Concerning Metaphysics
CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
Summary . Metaphysics, the science of the transcendentals . Concept and articulation of the transcendental
. Primacy of "'being'"' among the other transcendentals . On the deduction of the attributes of "'being"'
. Being as the subject and God as the goal of metaphysics oOo —& OO
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[I.
DE METAPHYSICA]
[1.
METAPHYSICA, UT SCIENTIA TRANSCENDENTIUM| *
Necesse est esse aliquam scientiam universalem, quae per se consideret illa transcendentia, et hanc scientiam vocamus metaphysicam, quae dicitur a meta, quod est trans, et physis scientia, quasi transcendens scientia, quia est de transcendentibus.
[2.
DE TRANSCENDENTIS NOTIONE EJUSQUE DIVISIONE] f
Sed tunc est dubium, qualia sunt illa praedicata, quae dicuntur de Deo [formaliter], ut sapiens, bonus, etc.
Respondeo : ens prius dividitur in infinitum et finitum quam in decem praedicamenta, quia alterum istorum, scilicet [ens] finitum, est commune ad decem genera.
Ergo quaecumque conveniunt enti ut indifferens ad finitum et infinitum, vel ut est proprium enti infinito, conveniunt sibi non ut determinatur ad genus sed ut prius, et per consequens, ut est transcendens et est extra omne genus.
Quaecumque sunt communia Deo et creaturae, sunt talia quae conveniunt enti ut est indifferens ad finitum et infinitum ; ut enim conveniunt Deo sunt infinita, ut creaturae sunt finita.
Ergo [illa] per prius conveniunt enti quam ens dividatur in decem genera, et per consequens quodcumque tale est transcendens.
Sed tunc est aliud dubium, quomodo ponitur sabg Quaestiones subtilissimae in Metaphysicam Aristotelis, prol., n. 5
(Vives, VOL. vil, 5%).
+ Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. VIII, q. iii (Assisi 137, f. 50v*; cf. Vatican ed.,
VOL. IV, 205-207).
CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
[1.
CONCERNING METAPHYSICS]
EC METAPHYSICS, THE SCIENCE OF THE
TRANSCENDENTALS |
There must necessarily exist some universal science which considers the transcendentals as such.
This science we call '"'metaphysics', from ''meta'', which means "'beyond"', and "'the science of nature'"'.!
It is, as it were, the transcending science, because it is concerned with the transcendentals.
[2. CONCEPT AND ARTICULATION OF THE
TRANSCENDENTAL |]
Now a doubt arises as to what kind of predicates are those which are predicated formally of God, for instance,
"'wise', "'good'', and the like.
I answer that before "'being"' is divided into the ten categories, it is divided into infinite and finite.
For the latter, namely finite being, is common to the ten genera.
Whatever pertains to "'being"', then, in so far as it remains indifferent to finite and infinite, or as proper to the Infinite Being, does not belong to it as determined to a genus, but prior to any such determination, and therefore as transcendental and outside any genus.
Whatever [predicates] are common to God and creatures are of such kind, pertaining as they do to being in its indifference to what is infinite and finite.
For in so far as they pertain to God they are infinite, whereas in so far as they belong to creatures they are finite.
They belong to "'being"', then, prior to the division into the ten genera.
Anything of this kind, consequently, is transcendental.
But then another doubt arises.
How can wisdom be
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pientia transcendens, cum non sit communis omnibus entibus, [et transcendentia videntur communia omnibus].
Respondeo, sicut de ratione [generis] generalissimi non est habere sub se plures species, sed non habere aliud supraveniens genus sicut hoc praedicamentum Quando, quia non habet supraveniens genus, est generalissimum, licet paucas habeat species aut nullas, ita transcendens quodcumque nullum habet genus sub quo contineatur.
Unde de ratione transcendentis est non habere praedicatum supraveniens nisi ens.
Sed quod ipsum sit commune ad multa inferiora, hoc accidit.
Hoc patet ex alio: quia ens non tantum habet passiones simplices convertibiles, sicut unum, verum, et bonum, sed habet aliquas passiones ubi opposita distinguuntur contra se, sicut necesse esse vel possibile, actus vel potentia, et hujusmodi.
Sicut autem passiones convertibiles sunt transcendentes quia consequuntur ens inquantum non determinatur ad aliquod genus, ita passiones disjunctae sunt transcendentes ; et utrumque membrum illius disjuncti est transcendens, quia neutrum determinat suum determinabile ad certum genus; et tamen unum membrum illius disjuncti formaliter est speciale non conveniens nisi uni enti, sicut necesse esse in ista divisione necesse esse vel possibile esse, et infinitum in ista divisione finitum vel infinitum, et sic de aliis.
Ita etiam potest sapientia esse transcendens et quodcumque aliud quod est commune Deo et creaturae, licet aliquod tale dicatur de solo Deo, aliquod autem de Deo et aliqua creatura.
Non oportet autem transcendens ut transcendens dici de quocumque ente, nisi sit convertibile cum primo transcendente, scilicet ente.
CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
considered a transcendental if it is not common to all beings, for transcendentals seem to be common. to all?
I answer that just as it is not of the nature of a supreme genus to have many species contained under it, but it is of its nature not to have any genus over and above it (the category of "'when"', for instance, is a supreme genus since it has no genus over and above it, although it has few, if any, species contained under it), so also whatever is not contained under any genus is transcendental.
Hence, not to have any predicate above it except "'being" pertains to the very notion of a transcendental.
That it be common to many inferior notions, however, is purely incidental.
This is evident too from the fact that "being" possesses not only attributes which are coextensive with it, such as '"'one'', ''true'' and "'good"', but also attributes which are opposed to one another such as "'possible-ornecessary', ''act-or-potency'', and suchlike.
But if the coextensive attributes are transcendental because they pertain to "'being"' as not determined to a definite genus, then the disjunctive attributes are transcendental too. And both members of the disjunction are transcendental since neither determines its determinable element to a definite genus.
Nevertheless, one member of the disjunction is proper and pertains formally to one being alone, for instance, "'necessary'' in the disjunction "'necessary-or-possible", or "'infinite'" in the disjunction "'finite-or-infinite"', and so also with the others.
And so ''wisdom'', or anything else, for that matter, which is common to God and creatures, can be transcendental.
A transcendental, however, may also be predicated of God alone, or again it may be predicated about God and some creature.
It is not necessary, then, that a transcendental as transcendental be predicated of every being, unless it be coextensive with the first of the transcendentals, namely "'being"'.
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[3.
DE PRIMITATE ENTIS RESPECTU CAETERORUM
TRANSCENDENTIUM] *
Dico quod ex istis quatuor rationibus sequitur, cum nihil possit esse communius ente, et ens non possit esse commune univocum dictum in quid de omnibus per se intelligibilibus, quia non de differentiis ultimis, nec de passionibus suis, sequitur quod nihil est primum objectum intellectus nostri propter communitatem ipsius in quid ad omne per se intelligibile.
Et tamen hoc non obstante, dico quod primum objectum intellectus nostri est ens, quia in ipso concurrit duplex primitas, scilicet communitatis et virtualitatis.
Nam omne per se intelligibile aut includit essentialiter rationem entis, vel continetur virtualiter, vel essentialiter in includente essentialiter rationem entis.
Omnia enim genera et species et individua et omnes partes essentiales generum et ens increatum includunt ens quidditative.
Omnes autem differentiae ultimae includuntur in aliquibus istorum essentialiter. Omnes autem passiones entis includuntur in ente et in suis inferioribus virtualiter.
Igitur illa, quibus ens non est univocum dictum in quid, includuntur in illis quibus ens est sic univocum.
Et ita patet quod ens habet primitatem communitatis ad prima intelligibilia, hoc est, ad conceptus quidditativos generum et specierum et individuorum et partium essentialium omnium istorum et entis increati, et habet primitatem virtualitatis ad omnia intelligibilia inclusa in primis intelligibilibus, hoc est, ad conceptus qualitativos differentiarum et passionum propriarum.
Quod autem supposui, communitatem entis dicti in quid ad omnes conceptus quidditativos praedictos, hoc
* Opus oxoniense, |, dist. 111, q. iii (Assisi 137, £. 28v'-29r': cf, Vatican ed.,
VOL. 1H, 85-93),
CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
[3. PRIMACY OF "'BEING" AMONG THE
OTHER TRANSCENDENTALS]
And I say that ... since nothing can be more common than "being", and that "'being' cannot be predicated univocally and in quid 2 of all that is of itself intelligible (because it cannot be predicated in this way of the ultimate differences * or of its attributes),4 it follows that we have no object of the intellect that is primary by reason of a commonness in quid in regard to all that is of itself intelligible.
And yet, notwithstanding, I say that "being" is the first object of the intellect, because in it a twofold primacy concurs, namely, a primacy of commonness and of virtuality.
For whatever is of itself intelligible either' includes essentially the notion of "'being" or is contained virtually or essentially in something else which does include "being" essentially.
For all genera, species, individuals, and the essential parts of genera, and the Uncreated Being all include "'being" quidditatively.
All the ultimate differences are included essentially in some of these.
All the attributes of "being" are virtually included in "being" and in those things which come under "'being"'.
Hence, all to which "'being"' is not univocal in quid are included in those to which "'being"' is univocal in this way.
And so it is clear that "being" has a primacy of commonness in regard to the primary intelligibles, that is, to the quidditative concepts of the genera, species, individuals, and all their essential parts, and to the Uncreated Being.
It has a virtual primacy in regard to the intelligible elements included in the first intelligibles, that is, in regard to the qualifying concepts of the ultimate differences and proper attributes.
My supposition that "'being" is predicated commonly in quid of all the aforementioned quidditative concepts
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probatur de omnibus illis, duabus rationibus positis in prima quaestione hujus distinctionis ad probandum communitatem entis ad ens creatum et increatum, quod ut pateat, pertracto eas aliqualiter.
Primam sic : de quocumque enim praedictorum conceptuum quidditativorum contingit intellectum certum esse ipsum esse ens, dubitando de differentiis contrahentibus ens ad talem conceptum.
Et ita conceptus entis, ut convenit illi conceptui, est alius a conceptibus illis inferioribus de quibus intellectus est dubius ; ita alius quod inclusus in utroque inferiori conceptu, nam differentiae illae contrahentes praesupponunt eumdem conceptum entis communem quem contrahunt.
Secundam rationem pertracto sic, sicut argutum est quod Deus non est cognoscibilis a nobis naturaliter nisi ens sit univocum creato et increato, ita potest argui de substantia et accidente; cum enim substantia non immutet immediate intellectum nostrum ad aliquam intellectionem sui, sed tantum accidens sensibile, sequitur quod nullum conceptum quidditativum poterimus habere de ea nisi aliquis talis possit abstrahi a conceptu accidentis. Sed nullus talis quidditativus, abstrahibilis a conceptu accidentis est nisi conceptus entis.
Quoad autem est suppositum de substantia, quod non immutat intellectum nostrum immediate ad actum circa se, hoc probatur: quia quidquid praesens immutat intellectum illius absentia potest naturaliter cognosci ab intellectu, quando non immutatur, sicut apparet secundo
De anima,* quod visus est tenebrae perceptivus, quando scilicet lux non est praesens, et ideo tunc visus non immutatur.
Igitur si intellectus naturaliter immutatur a substantia immediate ad actum circa ipsam, sequeretur quod quando substantia non esset praesens, posset * 11, cap. x (420%, 23).
CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
is established by the two arguments used in the initial question to prove that being is predicated commonly of created and uncreated being [Cf. pp. 20-3].
That what I have supposed may be evident, I now explain these reasons a little.
I explain the first reason thus.
Of each of the aforementioned concepts,, the intellect can be certain that it is being and still be in doubt about the differences which _ delimit "being" to the concept in question.
And so the concept of being, in so far as it agrees with the concept in question, is other than the dubious concepts which come under it. But it is other in such a way that it is included in both of the concepts which come under it, for these limiting differences presuppose the same concept of being which they limit.
The second reason I explain as follows:
We argued that God cannot be known naturally unless being is univocal to the created and uncreated. We can argue in the same way of substance and accident, for substance does not immediately move our intellect to know the substance itself, but only the sensible accident does so.
ows that we can have ive $e ee from the concept of an accident.
But the only quiddita-* eee tive" that can be abstracted from*/%,"2,*s that of an accident is the concept of being.
Our assumption that substance does not immediately move our intellect to know the substance itself, we prove thus : Ifsomething moves the intellect when it is present, then whenever the intellect is not so moved, it will be able to know naturally that this object is absent.
This is clear from the De anima, BK. ,* according to which the sense of sight can perceive darkness when, presumably, light is not present, and the sense, in consequence, is not moved.
Therefore, if substance immediately moved the intellect naturally to know the substance itself, it would follow that when a substance was absent, the intellect
* (2,322)
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cognosci non esse praesens, et ita naturaliter posset cognosci in hostia altaris consecrata non esse substantiam panis, quod est manifeste falsum.
Nullus igitur conceptus quidditativus habetur naturaliter de substantia immediate causatus a substantia, sed tantum causatus vel abstractus primo ab accidente, et illud non est nisi conceptus entis.
Per idem concluditur etiam propositum de partibus essentialibus substantiae.
Si enim materia non immutat intellectum ad actum circa ipsam, nec forma substantialis, quaero quis conceptus simplex in intellectu habebitur de materia vel forma?
Si dicas quod aliquis conceptus relativus, puta partis, vel conceptus per accidens, puta alicujus proprietatis materiae vel formae, quaero quis est conceptus quidditativus, cui iste per accidens vel relativus attribuitur ? Et si nullus quidditativus [habetur, nihil erit, cui attribuatur iste conceptus per accidens, nullus autem quidditativus] potest haberi nisi impressus vel abstractus ab illo quod movet intellectum, puta ab accidente, et ille erit conceptus entis.
Et ita nihil cognoscetur de partibus essentialibus substantiae, nisi ens sit commune univocum eis et accidentibus.
Istae rationes non includunt univocationem entis in quid ad differentias ultimas et passiones.
De prima, ostenditur quia aut intellectus est certus de aliquo tali quod sit ens, dubitando utrum sit hoc vel illud, tamen non est certus quod sit ens quidditative sed quasi predicatione per accidens.
Vel aliter, et melius: quilibet talis conceptus est simpliciter simplex, et ideo non potest secundum aliquid concipi et secundum aliquid ignorari, sicut patet per
Philosophum nono Metaphysicae, in fine,* de conceptibus * rx, cap. ix (10519, 25).
CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
could know that it was not present.
Hence, it could know naturally that the substance of bread does not exist in the Consecrated Victim of the Altar, which is clearly false.
Naturally, then, we have no quidditative concept of substance caused immediately by substance itself.
Our only quidditative concept thereof is that caused by, or first abstracted from, an accident, and this is none other than the concept of being.
By the same token, our conclusion holds for the essential parts of substance.
For if neither matter nor form move the intellect to an act of knowledge about themselves, I ask "'What simple concept shall we have of matter or form?"
If you say that it is some relative concept, for instance, of some part, or that it is an incidental concept, for instance, of some property of matter or form, then I ask "'What is the quidditative concept to which this incidental or relative concept is attributed?"?
And if there is no quidditative concept, there will be nothing to which this incidental concept may be attributed.
But the only quidditative concept possible is caused by, or abstracted from, that which does move the intellect, viz. an accident.
And this will be the concept of being. Consequently, nothing is known of the essential parts of substance unless "'being"' is univocal, common to them and to the accidents.
These reasons do not imply that "'being"' is predicated in quid of the ultimate differences and attributes.
The first does not, for the intellect [according to the argument] is certain that some such thing is a being while it doubts whether it is this being or that. The intellect, however, is certain that it [viz. an ultimate difference or attribute] is not being quidditatively, but it is as it were "being" by way of accidental predication.
Or another and better way.
Every such concept is irreducibly simple? and therefore one part of it cannot be conceived while another part remains unknown, as is evident from the statement of the Philosopher (in
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simpliciter simplicibus, quod non est circa eos deceptio, sicut est circa quidditatem complexorum ; quod non est intelligendum quasi intellectus simplex decipiatur formaliter circa intellectionem quidditatis, quia in intellectione simplici non est verum vel falsum, sed circa quidditatem compositam potest intellectus simplex virtualiter decipi.
Si enim ista ratio est in se falsa, tunc includit virtualiter propositionem falsam ; quod autem est simpliciter simplex, non includit virtualiter proximo nec formaliter propositionem falsam, et ideo circa ipsam non est deceptio.
Vel enim totaliter attingitur vel non attingitur, et tunc omnino ignoratur.
De nullo igitur simpliciter simplici conceptu potest esse certitudo secundum aliquid ejus et dubitatio secundum aliud.
Per hoc etiam patet ad secundam rationem supra positam, quia tale simpliciter simplex omnino est ignotum nisi secundum se totum concipiatur.
Tertio etiam modo potest responderi ad primam rationem, quod ille conceptus de quo est certitudo, est alius ab illis de quibus est dubitatio, et si ille certus idem salvatur cum alterutro illorum dubiorum, vere est univocus, ut cum alterutro illorum accipitur.
Sed non oportet quod insit utrique illorum in quid, sed ut sic, vel est univocus eis ut determinabilis ad determinantes, vel ut denominabilis ad denominantes.
Unde breviter, ens est univocum in omnibus, sed conceptibus non simpliciter simplicibus est univocus in quid dictus de eis ; simpliciter simplicibus est univocus ut determinabilis vel ut denominabilis, non autem ut dictum de eis in quid, quia hoc includit contradictionem.
Ex his apparet quomodo in ente concurrat duplex
CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
Metaphysics, BK. 1x, near the end) that there is no deception regarding irreducibly simple concepts as there is regarding the quiddity of what is complex.
This is not to be understood as though the simple intellect 8 is formally deceived regarding the knowledge of quiddities, for in simple intellection there is neither truth nor falsity.
In regard to a quiddity that is composed, however, the simple intellect can be virtually deceived.
For if such a notion is false in itself, then it includes virtually a false proposition.
But what is irreducibly simple includes a false proposition neither virtually nor formally, and therefore there is no deception in its regard.
Either it is grasped totally or not at all, in which case it remains completely unknown.
Of no irreducibly simple concept, therefore, can we be certain of one part and doubtful about another.
From this, it is clear also as far as the second reason stated above is concerned, that what is so irreducibly simple remains completely unknown unless it is grasped fully as it is in itself.
A third reply is possible regarding the first reason.
This concept of which we are certain is other than those of which we are in doubt.
Now if this same element of which we are certain is preserved with both of the doubtful concepts, it is truly univocal in the sense that it is grasped with both of them.
It is not necessary, however, that it be contained in both of them zn quid, but it may either be contained in quid or be univocal to them as determinable is univocal to determinant, or as what can be denominated to what denominates.
To put it briefly, then, "being" is univocal for all.
But for concepts that are not irreducibly simple, it is predicated of them univocally in quid; for concepts irreducibly simple, it is univocal as something determinable or denominable, but it is not univocal in the sense that it is predicated of them in quid, for that would be a contradiction.
And so it is clear how in "'being"' there concurs a two-
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primitas, videlicet primitas communicabilitatis in quid ad omnes conceptus non simpliciter simplices, et primitas virtualitatis in se vel in suis inferioribus ad omnes conceptus simpliciter simplices.
(4.
DE ENTIS PASSIONUM DEDUCTIONE] *
Quantum ad primum dico quod istud disjunctum necessarium vel possibile est passio entis circumloquens passionem convertibilem, sicut sunt talia multa illimitata entibus.
Passiones autem entis convertibiles, ut communius, immediate dicuntur de ente, quia ens habet conceptum simpliciter simplicem, et ideo non potest esse medium inter ipsum et suam passionem, quia neutrius est definitio quae possit esse medium.
Si etiam est aliqua passio entis non prima, difficile est videre per quam priorem, ut per medium, possit concludi de ente, quia nec facile est videre ordinem passionum entis.
Nec si ille ordo cognosceretur, viderentur propositiones sumptae ab eis pro praemissis esse multum evidentiores conclusionibus.
In passionibus autem disjunctis, licet illud totum disjunctum non possit demonstrari de ente, tamen communiter supposito illo extremo quod est minus nobile de aliquo ente, potest concludi illud extremum quod est nobilius de aliquo ente.
Sicut sequitur: si aliquod ens est finitum, ergo aliquod ens est infinitum ; et si aliquod est contingens, ergo aliquod ens est necessarium, quia in talibus non posset enti particulariter inesse imperfectius extremum nisi alicui enti inesset perfectius extremum a quo dependeret.
Sed nec isto modo videtur posse ostendi extremum * Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. xxxIx, q. i (Assisi 137, f. gtro-giv?; cf. Vivés, VoL. x, 625°—626%).
"i (
girb—g
CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
fold primacy, namely, a primacy of commonness in quid in regard to all concepts that are not irreducibly simple and a primacy of virtuality in itself or in its inferiors regarding all concepts which are irreducibly simple.
[4. ON THE DEDUCTION OF THE ATTRIBUTES OF "'BEING'']
I say that this disjunction ''necessary-or-possible'', like the countless other such found among beings, is an attribute of "'being" that is equivalent to a coextensive attribute.
But the coextensive attributes, as something more common, are affirmed immediately of ''being"', because "'being"' is an irreducibly simple concept and consequently no middle term can exist between '"'being"' and its attribute, for neither has a definition that might serve as a middle term.
Also, if there is some attribute of "'being"' that is not immediate, it is difficult to see what prior attribute could be used as a middle term to link it with "'being"', for it is not easy to discern any order among the attributes of "'being''.
And even if we knew of such an order among them, any propositions about them we might use as premises seem scarcely more evident than the conclusions.
In the disjunctive attributes, however, while the entire disjunction cannot be demonstrated from "'being"', nevertheless as a universal rule by positing the less perfect extreme of some being we can conclude that the more perfect extreme is realised in some other being.
Thus it follows that if some being is finite, then some being is infinite.
And if some being is contingent, then some being is necessary.
For in such cases it is not possible for the more imperfect extreme of the disjunction to be existentially predicated of "being", particularly taken, unless the more perfect extreme be existentially verified of some other being upon which it depends.
But we see that the less perfect member of such a
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imperfectius talis disjunctionis; non enim si perfectius est in aliquo ente, ex hoc necesse est imperfectius esse in alio ente ; et hoc nisi illa extrema disjuncta essent correlativa, sicut causa et causatum.
Ideo igitur non potest ostendi de ente per aliquod prius medium hoc disjunctum, necessarium vel contingens.
Nec etiam ista pars disjuncti quae est contingens posset ostendi de aliquo, supposito necessario de aliquo, et ideo videtur ista : Aliquod ens est contingens, esse vera prima et non demonstrabilis propter quid. Unde Philosophus * arguens contra necessitatem futurorum, non deducit ad aliquid impossibilius hypothesi, sed ad aliquod impossibile nobis manifestius, scilicet quod non oportet consiliari.
Et ideo negantes talia manifesta indigent poena vel scientia vel sensu, quia secundum Avicennam primo Metaphystcae + :
Negantes primum principium sunt vapulandi vel exponendi igni, quousque concedant quod non est idem comburi et non comburi, vapulari et non vapulari.
Ita etiam isti, qui negant aliquod ens contingens, exponendi sunt tormentis, quousque concedant quod possibile est eos non torqueri.
[5.
ENS UT SUBJECTUM ET DEUS UT FINIS METAPHYSICAEF]t
Hic tria videnda primo si primus et supremus habitus naturaliter acquisitus perficiens intellectum viatoris cujusmodi est habitus metaphysicae, habeat Deum pro primo objecto?...
De primo est controversia inter Avicennam et Aver- * De interpretatione, cap. ix (18>, 26-35). t Aristotle, Topica, 1, cap. xi (105%, 4-5).
++ Reportatio I A, prol. q. iii, art. i (Vienna, Oesterreichische Nationalbibliothek, cod. lat. 1453, f. 8va-b).
CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
disjunction cannot be established in this fashion, for if the more perfect exists in some being, there is no necessity on this score that the less perfect should exist in some other being, unless, of course, the two extremes of the disjunction should happen to be correlatives, such as "'cause"' and "'caused".
Consequently, this disjunction ""necessary-or-contingent"', cannot be established of '"'being"' through some prior medium.
Neither could the contingent part of the disjunction be established of anything on the supposition that something necessary exists.
The proposition : "Some being is contingent"', therefore, seems to be a primary truth and is not demonstrable by an a priort demonstration, which gives the reason for the fact.
That is why the Philosopher, in arguing against the theory that future events are necessary, makes no attempt to deduce from it something even more impossible than the hypothesis, but he deduces from it an impossibility that is more apparent to us, namely, that there would be no need to deliberate [about the future]. And therefore, those who deny such manifest things need punishment or knowledge or sense, for as Avicenna puts it (Metaphysics 1) tT: '"Those who deny a first principle should be beaten or exposed to fire until they concede that to burn and not to burn, or to be beaten and not to be beaten, are not identical".
And so too, those who deny that some being is contingent should be exposed to torments until they concede that it is possible for them not to be tormented.
[5.
BEING AS THE SUBJECT AND GOD AS THE GOAL
OF METAPHYSICS]
Here we must first see whether metaphysics as the first and highest of the naturally acquired habits perfecting man's intellect in this present life has God as its first object...
On this point there is a controversy between Avicenna
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roem. Posuit enim Avicenna quod Deus non est subjectum esse in metaphysica, sed aliquid aliud ut ens, quia nulla scientia probat suum subjectum esse; metaphysicus probat Deum esse et substantias separatas esse; ergo etc.
Averroes reprehendit Avicennam in commento ultimo I Physicorum; supposita majori Avicennae, quod nulla scientia probat suum subjectum esse, quae est Communis utrique, capit quod Deus est subjectum in metaphysica et quod Deum esse non probatur in metaphysica sed in physica, quia nullum genus substantiarum separatarum potest probari esse nisi per motum, quod pertinet ad physicam.
Sed Avicenna bene dicit et Averroes valde male. Et accipio propositionem utriusque communen, scilicet:
"Nulla scientia probat suum objectum esse," quae vera est propter primitatem subiecti ad scientiam, quia si esset posterius, posset ipsum proban esse in illa scientiain qua habet rationem posterioris et non objecti adaequati. Sed majorem primitatem habet subjectum respectu scientiae posterioris quam prioris; ergo si scientia prima non potest probare suum subjectum esse, quia est subjectum primum, ergo multo magis nec scientia posterior; ergo si metaphysica non potest probare Deum esse, multo magis nec physica. Probatio minoris, quia duplicem primitatem habet subjectum prioris scientiae ad posteriorem respectu scientiae prioris. Item, si Deum esse est demonstratum in physica et suppositum tamquam subjectum in metaphysica, ergo conclusio in physica est simpliciter principium, quia principium in scientia est ex subiecto ejus et per consequens physica erit simpliciter prior metaphysicae; quae omnia sunt absurda.
Item, ex omni proprietate manifesta in effectu potest concludi causam esse, si talis proprietas non ponitur in esse nisi solum a tali causa vel a tali causalitate. Sed non solum hujusmodi proprietates quae considerantur in physica, ut motum esse, manifeste concludunt causam esse moventem, sed etiam proprietates consideratae in
CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
and Averroes. Avicenna claims that not God, but something else, such as being, is the subject of metaphysics.
For no science proves the existence of its own subject, yet the metaphysician proves that God exists. In his final comment on Bk. 1 of the Physics, Averroes attacks Avicenna, using the same major premise admitted by both that no science proves the existence of its subject. God is the subject of metaphysics and his existence is not proved there but in physics, for it is only by means of motion that any sort of pure spirit can be proved to exist, and motion pertains to the science of physics.
Avicenna has spoken well, however, and Averroes very badly and against him I use the basic proposition they both hold, namely: "No science proves the existense of its subject." This is true, because of the priority a subject has with respect to the science. For if it were posterior, its subject could be proved in a lower science, where it would be conceived under some inferior aspect inadequate for its role as the object [of the higher science]. But a subject enjoys a greater priority over a lower science than over its own higher science. If the highest science, therefore, cannot establish the existence of its subject, since this is first or highest, still less can an inferior science do so.
The minor is proved because of the double primacy the subject of a higher science has in regard to a lower science's relationship to a prior science. Also, if God's existence is something demonstrated in physics and presupposed in metaphysics as subject, then—to put it simply—a conclusion in physics is the starting point of metaphysics, for any science starts with its subject. Hence, physics will be prior to metaphysics—all of which is absurd.
Also, ifany property can exist only in virtue of such and such a cause, from every such property that appears in an effect, we can infer the existence of its cause. Now itis not just such properties of the effect considered in physics, such as that something is moved, that leads one to con-
DUNS SCOTUS
metaphysica, ut ens posterius, ens possibile, ens finitum, prout sunt in effectu, concludunt de causa primitatem simpliciter, actualitatem et infinitatem, et hujusmodi, ex quibus potest demonstrari esse de primo ente potius quam ex ratione motus.
Dico ergo ad quaestionem quantum pertinet ad istam articulum quod Deus non est subjectum in metaphysica, quia ut supra probatum in prima quaestione* de Deo, potest tantum esse una scientia, quae non est metaphysica. Quod probo sic: De omni subjecto scientiae subalternatae praecognoscitur ex sensibus an est vel si est, ut patet de subjecto perspectivae. Licet enim linea visualis, quae est subjectum in perspectiva, possit demonstran tamquam conclusio geometriae, tamen si est subjectum alicujus scientiae subalternatae, de eo oportet statim esse notum si est, sine ulteriori inquisitione ex sensu vel experientia, scilicet quod sibi non repugnat esse; sicut enim principia statim sciuntur apprehensis terminis, et cum subjectum sit causa principii et per consequens prius eo in entitate et cognoscibilitate, ita cum subjectum non sit posterius suo principio nec ignotius, opertet ipsum esse statim notum ex sensibus si est; sed nulla ratio propria conceptibilis de Deo potest statim esse nobis nota si est; ergo nulla notitia viatoris acquisita naturaliter a nobis potest esse de Deo sub aliqua ratione ejus propria. Minor patet, quia prima ratio propria de Deo quam concipimus est quod sit primum ens; sed primum ens non est primo notum ex sensibus, sed oportet prius concipere possibilitatem unionis terminorum, et antequam sciamus hanc compositionem esse possibilem, oportet quod aliquod ens demonstretur esse primum. Concedo ergo cum Avicenna quod Deus non est subjectum in metaphysica; nec
Peau lapantepive
CONCERNING METAPHYSICS
II clude to the existence of a moving cause, but the same is true of properties considered in metaphysics. If an effect represents something posterior, possible, or finite, such properties imply their cause enjoys an unqualified primacy, actuality, infinity and the like. It is from properties of this sort rather than from notion of motion that the existence of a first being can be demonstrated.
So far as this article is concerned, then, I say that God is not the subject of metaphysics, for as we proved earlier in the first question* there can be but one science about God as first subject, and this is not metaphysics. And I prove this in the following way. The senses tell us whether or not any subject of a subordinate science exists, as is Clear in the case of optics. For although a visible line, which is the subject of optics, could be demonstrated as a conclusion of geometry, nevertheless if it is the subject of some subordinate science, one needs to know immediately, without any further experience or investigation by the senses, whether or not it can be, namely, that there is nothing absurd about its existence.
Just as principles are grasped immediately once the terms are apprehended through the medium of the senses, so too the existence of the subject must be known immediately from the senses. For the subject is not posterior or less known than the principle, since the subject is its cause, and hence prior to the principle in entity and knowability. But no knowledge acquired naturally in this life represents any characteristics of God that is proper to him. The minor is evident, for the first proper notion we have about God is that he is the first being. "First being," however, is not something initially known from the senses, for we must first ascertain that the combination of these two terms makes sense. Before we can know this combination represents something possible, we need to demonstrate that some being is first.
Hence, I concede with Avicenna that God is not the subject of metaphysics. Nor is this contradicted by the
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obviat dictum Averroris I Posteriorum,+ nec illud I Metaphysicae, * quod metaphyica est circa causas altissimas, quia loquitur sicut consuevit I Priorem,** cum dicitur:
"Primum oportet dicere circa quid et de quo, quoniam circa demonstrationem et de disciplina demonstrativa, i.e., universali scientia demonstrandi. Unde "circa" notat proprie circumstantiam causae finalis, sicut ly "de" circumstantiam causae materialis; unde metaphysica est circa causas altissimas finaliter ad quas terminatur ipsius speculatio.
+ Aristotelis, Analytica posteriora, 1, cap. 1 (71al0-12).
# I, cap. il, passim.
** Analytica priora, 1, cap. i (24a, 10ff).
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dictum of Averroes [about prior knowledge of the existence of the subject] (from the Posterior Analytics, Bk. 1),+ nor the statement that metaphysics is concerned with the highest causes (from Metaphysics, Bk. I).# For the Philosopher speaks there as he did in the Prior Analytics I,** where he says: "First we need to determine what this is concerned with and is about, for it is concerned with demonstration and is about the demonstrative branch of learning, i.e. it is about the general science of demonstrating"'. Hence, "concerned with" denotes properly the circumstance of the final cause, just as the word "about" designates the circumstance of the material cause. Consequently, metaphysics is concerned with the highest causes as its goal, and ends with the theoretical knowledge of them.
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