The Unicity of God
THE UNICITY OF GOD
Summary of the Argument Question : Is there but one God ?
Pro ET CONTRA Bopy OF THE QUESTION First opinion: The unicity of God is known only by faith
Scotus's opinion : Natural reason can prove the unicity of God oO First proof :
From the infinite intellect Second proof:
From the infinite will Third proof:
From the infinite goodness Fourth proof:
From the infinite power Fifth proof :
From absolute infinity Sixth proof :
From necessity of existence Seventh proof:
From the omnipotence Reply to the arguments for the first opinion
REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS AT THE BEGINNING
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[IV. DE UNITATE DEI] *
Quaero utrum sit tantum unus Deus ?
[Pro et Contra] Et quod non arguitur :
Quorum dicuntur multi domini et dii multi.t Item, si Deus est, ergo diisunt.
Probatur consequentia, quia singulare et plurale idem significant, licet differant in modo significandi ; ergo idem includit praedicatio proportionaliter accepta ; ergo sicut singulare includit singulare, ita plurale includit plurale.
Probatur secundo [MS tertio], quia sicut Deus est quo majus cogitari non potest, ita dii sunt quibus majores cogitari non possunt.
Ila autem quibus majora cogitari non possunt sunt in effectu.
Quod videtur, quia si non essent in effectu, possent cogitari majora eis ; ergo, etc.
Praeterea, omne ens per participationem reducitur ad aliquid tale per essentiam.
Individua in quacumque specie creata sunt entia per participationem, alioquin non essent multa ; ergo reducuntur ad aliquid tale per essentiam.
Ergo est aliquis homo, aliquis bos per essentiam, etc.
Quidquid autem est per essentiam, non per participationem, est Deus ; ergo, etc.
Item, plura bona sunt paucioribus meliora.
Sed quaecumque meliora sunt ponenda in universo ; ergo, etc.
Item, quidquid si est, est necesse esse, est simpliciter * Opus oxoniense, |, dist. 11, q. iii (Assisi 137, f. 18r?-19r°: cf. Vatican ed.,
VOL. I, 222-243),
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[1V. THE UNICITY OF GOD]
I ask whether there is but one God ?
[Pro et Contra] Some argue there is not merely one God! :
; [Arg. 1]. ''For indeed there are many gods and many ords"'.
[Arg.m]. Also, if God exists, then gods exist. Proof of the consequence:
(1) Singular and plural signify the same, although they differ in the way in which they do so.
'Therefore, the predication proportionately implies the same.
As the singular mode then implies a singular thing, so the plural implies several things.2
(2) Just as God is that greater than which nothing can be conceived, so gods are those greater than which nothing can be thought.
Things that could not be conceivably greater, however, actually exist.
This is clear from the fact that if they did not actually exist, we could think of something greater than they.
Therefore, etc.
{Arg. ut].
Furthermore, everything which is a being by participation can be traced back to something which is such by its very essence.? Now the individuals in any created species are beings by participation ; otherwise more than one individual per species would not exist.
Therefore, they can be traced back to something which is such by its very essence.
Consequently, there is some man who is by his essence, some ox which is by its essence, and so on.
Now whatever is by its essence and not by participation is God.
Therefore, etc.
[Arg.1v].
Likewise, a greater number of good things is better than a lesser number.4
But we should assume the best to exist in the universe.
Therefore, etc.
[An additional argument].6
Also, whatever is a
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necesse esse ; sed alius Deus si est, est necesse esse ; ergo, etc.
Major probatur : da oppositum praedicati "'non est necesse esse simpliciter", et sequitur oppositum subjecti quod scilicet si est, est possibile esse et non necesse esse.
Respondeo : Debet inferri oppositum subjecti sic, " non est necesse esse, si est"', ubi negetur habitudo inter antecedens et consequens.
Contra :
Deuter. 6.* Audi Israel: Dominus Deus tuus Deus unus est ; et Is.f :
Extra me non est Deus.
{Corpus Quaestionis] In illa quaestione conclusio est certa; sed dicunt aliqui quod haec conclusio non est demonstrabilis, sed tantum accepta per fidem.
Et ad hoc sequitur auctoritas Rabbi Moysi, xxiii cap.,{ quod unitas Dei accepta est a Lege.
Hoc etiam arguitur per rationem, quia si per naturalem rationem posset cognosci Deum esse unicum, ergo posset cognosci Deum esse singularem naturaliter ; ergo posset cognosci singularitas Dei et essentia ut singularis, quod falsum est et supra [read contra] prius dictum est in quaestione de subjecto theologiae.
[Opinio Scot: | Videtur tamen quod illa unitas posset naturali ratione ostendi; et hoc sumendo viam primo ex_ infinito * Deutsyvi. 4.
} Isaias, xiv. 5.
{ Doctor perplexorum, 1, cap. Ixxv.
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necessary being, if it exist, is necessary being without qualification.
But if another God exists, He is a necessary being. Therefore, etc.
Proofofthe major: Ifyou grant the opposite of the predicate (viz. "'[it] is not necessary being without qualification"'), the opposite of the subject follows (viz. "It is not necessary but only possible being, if it exists"?).—Reply : The opposite of the subject which is to be inferred is this.
'"'It is not a necessary being, if it exists.""
Here, then, the relation between antecedent and consequent may be denied.
To the contrary :
In Deuteronomy * we read: ''Hear O Israel, the Lord our God is one Lord'', and in Isaiast:
'"'There is no God besides me''.
[Body of the Question] In this question, the conclusion is certain.
{First Opinion] Some say,® however, that the unicity of God cannot be demonstrated but is accepted only on faith.
And in this they follow the authority of Rabbi Moses [Maimonides] ¢ who says that it is known from the Law that God is one.
Reason supports this view, for if the mind by its natural powers could know that God is one, then it could also know naturally that God is singular.
In this case, natural reason could know the singularity of God and could also know the essence of God as singular, which is false and contradicts what was said in the question about the subject of theology.'
[Scotus's Opinion] Nevertheless, it seems that natural reason could establish the unicity of God by arguing from (1) the infinite
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intellectu ; secundo ex infinita voluntate; tertio ex infinita bonitate ; quarto ex ratione infinitae potentiae ; quinto ex ratione infiniti absolute ; sexto ex ratione necesse esse ; septimo ex ratione omnipotentiae.
[Prima Via].
Ex parte intellectus infiniti arguitur sic primo.
Intellectus infinitus cognoscit intelligibile quodcumque perfectissime quantum est intelligibile in se ; ergo si sunt dii, sint A et B. A cognoscit B perfectissime, quantum scilicet B est cognoscibile : sed hoc est impossibile.
Probatio : quia aut cognoscit B per essentiam B, aut non.
Si non, et B est cognoscibile per essentiam, ergo non cognoscit B perfectissime et quantum scilicet est cognoscibile.
Nihil enim cognoscibile per essentiam perfectissime cognoscitur, nisi cognoscitur per essentiam suam, vel per aliquid perfectius includens essentiam suam quam ipsa sit in se.
Essentia autem B in nullo perfectius includitur quam in B, quia tunc B non esset
Deus.
Si autem cognoscit B per essentiam ipsius B, ergo actus ipsius A est posterius naturaliter essentia ipsius B, et ita A non erit Deus.
Quod autem actus ipsius A sit posterior ipso B probatio, quia omnis actus cognoscendi qui non est idem objecto est posterior objecto ; neque enim prior neque simul natura est actus cum aliquo alio ab actu, quia tunc actus posset intelligi sine objecto, sicut econverso.
Si dicatur quod illa intelligit B per essentiam ipsius A, quae simillima est ipsi B, sic videlicet quod A intelligit B in ratione speciei communis ipsi A et ipsi B.
Contra : neutra salvat responsio quod A intelligat B perfectissime, et per consequens non est Deus, quia cognitio alicujus in simili tantum, et in universali non est cognitio perfectissima et intuitiva ipsius rei, et ita A non cognosceret
B intuitive nec perfectissime, quod est propositum.
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intellect, (2) the infinite will, (3) the infinite goodness, (4) the infinite power, (5) the notion of infinity considered absolutely, (6) the nature of necessary being, and (7) omnipotence.
[First Proof].
The first argument, based on the infinite intellect, is this.
Such an intellect knows whatever can be known in the most perfect way that it could be known.
Suppose then that two gods existed, let us call them A and B.
A, therefore, would know B as perfectly as B could be known.
This, however, is impossible.
Proof :
Either A knows B through the essence of B or not.
If not, and B can be known through its essence, then A knows B neither in the most perfect manner nor to the extent that Bcan be known.
For nothing that can be known through its essence is perfectly known unless it be known either through its essence or through something which includes the essence in a more perfect way than the latter exists in itself.
But the essence of B is not included in anything more perfect than B, for it it were, B would not be God.
But if A knows B through the latter's essence, then A's act of knowledge is posterior to the essence of B and therefore A would not be God.
I prove that in such a case A's act would be posterior to B in this fashion.
Every act of knowing not identical with its object is posterior to that object.
For an act by nature is simultaneous only with itself.
Neither is it prior to its object, for then the act could be known without the object and vice versa.
But suppose we say that A through its own essence knows B because of the great similarity between the two, so that A knows B through some nature common to Aand B. To the contrary:
This answer saves neither of these two points: viz. (1) that A knows B most perfectly, and therefore, (2) that A is God.
For any such knowledge that is merely general and in virtue of some likeness is neither perfect nor intuitive.
Consequently, A would not know B intuitively or most perfectly, which is what we set out to prove.
(2,322
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Secundo ex parte intellectus arguitur sic, unica intellectio non potest habere duo objecta adaequata, A est objectum adaequatum suae intellectioni, quia A habet pro objecto adaequato essentiam suam ; ergo non habet essentiam B pro objecto adaequato.
Esset autem B objectum adaequatum intellectioni A, si posset simul intelligere perfecte A et B.
Major patet, quia aliter actus adaequatur objecto, quo abstracto, non minus quietaretur et adaequaretur, et ita frustra esset tale objectum.
[Secunda Via].
Quantum ad secundam viam arguitur sic: Voluntas infinita est recta ; ergo diligit quodlibet diligibile quantum est diligibile, et quanto amore potest si sit infinitum.
B autem est diligendus in infinitum cum ponitur esse alius Deus.
Et per consequens sit bonum infinitum et infinite a voluntate sic potenter diligere diligendum ; ergo voluntas A diligit B infinite : sed hoc est impossible, quia A naturaliter diligit plus se quam B.
Probatio: quilibet enim naturaliter plus [MS prius] esse suum quam esse alterius, cujus non est pars vel effectus.
A autem nihil est ipsius B nec ut pars nec ut effectus ; ergo plus diligit A se naturaliter quam ipsum B. Sed voluntas libera, quando est recta, conformatur voluntati naturali, alioquin voluntas naturalis non esset semper recta ; ergo A si habet istam voluntatem rectam, actu elicito plus diligit se quam B, ergo non B infinite.
Secundo sic de voluntate : aut A fruitur B aut utitur.
Si utitur eo, ergo habet A voluntatem inordinatam.
Si fruitur B et fruitur A, ergo A est beatus in duobus objectis, quorum neutrum dependet ab alio, quia sicut
A beatus est in se, sic et in B; sed consequens est impossibile, quia nihil potest esse actu beatum in duobus
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A second argument based on the intellect is this, One and the same act of intellection cannot have two adequate objects. Now A is its own adequate object of intellection, for the essence of A is the adequate object of A's intellection. Consequently B's essence is not its adequate object.
But if A could know perfectly both itself and B at one and the same time, then B would be an adequate object of A's intellection.
The major is evident, for otherwise the intellect could be perfectly satisfied and have all that it is capable of even though its adequate object were non-existent.
Such an object, consequently, would be useless.
[Second Proof].
A second way is this.
Any will that is infinite wills things the way they should be willed.
Therefore, it loves whatever is lovable to the extent that it is lovable.
If the object is infinitely lovable, then such a will loves it to the utmost of its ability.
But since B is assumed to be another God, it must be loved infinitely.
Consequently, B inasmuch as it is infinitely good must be loved infinitely by any power capable of infinite love.
The will of A, then, loves B infinitely.
Now this is impossible since A naturally loves itself more than B.8
Proof:
Everything naturally loves its own being more than any other if it is neither a part nor an effect of this other.
But A is neither a part nor the effect of B ;_ therefore A loves itself naturally more than B. But a free will that loves things as they should be loved conforms itself to this natural will ; otherwise the natural will would not always be as it should be. Therefore, if A wills as it should, then it elicits a greater act of love for itself than for B and hence does not love B infinitely.
A second argument based on the will runs as follows.
Either A finds its happiness in B or it simply uses B.
If it merely uses B, then A's love is inordinate.® If it finds its happiness in B as well as in itself, then A is beatified by two distinct objects, neither of which depends upon the other, for A is made just as happy by B as it is by itself.
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objectis beatificantibus totalibus.
Probatio: quia utroque destructo, nihilominus esset beatus; ergo in neutro est beatus.
[Tertia Via].
De tertia via, scilicet de ratione infiniti [boni], arguitur sic: voluntas ordinate potest appetere majus bonum et magis amare majus bonum.
Sed plura bona infinita, si sint possibilia, plus includunt bonitatis quam unum infinitum; ergo voluntas ordinate plus posset amare plura infinita quam unum, et per consequens in nullo uno objecto infinito quietaretur.
Sed hoc est contra rationem boni quod sit infinitum et non quietativum cujuscumque voluntatis.
[Quarta Via]. Quantum ad quartam viam de potentia infinita arguo sic : non possunt esse duae causae totales ejusdem effectus in eodem ordine causae ;_ sed infinita potentia est causa totalis respectu cujuscumque effectus in ratione primae causae ; ergo nulla alia potest esse in ratione causae primae respectu alicujus effectus, et ita nulla alia causa infinita in potentia.
Primam propositionem probo: quia tunc posset aliquid esse causa alicujus a quo illud non dependeret.
Probatio: a nullo aliquid dependet essentialiter, quo non_ existente, nihilominus esset ; sed si C habet duas causas totales
A et B, et in eodem ordine, utroque eorum non existente, nihilominus esset ipsum C ab altero eorum, quia non existente A, nihil minus est ipsum C ab ipso B et non existente B, nihil minus est C ab A.
Juxta illud arguitur de unitate cujuscumque primi in quacumque primitate praedicta.
Nihil enim est excessum a duobus primo excedentibus ; vel finitum essentialiter ordinatur [MS ordinantur] ad duos primos fines.
Esset [MS essent] enim aliquid ad finem, quo non
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But the consequent is impossible, for nothing finds its complete happiness in each of two objects.!°
Proof :
Either object could be destroyed and nevertheless the being would still be happy.
Therefore in neither object is it completely happy.
[Third Proof].
The third way, based on the notion of the infinite good, is this.
It is proper for a will to seek the greater good and love it more ardently.
But if more than one thing could be infinitely good, then together they would contain more goodness than a single infinite good.
An orderly will, consequently, could not be perfectly satisfied with but one infinite good.
Yet to be unable to satisfy perfectly any will whatsoever contradicts the very notion of an infinite good.
[Fourth Proof].
My fourth argument, from infinite power, is this. Two causes of the same order cannot each be the total cause of the same effect.
But an infinite power is the total primary cause of every single effect that exists.
Therefore, no other power can be the total primary cause of any effect.
Consequently, no other cause is infinite in power.
My proof of the first proposition:
If this proposition did not hold, then a thing could be the cause of something which does not depend upon it.
Proof:
Nothing depends essentially on anything if it could exist even when this other is non-existent.
But if C has two total causes, A and B, each of which is in the same order, then either could be non-existent and still C would continue to exist in virtue of the other.
For if A were non-existent, C' would still exist by reason of B and if B were non-existent, C' would exist by reason of A.
This argument can be used to establish the unicity of any of the primacies mentioned above [viz. efficiency, finality and eminence].41
What exists for the sake of an end is never essentially ordered to two ultimate ends, for then, as we argued above, it would exist for the sake of something which, as non-existent, would still be the
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existente, nihil minus esset finitum, ut prius argutum est ; et excessum esset essentialiter ab aliquo, quo non existente, nihil minus haberet essentiale excedens, quo mensuraretur essentialiter et a quo acciperet suam perfectionem essentialiter: quod est impossibile; ergo impossibile est aliquorum duorum infinitorum duos esse fines primos vel duorum excessorum duo prima eminentia.
[Quinta Via].
De quinta via dico, quod infinitum non potest excedi, et arguo sic ; quaecumque perfectio potest numerari in diversis plus perfectionis habet in pluribus quam in uno, sicut dicitur vin De Trinitate,c. 1*; ergo infinitum omnino in pluribus numerari non potest.
[Sexta Via].
De sexta via primo arguo sic: species plurificabilis scilicet in individuis non determinatur ex se ad certum numerum individuorum, sed quantum est ex se compatitur infinitatem individuorum, sicut patet in speciebus omnibus corruptibilibus; ergo si ratio necesse esse sit plurificabilis in individuis, non determinat se ad certum numerum, sed compatitur infinitatem quantum est ex se.
Sed si possent esse infinita necesse esse, sunt infinita necesse esse ; ergo, etc.
Consequens est falsum ; ergo et antecedens ex quo sequitur.
Ista ratio in alia forma fiat ex ratione primitatis sic :
Unum unius rationis se habens ad plura unius rationis non determinatur ad illam pluralitatem sive ad determinationem certam illorum.
Non est instantia in natura respectu suppositorum nec in causa respectu causatorum, nisi instes in proposito.
Sed deitas erit unum unius ra- * vim, cap. i (Migne, P.L., xLu, 947-948).
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end for whose sake the other exists.
Neither is anything excelled to the ultimate degree by two most perfect beings, for then something could be non-existent and still excel something either as its essential measure of perfection or as that from which it receives its essential perfection.
This, however, is impossible.
It is not possible, then, that two infinite beings should be ultimate ends, or that of two more perfect beings, both should be the most excellent.
[Fifth Proof].
As to the fifth way, I say that what is absolutely infinite, cannot be excelled. And I argue thus.
Any perfection that can exist in numerically different things is more perfect if it exist in several than if it exist merely in one, as [Augustine] points out in De Trinitate,
BK. vill, c.i.* Therefore, what is absolutely infinite cannot be found in several numerically different things.
[Sixth Proof].
The sixth way that I argue is this.
A species which can be multiplied in more than one individual, is not of itself determined to any certain number of individuals but is compatible with an infinity of individuals.
'This is evident in the case of all perishable species.
Therefore, if the perfection of necessary existence can be multiplied in more than one individual, it is not of itself restricted to any certain number, but is compatible with infinity.
But if an infinity of necessary beings can exist, they do exist.
Therefore, etc.
The consequence is false ; hence the antecedent is also false.
This argument can be reformulated on the basis of [God's] primacy as follows.
One thing of a given kind is not related to others of its kind in such a way that it is limited to just this plurality or to a certain number of such things.
There is nothing in the nature itself which requires that there be just so many individuals, nor in a cause that says there must be only so many things caused, unless you insist on what we seek to prove
[viz. that the nature is such that it be found in but one individual].
But "'deity'' is one given kind of thing, and
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tionis et per te se habet ad plura unius rationis, ergo ex se non determinatur ad certam pluralitatem singularium nec potest determinari aliunde, quia hoc repugnat primo, ergo deitas est in suppositis infinitis.
Ista ratio videtur quod fundatur super hoc quod primitas est de se indeterminata.
Secundo arguo sic et juxta istam viam.
Si sint plura necesse esse, aliquibus perfectionibus realibus distinguuntur.
Sint illae A et B.
Tune sic: aut illa duo distincta per A et B sunt formaliter necesse esse per A et per B, aut non.
Si non, ergo A non est ratio formalis essendi necessario, nec B.
Per consequens, nec ergo ea includens est necessarium primo, quia includit aliquam entitatem quae non est formaliter necessitas essendi, nec necessaria ex se.
Si autem illa sint formaliter necesse esse per A et B, et praeter haec utrumque est necesse esse per illud in quo convenit unum cum alio, ergo utrumque habet in se duas rationes, quarum utrumque formaliter est necesse esse.
Sed hoc est impossibile, quia neutra illarum includit alteram ; utraque ergo illarum circumscripta, esset tale necesse esse per reliquam, et ita aliquid esset formaliter necesse esse per rationem aliquam, qua circumscripta, nihilominus esset necesse esse, quod est impossibile.
[Septima Via].
De septima via, scilicet omnipotentia, videtur quod non sit per rationem naturalem demonstrabile, quia omnipotentia, ut alias patebit, non potest concludi ratione naturali, ut catholici intelligunt omnipotentiam, nec concluditur ex ratione infinitae potentiae.
Tamen ex omnipotentia credita arguitur sic propositum.
Si A est omnipotens, ergo potest facere circa quod-
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according to you is found in more than one individual of its kind.
Therefore, deity as such is not determined to any certain number of individuals nor can it be so determined by anything other than itself, for this would be repugnant to what is truly first.
Therefore, deity exists in an infinite number of individuals.
This argument, as we see, is based upon the notion that primacy of itself is indetermined.
The second argument I give, based on this way, runs as follows.
If several necessary beings existed, they would be distinguished from one another by some real perfections.
Let us call these A and B. Then I argue, either these two necessary beings which differ by A and B are necessary formally in virtue of A and B, or they are not.
If not, then A is not a formal reason for necessary existence, and the same is true of B.
Hence, whatever includes A or B is not primarily a necessary being, because it includes some entity which is neither its necessity of existence nor is it necessary of itself.
If, however, these two beings are formally necessary in virtue of A and B, in addition to being necessary by reason of what they have in common, then each being contains two reasons why it is formally necessary.
This, however, is impossible for neither of these two reasons includes the other, and hence if either of the two were absent, the being would still exist necessarily in virtue of what remains.
In such an impossible situation, something would owe its formal necessity to what could be removed and still leave the being a necessary being.
[Seventh Proof].
As regards the seventh way, from omnipotence, it seems that the thesis cannot be demonstrated by natural reason, for omnipotence—as Catholics understand the term—cannot be demonstrated from natural reason, nor does it follow from the notion of infinite power, as will be shown later.
Still, if omnipotence be accepted on faith, then one can argue that if A is omnipotent, it can make everything other than itself
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cumque aliud ipsum esse vel non esse, et ita posset destruere B, et ita faceret B nullipotentem, et sic sequitur quod B non est Deus.
Ista ratio non valet, sicut quidam respondent ad eam, quia B non est objectum omnipotentiae, quia omnipotentia pro objecto respicit possibile ; B autem ponebatur necessarium sicut A.
Ideo arguitur aliter declarando sic rationem Richardi secundo De Trinitate, cap. xvii vel ultimo,* ubi dicit sic : facile efficere poterit quisquis omnipotens fuerit ita quod omne aliud nihil possit, sicut omnipotens per suum velle
[MS add vel sicut omnipotens suo velle] potest producere quodcumque possibile, ita suo nolle potest impedire vel destruere omne possibile.
Sed si A est omnipotens, potest velle omnia alia a se esse et ita suo velle ipsa in esse producere.
Non necesse est autem quod B velit omnia illa esse quae vult A, quia voluntas B contingenter se habet ad illa, sicut voluntas A ad illa quae B vult, siest Deus.
Siautem B nolit illa esse, ergo nullum illorum est. Ergo si sint duo omnipotentes, uterque illorum faceret alium nullipotentem, non destruendo illum sed prohibendo per suum nolle esse volitorum ab alio.
Quod si dicas quasi sophisticando quod concordent in voluntate sua, quamvis nulla sit necessitas, sed quasi fecerint pactum, adhuc probo quod neuter eorum erit omnipotens ; nam si A est omnipotens, potest producere suo velle quodcumque producibile volitum aliud ase.
Ex hoc sequitur quod B nullum poterit producere suo velle, et ita non est omnipotens.
Quod autem hoc sequitur, patet ex quarta via, quia impossibile est duas * 1, cap. xxv (Migne, P.L., cxcvi, 902).
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go come into existence or go out of existence.
Consequently, it can destroy B and thus render B impotent.
From this it follows that B is not God.
Some ! object that this reason does not hold since B is not an object of omnipotence, for omnipotence has as its object only what can, yet need not, exist, whereas B is assumed to be just as necessary as A.
Wherefore, we must reformulate the argument of Richard [of St Victor] in his work De Trinitate* where he says : "'Whoever will have been omnipotent, will easily be able to make everything else impotent".
Just as an omnipotent being can produce whatever is possible simply by willing that it should be, so also he can impede or destroy everything that is possible by willing that it should not be.
But if A is omnipotent, he can will everything other than himself and so, by his will, cause everything to exist.
It is not necessary, however, that B will everything which A wills because the will of B is related only contingently to what A wills, even as the will of A is related contingently to what B wills, assuming here that each is God.
But if B wills that none of these things should exist, then none will exist.
Consequently, if two omnipotent beings exist, each will make the other impotent, not indeed by destroying the other, but because one by his positive will could keep non-existent what the other wills should exist.
And if you say, to argue sophistically, that they voluntarily agree on a common way of acting through some sort of pact, even though there is really no intrinsic necessity that they do so, still I prove that neither will be omnipotent.
For if A is omnipotent, by willing he can produce every possible thing that can be produced and thus B can produce nothing by willing and hence will not be omnipotent.
That this follows is clear from what was said in the fourth way.
For it is impossible that two total causes should produce one and the same effect,
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causas esse totales unius effectus, quia ex quo totaliter causatus est ab una, impossibile est quod sit ab alia.
[Ad Argumenta Pro Prima Opinione] Ad argumenta primo enim ad illa quae sunt pro alia opinione respondeo ad auctoritatem Rabbi Moysi et dico quod Deum esse unum creditur in Lege quia enim populus fuit rudis et pronus ad idolatriam.
Ideo indiguit instrui per Legem de unitate Dei, licet per naturalem rationem posset demonstrari.
Ita etiam acceptum est a Lege quod Deus sit: Exod. m*: Ego sum qui sum, et Apostolus ad Hebraeos,f dicit quod oportet accedentem ad Deum credere quia est, et tamen non negatur Deum esse demonstrabile.
Ergo pani ratione nec negandum est posse demonstrari per rationem Deum esse unum, licet accepta sit a Lege.
Illa etiam possunt demonstrari utile est communitati tradi etiam per viam auctoritatis et propter negligentiam communitatis in inquirendo veritatem et etiam propter impotentiam intellectus, et propter errores inquirentium per demonstrationem, quia veritatibus suis multa falsa permiscent, ut dicit Augustinus xvi De Civitate
Dei,t et ideo quia simplices sequentes tales demonstratores possent dubitare, cui esset asserendum vel assentiendum.
Ideo tuta est via et stabilis et communis, auctoritas certa [MS add. circa] quae non potest fallere nec falli.
Ad secundam rationem de singulari dico quod aliud est singularitatem esse conceptam vel ut objectum vel ut partem objecti, aliud singularitatem esse praecise modum concipiendi sive sub quo concipitur objectum.
Exemplum cum dico "'universale" [MS ''velle''], objectum conceptum est pluralitas, sed modus concipiendi, id est modus sub quo concipitur, est singularitas.
Ita in * Exodus, m. 14. i) ELeby xi. 6, $ xvi, cap. xli (Migne, P.L., xx, 601).
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gI for what is caused completely by one cannot be caused by the other.
[Reply to the arguments for the First Opinion] 18 First I answer the arguments for the other opinion, replying first to the authority of Rabbi Moses.
I say that the reason God's unicity was a matter of belief in the Law is to be found in the fact that the people were uneducated and prone to idolatry.
Consequently, they needed the Law to tell them that there is but one God even though this truth could be demonstrated by natural reason.
'The fact that God exists is also known from the Law, for instance, Exodus, u1* : "I am who am"', and the Apostle to the Hebrews ft : ''For he who comes to God must believe that God exists".
Nevertheless, we do not deny that God's existence is demonstrable.
On the same grounds, then, we must not deny that reason can demonstrate that there is but one God just because this is accepted from the Law.
Indeed it is good that many things demonstrable in themselves be transmitted to the human race by way of authority also because of man's weakness of intellect, his neglect to seek the truth and because of the mistakes he makes when he tries to demonstrate something.
As Augustine says in the City of God,* much falsity is mixed with truth, and since simple people following such demonstrators could still be in doubt about what they must assent to, the firm, safe and common way is by means of authority so certain it can neither deceive nor be deceived.
As for the second reason about the singular, I say that it is one thing to conceive singularity as an object or part of an object.
It is quite another thing to have singularity as a mode of conception or as the aspect under which the object is conceived.
For example, when I say "a universal', the object conceived is plurality, but singularity is the mode of conception, that is, it is conceived as a singular thing.
So also with logical intentions.
When
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intentionibus logicis, cum dico ''singulare", quod concipitur est singularitas, sed modus sub quo concipitur est universalitas, quia quod concipitur ut concipitur habet indifferentiam ad plura.
Ita dico in proposito, quod essentia divina potest concipi ut singularis, ita quod singularitas sit concepta vel ut objectum vel ut pars objecti.
Non tamen sequitur quod essentia possit cognosci ut est singularis, ita quod singularitas sit modus concepti.
Cognoscere enim sic aliquid ut singulare est illud cognoscere ut hoc sicut album videtur ut hoc.
Et hoc modo praedictum est quod non cognoscitur essentia divina sub ratione singularitatis, et ideo in argumento est fallacia figurae dictionis, commutando rem in modum.
[Ad Argumenta Principalia] Ad rationes principales, dico quod Apostolus loquitur de idolis et ideo de diis nuncupative, et subdit ibi * :
Nobis autem unus est Deus, quia omnes dii gentium daemonia. ft Ad secundam dico quod consequentia non valet, quia numerus non est talis modus cognoscendi grammaticus sicut alii modi grammaticales, qui praecise dicunt modum concipiendi rei absque aliqua realitate correspondente tali modo concipiendi ; unde [nec] dicunt praecise aliquid in re, a quo moveri possit intellectus ad talem modum concipiendum, quamvis illud motivum non sit aliquid in re (masculinitas enim non requirit aliquid masculinum in re sed aliquid correspondens masculinitati, scilicet potentiam activam vel aliquid hujusmodi).
Sed numerus vere includit rem substratum [MS subtractam].
Unde sequitur ""Homines currunt, ergo plures homines currunt".
Sed non sic de aliis consignificatis * 1 Cor. vim. 6.
Wf dabh Ske\ia
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I say "singular", it is singularity that is conceived, but the mode of conception is that of a universal, for what
I conceive is indifferent to being more than one.
And so my answer to their assumption is this. The divine essence can be conceived as singular in the sense that singularity is conceived either as the object or part of the object. From this, however, it does not follow that the divine essence can be known as singular in such a way that singularity is the mode of conception, for to know something as singular in this way is to know it as "'a this" just as a white object is seen as this white object.
As we said above,14 the divine essence is not known under the aspect of singularity in this manner.
'Therefore, the argument involves a fallacy of speech by substituting the mode for the thing.
[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning] To the initial arguments,}® I say that the Apostle is speaking of idols and hence of so-called "'gods'', for in the same passage he adds: "Yet for us there is only one
God"', ''for all the gods of the Gentiles are devils''.
To the second argument,'® I declare the consequence to be invalid inasmuch as number is not like some of the other grammatical modes which express precisely a mode of conception without any reality that corresponds to the conceptual mode, and consequently do not express precisely something in reality by which the intellect could be moved to conceive a thing the way it does, even where that motive be not something in the thing as such.
For a noun to be masculine, for instance, it is not necessary that the thing designated by the noun be itself masculine.
It suffices if it have something resembling masculinity, namely some active power or some such thing. Number, on the contrary, includes the underlying thing.
Consequently, from the proposition '"Men are running"' it follows that several men are running.
Such is not the
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nominis vel verbi, quia non [MS bene] sequitur: "Deus est, igitur Deus est masculinus", quia ad masculinitatem sufficit aliquid in re a quo ille modus concipiendi possit accipi, puta activitas.
Dico ergo quod illud solum "Dii" conceptum sub modo plurali includit contradictionem, quia modus concipiendi repugnat ei quod concipitur sub modo. Cum igitur probatur consequentia, quia idem includit singulare et plurale, dico quod singulare includit illud sub modo concipiendi convenienti ipsi concepto sed plurale includit illud sub modo impossibili illi concepto, et ideo singulare includit rationem quasi in se veram prout includit conceptum et modum concipiendi ; plurale autem prout includit ista duo includit rationem quasi in se falsam; et ideo non sequitur quod plurale sit verum de plurali, sicut singulare de singulari, quia de eo cujus est ratio in se falsa nihil est verum.
Per illud patet ad aliam probationem, quo majus cogitari non potest, quia non sunt dii cogitabiles sine contradictione, quia modus repugnat rei conceptae, et ideo major est glossanda sicut prius est dictum in quaestione praecedenti.
Ad sensum autem et veritatem requiritur quod ratio subjecti non includit contradictionem, sicut dictum est in quaestione secunda hujus distinctionis.* Ad tertiam dico quod illa major propositio non est prima, sed reducitur ad istam, ''omne imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum".
Et quia omne ens per participationem est imperfectum, et tantum illud ens est perfectum quod est ens per essentiam, ideo sequitur
* Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. 11, q. ii, n. 5.
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case, however, with the other co-significates of a noun or verb, for from the proposition ''God is" [where the noun God or Deus is masculine gender] it does not follow that God Himself is masculine, for it suffices for a noun to be masculine if there is something about the reality that would justify this gender, for instance, activity.
I say, therefore, that the subject '"'gods" conceived in the plural form includes a contradiction since the mode of conception is repugnant to what is conceived under this mode.
As for the proof of the consequence, viz. that the singular and plural include the same thing, I reply that the singular includes it in a conceptual mode that is in harmony with the thing conceived whereas the plural includes it in a conceptual mode that is incompatible with the thing conceived.
So far as the conceptual mode and the thing conceived are concerned, then, the singular includes a notion that is, as it were, true in itself, whereas the plural includes a notion that is, as it were, false in itself.
Consequently, it does not follow that the plural is true of several as the singular is true of one, for nothing is true that is false in itself.
And in this way we can answer the other proof for the consequence based on the proposition : ""There is something in comparison with which nothing greater can be conceived."
For "'gods"' is not something conceivable without contradiction, since the mode of conception is repugnant to the thing conceived.
Consequently, the major must be glossed the way it was in the previous question.
For if the proposition is to be true or to make any sense, it is necessary that the notion of the subject includes no inherent contradiction, as has been pointed out in the second question of this distinction.* To the third argument 17 I reply that its major premise is not a primary truth but is reduced to this : "Everything imperfect is traced back to something perfect''.1®
Since every being by participation is imperfect and only that being which is such by its essence is perfect, therefore this
(2,322)
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propositio illa, scilicet quod "'omne ens per participationem reducitur ad ens per essentiam quod est perfectum"'.
Utigitur vere possit sequi conclusio, haec autem major de [im]perfecto sic habet distingui.
Aliquid est imperfectum secundum perfectionem simpliciter, quae non necessario habet imperfectionem concomitantem quia non includit in se limitationem, sicut "hoc bonum'',
"hoc verum'', "hoc ens', et hujusmodi imperfectio reducitur ad perfectum ejusdem rationis, scilicet "bonum"',
"ens", et ""verum'', quae important perfectiones simpliciter.
Aliquid autem est imperfectum secundum perfectionem non simpliciter, quae de ratione sui includit limitationem et ideo necessario habet imperfectionem annexam, ut "hic homo'', ''hic asinus", et hujusmodi imperfecta non reducuntur ad perfectum per essentiam absolute ejusdem rationis sicut ad rationem specificam quia ipsa adhuc includit imperfectionem, quia limitationem ; sed reducuntur ad perfectum primum quod continet ea supereminenter et aequivoce.
Quod ergo imperfectum est primo modo, reducitur ad perfectum simpliciter secundum perfectionem illius rationis, quia aliquid secundum istam rationem potest esse simpliciter perfectum.
Quod autem est imperfectum secundo modo non reducitur ad aliquid perfectum secundum perfectionem ejusdem rationis, quia enim illa imperfectionem includit.
Ideo illa non potest esse perfectum simpliciter propter illam limitationem.
Sed reducitur ad aliquid simpliciter perfectum aequivocum, eminenter includens illam perfectionem.
Et ideo bonum imperfectum reducitur ad perfectum bonum, sed lapis, qui est imperfectus, non reducitur ad lapidem perfectum simpliciter, sed ad summum ens et ad summum bonum, quae includunt virtualiter illam. perfectionem.
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94. proposition follows:
'Every being by participation is traced back to a perfect being that is such by its essence"'.
Hence in order that the conclusion follow, the major premise regarding the "imperfect"? must be distinguished as follows.
Something is imperfect according to pure perfection.
A pure perfection inasmuch as it includes no limitation in itself does not necessarily include some concomitant imperfection.
Something imperfect according to pure perfection, for instance, would be "this good"',
"this true thing"', "this being'.
Such imperfect things are reducible to something perfect of the same character, namelyto' "the" Good*})s*the *l rae' **'Being'', 'aller which imply pure perfection.
Other things, however, are imperfect according to mixed perfection.
A mixed perfection is one which includes some limitation and therefore necessarily has some added imperfection.
'This man"', "this donkey"', and such like, would be imperfect in this way.
Such things are not reduced specifically to something which possesses the same perfection absolutely by its essence, for the latter would still be imperfect because it is limited.
They are reduced, however, to a perfect First Being which contains them in a more perfect and equivocal manner.
What is imperfect in the first way, then, is reduced to a pure perfection of the same formal character, for something of this kind can be simply perfect.
What is imperfect in the second way, however, cannot be reduced to something perfect of the same formal character, for the latter includes imperfection.
Such a thing by reason of this limitation, then, cannot be simply perfect, but it is reduced to something which is simply perfect and which is of a different character, but includes the perfection of the imperfect being in a more excellent way.
Consequently, an imperfect good is reduced to a perfect good, but an imperfect stone is not reduced to a stone which is simply perfect, but to the Highest Being and the Greatest Good which virtually include this perfection.
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Ad ultimum dicitur quod plura bona finita sunt meliora paucioribus bonis finitis, non autem plura bona infinita.
Sed hoc non videtur respondere ad argumentum, quia quaecumque si essent meliora essent, videntur ponenda esse in entibus, et maxime in ente supremo quod est necesse esse, quia ibi quidquid posset esse bonum est, et necesse est ibi esse.
Sed plura bona infinita si essent essent meliora.
Videtur igitur quod plura bona infinita sunt ponenda in natura summi boni.
Ad illud respondeo, quod cum dicitur in majori "'illa quae si essent essent meliora, sunt ponenda ibi'', dico quod aut per ly "si"? implicatur positio possibilis aut positio incompossibilium.
Si primo modo dico quod major est vera et minor falsa, quia implicatio illa in minori non possibilis sed incompossibilium.
Si autem ly ''si" implicet positionem incompossibilium, tunc minor est vera et major falsa, quae enim non essent meliora nisi ex positione incompossibilium, non essent meliora, nec etiam sunt bona, sicut illud quod non est nisi ex positione incompossibilium, omnino non est, sicut nec illud positum a quo dependet.
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To the /ast,!® some say ®° that a greater number of finite goods is better than a lesser number, but that the same is not true of infinite goods.
This, however, does not seem to answer the difficulty, for it seems that whatever is better, if it can exist, should be assumed to exist in some being and in particular in that being which is supreme and exists necessarily, for whatever can be a good exists there and it is necessary that it exist there.
Now if several infinite goods existed, this would be better.
Therefore in a nature of the highest good it seems that more than one infinite good must be assumed to exist.
To this I reply that when the major premise declares that "'those things are to be assumed to exist which would be better if they did exist", the term "'if" implies the assumption of something possible or something impossible.
Ifthe first, then I say the major is true and the minor false, for what the minor implies is not possible but includes incompatible notions.
But if the term "if" implies the assumption of the impossible, then the minor is true and the major false.
For if some things are better only inasmuch as they assume the coexistence of incompatible notions, then they are not really better, nor for that matter are they really good.
It is the same with something that can exist only if we assume the coexistence of incompatible notions.
Such a thing is simply nonexistent, and the same is true of the impossible basis postulated for it.
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