The Existence of God

The Existence of God

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Summary of the Argument Question : Among beings does one exist which is actually infinite ?

Pro ET CONTRA Bopy OF THE QUESTION Article I.

Relative properties of God Part1.

The triple primacy a. Primacy of efficient causality b. Primacy of finality c. Primacy of pre-eminence Part u.

Interrelation of the three primacies Part m1.

Unity of the divine nature Article II.

Absolute properties of God Parti.

Intellect and will Part u.

'The infinity of the First Being a.

First proof b. Second proof c. Third proof d. Fourth proof e. An ineffective proof Solution of the Question

REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS AT THE BEGINNING

DUNS SCOTUS

[III.

Der EssE DEI] * Circa secundam distinctionem quaero primo de his quae pertinent ad unitatem Dei, et primo, utrum in entibus sit aliquid existens actu infinitum.

[Pro et Contra] Quod non, sic arguitur :

Si unum contrariorum esset actu infinitum, nihil sibi contrarium esset in natura; ergo si aliquod bonum sit actu infinitum, nihil mali esset in universo.

Respondetur quod major est vera de contrariis formaliter ; sed nihil malum contrariatur Deo formaliter.

Contra: sive formaliter sive virtualiter contrarietur, si est infinitum, nihil patitur contrarium sui effectus, quia propter infinitam virtutem destruet omne incompossibile suo effectui ; ergo est major vera de contrario virtualiter, sicut formaliter.

Exemplum: si sol esset infinite calidus virtualiter, nihil relinqueret frigidum in universo sicut nec si esset infinite calidus formaliter.

Item, corpus infinitum nullum aliud secum compatitur ; sicut nec ens infinitum aliquod aliud ens cum eo.

Probatio consequentiae : tum quia sicut repugnat dimensio dimensioni, ita videtur actualitas actualitati repugnare ; tum quia sicut corpus aliud ab infinito, faceret cum illo aliquid majus infinito, ita ens aliud ab infinito videtur facere aliquid majus infinito.

Praeterea, quod ita est hic, quod non alibi, est * Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. 1, q. i (Assisi 137, £ 14r°-18r°: cf. Vatican ed.,

VOL. H, 124-125, 148-291),

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

(III. THE EXISTENCE OF GOD]

First I inquire about those things which pertain to the unicity of God, and J ask first whether in the realm of beings something exists which is actually infinite ?

[Pro et Contra] To prove that no such thing exists the following arguments are cited! :

[Arg. 1].

If one of two contraries were actually infinite, then nothing contrary to it would exist in nature ; therefore if some good were actually infinite, nothing evil would exist in the universe.

One answer given to this objection is that the major is true only of formal contraries, and evil is not formally contrary to God.?

To the contrary:

It makes no difference whether contrariety be virtual or formal.

If something is infinite, it will not tolerate anything contrary to its effect, since by — reason of its infinite power, it will destroy anything incompatible with its effect.

Therefore, the major is just as true of virtual contraries as it is of formal contraries.

For example: if the sun were infinitely hot either virtually or formally, in either case it would leave nothing cold in the universe.

[Arg. 1].

Again, just as an infinite body would not permit the coexistence of another body, even so an infinite being would not tolerate the coexistence of any other being.

Proof of the consequence : Actuality seems to be opposed to actuality in the same way as dimension is opposed to dimension.

Furthermore, if a being other than the infinite could exist, it would seem to increase the infinite just as to add another body to an infinite body would produce something greater than the infinite.

[Arg. 1].

Furthermore, anything present in this

DUNS SCOTUS

infinitum respectu ubi; et quod nunc est ita, quod non alias, est finitum respectu quando, et sic de singulis.

Quod ita agit hoc, quod non aliud, est finitum quantum ad actionem ; ergo quod est ita hoc aliquid, quod non aliud, est finitum secundum entitatem.

Deus est summe hoc, quia ex se singularitas ; ergo non est infinitus.

Item, vir Physicorum,* virtus infinita, si esset, moveret in non-tempore ; nulla virtus potest movere in nontempore ; quia si sic, motus esset in instanti ; ergo nulla est infinita.

Contra :

Ibidem Philosophus vi Physicorum t+ probat primum movens esse potentiae infinitae, quia movet motu infinito ; sed haec conclusio non potest intelligi tantum de infinitate durationis, quia propter infinitatem potentiae probat quod non possit esse in magnitudine; non repugnat autem magnitudini, secundum eum, quod in eo sit potentia infinita secundum durationem, sicut poneret de caelo.

Item, in Psalmot:

Magnus Dominus et laudabilis nimis.

Item, Damascenus, lib. 1, cap. iv ** : Est pelagus, etc.

[Corpus Quaestionis] Ad primam quaestionem sic procedo, quia de ente infinito sic non potest demonstrari esse demonstratione propter quid quantum ad nos, licet ex natura terminorum

* vin, cap. x (266%, 24-2660, 6).

T loc. cit. (2662, 6). t Ps. xlvii. 2; cxliv. 3.

** De fide orthodoxa, 1, cap. ix (Migne, P.G., xctv, 835).

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

place in such a way that it is nowhere else, is limited with regard to itswhereabouts. What exists at just this moment and no other, is finite with regard to temporal duration.

And so on with the single categories.

Whatever does just this and nothing else, is finite in its action.

Therefore, whatever is just this thing and no other, is limited in its entity.

Now God above all is a "'this'', for He is singularity of His very nature.

Therefore, God is not infinite.

[Arg. tv].

Again, according to Physics, BK. viu,* if an infinite force existed it would move or act instantaneously ; but no force can move things instantaneously, for if it could movement would take place in an instant.

Consequently, nothing is infinite.

To the contrary :

{Arg. 1].

In the same place in Physics, BK. vim,t the Philosopher proves that the First Mover is infinite in power because He moves with an infinite movement.

But this conclusion cannot be understood of power that is infinite only in duration.

The reason why it cannot is this.

Aristotle proves that because this power [of the First Mover] is infinite, it cannot reside in a [finite] magnitude.

But it is not contradictory, according to him, that a power infinite merely in duration should reside in a [finite] magnitude, for he assumes this to be the case with the heavens.

{Arg. 1]. Also, in the Book of Psalms f{ : "'Great is the Lord and exceedingly to be praised''.

[Arg. m].

Also, in the fourth chapter of the first book of Damascene **:

'"'He is a sea [of infinite perfections]"'.

[Body of the Question] My reason for proceeding as I do in this first question is this.

Although the proposition ''An infinite being

DUNS SCOTUS

propositio est demonstrabilis propter quid. Sed quantum ad nos bene propositio est demonstrabilis quia ex creaturis.

Proprietates autem infiniti entis relativae ad creaturas immediatius se habent ad illa quae sunt media in demonstratione quia quam proprietates absolutae, ita quod de illis proprietatibus relativis concludi potest immediatius esse per ista quae sunt media in tali demonstratione quam de proprietatibus absolutis ; nam immediate ex esse unius relativi sequitur esse sui correlativi.

Ideo, primo declarabo esse de proprietatibus relativis entis infiniti, quae sunt primitas et causalitas.

Et secundo declarabo esse de infinito ente, quia illae relativae proprietates soli enti infinito conveniunt.

Et ita erunt duo articuli principales.

[Articulus Primus.

De Proprietatibus Relativis] Quantum ad primum, dico: proprietates relativae entis infiniti ad creaturas aut sunt proprietates causalitatis aut eminentiae.

Causalitatis duplicis, aut efficientis aut finis. Quod additur de causa exemplari non est aliud genus causae ab efficiente, quia tunc essent quinque genera causarum ; unde causa exemplaris est quoddam efficiens, quia est agens per intellectum distinctum contra agens per naturam ; de quo alias.

In primo articulo principali, tria principaliter ostendam : primo ergo ostendam quod aliquid est in effectu inter entia quod est simpliciter primum omni primitate quae non includit aliquam imperfectionem.

Pars enim est imperfectior toto et tamen prior ; pars enim participat entitatem totius et non est ipsum totum.

Aliae autem sunt primitates quae non includunt aliquam

THE EXISTENCE

OF GOD

exists' can, by the very nature of its terms, be demonstrated by a demonstration of the reasoned fact, we are not able to demonstrate it in this way.

Nevertheless, we can demonstrate the proposition by a demonstration of fact beginning with creatures.

However, those properties of the infinite being which refer to creatures are related more closely than the absolute properties to what we must use as middle terms in a demonstration of fact, so that in virtue of such a demonstration the relative properties are established prior to the absolute properties, for the existence of one term of the relation implies immediately that of its correlative.

Consequently, I shall show first the existence of such relative properties of the infinite being as primacy and causality.

Secondly, from these I shall show that an infinite being exists, because these relative properties pertain exclusively to a being that is infinite.

And so there will be two principal articles.

[Article I.

Relative Properties of God] As to the first article, I say that the properties of the infinite being which refer to creatures are either of causality or of pre-eminence.

Those of causality in turn are twofold, the properties of efficient and final causali

What is added about the exemplar does not involve another cause different in kind from the efficient, for then there would be five kinds of causes.

Wherefore, the exemplar cause is a certain kind of efficient cause, namely agent ; but more of this elsewhere.® In the first main article, I shall set forth three principal points : first, in the realm of beings something actually exists which is simply first by every primacy that includes no imperfection.

For a part, though prior to, is less perfect than, the whole, since the part shares in the uni Fig rem tien leva aqrotttheceholeineliecomer ; (

2,322)

DUNS SCOTUS

imperfectionem ; ut primitas eminentiae et triplicis causalis independentiae ; scilicet efficientis, formalis vel exemplaris, et finalis.

Primitas autem eminentiae non est primitas causalitatis ; non enim ex hoc quod unum ens praeeminet alteri est causa illius, nam primum et summum in quolibet genere praeeminet alteri posteriori in illo genere, et tamen non est causa illius.

Primitas etiam exemplaris non distinguitur a primitate efficientiae, quia principium exemplans alia in esse intelligibili non est nisi principium efficiens per intellectum ; sicut enim naturale efficiens non distinguit efficiens sed continetur sub eo, sic nec exemplaris distinguitur ab efficiente. Sunt ergo duae causalitates contra se distinctae, scilicet causae efficientis et finalis.

Et omnes illae primitates quas attribuimus Deo, nullam imperfectionem includunt.

Unde primo ostendam quod est aliquid in effectu inter entia simpliciter primum secundum efficientiam et aliquid est quod etiam est simpliciter primum secundum rationem finis, et aliquid quod est simpliciter primum secundum eminentiam.

Secundo ostendo quod illud quod est primum secundum unam rationem primitatis, idem est primum secundum alias primitates.

Et tertio ostendo quod illa triplex primitas uni soli naturae convenit, ita quod non pluribus naturis differentibus specie vel quidditative.

Et ita in primo articulo principali erunt tres articuli partiales.

[Pars Prima.

De Triplici Primitate|.

Primus articulus illorum includit tres conclusiones principales per triplicem primitatem.

Quaelibet autem illarum trium conclusionum habet tres ex quibus dependet.

Prima est quod aliquid sit primum.

Secunda est quod illud est incausabile. Tertia est quod illud actu existit in entibus.

Itaque in primo articulo sunt novem conclusiones, sed tres principales.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

primacies, however, include no imperfection.

Such is the primacy of pre-eminence and of independence in regard to the three kinds of causes, viz. efficient, formal or exemplar, and final.

The primacy of pre-eminence, however, is not a primacy of causality.

For just because one thing is more perfect than another, it does not follow that the former is the cause of the latter ; for the first and most perfect in any given genus is more perfect than any other of its kind and yet is not the cause of the others.®

Neither is the primacy of exemplarity to be differentiated from that of efficiency, for the principle which copies what exists in thought is nothing else than an intelligent efficient cause.

For just as a natural efficient cause 7 is not considered as distinct from efficient cause but rather as a subdivision thereof, so also the exemplar cause.

Consequently, we have but two causalities distinct from one another, that of the efficient cause and that of the final cause.

And none of these primacies which we attribute to God include any imperfection.

Wherefore, I shall show that in the realm of beings something indeed exists which is simply first according to efficiency, and also that something exists which is simply first in the order of ends, and that something exists which is simply first by reason of pre-eminence.

Secondly, I shall show that what is first in virtue of one kind of primacy is also first in virtue of the others.

And thirdly, I shall show that this triple primacy pertains to but one nature, so as not to be found in several specifically or essentially different natures.

This first article, then, will contain three subordinate parts.

[Part I.

The Triple Primacy].

This first part comprises three principal conclusions corresponding respectively to the threefold primacy.

Each of these three wt-€ Scunh, conclusions in turn depends upon three others:

(1) Fe zd Something is first, (2) It cannot be caused, (3) It actually tees Abit pa f beings. And so the first part coniz suhe tains nine conclusions, three of which are principal. tog.

0) EBctet (que f 2) Fira Case DD Moat OC) bely,

DUNS SCOTUS

fa.

De Primitate Efficientis].

Prima autem conclusio istarum novem est ista, quod aliquod effectivum sit simpliciter primum, ita quod nec sit effectibile nec virtute alterius a se effectivum.

Probatio: quia aliquod ens est effectibile ; aut ergo a se aut a nihilo vel ab aliquo alio.

Non a nihilo, quia nullius est causa illud quod nihil est.

Nec a se, quia nulla res est quae seipsam faciat vel gignat, 1 De Trinitate.* Ergo ab alio.

Illud aliud sit A.

Si est A primum hoc modo exposito, propositum habeo.

Si non est primum, ergo est posterius effectivum, quia effectibile ab alio vel a virtute alterius effec[ti]vum, quia si negetur negatio, ponitur affrmatio.

Detur illud alterum et sit B de quo arguitur sicut de A argutum est.

Et ita aut proceditur in infinitum quorum quodlibet respectu prioris erit secundum ; aut statur in aliquo non habente prius.

Infinitas autem impossibilis est in ascendendo.

Ergo, primitas necessaria, quia non habens prius, nullo priore se est posterius, nam circulum in Causis esse est inconveniens.

Contra istam rationem sic instatur primo quod petat stare in causis ; secundo quod procedit ex contingentibus et ita non fit demonstratio.

Secundum probatur, quia praemissae accipiunt esse de aliquo causato et omne causatum contingenter est.

Similiter, procedit ex contingentibus quia ex rationibus productis et producti qui tantum sunt termini contingentes.

Primum confirmatur per hoc quod secundum philosophantes infinitas est ascendendo, sicut ponunt exemplum de generationibus infinitis, quorum nullum est primum sed quodlibet

T< * De Trinitate, 1, cap. i (Migne, P.L., xim, 820).

THE EXISTENCE

OF GOD

[a. The Primacy of Efficient Causality].

Now the first of these nine conclusions is this : Among beings which can prodice an effect one is simply first, in the sense that it neither _can be produced by an efficient cause nor does it exercise ee a its efficient causality in virtue of anythin Some being can be produced. Therefore, it is either produced by itself or by nothing or by something other than itself.

Now it cannot be produced by nothing, for what is nothing causes nothing.

Neither can it be produced by itself, for as Augustine points out in his work De Trinitate, BK. 1,* nothing ever makes itself or begets itself.

'TF another.

Now let this other be called 4.

If A is first in the way we have described, then I have what I seek to prove.

But if it is not first, then it is some posterior agent—either because it can be produced by something else or because it is able to produce its effect only in virtue of something other than itself.

To deny the negation is to assert the affirmation.

Let us assume that this being is not first and cal] it B. Then we can argue of B as we did of A.

And so we shall either go on ad infinitum so that each thing in reference to what precedes it in the series will be second ; or we shall reach something that has nothing prior to it. .However, an infinity in the +ascending order)® is impossible ; hence a primacy is necessary because whatever has nothing prior to itself is posterior to nothing prior, for a circle in causes is inadmissible.

Against this argument, it iS objected,/ first, that the che lao assumes an end in_the series of causes ; secondl

i roposition and hence is an a demonstration.

'This second objection is argued in this way. The premises assume the existence of something that has been caused, and everything caused exists contingently.

The first objection is confirmed from the admission of those who philosophise that an infinity is possible jg an ascending order, as for instance, when they assume infinite generations, where no single one is

DUNS SCOTUS

secundum, quia secundum eos, non est inconveniens procedere in infinitum in productionibus ejusdem rationis ubi nullum est primum sed quodlibet secundum, et tamen hoc ab eis sine circulo ponitur.

Ad primam instantiam primo excludendam dico quod philosophi non posuerunt infinitatem possibilem in causis essentialiter ordinatis, sed tantum in accidentaliter ordinatis, sicut patet per Avicennam sexto Metaphysicae, cap. v, ubi loquitur de infinitate individuorum in specie.

Et ad propositum melius ostendendum sciendum quae sunt causae essentialiter et accidentaliter ordinatae, ubi notandum quod aliud est loqui de causis per se et per accidens ; et aliud est loqui de causis per se sive essentialiter et accidentialiter ordinatis, nam in prima est tantum operatio unius ad unum, scilicet causae ad causatum, et est causa per se quae secundum naturam propriam, et non secundum aliquid sibi accidens, causat ut subjectum est causa per se respectu suae propriae passionis et in aliis ut album disgregat et aedificator aedificat ; sed causa per accidens econverso ut Polycletus aedificat.

In secundo est comparatio duarum causarum inter se in quantum ab eis est causatum.

Et differunt causae per se sive essentialiter ordinatae a causis per accidens sive accidentaliter ordinatis in tribus.

Prima differentia est, quod in per se ordinatis secunda in quantum causa dependet a prima ; in per accidens non, licet in esse vel aliquo modo alio dependeat.

Filius enim licet secundum esse dependeat a patre, non

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

first but each is second to some other. For they find nothing inconvenient about proceeding to infinity with productions of the same kind, where nothing is first and every member [of the series] i r member].

And still they assume no circle in causes.

To exclude this first objection, I say that the philosophers_do not assume the possibility of an infinity in causes{essentially ordered, but onl

ordered, as is evident from Avicenna's Metaphysics, BK. VI, Cc. v, where he speaks of an infinity of individuals in a species.

To understand better what we have in mind, one should know that some causes are essentially ordered and others accidentally ordered.

Here it should be noted that it is one thing to speak of incidental causes (causae per accidens) as contrasted with those which are intended by their nature to produce a given effect (causae per_se).

It is quite another to speak of causes which are ordered to one another essentially or of themselves (per se) and those which are ordered only accidentally (per accidens).

For in the first instance we have merely a comparison one-to-one, namely of the cause to that which is caused.

A_per se cause is one which es iT See Py Season OF ae ver) arure ane ner by reason of something incidental to it. For instance, the subiectis & per i cause OPT proper Attributes. Other such rane are "white diate" ora builder building". On the contrary, ''Polycletus building"' would be an incidental cause.!® In the second instance, two causes are compared with each other in so far as they are causes of the same thing.

Per se or essentially ordered causes differ from accidentally ordered causes in three respects. The first difference is that in essentially ordered .causes, the second depends © upon the first precisely in its act of causation.

In accidentally ordered causes this is not the case, although the second may depend upon the first for its existence or in some other way.

Thus a son depends upon his father for wl

DUNS SCOTUS

tamen in causando, quia patre mortuo potest agere sicut ipso vivo.

Differentia secunda est, quod in per se ordinatis est causalitas alterius rationis et alterius ordinis, quia superior est perfectior ; in accidentaliter autem ordinatis non.

Et differentia haec sumitur ex prima ; nam nulla causa a causa ejusdem rationis dependet essentialiter in causando, quia in causatione alicujus sufficit unum unius rationis.

Tertia est, quod omnes causae essentialiter et per se ordinatae simul necessario requiruntur ad causandum, alioquin aliqua causalitas essentialis et per se deesset effectui; in accidentaliter autem ordinatis non est sic, quia non requiritur simultas eorum in causando, quia quaelibet habet suam perfectam causalitatem sine alia respectu sui effectus.

Sufficit enim quod successive causet una post aliam.

Ex his ostenditur propositum, scilicet quod infinitas essentialiter ordinatorum est impossibilis.

Similiter secunda infinitas accidentaliter ordinatorum est impossibilis, nisi ponatur status in ordinatis essentialiter.

Ergo omni modo est impossibilis infinitas in essentialiter ordinatis.

Si etiam negetur ordo essentialis, adhuc infinitas est impossibilis.

Ergo omni modo est aliquod primum necessario et-simpliciter effectivum.

Istarum trium propositionum assumptarum, propter brevitatem, prima dicatur A, secunda B, tertia C.

Probatio illarum, primo A, scilicet quod essentialiter ordinatorum infinitas est impossibilis.

Probo tum quia in causis essentialiter ordinatis ubi ponit adversarius infinitatem secunda in quantum causat, dependet a prima, ex prima differentia.

Si igitur essent causae

THE EXISTENCE

OF GOD

existence but i im_in_exercisin his own causality, since he can act just_as_well whether his father be living or dead.

The second difference is @) that_in essentially ordered causes the cz causality is of another nature and order, inasmuch 'as the higher cause is more perfect.

Such is not the case, however, with accidentally ordered causes.

This second difference is a consequence of the first, since no cause in the exercise of dedered causes this j is not so, because there is no need of simultaneity in causing inasmuch as each possesses independently of the others the perfection of causality with regard to its own effect.

For it is enough that one cause after the other exercises causality successively.

From all this we propose to show that_an infinity of 4

PPT ANE a

eS STON ON SCRTT ORETEL

"aninfinity of accidentally ordered causes is also impossible unless we admit a terminus in an essentially ordered * SericeMereisre aeRO an ETUIIY GRIT Cees is impossible in any case ; thirdly, even if we deny the existence of an essential order, an infinity of causes is still © saat lev ConReG Ga Ta eer ELE of necessity some first being able to cause exists.

For the sake of brevity, let us call the first of these three assumptions A, — the second B and the third_C.

Proof of the first of these propositions, A (namely that an infinity of essentially ordered causes is impossible) : I prove this first, because in essentially ordered causes a where our opponent assumes an infinity, the second of _ ae the series depends upon the first.

This is a consequence "%% %\ 2; of the first difference between essentially and accidentally

*% ordered causes.

Now if these causes were infinite so ,

DUNS SCOTUS

infinitae ita quod non solum quaelibet posterior sed quaelibet alia dependet a sua causa proxima prior, ergo universitas causatorym est ab aliqua causa priori.

Non ab aliqua causa quae est aliquid totius universitatis, quia tunc esset causa sui.

Tota enim universitas dependet et a nullo illius universitatis et hoc voco primum efficiens.

Si igitur sunt infinitae, adhuc dependent ab aliqua quae non est illius universitatis.

Tum quia si causae infinitae ordinatae essentialiter concurrant ad productionem alicujus effectus; et ex tertia differentia omnes causae essentialiter ordinatae sunt simul, sequitur quod infinita sunt simul ad causandum hunc effectum, quod nullus philosophus ponit.

Tum tertio, quia prius est principio propinquius, quinto Metaphysicae.* Ergo ubi nullum [MS unum] principium nihil essentialiter prius.

Tum quarto, quia superior causa est perfectior in causando ex secunda differentia; ergo in infinitum superior est in infinitum perfectior ; ergo [M/S in] infinitae perfectionis.

Et nulla talis est causans de virtute alterius quia quaelibet talis est imperfecte causans, quia est dependens incausando ab alia.

Tum quinto, quia effectivum nullam imperfectionem ponit necessario ; ergo potest esse in aliquo sine imperfectione, quia quod nihil imperfectionis includit potest poni inter entia sine imperfectione ; sed si nulla causa est sine dependentia ad prius, in nullo est sine imperfectione ; ergo effectibilitas independens potest inesse alicui naturae, et illa simpliciter est prima.

Ergo effectibilitas simpliciter prima est possibilis.

Hoc * v, cap. xi (1018, g—11)

THE EXISTENCE

OF GOD

that not only would each single cause be posterior to something but every other cause which precedes it would be dependent in turn upon the cause that goes before it, then4#whole series of effects [would be depend some prior cause.

Now the latter cannot be a cause that is part of the series, for then it would be its own cause.

The series as a whole, then, is dependent on something which does not 'pertain to the group that is caused, and his I call the first efficient cause. Even

~ Even if the group of e* something outside the group.

Then, too, if an infinite number of essentially ordered causes concurred to produce some effect, it would follow that an infinite number would simultaneously cause this effect, for it follows from the third difference that essentially ordered causes must exist simultaneously.

Now no philosopher assumes this.

Then, thirdly, to be prior, a thing must be nearer to the beginning.1!* Consequently, where there is no beginning, nothing can be essentially prior to anything else.

Then, fourthly, by reason of the second difference, the higher cause is more perfect in its causality, therefore

'what i infinitely higher is Tiley more perfect, and hence of infinite perfection.

Now nothing infinitely perfect can cause something only in virtue of another, because everything of this kind is imperfect in its causality since it depends on another in order to cause its effect.

Then, fifthly, inasmuch as to be able to produce something does not imply any imperfection, it follows that this ability can exist in something without imperfection, because that which implies no imperfection can be asserted of beings without imperfection.

But if every cause depends upon some prior cause, then efficiency is never found without imperfection.

Hence an independent power to produce something can exist in some nature, and this nature is simply first.

Therefore, such an efficient power is possible, and this suffices, for later

DUNS SCOTUS

sufficit, quia inferius ex hoc concluditur quia tale efficiens primum, si est possibile, est in re.

Et sic quinque rationibus patet A.

B probatur, scilicet quod infinitas in accidentf&liter ordinatis sit impossibilis, nisi ponatur status essentialiter ordinatorum, quia infinitas accidentalis, si ponitur, hoc non est simul, patet, sed successive tantum, ut alterum post alterum, ita quod secundum aliquo modo fluit a priore, non tamen dependet ab ipso in causando.

Potest enim causare, illo non existente, sicut illo existente ; sicut filius generat, patre mortuo sicut ipso vivo.

'Talis infinitas successionis est impossibilis, nisi ab aliqua natura infinite durante, a qua tota successio et quidlibet ejus dependeat ; nulla enim difformitas perpetuatur, nisi in virtute alicujus permanentis quod nihil est illius successionis, quia omnia successiva illius successionis sunt ejusdem rationis, et quia nulla pars successionis potest permanere cum tota successione eo quod tunc non esset pars ejus.

Sed est aliquid prius essentialiter, quia quidlibet successionis dependet ab ipso, et hoc in alia ordinatione quam a causa proxima, quia est aliquid illius successionis.

Omne igitur quod dependet a causa accidentaliter ordinata, dependet essentialius a causa per se et essentialiter ordinata.

Imo negato ordine essentiali negabitur ordo accidentalis quia accidentia non habent ordinem nisi mediante fixo et permanente, nec per consequens habet multitudinem in infinitum.

Patet ergo B.

Probatur etiam C, quod scilicet si negetur ordo essentialis, adhuc infinitas est impossibilis.

Probo :

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

we shall prove that if such a first efficient cause is possible, then it exists in reality. And so A becomes evident from these five arguments.

Now B (namely, that an infinity of accidentally ordered causes is impossible unless we admit that the essentially ordered series has an end) is proved in this way.

If we assume an infinity of accidentally ordered causes, it is clear that these not exist simultaneously but only successively, one after the other, so that what follows flows in some way from what precedes. Still the Sie Goeaih eta sewAOS AUC peudmasonstio See edie for the exercise of its causality, for it is equally effective whether the preceding cause exists or not.

A son in turn may beget a child just as well whether his father be dead or alive.

But an infinite succession of such causes is impossible unless it exists in virtue of some nature of infinite duration from which the whole succession and every part thereof depends.

For no change of form _is perpetuated save in virtue of something permanent which is not a ts fF art of th ion.

And the reason for this is that everything of this succession which is in flux, is of the same nature and no part thereof can be coexistent with the entire series for the simple reason that it would no longer be a part of the latter. Something essentially prior to the series then exists, for everything that is part of the succession depends upon it, and this dependence is of a different order from that by which it depends upon the immediately preceding cause where the latter is a part of the succession.

Therefore, whatever depends upon an accidentally ordered cause depends more essentially upon an essentially ordered cause.

Indeed, to deny the essential order is to deny the accidental order also, since accidents do not have any order save in virtue of what is fixed and permanent.

Consequently, neither will an infinite multitude exist.

B, then, is evident.

Proposition C' (namely that if an essential order is denied, an infinity is still impossible), also is proved.

Gs 2» =>

DUNS SCOTUS

quia cum ex prima ratione hic adducta, scilicet quod a nullo nihil potest esse, sequatur quod aliqua natura sit effectiva.

Si negatur ordo essentialis activorum, ergo illa in nullius alterius virtute causat, et licet ipsa in aliquo singulari ponatur causata, tamen in aliquo est non causata, quod est propositum de natura vel si in quolibet ponatur causata, statim implicatur contradictio negando ordinem essentialem, quia nulla natura potest poni in quolibet causata, ita quod sit ordo accidentalis sub ipsa sine ordine essentiali ad aliam naturam [sicut patet ex B].

Ad secundam instantiam supra positam, quae dicit quod ratio procedit ex contingentibus et ita non est demonstratio, cum dico aliqua natura vere est effecta, ergo aliquid est efficiens, respondeo quod posset sic argui : aliqua natura est effecta quod aliquod subjectum mutatur, et ita terminus mutationis incipit esse in subjecto, et ita ille terminus vel compositum producitur sive efficitur ; ergo est aliquod efficiens, per naturam correlativorum ; et tunc potest esse secundum veritatem prima contingens, sed manifesta.

Potest tamen sic argui probando primam conclusionem sic.

Haec est vera: aliqua natura est effectibilis ; ergo aliqua est effectiva.

Antecedens probatur: quia aliquod subjectum est mutabile, quia aliquod entium est possibile, definiendo possibile contra necessarium ; et sic procedendo ex necessariis.

Et tunc probatio primae conclusionis est de esse quidditative sive,

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Proof:

From the first reason adduced here, viz. that nothing can come from nothing, it follows that some nature is capable of causing effectively.

Now, if an essential order of agents be denied, then this nature capable of causing does not cause in virtue of some other cause, and even if we assume that in one individual it is caused, nevertheless in some other it will not be caused, and this is what we propose to prove to be true of this nature.

For if we assume that in every individual this nature is caused, then a contradiction follows immediately if we deny the existence of an essential order, since no nature that is caused can be assumed to exist in each individual in such a way that it is included in an accidental order of causes without being at the same time essentially ordered to some other nature.

This follows from proposition B.

Then we come to the second objection cited above,}2 namely that when I argue: "Some nature is capable of producing an effect, therefore something is an efficient cause', the argument is not a demonstration, since it proceeds from contingent propositions.

I reply that I could indeed argue that some nature is produced because some subject undergoes a change and therefore the term of the change comes into existence in the subject, and consequently this term or the composite [i.e. the subject and term] are produced or effected.

Hence by the nature of the correlatives, some efficient cause exists.

Formulated in this fashion, this first argument would be based upon a contingent but manifest proposition.

However, to prove our conclusion the argument can be reformulated in such a way that it proceeds from necessary premises.

Thus it is true that some nature is able to be produced, therefore something is able to produce an effect.

The antecedent is proved from the fact that something can be changed, for something is possible

(''possible"' being defined as contrary to "necessary'').

In this case, the proof for the first conclusion proceeds

DUNS SCOTUS

de esse possibili, non autem de existentia actuali.

Sed de quo nunc ostenditur possibilitas ultra in conclusione tertia ostendetur actualis existentia.

Secunda conclusio de primo effectivo est illa quod simpliciter primum effectivum est incausabile.

Hoc probatur, quia est ineffectibile independens effectivum.

Hoc patet prius, quia si sit virtute alterius causativum, vel ab alio effectibile, ergo vel processus in infinitum, vel circulus, vel status in aliquo [in]effectibili independente effective ; illud dico primum, et aliud patet quod non est primum ex datis tuis.

Ergo ulterius concluditur, si illud primum est ineffectibile, ergo incausabile, quia non est finibile, nec materiabile, nec formabile.

_Probatur consequentia prima, scilicet quod si est ineffectibile, ergo est infinibile quia causa finalis non causat nisi quia causa movet metaphorice ipsum efficiens ad efficiendum ; nam alio modo non dependet entitas finiti ab ipso ut a priori.

Nihil autem est causa per se nisi ut ab ipso tamquam a priore essentialiter dependet causatum.

Duae autem aliae consequentiae, scilicet quod si est ineffectibile, ergo est immateriabile et informabile, probantur simul ; quia cujus non est causa extrinseca, nec intrinseca ; quia causalitas causae extrinsecae dicit perfectionem sine imperfectione.

Causalitas vero causae intrinsecae necessario dicit imperfectionem annexam, quia causa intrinseca est pars causati. Igitur ratio causae

THE EXISTENCE

OF GOD

from what the thing is or from its possible existence, but not from its actual existence.

The actual existence of this being which up to now we have shown to be merely possible, however, will be established in the third conclusion.

—__ The/second conclusion|about the first possible efficient cause is this.

Among those things which can produce an effect at_which is simply first is itself incapable of being caused. roof 4 Such a being cannot be produced and is independently able to produce an effect.

This was proved above, for if such a being could cause only in virtue of something else or if it could be produced, then either a process ad infinitum or a circle in causes would result, or else the series would terminate in some being which cannot be produced and yet independently is able to produce an effect.

This being I call "'first'', and from what you grant, it is clear that anything other than this is not first.

Therefore, the further conclusion follows that if such a being cannot be produced, it has no causes whatsoever, for it cannot be the result of a final, material or formal cause.

Proof of the first consequence, viz. that if such a being cannot be produced, neither can it have any final cause. A final cause does not cause at all unless in a metaphorical sense it moves the efficient cause to produce the effect.

Only in this way does the entity of what exists for the sake of an end depend on the end as prior.

Nothing, however, is a per se cause unless the thing caused depends upon it essentially as upon something prior. Now the other two consequences are proved simultaneously.

If something cannot be produced, then it can be the result neither of a material nor of a formal cause.

The reason is this.

If something has no extrinsic cause, neither does it have an intrinsic cause, for while to be an extrinsic cause does not imply imperfection but perfection, to be an intrinsic cause necessarily includes some imperfection since the intrinsic cause is a part of the thing it causes.

For this reason, the very notion of (2,322)

DUNS SCOTUS

extrinsecae est naturaliter prior ratione causae intrinsecae ; negato igitur priori, et negatur et posterius.

Probantur etiam eaedem consequentiae, quia causae intrinsecae sunt causatae ab extrinsecis vel secundum esse earum vel in quantum causant compositum vel utroque modo, quia causae intrinsecae non seipsis sine agente constituunt compositum.

Ex istis dictis satis patet conclusio secunda.

Tertia conclusio de primo effectivo est ista : primum effectivum est in actu existens, et aliqua natura vere existens actualiter sic est effectiva.

Probatio istius :

Cujus rationi repugnat esse ab alio, illud si potest esse, potest esse a se; sed rationi primi effectivi simpliciter repugnat esse ab alio, sicut patet ex secunda conclusione.

Similiter etiam ipsum potest esse, sicut patet ex prima ubi posita est quinta probatio ad A, quae minus videtur concludere et tamen hoc concludit.

Aliae autem probationes ipsius A possunt tractari de existentia quam proponit haec tertia conclusio, et sunt de contingentibus, tamen manifestis: vel accipitur A de natura et quidditate et possibilitate, et sunt ex necessariis.

Ergo effectivum simpliciter primum potest esse ex se ; quod non est a se, non potest esse a se quia tunc non ens produceret aliquid ad esse, quod est impossibile, et adhuc tunc illud causaret se, et ita non esset incausabile omnino.

Illud ultimum, scilicet de existentia primi effectivi

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

an extrinsic cause has a natural priority over that of intrinsic cause ; to deny what is prior is to deny also what is posterior.

Another way of proving these same consequences is this.

Intrinsic causes are caused by extrinsic causes either in their very being or in so far as they cause the composite, or in both of these ways, for the intrinsic causes of themselves and without the intervention of some agent cannot constitute the composite.

This suffices to make the second conclusion evident. bla third conclusionfabout this being capable of exercising efficient causality 1s this. Such a being actually exists and some nature actually existing is capable_of such causality.

Proof: Anything to_whose_nature it is Tepugnant to Oy, receive existence from something else, can exist of itself. "g m Xx %, if it 1s able to exist at all. To receive existence from something else, however, is repugnant to the very notion of a being which is first in the order of efficiency, as is clear from the second conclusion. That it can exist, is also clear from the first conclusion [namely A], where the fifth argument, which seems to be less conclusive than the others, establishes this much at least.!? However, the other proofs of proposition A can also be used to establish the existence of this being as proposed by this third conclusion, but in this case they are based on contingent though manifest propositions. If A, however, is understood of the nature, the quiddity and the possibility, then the conclusions proceed from necessary premises. From allo pee allan thatien ativientgayee hich teastin

Ps the unqualified sense of the term can exist of itself. onsequently, it does exist of itself, for what does not actually exist of itself, is incapable of existing of itself.

Otherwise a non-existent being would cause something to exist; but this is impossible, even apart from the fact that in such a case the thing would be its own cause and hence could not be entirely uncaused.

Another way to establish this last conclusion, viz. the

DUNS SCOTUS

aliter declaratur, quia inconveniens est universo deesse supremum gradum possibilem in essendo.

Juxta tres conclusiones ostensas de effectivo primo, nota corollarium quoddam quod quasi continet tres conclusiones probatas, quod, scilicet primum effectivum non tantum est prius aliis, sed eo prius aliud esse includit contradictionem.

Sic in quantum primum, existit, probatur ut praecedens ; nam in ratione talis primi maxime includitur incausabile, probatur ex secunda; ergo si potest esse, quia non contradicit entitati, ut probatur ex prima, sequitur quod potest esse a se, et ita est a se.

[b. De Primitate Finalitatis]|.

Juxta tres conclusiones primas de causa effectiva, propono tres conclusiones similes de causa finali.

Aliquod finitivum est simpliciter primum, hoc est nec ad aliud ordinabile nec in virtute alterius natum finire alia.

Et probatur quinque probationibus similibus illis quae ponebantur ad primum conclusionem de primo effectivo.

Secunda est quod primum finitivum est incausabile.

Probatur, quia infinibile, alias non primum, et ultra, ergo ineffectibile.

Haec consequentia probatur, quia omne per se agens agit propter finem, ex secundo Physicorum,* ubi etiam hoc vult Philosophus de natura, de qua minus videtur quam de agente a proposito.

Sed cujus non est aliquod per se efficiens, illud non est effectibile, quia in nullo genere potest per accidens esse primum, sicut patet in proposito specialiter de causis

* m1, cap. v (1969, 17-22).

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

existence of this first efficient cause, would be to argue from the impropriety of a universe that would Jack the highest possible degree of being.

A kind of corollary contained, as it were, in these three conclusions concerning the first being able to exercise efficient causality, is the following.

Not only is such a cause prior to all the others, but it would be contradictory to say that another is prior to it. And, in so far as such a cause is first, it exists.

This is proved in the same way as the preceding.

The very notion of such a being implies its inability to be caused (which is proved from the second conclusion).

'Therefore, if it can exist, owing to the fact that to be is not contradictory to it (as the first conclusion proves), then it follows that it can exist of itself, and consequently that it does exist of itself.

[b. The Primacy of Finality].

Concerning the final cause, I propose three conclusions similar to the first three conclusions about the being which is able to produce something.

The first conclusion is that some end is simply ultimate, that is, it can neither be ordained to something else nor exercise its finality in virtue of something else.

This is proved by five arguments similar to those advanced for the first conclusion concerning the possibility of a first efficient cause.

The second conclusion is that the ultimate end cannot be caused in any way.

'This is proved from the fact that it cannot be ordained for another end ; otherwise it would not be ultimate.

It follows in addition that it cannot be caused by an efficient cause.

This latter consequence is proved from the fact that every agent per se acts for the sake of an end as is said in Physics, BK. 1,* where the Philosopher understands this proposition to hold also of "nature" where it seems to apply less than in the case of an agent who acts according to purpose.14

Now a thing cannot be produced if no per se efficient cause of it exists, for the first of any given kind of cause is never an incidental cause (causa per accidens).

'This is clear from

DUNS SCOTUS

agentibus per accidens, quae sunt casus et fortuna quae secundum Aristotelem, secundo Physicorum,* reducuntur necessario ad causas per se agentes ut priores, scilicet ad naturam et intellectum ut propositum ; cujus igitur non est aliquid per se agens ejus nullum erit agens, sed cujus non est finis, ejus non est aliquod per se agens ; ergo ipsum erit ineffectibile ; nam finibile excellitur a fine in bonitate et per consequens in perfectione.

Et ultra, ut supra ostensum est de causa effectiva prima.

Tertia conclusio est, quod primum finitivum est actu existens, et alicui naturae actu existenti convenit illa primitas.

Probatur ut prima via de efficientia.

Sequitur quod primum est ita primum, quod impossibile est aliud prius esse.

Et probatur ut corollarium in via priori.

[c. De Primitate Eminentiae].

Conclusionibus tribus de utroque ordine causalitatis extrinsecae jam positis, propono tres similes de ordine eminentiae.

Aliqua natura eminens est simpliciter prima secundum perfectionem.

Hoc patet quia inter essentias ordo essentialis, quia secundum Aristotelem, formae se habent sicut numeri, octavo

Metaphysicae.t In hoc ordine statur.

Quod probatur illis quinque rationibus quae de statu in effectivis sunt superius.

Secunda conclusio est quod suprema natura est incausabilis.

Probatur, quia est infinibilis, ex praecedentibus [nam finibile excellitur a fine in bonitate et per consequens in perfectione].

Ergo ineffectibilis.

Et ultra, * u, cap. vi (198%, 5-13). ft vii, cap. iii (1043, 33).

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

what is said in particular of incidental causes, which are chance and fortune.

These, according to Aristotle in Physics, BK. 1,* must be reduced respectively to the prior causes of "nature" and "'intellect" as purpose, neither of which are incidental causes.

Hence, whatever has no per se efficient cause has no efficient cause whatsoever.

But whatever has no end, also has no per se efficient cause.

Therefore, it will not be something that could be produced, for whatever could be the result of a final cause will be surpassed in goodness, and consequently in perfection, by the end.

Further, as has been shown above of the first potential efficient cause [such a being will have no material or formal cause either].

The third conclusion is that the being which can be an ultimate end actually exists and that this primacy pertains to some actually existing nature.

'The proof for this is like that used in the first way from efficiency.15

It follows that such a being is first in the sense that it is impossible that anything should be prior to it.

This is proved in the same fashion as the preceding corollary about the efficient cause.

[c.

The Primacy of Pre-eminence]|.

Having already established three conclusions of each of the two orders of extrinsic causality, I submit three similar conclusions concerning the order of pre-eminence.

The first conclusion is that some eminent nature is simply first in perfection.

'This is evident because an essential order exists among essences, for as Aristotle puts it,t forms are like numbers. And in such an order an ultimate nature is to be found.

This is proved by the five reasons given above for a first being in the order of efficient causality.

The second conclusion is that the supreme nature cannot be caused.

'This is proved from the fact that it cannot be ordained to an end, for whatever is ordained to an end is surpassed in goodness, and therefore also in perfection, by the end.

But if it is not ordained to an end, then, it cannot be caused by an efficient cause, and consequently

DUNS SCOTUS

ergo incausabilis.

Illae duae consequentiae sunt probatae ex secunda conclusione de effectivis.

Item, quod suprema natura sit ineffectibilis probatur.

Nam omne effectibile habet aliquam causam essentialiter ordinatam, sicut patet ex probatione ipsius B in conclusione prima de primo effectivo.

Causa autem essentialiter ordinata excellit effectum.

[Igitur, si esset effectibilis, non esset suprema. | Tertia conclusio est quod suprema natura est aliquod actu existens et probatur ex praecedentibus.

Corollarium : aliquam esse naturam eminentiorem vel superiorem ipsa includit contradictionem.

Probatur ut corollarium de efficiente et fine.

[Pars Secunda.

De primitatibus ad invicem comparatis].

Quantum ad secundum articulum dico quod primum efficiens est ultimus finis.

Probatio, quia omne efficiens per se agit propter finem et prius efficiens propter finem priorem.

Ergo primum efficiens propter ultimum finem.

Sed propter nihil aliud a se principaliter et ultimate agit.

Ergo, propter se sicut propter finem.

Ergo primum efficiens est primus finis.

Si enim ageret per se propter finem alium a se, tunc aliquod esset nobilius primo efficiente, quia finis qui est aliquid remotum ab agente intendente finem nobilius eo.

Similiter, primum efficiens est primum eminens.

Probatur, quia primum efficiens non est univocum respectu aliarum naturarum effectivarum, sed aequivocum.

Ergo eminentius et nobilius eis.

Ergo primum efficiens est eminentissimum.

[Pars Tertia.

De divinae naturae unitate].

Quantum ad tertium articulum dico quod cum sit idem cui inest

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

it cannot be caused in any way.

These last two consequences are proved from the second conclusion about the efficient cause.

Another consideration proves that this supreme nature cannot be an effect.

Everything which can be produced has some essentially ordered cause, as is evident from the proof of the proposition B in support of the first conclusion about the possibility of a first efficient cause.

Now an essentially ordered cause excels its effect ; therefore, if it could be produced, it would not be supreme.

The third conclusion is that the supreme nature actually exists, and this is proved from what we have said above.!6

Corollary:

It is contradictory that any nature should be more excellent or higher than this nature.

This is proved in the same way as were the corollaries about the efficient and final cause.1'

[Part 1.

Interrelation of the Three Primacies].

Régarding the second part, I say that_the first cause is the ultimate end. Proof:

Every per se efficient cause acts for ke of an end, and a prior cause acts for a prior end ; therefe Niet eae eae akeetihe, ultimate end.

'Now the first efficient cause does not_act_primarily_or ultimately for the sake of anything distinct from itself ; hence, it must act for itself as an end-—therefore, the fr therefore, the first efficient cause is the ultimate end.

If it were to act per se for the sake of any end other than itself, then something a a would be more noble than the first efficient cause, for if the end were anything apart from the agent intending the end, it would be more noble than the agent.

Now the first effictent cause is also the supreme nature. Proof :

The first efficient cause is not a univocal cause with reference to the other efficient causes but rather an equivocal cause.

Such a cause, therefore, is more excellent and noble than they.

Consequently, the first efficient cause is the most excellent.!8

[Part 1.

Unity of the Divine Nature].

Regarding the third part, I say that since this triple primacy is

DUNS SCOTUS

triplex primitas, quia cui inest una, insunt et aliae ; et etiam est ibi triplex identitas, ita quod primum efficiens est tantum unum secundum quidditatem et naturam.

Ad quod ostendendum ostendo primo quamdam conclusionem praeambulam et secundo principalem conclusionem.

Praeambula autem est quod efficiens quod est primum hac triplici primitate, est necesse esse ex Se.

Probatio, quia est penitus incausabile ; nam contradictionem includit aliquod esse prius eo in genere causae efficientis vel finis, et per consequens in genere cujuscumque causae ; ergo est omnino incausabile.

Ex hoc arguo: uihil potest non esse, nisi cui aliquid incompossibile positive vel privative potest esse.

Ei autem quod est a se et penitus incausabile, non potest aliquid esse quod ei sit incompossibile positive vel privative ; ergo etc.

Major patet quia nullum ens potest destrui, nisi per incompossibile sibi vel positive vel privative.

Minor probatur, quia illud incompossibile aut potest esse a se aut ab alio.

Siaseeterit ase.

Erit igitur duo incompossibilia simul, vel neutrum est, quia utrumque destruit esse alterius.

Si ab alio, contra : -nulla causa potest destruere aliquod ens propter repugnantiam sui effectus ad illud, nisi suo effectui perfectius et intensiu® esse det quam sit esse illius alterius destructibilis : nullius entis ab alio est nobilius esse a causa sua quam sit esse necessarium a se, quia omne causatum habet esse dependens, sed quod est ex se habet esse independens.

Ex hoc ultra ad propositum, probatur unitas [MS veritas] naturae primae, quae est principale intentum in hoc tertio articulo, quod ostenditur tribus rationibus.

Primo sic: quia si duae naturae sunt necesse esse, aliquibus rationibus propriis realibus distinguuntur ; et dicantur A et B. Illae rationes aut sunt formaliter neces-

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

found together (for where one 1s, there also are the others), it follows further that this triple identity is such that there 1s but one first efficient cause according to essence and nature.19

To show this, I will first establish a preliminary conclusion and only afterwards the principal conclusion.

Now the preliminary conclusion is this.

_ The efficient cause which is first by this triple primacy ts of itself necessarily existent.

Proof:

It is completely incapable of being caused, for it is contradictory that it should have anything prior to it in the order of efficiency or finality, and consequently in any causal order.

Hence, it is wholly incapable of being caused. From this I argue, nothing can_be non-existent unless something either positively or privatively incompatible with it can exist. JNow nothing can be positively

'or privatively Incompatible with a being whi ists of { May a ae ns % hal Noe itself and is totally uncaused ; therefore, etc.

The major is 'clear, masmuch as no being can be destroyed except by something positively or privatively incompatible with it. The minor is proved as follows.

What is incompatible could exist either of itself or in virtue of some other being.

If it can exist of itself, then it will exist of itself.

Consequently, two incompatible entities will coexist or rather neither will exist because each will destroy the other.

But can this incompatible entity exist in virtue of another being?

No, for no cause is able to destroy something by reason of an effect incompatible with the thing to be destroyed unless it is able to give a more perfect and intense existence to its effect than that which the thing to be destroyed possesses. Now the existence which a cause imparts to a being is never as perfect as that of a self-existent being, for the existence of what is caused is dependent whereas that of the self-existent being is independent.

Now to proceed to what we primarily intended to prove in this third part, the unity of this first nature.

Three reasons are adduced by way of proof, the first of which is this.

If two necessary natures existed, some reality proper to each would distinguish one from the i ot =

DUNS SCOTUS

sariae, aut non.

Si sic, igitur utrumque duabus rationibus formalibus erit necesse esse, quod est impossibile, quia cum neutra illarum rationum per se includat aliam, utraque istarum circumscripta, esset necesse esse [MS om. per alteram, et ita esset aliquid necesse esse per illud, quo circumscripto, non minus esset necesse esse].

Si vero per illas rationes quibus distinguuntur neutrum sit formaliter necesse esse, igitur illae rationes non sunt rationes necessario essendi, et ita neutrum includitur in necesse esse, quia quaecumque entitas non est necesse esse est de se possibilis ; sed nihil possibile includitur in

NeCESSE ESSE.

y Secundo probatur, quia duae naturae eminentissimae non possunt esse in universo; ergo nec duo prima effectiva.

Probatio antecedentis, quia species se habent sicut numeri, ex octavo Metaphysicae,* et per consequens duae non possunt esse in eodem ordine.

Ergo multo minus nec duae primae vel duae eminentissimae.

Hoc etiam patet tertio per rationem de ratione finis, quia duo fines ultimi si essent haberent duas coordinationes entium ad se, ita quod ista entia ad illa nullum ordinem haberent, quia nec ad finem illorum ; nam quae ordinantur ad unum finem ultimum non possunt ordinari ad alium, quia ejusdem causati duas esse causas totales et perfectas in eodem ordine est impossibile ; tunc enim aliquid esset in aliquo ordine per se causa, quo non posito, nihilominus causatum illud [aeque perfecte esset].

* vill, cap. iii (1043°, 33).

THE EXISTENCE

OF GOD

Qther.

Let us call these real differences A and B. Now either A and B are formally necessary or they are not.

If we assume them to be necessary, then each necessarily existing nature will possess tw. mal reasons for its necessary existence, for in addition to A or B, each is

Ce ie ae since neither of the two reasons of itself includes the other, o de if either be excluded, the being would still exist neces- "2°, * sarily in virtue of the other {In such a case the being %& = would exist necessarily in virtue of something which, if ay eliminate wou Sti €ave € nature existing as necessarily _as before.

_On the other h i ither nature is formally necessary in virtue of these real differences, then the la not of the essence of necessary existence and consequently neither is included in a necessary being. .For any entity which is not of itself necessary being is only possible being.2° Nothing merely

Reg a eee pein Decree, econd proof: {Iwo pre-eminent natures cannot exist <.. in_one universe ; therefore neither can two beings first "44 oye in the order of efficient causality. Proofofthe antecedent:

~~ Species are like numbers (Metaphysics, Bk. vi11)* and hence no two occur in the same order.

Still less could two be first or pre-eminent.

This is also evident in the third place from the fact that this Being has the character of an end. Now if there were two ultimate ends, then we should have two separate series of co-ordinated beings where the members of one group wculd have no relation to the other inasmuch as they are not ordered to the same end.

For what is ordered to one ultimate end cannot be ordered to another, as it is impossible to have two total and perfect causes of the same order causing one and the same thing.

In such a case, something could be a fer se cause in a given order, although its effect would exist no less perfectly even should this cause never have existed.

Therefore, things

DUNS SCOTUS

Ordinata ergo ad unum finem nullo modo ordinantur ad alium, nec per consequens ad illa quae ordinantur ad alium, et ita ex eis non fieret universum.

Hoc etiam confirmatur in communi, quia nulla duo possunt esse terminantia totaliter dependentiam alicujus ejusdem, quia tunc illud terminaret dependentiam, quo subtracto, non minus terminaretur illa dependentia, et ita non esset dependentia ad illud; sed ad efficiens et eminens et ad finem dependent aliqua [MS alia] essentialiter.

Ergo nullae dua& naturae possunt esse primo terminantia aliqua [MS alia] entia secundum illam triplicem dependentiam.

Praecise igitur est aliqua una natura terminans entia secundum illam triplicem dependentiam, et ita habens istam triplicem primitatem.

[Articulus Secundus.

De Proprietatibus Dei Absolutis] Ostenso esse de proprietatibus relativis primi entis, ulterius ad ostendendum illius primi infinitatem, et per consequens esse de ente infinito, precedo sic:

Primo ostendo quod primum efficiens est intelligens et volens, ita quod sua intelligentia est infinitorum distincte, et quod sua essentia est repraesentativa infinitorum, quae quidem essentia est sua intelligentia.

Et ex hoc secundo concludetur sua infinitas.

Et sic cum triplici primitate ostensa, erit quadruplex medium ad ostendendum ejus infiniWENO GelS GG

[Pars Prima.

De Intellectu et Voluntate Primi Entis].

[Conclusio Prima]. Quod autem sit intelligens et volens arguo sic : Aliquod agens est per se primum agens, quia omni causa per accidens prior est aliqua causa per se, secundo Physicorum,* ubi hoc vult de natura de qua

* m1, cap. vi (198%, 8-9).

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

ordered to one end cannot be ordered to another. Neither then, can they be ordered to things which in turn are ordered to something else.

Consequently, they would not form one universe [with the latter].

This is also confirmed in general because one and the same thing cannot be totally dependent upon two things.

For then it would be dependent upon something which, if removed, would still leave the thing in question as dependent as before.

Hence, the thing would not really be dependent upon it at all. Now some things depend essentially upon an efficient cause which is also preeminent and they depend essentially upon an end. They cannot, then, be dependent upon two natures in this triple way.

Consequently, some one nature is the term of this triple dependence, and thus enjoys this triple primacy.

[Article II.

Absolute Properties of God ] Having shown the existence of the relative properties of the First Being, we go on to prove that this Being possesses infinity and, consequently, that an Infinite Being exists.

I proceed as follows:

First I show that the first efficient cause is endowed with will and possesses such intelligence that this cause understands an infinity of distinct things and that its essence, which indeed is its intelligence, represents an infinity of things.

Secondly, I go on from this to infer the infinity of this Being.

This approach coupled with the triple primacy which we have established provides four ways of showing the infinity of thissBeing., fia ¢ [Part 1.

Intellect and Will].

[First Conclusion].

I argue that this being is intelligent and endowed with will as follows :

Some agent is fer se and first, for according to Physics, BK. 1,* every incidental cause is preceded by one that is not incidental but per se.

In this passage the Philosopher applies this to nature where it would seem to hold still

DUNS SCOTUS

minus videtur.

Sed omne agens per se agit propter finem.

Et ex hoc arguitur dupliciter:

Primo sic:

Omne agens naturale, praecise consideratum ex necessitate et aeque ageret si ad nullum finem alium ageret, sed sit independenter agens; ergo si non agit nisi propter finem, hoc est quia dependet ab agente amante finem ; tale est primum efficiens ; ergo etc.

Item, si primum agens agit propter finem, aut ergo finis ille movet primum efficiens ut amatus actu voluntatis, aut ut tantum naturaliter amatus.

Si ut amatus actu voluntatis, habetur propositum.

Si tantum amatus naturaliter, hoc est falsum, quia non naturaliter amat alium finem a se, ut grave centrum, et materia formam.

Tunc enim esset aliquo modo ad finem, quia inclinatus ad illum.

Si autem tantum naturaliter amat finem qui est ipse, hoc nihil est nisi ipsum esse ipsum.

Hoc enim non est salvare duplicem rationem in ipso.

Item arguitur quasi confirmando [MS conferendo] rationem jam factam sic.

Ipsum primum efficiens dirigit effectum suum ad finem ; ergo vel naturaliter dirigit, vel cognoscendo et amando illum finem.

Non naturaliter, quia non cognoscens nihil dirigit nisi in virtute cognoscentis : sapientis enim est prima ordinatio, primo Metaphysicae.* Sed primum efficiens nullius alterius virtute dirigit, sicut nec causat ; tunc enim non esset primum ; ergo, etc.

Item, aliquid causatur contingenter; ergo prima causa contingenter causat ; ergo volens causat.

Probatio * 1, cap. ii (982%, 17-18).

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

less [than of a deliberate cause].

Now every per se agent acts for the sake of an end.

From this I draw a double argument : First, that every natural agent, considered precisely as natural, acts of necessity 2! and would act just as it does now even if it had no other end but was an independent agent.

Therefore, if it acts only because of an end, this is so only because it depends upon an agent which loves the end.

But the first efficient cause is such an agent, therefore, etc.

[Secondly,] if the first agent acts for the sake of an end, then this end moves the first efficient cause inasmuch as it is loved either naturally or by an act of the will.

If the latter be the case, you grant what I seek to prove.

If you assume that the end is loved naturally, the assumption is false, for the first agent loves naturally no end other than itself, as matter, for instance, naturally loves form or the heavy object the centre [of the earth].

If it did, the first agent would be oriented to it as an end, since it is inclined to it by its very nature.

But if this end which it loves naturally is nothing other than itself, then we assert nothing more than that the thing is itself.22

In such a case, however, the twofold [causal] aspect would not be saved.

In confirmation of the argument just given we could argue that the first efficient cause directs its effect to some end.

Now, it directs it either naturally or by consciously loving this end.

The first alternative is untenable, inasmuch as whatever lacks knowledge can direct its effect to some end only in virtue of something which does possess knowledge, for '"'to order ultimately" pertains to wisdom according to Metaphysics, Bk. 1.* Now just as the first efficient cause does not cause in virtue of something else, neither does this cause direct its effect to an end by reason of something other than itself, for otherwise it would not be first ; therefore, etc.

Another proof is this.

Something causes contingently.

Therefore, the first cause causes contingently ; (2,322)

DUNS SCOTUS

primae consequentiae : quaelibet causa secunda causat in quantum movetur a prima ; ergo si prima necessario movet, quaelibet alia necessario movetur et quidlibet necessario causatur.

Igitur, si aliqua causa secunda contingenter movet, et prima contingenter movebit, quia non causat causa secunda nisi in virtute primae causae, in quantum movetur ab ipsa. Probatio secundae consequentiae: nullum est principium contingenter operandi nisi voluntas, vel aliquid concomitans voluntatem, quia quodlibet aliud agit ex necessitate naturae, ita et non contingenter ; ergo etc.

Contra istam rationem instatur, et primo contra primam consequentiam arguitur sic: quia nostrum velle posset adhuc aliquid contingenter causare, et ita non requiritur quod prima causa illud contingenter causet.

Item, Philosophus antecedens concessit, scilicet quod aliquid contingenter causatur, et negavit consequens, intelligendo de velle scilicet quod prima causa contingenter causet; ponendo contingentiam in inferioribus, non propter contingenter Deum velle, sed ex motu qui necessario causatur in quantum uniformis, sed difformitas sequitur ex partibus ejus, et ita contingentia.

Contra secundam consequentiam : si causat contingenter, ergo volens, non videtur tenere, quia aliqua naturaliter mota possunt impediri, et ita oppositum contingenter et violenter potest evenire.

Ad primum' dicendum, quod si Deus est primum movens vel efficiens respectu voluntatis nostrae, idem sequitur de ipsa quod de aliis, quia sive immediate necessario movet eam, sive aliud immediate, et illud necessario motum necessario moveat eam, quia movet

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

consequently, it causes voluntarily.

Proof of the first consequence:

Every secondary cause causes in so far as it is moved by the first cause.

If the first cause moves necessarily, then, every other cause will be moved necessarily and everything will be caused necessarily.

Consequently, if any secondary cause moves contingently, the first cause also moves contingently, since the secondary cause can cause only in so far as it is moved by the first.

Proof of the second consequence : The only source of contingent action is either the will or something accompanied by the will.

Everything else acts with a natural necessity and, consequently, not contingently ; therefore, etc.

One objection to this argument is directed against the first consequence, namely that our volition would still be able to cause something contingently and therefore it is unnecessary that the first cause should cause contingently.

Furthermore, the Philosopher 23 concedes the antecedent (that something is caused contingently), yet denies the consequent (that the first cause causes contingently).

He places contingency in the lower beings and not in the fact that God wills things contingently.

Contingency arises from motion, which, though it is caused necessarily in so far as it is uniform, gives rise to difformity owing to its parts.

The other objection is to the second consequence.

Just because something causes contingently, it does not seem to follow that therefore this cause is endowed with a will, for even what is moved naturally can be impeded.

Hence, the opposite can happen either contingently or violently.

To the first objection we must reply that if God is the first mover or efficient cause with regard to our will, then the same holds of our will as of other things.

Whether God moves our will immediately with necessity or whether He first moves something else necessarily and this latter in turn moves our will with necessity,

DUNS SCOTUS

non nisi ex hoc quod movetur, sequitur tandem quod proximum voluntati necessario moveat voluntatem, etiam si proximum voluntati sit ipsamet voluntas, et ita necessario volet, et erit volens necessario.

Et sequitur ulterius impossibile, quod necessario causat quodlibet causatum [, et non est aliquid contingens].

Ad secundum dico, quod non voco hic contingens quodcumque non necessarium, vel non sempiternum, sed cujus oppositum posset fieri quando illud fit.

Ideo dixi: aliquod contingenter causatum, et non aliquod est contingens.

Nunc dico, quod Philosophus non potest consequens negare salvando antecedens per motum ; quia si ille totus motus necessario est a causa sua, quaelibet pars ejus necessario causatur quando causatur, id est, inevitabiliter, ita quod oppositum non potest tunc causari.

Et ulterius, quod causatur per quamcumque partem motus, necessario causatur et inevitabiliter.

Vel igitur nihil fit contingenter, id est, evitabiliter, vel primum sic causat immediate, quod posset etiam non causare.

Ad tertium dico, quod si aliqua causa potest impedire istam, hoc non est nisi in virtute superioris causae, et sic usque ad primam causam quae si immediatam causam sibi necessario movet, usque ad ultimam erit necessitas ; ergo necessario impediet, et per consequens, non potest alia causa naturaliter causare.

Sic ergo videtur triplici via ostensum quod primum agens est intelligens et volens.

Quarum prima est quod natura agit propter finem, et non nisi quia dependens

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

in any case the will would be necessarily moved by whatever is proximate to it.

This would be true even if this proximate cause were itself will.

The will, therefore, would will necessarily and would be a necessary voluntary agent.

And there is still another absurdity that would follow, viz. that it would cause necessarily anything that is caused, and there would be nothing contingent.

As to the second objection, let me say that by ''contingent'"' I do not mean something that is not necessary or which was not always in existence, but something whose opposite could have occurred at the time that this actually did.

'That is why I do not say that something is contingent, but that something is caused contingently.

Now I maintain that the Philosopher cannot deny the consequent and still save the antecedent through the expedient of motion, because if the motion as a whole proceeds from its cause in a necessary manner, every single part of it is caused necessarily at the time it occurs.

In other words, it is inevitable, so that the opposite effect could not possibly be caused at just this moment.

Furthermore, whatever is caused by any part of this motion is caused necessarily and inevitably.

Therefore, either nothing ever happens unavoidably or contingently, or the first cause immediately causes what it was also able not to cause.

To the third objection, I say that if any cause can impede a natural cause, it can do so only in virtue of a higher cause, and so we are forced back again to the first cause.

If this first cause necessarily moves the cause immediately below it, this necessity will continue down to the last cause, which will consequently be necessarily impeded in its action.

As a result, this last cause could not cause anything naturally.

There appears to be three ways, then, of proving that the first agent is intelligent and endowed with will. The first of these is that nature acts on account of an end,

DUNS SCOTUS

et directa a cognoscente finem ; secunda est quod ipsum primum agens agit propter finem; et tertia quod aliquis effectus contingenter fit quando causatur.

[Conclusio Secunda].

Ulterius quoad quaestionem praeambulam ad infinitatem, probo secundo quod ejus intellectio et volitio est idem quod ejus essentia.

Et primo de volitione sui ipsius ut objecti, ita quod primam causam amare est idem essentialter cum natura causae et omnis actus voluntatis ejus.

Probatio: causalitas et causatio causae finalis est simpliciter prima, secundum Avicennam sexto Metaphysicae [cap. v], dicentem quod si de qualibet causa esset scientia, illa quae esset de causa finali esset nobilissima ; ipsa enim quantum ad causalitatem praecedit causam efficientem, quia movet eum ad agendum, et ideo causalitas primi finis et ejus causatio est penitus incausabilis secundum quamcumque causationem in quolibet genere causae.

Causalitas autem finis primi est efficiens primum movere sicut amatum.

Idem autem est primum finem movere primum efficiens ut amatum ab ipso et primum efficiens amare propter finem, quia nihil aliud est objectum amari a voluntate quam voluntatem amare objectum; ergo primum efficiens amare primum finem est penitus incausabile, et ita per se necesse esse, et ita erit idem naturae primae.

Et quasi convertitur ratio ex opposito conclusionis; quia si primum amare est aliud a natura prima, ergo est causabile, et per consequens effectibile.

Igitur ab aliquo per se efficiente amante finem ; igitur primum amare se esset causatum ex aliquo amore finis priore isto causato ; quod est impossibile.

Hoc ostendit Aristoteles, duodecimo Metaphysicae,* de intelligere quia aliter primum non erit optima * xu, cap. ix (1074, 28-29).

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

and it does this, only because it is dependent upon and directed by someone who knows the end.

The second is that this first agent acts for the sake of an end. The third is that some effects are caused contingently.

But let us proceed with the preliminaries to the proof for infinity.

[Second Conclusion].

The second conclusion I establish is this: the knowledge and volition of this First Being is the same as its essence.

'This is true, first, of its volition of itself as object, so that to love the first cause is something essentially identified with the nature of this cause, and the same holds for every act of its will.

Proof:

The causality and causation of the final cause is simply first according to Avicenna's Metaphysics, BK.v1, where he says :

"If we had scientific knowledge of any cause, that of the final cause would be the most excellent".

The reason is this.

The final cause from the standpoint of causality precedes the efficient cause inasmuch as it moves it to act.

Therefore, the causality of the ultimate end and its causation is completely incapable of being caused in any way.

Now the causality of the ultimate end consists in this.

By being loved it moves the first efficient cause.

But it is one and the same thing whether the ultimate end moves the first efficient cause by being loved by this cause or whether the first efficient cause loves for the sake of anend.

For an object being loved by the will means the same as a will loving an object.

Hence, the love by which the first efficient cause loves the ultimate end is completely incapable of being caused.

Therefore, it exists necessarily and consequently is the same as the first nature.

Or to use the argument in reverse, if this first love is directed towards anything other than the first nature itself, it can be caused and therefore produced, and this by some fer se efficient cause which in turn loves some end.

Consequently, this first love of itself would be caused by some prior love of an end, which is impossible.

Aristotle in his Metaphysics, BK. xu,* proves that the knowledge which the First Being possesses is the same as

DUNS SCOTUS

substantia, quia per intelligere est honorabile ; secundo quia alias laboriosa erit ejus continuatio.

Item si non sit illud, erit in potentia contradictionis ad illud.

Ad illam naturam sequitur labor, secundum ipsum.

Istae rationes possunt ratione declarari.

Prima sic : cum omnis entis in actu primo perfectio ejus ultima sit in actu secundo quo conjungitur optimo, maxime si sit activum et non tantum factivum.

Omne autem intelligibile est activum, et prima natura est intelligibilis ex praemissa, sequitur ergo quod ultima ejus perfectio erit in actu secundo.

Igitur si ille non sit ejus substantia, substantia ejus non est optima, quia aliud est suum optimum.

Secunda ratio potest declarari sic: potentia solummodo receptiva est potentia contradictionis ; ergo cum hoc non sit hujusmodi; ergo etc.

Sed quia secundum Aristotelem, nec ista est ratio demonstrativa, sed tantum probabilis, aliter propositum ostendatur ex identitate potentiae et objecti in se ; ergo actus erit eis idem.

Sed consequentia non valet.

Patet instantia: quia angelus intelligit se et amat se, et tamen actus angeli amandi et intelligendi non sunt idem substantiae ejus.

Haec conclusio, videlicet, quod essentia divina sit eadem quod volitio sui ipsius, foecunda [MS vera] est ex corollariis.

Nam sequitur primo quod voluntas est idem primae naturae ; quia velle non est nisi voluntatis ; ergo illa voluntas cujus velle est incausabile, est

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

its essence, first, because it would not be the best substance, were such not the case, since this is the most excellent of substances precisely because of the knowledge it possesses.

And secondly, because otherwise the First Being would grow weary if it continued to think, for if its thought were not its substance, the latter would be in potency of contradiction ** to thinking, and this would produce weariness according to Aristotle.

These arguments from authority can be established by reason.

As to the first, every being which is in first act finds its ultimate perfection in its second act, through which it is united to that which is best for it.25

This is true especially if this being is capable of acting in the proper sense of the term and not merely in the sense of producing or fashioning some external object.26

Now whatever is intelligible is active in the proper sense of the term, and the first nature is intelligible from what we said above. Therefore, it follows that the ultimate perfection of this Being will be in its second act.

But if this act is not the substance itself, the latter will not be the best inasmuch as its ultimate perfection is something other than itself.

[Aristotle's] second reason can be put in this way.

Only a receptive potency is in potency of contradiction.

But this Being has no receptive potencies ; therefore, etc.

Since Aristotle, however, did not consider his proof demonstrative but merely probable, some ?? would prove the thesis in another way, viz. since the faculty and the object are identical, therefore the act is identified with them.

This inference, however, is invalid as is clear from the case of an angel, which knows and loves itself and nevertheless, its acts of loving and knowing are not identical with its substance.

This conclusion, viz. that the divine essence is identical with its volition, is fruitful because of its corollaries.

First of all, it follows that the will is the same as the first nature, because willing is a function only of the will ; wherefore, if the volition itself is uncausable, the same is true of the

DUNS SCOTUS

etiam incausabilis ; ergo, etc.

Et similiter velle intelligitur quasi posterius voluntate ; tamen velle est idem illi naturae ; ergo magis voluntas.

Item, secundo sequitur quod intelligere se est idem illi naturae, quia nihil amatur nisi cognitum ; sicut si amare se ex se est necesse esse, sequitur quod intelligere se est necesse esse ex se.

Et si est intelligere propinquior illi naturae quam velle, ideo sequitur ulterius quod intellectus sit idem illi naturae, sicut prius de voluntate ex velle argutum est.

Sequitur quarto etiam quod ratio intelligendi se sit idem sibi quia necesse esse est ex se, si intelligere sit ex se necesse esse, et ratio intelligendi se quasi praeintelligitur ipsi intellectui.

[Conclusio Tertia].

Ostenso de intelligere se et velle se quod sint idem essentiae primi, ostendo propositum ex aliis, scilicet de omni intelligere et velle ; et sit conclusio tertia ista : nullum intelligere potest esse accidens primae naturae.

Probatio, quia de illa natura prima ostensum est esse in se primum effectivum.

Ergo ex se habet unde posset quodcumque causabile causare circumscripto alio quocumque, saltem ut prima causa illius causabilis ; sed circumscripta cognitione ejus, non habet unde possit illud causabile causare ; ergo cognitio cujuscumque alterius non-est aliud a natura sua.

Probatio assumpti, quia nihil potest causare nisi ex amore finis volendo illud, quia non potest aliter esse per se agens, quia nec agere propter finem ; nunc autem ipsi

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

will to which it belongs ; consequently [the will is identified with the nature].

Furthermore, since the act of the will is conceived as though it were posterior to the will, if the former is identical with that nature, then the latter will be all the more so.

Secondly, it follows that this self-knowledge is identical with that nature, for nothing is loved unless it is known.

Hence it follows that just as this self-love exists necessarily in virtue of itself, so also this self-knowledge.

Then too, knowledge, as it were, is more closely connected with that nature than is volition.

Therefore, it follows in the third place that the intellect is the same thing as that nature.

We prove this in the same way as we previously established the identity of the will from the act of willing.

Fourthly, it follows that whatever is required for this nature to know itself is also identical with the nature,?8 for if the knowledge exists in virtue of itself, then the same is true of the reason for knowing, because the latter, as it were, must first be known to the intellect.

[Third Conclusion].

Having proved that this selfknowledge and self-love of the first being are the same as its essence, I go on to show the same to be true of other acts, namely of all its knowledge and all its acts of volition.

Let the third conclusion be that no knowledge can be an accident of the first nature.

Proof:

'The first nature has been shown to be first in the order of efficiency, and therefore has of itself and apart from anything else, the ability to produce whatever can be produced, at least in so far as it is the first cause of that which can be produced.

But without a knowledge of the latter, the first nature would be unable to produce what can be produced.

Hence, the knowledge of any of these other beings is not something distinct from its own nature.

Proof of the last assumption:

Nothing can cause an effect except by willing it for the sake of an end.

Otherwise it would not be a per se agent, since it would not

DUNS SCOTUS

velle alicujus propter finem praeintelligitur intelligere ipsum.

Ante igitur primum signum, in quo intelligitur causans sive volens A, necessario praeintelligitur intelligens A, ita sine hoc non potest per se efficere, et ita de aliis.

Item probatur idem: quia omnes intellectiones ejusdem intellectus habent similem habitudinem ad intellectum secundum identitatem essentialem vel accidentalem, sicut patet de omni intellectu creato et ejus intellectionibus, quia videntur perfectiones ejusdem generis.

Ergo si aliquae habent receptivum, et omnes; et si aliqua est accidens, et quaelibet, Sed aliqua non potest esse accidens in primo, ex praecedenti quaestione, quia non intellectio sui ipsius ; ergo nulla erit ibi accidens.

Item, intelligere si quod potest esse accidens recipietur in intellectu ut in subjecto; ergo et in illo intelligere quod est idem intellectui, et ita perfectius intelligere erit in potentia receptiva respectu imperfectioris [quod est absurdum].

Item, idem intelligere potest esse plurium objectorum ordinandorum ; ergo quanto perfectius tanto plurium ; ergo perfectissimum, quo incompossibile est perfectius intelligi, erit idem omnium intelligibilium.

Intelligere primi sic est perfectissimum ; ergo idem est omnium intelligibilium, et illud quod est sui est idem sibi, ex proxima praecedente; ergo intelligere omnium est idem.

Et eandem conclusionem volo intelligi de velle.

THE EXISTENCE

OF GOD

be acting for an end.

But before anything can be willed for the sake of an end, it must be known.

Hence, before we can even conceive of the First Being as willing or causing A, we must conceive it as knowing A, for without such knowledge the first cause would not be properly a cause.

And the same holds true of everything else it could produce.

Another proof of the same is that all the acts of knowledge of any given intellect are related in the same way to that intellect, so that either all are accidents or all are of the essence of that intellect.

This is clear in regard to all created intellects and their respective acts of knowledge, all of which seem to be of the same kind of perfection.

Therefore, if some of the acts are received by the intellect, all the acts are, and if one of them is an accident, the remainder are likewise.

But from the preceding conclusion, the self-knowledge of the first being cannot be an accident ; therefore none of its knowledge will be accidental to it.

Furthermore, if some act of knowledge can be an accident, it will be received by the intellect as by its subject.

In such a case, however, the act of knowledge which is identical with the intellect and is the more perfect of the two acts of knowledge, would itself be the recipient of the less perfect, which is absurd.?®

Furthermore, the same act of knowledge can embrace several interrelated objects, and the more perfect this act is, the greater can be the number of objects.

Consequently, an act that is so completely perfect that it would be impossible to have anything more perfect, will embrace all that can be known.

Now the understanding of the First Being is of such perfection ; therefore there is but one act for all that can be known.

Now, from the preceding conclusion, self-knowledge is identical with its very being ; consequently, all knowledge is identical with its being.

This same conclusion I wish to be understood of the act of volition.

DUNS SCOTUS

Item, iste intellectus non est nisi quoddam intelligere ; sed iste intellectus est idem omnium et ita quod non potest esse alicujus alterius objecti ; ergo nec intelligere aliud ; ergo idem intelligere est omnium.

Fallacia est accidentis ex identitate aliquorum inter se concludere identitatem respectu tertii, respectu cujus extraneantur, et patet in simili: intelligere est idem quod velle ; si ergo intelligere ipsum est alicujus, ergo et velle est ejusdem ; non sequitur, sed tantummodo sequitur quia est velle, quod quidem velle est aliquid ejusdem, quia intelligere est ejusdem ; ita quod divisim inferri potest, non conjunctim propter accidens.

Item, intellectus primi habet actum unum adaequatum sibi et coaeternum, quia intelligere se est idem sibi.

Ergo non potest aliquem habere alium.

Consequentia non valet.

Exemplum de beato, qui simul videt Deum et aliud etiamsi videat Deum secundum ultimum capacitatis suae, ut de anima Christi ponitur, et adhuc potest videre aliud.

Item arguitur : intellectus iste habet in se per identitatem perfectionem maximam intelligendi; ergo et omnem aliam.

Respondeo: non sequitur, quia alia quae minor est, potest esse causabilis, et ideo differre ab incausabili ; maxima autem non potest.

[Conclusio Quarta].

Quarta conclusio principalis de intellectu et voluntate Dei est ista: intellectus primi intelligit semper et distincto et actu et necessario quod-

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

It is also said that this intellect is nothing more than a certain kind of knowing ; but this intellect is the same for all things so that it cannot differ for different objects.

Therefore, neither is the act of understanding different.

Hence, one act of understanding suffices for all objects.

However, to argue in all cases from the identity of two things among themselves to their identity with relation to a third object distinct from both, as this argument does, is to commit the fallacy of accident.

For instance, just because an act of understanding is identified with the act of willing, it does not follow that whatever is known by the act of knowledge is also loved by the will.

All that follows is that an act of volition exists and that this act of will is something wliich is related to object known [not indeed by a relation of love] but in so far as it is also an act of knowledge.

The inference can be made only in disjunction, not in conjunction, for only an incidental relation exists between the two.

Another argument advanced is that inasmuch as the First Being's act of self-knowledge is identical with itself, its intellect has one coeternal and completely adequate act, and therefore can have no other.

The inference is invalid.

Take the example of one who is beatified.

He has an intellectual vision of God and of other things as well.

Even though he sees God to the utmost of his ability, as we assume to be the case with the soul of Christ, he can still see something else.

Still another argument employed is this.

Since this intellect is identified with the most perfect knowledge possible [viz. knowledge of the supreme nature itself], it also possesses all other knowledge. I reply that this does not follow, for this other lesser knowledge could be caused, and therefore it could be different from the most perfect self-knowledge, which is uncaus-2d.

[Fourth Conclusion].

The fourth principal conclusion which concerns the intellect and will of God is this : the intellect of the First Being knows everyt'\ing else that can be

DUNS SCOTUS

cumque intelligibile, prius naturaliter quam illud sit in se.

Prima pars probatur, quia potest cognoscere quodcumque intelligibile, sic: hoc enim est perfectionis in intellectu, posse distincte et actu cognoscere quodcumque intelligibile.

Imo hoc ponere est necessarium ad rationem intellectus, quia omnis intellectus est totius entis sumpti communissime, ut determinabitur distinctione tertia.* Nullam autem intellectionem potest habere intellectus primi nisi eamdem sibi, ex proxima ; igitur cujuslibet intelligibilis habet intelligere actuale et distinctum, et hoc idem sibi, et ita semper et necessario.

Secunda pars, de prioritate, probatur sic: quia quidquid est idem sibi, a se est necesse esse, sicut patuit prius.

Sed esse aliorum non a se est non necesse esse ; ergo necesse esse ex se est prius natura omnium non necessario.

Aliter probatur, quia esse cujuslibet alterius dependet ab ipso ut a causa, et ut causa est alicujus causabilis, necessario includitur cognitio ejus ex parte causae ; ergo illa cognitio erit prior naturaliter ipso esse cogniti.

Secunda pars etiam conclusionis probatur aliter, quia artifex perfectus distincte cognoscit omne agendum antequam fiat ; alias non perfecte operaretur, quia cognitio est mensura juxta quam operatur ; ergo

Deus est omnium producibilium a se habens notitiam distinctam et actualem, vel saltem habitualem, priorem eis.

Contra istam instatur de arte, quia ars universalis sufficit ad universalia; ergo, etc.

Responsionem quaere.

* Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. 111, q. ili.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

known with a knowledge that is eternal, is distinct, is actual, is necessary and is prior by nature to the existence of these things in themselves.

Proof of the first part.

To be able to know actually and distinctly each and every other thing that can be known is something that pertains to the perfection of knowledge.

Indeed, the very notion of an intellect makes it necessary to assume the possibility of such knowledge, for every intellect (as will be determined in distinction three) has to do with all being in general.

But the intellect of the First Being can have no knowledge that is not one with itself (from the preceding conclusion).

Therefore, it knows everything intelligible actually and distinctly.

Since this knowledge is identified with the First Being, it is eternal and necessary.

The second part about the priority of this knowledge is proved as follows.

As we have made clear above, whatever is identical with this Being, exists necessarily.

But the existence of other things which are not self-existent is not necessary.

Necessary being, however, is prior by nature to everything that does not necessarily exist.—

Another proof is this.

Every being other than the first depends upon the latter as upon a cause.

Now to bea cause of something, it must necessarily possess a knowledge of what it can cause.

Consequently, this knowledge will be naturally prior to the existence of the thing known.

—Still another proof for the second part of this conclusion is the following.

The perfect artisan has a distinct knowledge of everything to be done before he does it. Otherwise he would not act perfectly, for knowledge is the norm which regulates his work.

God, therefore, has some previous distinct knowledge, either actual or at least habitual, of everything that he can make.—Against this last argument, the objection is raised that the possession of some universal art suffices for the production of both the universal and the singular.

For the solution to this objection, see what I have said elsewhere.*° (2,322)

DUNS SCOTUS

[Pars Secunda.

De Infinitate Primi Entis].

His ostensis praeambulis, arguo infinitatem quatuor viis : primo per viam efficientiae ubi ostendetur propositum dupliciter : primo quia ipsum est primum efficiens omnium ; secundo, quia efficiens, puta distincte cognoscens omnia factibilia : tertio ostendetur infinitas per viam finis: et quarto per viam eminentiae.

[Via Prima].

Primam viam ex parte causae tangit Philosophus, octavo Physicorum* et duodecimo Metaphysicae,t quia movet motu infinito; ergo habet potentiam infinitam.

Haec ratio roboratur quantum ad antecedens sic: aeque concluditur propositum si possit movere per infinitum, sicut si moveret per infinitum, quia aeque oportet eum esse in actu ; sicut illud posse patet de primo quantum est ex se ; licet igitur non moveat motu infinito sicut intelligit Aristoteles, tamen si accipiatur antecedens istud quod quantum est ex parte sua potest movere, habetur antecedens verum et aeque sufficiens ad inferendum propositum.

Consequentia probatur sic : quia si ex se non virtute alterius movet motu infinito, ergo non ab alio accipit sic movere, sed in virtute sua activa habet totum effectum suum simul, quia independenter ; sed quod simul habet in virtute infinitum effectum est infinitum ; ergo, etc.

Aliter roboratur prima consequentia sic: primum movens simul habet in virtute sua omnes effectus * vill, cap. x (266%, 10-24).

{ XI, cap. vii (10732, 3-13).

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

[Part II.

The Infinity of the First Being].

Now that these preliminary conclusions have been established, I argue in four ways for the infinity [of the First Being].

The notion of efficiency really provides two of the arguments, the first of which is drawn from the fact that this

Being is the first efficient cause of all other things ; the second, that as efficient cause, this Being has a distinct knowledge of all that can be made.

The third way is that of finality ; the fourth, that of eminence.

{a. First Proof].

The Philosopher treats of the first way from efficient causality in Physics, Bk. vm,* and his

Metaphysics, BK. xu,t where he argues that the First Being has infinite power, because it moves with an endless movement.

The antecedent can be reinforced inasmuch as the desired conclusion follows equally well from the fact that the First Being can cause such motion as it would if it actually did so ; for in either case, the actual existence of such a being would be necessarily required.

Now it is clear that, so far as the First Being exists in virtue of itself, it has this ability to produce endless movement.

Therefore, even though such a being may not actually cause an endless movement as Aristotle thought, still the proposed conclusion can be inferred with equal validity if the antecedent be understood of the ability of the first cause to produce such movement.

The proof of the consequence is this.

If the First Being, by itself and not in virtue of another, moves with an infinite movement, then it has not received such power of movement from another.

Hence it has in its power at one and the same time the totality of its effect, because it has this power independently.

But, whatever has an infinite effect in its power at one and the same moment is infinite ; therefore, etc.

Another way to reinforce the first consequence is this.

At one and the same moment, the First Mover has in its power all the possible effects to be produced by motion,

DUNS SCOTUS

possibiles produci per motum ; sed illi sunt infiniti, si motus infinitus ; ergo, etc.

Contra istas declarationes Aristotelis: quidquid sit de antecedente, tamen consequentia prima non videtur bene probari.

Non primo modo, quia duratio major nihil perfectionis addit ; nam albedo quae uno anno manet non est perfectior quam si tantum uno die maneret ; ergo motus quantaecumque durationis non est perfectior effectus quam motus unius diei.

Ergo ex hoc, quod agens habet in virtute sua activa simul movere motu infinito, non concluditur major perfectio hic quam ibi, nisi quod agens diutius movet et ex se; et ita esset ostendendum quod aeternitas agentis concluderet ejus infinitatem ; alias ex infinitate motus non posset concludi.

Tunc ad formam, ultima propositio illius roborationis negatur, nisi de infinitate durationis.

Secunda roboratio etiam consequentiae improbatur quia non major pertectio intensiva concluditur ex hoc quod agens quodcumque ejusdem speciei potest producere successive quotcumque quamdiu manet, quia quod potest in tempore uno in unum tale, potest eadem virtute in mille talia, si mille temporibus maneat.

Et non est possibilis apud philosophos infinitas nisi numeralis effectuum producibilium, per motum scilicet generabilium et corruptibilium, quia in speciebus finitatem ponebant ; ergo non magis sequitur infinitas intensiva in agente ex hoc quod potest in infinita numero successive, quam si posset

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

If the motion is without end, however, these effects are infinite ; therefore, etc.

Against these statements of Aristotle : Whatever is to be said of the antecedent, the first consequence still does not seem to be validly established.

Certainly not in the first way for a perfection does not increase simply because it endures for a greater length of time.

Whiteness which exists for a year does not become any more perfect than if it existed just for a day.

Therefore, movement which continues for howsoever long a time, is not a more perfect effect than the movement which lasts for a day.

Consequently, just because at one and the same moment an agent virtually possesses infinite movement, we cannot conclude to any greater perfection in this case than in any other—except that here the agent moves by itself and for a longer time.

And so we would have to prove that the eternity of the agent implied its infinity ; otherwise, the latter could not be inferred merely from the endlessness of the movement.

As to the form of the argument, the last proposition of the reinforced argument [viz. that whatever has an endless effect virtually is infinite] may be denied if used to prove anything more than an infinity of duration.

Also the second reinforcement of the consequence breaks down, inasmuch as we cannot conclude to greater intensive perfection merely from this that an agent, if it remains in existence long enough, can produce successively any number whatsoever of the same species.

For what an agent can do in one moment to one thing, by the very same power it can do to a thousand in a thousand such moments, if it exists for such a length of time. However, according to the philosophers, who assumed only a finite number of species, the only infinity possible is the numerical infinity of effects that come into existence and go out of existence through motion.

Hence, there is no more reason for concluding that the agent is intensively infinite 31 just because it can do an infinite number of

DUNS SCOTUS

in duo tantum, tantum enim est possibilis infinitas numeralis secundum philosophos.

Si quis autem probet infinitatem specierum possibilem, probando aliquos motus coelestes esse incommensurabiles, et ita numquam posse redire ad uniformitatem, etiam si per infinitum durarent, et infinitae conjunctiones specie causarent infinita generabilia specie, de hoc, quidquid sit in se, nihil tamen ad intentionem Philosophi, qui infinitatem specierum negaret.

Ultima probabilitas quae occurrit pro consequentia Philosophi declaranda est ista : quidquid potest in aliqua multa simul quorum quodlibet requirit aliquam perfectionem sibi propriam, illud concluditur esse perfectius ex pluralitate talium, ita videtur de primo agente esse concedendum, quod si posset causare simul infinita, quod esset ejus virtus infinita, et per consequens si primum agens simul habet virtutem causandi infinita, quantum est ex se simul posset ea producere, licet natura effectus non permittat, adhuc sequitur infinitas virtutis ejus.

Haec consequentia ultima probatur : quia potens causare albedinem et nigredinem, non est minus perfectum quia non sunt simul causabilia.

Haec enim non simultas est ex repugnantia eorum et non est ex defectu agentis.

Et ex isto probo infinitatem sic: si primum haberet omnem causalitatem formaliter simul, licet non possent causabilia simul poni in esse, esset infinitum, quia simul, quantum est ex se, posset infinita producere, et posse

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

things successively (for only a numerical infinity is possible according to the philosophers) than there would be if it could do but two.

But suppose someone should prove that an infinity of species is possible by proving that some heavenly movements are incommensurable and so the same arrangement would never recur even though the movement should continue ad infinitum.

The infinite variety of [planetary] conjunctions, then, would cause an infinite variety in the effects that can be produced.

Whatever is to be said of this view, however, it is definitely not the position of Aristotle, who denies the infinity of the species.??

The final probable interpretation advanced to reinforce the Philosopher's reasoning may be put in this way.

If an agent can do many things at once, where each of the things in question needs some perfection proper to itself, then the greater the number of such things, the greater the perfection of the agent.

And so it seems that we must concede that if the power of the First Agent could produce an infinity of effects at one and the same time, it must be infinite.

This conclusion would follow even where the nature of the effect was such as to make its simultaneous existence in an infinite number impossible, provided that, so far as the causal power of the agent was concerned, it could produce simultaneously an infinite multitude.—This last inference is proved as follows.

An agent that can cause both whiteness and blackness is not less perfect because it cannot cause the two simultaneously, for this inability to exist simultaneously arises from the repugnance of the effects to each other, and not from any defect in the agent.

From this I prove infinity in this way:

If the First Being at one and the same time formally possessed all causal power, even though the things which it could cause could not be given simultaneous existence, it would be infinite, because—as far as it is concerned— it has power enough to produce an infinite number all

DUNS SCOTUS

plura simul concludit majorem potentiam intensive ; ergo si habet perfectius quam si haberet omnem causalitatem formaliter, magis sequitur infinitas intensiva.

Sed habet omnem causalitatem cujuslibet rei secundum totum quod est in re ipsa eminentius quam si esset formaliter.

Licet ergo omnipotentiam proprie dictam secundum intentionem theologorum tantum creditam esse et non naturali ratione credam posse probari, sicut dicetur distinctione xin et Quodl. q. vu,* tamen probatur naturaliter infinita potentia, quae simul, quantum est ex se, habet omnem causalitatem, quae simul posset in infinita, si essent simul factibilia.

Si objicis, primum non potest ex se simul in infinita, quia non est probatum quod sit totalis causa infinitorum, hoc nihil obstat, quia si haberet simul unde esset totalis causa, nihil perfectius esset quam nunc sit, quando habet unde sit prima causa: tum quia illae secundae causae non requiruntur propter perfectionem in causando, quia tunc remotius a prima esset perfectius, quia perfectiorem requireret causam, sed si requiruntur causae secundae cum prima, secundum philosophos, hoc est propter imperfectionem effectus, ut primum cum alia causa imperfecta posset causare imperfectum, quod secundum ipsos, non posset immediate causare: tum quia perfectiones totae secundum Aristotelem eminentius sunt in primo quam si ipsae formalitates earum sibi inessent, si possent inesse.

Quod probatur, quia causa secunda proxima * Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. xLI, q. unica; Quodlibet, q. vii.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

at once, and the more one can produce simultaneously, the greater the power in intensity.

But if the First Being possessed such power in an even more perfect way than if it had it formally [as Avicenna, for instance, assumes], its intensive infinity follows a fortiorz.

But the full causal power that each thing may have in itself, the First Being possesses even more perfectly than if it were formally present.

Therefore, although I believe that the omnipotence in the proper sense of the word as the theologians understand it,33 cannot be proven by natural reason, but is only believed (as will be shown in dist. x_m and Quodlibet q. vii),* nevertheless we can establish naturally the existence of an infinite power which on its part possesses simultaneously the fulness of causality and could produce an infinite number of things at once, if only they were capable of existing simultaneously.

It is objected that the First Cause on its part cannot cause an infinite number of effects at one time, so long as it is not proved that it is the total cause of these effects.

This objection, however, presents no obstacle, since the requirements to be a total cause would not make it any more perfect than it would have to be if it were the First

Cause.

This is clear, first of all, because secondary causes are not required simply to supply some additional perfection to the causality, for if that were the case, the more remote effect would be the more perfect inasmuch as it would require a more perfect cause.

But if secondary causes are needed in addition to the First Cause, the reason, according to the philosophers,*4 lies in the fact that the effect is imperfect.

That is to say, the First Cause, which immediately would be unable to cause anything imperfect, could do so in conjunction with another imperfect cause.

Also, the First Being, according to Aristotle, contains all the perfections in a more perfect manner than if they were formally present, were this latter possible. The proof of this lies in the fact that

DUNS SCOTUS

primae totam perfectionem suam causativam habet a sola prima ; ergo totam perfectionem illam eminentius habet causa prima quam secunda causa habens ipsam formaliter.

Consequentia patet, quia prima respectu illius causae secundae est causa totalis et aequivoca.

Consimiliter quaeratur de tertia causa respectu secundae vel respectu primae.

Si respectu primae, habetur propositum.

Si respectu secundae, sequitur secundam eminenter continere perfectionem totalem quae est formaliter in tertia.

Sed secunda habet a prima quod sic continet perfectionem tertiae, ex praeostensa ; ergo prima eminentius habet continere perfectionem tertiae quam secunda ; et sic de omnibus aliis usque ad ultimam; quare [concluditur] primam causam_habere eminenter totalem perfectionem causativam omnium et perfectius quam si haberet causalitatem omnium formaliter, si esset possibile.

Videtur judicio meo posse concludere ratio Aristotelis de substantia infinita, quae accipitur ex octavo Physicorum* et duodecimo Metaphysicae + superius posita.

Juxta istam viam efficientiae arguitur quod habeat potentiam infinitam, nam virtus quae potest super extrema distantia in infinitum, est infinita.

Sed virtus divina est hujusmodi in creatione.

Inter enim extrema creationis est infinita distantia, sicut inter aliquid et nihil.

Sed hoc antecedens ponitur tantum creditum, et verum est de creatione in ordine reali, ita scilicet quod non-esse quasi durative praecederet esse reale existentiae creaturae.

Non tamen est minor credita de creatione qua ordine naturae esse sequitur non-esse, quo modo loquitur Avicenna de creatione quinto [read sexto] Metaphysicae t ; sed est sufficienter demonstrata quia saltem prima natura

* vill, cap. x (266%, 10-24).

{ XU, cap. vii (10732, 3-13). t Metaphysica, vi, cap. il. hang a

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

the secondary cause closest to the first receives all of its causal perfection exclusively from the first. Consequently, the First Cause has the whole of this perfection in a more eminent way than the second cause, which possesses it formally.

The consequence is evident, since the first is the total equivocal cause of the second.

We can argue the same way regarding the relation of the third cause to the second or first cause.

If we take it in relation to the first, we have the proposed conclusion.

If we take it in relation to the second, then it follows that the second cause contains the total perfection found formally in the third.

But as we have shown, the second cause owes this all to the First Cause ; therefore, the First Cause must contain the perfection of the third in an even more perfect way than does the second.

And the same is true with all the other causes down to the very last.

Therefore, we conclude that the First Cause contains eminently the total causal perfection of all the other causes, and this in a way that is even more perfect than if it contained this causality formally, were that possible.

To my mind, it seems that Aristotle's argument for an infinite substance in Physics, BK. viul,* and Metaphysics, BK. xu, f can be made to hold.

Using this way of efficiency, some % argue that the First Cause has infinite power, because any power which can bridge the distance between infinite extremes is itself infinite.

The divine power in creation, however, is of such a nature, for between the extremes of creation

(i.e. between nothing and something) an infinite distance intervenes.

If existence be understood as true of the real order where non-existence precedes existence by a priority of duration, then the antecedent is an assumption based on faith alone ; whereas if we take creation as Avicenna doesin Metaphysics, BK. v1,¢ in thesense that nonexistence precedes existence merely by a priority of nature, then the antecedent is no longer an assumption of faith.36

For it is sufficiently demonstrated that the first

DUNS SCOTUS

post Deum est ab ipso et non a se, nec accipit esse aliquo praesupposito.

Ergo illud creatur.

Nam si est primum effectivum, quodlibet aliud ab eo totum esse suum capit ab eo, quia aliter secundum aliquid ejus non dependet ab eo, nec illud esset tunc primum effectivum.

Sed quod sic capit totum esse suum ab aliquo, ita quod per naturam suam habet esse post non-esse, creatur ; ergo, etc.

Sed sic accipiendo prius natura tam esse quam non-esse, non sunt extrema mutationis [MS univocationis] quam causet ista virtus, nec illud effici requirit mutari.

Sed quidquid sit de antecedente, consequentia non probatur ; quia quando inter extrema nulla est distantia media, sicut est in continuo cujus extrema sunt duo puncta, ista dicuntur praecise distare ratione extremorum inter se; tanta ergo est distantia quantum est majus extremum.

Exemplum:

Deus distat in infinitum a creatura etiam suprema possibili, non quidem propter aliquam distantiam mediam inter extrema, sed propter infinitatem unius extremi; sic ergo contradictoria non distant per aliqua media, quia contradictoria sunt immediata, ita quod quantumcumque parum recedit aliquid ab uno extremo, statim est sub altero; sed distant [MS differunt] propter extrema in se.

Tanta ergo est distantia ista quantum est illud extremum quod est perfectius: illud est finitum; ergo, etc.

Confirmatur, quia posse totaliter super terminum positivum hujus distantiae est posse super distantiam sive super transitum ab extremo in extremum ; ergo ex posse super istum transitum non sequitur infinitas, nisi sequatur ex

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

nature after God does not exist of itself but is dependent upon Him ; neither is anything [viz. matter] presupposed in order to give it existence.

Consequently, it is created.

For if a first efficient cause exists, everything else receives its total being from it.

Otherwise, these other beings would not be dependent upon it, nor could it really be the first efficient cause.

But anything that receives its total being from another so that by its nature it has existence after non-existence, is created ; therefore, etc.

If we understand nature as being prior to both existence and non-existence in this [viz. ontological] sense, then existence and non-existence are not termini of a change ; neither does '"'to be produced in this way" necessarily imply '"'to be changed"'.

Whatever is to be said of the antecedent of this argument, the consequence remains unproved.

When there is no interval between the extremes as is the case in a continuum, whose extremes are two points, it is how one extreme compares with the other that determines how

"distant" it is said to be.

Consequently, it will be as distant from, as it is greater than, the other.

God, for example, is infinitely distant from even the greatest creature possible, not indeed because of any interval between the two, but because of the infinity of the one extreme.

And so I argue that contradictories are distant from one another in virtue of the extremes themselves, and not by reason of some interval between them, for contradictories are immediate.

No matter how little something departs from one extreme, it immediately comes under the other.

In the present instance, then, there will be as much "'distance"' as there is [entity] in the more perfect extreme.

But the latter is finite ; therefore, etc.

This is confirmed, inasmuch as to possess complete power over the positive term of this "distance" is to have power over the distance or the passage from one extreme to the other.

Infinity, therefore, cannot be inferred from the power of the agent to effect this transi-

DUNS SCOTUS

posse totaliter super terminum ejus positivum. Terminus ille est finitus ; ergo posse super transitum ad istum terminum non concludit virtutem activam infinitam demonstrative.

Quod autem dicitur communiter, contradictoria distare in infinitum, potest sic intelligi, id est, indeterminate ; quia sicut nulla est ita parva distantia quae non sufficiat ad contradictoria, sic nulla est ita magna, etiam si esset major maxima possibili, quin ad illa contradictoria se extendere.

Est igitur eorum distantia infinita, id est, indeterminata ad quamcumque scilicet magnam vel parvam.

Et ideo ex tali infinitate distantiae, id est, indeterminata, non sequitur consequens de infinita potentia intensive, sicut nec sequitur ad minimam distantiam, in qua salvatur sic infinita distantia, id est, indeterminata ; et quod non sequitur ad antecedens, nec ad consequens.

Contradictoria ergo maxima distantia est et oppositio, sed privative et indeterminate ; contrarietas vero est maxima positive, sicut patet decimo Metaphysicae.*

[Via Secunda].

Ostenso proposito per viam primae efficientiae, quia illa prima efficientia infert infinitatem, sequitur secunda via ex hoc quod est intelligens distincte omnia factibilia, ubi arguo sic:

Intelligibilia sunt infinita, et hoc actu in intellectu omnia intelligente.

Ergo intellectus ista simul actu intelligens est infinitus.

Talis est intellectus primi.

Hujus enthymematis probo antecedens et consequentiam.

Quaecunque sunt infinita in potentia, ita quod in accipiendo alterum post alterum nullum possunt habere finem, illa omnia, si simul actu sunt, sunt actu infinita.

Intelligibilia sunt hujusmodi respectu intel- * x) cap. ivi(1055%, 9);

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

tion, unless it is already implied by its power to produce the positive extreme.

But the latter, in the present case, is finite ; consequently, it is not demonstratively established that infinite power is required to effect such a transition.

Still, the common saying that "'contradictories are infinitely distant' can be understood in the sense of ""indeterminately".

For just as no "'distance'' is too small to produce a contradiction, so likewise, none is too great, even if it were greater than the greatest possible.

Therefore this "'distance"' is infinite in the sense that it is not determined to any definite interval, howsoever great or small.

Such an infinity or indeterminateness, then, does not imply the consequent about a power that is intensively infinite, just as the minimum distance characterised by such an infinity does not imply it. For what does not follow from the antecedent, does not follow from the consequent.

Contradictories, therefore, are at the greatest ''distance"' and in the greatest opposition to each other, but privatively and indeterminately.

Positively, however, the greatest "'distance"' is between contraries, as is clear from Metaphysics, BK. x.* [b. Second Proof].

Having established the proposed conclusion by the first way of efficiency inasmuch as the first efficient cause implies infinity, we proceed to the second, where, from the fact that the First Being knows distinctly everything that can be made, we argue as follows:

The things that can be known are infinite in number.

But they are all actually known by an intellect which knows all things.

Therefore, that intellect is infinite which, at one and the same moment, has actual knowledge of all these things. Now such is the intellect of the First Being.

I prove the antecedent and consequence of this enthymeme.

Things potentially infinite or endless in number, if taken one at a time, are actually infinite if they actually exist simultaneously.

Now what can be known is of such

DUNS SCOTUS

lectus creati.

Satis patet.

Et in intellectu divino sunt simul omnia actu intellecta quae ab intellectu creato successive sunt intellecta.

Ergo ibi sunt infinita actu intellecta.

Hujus syllogismi probo majorem, licet satis evidens videatur, quia omnia talia acceptibilia quando sunt simul existentia, aut sunt actu finita aut sunt actu infinita.

Si actu finita, ergo accipiendo alterum post alterum, tandem omnia possunt esse actu accepta.

Ergo si non possunt esse omnia actu accepta, si talia actu simul sunt, sunt actu infinita.

Consequentiam primi enthymematis sic probo: quia ubi pluralitas requirit vel concludit majorem perfectionem quam paucitas, ibi infinitas numeralis concludit infinitam perfectionem.

Exemplum : posse ferre decem majorem perfectionem requirit virtutis motivae quam posse ferre quinque : ideo posse ferre infinita concludit infinitam virtutem motivam.

Ergo in proposito, cum intelligere A sit aliqua perfectio, et intelligere B sit similiter alia perfectio, numquam intelligere idem est ipsius A et B et aeque distincte, ut duo intelligere essent, nisi perfectiones [M48 perfectiores] duorum. intelligere includuntur in illo uno eminenter, et sic de tribus, et ultra de infinitis.

Consimiliter etiam quia de ipsa ratione intelligendi argueretur sicut de intellectu et actu argutum est : quia major perfectio concluditur in actu intelligendi ex pluralitate illorum quorum ratio intelligendi distincte, quia oportet quod includant eminenter perfectiones omnium propriarum operationum intelligendi, quarum quaelibet secundum propriam rationem aliquam perfectionem ponit ; ergo infinitae concludunt infinitam.

Secundo, juxta istam viam de intelligere primi propositum sic ostendo; causa prima, cui secundum

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

a nature so far as a created intellect is concerned, as is sufficiently clear.

Now all that the created intellect knows successively, the divine intellect knows actually at one and the same time.

Therefore, the divine intellect knows the actually infinite.

I prove the major of this syllogism, although it seems evident enough.

Consider these potentially infinite things as a whole.

If they exist all at once, they are either actually infinite or actually finite.

If finite, then if we take one after the other, eventually we shall actually know them all.

But if we cannot actually know them all in this way, they will be actually infinite if known simultaneously.

The consequence of this first enthymeme, I prove as follows.

Whenever a greater number implies or requires greater perfection than does a smaller number, numerical infinity implies infinite perfection.

For example, greater motive power is required to carry ten things than to carry five.

Therefore, an infinite motive power is needed to carry an infinity of such things.

Now in the point at issue, since to know A is one perfection and to know B also is another perfection, it follows that A and B as two equally distinct objects will never be known by one and the same act of knowledge unless the latter includes in a more eminent way these two perfections. The same holds for three objects, and so ad infinitum.

A similar argument to that based on the intellect and the act of knowing could be constructed in regard to the reason for knowing (ratio intelligendt).87_

For the greater the number of things known distinctly through this medium of knowledge, the more perfect is the act of knowing since the act by which all things are known must include in a more eminent way the perfections of each proper act of knowledge, where each of these includes some perfection proper to itself.

Where the latter are infinite, therefore, infinite perfection is required.

A second proof from the knowledge of the First Being in support of our thesis is this.

Suppose a secondary (2,322)

DUNS SCOTUS

ultimum suae causalitatis causa secunda aliquid perfectionis addit in causando, non videtur sola posse ita perfectum effectum causare, sicut ipsa cum secunda, quia causalitas sola primae diminuta est respectu causalitatis ambarum ; ergo si illud quod natum est esse a causa secunda et prima simul sit multo perfectius a sola prima, secunda nihil perfectionis addit primae; sed omne finitum omni finito addit aliquam perfectionem ; ergo talis causa prima est infinita.

Ad propositum, notitia cujuscumque nata est gigni ab ipso sicut a causa proxima, et maxime illa quae est visio sive intuitiva intellectio ; ergo si illa alicui intellectui inest sine actione quacumque talis objecti, tantummodo ex virtute alterius objecti prioris, quod natum est esse causa superior respectu talis cognitionis, sequitur quod illud objectum superius est infinitum in cognoscibilitate, quia inferius nihil sibi addit in cognoscibilitate : tale objectum superius est natura prima, quia ex sola praesentia ejus apud intellectum primi, nullo alio objecto concomitante, est notitia cujuscumque objecti in intellectu ejus; ergo nullum aliud intelligibile aliquid sibi addit in cognoscibilitate ; ergo est infinitum in cognoscibilitate sic, ergo est in entitate, quia unumquodque sicut se habet ad esse, sic ad cognoscibilitatem, ex secundo Metaphysicae.*

[Via Tertia].

Item, tertia via, scilicet ex parte finis arguitur sic : voluntas nostra omni finito aliquid aliud majus potest appetere et amare, sicut intellectus intelligere ; et videtur quod plus est inclinatio naturalis ad summe amandum bonum infinitum ; nam inde arguitur inclinatio naturalis ad aliquid in voluntate, quia ex se,

* m1, cap. i (993°, 30-31).

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

cause can add some perfection to the causality of the First Cause, even when the latter acts to the utmost of its power.

In such a case, if the First Cause were to act alone, its effectiveness would seem to be less perfect than that of the two causes together.

Therefore, if something which a secondary cause can produce together with the First Cause, can be done much more perfectly by the First Cause alone, the secondary cause adds no perfection to the first.

But a finite thing always adds some perfection to what is finite.

Hence, a first cause whose causality cannot be perfected is infinite.

To apply this to the question at issue.

Knowledge of any object is by its very nature apt to be engendered by that object as its proximate cause, and this is especially true of intuitive knowledge or vision.

Therefore, if some intellect possesses such knowledge without any action on the part of the object known, but solely in virtue of some prior object which by nature is a higher cause of such knowledge, it follows that the higher object is infinitely intelligible, because the lower object adds nothing to it in the way of cognoscibility.

Now, the supreme nature is such a superior object, since in the absence of all other objects by the mere fact that it is present to the intellect of the First Being, it gives to that intellect a knowledge of every object without exception.

Therefore, nothing else that can be known adds anything to this nature in the way of cognoscibility.

Consequently, it is infinitely intelligible ; therefore, its entity is also infinite, for a thing can only be known to the extent that it has entity, according to Metaphysics, BK. 11.* [c. Third Proof].

The fact that the First Being is also the ultimate end provides a third way of arguing to infinity.

Our will can always love and seek something greater than any finite being, even as our intellect is always able to know more.

And, what is more, there seems to be a natural inclination to love an infinite good to the greatest degree possible, because the free will of

DUNS SCOTUS

sine habitu, prompte et delectabiliter vult illud voluntas libera : ita videtur quod experimur actu amandi bonum infinitum : imo non videtur voluntas in alio perfecte quietari.

Et quomodo non illud naturaliter odiret, si esset objectum sui objecti, sicut naturaliter odit non esse, secundum Augustinum, De libero arbitrio, libri [tertii] capitulo [octavo] * Videtur etiam si infinitum repugnaret bono, quod nullo modo quietaretur in bono sub ratione infiniti, nec in illud faciliter tenderet, sicut nec in repugnans suo objecto.

Confirmabitur illa ratio in sequenti via de intellectu.

[Via Quarta].

Item quarto propositum ostenditur per viam eminentiae et arguo sic : eminentissimo incompossibile est aliquid esse perfectius, sicut prius patet.

Finito autem non est incompossibile esse aliquid perfectius ; quare, etc.

Minor probatur quia infinitum non repugnat enti; sed omni finito magis est infinitum.

Ad istud aliter arguitur, et est idem : cui non repugnat infinitum esse intensive, illud non est summe perfectum nisi sit infinitum, quia si est finitum potest-excedi vel excelli, quia infinitum esse sibi non repugnat : enti non repugnat infinitas ; ergo perfectissimum ens est infinitum.

Minor hujus quae in praecedenti argumento accipitur, non videtur a priori ostendi; quia sicut contradictoria ex rationibus propriis contradicunt, nec potest per aliquid manifestius hoc probari, ita non repugnantia ex rationibus propriis non repugnant, nec videtur posse ostendi, nisi explicando rationes ipsorum :

* im, cap. vi, viii (Migne, P.L., xxxu, 1280, 1282).

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

gis itself and without the aid of any habit promptly and delightfully loves this good, so that we seem to experience an act of love for an infinite good. Indeed it seems that the will is not perfectly satisfied with anything else.

And if such an infinite good were really opposed to the natural object of the will, why is it that the will does not naturally hate an infinite good, just as it naturally hates non-existence, according to Augustine in De libero arbitrio, m1, viii? * For it seems that if "infinite"? and ""good"' were incompatible, then there would be no way in which the will could be satisfied in such a good, nor could it readily tend towards such a good just as it cannot readily tend towards anything which is opposed to its proper object.

This argument will be confirmed in the following by a similar argument from the intellect.

{d. Fourth Proof].

The thesis is shown also by the way of eminence, and here I argue that it is incompatible with the idea of a most perfect being that anything should excel it in perfection, as has been previously explained.

Now there is nothing incompatible about a finite thing being excelled in perfection ; therefore, etc.

The minor is proved from this, that to be infinite is not incompatible with being ; but the infinite is greater than any finite being.

Another formulation given to the same argument is this.

That to which intensive infinity is not repugnant is not all perfect unless it be infinite, for to be infinite is compatible with it. And if it is finite, it can be exceeded or excelled.

Now infinity is not repugnant to being, therefore the most perfect being is infinite.

The minor of this proof, which was used in the preceding argument, cannot, it seems, be proven a priort.

For, just as contradictories by their very nature contradict each other and their opposition cannot be made manifest by anything more evident, so also these terms [viz. "'being" and ''infinite''] by their very nature are not repugnant to each other.

Neither does there seem to be any way of

DUNS SCOTUS

ens per nullius notius explicatur ; infinitum intelligimus per finitum, hoc vulgariter sic expono: infinitum est quod aliquod finitum datum secundum nullam habitudinem finitam praecise excedit, sed ultra omnem talem habitudinem assignabilem adhuc excedit.

Sic tamen propositum suadetur : sicut quidlibet ponendum est possibile, cujus non apparet impossibilitas, ita et compossibile cujus non apparet incompossibilitas. Hic incompossibilitas nulla apparet quia de ratione entis non est finitas, nec apparet ex ratione entis quod sit passio convertibilis cum ente ; alterum istorum requiritur ad repugnantiam praedictam : passiones enim primae entis et convertibiles satis videntur notae sibi inesse.

Item sic suadetur : infinitum suo modo non repugnat quantitati, id est, in accipiendo partem post partem ; ergo nec infinitum suo modo repugnat entitati, id est in perfectione simul essendo.

Item, si quantitas virtutis est simpliciter perfectior quam quantitas molis, quare erit infinitum possibile in mole et non in virtute ? Quod si est possibilis, est in actu, sicut ex tertia conclusione patet supra de primitate effectiva et etiam inferius probabitur.

Item, quare [MS quia] intellectus, cujus objectum est ens, nullam invenit repugnantiam intelligendo aliquod infinitum ; imo videtur perfectissimum intelligibile ?

Mirum est autem, si nulli intellectui talis contradictio patens fiat circa primum ejus objectum, cum discordia in sono faciliter offendat auditum ; si enim disconveniens

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

proving this except by explaining the meaning of the notions themselves.

"Being" cannot be explained by anything better known than itself.

'Infinite'? we understand by means of finite.

I explain "infinite" in a popular definition as follows:

The infinite is that which exceeds the finite, not exactly by reason of any finite measure, but in excess of any measure that could be assigned.

~ The following persuasive argument can be given for what we intend to prove.

Just as everything is assumed to be possible, if its impossibility is not apparent, so also all things are assumed to be compatible, if their incompatibility is not manifest.

Now there is no incompatibility apparent here, for it is not of the nature of being to be finite ; nor does finite appear to be an attribute coextensive with being.

But if they were mutually repugnant, it would be for one of these reasons.

The coextensive attributes which being possesses, seem to be sufficiently evident.

Another persuasive argument adduced is this.

Infinity, in its own way, is not opposed to quantity (that is, where parts are taken successively) ; therefore, neither is infinity, in its own way, opposed to entity (that is, where perfection exists simultaneously).

Again, if the quantity characteristic of power is simply more perfect than that characteristic of mass, why is it possible to have an infinity [of small parts] in an [extended] mass and not an infinite power?

And if an infinite power is possible, then it actually exists, as is evident from the third conclusion about the first efficient cause, and will also be proved again later.8

Again, why is it that the intellect, whose object is being, does not find the notion of something infinite repugnant?

Instead of this, the infinite seems to be the most perfect thing we can know.

Now, if tonal discord so readily displeases the ear, it would be strange if some intellect did not clearly perceive the contradiction between infinite and its first object [viz. being] if such existed.

DUNS SCOTUS

statim ut percipitur offendit, cur nullus intellectus ab intelligibili infinito naturaliter refugit sicut a non conveniente, suum ita primum objectum destruentem ?

Per illud potest colorari illa ratio Anselmi de summo bono cogitabili, Proslogion,* et intelligenda est ejus descriptio sic.

Deus est quo cognito sine contradictione majus cogitari non potest sine contradictione.

Et quod addendum sit contradictione, patet: nam in cujus cognitione vel cogitatione includitur contradictio, illud dicitur non cogitabile, quia sunt tunc duo cogitabilia opposita nullo modo faciendo unum cogitabile, quia neutrum determinat alterum, ut quod homo sit irrationalis est incogitabile.

Unde sicut in rebus nihil est nisi sit simplex vel compositum ex potentia et actu, ita inconceptibus.

Contradictoria autem nihil faciunt unum nec simplex, nec compositum.

Summum cogitabile praedictum, sine contradictione potest esse in re.

Hoc probatur primo de esse quidditatibo : quia in tali cogitabili summo quiescit intellectus ; ergo in ipso est ratio primi objecti intellectus scilicet entis, et hoc in summo.

Et tunc arguitur ultra, quod illud sit loquendo de esse existentiae.

Summe cogitabile non est tantum in intellectu cogitante, quia tunc posset esse, quia cogitabile possibile, et non posset esse, quia repugnat rationi ejus esse ab aliqua causa, sicut patet prius in secunda conclusione de via efficientiae.

Majus ergo cogitabile est * Cap. iii (Migne, P.L., cLvm, 228).

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

For if the disagreeable becomes offensive as soon as it is perceived, why is it that no intellect naturally shrinks from the infinitely intelligible as it would from something out of harmony with, and even destructive of, its first object ?

In this same way Anselm's argument in the Proslogion * about the highest conceivable good can be touched up.

His description must be understood in this way.

God is a being conceived without contradiction, who is so great that it would be a contradiction if a greater being could be conceived. That the phrase '"'without contradiction" must be added is clear, for anything, the very knowledge or thought of which includes a contradiction, is called

"inconceivable'', for it includes two conceivable notions so opposed to each other that they cannot in any way be fused into a single conceivable object, since neither determines the other.

Thus "man is irrational' cannot be conceived.

Hence, just as in the world of reality nothing exists that is not either simple or at least composed of act [the determining element] and potency [the determinable element], so also with concepts.

Contradictories, however, do not form a unity, be it simple or composed.

It follows then, that the greatest object conceivable without contradiction can actually exist in reality.

This is proved first of its essential being, for in such an object the intellect is fully satisfied ; therefore, in it the primary object of the intellect, viz. ""being"', is verified and this in the highest degree.

It is further argued, then, that this being actually exists because the highest conceivable object is not one which is merely in the intellect of the thinker, for then it both could exist, because as something possible it is conceivable, and yet could not exist, because the idea of existing in virtue of some cause is repugnant to its very nature.

This latter was shown above in the second conclusion of the proof from efficiency.*®

Therefore, what

DUNS SCOTUS

quod est in re quam quod est tantum in intellectu.

Non est autem hoc sic intelligendum, quod idem si cogitetur per hoc sit majus cogitabile si existat, sed omni quod est in intellectu tantum est majus aliquod quod existit.

Vel aliter coloratur sic: majus cogitabile est quod existit, id est perfectius cognoscibile, quia visibile sive intelligibile intellectione intuitiva.

Cum [read Quod autem] non existit, nec in se, nec in nobiliori, cui nihil addit, non est visibile.

Visibile autem est perfectius cognoscibile non visibili, sed tantum modo intelligibili abstractive ; ergo perfectissimum cognoscibile existit.

De differentia intellectionis intuitivae et abstractivae et quomodo intuitiva est perfectior, tangetur distinctione tertia * et alias quando locum habebit.

[Via Inefficax].

Ultimo ostenditur propositum ex negatione causae extrinsecae [read intrinsecae]; quia materia finitur per formam, sicut potentia per actum et perfectionem et esse formae ejus.

Et e converso forma finitur per materiam sicut actus per potentiam.

Forma ergo quae non est nata esse in materia est infinita ; cujusmodi est Deus.

Haec ratio non valet, quia secundum ipsos angelus est immaterialis ; ergo in natura est infinitus.

Non possunt dicere, quod esse angeli finiret essentiam ejus, quia secundum eos est accidens essentiae et posterius naturaliter ; et sic in primo signo naturae essentia secundum se ut prior esse, videtur infinita intensive, et per consequens in secundo signo naturae non erit finitabilis per esse.

* Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. m1, q. iii.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

exists in reality is conceivably greater than what exists only in the intellect.

This is not to be understood, however, in the sense that something conceived if it actually exists, is, by the fact of existing, conceivable to any greater extent.

'The meaning is that whatever exists is greater than whatever is solely in the intellect.

Or the argument could be retouched in this way.

Whatever exists is conceivable to a greater extent [than what does not] ; that is to say, it can be known more perfectly, because it is intuitively intelligible or visible.

What does not exist either in itself or in something more noble to which it adds nothing, is not capable of being intuited.

Now what can be seen is able to be known more perfectly than what can not be intuited, but known only abstractively.

Therefore, the most perfect thing that can be known exists.

The difference between intuitive and abstractive knowledge, and the superiority of the former over the latter, will be treated in distinction three and elsewhere as occasion offers.4°

[e. An Ineffective Proof].

Finally, some 4! argue to the proposed conclusion from the absence of any intrinsic cause, for matter is determined by form as the potential is determined by act, perfection, and the existence of its form.

Conversely, the form is limited by matter as act is limited by potency.

Any form incapable of being in matter, therefore, is infinite.

God is of such kind.

This reason does not hold, for according to these men, 4? the angel is immaterial ; therefore, its nature is infinite.

They cannot avoid this conclusion by saying that the existence of the angel limits its essence, for they maintain that existence is accidental to the essence and naturally posterior to it. And so in the first instance of nature,' the essence, considered in its own right and as prior to existence, seems to be intensively infinite.

Consequently, it cannot be limited by existence in the second instance of nature.

DUNS SCOTUS

Breviter respondeo ad argumentum : nam quaelibet entitas habet intrinsecum sibi gradum suae perfectionis, in quo est finitum, si est finitum, et in quo infinitum, sl potest esse infinitum, et non per aliquid accidens sibi.

Arguitur etiam: si forma finitur ad materiam, ergo si non ad illam, non finitur.

Fallacia consequentis : sicut corpus finitur ad corpus ; igitur si non ad corpus, erit infinitum ; ultimum ergo coelum erit actu infinitum; sophisma est istud tertio Physicorum,* quia sicut prius corpus in se prius finitur propriis terminis antequam ad aliquid aliud finiatur, ut de coelo, ergo ita forma finita prius est in se finita quam finiatur ad materiam, quia est talis natura in entibus quod finitur, id est antequam uniatur materiae ; nam secunda finitas praesupponit primam et non causat eam; ergo in aliquo signo naturae erit essentia [angeli] finita ; ergo non finitur per esse ; ergo in secundo signo non finitur per esse.

Breviter dico unam propositionem, quod quaecumque essentia absoluta finita in se, est finita ut praeintelligitur omni comparatione sui ad aliam essentiam.

[Solutto Quaestionis| Ex dictis patet solutio quaestionis: nam ex primo articulo habetur quod aliquod ens existens est simpliciter primum triplici primitate, videlicet efficientiae, finis et eminentiae, et ita simpliciter quod incompossibile est aliquid esse prius ; et in hoc probatum est esse de Deo quantum ad proprietates respectivas Dei ad creaturam, vel in quantum determinat dependentiam respectus creaturarum ad ipsum.

Ex secundo articulo habetur * 1, cap. iv (203%, 20-22).

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

Briefly, then, I reply to the argument.

If an entity is finite or infinite, it is so not by reason of something incidental to itself, but because it has its own intrinsic degree of finite or infinite perfection respectively.

It is also argued that,*4 if form is limited with reference to matter, where there is no matter, there the form is infinite.

This is the fallacy of asserting the consequent, just as is the following : a body is limited with reference to a body ; therefore, if a body is not limited with reference to another body, it will be infinite; hence, the outermost heaven will be actually infinite.

This is the fallacy of Physics, BK. m1.* For, just as a body is first limited in itself by its own proper boundaries before it is limited with respect to anything else (as is the case with the heavens), so the finite form is first limited in itself before it is limited with respect to matter.

That is to say, it is of such a nature that it is limited, and this, prior to any union with matter ; for the second limitation presupposes, and does not cause, the first.

The finite character of the angelic essence, then, is something that is prior by nature to its existence.

Consequently, it is not its subsequent existence that makes such an essence limited.

To put the argument briefly in one sentence, I say that every finite essence is such absolutely and prior to any reference it may have to another essence.

[Solution of the Question] 45 The solution to the question, then, is clear from the foregoing, for the first article establishes the existence of some being that is simply first by the triple primacy of efficiency, finality and eminence, and is first in such an unqualified sense that it would be impossible for anything to be prior to it. This is to establish the existence of God so far as the divine properties that have reference to creatures are concerned, or in so far as creatures are dependent upon him.

The second article shows in four

DUNS SCOTUS

quadruplex via quod illud primum est infinitum : primo videlicet, quia primum efficiens ; secundo, quia primum agens omnia factibilia, secunda via continet quatuor conclusiones de intelligere primi; tertio, quia finis ultimus ; quarto, quia eminens.

Juxta primam exclusa est quaedam via inutilis de creatione.

Juxta secundam tangitur alia via de perfectione primi objecti et intellectualitate.

Juxta quartam exponitur ratio Anselmi, Proslogion, Deus est quo majus cogitari non potest.

Ultimo excluditur via inutilis ex immaterialitate inferens infinitatem.

Ex praemissis conclusionibus probatis et ostensis, arguitur sic ad quaestionem: aliquod ens tripliciter primum in entibus existit in actu et illud tripliciter primum est infinitum; ergo aliquod infinitum ens existit in actu, et istud est perfectissimum conceptibile et conceptus perfectissimus absolutus quem possumus habere de Deo naturaliter quod sit infinitus, sicut dicitur distinctione tertia.* Et sic probatum est Deum esse quantum ad conceptum vel esse ejus perfectissimum conceptibilem vel possibilem haberi a nobis de Deo.

[Ad Argumenta Principalia] Ad argumenta hujus quaestionis: ad primum dico quod causa infinita activa ex necessitate naturae non compatitur aliquid sibi contrarium, sive sit ei contrarium aliquid formaliter [M/S om. id est, secundum aliquod quod convenit sibi essentialiter] sive virtualiter, id est, secundum rationem effectus sui quem virtualiter includit ; utroque enim modo impediret quodlibet incompossibile suo effectui, sicut argutum est prius.

Contra: numquid philosophi ponentes Deum agere ex necessitate naturae non ponebant esse aliquid malum

* Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. m1, q. i.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

ways that this First Being is infinite, first, because it is the first efficient cause ; secondly, because as first agent it knows all that can be made (this second way contains four conclusions regarding the knowledge of the first being) ; thirdly, because it is the last end ; and fourthly, because it is most excellent.

In our treatise on the first way, we rejected as useless a certain argument regarding creation.

With the second, we considered another way based on the perfection of the first object and its intelligibility.

In connection with the fourth, we expounded the argument of Anselm in the Proslogion, cap. ii, namely that God is that, greater than which nothing can be thought.

Finally, we rejected as useless the argument that would infer infinity from immateriality.

Having proved these conclusions, one can answer the question as follows.

In the realm of beings there actually exists a being which has a triple primacy, and this being is infinite.

Therefore, some infinite being actually exists.

This notion of God as an infinite being is the most perfect absolute concept we can have of him, as we point out in dist. 111.46

Consequently, we prove that God, conceived under the most perfect aspect possible to us, actually exists.

[Reply to the Arguments at the Beginning] To the first 4" of the arguments at the beginning of the question, I say that an infinite cause that acts by a necessity of nature would not suffer anything contrary to itself, whether such a thing be formally contrary (i.e. opposed to some essential perfection of the First Cause) or only virtually contrary (i.e. opposed to some effect which it includes virtually).

For in either case, an infinite cause would impede anything incompatible with its effect, as the argument states above.

To the contrary:

Did not the philosophers who assumed that God acted out of a necessity imposed by

DUNS SCOTUS

in universo?

Respondeo, sicut patuit probando Deum esse agens per cognitionem, non potuerunt salvare aliquod malum fieri posse contingenter in universo, sed tantum unus ordo causarum produceret aliquid quod esset receptivum alicujus perfectionis ; alius autem ordo de necessitate produceret oppositum illius perfectionis, ita quod ista perfectio non posset tunc induci concurrentibus omnibus causis, licet absolute productum ab aliquibus [MS aliis quibus], consideretur secundum rationem suae speciei, esset receptivum illius perfectionis, cujus oppositum necessario evenit ; ergo secundum eos sicut causae efficientes in una coordinatione necessario agunt, ita causae efficientes impedientes in alia coordinatione necessario agunt impediendo.

Unde aequali necessitate qua sol agit ad dissolvendum, agit Saturnus ad condensandum.

Cum ergo omnis defectus materiae reducatur ad causas efficientes quae sunt defectuosae in virtute, si quaelibet causa efficiens agit necessario, tunc nihil defectus vel monstruositatis vel malitiae erit in universo quin necessario accidat.

Quid autem possunt philosophi dicere de libero arbitrio nostro et malitia moris, dicendum est alias.

Ad secundum dico, quod consequentia non valet.

Ad probationem ostendo quod non est consimilis incompossibilitas dimensionum in replendo locum et essentiarum in simul essendo ; non enim una entitas ita replet totam naturam entis quin cum ea posset stare alia entitas.

Hoc autem non debet intelligi de repletione locali, sed quasi commensuratione essentiali; sed una dimensio replet eumdem locum secundum ultimum capacitatis suae, itaque una entitas simul potest esse cum cum alia,

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

his nature, also admit the existence of evil in the universe?

As I have already made clear in proving that God acts with knowledge,'® I reply that they could not consistently explain the contingent character of the evil in the universe.

All they could maintain would be that one order of causes could produce something capable of receiving a given perfection, whereas another order of necessity would produce the opposite of this perfection.

In other words, if we considered all the causes actually concurring at that time, this perfection could not be induced at this particular moment.

Absolutely speaking, however, if we consider not this particular event, but one similar in kind, then a thing produced by some of these causes could also be the recipient of a perfection which de facto was necessarily absent at this particular time. According to them, therefore, just as the efficient causes in one group act necessarily, so the impeding efficient causes of the other group act necessarily. The sun dissolves something, then, with the same necessity with which Saturn condenses it.

Therefore, since every defect of matter is due to a deficiency in the strength of the efficient causes, if each efficient cause acts necessarily, then every defect, monstrosity, or evil in the universe occurs necessarily.

What the philosophers can say of our free will and moral evil, however, will have to be treated elsewhere.

To the second argument,*® I say that the consequence is invalid.

As to the proof adduced in its favour, I show that there is no parity between the impossibility of several extended things filling the same place and several essences existing simultaneously.

For no entity so fills the whole nature of being as to render impossible the coexistence of another.

''Coexistence'' in this latter case, however, should not be understood in the sense of filling a place, but rather as a kind ofessential commensuration. °°

The extension of one thing, however, fills any place to the utmost of its capacity.

More than one entity, therefore, (2,322)

DUNS SCOTUS

sicut posset respectu loci cum corpore replente locum esse aliud corpus non replens locum.

Similiter alia consequentia non valet, quia corpus infinitum si esset cum alio, fieret totum majus utroque ratione dimensionum, quia dimensiones alterius corporis essent aliae a dimensionibus corporis infiniti et ejusdem rationis cum eis, et ideo totum esset majus propter dimensionum diversitatem, et totum non majus, quia dimensio infinita non potest excedi.

Hic autem tota quantitas infinitae perfectionis nullam additionem recipit in ratione talis quantitatis ex coexistenti alicujus finiti secundum talem qualitatem.

Ad tertium dico, quod consequentia non valet, nisi illud quod demonstratur in antecedente, a quo alia separantur, sit finitum.

Exemplum: si esset aliquod ubi infinitum per impossibile, et corpus infinitum replet illud ubi, non sequeretur : hoc corpus est hic, ita quod non alibi ; ergo est finitum secundum ubi, quia ly hic non demonstrat nisi infinitum.

Item, secundum Philosophum, si motus esset infinitus et tempus infinitum, non sequitur : iste motus est in hoc tempore et non in alio ; ergo est finitum secundum tempus.

Ita ad propositum, oporteret probare illud quod demonstratur per ly hoc esse finitum.

Quod si assumatur, petitur conclusio in praemissa.

Ad ultimum dico, quod Philosophus infert moveri in non-tempore ex hoc antecedente, quod potentia infinita est in magnitudine, et intelligit in consequente moveri proprie, ut distinguitur contra mutationem, et hoc modo consequens includit contradictionem, et etiam antecedens, secundum eum.

Qualiter autem teneat illa consequentia, sic declaro: si potentia est infinita et agit ex

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

can exist at once, even though one body cannot fill a place already occupied by another.

The other consequence is also invalid, for if an infinite body were to coexist with another body, the reason the combination of the two would be greater than either taken singly lies in the nature of extension, for the dimensions of this other body would be different from those of the infinite body and still they would be qualitatively the same.

Therefore, the union of two extended bodies implies an increase in extension because of the distinct dimensions and yet the sum total could not represent an increase, because an infinite extension cannot be exceeded.

In our case, however, the total amount of infinite perfection is not increased quantitatively by the coexistence of some qualitatively similar finite entity.

To the third ®' argument, I say that the consequence does not hold unless, in the antecedent, the thing singled out from all the others is something finite.

For example, to assume the impossible, if an infinite place were occupied by an infinite body, it still would not follow that this body is ''here'' in such a way that it is nowhere else, because the word '"'here'', in this case, only designates what is infinite.

Then too, according to the Philosopher,® if motion and time were infinite, from the proposition "'this motion is at this time and not at another'', it does not follow that motion is finite in duration.

Consequently, if the desired conclusion is to be established, it would be necessary to prove that whatever is designated by the word ''this" is finite.

To assume it simply begs the question.

To the last ** argument, I say that the Philosopher argues that if the antecedent be true (viz. that some power is of infinite magnitude), it would move instantaneously, where he understands ''moves"' in the proper sense as different from mutation.

In this sense, according to him, the consequent as well as the antecedent is self-contradictory.

I will show, however, how this consequence could be made

DUNS SCOTUS

necessitate naturae, ergo agit in non-tempore.

Quia si agat in tempore, sit illud A, et accipiatur alia virtus finita quae in tempore finito agit, sit illud B; et augmentetur virtus finita quae est B secundum proportionem illam quae est Bad A.

Puta, si A [MS B] est centuplum vel milletuplum ad B [MS A], accipiatur virtus centupla ad illam virtutem finitam datam, vel milletupla.

Igitur illa virtus sic aygmentata movebit in A tempore, et ita virtus illa et infinita in aequali tempore movebunt, quod est impossibile, si virtus infinita movet secundum ultimum potentiae suae et necessario.

Ex hoc ergo quod virtus est infinita sequitur quod si agat ex necessitate, agit non in tempore.

Ex hoc autem quod ponitur in antecedente, quod est in magnitudine sequitur si agit circa corpus quod proprie moveat illud corpus, quod loquitur de virtute extensa per accidens.

Talis autem virtus si ageret circa corpus, haberet partes hujus corporis diversimode distantes respectu ejus : puta unam partem corporis propinquiorem et aliam remotiorem ; habet etiam resistentiam aliquam in corpore, circa quod agit, quae duae causae, scilicet resistentia et diversa approximatio partium mobilis ad ipsum movens, faciunt successionem esse in motu et corpus proprie moveri.

Ergo ex hoc quod in antecedente illo ponitur virtus in magnitudine sequitur quod proprie movebit, et ita jungendo illa duo simul, scilicet quod est infinitum et quod est in magnitudine, sequitur quod [MS om. proprie] in nontempore movebit, quod est contradictio.

Sed istud non sequitur de virtute infinita quae non est in magnitudine, ipsa enim licet in non-tempore agat, si in non-tempore agit, quia hoc sequitur infinitatem, tamen non proprie

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

to hold.

Ifa power is infinite and acts by necessity of nature, then it acts instantaneously.

If it were to act in time, let us call this time A.

Now take another finite power, which acts in the finite time B.

Then let the finite power, which acts in B time, be increased by the amount that A exceeds B, e.g. if A is one hundred or one thousand times as great as B, let the finite power be increased a hundred—or a thousand fold.

Now, this increased power would act in A time.

Consequently, this finite power would act in the same time as the infinite, which is impossible if the infinite power moves necessarily and to the utmost of its ability.

Therefore, if an infinite power acts necessarily, it follows that it acts instantaneously.

On the other hand, however, if we assume, as the antecedent does, that this power has magnitude, i.e. is extended accidentally, then it follows that if it acts on a body, it moves this body in the proper sense of moving.

But if such a. power acted upon a body, it would be at unequal distance from the different parts of this body, that is, one part of the body would be closer, whereas another would be farther away.

Then, too, this power would meet with some resistance in the body on which it acts.

Now these two causes (viz. resistance and the difference in distance between the mover and the various parts of the thing moved) give rise to succession in motion and, therefore, cause the body to be moved in the proper sense of that term.

From the fact, then, that we assume in the antecedent a power with magnitude, it follows that it moves in the proper sense, and thus by combining these two notions simultaneously, namely that it is infinite and that it has magnitude,*4 it follows that it moves in the strict sense of the term and, nevertheless, does so instantaneously, which is a contradiction.

This contradiction, however, does not follow from the notion of an infinite power which has no magnitude.

For although it would act instantaneously, were it infinite and necessarily acting, still it

DUNS SCOTUS

movebit, quia non habebit in passo illas duas rationes successionis.

Non igitur vult Philosophus quod infinita potentia proprie moveat in non-tempore, sicut argumentum procedit, sed quod infinita potentia in magnitudine proprie moveat et non in tempore, quae sunt contradictoria.

Et ex hoc sequitur quod talis antecedens includit contradictoria, scil. quod virtus infinita sit in magnitudine.

Sed tunc est dubitatio: cum potentiam motivam ponat infinitam et naturaliter agentem, videtur sequi quod necessario ageret in non-tempore ; licet non moveat in non-tempore ; imo tunc nihil movebit aliud proprie loquendo.

Et quod hoc sequatur patet: quia illud probatum fuit prius per rationem potentiae infinitae necessario agentis.

Respondet Averroes duodecimo Metaphysicae,* quod praeter primum movens, quod est infinitae potentiae, requiritur movens conjunctum potentiae finitae, ita quod ex primo movente sit infinitas motus et ex secundo sit successio, quia aliter non posset esse successio nisi concurreret illud finitum, quia si solum infinitum ageret, ageret in non-tempore.

Illud improbatur distinctione octava quaestione ultima,f ubi in hoc arguitur contra philosophos, qui ponunt primum agere ex necessitate quidlibet quod immediate agit.

Sed Christianis non est argumentum difficile, qui dicunt Deum contingenter agere.

Ipsi enim possunt faciliter respondere, quia licet virtus infinita necessario agens agat secundum ultimum sui, et ita in non-tempore, quidquid immediate agit, non tamen virtus infinita contingenter et libere agens ; sicut enim est in potestate ejus agere vel non agere, ita est in potestate ejus in * xi, com. 41. t Opus oxoniense, 1, dist. vin, q. v, nn. 3, 8 ff.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

would not move, properly speaking, since the two reasons for succession would be absent in that on which it acts.

The Philosopher, therefore, does not mean that an infinite power would move instantaneously as the argument assumes, but that a power infinite in magnitude, though it is not in time, nevertheless moves in the proper sense, which is a contradiction.

From this it follows that such an antecedent includes contradictory notions, namely a power infinite in magnitude.

But a doubt arises.

Since an infinite motive power acting of necessity is assumed, it would seem to follow necessarily that this power acts instantaneously, even though it may not move instantaneously.

Consequently, it follows further, that no agent will move another properly speaking.

That this would follow is clear from what was just proved above regarding an_ infinite necessarily acting power.

Averroes in Metaphysics, BK. xu,* replies that it is not enough simply to have an infinitely powerful First Mover.

What is further required is that this First Mover and some additional finite power co-operate in such a way that the infinity of the motion is due to the First Mover, whereas the succession is due to the other.

Without the co-operation of some finite mover, succession would be impossible ; for if only the infinite agent acted, it would act instantaneously.

This solution will be disproved in the last question of distinction eight f where the philosophers who assume that whatever the First Cause does immediately, it does with necessity, are attacked.

But for Christians, who say that God acts contingently, the objection presents no difficulty, since they can answer it with ease.

For, even if an infinite power which acts necessarily and to the utmost of its power, does instantaneously whatever it does immediately, this is not true of an infinite power which acts freely and contingently.

As it is in the power of such an agent either to act or not to act, so it has the power either to act in time or to act

DUNS SCOTUS

tempore agere vel in non-tempore agere ; et ita facile est salvare primum movere corpus in tempore, licet sit infinitae potentiae, quia non necessario agit nec secundum ultimum potentiae quantum scilicet posset agere, neque in tam brevi tempore in quam brevi posset agere.

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD

instantaneously.

Consequently, it is easy to defend the position that the First Cause moves a body in time even if it be of infinite power, for it does not act necessarily neither to the full extent cf its power nor in as short a time as it could.

ape) i > —aee aed ner a Ae beterialy oF "iis & a » silence Greens Jor Goce ot away Niles Te £204 nf penne he oebcel ok Keres Gm UP wSee4 Comet —— oe .

_ Ree 7 4"

↑ Back to top