentions, such as that of the universal, the genus, the species, the judgment and other logical intentions.
(vi) We also experience that we know the very act, whereby_we know these things and we experience that AE this act exists within us.
This we do by an act of reflection upon the direct act and its recipient.
(vii) We experience that we assent to propositions such as the rst principles without a possibility of error or contradiction:
(viii) We also experience that we learn the unknown from the known by means of discursive reasoning, so that we are unable to refuse our assent to the evidence of the reasoning process or to the conclusion that is inferred.
But the knowledge of any of these cannot be attributed to any sensitive faculty ; therefore, etc.—Should a contentious individual deny that such acts are present in man or that he experiences these acts in himself, a person ought not to argue with him any further, but he ought to be told that he is a brute animal.
It is the same with one who says:
'"'I do not see colour here'.
We should not argue with such a one but simply tell him:
"You need senses because you are blind'.
And so by a certain "sense", namely internal perception, we experience these acts within ourselves.
Hence, if someone were to deny their existence we would have to say that he is not a man because he lacks this interior vision which others experience.—The assumption that a sense faculty is not the source of any of these acts [viz. (i) to (vili)] is proved as follows : The actual universal has such an indifference
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sub quanta ipsum sic cognitum est simul dicibile de omnibus singularibus in quibus salvatur ; sic non cognoscit sensus.
Sed de secundo est evidentius, quia nulla potentia potest cognoscere aliquid sub ratione universaliori ratione sui proprii objecti ; sicut visus non cognoscit aliquid sub ratione indifferenti ad colorem et ad sonum ; ergo cognitio illa est alicujus sub ratione communiori quocumque posito objecto, etiam supremi sensus non potest esse aliqua sensatio.
Quartum probat idem, quia nulla sensatio potest esse distinctive primi objecti sensibilis, i.e. communissimi, ab eo quod non est tale, quia nec potest esse utriusque extremi.
De relationibus consequentibus alia non sensibilia inter se vel insensibilia ad sensibilia, patet per idem quia sensus non potest in istos et multo magis patet de relationibus istis, quae dicuntur rationis, quia sensus non potest moveri ad cognoscendum aliquid quod non includitur in objecto sensibili ut sensibili; habitudo rationis non includitur in aliquo ut existens est ; sensus autem existentis est ut existens est, et per hoc posset probari primum etiam de actu universali, quia universali in actu repugnat esse .existens ut existens est.
Aliud de reflexione super actum et potentiam, probatur per hoc quod quantum non est reflexivum supra se.
Alia duo de compositione et assensione compositioni, et de discurrere et assentire evidentiae discursus probantur ex relatione rationis, quia ista non sunt sine relatione rationis.
Consequentia primi enthymematis probatur sic.
Si talis actus sit in nobis formaliter cum non sit substantia
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
about it that what is known in this way can be predicated simultaneously of all the_singulars of which it is characteristic ; (no sease faculty] however, knows. thing in this way.
The same is even more evident as regards the second, for no faculty can know something under an aspect more universal than that of its proper object, even as vision perceives nothing under some aspect common to colour and to sound.
Consequently, a knowledge of something in even more general terms than that characteristic of the first object of even the highest sense cannot be a sensation.
'The same holds true of the fourth, for no sensation can distinguish between the most universal of all sensible objects and that which is not sensible, because it cannot perceive both extremes.
This is also true of the relations which exist between things imperceptible to the senses or between such things and those which can be perceived by the senses, for the sense faculty\has'no abilityit ive such relationships.
And this is all the more true of those relations which are purely conceptual, since the senses can be moved to perceive only what is included in a sensible object as such.
But conceptual relations are not included in any existing thing as such, whereas the senses haves do with existing things as existing. The same argument could be applied universal should exist as such.
The other, regarding our ability to reflect upon the act and the faculty, is proved from the fact that anything that has quantity cannot reflect upon itself.
As for the other two (viz. the act of judgment and the assent to the same or the act of reasoning and the assent given to the evidence for the same), what was said of conceptual relations proves these acts do not proceed from a sense faculty, for neither of these two exist without a conceptual relation.
[b. Proof of the consequent].
The consequence of the first enthymeme ® is proved as follows :
[First proof].
If we formally possess such an act, since
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nostra, quia quandoque inest et quandoque non inest, ergo oportet dare illi aliquod receptivum proprium ; non autem aliquod extensum, sive sit pars organica sive totum compositum, quia tunc illa operatio esset extensa ; nec posset esse talis qualis dicta est, circa objecta talia qualia dicta sunt ; ergo oportet quod insit secundum aliquid non extensum ; et quod illud sit formaliter in nobis, illud non potest esse nisi anima intellectiva, quia quaecumque alia forma est extensa.
Vel aliter potest probari consequentia ista eundo ad conditionem objecti istius actus, quia quaelibet forma inferior intellectiva, si habet operationem, habet praecise respectu objecti sub rationibus oppositis istis rationibus dictis ; ergo si habemus operationem circa objectum sub istis rationibus, illa non inerit nobis secundum aliquam formam aliam ab intellectiva ; ergo inest nobis secundum intellectivam ; ergo intellectiva formaliter inest nobis, aliter non essemus formaliter operantes secundum illam operationem.
Ex secunda operatione humana, scilicet voluntate, potest probari idem, quia homo est dominus actuum suorum, ita quod in potestate ejus est per voluntatem determinare se ad hoc vel ejus oppositum, sicut dictum est distinctione xxii, secundi vel xxiii,* q. iii, et hoc est notum non tantum ex fide sed etiam per rationem naturalem.
Ista autem indeterminatio non potest esse in aliquo appetitu sensitivo seu organico vel extenso quia quilibet appetitus organicus vel materialis determinatur ad certum genus appetibilium sibi conveniens, ita quod illud apprehensum non potest non convenire nec appetitus nec appetere; ergo voluntas, qua sic indeterminate volumus est appetitus non alicujus talis formae, scilicet
* Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. xxv, q. unica (Vives ed.).
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
144. it is not our substance as such—for it is not always present in us—it follows, therefore, that this act-needs a proper subject.
Now the latter cannot be something extended, whether it be a part of the organism or the whole composite, for then this operation itself would be extended and would lack the prescribed characteristi 1 eres creg AEE crave Rasa fon rn sR been described above. _Hence, it is necessary that this act be in us in virtue of something unextended_ and that 'the latter be formally in us. can b nothing else than the intellective soul, for every other form is extended.
[Second proof]. Another way to prove this consequence would be to consider the condition of the object of this act, for if any form inferior to the intellective form functions, it is always with reference to an object having characteristics the very opposite of those cited above.1°
Therefore, if we have an operation which regards an object under the aforementioned aspects, this will not be present in us in virtue of any form other than the intellective.
Hence, it is by reason of this form that it is present in us, and consequently the intellective form itself is formally in us, for otherwise we would not formally function in this way.
[ Third proof |. We can prove the same from the second operation characteristic of man, namely volition, for man is master of his acts to such an extent that it is within his power to determine himself at will to this or to its opposite, as has been said in BK. 0, dist. XxII Or XXIII, q.1ii.*
And this is something known by natural reason and not merely by faith.
Such a lack of determination, however, cannot exist in any organic or extended appetite, because every organic or material appetite is determined to a certain class of suitable objects so that what is apprehended cannot be unsuitable nor can the appetite fail to seek it. The will, therefore, by which we can will in such an indeterminate way, is not the appetite of a
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materialis, et per consequens alicujus excedentis omnem talem formem hujusmodi ponimus intellectivam, et tunc si appetitus ille sit formaliter in nobis, quia et appetere, sequitur quod forma illa sit forma nostra.
[Propositio II.
Anima intellectiva est immortalis].
De secunda propositione principali, quae est, quod anima intellectiva est immortalis, proceditur sicut de prima.
Primo adducendo auctoritates Philosophorum qui hoc senserunt.
Aristoteles 11 De anima* dicit quod intellectus separatur a caeteris, sicut perpetuum a corruptibili.
Si dicatur quod separatur quantum ad operationem ; contra— ex hoc sequitur propositum, quia si potest separari secundum operationem et secundum esse secundum ipsum
1 De anima.t Item, m1 De anmat ponitur differentia inter sensum et intellectum, quod excellens sensibile corrumpit sensum, et propter hoc post sensationem talis minus sentit minus sensibile; non sic de intellectu.
Imo postquam intellexerit summa intelligibilia, magis intelligit inferiora ; ergo intellectus non debilitatur in operando, et tunc ultra sequitur, quod sit incorruptibilis in essendo.
Item, x11 Metaphysicae, cap. i,** moventes causae velut prius existentes, quae autem ut ratio, id est, forma substantalis supple cum causato ut toto; quando enim sanatur homo, tunc et sanitas est.
Si autem posterius aliquid manet, perscrutandum est ; in quibusdam enim * m1, cap. ii (413, 25). f um, cap. ii (413%, 29-31).
¢ mr, cap. iv (429%, 29-4299, 4).
** xuI, cap. iii (1070%, 21 ff.).
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
material form, and in consequence it belongs to something which excels every such form.
But this is just what we assume the intellective form to be. And therefore, if this appetite is formally in us inasmuch as its act is in us, it follows that this form is our form.
[Second Proposition:
The intellective soul is immortal].
The method of dealing with the second proposition, viz. that the intellective soul is immortal, is the same as that used with the first.
The testimony of those philosophers who held this is adduced first.
[Arguments for immortality :41 Arg. 1]. Aristotle, in De anima, BK. 11,* says that the "'intellect differs from the rest as what is eternal differs from what is perishable".
And if someone objects that it is something different and apart only in so far as its operations are concerned, the pro- - posed conclusion still follows, for according to Aristotle in De anima, BK. 1,7 if it can be set apart by reason of its operations it can also exist apart.
[Arg. 1m]. Furthermore, in De anima, BK. m1,{ he says that the senses differ from the intellect, because something that stimulates the sense excessively tends to impair it so that afterwards even an object that does not stimulate the sense so strongly is less capable of being perceived, whereas such is not the case with the intellect.
Quite the contrary, once the highest intelligibles have been grasped what is less intelligible becomes even better known.
The intellect consequently is not weakened in function, and from this it follows further, the intellect is imperishable in its being.
[Arg. mt]. Also, in Metaphysics, BK. Xu, c.i,** he says :
''The causes that produce motion, for instance, exist previously whereas those which are the essence, that is, the substantial form, exist simultaneously (Add 'with the effect considered as a whole').
For when a man is healthy, then health also exists. ...
But we must inquire whether anything remains afterwards.
For in "some cases there is nothing to prevent this, for instance
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nihil prohibet, ut si anima est talis, non omnis, sed intellectus, etc.
Vult ergo dicere quod intellectus est forma manens post compositum, sed non ante.
Item, xvi De animalibus,* relinquitur solum intellectum de foris advenire.
Ergo non accipit esse per generationem, sed a causa extrinseca ; et per consequens non potest accipere non esse per corruptionem, nec per aliquam causam inferiorem corruptivam, quia ejus esse non subest alicui tali causae, cum sit a causa superiori immediate.
Item, ex dictis Philosophi formantur aliquae rationes ; est unum principium apud eum, quod naturale desiderium non est frustra; nunc autem in anima est desiderium naturale ad semper esse.
Item, vu Metaphysicae,t vult quod materia est, qua res potest esse et non esse.
Ergo illud quod non habet materiam secundum eum non habet potentiam non essendi ; intellectiva non habet materiam secundum eum, quia est forma simplex.
Item, m1 Ethicorum t vult quod fortis debet se exponere morti pro republica et idem vult rx Ethicorum,** et loquitur secundum judicium rationis naturalis ; ergo secundum rationem naturalem potest cognosci immortalitas animae.
Probatio istius consequentiae, quia nullus_propter quodcumque bonum virtutis vel in se, vel in alio vel communitatis debet appetere vel potest omnino non esse suum, quia secundum Augustinum wi De libero arbitrio,tt Non esse non potest appeti.
Nunc autem si anima non esset immortalis, moriens acciperet totaliter non esse.
* De generatione animalium, u, cap. iii (736°, 28). t vil, cap. xv (1039°, 29).
{ Ethica Nicomachea, m, cap. vii (11175, 8).
** Ix, cap. viii (1169%, 20). tf 1, cap. viii (Migne, P.L., xxxu, 1282).
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
the soul may be of this sort—not all the soul, but the intellect''.
Hence, what Aristotle wishes to say-is that the intellect is the form which exists after the composite ceases to exist, even though this form does not exist prior toithelecompasitess muy, pees Lee [Arg. tv].
Also, he says in his work De generatione animalium* : "It remains for the intellect alone to enter from the outside'.
Hence, the intellect does not receive existence by way of generation but rather from an extrinsic cause ; consequently, it cannot cease to exist by <a perishing.
Neither can any inferior cause corrupt the soul since its existence does not come under the power of any such cause, for it owes its existence directly to a higher cause.
[Arg. v].
Also, some arguments can be constructed __, from the dicta of the Philosopher.
One of his principles ¥ "'is that a natural desire is not in vain.!2
Now the soul has a natural desire to exist forever.
[Arg. vi]. Also, in Metaphysics, BK. vu, he has this to say : ''Matter is that in virtue of which a thing can exist or not exist".
Therefore, according to him, whatever has no matter lacks the capacity to be non-existent. Now the intellective soul, according to him, is devoid of matter since it is a simple form.
[Arg. vu]. Also, in Nicomachean Ethics, BK. 11, he says that a brave man must expose himself to death for the state.
And this he appears to repeat in BK. 1x of the same work.** Now he speaks according to the dictates of natural reason.
Consequently, the immortality of the soul can be known by natural reason.
Proof of this consequence : No-one is obliged or is even able to seek his complete non-existence for the sake of some virtuous good whether that good be something in himself or in another or a good of the community, for according to Augustine a person cannot desire non-existence.t{
Ifthe soul were not immortal, however, the one who is dying would be accepting complete non-existence.
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Item, arguit unus Doctor quasi ex verbis Philosophi sic : Quod corrumpitur aut corrumpitur per contrarium, aut per defectum alicujus necessario requisiti ad esse ejus.
Sed anima intellectiva non habet contrarium, nec esse corporis est simpliciter necessarium ad ejus esse, quia habet proprium esse per se, et idem in corpore et extra corpus ; nec est differentia nisi quod in corpore communicat illud corpori [MS corrumpitur]; extra corpus non communicat.
Item, simplex non potest separari a seipso ; anima est simplex ; ergo non potest separari a seipsa et per consequens nec a suo esse separari potest quia non per aliam formam a se habet esse.
Secus est de composito, quod habet esse per formam, quae forma potest separari a materia, et ita esse compositi destrui.
Sed oppositum videtur Philosophus sensisse, quia in fine, vi. Metaphysicae,* ex intentione vult quod omnes partes, quae possunt separatae manere a toto, sunt elementa, id est, partes materiales, sicut ipse ibi accipit elementa ; et praeter tales necesse est ponere in toto aliquam formam, quae totum est illud quod est, quae non possit manere separata a parte materiali, toto non manente.
Ergo si concessit animam intellectivam esse formam hominis, ut patet ex probatione propositionis praecedentis, non ponit eam manere separatam a materia, toto non manente.
Item, principium videtur apud eum quod _ illud quod incipit esse, desinit esse.
Unde 1 De caelo et mundo, contra Platonem videtur habere pro incom- * vir, cap. xvii (10415, 12 ff.).
T 1, cap. x (279", 31-32) ; cap. xii (282%, 4).
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
[Arg. vi]. Also, one teacher !* argues as it were from the words of the Philosopher as follows : What perishes, perishes by reason of its contrary or because it lacks some necessary prerequisite for its existence.
The intellective soul, however, has no contrary.
Neither is the existence of the body a necessary prerequisite for the soul's existence, since the soul possesses its own proper per se existence.
The latter is the same whether the soul is in the body or out of it.
The only difference is that when the soul is in the body, it communicates its existence to the body, whereas when it is outside it does not do so.
[Arg. 1x]. Also, what is simple cannot be separated from itself.
The soul is simple ; therefore, it cannot be separated from itself, nor can it, in consequence, be separated from its existence, for it does not have its existence in virtue of some form other than itself.
It is otherwise with something composite which has existence in virtue of the form.
This form can be separated from matter, thus destroying the existence of the composite.
[Arguments against immortality: Arg. 1]. The Philosopher, however, seems to take the opposite view, for at the end of Metaphysics, Bk. vu,* he expresses the opinion that the only parts which could be separated from the whole are the elements, i.e. the material parts, for in this sense he understands elements here.
In addition to these elements it is necessary to assume the existence of some form in the whole which is the totality of that which exists.
This form could not exist in separati material f part once the whole no longer exists. Hence; if he grants that the intellective soul is the form of as is evident from the proof of the preceding proposition, he does not admit that it exists in separation from matter, once the whole no longer € exists.
"[Arg. uJ. Likewise, it seems to be one of his principles that what begins to exist ceases to exist.
Hence, in his work De caelo et mundo,t against Plato, he seems to consider it impossible that anything could have come into
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possibili, quod aliquid inceperit, et tamen sit perpetuum et incorruptibile ; et mt Physicorum, cap. de infinito,* cujus est principium, ejus est finis.
[Opino Scoti].
Potest dici quod licet ad istam secundam propositionem probandam sint rationes probabiles, non tamen demonstrativae, imo nec necessariae.
Et quod adducebatur pro ea secundum primam viam de auctoritatibus philosophorum, dupliciter potest solvi.
Uno modo quod dubium est quid Philosophus circa hoc senserit.
Varie enim loquitur in diversis locis, et habuit diversa principia, ex quorum aliquibus videtur sequi unum oppositum, ex aliis aliud.
Unde probabile est, quod in ista conclusione semper fuerit dubius, et nunc magis videbatur accedere ad unam partem, nunc ad aliam, juxta quod tractabat materiam consonam uni parti magis quam alteri.
Est et alia responsio realior quod non omnia dicta a philosophis assertive, erant eis probata per rationem necessariam naturalem ; sed frequenter non habebant nisi quasdam probabiles persuasiones, vel vulgarem opinionem philosophorum praecedentium.
~Unde dicit Philosophus 1 Caeli et mundi + in cap. de duabus quaest. difficilibus, tentandum est dicere quod videtur esse dignum, reputantes promptitudinem magis imputari verecundiae, quam audaciae, si quis propter philosophiam stare, et parvas sufficientias diligit, de quibus habemus maximas dubitationes.
Unde parvae sufficientiae frequenter suffecerunt philosophis, ubi non poterant ad majorem pervenire, ne contradicerent principiis philosophiae.
Et in eodem cap. de [aliis] astris dicunt Aegypti * wu, cap. iv (203%, 9). t mM, cap. xii (2914, 25-29; 292%, 6 ff.).
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
existence and still be eternal and imperishable.
And in the Physics he says* : ''Whatever has a beginning has an ende?
[Scotus's Opinion}.
It can be stated that although there are probable reasons for this second proposition, these are not demonstrative, nor for that matter are they even necessary reasons.!4
[Reply to the arguments for immortality].
The testimonies of the philosophers—the first way used to prove the proposition—can be solved in two ways.
First of all, it is doubtful what the Philosopher really held on this point, for he speaks differently in different places and has different principles, from some of which one thing seems to follow whereas from others the very opposite can be inferred.
Wherefore, it is probable that he was always doubtful about this conclusion and at one time seems to be drawn to one side and at other times to the other depending on whether the subject matter he was treating at the moment was more in accord with the one or with the other.
Another answer, and one more in accord with facts, is that not all the statements by the philosophers were established by proofs both necessary and evident to natural reason.
Frequently, what they gave was nothing more than rather persuasive probable arguments or what was commonly held by earlier philosophers.
For this reason, the Philosopher in De caelo et mundo, BK. u,f in the chapter on the two difficult questions, says:
'"We must now attempt to state the probable solution, for we regard the zeal of one whose thirst after philosophy leads him to accept even slight indications where it is very difficult to see one's way, as a proof rather of modesty than of over-confidence''.
Hence, in those matters where they could find nothing better without contradicting the principles of philosophy, "'slight indications" frequently had to suffice for the philosophers.
As he says in the same chapter : "'Accounts of other stars are given by the
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et Babylonii, a quibus multas credulitates habemus de unoquoque astrorum.
Unde philosophi quandoque acquiescunt propter persuasiones probabiles, quandoque propter assertiones principiorum suorum praeter rationem necessariam.
Et ista responsio sufficeret ad omnes auctoritates, licet essent expressae [MS nullae], quod non concludunt propositum.
'Tamen responderi potest per ordinem.
Ad primum, quod non intelligit istam separationem, nisi praecise in hoc quod intellectus non utitur corpore in operando, et propter hoc est incorruptibilis in operando, loquendo de illa corruptione, qua virtus organica corrumpitur propter corruptionem organi; et ista sola corruptio competit potentiae organicae.
Secundum Philosophum 1 De anima,* si senex acciperet oculum juvenis, videret utique sicut juvenis ; ergo ipsa potentia visiva non est debilitata sive corrupta quantum ad operationem ; sed [ad] organum tantum ; nec tamen ex ista incorruptione intellectus, quia scil. non habet organum, per cujus corruptionem possit corrumpi in operando, sequitur quod sit simpliciter incorruptibilis in operando, quia tunc sequeretur quod in essendo esset incorruptibilis, sicut tunc argutum est; sed tantum sequitur quod non est corruptibilis in operando, illo modo quo potentia organica ; tamen poneretur simpliciter corruptibilis, juxta illud Philosophi m De anima.t
Intellectus corrumpitur in nobis quodam interiori corrupto.
Et hoc pro tanto, quia poneretur principium operandi toti composito operationem propriam ejus ;
* 1, cap. iv (408, 18-30). t m1, cap. v (430%, 23) ; 1, cap. i (403%, 7-10).
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
Egyptians and Babylonians . .
. from whom many of our beliefs about particular stars are derived".
-Therefore, the philosophers agreed to things sometimes because of probable persuasive reasons, at other times because they had asserted as principles, propositions which were not necessary truths.
And this reply would suffice for all the testimonies cited above ; even if they clearly asserted the proposed conclusion, they still do not establish it.
Nevertheless, these arguments can be answered in order as follows.
[To 1].
To the first:
Aristotle understands this separation to mean nothing more than that the intellect does not use the body in performing its operation, and for this reason it is incorruptible as to function.
This is to be understood in the sense that it is unlike an organic power which perishes precisely because the organ decays.
This type _of decay pertains exclusively to an organic CSealgeeaone online tau peeenlocsplicn tn in De anima,* BK. I, if an old man were given the eye of a young man, he wand indeed see as well as the youth.
Hence, the faculty of vision grows weak or decays only from the standpoint of its organ and not in so far as its operation directly is concerned.
From the fact that the intellect, however, is incapable of decay in the sense that it has no organ by which it could perish, it does not follow that the intellect is imperishable as to function in an unqualified sense, for then it would indeed follow that it is also imperishable in being as the argument maintains.
What does follow is this.
So far as its ability to operate alone is concerned, the intellect is incapable of dissolution in the same sense that an organic power is corruptible.
Absolutely speaking, however, the intellect is assumed to be perishable according to the Philosopher's statement in De anima, BK. 111,f that the intellect perishes in us once the interior sense perishes.
And this is just what one would have to maintain if he assumed the soul to be a principle which has an operation proper to the commromie
(2,322)
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sed compositum est corruptibile, ergo et principium operativum ejus.
Quod autem sit principium operandi toti, et quod operatio ejus sit operatio totius, videtur
Aristoteles dicere 1 De anima.* Ad aliud dico, quod excellens sensibile corrumpit sensum per accidens, quia corrumpit organum, quia solvit illam mediam proportionem, in qua consistit bona dispositio organi ; et per oppositum intellectus, quia non habet organum, non corrumpitur ab excellenti objecto ; sed ex hoc non sequitur quod sit incorruptibilis nisi probetur quod non dependeat in essendo a toto quod est corruptibile.
Ad tertium de xu Metaphysicae dicitur quod Aristoteles posuit illud sub dubio, quia dicit forsan.
Sed non dicit forsan ad istud quod intellectus manet posterius, id est, post totum ; sed dicit non omnis anima, sed intellectus ; et sequitur:
Omne namque impossibile forsan, ubi dubitabat an 'possibile sit omnem animam manere post compositum.
Sed de intellectu non dubitat non dependeat in essendo a toto quod est corruptibile.
Si ergo expresse hoc asserat, potest dici quod tamen-non fuit per rationem necessariam sibi demonstratum, sed per rationes probabiles persuasum.
Ad aliud, valde dubium est, quid ipse senserit de inceptione animae intellectivae.
Si enim non posuit Deum aliquid immediate de novo agere, sed tantummodo motu sempiterno movere coelum, et hoc ut agens remotum, a quo agente separato poneret ipse intellectivam de novo produci?
Si enim dicas, quod ab aliqua * I, cap. v, passim.
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
as a whole.
The composite, however, is perishable.
Consequently, its operative principle is also perishable.
That the soul is the operative principle of the whole composite and that its operation is also that of the whole is just what Aristotle seems to say in De anima, BK. 1.*
[Tou].
To the next, I say that an excessively stimulating object damages the senses only incidentally inasmuch as it damages the organ by disrupting that balance which constitutes the quality of being properly disposed.
On the other hand, since the intellect has no organ, it is not damaged-by a more highly intelligible object.
But from this it does not follow that the intellect is imperishable unless it first be proved that it does not depend for existence on a composite being that can perish.
[Tom]. To the third argument based on Metaphysics, BK. XII, some reply that Aristotle assumes this as something doubtful since he uses the word '"'perhaps".—However, he does not say "'perhaps" when he speaks of the intellect persisting after the whole, but says: "Not all the soul, but the intellect".
Only afterward does he add: "For it is perhaps impossible that all [the parts of the soul. . .]"', where he doubts whether it is possible for the entire soul to outlive the composite.
Nevertheless, he has no doubts that the intellect does not depend for its existence on the whole composite which is perishable.
If Aristotle expressly asserts this, then it can be said that he was convinced of this because of probable reasons and not because it was anything demonstrated to him by necessary reasons.
[To 1v].
As for the other, it is very doubtful what Aristotle held in regard to the origin of the intellective soul.
For if he assumed that God does not immediately produce anything new, but merely moves the heaven with an eternal movement and this only as a remote agent, then by what separate 15 agent did Aristotle assume the soul was produced from without?
If you
I51
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Intelligentia, duplex est inconveniens.
Unum quia ipsa non potest creare substantiam ex prima distinctione hujus quarti.* Aliud, quia illa non magis potest aliquid novum producere immediate, quam Deus secundum principia
Philosophi de immutabilitate agentis, et ideo sempiternitate in agendo.
Nec potest ipse, ut videtur, secundum principia sua ponere intellectivam esse terminum agentis naturalis quia ut videtur ex xu Metaphysicae,t ponit eam incorruptibilem et nulla forma quae est terminus agentis naturalis, est simpliciter incorruptibilis.
Potest dici quod ponit eam immediate accipere esse et novum esse a Deo quia quod acciperet esse satis sequitur ex principiis ejus cum non ponat eam perpetuo praecessisse sine corpore, nec prius fuisse in alio corpore ; nec est probabile secundum rationem a quo possit recipere tale esse, nullo praesupposito, nisi a Deo.
Sed contra : ergo concederet creationem.
Respondeo, non sequitur, quia non posuit aliam productionem compositi, et animae intellectivae, sicut nec ignis et formae ignis ; sed illam animationem corporis organici ponit esse productionem per accidens ipsius animae.
Nos autem ponimus duas productiones ; unam a non esse animae ad esse ejus, et ista est creatio ; aliam a non animatione corporis ad animationem ejus, et illa est productio corporis animati, et per mutationem proprie dictam.
Qui * Opus oxoniense, IV, dist. 1, q. i, n. 28. t XM, cap. ili (1070%, 25-28).
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I5!I Say it was by one of the Intelligences, then we encounter a double difficulty ; one, because an Intelligence cannot create a substance (as I prove in Bx. 1Vv, dist. i)*; the other, because such a being cannot immediately produce anything new any more than God could, for according to the Philosopher's principles regarding the immutability of the agent it follows that the action of such a being is eternal.
Neither do we see any way in which Aristotle could claim that the intellective soul is the effect of some natural agent ! without violating his principles, because he seems to assume the soul to be imperishable in Metaphysics, BK. xu.— And no form that is the effect of a natural agent is imperishable in an unqualified sense.
But it can be said that he assumed the soul received existence immediately from God and that this existence was something new.
For it would follow readily enough from his principles that it would have received existence, since Aristotle assumed no eternal bodiless pre-existence ; neither did he hold that the soul existed previously in some other body ; nor does it seem possible according to reason that a soul which presupposes no material principle could have received its existence from anyone other than God.
To the contrary : If this explanation were true, Aristotle would have admitted creation.—I reply that this does not follow, for he did not assume a production of the intellective soul distinct from the production of the composite, just as he did not assume one production for fire and another for the fire form.
What he posited was the animation of the organic body and this incidentally involved the production of its soul.
Now we admit two types of production, one from the soul's non-existence to existence and this we call creation, the other is the passage of the body from an inanimate to an animate state and this is the production of a living body by a change in the proper sense of the word.
If anyone, therefore, were to assume merely the second type of production
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igitur, poneret tantum secundam, nullam creationem poneret, et ita Aristoteles.
Sed licet vites secundum eum creationem, quomodo tamen potest salvare agens immutabile aliquid novum producere?
Respondeo, nullo modo nisi propter novitatem passi receptivi; quod enim effectus totaliter et praecise dependens a causa activa, esset novus, reduceretur secundum Aristotelem in aliquam variationem ipsius causae efficientis ; sed quod effectus dependens ab agente et receptivo sit novus, potest reduci in novitatem ipsius passi, sine novitate agentis et ita diceretur hic quod
Deus de necessitate naturali, transmutat corpus organicum ad animationem, quam cito corpus est susceptivum istius animationis et a causis naturalibus fit aliquando de novo istud susceptivum, et ideo tunc nova est mutatio ad animationem ab ipso Deo.
Sed quare reducenda est ista novitas in Deum, sicut in causa.agentem?
Dico quod, quia sicut est primum agens et ideo secundum Aristotelem est semper agens aliqua actione in passum semper eodem modo se habens, ita si aliquod passum potest esse novum et susceptivum alicujus formae, quae non potest subesse causalitati alicujus causae secundae, Deus est immediata causa illius et tamen de novo, quia omni potentiae passivae in ente oportet ponere aliam activam correspondentem, et ideo si passivae novae non correspondet alia activa creata, correspondebit sibi immediate divina.
Ad aliud de desiderio naturali respondebitur, respondendo ad rationes principales, quia prima ratio principalis et secunda et tertia procedunt ex hoc.
Ad aliud de vir Metaphysicae,* de materia, vera est illa * vil, cap. xv (1039), 29).
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
he would not thereby postulate a creation.
And this was the case with Aristotle.
But even if you avoid asserting a creation according to Aristotle, how is it possible to save the idea that something new is produced by an agent that is immutable ?—I reply that the only way is to explain what is new in terms of something in the patient or recipient of the action.
According to Aristotle, if a new effect depended solely upon the active cause, some variation in the efficient cause itself would be required.
But a new effect that depends upon both the recipient and the agent can be accounted for in terms of something new in the recipient alone and not in the agent.
And thus we could say that in the present instance God by a natural necessity changed an organic body into a living substance just as soon as the body was capable of receiving life.
And natural causes will determine just when the latter becomes ready to receive it, and hence at this moment God produces this new change so that it comes to life.
But why must this new entity be attributed to God as to its [immediate] efficient cause ?—I reply that the reason is this. Just as God, the first agent, is continually operating by some action on a patient which remains constantly in the same condition according to Aristotle, so likewise if something is capable of receiving some new form which cannot be caused by any secondary cause,
God must be its immediate cause ; and yet for all that something new comes into existence.
For it is necessary to postulate some active potency that corresponds to every passive potency.
Now if there is no such created cause corresponding to the new passive potency, then its immediate corresponding cause will be divine.
[To v]. The other argument about the natural desire will be answered in the reply to the initial arguments,
1!" for the first three proceed from this notion.
[To v1]. As for the argument about matter in Metaphysics, BK. vu,* this description of matter holds not merely
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descriptio materiae non tantum_intelligendo quod materia est, qua res cujus ipsa est pars potest esse et non esse ; sed res, sive cujus ipsa est pars, sive quae recipitur in ipsa ; alioquin forma ignis non posset non esse, quia materia non est pars formae ignis.
Ad aliud de forti fit magna altercatio, an secundum rectam rationem debet sic se exponere.
Potest tamen dici sicut Philosophus respondet in x* quod bonum maximum tribuit sibi in exercendo illum magnum actum virtutis, et hoc bono privaret se, imo vitiose viveret, si illo actu praetermisso tunc, salvaret suum esse per quantumcumque ; melius est autem simpliciter maximum bonum et momentaneum quam remissum bonum virtitis vel vita vitiosa per magnum tempus.
Unde ex illo probatur evidenter, quod bonum commune secundum rectam rationem est magis diligendum quam bonum proprium, quia totum bonum proprium debet homo exponere destructioni simpliciter, etiamsi nesciat animam immortalem, propter boni communis salvationem, et illud magis diligitur simpliciter, propter cujus salutem esse alterius contemnitur.
Ad illas rationes Doctorum.
Si intelligit animam habere per se esse idem in toto, et extra totum, prout per se esse distinguitur contra in esse accidentis ; hoc modo forma ignis, si esset sine materia, haberet per se esse et tunc posset concedi quod forma ignis esset incorruptibilis.
Si autem intelligat de esse per se, quod convenit composito in genere substantiae, sic falsum est quod anima sine corpore habet per se esse, quia tunc esse ejus non esset alteri communicabile, quia in divinis etiam per se esse isto modo acceptum est incommunicabile.
Unde omni * Ethica Nicomachea, 1x, cap. viii (1169%, 15-17).
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in the sense that a thing which has matter as one of its parts is able to exist and not exist, but also that a thing composed of matter or received into matter is able to exist and not exist.
Otherwise the form of fire could not be non-existent, for matter is not a part of the fire form.
[To vu]. To the other about the brave man, there is a great dispute whether according to right reason one must expose himself to death in this way.
Be that as it may, one could solve this objection the way the Philosopher does.*
One could say that by performing such a great act of virtue, this individual has obtained the highest good, whereas if he had saved his life by omitting this act, he would have deprived himself of this good and what is more, his life would be morally evil.
Absolutely speaking it is better to have this greatest good even momentarily than to be without it or to have a long, but a morally evil, life.
Wherefore, evident proof is had from this that according to right reason the common good is to be preferred to one's individual good, because even if a man is unaware that his soul is immortal, he is still bound to expose his entire personal good to destruction in order to save the common good.
And that must be loved all the more, absolutely speaking, to save which the existence of another is regarded as of little account.
(Tovm]. As for the arguments of certain teachers, if the meaning is that the soul has the same fer se existence 18 in the composite as it has outside the composite, where per se existence is understood as contrasted with the existence characteristic of an accident, then the fire form, if it were to exist apart from matter, would also have per se existence, and then we could admit that the fire form is imperishable.
But if by per se existence is meant that characteristic of the composite in the line of substance, then it is false to say that the soul has fer se existence outside the body.
For were such the case, it could not communicate its being to another, for even in what is divine, per se being in this sense is incommunicable.
154.
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modo deficit quod anima habet per se esse sine corpore, quia in secundo intellectu antecedens est falsum et in primo consequentia non valet, nisi addas ibi, quod naturaliter sine miraculo habet per se esse primo modo ; sed haec propositio credita est, et non per rationem naturalem nota.
Ad aliud, non omnis corruptio est per separationem alterius ab altero ; accipiendo enim esse angeli, si illud ponatur secundum aliquos aliud ab essentia, illud non est separabile a seipso, et tamen est destructibile per successionem oppositi ad ipsum esse.
[Propositio III.
Anima non remanebit perpetuo extra suum totum].
De tertia propositione dicitur eam posse probari ex hoc, quod pars extra totum est imperfecta ; forma autem tam nobilis non remanebit perpetuo imperfecta ; ergo nec separata a toto.
Item, nullum violentum est perpetuum secundum Aristotelem 1 De caelo et mundo.* Separatio autem animae a corpore est violenta, quia contra inclinationem naturalem animae ; secundum Philosophum, quia inclinatur naturaliter ad perfeciendum corpus.
[Opinio Scoti].
De ista propositione videtur quod Philosophus, si posuisset animam immortalem, magis posuisset eam perpetuo manere sine corpore quam in corpore, quia omne compositum ex contrariis est corruptibile.
Nec rationes istae probant. Prima non, nam illa major, 'Pars extra totum est imperfecta,' non est vera nisi de
* 1, cap. iii (286%, 18).
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Hence, there is no way in which the soul has per se existence without the body, for if we take the term in the second sense the antecedent of the argument is false, whereas if we take it in the first sense, the consequence is invalid, unless you add that it has this existence naturally and without a miracle.
But this latter is something we believe, but it is not known by natural reason.
[To rx]. To the other, not all destruction is the result of separating one thing from another.
Take the being of an angel, and let it be assumed as some do that its existence is distinct from its essence.19 Such a being is not separable from itself and nevertheless it can be destroyed if its existence is succeeded by the opposite of existence.
[Third Proposition:
The human soul will not remain outside the body forever.
Arg.1]. They say that the third proposition can be proved from this that a part which exists outside the whole is imperfect.2° This form [wviz. the soul], however, is so noble that it will not remain forever imperfect ; therefore it will not exist apart from the composite forever.
[Arg. mn]. Likewise, according to Aristotle in his work De caelo et mundo,* nothing unnatural is eternal.
But the separation of the soul from the body is unnatural, because it is contrary to the natural inclination of the soul.
For according to the Philosopher the soul has a natural inclination to perfect the body.
[Scotus's Opinion].
So far as this proposition is concerned, it seems that if the Philosopher had assumed the soul to be immortal, he would have held that it continued to exist outside the body rather than in the body, for everything composed can be destroyed by its contraries.
[Reply to the arguments].
Neither do the reasons given above prove the proposition.
[To 1]. The first does not because this major: ""The part without the whole is imperfect'', is true only of that part which receives some perfection when it is in the
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parte quae recipit aliquam perfectionem in toto ; anima autem non recipit perfectionem sed communicat ; et sic potest formari ratio ad oppositum, quia non repugnat alicui aeque perfecto in se manere, licet alteri non communicet suam perfectionem; hoc apparet de causa efficiente, cui non repugnat quantumcumque manere sine suo effectu ; sed anima manet aeque perfecta in esse suo proprio, sive conjuncta sive separata ; in hoc tamen habens differentiam, quod separata non communicat esse suum alteri.
Per hoc ad aliud, quia inclinatio naturalis est duplex : una ad actum primum et est imperfecti ad perfectionem, et concomitatur potentiam essentialem ad actum secundum.
Et est alia inclinatio ad actum secundum et est perfecti ad perfectionem communicandum et concomitatur potentiam accidentalem.
De prima verum est, quod oppositum ejus est violentum, et non perpetuum, quia ponit imperfectionem perpetuam, quam Philosophus habuit pro inconvenienti, quia posuit in universo causas ablativas aliquando cujuslibet imperfectionis.
Sed secunda inclinatio, etsi perpetuo suspendatur, nullum violentum proprie dicitur, quia nec imperfectio ; "nunc autem inclinatio animae ad corpus tantum est secundo modo, Vel potest dici secundum Avicennam, quod appetitus animae satiatus est per hoc quod semel perfecit corpus, quia illa conjunctio est ad hoc, ut anima mediante corpore, acquirat suas perfectiones per sensus, quas non posset acquirere sine sensibus, et per consequens nec sine
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
composite. Now the soul does not receive perfection but communicates perfection.
Consequently, one could twist this argument in favour of the opposite view.
For there is nothing absurd about a thing existing apart, even though it does not communicate its perfection to another, so long as it is equally perfect existing in this way.
This is clear from the [similar] case of an efficient cause.
For it is not repugnant that such a cause should exist without causing an effect. Now the soul, so far as its own being is concerned, is equally perfect whether it is separated from or joined to a body.
There is, of course, this difference.
As separated, the soul does not communicate its being to another.
[To m]. This also answers the other argument, since there are two kinds of natural inclinations
One regards the primary act or actualisation, and this is the natural inclination of the imperfect for its perfection and is something that accompanies an essential potency in relation to its second act.
But there is another inclination towards a second act where the latter is a perfection to be communicated and this is the natural inclination that accompanies an accidental potency.
Of the first, it is true that the opposite of the natural inclination is something unnatural and not eternal, because it would imply eternal imperfection, which the Philosopher regards as something improper inasmuch as he has postulated that causes exist in the universe which will in time do away with any imperfection.
The second inclination, however, even though it would be forever suspended, implies nothing unnatural in the proper sense of the term since no imperfection is involved.
Now the inclination that the soul has for the body is of the second type.
Or it can be said with Avicenna that once the soul has perfected the body, this desire of the soul has been sated, since the purpose of this union is that the soul through the medium of the body may acquire those of its perfections which it could not acquire without the senses or without a body.
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corpore ; semel autem conjuncta, acquisivit quantum illa simpliciter appetit acquirere illo modo.
Dico ergo quod istarum trium propositionum ex quibus formatur ratio ad resurrectionem quodammodo a priori quia sumptae sunt a forma hominis resuscitandi, prima est naturaliter nota et error ei oppositus qui proprius est et solius Averrois, pessimus est, non tantum contra veritatem theologiae, sed etiam contra veritatem philosophiae ; destruit enim scientiam quia omnes actus intelligendi, ut distinctos ab actibus sentiendi, et omnes actus electionis, ut distinctos ab actibus appetitus sensitivi; et ita omnes virtutes quae non generantur sine electionibus factis secundum rectam rationem et per consequens talis errans esset a communitate hominum, ratione utentium exterminandus.
Sed aliae duae non sunt sufficienter notae ratione naturali, licet ad eas sint quaedam persuasiones probabiles.
Ad secundam quidem plures et probabiliores ; unde et illam videtur magis expresse sensisse Philosophus.
Ad tertiam autem pauciores, et per consequens conclusio sequens ex istis non est sufficienter per istam viam nota ratione naturali.
[Pars Secunda : Rationes a posteriori | Secunda via ad eam est a posterioribus, quarum aliquae probabiles tactae sunt in rationibus principalibus, utpote de beatitudine hominis.
Ad hoc etiam additur de justitia Dei retribuentis; nunc autem in
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
I 56 But if at any time the soul was joined to the body, then it has acquired the perfections that it simply desired to acquire in this way.
[Evaluation of the a priori proof].
Of the three propositions used to construct a kind of a priori argument in the sense that the proof is based on the nature of the form of man that is to be restored, I say that the first is known by natural reason and that the contrary error, which is proper to Averroes only, is of the very worst kind.
Not only is it opposed to theological truth but to philosophical truth as well.
For it destroys knowledge itself inasmuch as it denies any act of knowledge distinct from sensation or any act of choice distinct from sense appetite and hence does away with all those virtues which require an act of choice in accord with right reason.
One who errs in this way, consequently, should be banished from the company of men who use natural reason.
The other two propositions, however, are not known adequately from natural reason even though there are a number of probable persuasive arguments in their favour.2!_ The reasons for the second, indeed are more numerous as well as more highly probable.
For this reason, the Philosopher appears to have held this doctrine more expressly.22.
For the third, however, the reasons are fewer.
The conclusion, then, which follows from these three propositions is not sufficiently known a priori by natural reason.
[Part II.
The A Posteriori Proofs] The second way to prove the resurrection is by a posteriori arguments.
Some probable arguments of this kind were mentioned in the initial arguments, for instance, those concerning the happiness of man.
To the latter this argument based on the justice of a rewarding God is added.
In the present life the virtuous suffer
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vita ista virtuosi majores patiuntur poenas, quam vitios!.
Et istud argumentum videtur Apostolus tangere ad I Cor. xv*:
Siin hac vita tantum sperantes sumus in Christo, miserabiliores sumus omnibus hominibus, etc.
Sed istae rationes a posteriori minus concludunt, quam illa a priori accepta a propria forma hominis ; non enim apparet per rationem naturalem, quod unus est rector omnium hominum secundum leges justitiae retributivae et punitivae.
Et esto quod sic diceretur quod unicuique in bono actu suo sit retributio sufficiens, sicut dicit Augustinus
¢: Jussisti, Domine et ita est, ut sit sibi poena omnis peccator, ita quod ipsum peccatum est prima poena peccati.
Unde patet quod Sancti arguentes a posteriori ad propositum, non intendunt facere, nisi quasdam persuasiones probabiles, sicut Gregorius lib. xIv, t positis ad hoc quibusdam persuasionibus dicit :
Qui propter istas rationes noluerit credere, propter fidem credat.
Consimiliter doctrina Pauli Act. xvii et xxvi ** et I ad Cor. xv t+ per exemplum de grano cadente, et per resurrectionem Christi:
Si Christus resurrexit et mortui resurgent, et per retributionem justam.
Hujusmodi non sunt, nisi persuasiones probabiles, vel tantum ex praemissis creditis.
Patet discurrendo per singula.
[Pars Tertia : Solutio Quaestionis| Breviter ergo potest teneri quod nec a priori puta nec per rationem principii intrinseci in homine, nec a we COre yy 1G:
+ Confessiones, 1, cap. xii (Migne, P.L., xxxu, 670).
{ Moralia in Job, xiv, cap. xl (Migne, P.L., Lxxv, 1077).
** Acts, XVII. 313 XpeyI. 23.
TT 1 Cor. xv.
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more punishments than those who are wicked.
It is this line of argument that the Apostle seems to have in mind in the first letter to the Corinthians* ; ''If with this life only in view we have had hope in Christ, we are of all men the most to be pitied, etc''.
[Evaluation of the a posteriori arguments].
These a posteriori' arguments, however, are even less conclusive than the a prior: proof based on the proper form of man, since it is not clear from natural reason that there is one ruler who governs all men according to the laws of retributive and punitive justice.23
It could also be said that the good act is itself sufficient reward for anyone, as Augustine says in the Confessions, BK. 1¢ : "'For it is even as Thou hast appointed, that every inordinate desire should bring its own punishment'', so that sin itself is the first punishment of sin.
It is clear then that when the saints argued a posteriori for the proposed conclusion, they did not intend to give anything more than probable persuasive proofs. Gregory, for instance, having put down certain such proofs says ¢ :
'Whoever does not wish to believe because of these reasons, let him believe because of faith'.
The same is truc of Paul's teachings in the Acts** and in the first epistle to the Corinthians ff where he uses the example of the grain that falls into the earth, or where he argues from the resurrection of Christ that if Christ be risen, the dead will rise again, or where he appeals to the notion of a just reward.
Such arguments are nothing else than probable persuasive proofs, or they are reasons derived from premises that are matters of belief, as is evident if we examine them individually.
[Part III.
Solution to the Question] To put it briefly, then, we can maintain that natural reason cannot prove that the resurrection is necessary, neither by way of a priort reasons such as those based on (2,322)
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posteriori, puta per rationem alicujus operationis vel perfectionis congruentis homini, potest probari necessario resurrectio, innitendo rationi naturali ; ergo hoc tanquam omnino certum, non tenetur nisi per fidem.
Imo nec secunda propositio in prima via, sicut dicit Augustinus xi De Trinitate, cap. ix,* tenetur per rationem sed tantum per Evangelium,t dicente Christo:
Nolite timere eos qui occidunt corpus, animam autem non possunt occidere...
[Ad Argumenta Principalia] Ad primum argumentum, aut arguitur praecise de desiderio naturali proprie dicto, et ille non est aliquis actus elicitus, sed sola inclinatio naturae ad aliquid, et tunc planum est, quod non potest probari desiderium naturale ad aliquid, nisi primo probetur possibilitas in natura ad illud, et per consequens e converso arguendo est petitio principii ; aut arguitur de desiderio naturali minus proprie dicto, quod scilicet est actus elicitus, sed concorditer inclinationi naturali, et tunc iterum non potest probari quod aliquod desiderium elicitum sit naturale isto modo, nisi prius probetur quod ad illud sit desiderium naturale primo modo.
Si autem arguas: quod illud naturaliter desideratur, quod apprehensum statim actu elicito desideratur, quia ista pronitas non videtur esse nisi ex inclinatione naturali.
Hic uno modo negaretur prima, quia vitiosus statim inclinatur secundum habitum suum ad desiderandum illud quod sibi offertur ; sed quia natura non statim est
©x se vitiosa, nec in omnibus, et quilibet statim appetit * xu, cap. ix (Migne, P.L., xin, 1023).
7 Mt. x. 28.
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the notion of the intrinsic principle in man, nor by a posterior' arguments, for instance, by reason of some operation or perfection fitting to man.
Hence we hold the resurrection to be certain on the basis of faith alone.
Furthermore, as Augustine says in De Trinitate, BK. x10, c. ix,* the second proposition used in the first [or a priori] proof [viz. of the immortality of the human soul] is not held because reason dictates this, but solely because of the Gospel t where Christ tells us: "Do not be afraid of those who kill the body but cannot kill the soul''.
[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning] To the first argument 24:
If the argument is based on the notion of natural desire taken in an exact and proper sense, and a natural desire in this sense is not an elicited act but merely an inclination of nature towards something, then it is clear that the existence of such a natural desire for anything can be proved only if we prove first that the nature in question is able to have such a thing.
To argue the other way round, therefore, is begging the question.
Or if natural desire is taken in a less proper sense, viz. as an act elicited in conformity with the natural inclination, we are still unable to prove that any elicited desire is natural in this sense without first proving the existence of a natural desire in the proper sense of the term.
But suppose that someone were to argue that whatever is immediately desired, once it is known, is something that is desired naturally, since such proneness seems to arise only from some natural inclination.
One answer to this objection would be to deny the first statement, since a person with bad habits is inclined to desire immediately whatever is in accord with these habits just as soon as such a thing presents itself.
However, if nothing else intervenes, nature of itself is not vicious ; neitheris it vicious ineveryone.
Consequently, if everyone
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illud apprehensum, sequitur quod illud desiderium non est vitiosum; ergo ista responsio non est generalis.
Ideo potest dici quod oporteret ostendere illam apprehensionem esse secundum rectam rationem non erroneam; alioquin si ad apprehensionem erroneam statim omnes appetant actu elicito, non sequitur illud desiderium esse consonum inclinationi naturae ; imo magis oppositum.
Non est autem manifestum per rationem naturalem, quod ratio ostendens homini semper esse tanquam appetibile, sit ratio non erronea, quia prius oporteret ostendere quod istud posset competere homini.
Breviter ergo omne medium ex desiderio naturali videtur esse inefficax, quia ad efficaciam ejus oporteret ostendere vel potentiam naturalem in natura ad istud, vel quod apprehensio, quam statim sequitur istud desiderium, si sit actus elicitus, sit apprehensio recta et non erronea ; et horum primum est idem cum conclusione quae concluditur ex desiderio naturali.
Secundum autem difficilius vel minus notum ista conclusione.
Et ad probationem hujus quod desiderium hominis naturale est ad immortalitatem, quia naturaliter fugit mortem, posset dici quod ista probatio concluderet aeque de quocumque bruto.
Et si addatur illud Philosophi m De generatione*:
Melius est in omnibus semper esse quam non esse, istud est ad oppositum, tum quia aeque concluderet in bruto sicut in homine ; tum quia subdit :
Hoc autem in omnibus impossibile existere continue propter longe a principio distare : ideo reliquo modo complevit Deus naturam continuam facere generationem,
* De generatione et corruptione, u, cap. x (226, 25 ff.).
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immediately desires such a thing as soon as he knows of it, it would follow that the desire in this case is not vicious.
The first answer to this objection, then, is not adequate.
Therefore it could be answered like this. We must show that such knowledge is not erroneous but is in accord with right reason.
Otherwise, it does not follow that just because everyone, on the basis of an erroneous conception, were immediately to elicit on act of desire, this desire is in accord with an inclination of nature.
Indeed, it is rather the opposite that follows.
Now it is not clear by natural reason that the argument establishing eternal existence as something desirable is not erroneous, since man must first be shown to be capable of such a thing.
To put it briefly, then, every argument based on natural desire seems to be inconclusive, for to construct an efficacious argument, it would be necessary to show either that nature possesses a natural potency for eternal life, or that the knowledge which immediately gives rise to this desire, where the latter is an elicited act, is not erroneous but in accord with right reason.
Now the first of these alternatives is the same as the conclusion to be established.25
'The second is more difficult to prove and is even less evident than the conclusion.
As fer the proof that man has a natural desire for immortality because he naturally shuns death, it can be said that this proof applies to the brute animal as well as toman.
And should some one bring up the statement of the Philosopher in De generatione et corruptione, BK. 1* that it is better for everything to exist forever than not to exist forever, this is really an argument for the opposite view ; first of all, because it holds equally well for both brute and man, and secondly, because Aristotle himself adds:
''Since it is impossible, however, for all things to exist forever because of their great distance from their source, therefore God adopted the remaining alternative and completes the perfection of nature by making generation continuous".
It is just as if Aristotle wished to
DUNS SCOTUS
quasi dicat, cum desiderium naturale sit ad semper esse, in quibus est hoc impossibile in seipso, est illud sicut possibile est, scilicet in continuatione speciel in diversis individuis; et ita concederet de homine sicut de alio generabile quod habet naturale desiderium ad semper esse, non in unico individuo, sed in tali successione.
Sed semper videtur stare vis quod fugiens unum oppositum, non fugit illud nisi propter amorem alterius.
Concedi potest quod ex hoc sequitur quod cum fugiat mortem pro nunc, amat vitam pro nunc, et sic de quolibet nunc signato.
Sed non sequitur, ergo pro infinito.
Ad illud Apostoli: respondeo nolumus nos inspirati sive certificati per fidem, et utique nolumus naturaliter sic, quod istud nolle est secundum inclinationem naturalem, sed non est notum ratione naturali quod istud nolle est secundum inclinationem naturalem.
Ad secundum, concedo quod verum est beatitudinem non solum in universali, sed etiam in speciali appeti naturaliter ab homine, sicut inferius patebit dist. xLrx.*
Sed non est notum naturali ratione quod ipsa in particulari, quae scilicet consistit in illo in quo nos credimus eam consistere, appetatur naturaliter ab homine autem ; enim oporteret esse notum per rationem naturalem, quod esset ille actus nobis conveniens tanquam finis.
Cum ergo probas per Philosophum quod beatitudo non tantum in generali ex 1 Ethicorum, + sed etiam in speciali ex X { appetitur naturaliter, respondeo: illa ratio beatitudinis quam Philosophus reputat specialem, quod scilicet consistat in speculatione altissimarum causarum perfectissima, est valde universalis ; in speciali autem
* Opus oxoniense, tv, dist. XLIx, q. ix, nn. 2-3 (Vivés, VOL. XxI, 318).
+ Ethica Nicomachea, 1, cap. vii (10975, 1ff.). t x, cap. vii-viii (117%, 12ff.).
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL'
say that since there is a natural desire to exist forever, in those beings incapable of such existence there is a desire for such continued existence as is possible, viz. through the continuity of the species in diverse individuals.
And so one could grant that just like the other beings that can be generated, man too has a natural desire to exist forever—not indeed in a single individual, but in a continual succession of individuals.
As for the principle that one flees from one thing only because he loves its opposite, however, it appears that this is always valid.
We can admit that it follows from this principle that if one shuns death now, he loves life now, and the same can be said at any given moment.
But from this it does not follow that he loves to live forever.
To that argument from the Apostle, I reply that we who do not wish [to be unclothed or who are averse to dying] are we who are made certain or inspired by faith.
We are indeed naturally averse to dying inasmuch as such an aversion is in accord with an inclination of nature.
But it is not known to natural reason that this aversion is in accord with an inclination of nature.
To the second argument:
I concede that it is true man naturally seeks happiness not only in general but also in particular, as will be made clear in distinction xLrx.*
But it is not known by natural reason that man naturally desires that particular beatitude which consists in what we believe it to consist,26 for it would be necessary to know by natural reason that such an act pertains to us as an end.
Consequently, when you prove by the Philosopher that not only is beatitude in general desired naturally (from Nicomachean Ethics, BK. 1)} but also beatitude in particular (from Bx.x),t I reply that the beatitude which the Philosopher considered particular, namely the beatitude which consisted in the most perfect speculation about the highest causes, is in fact a knowledge through universals.2?7_ By descending to particulars, then, Aristotle
DUNS SCOTUS
descendendo, ipse non videtur processisse ultra speculatiotionem perfectissimam in vita ista.
Unde inquisita ista beatitudine hominis subdit : Oportet et corpus sanum esse, et cibum, et famulatum esse, non tamen aestimandum multum magnis indigere, felicem.
Ergo felicitas illa specialis quam nos ponimus speculationem homini possibilem longe perfectior est quacumque possibili in vita ista, illa non est naturaliter nota esse finis noster nec naturaliter notum est eam naturaliter appeti a nobis tanquam finem.
Cum probas per rationem Augustini beatitudinem non posse esse nisi sempiternam, dabitur istud ab illo qui tenet beatitudinem humanam posse haberi in vita ista,
_ quod volens amittit eam, quia debet secundum rectam rationem velle conditionem naturae suae.
Recta autem ratio ostendit isti non habenti fidem, ut videtur sibi, quod conditio naturae suae est mortalitas tam animae quam corporis, et ideo debet velle sicut et vitam amittere, ita vitam beatam.
Et cum dicis, non est vita beata quae non erat amata ab habente, verum est, si non esset amata pro tunc quando est possibilis, et conveniens illi amanti, sed sic esse convenientem pro semper non est notum per rationem naturalem.
Ad aliud conceditur quod notum est homini ipsum posse consequi finem suum in aliquo individuo, et per consequens, beatitudinem in illo gradu in quo notum est beatitudinem esse finem hominis.
Et cum dicis hoc impossibile esse in vita ista, dico quod ista impossibilitas non est nota per rationem naturalem.
Cum adducis infortuna, infirmitatem, imperfectionem virtutis et scientiae, respondetur quod haec omnia repugnant perfectae felicitati, qualem notum est competere Intelligentiae, sed non qualem notum est posse competere homini,
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
I6I did not seem to go beyond the most perfect speculation possible in this life.
Hence, having inquired into the nature of this happiness of man, Aristotle adds 28 :
"To be happy it is necessary for man that his body be healthy, that he have food, companionship, that he does not crave too much or want too much"'.
Since we assume that man is capable of a speculation far more perfect than anything possible in this life, the special happiness which we postulate is not known naturally to be our end, neither is it known naturally that we seek it as an end.
When you argue from Augustine's proof that happiness cannot be anything but eternal, a person who holds that human happiness is possible in this life will reply that he does wish to lose it.
For according to right reason, he must wish whatever is the lot of his nature.
But to a person who has no faith, right reason seemingly reveals the lot of our nature to be mortal both in body and soul.
Therefore, he must wish to lose life and therefore to lose the happy life.
And when you say that such a life is not happy which had not been loved by the one who possessed it, this is true only if such a life had not been loved at a time when it was both possible and fitting to have it. But it is not known by natural reason that to be happy forever is something in accord with our nature.
As for the other [or third argument], we grant that man knows he can attain his end in some individual, and consequently, that he knows he can attain happiness in the degree recognised to be man's end.
When you say that such happiness is not possible in this life, I reply that this impossibility is not known by natural reason.
When you adduce the misfortune, bodily infirmity, inperfection of virtue and knowledge, the answer is that these are inconsistent with the type of perfect happiness known to be characteristic of an Intelligence ?® but they are not inconsistent with the happiness known to be within the reach of man.
DUNS SCOTUS
Ad quartum, diceretur quod ista species perpetuabitur in universo per continuam successionem individuorum quam poneret Philosophus per generationem continuam, non autem continuabitur per vitam alicujus, nec aliquorum in specie.
Ex his apparet quantae sunt gratiae referendae nostre Creatori qui nos per fidem certissimos reddidit in his, quae pertinent ad finem nostrum, et ad perpetuitatem sempiternam ad quae ingeniosissimi et eruditissimi per rationem naturalem quasi nihil poterant attingere, juxta illud quod adductum est de Augustino xi De Trinitate cap. ix* : Quod vix pauci, etc.
Si fides adsit quae est in eis quibus dedit filios Dei fieri, nulla quaestio est quia ipse suos credentes in hoc certissimos reddit.
* xi, cap. ix (Migne, P.L., xLu, 1023).
THE SPIRITUALITY AND IMMORTALITY OF THE SOUL
To the fourth, it might be said that in the universe it is the species that will go on forever through the continuous succession of individuals.
It is this which the Philosopher postulated by his doctrine of continuous generation.
But it is not the life of any single individual or individuals within the species that will continue to exist.
From all this it is apparent how much thanks must be given to our Creator, who through faith has made us most certain of those things which pertain to our end and to eternal life—things about which the most learned and ingenious men can know almost nothing according to Augustine's statement in De Trinitate, BK. XII, c. 1x* :
""Scarcely a few, etc''.2° "But if faith be there—that faith which is to be found in those to whom [Jesus] has given the power to become the sons of God—there is no question about it," *4 for of this He has made those who believe in Him most certain.
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NOTES
NOTES Section I 1 The mss read either phicos or phycos.
The text is faulty here as it is in so many other instances.
Scotus's meaning, however, seems clear enough. w In quid and in quale are two basic modes of predication. They refer primarily to the five predicables of Porphyry, namely, the genus, species, specific difference, property, and accident, though Scotus extends the idea of in quid and in quale predication to the transcendental order.
Briefly, the difference between the two is this. To predicate in quid means to predicate either the entire essence (i.e. the species) or at least the determinable part of the essence
(e.g. the genus).
The term is derived from quiddity or essence and such predication represents an answer to the question:
What is it?
(Quid est?).
To predicate in quale means to predicate a further determination or qualification of the essence.
This qualification (quale) may be either essential (e.g. a specific difference) or non-essential
(e.g. a property or accident).
Since the specific difference is really a part of the essence or quiddity, Scotus sometimes speaks of it as being predicated in quale quid or in quale substantiale in order to distinguish it from properties or accidents which are said to be predicated either in quale accidentale or simply in quale.
To predicate something in quid, says Scotus, it is not enough that the predicate be an essential note but that it be predicated per modum subsistentis, which from the viewpoint of grammar means that it must be predicated as a noun, not as an adjective or participle or adverb.
Predication in quale, whether it be an essential qualification or not, is always predicated per modum denominantis, which from the viewpoint of grammar means it is predicated as a modifier.
"Substance", "whiteness", "rationality", "rational animal"'', "'life'', "'truth'',
"goodness", if used as predicates, would be predicated in quid, ; :
: be hai whereas "substantial", "white", "rational'', "living", "true",
DUNS SCOTUS
"good", if used as predicates, would be predicated in quale.
"Being" (ens) can be used either as a noun or as a participle.
In the first case it is predicated in quid and is equivalent to "a being" or "a thing" with a singular and plural. In the second case, if used as a predicate, it is predicated in quale or denominative.
Used as a participle, "being" always requires a subject which it modifies.
Ultimate differences are denominative terms that are irreducibly simple.
In regard to concepts that designate real things or some real aspects of real things (first intentions), Scotus distinguishes those which are irreducibly simple and those which are not.
Irreducibly simple concepts (conceptus simpliciter simplices) are such as cannot be reduced or broken down into two more simple concepts that are first intentions, one of which is determinable and the other determining.
The concept of "man'', for instance, can be reduced to "'animal"' and "'rational''. ""Animal"' in turn can be broken down into "sentient " and ''organism"'.
This process, according to Scotus, cannot go on indefinitely.
Otherwise nothing would be known.
Ultimately we arrive at intelligible elements or notions that are incapable of further analysis and hence are irreducibly simple.
Restricting ourselves to real concepts, that is "'first intentions', we can say, according to Scotus, that there is but one irreducible simple concept that is determinable or quidditative, and that this is
"thing" or "'being'' used as a noun.
But there will be as many irreducibly simple differential, determining, or qualifying concepts as there are different concepts, where different is taken in the technical Aristotelian sense.
(Things differ, according to the Stagirite, only if they have something in common ; otherwise they are simply diverse.
Cf. Metaphysica, x, cap. iii, 1054', 23-30).
Since Scotus gives as examples of concepts that are not irreducibly simple that of the individual, the species and the genus, and since even such concepts must contain an ultimate difference, it seems that we can distinguish three types of ultimate differences, according to him:
(1) the haecceitas or individuating difference; (2) certain kinds of specific differences ; (3) transcendental differences, such. as those which limit or contract "being" to the ultimate genera
NOTES
or categories, or such notions as "'infinite", 'necessary', "accidental", etc.
According to Scotus, not every. specific difference should be considered to be irreducibly simple.
Since we are speaking of first intentions we must take into consideration the nature of the reality designated by the concept.
Consider the notion "living body".
According to Scotus, "living" is derived from and connotes the life principle which is a form or substance really distinct from the body which has its own forma corporeitatis.
Since the life principle can be designated by a determinable or non-differential notion (e.g. "'substance'', "thing'', "fa being') Scotus does not consider the term "living", as applied to an organism or man, as an irreducibly simple concept.
Sucha specific difference is not ultimate, though further analysis will eventually yield a specific difference that is irreducibly simple (Cf. Opus oxoniense, 1, d. 1, q. Vi, nN. 12; 1, d. m, q. ili, n. 153; u, d. xxv, q. i, n. 16).
Attributes or properties (propria or passiones) are those qualifica- = tions which are necessarily connected with their respective subject yet do not enter into its essential definition.
"Being" has two types or attributes, those which are simply coextensive, such as "'one"', "'true'', '"good'', and those which are coextensive in disjunction such as "'infinite-finite'', 'simple-composed'',
"necessary-contingent"', etc.
The primacy of commonness, or better, of common predication, which Scotus ascribes to being, simply means that "being" conceived quidditatively or as a noun is predicable of anything that can be grasped by a concept that is not irreducibly simple.
The virtual primacy that Scotus attributes to ''being"' in reference to its attributes and ultimate differences does not mean that the formal concept or ratio "'being" contains these notions in such a way that the latter can be abstracted from the former by an act of intellectual abstraction or analysis as some have claimed.
It simply means that these other notions or rationes are predicable by a necessary or per se predication of some subject that can be designated as "'a being" or "a thing"'.
According to scholastic usage, if the predicate of a necessary or per se nota proposition is part of the essential definition of (2,322)
DUNS SCOTUS
the subject, the latter is said to '"'contain the predicate essentially" and the predicate is said to be predicated according to the first mode of per se predication.
If the predicate, however, is an attribute or property (see above, note 4) it is said to be "contained virtually in the subject " of which it is predicated necessarily and according to the second mode of per se predication.
Since every modification or qualification presupposes some subject that is modified or qualified, the subject is said to have a natural priority or primacy in regard to the modification or qualification.
Applying this to the notion of "being" conceived quidditatively or as a noun, Scotus argues that since "'being"' is the ultimate subject or determinable element to which every concept not irreducibly simple can be reduced,
"being"? has a primacy in regard to all such concepts or "primary intelligibles'.
Since "'being" is furthermore the ultimate subject of which the attributes and ultimate differences are predicable, "'being'' can be said to enjoy a virtual primacy in regard to these notions.
Since the latter will express either a property (proprium) or an essential determination
(specific difference or transcendental modification), Scotus declares that all notions that are ultimate qualifications (such as the attributes like "'one'', "'true'', etc., or ultimate differences like
"substantial'', "infinite'', "finite", etc.) are "'contained virtually [i.e. as a proprium] or essentially [i.e. as a specific difference or transcendental determination] in something else which does include ' being' essentially [i.e. in something which is a primary intelligible].
Scotus alludes to the theological teaching that in the Eucharist the substance of bread and wine is no longer present after the act of consecration, though the species or appearances (accidents) remain.
> For the meaning of irreducibly simple cf. note 3 above.
The simple intellect or simple intelligence is a term applied to the mind or intellect in so far as it is the principle of the act of simple apprehension or intelligence. The scholastics distinguish three acts or functions of the mind or intellect:
(1) simple apprehension, whereby the mind grasps the meaning of ao
NOTES
something without affirming or denying anything of it; (2) the act of "composition and division", or immediate judgment, whereby the mind affirms or denies some predicate of some subject ; (3) the act of reasoning or mediate judgment, by which the mind infers one proposition from another or other propositions.
Demonstration, according to Aristotle (Analytica posteriora, 1, cap. xiii) is of two kinds: demonstration of the fact (demono stratio quia) and demonstration of the reasoned fact (demonstratio propter quid).
'The first merely establishes that the conclusion of the syllogism is true, but the second additionally indicates the reason why the predicate of the conclusion inheres in the subject.
For the middle term of a demonstration of reasoned fact gives the cause or some ontologically prior principle (e.g. the essential definition) that can be considered as the reason or rational explanation why the predicate must be affirmed of the subject.
A demonstration of reasoned fact will always be an a priori form of demonstration ; an a posteriori demonstration, on the contrary, will always be a demonstration of the simple fact.
Scotus has previously discussed why God is the subject of theology but not of metaphysics, and to what extent theology verifies the Aristotelian notion of a science.
"Its principle'', that is, some self-evident or analytical proposition of which it is the subject.
_ Section II For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see pp. 30 ff. ry The statement of Pseudo-Dionysius that we do not know what
God is ; we know only what he is not (Cf. De caelesti hierarchia, u.
Migne, P.G., m, 141 ; see also St John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, 1, iv. Migne P.G., xctv, 800), was often quoted by the scholastics.
This docta ignorantia was exaggerated by many.
Scotus Eriugena, for instance, suggests that perhaps it might be more correct to say that God is not good, true, just, etc., i
DUNS SCOTUS
since any term or concept we might derive from the universe of creatures is so radically inadequate to express what God is that it could more truly be denied of God than affirmed of Him (Cf. De divisione naturae, 1, xiv ff. Migne, P.L., cxxm, 462ff.).
Duns Scotus reminds us that this way of speaking cannot be taken too seriously.
If our knowledge is purely negative, it is no knowledge of God at all.
Henry of Ghent makes use of this distinction in his Summa, art. xxii, q. iad ili; q. iv.
Henry of Ghent, loc. cit., q. iv; St Thomas, Summa theologica, I, q. ili, art. iv ad iil.
Henry of Ghent, loc. cit. a Ibid.
Henry maintains that God is already known in a most general Q manner in every concept the human intellect forms of a created object as "this being".
Consequently, he is forced to hold that we cannot know a creature without at the same time having some knowledge of God.
This knowledge of God in creatures, however, must be distinguished from a knowledge of God as He is in Himself.
See Summa, art. xxii, q. vi.
Henry, Summa, art. xxiv, q. vi.
For Scotus's answer to Henry's arguments, see p. 32.
Henry contrasts two radically different notions.
By privatively undetermined being, he understands the notion of being that applies to creatures.
As creatures actually exist, they are qualified or determinate forms of being.
For instance, man is a rational, sentient, organic, material, substantial being.
Nevertheless, the mind prescinds from all these determinations to form a simple concept of being, undetermined but determinable.
The concept of being that applies to God, however, negates or denies all determination and therefore is called negatively undetermined being.
God, in a word, is not only being in an -unqualified and undetermined sense, but His being is incapable of any restriction, limitation or determination.
Therefore, being in this sense is undetermined and indeterminable.
Now determinable and indeterminable beings have nothing positive
NOTES
in common; they agree only in what is denied, namely, determination.
'Therefore, our so-called "concept" of being as common to God and creatures is in reality not one concept but two.
But because of their similarity, the mind fails to distinguish between the two, even as the eye fails to resolve two distant objects.
This dual "concept" is what Henry calls the ''analogous concept of being"'.
In scholastic terminology, "'indetermination" as applied to God is a first intention.
It expresses a perfection of a really existent entity, in this case the positive mode of existence, infinity.
Indetermination in the second instance, is characteristic not of a real entity, but of our concept of being.
It is a second intention, since it refers not to some condition of reality but to a characteristic of a concept or ens rationis.
Only what is true can be an object of "'knowledge" or scientia in the strict Aristotelian or scholastic sense of the term.
Hence, 'false knowledge"? is a contradiction in terms.
Similarly certitude, in the technical sense of the term, presupposes that the proposition to which the mind gives its firm assent is a true and not a false statement.
et The intellect, according to the general view of the scholastics, is a dual faculty comprising the active or agent intellect and the passive or possible intellect.
This division is based upon an obscure passage in Aristotle's De anima (m1, cap. v ; 430% 18) and underwent a variety of interpretations.
With Alexander of Aphrodisias, as well as with some scholastic interpretations of Augustinian illumination, the active intellect is identified with God.
With Alfarabi and Avicenna, it is a subordinate intelligence or ''angel'? somehow connected with the moon,
St Thomas considers the active intellect to be a faculty of the soul really distinct from the possible intellect.
Scotus also considers it to be a property of the soul but regards it as only formally distinct from, but really identical with, the possible intellect and the soul's substance.
The general function of the active intellect is to render the potentially intelligible in the sense image actually intelligible.
The additional specific refinements Scotus has given to this general function do not concern us here.
DUNS SCOTUS
Notions pertaining to the essence of the object (generic, differential or specific notions) are contained "essentially".
Colour, for instance, is contained essentially in redness.
A notion is regarded as virtually contained in a given object, if the object has the power or virtus of producing the notion in the mind.
In a broad sense, "'virtual'' is not opposed to "essential", since the object has the power to produce a concept of what it contains essentially.
In addition, however, the object can be said to contain virtually its necessary properties
(propria) or any effects it is capable of producing.
An object such as a golf-ball could produce a simple notion proper of itself as a sphere and also a simple proper notion of a circle, according to Scotus, for the notion of circularity is virtually contained in the notion of sphericity.
Such an object, however, could not give rise to a simple proper notion of a triangle or pentagon.
A pure or simple perfection (perfectio simpliciter) is one that does not contain in its formal notion any imperfection or limitation.
As such it is opposed to mixed perfections (ferfectio secundum quid) which involve both perfection and imperfection.
Knowledge, volition, existence, wisdom and the like are regarded by Scotus as pure perfections.
Matter, corporeity, sense knowledge or even knowledge obtained by a reasoning process as contrasted with intuitive knowledge, all involve limitation and imperfection in their very notion.
For this discussion see above, pp. 4-8.
Scotus distinguishes between two types of objects that move the intellect of a creature to knowledge, one natural, the other voluntary or supernatural.
The natural motivating object of an intellect causes knowledge automatically or necessarily, as it were, by the very fact that it is what it is and is co-present to that intellect.
Now the divine essence is a natural or adequate motivating object of immediate and intuitive knowledge only in regard to the divine intellect itself.
For any created intellect, God's essence is a purely voluntary object.
The reason, says Scotus, lies in this fact that God's essence cannot be related necessarily or automatically, as it were, to any
NOTES
creature or part thereof—a corollary of the absolute independence of the First Being.
All relationships between God and creatures are contingent and dependent upon the divine will, the ultimate source of all contingency.
Consequently, in the beatific vision of God in heaven, says Scotus, it is not the divine essence as such that moves the intellect but rather the divine will.
In this sense, God is a voluntary object.
But the peculiarity of the beatific vision lies in the fact that the divine will motivates but does not terminate this act of intuition.
And this is something unique in the order of objects and follows from the fact that God's will is really identical with God's essence (Cf. Quodlibet, q. xiv).
7 For the distinction between a demonstration of the fact and a demonstration of the reasoned fact see note 9 above.
In this particular instance, the demonstration of the fact referred to ~ is an a posteriori argument which proceeds from effect (creatures) to cause (God).
In such a process, that which is most unlike creatures, and consequently most distinctive of God, is the last to be demonstrated.
See Scotus's proof for the existence of God, pp. 52 ff.
The less universal and more specific the concept, the greater
its comprehension or intension.
The concept of man, for instance, contains the more universal notions of ''animal'',
"organism"', "'substance'', "'being"', in its intension.
The scholastics list a number of loci from which a dialectitian may draw his arguments.
The locus a minori assumes that what is within the power of the less perfect, is also within that
of the more perfect.
Now the intellect, a purely spiritual faculty, is more perfect than the imagination, an organic faculty.
Seep; 14.
See p. 14.
For a description of this fallacy see Aristotle's De sophisticis elenchis, cap. v (1675, 1-20).
Intuitive knowledge of God is supernatural.
See note 16,
DUNS SCOTUS
See p. 14.
See pp. 68 ff.
See p. 14.
See p. 17:
Section III For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see p. 76.
This is the solution given by Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. i<) Xxi, q. 1.
See Aristotle, De caelo, 1, cap. iii (270%, 12-13); cap. xii (2815, 18 ff.) ;_ u, cap. iv (2872, 23-24) ; cap. vi (289%, 8-9) ;
Metaphysica, 1X, cap. vili (1050, 22-24). oo See p. 173, note 17.
Cf. Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. xxxvi, q. unica, n. 5.
Cf. St Thomas, Summa theologica, 1, q. ii, art. 111 corpus, quarta via.
'Natural'? is understood in the technical sense of a cause that acts by a necessity of nature and not deliberately or freely.
Efficient causes, according to Scotus, fall into two classes : a (1) those which possess antecedent rational knowledge and act deliberately ; (2) those which lack such knowledge and act automatically or by a necessity of nature.
See Quaest. in Metaphysicam, Ix, q. xv, n. 4. (Vivés, VOL. vil, 608° ff.) where he divides all active powers into either nature or will.
Here he proves paradoxically that according to Aristotle's division of rational and irrational powers the intellect is "irrational" in the sense that it acts automatically in the presence of evident truth whereas the will is "rational" in the sense that it can freely choose to love or not to love an object known through reason or intellect.
In an ascending order one progresses by going from the posterior to the prior; in a descending order, from the prior to the posterior.
For instance, in regard to a series of temporally ordered causes where one precedes the other in time, many philosophers (e.g. St Bonaventure) deny the possibility of an a
NOTES
infinite regress into the past (an ascending order) and use this argument to establish a creation in time, yet they admit the possibility of effects of created causes continuing indefinitely into the future (infinite regress in a descending temporal order).
Scotus, as-his answer to the objection that follows indicates, denies categorically the possibility of an infinite regress in an ascending order only in regard to essentially ordered causes.
Inasmuch as such causes must exist simultaneously to produce a given effect, a chain of such causes will be non-temporal in character.
According to Aristotle's theory of colour borrowed from Plato (Zimaeus, 67E), fine particles penetrate and dilate the medium whereas large particles compress it producing white or black colour respectively.
Cf. Metaphysica, x, cap. vii (10579, 8). Hence "dilating" is regarded as a property of anything white, and "'white'' may be regarded as a per se cause of the same. os See Aristotle, Physica, 11, cap. 111 (195%, 27 ff.); cap. v (196°,
24-29) ; Metaphysica, v, cap. 11 (1013%, 29Qss).
1 i— See Aristotle, Metaphysica, v, cap. xi (1018, g-11).
1 = See p. 30.
See p. 42.
Scotus contrasts "'nature'' as a necessarily acting cause with a free agent acting with purpose or deliberation.
See above, note 7.
See pp. 46-7.
Cf. Scotus's third conclusion, p. 46.
See pp. 47-8.
1 a A univocal cause is one whose effect is of the same nature as
itself.
A father, for instance, is the univocal cause of his son.
An equivocal cause, on the contrary, is of a different nature from its effect.
For instance the artist is an equivocal cause of his painting.
Since the less perfect cannot be the total cause of the more perfect, the total or principal cause, if
DUNS SCOTUS
equivocal, must be more perfect than its effect.
This argument seems to presuppose that efficient causality involves no imperfection and therefore will be found in the most excellent nature.
Cf. pp. 42 and 45.
19 Scotus is not attempting to prove numerical or individual unity at this point but rather a unity of nature.
To put it in other words, the triple primacy is characteristic of but one kind of being.
Whether there is more than one individual of this kind is not discussed here but in the following question on the unicity of God (cf. pp. 82 ff.).
Scotus's intention is expressed more clearly in the De Primo Principio, chapter iii of which parallels the present question of the Oxoniense.
He proposes "'to demonstrate, if Thou wilt grant it, that some one nature is simply first.
However, I say one nature for this reason, because in this third chapter the aforesaid three primacies will be shown, not about a unique singular or one in number, but about a unique quiddity or nature.
There will, however, be mention of numerical unity later."
(De Primo Principio, cap. iii ; Roche translation, p. 39).
20 'Possible' is taken as the contradictory disjunction of "necessary".
It designates a being which exists in virtue of another and hence, of itself, is merely possible.
Scotus seems to have been influenced by Avicenna's possibile esse and necesse esse.
21 See note 14.
22 Scotus refers to his theory of "'natural appetite'? in virtue of which appetite every nature seeks its own perfection.
This 'seeking', however, is not to be understood in the sense of a conscious striving for some known goal but is merely the ontological relation that exists between a thing and whatever can perfect.
In this sense, for instance, matter seeks or loves form and vice versa.
In the present case the subject perfected and that which perfects it (viz. the end) are simply identical.
Hence, Scotus argues that if we say the First Agent has a 'natural love"' of itself, this is equivalent to saying that it is its own perfection or it is itself.
NOTES
See Aristotle, Physica, vit, cap. vi (259, 32 ff.) ; De caelo, Il, cap. iii (286%, 34 ff.) ; De generatione et corruptione, u, cap. X (3362, 23 ff.) ; Metaphysica, xu, cap. vi-vii (10724, 9 ff.).
A subject is said to be in contradictory potency to something if it can either have it or not have it.
The argument here is this.
If thought can either be present or absent so far as the nature itself is concerned, then to think requires some effort on the part of the nature and this would eventually produce weariness.
The first act or actualisation of a being is that it exists with
its various faculties or powers.
Thus, for instance, so far as man's body is endowed or informed by the human soul, man is in first act.
When a man actualises his human faculties or powers by acts of seeing, thinking, willing, etc., he is in second act.
For Scotus, a rational nature achieves its highest perfection by loving the highest good.
Activum implies an immanent operation, that is one which is not only initiated by the subject but remains in and perfects that subject.
Vital activities such as thought, volition and the like are immanent operations.
/Factivum, on the other hand, implies that the operation is transient, that is, has a term outside the agent.
Man's artifacts are produced by a transient activity.
Cf. St Thomas, Sent., 1, dist. xxxv, q. i, art. i ad iii; Summa theologica, 1, q. xiv, art. il. a
Scotus uses the term ratio intelligendi (literally ''the reason for knowing"').
The allusion here is probably to the notion of an 'intelligible species", which in human knowledge is supposed to substitute for the object in such a way as to make universal concepts possible.
Even if one were to postulate something analogous to the species in regard to God's knowledge, it would still be identical with His essence and intellect.
Since whatever receives something is perfected by the form received, it would follow that the more perfect knowledge would be perfected by the less perfect.
See Quaest. in Metaphysicam, vu, q. xv, Nn. 9.
DUNS SCOTUS
"Infinity" is regarded here as a degree of intensity which the perfection in question possesses.
Scotus distinguishes between intensive and extensive infinity.
A thing is said to be extensively infinite if there is no pure perfection (cf. p. 172, note 14) which it does not possess.
Nothing, however, is said in regard to the intensity or degree to which such perfections are possessed.
Each pure perfection, however, is said to be intensively infinite if it exists in the highest degree possible for that respective perfection.
Thus God would not be extensively infinite if He lacked knowledge and love.
But His knowledge is intensively infinite if it is a comprehensive knowledge of all that can be known, including His infinitely intelligible nature.
3 = Cf. e.g. Aristotle, Metaphysica, 11, v (994%, 1-2).
Scotus distinguishes between the omnipotence of God as an article of his Catholic creed (omnipotence in the proper sense of the term) and the infinite power of God (omnipotence in a qualified sense) as demonstrated philosophically by reason unaided by faith (Cf. Quodlibet, q. vii ; Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. xlii, q. unica).
In this distinction we see the influence of the philosophy of Alfarabi and Avicenna.
The latter, influenced by Plotinus's theory of emanation, maintained that God can create only one being immediately, viz. the highest Intelligence.
This creature in turn produces subordinate Intelligences.
The creation of the earth as well as the heavenly bodies and their souls is the work of these created Intelligences.
Even in this theory, however, God is the ultimate cause of all things that emanate directly or indirectly from Him, and therefore the First Cause in some qualified sense at least is omnipotent.
As a theologian, however, Scotus could not subscribe to this view, for according to his theology, he believed that whatever
God can do through the medium of the secondary cause He has created He can do directly or immediately if He so willed.
But Scotus makes this much of a concession to Arabic philosophy, namely, that in our present state we can only demonstrate that God can create all things either mediately or immediately and in this sense God's power must be infinite intensively.
We can give only probable arguments for
NOTES
omnipotence in the proper sense of the term, according to him, and cannot demonstrate that God could create all possible things immediately.
84 See, for instance, Aristotle's doctrine (cf. note 23).
Also Averroes, Physica, vit, com. 9; Metaphysica, vu, com. 28 ; IX, com. 41, etc.; Avicenna, Metaphysices compendium, 1, pars iv, tr. ii, cap. 1, etc.
35 See, for instance, St Thomas, Summa theologica, 1, q. xlv, art. v ad iii ; Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. xxxv, q. vi; Quodlibet rv, q. XXXvii.
36 The classical definition of creation is esse post non-esse, that is "existence after non-existence'.
The question arises : How is post or "'after'' to be understood ? The obvious interpretation is to take it in a temporal sense.
Avicenna, however, to reconcile the dogma of divine creation and the Aristotelian theory of the eternity of the world understood post in an ontological sense, viz. that the nature of a creature considered absolutely or in itself does not imply existence.
Since any thing it possesses in addition to its nature is subsequent to that nature, existence can be said to be subsequent or "after" nonexistence.
Following Avicenna, St Thomas, Scotus and others tend to interpret this definition in an ontological rather than a temporal sense.
37 See note 28.
38 See pp. 46 and 73.
39 See pp. 45-6.
40 See Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. ili, q. iii, nn. 10, 24, 28; dist. ii, q. vii, n. 42, etc.
Briefly, intuition is a simple or non-discursive knowledge of something as existing.
Abstract knowledge prescinds from actual existence or non-existence.
41 Cf. St Thomas, Summa theologica, 1, q. vii. art. i; Contra gentiles, I, cap. xlv, etc.
42 St Thomas, Sent., u, dist. iii, q. i, art. i; Summa theologica, 1, q. 1, art. ii, See E. Hocedez's introduction to Aegidii Romant
DUNS SCOTUS
theoremata de esse et essentia (Louvain, 1930), pp. 17 ff., regarding the particular interpretation to which Scotus is referring.
48 In his analysis of a given entity, Scotus often arranges the various perfections or rationes the mind distinguishes therein according to an ontological priority, accordingly as one ratio presupposes the other for its existence but not vice versa.
To conceive the entity under some prior ratio in order to discover what additional attributes are implied in virtue thereof is to conceive it according to a prior instance of nature.
44 St Thomas, Sent., m1, dist. xliii, q. i, art. i; Summa theologica, 1, q. Vii, art. 1. ab See ps5.
46 See pp. 27-8.
ISS oh, Bi.
"8 See pp. 53-4.
See ja: BS:
50 That is to say, a kind of one-to-one correspondence exists between the two by reason of certain essential likenesses or similarities.
52 See p35:
52 Cf. Aristotle, Physica, vit, cap. i (251%, 8-252%, 4).
53 See p. 36.
54 Magnitude is considered as being finite by nature.
Cf. the first argument in the contra, p. 36.
Section IV 1 For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see pp. o2ff.
* Cf. Aristotle, Topica, u, cap. x (114°, 33).
8 Cf. Pseudo-Dionysius, De divinis nominibus, cap. v (Migne, P.G., im, 819); St Bonaventure, De mysterio Trinitatis, q. i, art. i
NOTES
(Quaracchi, vot. v, 47%); Aristotle, Metaphysica, m, cap. i (993°, 24-31).
Cf. Aristotle, Topica, m1, cap. 1 (1174, 16); St Augustine, De libero arbitrio, m1, cap. ix, xi (Migne, P.L., xxxm, 1282, 1288).
= ®° This argument and its accompanying refutation have been added later by Scotus as some manuscripts indicate. o William of Ware, Sent. 1, dist. ii. q. ii (Muscat ed. in Antonianum,
II (1927), 344-350).
For Scotus's reply, see pp. gif.
Opus oxoniense, prol. q. iii, n. 12. a ao The "natural will'? and "natural love'' according to Scotus are not elicited acts or operations at all.
They are merely the ontological relation of perfectibility that exists between whatever can be perfected and that which perfects it (cf. section m1, note 22). In this sense, everything may be said to love itself, i.e. its own perfection.
Only if the thing is a part can it be said to love the whole more than itself since the whole is the perfection of the part.
Similarly, God as the ultimate perfection of rational creatures is loved naturally more than the creature itself.
® To use as a means something that should be loved as an end is a perversion of love.
10 Beatitude in the technical sense implies that the object exhausts the potentialities of the rational being so that the latter is perfectly satisfied and is at rest in the possession of this object.
Such an object is necessary to the happiness of this being and therefore it could not be destroyed without destroying the happiness.
11 Cf, the preceding question, pp. 38 ff.
12 St Bonaventure, Sent. 1, dist. ii, art. i, q. i ad iv; William of Ware, Sent. 1, dist. ii, q. 1.
13 See p. 84.
14 See pp. 25-6, the third statement.
15 See p. 83.
16 See p. 83.
DUNS SCOTUS
17 See p. 83.
18 Aristotle, De caelo, 1, cap. ii (269%, 19-20).
19 See p. 83.
20 St Bonaventure, Sent. 1, dist. ii, a. i, q. 1 ad il.
SEcTION V
1 For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see pp. 131, 122 ff.
2 Henry of Ghent, Summa, art. i, q. il.
3 Aristotle, Metaphysica, m1, cap. iv (999%).
See Henry's interpretation of this passage, Summa, art. 1, q. ii.
4 Scotus summarises the teaching of Henry in Summa, art. i, q. ili.
5 Note added by Scotus, according to the scribe of the Assisi manuscript.
® Scotus, following St Augustine, uses the term Academician and sceptic as synonyms.
The Academicians or Academics were the adherents of Plato, so called because Plato used to deliver his discourse in the Academy at Athens.
The Academy continued after Plato's death and was characterised at different periods of its existence by different philosophical trends.
Scepticism, it seems, was introduced by Arcesilas, the founder of the Middle Academy, and later modified by Carneades, who dominated the Third Academy.
Cf. St Augustine, Contra Academicos.
7 See p. 100.
8 A marginal note in the Assisi manuscript indicates that the subsequent passage is not found in Scotus's own copy.
® Cf. note 25 of sect.1m.
Here the objector argues : By life or being alive Augustine means nothing more than that the body has a life principle, viz. the soul, which is its primary or first actualisation.
He does not mean that the soul is conscious, that is, that we are in second act.
10 Note added by Scotus.
NOTES
11 Additional note by Scotus.
"Cf. Aristotle's definition of the perfect syllogism, which is a syllogism of the first figure. Analytica priora, 1, cap. ii (24, 22 ff.), cap. iv (26°, 29 ff).
13 Cf. note g of sect. 1.
14 Opus oxoniense, prol. q. ili, n. 13 ; 1, dist. vili, q. v, n. 24.
15 Note added by Scotus.
18 An additional note of Scotus.
See pp: toot 18 Note added by Scotus.
19 Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, tv, qq. vii, viii, xxiii; v, q. iv.
0'See pp Loli.
*1 The acts of "'intelligence"' as distinguished from "reasoning" are of two kinds:
(a) simple apprehension or intelligence whereby the mind grasps the meaning of something without affirming or denyin inything of it, and (b) the act of ''composition and division", that is, the act of judgment, in which the mind affirms or denies some predicate of the subject of the proposition.
22 The active intellect, according to Scotus, is not really distinct from the soul.
Hence, it is a more perfect effect of God than would be the impression or accidental effect produced in the soul by God, the Uncreated Light.
23 This or some similar qualification must be added, because according to Scotus, the will or faculty of love is more noble than either the active or possible intellect.
24 The marginal note in the Assisi manuscript, non in libro Scoti, indicates that the passage in the Latin text within parentheses is not found in Scotus's own copy.
25 Cf. p. 97.
The elaborate attempt to "save face" for St Augustine in this fifth article not only indicates the esteem in (2,322)
DUNS SCOTUS
which Scotus held the saint but it also illustrates the cardinal principle he uses in interpretating other thinkers.
"I wish to give the most reasonable interpretation to their words that I possibly can" (Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. vili, q. v, n. 8).
The intricate and subtle explanation that follows is typical of the reasoning that earned Scotus the title Doctor subtilis.
According to the scribe of the Assisi manuscript, the subsequent section in parentheses in the Latin text is missing in Scotus's own copy.
Scotus tells us (Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. xliii, q. unica) that prior to their actual existence, God knows all possible creatures whether they shall ever be given existence or not.
Absolutely speaking, these creatures may consequently be said to "have an intelligibility"' or esse intelligibile ; this, however, is dependent upon the divine intellect so that one can say that God does not know these things because they are intelligible, but rather they are intelligible because God knows them.
For in knowing the possible, God gives it a kind of "existence", viz. that characteristic of the content or object of thought.
Even though the human intellect in the present life has no immediate intuitive knowledge of God, of the divine intellect or its thought content, it still remains true that the ultimate reason why the notions derived from created objects are intelligible is because
God first gave them intelligibility in knowing them.
This intelligibility or meaning can be called the "eternal light'? in a qualified sense.
And all propositions that are evident from the meaning of the terms can be said to be seen in the eternal light.
Only something that exists in the proper sense of the word can be an efficient cause.
Consequently, we cannot ascribe any such causality to something that exists only in an improper sense as the content or object of thought.
Nevertheless, it is the intelligibility of the object that is said to ''move'' the intellect to know the thing in question.
Scotus argues that we should rather ascribe that causality which meaning has in regard to our intellect to the divine mind or intellect which gave to all created things their meaning or intelligibility.
NOTES
*®'The priority referred to here is one of nature, not of time.
Cf. note 43 of sect. m1.
8° Such knowledge implies a direct vision of God and is not possessed by man in this life.
31 The triangle is considered the first figure in plane geometry.
Thus it is symbolic of the Triune God who is first in the hierarchy of beings.
32 See pp. 99-100.
33 According to the scribe of the Assisi manuscript, Scotus's personal copy is left incomplete at this point.
What follows is supplied from the Vivés edition, vot. Ix, 207. seISeeip. 120.
35 Literally, "'It is in respect to every being whatsoever''.
36 That is, principles evident from their terms.
Section VI 1 For Scotus's reply to these arguments, see pp. 158 ff.
2 The matter of the heavenly spheres was considered to be incorruptible in contradistinction to the corruptible terrestrial matter of the four elements.
3 Subjective parts are contrasted with essential parts.
The latter refer to the order of comprehension or intension ; subjective parts refer to the order of extension or class inclusion.
Here the meaning is that the intellective or rational soul is a member or part of what Aristotle designates by the general term of the soul or life principle of man.
4 Cf., for example, St Thomas, Summa theologica, 1, q. |xxv, art. 1i.
5 St Thomas maintains that the intellect which is perfected by the act of knowledge pertains to the category of passive potencies.
This is the so-called intellectus possibilis.
Cf. Summa theologica, 1, q. Ixxxv, art. ii. ili; mI, q. ix, art. iii; Contra gentiles, , cap. Ixxxv, xcvi, xcviii.
Godfrey of Fontaines goes
DUNS SCOTUS
even further in denying all activity to the possible intellect.
Cf. Quodlibet, v1, q. vii; VI, q. 115 TX, q. XIX 5 XII, q.v.
Cf. also Giles of Rome, Quodlibet, m1, q. XU, X11.
Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, v, q. xiv.
Aristotle, De anima, 1, cap. ii (424%, 30 ff.) ; see also mI, cap. i _ (425%, 19).
According to Aristotle, the sensory power consists in "'the equipoise of contrary qualities in the organ".
(Cf. De anima, @ Il, cap. Xil, 424%, 30 Ss.) See pp. 138 f., number 2.
See pp. 141 ff.
Cf. Richard of Middleton, Sent., m, dist. xix. art. i, q. lL.
Cf. for example, Ethica Nicomachea, I, cap. 11 (1094%, 20-21) ; also Averroes, Metaphysica, 11, com. 1.
Cf. St Thomas, Summa theologica, 1, q. Ixxv, art. vi.
According to Aristotle and the scholastics, a demonstrative proof in the technical sense of the term must have premises that are both necessary and evident propositions.
Premises known by faith in revelation are not evident and hence are not technically capable of producing a demonstration.
Such premises, though never evident, may be either necessary or contingent propositions.
For instance, "God is just'? would be considered a necessary proposition inasmuch as it is based on the immutable nature of God and could never be otherwise.
On the contrary, '"'Jesus Christ is the redeemer of mankind" would be considered a contingent proposition because the whole order of redemption like creation depends on the free decrees of God.
Now Scotus calls proofs based on necessary though not evident propositions "necessary reasons".
The arguments for immortality, however, are based on contingent propositions and hence fail to meet the technical requirements for an Aristotelian demonstration on two counts.
"Separate agent", that is, a pure spirit or Intelligence.
Such celestial beings (the angels of the scholastics) were called 1 a
NOTES
"separate substances" inasmuch as they subsisted apart from matter and were not destined by nature to inform or dwell in a corporeal body like the spiritual soul of man.
16 "Natural agent" is understood here as one which causes generation and corruption.
17 See pp. 158 ff.
18 Literally, "'existence through itself'.
Technically, however, per se existence or subsistence is used by the scholastics to designate that mode of being characteristic of substance or substantial union in contradistinction to per accidens existence characteristic of accidents or incidental aggregates.
Scotus's reply to the argument plays upon the ambiguity of the term per se existence as applied to a composite substance such as man.
Since the component elements of man (body and soul) are not accidents but substances, albeit incomplete as to function at least, each could be said to possess per se existence.
But the same is true. of any material or perishable form.
On the other hand, since man as a whole is not an accidental aggregate but a composite substance, the union of soul and body represent a fer se mode of existence, but one which the soul possesses only as long as it is united to the body.
19 Cf. St Bonaventure, Sent. 11, dist. ii, pars prima, art. i, q. iii ; St Thomas, Summa theologica, 1, q. 1, art. ii ad iii.
20 Confer Henry of Ghent, Quodlibet, u, q. iii; St Thomas, Contra gentiles, tv, cap. Ixxix.
21 For Scotus, as for Aristotle and the scholastics generally, a probable or dialectical proof does not have the same connotation as it has for the neo-scholastic.
A valid and convincing proof may still lack the technical requirements of an Aristotelian
"demonstration" as defined by the Stagirite in the Analytica posteriona, 1, cap. ii (719, 18-25) or by Scotus in Opus oxoniense, prol. qq. iii-iv lat., n. 26 (Vivés, vot. vm, 183°) ; m1. dist. xxiv, q. unica, n.
13, (xv, 44°) ; Reportata parisiensia, prol. q. i, n. 4 (xxu, 7°) ; mt, dist. xxiv, q. unica, n. 16 (xXxmMl, 454).
If such a probable proof is persuasive, it may even give
DUNS SCOTUS
subjective or moral certitude in the sense that all prudent fear of error is excluded, and yet it will not produce strictly demonstrative knowledge or scientia.
22 See pp. 145 ff.
23 Though Scotus claims that natural reason can demonstrate the existence, unicity and infinite perfection of God, he regards the Christian concept of a just and merciful God as a matter of faith.
Cf. De Primo Principio, cap. iv (ed. Roche p. 146).
24 See p. 134.
28 According to Scotus's theory of natural desire, to admit that human nature is capable of immortality is to admit that man has a natural desire for it ; for a natural desire is not a conscious act or elicited volition but is rather the ontological relation that arises between the perfectible and its perfection.
Only in a metaphorical sense can this relation be called "desire''.
Cf. Reportata parisiensia, 1v, dist. xlix, q. ix, nn. 3-53 see also note 22 of sect. 11.
26 Namely, in the beatific face-to-face vision of God.
*? Cf. the question on man's natural knowledge of God, especially the fifth statement, p. 28.
28 Ethica Nicomachea, x, cap. viii (1178, 35 ff.).
9 That is, a pure spirit or angel.
80 Cf. p. 136 for the complete text.
81 St Augustine, De Trinitate, xm, cap. ix (Migne, P.L., xu, 1023).
INDEXES
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