Man's Natural Knowledge of God
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE
OF GOD Summary of the Argument Question : Is the intellect of man in this life able to know
God naturally ?
Pro ET CONTRA Bopy OF THE QUESTION Preliminary observations The opinion of Henry of Ghent Scotus's own opinion First statement : It is possible to have a quidditative concept of God Second statement : God is conceived not only analogously, but also univocally Third statement : God's essence is not known intuitively by man in this life Fourth statement : Man can have many proper concepts of God Fifth statement : We know God through the intelligible species of creatures
REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS AT THE BEGINNING
Reply to Henry's arguments (2,322)
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[II].
COGNITIO NATURALIS DE DEO] *
Circa tertiam distinctionem quaero primo de cognoscibilitate Dei.
Et quaero primo: Utrum Deus sit naturaliter cognoscibilis ab intellectu viatoris.
[Pro et Contra] Arguo quod non :
Philosophus m De animat dicit:
Phantasmata se habent ad intellectum sicut sensibilia ad sensum.
Sed sensus non sentit nisi sensibile, ergo intellectus nihil intelligit nisi cujus phantasma potest per sensus apprehendere.
Deus autem non habet phantasma nec est aliquid phantasma nec est aliquid phantasibile ; ergo, etc.
Item m1 Metaphysicae t : sicut oculus noctuae ad lucem solis, sic et intellectus noster ad ea quae sunt manifestissima naturae ; sed ibi est impossibilitas ; ergo et hic.
Item 1 Physicorum ** : Infinitum inquantum infinitum estignotum. Etu Metaphysicae +¢ : Infinita non contingit cognoscere ; ergo nec infinitum, quia eadem videtur esse improportio intellectus finiti ad infinitum et ad infinita, quia aequalis excessus vel non minor.
Item Gregorius Super Ezechielem tt : Quantumcumque * Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. , q. i (Assisi 137, f. 25r*-27r": cf. Vatican ed.,
VOL. II, 1-48).
t m1, cap vii (431%, 14). t um, cap. i (993%, 9).
**Uiycape iv. (13705 8).
TT u, cap. ii (994%, 22). ft} Sermons on Ezechiel, 1, hom. viii, n. 30 (Migne, P.L., Lxxv1, 868).
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
[II.
MAN's NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD]
Concerning the third distinction I ask first whether it is possible to know God.
And I ask first : whether the intellect of man in this life is able to know God naturally.
[Pro et Contra] I argue that it cannot! :
[Arg. 1]. The Philosopher in De anima, BK. m, f says :
"Sense images are related to the intellect in the same way as sense objects are related to the senses".
But the senses perceive only what is sensible.
Therefore the intellect is unable to grasp anything whose sense image cannot be known by the senses.
Of God there is no sense image.
Neither is He such that He could be perceived by such a sense faculty.
Therefore, etc.
[Arg. 1].
Again, according to Metaphysics, Bk. ut:
'As the eyes of bats are to the blaze of day, so is our intellect to the things which are by nature most evident''.
But if it is impossible to know such things, it is impossible to know God.
[Arg. m1]. Also, according to Physics, Bk. 1 ** : "The infinite as infinite is unknowable'.
And according to the Metaphysics, BK, 1 Tf: "It is not possible to know an infinite [number] of things".
Therefore, neither can the Infinite Being be known, since an infinite number and an Infinite Being would seem to be equally disproportionate to our intellect; for an Infinite Being exceeds the powers of our intellect in the same measure as, or certainly to no less a degree than, does the infinite in number.
[Arg. tv].
Gregory, also, in his commentary on Ezechiel says ++: ''No matter how far our mind may have
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mens nostra in contemplatione profecerit Dei, non ad illud quod ipse est, sed ad illud quod sub ipso est attingit.
Contra : v Metaphysicae*:
Metaphysica est theologia de Deo et circa divina principaliter, ergo etc.
Et in actu ejus,f scilicet in consideratione actuali substantiarum separatarum ponit felicitatem humanam.
[Corpus Quaestionis] [Notiones Praeviae] In prima quaestione non est distinguendum quod Deus possit cognosci negative vel affirmative, quia negatio non cognoscitur nisi pre affirmationem: m Perihermenias, in fine,t et 1v Metaphysicae.** Patet etiam quod nullas negationes cognoscimus de Deo nisi per affirmationes per quas removemus alia incompossibilia ab illis affirmationibus.
Negationes etiam non summe amamus.
Similiter etiam aut negatio concipitur praecise aut ut dicta de aliquo.
Si praecise concipitur negatio, ut non lapis, hoc aeque convenit nihilo sicut Deo, quia pura negatio dicitur de ente et de non ente.
Igitur in hoc non magis intelligitur Deus quam nihil vel chimera.
Si intelligitur ut negatio dicta de aliquo, tunc quaero illum conceptum subtractum de quo intelligitur ista negatio esse vera.
Aut erit conceptus affirmativus aut negativus.
Si est affirmativus, habetur propositum.
Si negativus, quaero ut prius. Aut negatio concipitur praecise aut ut * v, cap. vii (10642, 36).
} Ethica Nicomachea, x, cap. viii. ft De interpretatione, cap. xii (22%, 33) ; cf. also cap. xiv in fine.
** Iv, cap. ii (1004%, 10-16).
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
progressed in the contemplation of God, it does not attain to what He is, but to what is beneath Him''.
To the contrary :
According to Metaphysics, BK. v *: "Metaphysics is a theology of God and is primarily concerned with the divine".
And [Aristotle] places man's happiness i in the actual possession of such knowledge, that is to say, in the actual speculation about the pure spirits.
[Body of the Question] [Preliminary Observations] In this first question there is no need to make the distinction that we cannot know what God is: we can only know what He is not.? For every denial is intelligible only in terms of some affirmation. { ** Itis also clear that we can know negations of God only by means of affirmations ; for if we deny anything of God, it is because we wish to do away with something inconsistent with what we have already affirmed.
Neither are negations the object of our greatest love.
Furthermore, if something is negated, either the negation is considered simply in itself or as predicated of something.
If a negation, such as "'not-stone"', is considered simply in itself, it is as characteristic of nothing as it is of God, for a pure negation is predicated of both what is and what is not a being.
Consequently, what we know through such a negation is no more God than it is a chimera or nothing at all. Ifthe negation is understood as modifying something, then I inquire after the underlying notion of which the negation is understood to be true.
It will be either an affirmative or a negative notion.
If it is affirmative, we have what we seek.
If it is negative, I inquire as I did before.
Either the negation is conceived simply in itself or as predicated of something.
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dicta de aliquo.
Si primo modo, hoc aeque convenit nihilo sicut Deo.
Si ut dicta de aliquo, sicut prius; et quantumcumque procederetur in negationibus, vel non intelligeretur Deus magis quam nihil vel stabitur in aliquo affirmativo conceptu qui est primus.
Nec secundo est distinguendum de cognitione quia [read quid] est et si est, quia in proposito quaero conceptum simplicem de quo cognoscatur esse per actum intellectus componentis et dividentis.
Numquam enim cognosco de aliquo si est, nisi habeam aliquem conceptum illius extremi de quo cognosco esse ; et de illo conceptu quaeritur hic.
Nec tertio oportet distinguere si est, ut est quaestio de veritate propositionis vel ut est quaestio de esse Dei, quia si potest esse, quaero de veritate propositionis in qua est esse tamquam praedicatum de subjecto; ad concipiendum veritatem illius quaestionis vel propositionis, oportet praeconcipere terminos illius quaestionis, et de conceptu simplici illius subjecti si est possibilis est nunc quaestio.
Nec quarto valet distinguere de conceptu naturali et supernaturali, quia quaeritur de naturali.
Nec quinto valet distinguere de naturaliter loquendo de natura absolute vel de natura pro statu isto, quia quaeritur praecise de cognitione pro statu isto.
Nec sexto valet distinguere de cognitione Dei in creatura vel in se, quia si cognitio habeatur per creaturam ita quod cognitio discursiva incipiat a creatura, quaero in quo termino sistitur ista cognitio.
Si in Deo in se, habeo propositum, quia illum conceptum Dei in se quaero.
Si non sistitur in Deo in se, sed in creatura,
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
If the first be true, then the negation applies to nothing as well as to God.
If it is conceived as predicated of something, then I argue as before.
And no matter how far we proceed with negations, either what we know is no more God than nothing is, or we will arrive at some affirmative concept which is the first concept of all.
In the second place, there is no point in distinguishing between a knowledge of His essence and a knowledge of His existence,* for I intend to seek a simple concept of which existence may be affirmed or denied by a judgment of the intellect.
For I never know anything to exist unless I first have some concept of that of which existence is affirmed.
And this is what we seek here.
Thirdly, in regard to God's existence there is no need to distinguish between the question of the truth of the proposition and the question of His existence.4
For before there can be any question of the truth of a proposition wherein existence is predicated of a subject, it is necessary first of all to conceive the terms of this proposition. Now the question is this: "'Is it possible to have a concept of the subject [of this proposition:
'God exists'] by natural means?"
Fourthly, the distinction between a natural and supernatural concept is out of place, because we are interested here only in the former.® Fifthly, in regard to the natural, there is no necessity for a distinction between "'nature, absolutely speaking"' and ''nature, in our present state'', for we are interested only in the latter.® Sixthly, the distinction between knowing God in Himself and knowing Him in a creature is not to the point."
For if our knowledge comes through a creature in the sense that the reasoning process begins with what can be known from a creature, then I ask ''What do we know at the conclusion of this process?"
If it is God Himself, then I have what I seek, for I am looking for a concept of God Himself.
Ifit is not God, but a creature,
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tunc idem erit terminus et principium discursus, et ita nulla notitia habebitur de Deo ; saltem non est intellectus in ultimo discursus termino quam diu sistit in aliquo objecto quod est principium discurrendi...
Est ergo mens quaestionis ista:
Utrum aliquem conceptum simplicem possit intellectus viatoris habere in quo conceptu simplici concipiatur Deus.
[Opinio Henricz] Ad hoc dicit quidam doctor sic loquendo: De cognitione actus distingui potest ex parte objecti et potest cognosci per se vel per accidens, in particulari vel in universali.
Realiter per accidens non cognoscitur Deus, quia quidquid de ipso cognoscitur est ipse, tamen cognoscendo aliquod attributum ejus cognoscimus quasi per accidens quid est.
Unde de attributis dicit Damascenus libro primo, capitulo 4 * : Non naturam dicunt Dei, sed quae circa naturam.
In universali etiam, puta in generali attributo, cognoscitur ; non quidem in universali secundum praedicationem quod dicatur de ipso in quo nullum est velle [sic / universale], quia quidditas illa est de se singularis, sed in universali quod tantum analogice commune est sibi et creaturae, tamen quasi unum a nobis concipitur propter proximitatem conceptuum, licet sint diversi conceptus.
* Migne, P.G., xcrv, 800.
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
then the beginning and conclusion of the reasoning process are identical, and therefore I have no knowledge of God at all—or at least God is not grasped at the end of the reasoning process so long as the mind does not get beyond the object that served as the initial point of the argument.
The meaning of the question, then, is this:
"Is it possible by natural means for man's intellect in the present life to have a simple concept in which concept
God is grasped?"
[ The Opinion of Henry of Ghent] A certain teacher § answers the question in this way :
An act of knowledge can be distinguished in terms of its object, and on this score we can distinguish:
(a) a knowledge of a thing through the thing itself; (5) a knowledge of the thing through something incidental to it ; (c) a knowledge of the thing in particular ; and (d) a knowledge of the thing in general.
In reality there is no knowledge of God through something incidental to Him, for whatever is known of God is
God Himself.
Nevertheless, we do know what God is in a quasi-incidental manner when we know some one of His attributes.
Hence, Damascene says * that the attributes "'do not bespeak the nature of God, but something about the nature'.
God is also known in a general way, that is, through some universal attribute.
Not indeed that any attribute, universal by way of predication, is affirmed of Him in whom nothing is universal, for His essence is singular of its very nature.
He is known, however, in a "'universal"' that is only analogically common to Himself and to a creature.
'This universal is conceived by us as though it were one notion, because of the close resemblance of the concepts it contains, although the latter in reality are diverse.
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In particulari non cognoscitur ex creaturis, quia creatura est peregrina similitudo ejus, sic quia tantum conformis ei quo ad alia attributa quae non sunt illa natura in particulari.
Ergo cum nihil ducat in cognitione alterius nisi sub ratione similis, sequitur, etc.
Item in universali tripliciter cognoscitur : generalissime, generalius, generaliter.
Generalissime tres habet gradus : cognoscendo enim quodcumque ens, ut hoc ens est, indistinctissime concipitur [Deus quia concipitur] ens quasi pars conceptus, et est primus gradus ; et amovendo hoc et concipiendo ens est secundus gradus.
Jam enim ut conceptum, non ut pars, concipitur commune analogum Deo et creaturae.
Quod si distinguatur conceptus entis qui Deo convenit, puta concipiendo ens indeterminatum negative, id est non determinabile, a conceptu entis qui convenit analogice, quod est ens indeterminatum privative, jam est tertius gradus.
Primo modo indeterminatum abstrahitur, ut forma ab omni materia ut in se subsistens et
[im]participabilis.
Secundo modo indeterminatum est velle [stc /] vel universale abstractum a particularibus quod est actu participatum in illis.
Post istos tres gradus generalissime concipiendi concipitur Deus generalius concipiendo quodcumque attributum non simpliciter ut prius, sed cum praeeminentia summa.
Generaliter autem concipitur concipiendo quodcumque
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
God is not known in particular from creatures, because a creature bears only an external likeness to Him, since it resembles Him only in those attributes which do not constitute Him as this particular nature.
Now since one thing can be known through another only by reason of the similarity existing between the two, it follows that God is not known in particular through creatures.
Furthermore, there are three ways in which we may have a general knowledge of God : (a) in a most general way, (6) in a less general way, and (c) in the least general manner.
(a) The most general knowledge we have of God comprises three stages.
To know any being as '"'this being"' is already to conceive God in a very indistinct way ; for "'being"' is included, as it were, as part of the concept.
This is the first step.
The second step consists in removing the "this" and conceiving simply "'being"'.
For "'being"', in so far as it is a concept and not simply a part of a concept, is already conceived as analogically common to God and creature. We are in the third stage, if the concept of ''being'' which pertains to God is distinguished from the concept of "'being'' which pertains analogically to creatures, if, for instance, God is conceived as a being that is negatively undetermined, that is, incapable of being determined, while a creature is conceived as a being that is privatively undetermined.®
In the first instance, "undetermined" is conceived abstractly as something self-subsistent and incapable of being participated in, like a form that lacks all matter.
In the second, ''undetermined"' is a universal abstracted from particulars and not actually shared by them.?¢
(6) In addition to these three stages of most general knowledge, God is grasped in a less general and more specific way, when any given attribute is conceived not in an unqualified manner as before, but as existing in the highest degree of perfection possible to such an attribute.
(c) God is known in the least general manner, however,
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attributum esse idem cum suo primo attributo, scilicet esse, propter simplicitatem.
Nec per speciem propriam cognoscitur, quia nihil est eo simplicius, sed ad modum aestimativae per speciem aliquam alienam ex creaturis.
Et hoc omnibus tribus modis praedictis...
[Opinio Scoti] Respondeo aliter ad primam quaestionem et in quibusdam, scilicet in quinque, contradicam positioni praedictae.
Rationes meae positionis ostendent oppositum hujus positionis...
[Prima Sententia].
Dico ergo primo quod non tantum haberi potest conceptus naturaliter in quo quasi per accidens concipitur Deus, puta in aliquod attributo, sed etiam aliquis conceptus in quo per se et quidditative concipiatur Deus.
Probo : quia concipiendo sapientem concipitur proprietas, secundum eum, vel quasi proprietas in actu secundo perficiens naturam.
Ergo intelligendo sapientem oportet prius intelligere aliquod quid, quia cum intelligo istud quasi proprietatem inesse, et ita ante conceptus omnium passionum vel quasi passionum, oportet quaerere conceptum quidditativum cui intelligantur ista attribui ; et iste conceptus alius erat quidditativus de
Deo, quia in nullo alio potest esse status.
[Secunda Sententia].
Secundo dico quod non tantum in conceptu analogo conceptui creaturae concipitur Deus, scilicet qui omnino sit alius ab illo qui de creatura dicitur, sed in conceptu aliquo univoco sibi et creaturae.
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
when the mind, on the basis of God's simplicity, identifies any of His other attributes with His primary attribute, namely, being itself.
Since nothing is simpler than God, He is known not through a species proper to Him, but, in a manner reminiscent of the operation of the estimative power through a species, alien to Him, derived from creatures.
And this holds for all three of the aforementioned ways of knowing God.
[Scotus's own opinion] My answer to the first question is different.
I shall contradict the preceding view on five points.
The reasons I give for my position will refute the other.
[First Statement].
In the first place, then, I say that it is naturally possible to have not only a concept in which God is known incidentally, as it were—for instance, under the aspect of some attribute—but also one in which He is conceived by Himself and quidditatively.
This I prove as follows.
According to [Henry of Ghent], by conceiving '"'wise'"? we grasp a property or quasi-property which perfects the nature after the manner of a secondary act.
In order to conceive "'wise'', therefore, it is necessary to have a conception of some prior subject, because I understand this property to be verified existentially.
And so we must look beyond all our ideas of attributes or quasi-attributes, in order to find a quidditative concept to which the former may be attributed.
'This other concept will be a quidditative notion of God, for our quest for a quasi-subject will not cease with any other kind of concept.
[Second Statement].
Secondly, I say that God is conceived not only in a conceptfanalogous| to the concept of-a-creatur s, one which is wholly other than that which is predicated _of creatures, but even in some concept univocal to Himself and to a creature.
TN eee ae as pach eda Lone wed ascoctoted wh Sawume concept,
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Et ne fiat contentio de nomine univocationis, univocum conceptum dico qui ita est unus quod ejus unitas sufficit ad contradictionem affirmando et negando ipsum de eodem, sufficit etiam pro medio syllogistico, ut extrema unita in medio sic uno sine fallacia aequivocationis concludantur inter se uniri et univocationem sic intellectam probo quadrupliciter.
[Arg.1].
Primo sic : omnis intellectus certus de uno conceptu et dubius de diversis habet conceptum de quo est certus alium a conceptibus de quibus est dubius, subjectum includit praedicatum.
Sed intellectus viatoris potest esse certus de Deo quod sit ens dubitando de ente finito vel infinito, creato vel increato; ergo conceptus entis de Deo est alius a conceptu isto et illo, et ita neuter ex se, et in utroque illorum includitur, igitur univocus.
Probatio majoris: quia nullus idem conceptus est certus et dubius ; ergo vel alius, quod est propositum, vel nullus, et nunc non erit certitudo de aliquo conceptu.
Probatio minoris:
Quilibet Philosophus fuit certus iliud quod posuit primum principium esse ens, puta unus de igne et alius de aqua, certus erat quod erat ens.
Non autem fuit certus quod esset ens creatum vel increatum, primum vel non primum.
Non enim erat certus quod erat primum, quia tunc fuisset certus de falso, et falsum non est scibile ; nec quod erat ens non primum, quia tunc non posuissent oppositum.
Confirmatur etiam: nam aliquis videns Philosophos
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
And lest there be a dispute about the name "'univocation", I designate that conceptQunivocalwhich possesses siheeni unity in itself, so that to affirm and deny it of 'one and the same thing would be-a_conteadietion
Ogee abet tap td near creacieson alle also has sufficient unity to serve as the middle term of a>
—syllogism, so that wherever two extremes are are united by a middle term that is one in this way, we may conclude to the union of the two extremes among themselves.
Univocation in this sense I prove by the following four arguments.
[Arg. 1].
.The first is this.
Every intellect that is certain about one concept, but dubious about others has, in addition to the concepts about which it is in doubt, another concept of which it is certain.
(The subject includes the predicate.) Now, in this life already, a man an be certain in his mind that God is a being and still Tg »| be in doubt whether He is a finite or an infinite being, a / | created or an uncreated being. Consequently, the con_cept of "being" as affirmed of God is different from the ther two concepts but is included in both of them and RET eo aed mn Bom other 2 "Proof of the major. One and the same concept cannot + be both certain and dubious.
Therefore, either there is 'another concept (which is our contention), or there is no concept at all, and consequently no certitude about any_conce (prove the minor Every philosopher was certain that what he postulated as a first principle a being ; for instance, one was certain that fire was a being, another Oi oe emia oe lic repibieialacean alae veteran it_was a created _or-an-uncreated being, whether it was_ first_or not first.
He could not sertain that it was thetiustebeinga fon then he: would have. beenscertain about something false, and what is false is not strictly
Freel e ed Nace a he carton tharat es ot first ; for then he would not have claimed the opposite.
This reason is confirmed as follows:
Someone
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discordare, potest esse certus de quocumque quod Deus [read quilibet] posuit primum principium esse ens, et tamen propter contrarietatem opinionum eorum, potuit dubitare utrum sit hoc ens vel illud. Et talidubitanti, si fieret demonstratio concludens vel destruens aliquem conceptum inferiorem, puta quod ignis non erit ens primum, sed aliquid ens posterius primo ente, non destrueretur ille conceptus primus sibi certus quem habuit de ente, sed salvaretur in illo conceptu particulari probato de igne ; et per hoc probatur propositio supposita in ultima consequentia rationis, quae fuit quod ille conceptus certus quae est ex se neuter dubiorum in utroque istorum salvatur.
Quod si non cures de auctoritate illa accepta de diversitate opinionum philosophantium, sed dicas quod quilibet habet duos conceptus in intellectu suo propinquos, qui propter propinquitatem analogiae videntur esse unus conceptus.
Contra hoc videtur esse quod tunc ex ista evasione videretur destructa omnis via probandi unitatem alicujus conceptus univocam.
Si-enim dicis hominem habere unum conceptum ad Socratem et Platonem, negabitur tibi et dicetur quod sunt duo, sed videntur unus propter magnam similitudinem.
A Praeterea, illi duo conceptus sunt simpliciter simplices, ergo non intelligibiles nisi distincte et totaliter, ergo si nunc non videntur duo, nec post.
Item, aut concipiuntur ut omnino disparati et mirum quomodo videntur unus, aut ut comparati secundum analogiam aut secundum similitudinem vel distinctionem,
-_ .
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
QI perceiving the disagreement among philosophers can still be certain that any of the things that they have acclaimed as the first principle is a being.
Nevertheless, in view of the contrariety of opinions, he could be in doubt whether this or that being is primary.
Now if we could demonstrate for such an individual the truth or falsity of one of these alternatives, for example that fire is not the first being, but is posterior to the first being, uld_ not destroy his first certain notion of it as a oer but this notion would survive in the particular conception which _we had proven about fire. And this also proves the proposition stated as the final conclusion of the argument, namely that this certain concept, since as such it is neither of the doubtful notions, is preserved in both of them.
You may not recognise the force of this argument based on the diversity of opinion among the philosophisers, but insist that each has in his mind two concepts closely resembling each other.
Yet because of the very closeness of the analogy, they seem to be one concept.
The following consideration, however, may be urged against this. By such an evasion all possibility of proving the unity of any univocal concept would be destroyed.
For if you say that '"'man" is one concept applicable to both Socrates and Plato, some one will deny it, asserting that there are two concepts, but they seem to be one because of their great similarity.
Furthermore, these two concepts are irreducibly simple.
Unless, therefore, they are known distinctly and in toto, they cannot be known at all.
Consequently, if these concepts are not perceived as two concepts now, they will not be perceived as two later on.
Again, either these two concepts are conceived as opposed to each other, and then it is strange how they are perceived as one.
Or they are compared according to analogy, or according to similarity or distinction, in which case they are conceived as distinct either prior to (2,322)
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et tunc simul vel prius concipiuntur ut distincti, ergo non videntur unus.
Item, ponendo duos conceptus, ponis duo objecta formalia cognita, quomodo sunt duo cognita formalia et non ut distincta.
Praeterea, si intelligeret singularia sub _ propriis rationibus quamvis conceptus duorum ejusdem speciei essent similimi, non est dubium tamen, quin multo similiores quam isti duo in proposito, quia isti duo differunt specie, adhuc intellectus bene distingueret inter tales conceptus singularium...
[Arg. 1].
Secundo principaliter arguo sic:
Nullus conceptus realis causatur in intellectu viatoris naturaliter nisi ab his quae sunt naturaliter motiva intellectus nostri.
Sed illa sunt phantasma vel objectum relucens in phantasmate et intellectus agens, ergo nullus conceptus simplex naturaliter fit in intellectu nostro modo nisi qui potest fieri virtute istorum, sed conceptus qui non esset univocus objecto relucenti in phantasmate, sed omnino alius prior ad quem ille habeat analogiam, non potest fieri virtute intellectus agentis et phantasmatis, ergo talis conceptus alius analogus qui ponitur naturaliter in intellectu viatoris numquam erit et ita non poterit haberi naturaliter aliquis conceptus de Deo, quod est falsum.
Probatio assumpti: Objectum quodcumque sive relucens in phantasmate sive in specie intelligibili cum intellectu. agente vel possibili cooperante secundum ultimum suae virtutis facit sicut effectum sibi adaequatum conceptum suum proprium et conceptum omnium essentialiter vel virtualiter inclusorum in eo.
Sed ille alius conceptus, qui ponitur analogus, non est essen-
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
or simultaneously with the comparison, and therefore they are not perceived as one concept.
Likewise, in postulating two concepts, you assume that two formal objects are known. How then can two formal objects be known and not be known as distinct?
Furthermore, if singulars were known under their proper notions even though the concepts of two of the same species were so very much alike, the intellect would still readily distinguish the concept of one singular from the other.
And yet there is no doubt that such concepts are even more alike than the two concepts in question [viz. of God and of a creature], for the latter differ specifically.
[Arg. un].
My second principal argument is this.
In the present life no concept representing reality is formed naturally in the mind except by reason of those factors which naturally motivate the intellect. Now these factors are the active intellect, and either the sense image or the object revealed in the sense image.!? No simple concept, then, is produced naturally in our mind ich can arise in virtue of these factors. Now, no concept could arise in virtue of the active intellect and the sense image that is not univocal but only analogous with, or wholly other than, what is revealed in the sense image.
In the present life, since no other such analogous concept could arise in the intellect naturally, it would be simply impossible to have any natural concept of God whatsoever.
But this is false.
Proof of the assumption.
With the co-operation of the active and possible intellect, any object revealed in the sense image or existing as an intelligible species at the very most can produce in the intellect as its adequate effect (a) a proper concept of itself and (6) a concept of all that is essentially or virtually included in it. Now this concept which they postulate to be analogous is neither a proper concept of the object in the sense image nor is it a proper concept of anything virtually or essentially
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tialiter nec virtualiter inclusus in isto, nec etiam est iste, ergo iste non fiet ab aliquo tali movente.
Et confirmatur ratio, quia objectum praeter conceptum suum proprium adaequatum et inclusum in ipso altero duorum modorum praedictorum nihil potest cognosci ex isto objecto nisi per discursum, sed discursus praesupponit cognitionem istius simplicitatis ad quod discurritur.
Formetur igitur ratio sic : quia nullum objectum facit conceptum simplicem proprium in isto intellectu conceptum simplicem proprium alterius objecti nisi contineat illud aliud objectum essentialiter vel virtualiter, objectum autem creatum non continet increatum essentialiter vel virtualiter, et hoc sub ea ratione sub qua sibi attribuuntur, ut posterius essentialiter attribuitur priori essentialiter, quia contra rationem posterioris essentialiter est includere virtualiter suum prius et patet quod objectum creatum non essentialiter continet increatum secundum aliquid omnino sibi proprium et non commune, ergo non facit conceptum simplicem et proprium enti increato...
[Arg. mr].
Tertio arguitur sic:
Conceptus proprius alicujus subjecti est sufficiens ratio concludendi de illo subjecto omnia conceptibilia quae sibi necessario insunt.
Nullum autem conceptum habemus de Deo per quem sufficienter possumus cognoscere omnia concepta a nobis quae necessario sibi insunt.
Patet de Trinitate, et aliis creditis necessariis ; ergo, etc.
Major probatur, quia immediatam quamlibet cognoscimus, inquantum terminos cognoscimus.
Igitur patet major de omni illo conceptibili quod immediate inest conceptui subjecti, quod si insit mediate, fiet idem
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
included in it.13
Consequently, it cannot arise by any such moving factor.
And this argument is confirmed by the fact that except through a reasoning process the mind can know nothing from this object besides the proper and adequate concept of the object itself and whatever is included therein in one of the two aforementioned ways.
But such a reasoning process presupposes a knowledge of the simple thing towards which one reasons.
Consequently, the argument may be formulated as follows:
No object will produce a simple and another_object, unless it_contains this second object ésentially_or virtually. No created object,however, contains the ''Uncreated"' essentially or virtually—at east in the way that the two are actually related, namely as what is by nature secondary is related to what is by nature prior.
For it is contrary to the very notion of what is essentially secondary to include virtually what contain, as part of its essence, something that is not merely common, but is exclusively proper to the 'Uncreated'.
Therefore, it produces no simple and proper concept of the "Uncreated" at all. apa ae THe chtrd arated is this.
The proper concept of any subject provides sufficient ground for concluding to everything conceivable which necessarily inheres in that subject.
We have no concept of God, however, that enables us to know every necessary attriBute which we conceive of Him, as is evident from the fact-of the Trmity, and the other necessary attributes now of Him by faith. ereiore, etc.
Proof of the major. We know any immediate proposition in so far as we know its terms.
Consequently, the major clearly holds for every concept that is immediately verified existentially of the subject-concept.
If it is a question of a notion that is only mediately verified, our
24.
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argumentum de medio comparato ad idem subjectum, et ubicumque stabitur, habetur propositum de immediatis, et ultra per illas scientur mediatae.
[Arg. tv].
Item, quarto potest sic argui.
Aut aliqua perfectio simpliciter habet rationem communem Deo et creaturae, et habetur propositum, aut non, sed tantum propriam creaturae, et tunc ratio ejus non conveniet formaliter Deo, quod est inconveniens.
Aut habet rationem omnino propriam Deo, et tunc sequitur quod nihil attribuendum est Deo, quia est perfectio simpliciter.
Nam hoc nihil est aliud dicere, nisi quod quia ratio ejus ut convenit Deo, dicit perfectionem simpliciter, ideo ipsum ponitur in Deo, et ita peribit doctrina Anselmi
Monologion,* ubi vult quod praetermissis relationibus in omnibus aliis quidquid est simpliciter melius ipsum quam non ipsum, attribuendum est Deo, sicut quodcumque non tale, est amovendum ab ipso. Primo ergo secundum ipsum aliquid cognoscitur esse tale et secundo attribuitur
Deo.
Ergo non est tale praecise ut in Deo.
Hoc etiam confirmatur quia tunc nulla perfectio simpliciter esset in creatura.
Consequentia patet, quia nullius talis perfectionis etiam conceptus aliquis convenit creaturae nisi conceptus analogicus ex hypothesi.
Talis secundum se, quia analogicus, est imperfectus et in nullo est ejus ratio melior non ipso, quia alias secundum illam rationem analogicam poneretur in Deo.
Confirmatur etiam haec quarto ratio sic:
Omnis * Cap. xv (Migne, P.L., ctv, 162-3).
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
(24) argument will continue to apply to the middle term in reference to the subject-concept until we have what we are seeking—some immediate propositions.
Through these immediate truths, then, the mediate truths will be known.
[Arg. tv].
A fourth argument can also be adduced.
Either some pure perfection 14 has a common meaning as applied to God and creatures (which i is our contention), ee because its meaning does not apply formally to alt (which is inadmissible),—or else it has a ee that i wholly proper - to to God,fin which case nothing | need _be attributed to ) God _ because it is a pure perfection.
For such an assumption is equivalent to saying that the meaning of such a perfection in so far as it applied to God, is a pure perfection and therefore is affirmed of God.
But this is to bring to nought what Anselm teaches in the Monologion,* namely that, with régard to everything except relations, whatever ee eo ae ee
SAE 2 IAI Ra Of: CIE NTE ET TRIE
kin Le. ever t_better than anything positive that is incompatible with it] must be denied of Him" According to. Ansel Then we Gist KnGW 8 something to be a pure perfection and secondly we attribute this perfection to God.
Therefore, it is not a pure perfection precisely in so far as it is in God.
This is also confirmed by the fact that otherwise no pure perfection would exist in creatures.
The consequence is evident, for in this hypothesis only such concepts as express such pure perfections analogously can be applied to a creature.
But such a notion in itself is imperfect since it is only analogous to the pure perfection.
And therefore, nothing is any better for having this analogous perfection than it would be if it did not have it, for otherwise such a perfection would be affirmed of God.
This fourth reason is also confirmed as follows.
Every
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inquisitio metaphysica de Deo sic procedit, considerando formalem rationem alicujus et auferendo ab illa ratione formali imperfectionem quam habet in creaturis et reservando illam rationem formalem et attribuendo sibi omnino summam perfectionem et sic attribuendo illud
Deo.
Exemplum de formali ratione sapientiae vel intellectus vel voluntatis.
Consideratur enim in se et secundum se, et ex hoc quod ista ratio non concludit formaliter imperfectionem aliquam nec limitationem, removetur ab ipsa imperfectiones quae concomitantur eam in creaturis et reservata eadem ratione sapientiae et voluntatis attribuuntur ista Deo perfectissime, ergo omnis inquisitio de Deo supponit intellectum habere conceptum eundem univocum quem accepit ex creaturis.
Quod si dicas alia est formalis ratio eorum quae conveniunt Deo, ex hoc sequitur inconveniens, quod ex nulla ratione propria eorum prout sunt in creaturis possunt concludi de Deo, quia omnino alia et alia ratio illorum est et istorum.
Immo non magis concludetur quod Deus est sapiens formaliter ex ratione sapientiae quam apprehendimus ex creaturis quam quod Deus est formaliter lapis.
Potest enim conceptus aliquis alius a conceptu lapidis creati formari ad quem conceptum lapidis ut est idea in Deo habet iste lapis attributionem, et ita formaliter diceretur Deus est lapis secundum istum conceptum analogicum vel analogum, sicut sapiens secundum illum conceptum analogum.
Qualis autem sit univocatio entis, ad quanta et ad quae dicetur magis in quaestione de primo objecto intellectus. * [Tertia Sententia].
Tertio dico quod Deus non cog- * Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. m1, q. iii.
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
ete:
, :
A ee etaphysical inquiry about God proceeds in this fashion ' the formal notion of something is considereé he-im ion associated with this notion in creatures is removed, and then, retaining this same formal notion, we ascribe to it the ultimate degree of perfection and then attribute it to God.
'Take, for example, the formal notion of ''wisdom"' or "'intellect" or '"'will''.
Such a notion is considered first of all simply in itself and absolutely. Because this notion includes formally no imperfection nor limitation, the imperfections associated with it in creatures are removed. Retaining this same
~¥_ notion of *wisdom" and "will", we attribute these to God nas Foye € rin bw 'shua se —hbut in a most perfect degree.
Consequently, every inquiry regarding God is based upon the supposition that same_univo the intellect has the sam hich it obtained from creatures.
If you maintain that this is not true, but that the formal concept of wh j od is another j a disconcerting consequence ensues ; namely that from the proper notion of anything found in creatures nothing at all can be inferred about God, for the notion of what is in each is wholly different.
We would have no more reason to conclude that God is formally wise from the Hf st have reason to conclude that God is formally a stone.
For it is possible to form another notion of a stone to which the notion of a created stone bears some relation, for instance, stone as an idea in God.
And so we could say formally, '"'God is a stone", according to this analogous concept, just as we say, ''He is wise'', according to another analogous concept.
What kind of univocation is ascribed to being and how far and to what it extends, will all be discussed more at length in a subsequent question on the primary object of the intellect.15
[ Third Statement].
Thirdly, I say that God is not known naturally by anyone in the present life in a proper and
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noscitur naturaliter a viatore in particulari et proprie, hoc est, sub ratione hujus essentiae ut haec et in se.
Sed ratio illa posita ad hoc in praecedenti opinione non concludit.
Cum enim arguitur quod non cognoscitur aliquid nisi per simile, aut intelligit per simile de similitudine univocationis aut imitationis.
Si primo modo, igitur nihil cognoscitur de Deo secundum illam opinionem, quia in nullo habet similitudinem univocationis secundum illum modum.
Si secundo modo, et creaturae non tantum imitantur illam essentiam sub ratione generalis attributi, sed etiam essentiam hanc ut est haec essentia sive ut nuda in se est existens, secundum eum ; sic enim magis est idea vel exemplar quoniam sub ratione generalis attributi; ergo propter talem similitudinem posset creatura esse principium cognoscendi essentiam divinam ip se et in particulari.
Est ergo alia ratio hujus quaestionis, videlicet quod Deus ut haec essentia in se non cognoscitur naturaliter a nobis, quia sub ratione talis cognoscibilis est objectum voluntarium non naturale nisi respectu sui intellectus tantum, et ideo a nullo intellectu creatopotest sub ratione hujus essentiae ut haec est naturaliter cognosci.
Nec aliqua essentia naturaliter cognoscibilis a nobis sufficienter ostendit hanc essentiam ut haec, nec per similitudinem univocationis nec imitationis.
Univocatio enim non est nisi in generalibus rationibus, imitatio etiam deficit, quia imperfecta, quia creatura imperfecte eum imitatur.
Utrum autem sit alia ratio hujus impossibilitatis, videlicet propter rationem primi objecti, sicut alii ponunt, de hoc in quaestione de primo objecto.* [Quarta Sententia].
Quarto dico quod ad multos con- * Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. m1, q. iii.
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
particular manner ; that is to say, we do not know Him in His essence itself precisely as this essence.
But the reason given for this in the preceding opinion is not conclusive.
For, when [Henry] argues that one thing can be known from another only by reason of what is similar, we can only understand this likeness to be one of univocation or of imitation.
If the first is meant, then nothing is known about God, for according to this opinion there is no likeness of univocation between God and creatures whereby He might be known by us.
If the second is meant, then creatures would not imitate God's essence merely under the aspect of some general attribute, but also precisely as "'this essence'', unveiled and as it exists in itself, for in this way it is more an idea or exemplar than if it were conceived under some general attribute.
By reason of this similarity, therefore, a creature, according to him, could be a principle of knowing the divine essence in itself and in particular.
There is, however, another reason for this conclusion that God Himself as this essence is not an object of natural knowledge for us ; for if He be known in this way by any intellect other than His own, it is as a voluntary and not as a natural object.16
Therefore He cannot be known naturally by any created intellect precisely as '"'this essence'.
Neither is there any essence naturally knowable to us that would suffice to reveal "'this essence"' as ''this essence' whether by reason of a likeness of univocation or of imitation.
For there is univocation only where general notions are concerned.
Imitation too is deficient because it is imperfect, for creatures only imperfectly imitate Him.
Whether there is another reason for the impossibility of such knowledge based on the nature of the primary object of the intellect, which some claim to be the quiddity of a material thing, will be discussed in the question on the primary object of the intellect.
[Fourth Statement].
Fourthly, I say that we can arrive
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ceptus proprios Deo possumus perverire qui non conveniunt creaturis.
Cujusmodi sunt conceptus omnium perfectionum simpliciter in summo, et perfectissimus conceptus in quo quasi in quadam descriptione perfectissime cognoscimus Deum est concipiendo omnes perfectiones simpliciter et in summo.
'Tamen conceptus perfectior simul et simplicior nobis possibilis est conceptus entis infiniti.
Iste enim est simplicior quam conceptus entis boni, entis veri, vel aliorum similium, quia infinitum non est quasi attributum vel passio entis, sive ejus de quo dicitur, sed dicit modum intrinsecum illius entitatis, ita quod cum dico infinitum ens, non habeo conceptum quasi per accidens ex subjecto et passione, sed conceptum per se subjecti in certo gradu perfectionis, scilicet infinitatis, sicut albedo intensa non dicit conceptum per accidens sicut albedo visibilis ; immo intensio dicit gradum intrinsecum albedinis in se et ita patet simplicitas hujus conceptus ens infinitum.
Probatur perfectio istius conceptus, tum quia iste conceptus inter omnes nobis conceptibiles conceptus virtualiter plura includit, sicut enim ens includit virtualiter verum et bonum in se, ita ens infinitum includit verum infinitum et bonum infinitum et omnem perfectionem simpliciter sub ratione infiniti.
Tum quia demonstratione quia ultimo concluditur esse de ente infinito, sicut apparet ex quaestione prima secundae distinctionis.
Illa autem sunt perfectiora quae ultimo cognoscuntur demonstratione quia ex eis, quia propter eorum remotionem a creaturis difficilimum estvea lex creaturis concludere.
Si dicis de summo bono vel summo ente quod istud
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
27) at many concepts proper to God in the sense that they do not apply to creatures. _Such are the concepts of all the pure_per hen taken in the hi e. questing mossperteet-concept of allsbyjwhich,we-know God most perfechy, as it were, ina descriptive sort. of way, is obtained by conceiving all the pure perfections and each in the highest depres Now 2 less perfect bu perfect but simpler concept is possible to us, namely the concept of an infinite penn simpler than the concept of 'good being'
"true being" or other similar concepts, SHOE infipe ie HoT a GuANTRIRRDMEE ar tooo ot "'being"' or of that of which it is predicated.
Rather it i apit aan sa inode oianemiGy that when I say 'Infinite Being'', I do not have a concept composed accidentally, as it were, of a subject and its attribute.
What I do have is a concept of what is essentially one, namely of a subject with a certain grade of perfection— infinity.
It is like "intense whiteness", which is not a notion that is accidentally composed, such as "'visible whiteness'? would be, for the intensity is an intrinsic grade of whiteness itself.
'Thus the simplicity of this concept "Infinite Being"' is evident.
Now the perfection of this concept is proved first from the fact that it virtually includes more than any other concept we can conceive.
As "'being"' virtually includes the "good" and the "'true'', so "Infinite Being" includes the "infinitely good'', the "infinitely true'', and all pure perfections under the aspect of infinity.
It is also proved from this fact.
With a demonstration of fact,!? the existence of an Infinite Being, or the fact that something has infinite being, is the last conclusion to be established.
This is clear from Dist. u, q. i.18
The more perfect, however, are the last to be established by a demonstration of fact which begins with creatures.
For their very remoteness from creatures makes knowledge of them from creatures most difficult of attainment.
But if you say that "'highest good" or '"'Highest Being"
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dicit modum intrinsecum entis et includit virtualiter alios conceptus: respondeo, quod si summum intelligatur comparative, sic dicit respectum ad extra, sed infinitum dicit conceptum ad se.
Si autem intelligas absolute summum, hoc est, quod ex natura rei non posset excedi, perfectio illa expressius concipitur in ratione infiniti entis.
Non enim summum bonum indicat in se utrum sit infinitum vel finitum.
Ex hoc apparet improbatio illius quod dicitur im praecedenti opinione, quod perfectissimum est cognoscere attributa reducendo illa in esse divinum propter simplicitatem divinam.
Cognitio enim esse divini sub ratione infiniti est perfectior cognitione ejus sub ratione simplicitatis, quia simplicitas communicatur creaturis, infinitas autem non secundum modum quo convenit Deo.
[Quinta Sententia].
Quinto dico quod ista quae cognoscuntur de Deo cognoscuntur per species creaturarum, quia sive universalius et minus universale cognoscantur per eandem speciem minus universalis sive utrumque habeat speciem sui intelligibilem.
Si propriam saltem illud quod potest imprimere speciem minus universalis in intellectu potest etiam causare speciem cujuscumque universalioris et ita creaturae quae imprimunt proprias species in intellectu possunt etiam imprimere species transcendentium quae communiter conveniunt eis et Deo.
Et tunc intellectus propria virtute potest uti multis speciebus simul ad concipiendum illa simul quorum sunt istae species, puta specie boni et specie summi et specie actus ad concipiendum aliquid summum bonum et actualissimum, quod apparet per locum a minori.
Imaginativa enim potest uti speciebus diversorum
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
expresses an intrinsic mode of being and includes other concepts virtually, I reply that if ''highest'' be taken in a comparative sense, then it includes a relation to something extrinsic to the being, whereas "'infinite'" is an absolute concept.
But if "'highest" is understood in an absolute sense, i.e. as meaning that the very nature of the thing is such that it cannot be exceeded, then this perfection is conceived even more expressly in the notion of an infinite being, because "highest good"' does not indicate as such whether it is infinite or finite.
This obviously refutes the assertion made in the previous opinion [of Henry], namely that the most perfect knowledge we have of God is to know His attributes as identified with the divine being in virtue of His simplicity.
A knowledge of the divine being as infinite is, however, more perfect than a knowledge of Him as simple, for simplicity is shared with creatures, whereas infinity, as God possesses it, is not.
[Fifth Statement].
In the fifth place, I say that what we know of God is known through intelligible species of creatures.
Whether the more universal and less universal have each their own proper intelligible species, or whether both are known through one and the same species, namely that which is less universal, this in any case is true.
Whatever can imprint or cause a species of what is less universal, can also cause any species of that which is more universal.
Thus it is that creatures which impress their own proper species on the intellect can also impress the species of the transcendentals which are common to themselves and to God.1!® Then, the intellect in virtue of its own power can make use of many such species simultaneously, in order to conceive at one time those things of which these are the species.
For instance, it can use the species of ''good'', the species of "'highest'', the species of "'act'', to conceive the "'highest good which is pure act".
This is clear from an instance of the dialectical rule a minori,2° for the imagination is able to use
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sensibilium ad imaginandum compositum ex illis diversis, sicut apparet imaginando montem aureum.
Ex hoc apparet improbatio illius quod dicitur in praecedenti opinione de illa suffosione, quia suffodiendo numquam illud quod non subest suffosioni invenitur per suffosionem.
Non autem subest conceptui creaturae aliquis conceptus vel species repraesentans aliquid proprium Deo quod sit omnino alterius rationis ab eo quod convenit creaturae, ut probatum est per secundam rationem in secundo articulo.
Ergo per suffosionem nullus talis conceptus invenitur.
Et quod adducitur simile de aestimativa, dico quod videtur adduci falsum ad confirmationem alterius falsi, quia si maneat ovis in eadem natura et in eodem affectu naturali ad agnum, imitaretur [read mutaretur] tamen ut esset similis lupo per miraculum in omnibus accidentibus sensibilibus, puta colore, figura et sono et caeteris hujusmodi, agnus fugeret ovem sic mutatam sicut fugeret lupum.
Et tamen in ove sic mutata non esset intentio nocivi, sed convenientis.
Ergo aestimativa agni non suffoderet ad inveniendum intentionem convenientis sub speciebus sensibilibus, si praecise ita moveretur secundum appetitum sensitivum sicut accidentia sensibilia moverent.
Si dicas quod ibi intentio convenientis non multiplicat se quia non sunt talia accidentia convenientia tali intentioni, et intentio convenientis non multiplicatur sine accidentibus convenientibus, hoc nihil est, quia si agnus fugeret lupum propter perceptionem nocivi conceptam ab aestimativa et illa non multiplicatur cum accidentibus istis sensibilibus quia non est cum eis
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
the species of different things perceptible to the senses and thus imagine a composite of these different elements, as is apparent, for instance, when we imagine a gold mountain.
This obviously refutes the assertion made in the previous opinion regarding the process whereby the intellect burrows beneath the concept of creatures.
For by such a process, we can unearth only what lies beneath the surface.
In the concept of a creature, however, no notion or species will be found to represent something proper to God which is wholly different in nature from anything pertaining to a creature, as we have proved in the second reason for the second statement.
Consequently, we shall never discover such a concept by this burrowing process.
And as to the analogy of the estimative power, I would say that he seems to adduce one false instance to confirm another.
For if a sheep were to remain the same in nature and to retain its natural affection towards a lamb, and yet by some miracle were to be changed accidentally so as to resemble a wolf in all its sensible manifestations, for instance in its colour, its shape, its cries, and all the rest of it, a lamb would flee from such a sheep just as it would flee from a wolf.
And still such a sheep has only friendly, and not harmful, intentions towards the lamb.
Consequently, the estimative power would not dig beneath the sense images to discover the friendliness, if it were moved according to the sense appetite in the precise way that the sensible appearances move it.
It does not help at all to say that this friendliness is not conveyed sensibly in such a case, since the external manifestations do not agree with the intent in question, and that it is only when the two agree that the friendly intent will be conveyed in a perceptible manner.
For if the lamb flees from the wolf only because, by its estimative power, it perceives something inimical, and in the present case the intention [of friendliness] is not transmitted perceptibly where the sensible manifestations are
(2,322)
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[in]tentio casu, ergo haec est suffosio agni ad intentionem nocivi, quae nulla est, aut si hic non fugit propter suffossionem, ergo nec alias.
[Ad Argumenta Principalia] Ad argumenta istius quaestionis :
Ad primum dico quod illa comparatio debet intelligi quantum ad primam motionem intellectus ab objecto, ibi enim phantasma cum intellectu agente habent vicem objecti primi moventis, sed non debet intelligi quantum ad omnem actum sequentem primam motionem.
Potest enim intellectus abstrahere omne objectum inclusum in objecto primo movente, et considerare illud abstractum non considerando illud a quo abstrahit et considerando istud abstractum sic considerat commune sensibili etinsensibili, quia in illo consideratur insensibile in universali sicut et sensibile, et potest considerare illud abstractum et aliud abstractum in quo sit proprium alteri, scilicet insensibili ; sed sensus non est abstractivus, et ideo in omni actu tam primo quam secundo requirit objectum aliquod proprium movens quomodo non se habet phantasma ad intellectum.
Ad secundum dico quod Commentator exponit illud simile Philosophi de difficili et non de impossibili, et ratio sua est quia tunc natura fecisset otiose illas substantias abstractas intelligibiles, et non possibiles intelligi ab aliquo intellectu.
Sed ista ratio ejus non valet ; tum
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE
OF GOD
those [of a wolf], it follows that the lamb unearths a non-existent intention of enmity ; or if the lamb does not flee in virtue of what it discovers by such a burrowing process in the present instance, then neither does it do so in other cases.
[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning] As to the arguments at the beginning of this question :
To the frst, I reply that the Philosopher's comparison applies to the initial movement of the intellect by the object, for in this case the sense images together with the active intellect function in the role of primary moving object.
It must not be understood, however, of all the actions which follow this initial movement.
For the intellect can abstract any object which is included in that which produces the initial movement.
It is able to consider the former without considering that from which it was abstracted.
Now when the intellect considers something that has been abstracted in this way, it grasps what is common to both sensible and insensible.
In its consideration the intellect can unite a second abstract notion with the first so that the latter becomes proper to something else, namely to the insensible, for in the abstracted are considered both the insensible (in the universal) as well as the sensible.
The sense faculty, however, is incapable of making abstractions.
Therefore, in all its acts, whether they be primary or secondary, it requires some object to first put it in motion.
But this is not the way that the sense image is related to the intellect.
To the second,22 I reply that the Commentator restricts this comparison of the Philosopher to what is difficult, but not impossible, to know.
And his reason is that otherwise nature would have made these separate substances intelligible in vain, for no intellect would be able to know them.
But this reason is invalid, first of all,
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quia non est finis istarum substantiarum inquantum intelligibiles sunt ut intelligantur ab intellectu nostro, et ideo si hoc non conveniret eis, non propter hoc essent frustra intelligibiles ; tum quia non sequitur : non sunt intelligibiles ab intellectu nostro, ergo a nullo, possent enim intelligi a seipsis, et ideo est ibi fallacia consequentis.
Unde licet multipliciter posset exponi auctoritas Philosophi, dico quod oculus noctuae non habet cognitionem nisi intuitivam et naturalem, et quantum ad istas duas conditiones potest exponi auctoritas Philosophi de impossibilitate, quia sicut est impossibile illi oculo intuitive considerare objectum istud, sic intellectui nostro est impossibile naturaliter et etiam intuitive cognoscere Deum.
Ad tertium, dico quod infinitum potentiale est ignotum quia unumquodque est cognoscibile inquantum est in actu.
Non tamen est ignotum sequitur [read sic] quod repugnet sibi intelligi ab intellectu infinito, sed non potest infinitum cognosci ab aliquo intellectu cognoscente ipsum secundum modum_ suae _infinitatis.
Modus enim suae infinitatis est accipiendo alterum post alterum, et intellectus qui cognosceret hoc modo alterum post alterum, cognosceret semper finitum et numquam infinitum, intellectus tamen infinitus potest cognoscere totum illud simul, non partem post partem.
Cum etiam arguitur de secundo Metaphysicae de infinitis et infinito, dico quod non est simile quia cognitio objectorum infinitorum numeraliter concluderet infinitatem potentiae cognoscentis, sicut patuit in quaestione prima secundae distinctionis argumento secundo ad _infinitatem, quia videlicet ibi pluralitas ex parte objecti con-
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
because we cannot say that the sole purpose or reason for the intelligibility of these substances is that we may know them.
Consequently, even if we could know nothing about them, we still could not say they are intelligible to no purpose.
Secondly, it does not follow that just because these substances are unintelligible to our minds, they are unintelligible to all minds, for they could be intelligible to themselves.
Therefore, we have the fallacy of affirming the consequent.?® Wherefore I say that even though there are many ways in which this citation of the-Philosopher could be explained, still the eye of the bat has only a natural and intuitive knowledge. And on the basis of these two characteristics the Philosopher's words can be explained even in terms of impossibility.
For just as it is impossible for the eye of the bat to consider such an object naturally and intuitively, so it is also impossible for our intellect to possess a natural and intuitive knowledge of God.™4
To the third,2> I reply that the potentially infinite is unknown, because only to the extent that something is in act it is knowable.
But it is not so unknown that it would be impossible for an infinite intellect to know it.
Nevertheless the [potentially] infinite cannot be known by an intellect which proceeds to know it in the way that it is infinite.
For it is infinite only in so far as the mind in considering only one thing after another never comes to anend. Now the mind which considers only one thing after another in this way always considers something finite and never something infinite.
An infinite intellect, however, can know the whole thing at once, and not simply one part after another.
And to the argument from Metaphysics, BK.
0, concerning infinite numbers and the "'Infinite'', I reply that there is no parity between the two, for a knowledge of an infinite number of objects would imply that the faculty of knowledge itself is infinite (as is clear from q. i of dist. 1 regarding the infinity of God),? since one can infer a greater power of
DUNS SCOTUS
cludit majoritatem virtutis in intellectu, sed intellectio alicujus infiniti non concludit infinitatem, quia non oportet actum habere talem modum realem, qualem habet objectum, quia actus sub ratione finiti potest esse ad objectum sub ratione infiniti nisi esset actus comprehensivus, et concedo quod talem actum circa objectum infinitum non habemus nec possibile est habere.
Ad Gregorium dico quod non debet intelligi quod contemplatio sistat sub Deo in aliqua creatura, quia hoc esset frui utendis, quod esset summa perversitas secundum
Augustinum LXXXIII Quaestionum, quaestione xxx.* Sed conceptus illius essentiae sub ratione entis est imperfectior conceptu illius essentiae ut haec essentia est, et quia est imperfectior, ideo inferior in intelligibilitate, contemplatio autem de lege communi stat in tali conceptu communi, et ideo stat in aliquo conceptu qui est minoris intelligibilitatis quam Deus in se, ut est haec essentia.
Et ideo debet intelligi ad aliquid quod est sub Deo, hoc est ad aliquid sub ratione intelligibilis cujus intelligibilitas est inferior intelligibilitate Dei in se, ut haec essentia singularis.
[Ad Argumenta pro Opinione Henrici | Ad argumenta pro prima opinione, cum arguitur quod
Deus non potest intelligi in aliquo conceptu communi sibi et creaturis univoce, quia est singularitas quaedam : consequentia non valet.
Socrates enim inquantum Socrates est singularis et tamen a Socrate plura possunt abstrahi praedicata, et ideo singularitas alicujus non *PMicnewPs la xterooe
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
intellect from a greater number of objects known.
But a knowledge of something infinite does not imply that the act of knowledge itself is infinite unless it be an act which fully comprehends the object, for it is not necessary that the act and object should have the same mode of reality, since an act which by nature is finite can be related to an object which by nature is infinite.
I admit, however, that we neither have, nor can have, such a comprehensive act of knowledge in regard to an infinite object.
To the ( fourth} argument,2' [that] of Gregory, I reply that we should not think that contemplation terminates in some creature beneath God, for this would be to enjoy as an end what is to be used as a means.
According to Augustine,* this would be the greatest perversion.
But the concept of God's essence under the aspect of '"'being"' is less perfect than the concept of the same essence as "this essence'.
Because it is less perfect, it falls below the latter concept in intelligibility.
But the contemplation that is characteristic of the ordinary dispensation rests with just such an [imperfect or] common concept, and hence with one of inferior intelligibility to God Himself considered as this essence.
Consequently '"'to what is beneath God" must be understood in terms of being intelligible, [that is to say it refers to a concept] whose intelligibility is less than that of God considered in Himself as this singular essence.
[A Reply to the Arguments in Support of Henry| To the arguments for the first opinion 78 I reply that when it is argued that God by reason of His unique singularity cannot be known through some concept univocally common to Himself and creatures, the consequence is invalid.
For Socrates, in so far as he is Socrates, is singular.
Nevertheless several predicates can be abstracted from Socrates.
Consequently, the singularity
DUNS SCOTUS
impedit, quin ab eo quod singulare est, possit abstrahi aliquis conceptus communis.
Et licet quidquid ibi in re sit singulare ex se in existendo ita quod nihil contrahit aliud ibi ad singularitatem, tamen illud idem potest concipi ut hoc in re, vel quodammodo indistincte, et ita ut singulare vel commune.
Quod dicit pro illa opinione de cognitione per accidens, non oportet improbare, quia quasi per accidens cognoscitur in attributo, sed non praecise sicut probatum est.
MAN'S NATURAL KNOWLEDGE OF GOD
of a thing is no impediment to the abstraction of a common concept.
Though in reality everything in God, since it exists of itself, is singular, so that one thing does not contract another to singularity, nevertheless one and the same thing can be conceived indistinctly or as "'this thing existing in reality", and thus it can be conceived either as common or as singular.
There is no need to refute what he says regarding an incidental knowledge of God, because God is known in a quasi-incidental manner in an attribute.
However, this is not the-sole way He can be known, as has been proved above.
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