GLOSSARY
GLOSSARY
absolute. Not having any relation to anything else; relationless, independent, or unconditional.
accident. An incidental property of a thing. That which affects something and is outside its essence. For example, “whiteness” is an accident of a whitewashed wall, not of its substance. See substance.
actuality, primary (actus primus). This term can be taken in two ways. Sometimes it means “potentiality,” which is contrasted with “actuality.” For example, “The boy is a grammarian in primary actuality,” because as time passes he can become a grammarian, though he is not actually one now. But sometimes it means an inherent quality or habitus that one possesses but that does not exert itself. “Primary actuality” in this sense is contrasted with “secondary actuality” or “operation.” For example, “Priscian, even in his sleep, is a grammarian in primary actuality, though he is not exerting this grammatical knowledge in secondary actuality.” In both cases, primary actuality refers to a power or potential that is not currently actualized. See actuality, secondary.
actuality, secondary (actus secundus). The actual operation of a thing. For example, “Priscian, when exercising his grammatical knowledge, is a grammarian in secondary actuality.” See actuality, primary.
adjunct. Anything added to something else that is not part of its essence. An adjunct is really distinguished from its subject, even if it is proper to the subject. While adjuncts are often accidents (such as wisdom in a man), they also can be substances (such as wine in a bottle).
concrete. A “concrete” of a nature is a name that denotes one of the natures in Christ, but with the connotation of the hypostasis; for example, “God” or “man.” A “concrete” of the person, on the other hand, is a name that denotes the person; for example, “Christ,” “King,” or “Shepherd.”
denominative (paronyma or denominativa). A derivative; derived. Paronyma or denominativa are concrete nouns derived from abstract nouns, such as “wise man” (sapiens), which is derived from “wisdom” (sapientia).
dulia. “Veneration.” According to Roman Catholic theology, it is a reverence or honor that can be given to creatures, especially the saints.
fallacy of division and composition. An invalid argument that confuses statements in the divided sense with statements in the composite sense. See sense, composite, and sense, divided.
hyperdulia. “High veneration.” According to Roman Catholic theology, it is the highest kind of reverence that can be given to creatures; it is accorded, for example, to St. Mary.
hypostasis. An individual substance, intelligent, incommunicable to another hypostasis, not dependent on another nor existing as a part in a whole, but subsisting of itself as a perfect whole and absolute in its own genus. Gerhard often uses “hypostasis” as a synonym for “subsistence” and “person.” See subsistence.
impulsive cause. That which impels a principal efficient cause to act. This impulsion comes either from inside or outside of the principal cause.
inchoatively. With regard to the beginning and doing of something.
latria. Worship that is due to God alone.
negative nothing (nihil negativum). Or “negation.” The absence of something in a subject that is inept for receiving it; for example, the absence of vision in a stone. Distinguished from “privative nothing.” See privative nothing.
notion, first and second. Notions (notiones or 
) are ideas or concepts of the mind about certain things. “Intention” is a synonym here for “notion.” “First notions” (notiones primae, also called “formal concepts”) represent things themselves as they really are, such as the concept of a dog in the mind. “Second notions” (notiones secundae, also called “objective concepts”) are concepts of concepts, because the mind looks at the first concepts by means of another concept. Examples of second notions include logical concepts such as genus and species, grammatical concepts such as masculine and feminine (for languages such as Latin in which nouns have gender), and rhetorical concepts such as trope and figure.
paronymous. See denominative.
privative nothing (nihil privativum). Or “privation.” The absence of something in a subject to which it is due; for example, blindness in the eye of Peter. Distinguished from “negative nothing.” See negative nothing.
proper in the fourth mode. Proper to the whole species, proper only to that species, and always proper to that species.
removal, mode of. By way of contrast. To compare two similar things by the mode of removal means to show how they are different.
same according to genus. Having the same genus, but not being identically the same nor of the same species. Such things are said to have “generic identity.” For example, the sky and a man are the same according to genus, since they are both corporeal.
same according to number (identically the same). Being identical, even if place, size, and the like differ. Such things are said to have “numerical identity.” For example, young Plato and old Plato are identically the same, or the same according to number.
same according to species. Having the same species but not being identically the same. Such things are said to have “specific identity.” For example, Peter and Paul (two human beings) are the same according to species.
sense, composite. The meaning of a concept when considered together with other facts or concepts. See sense, divided.
sense, divided. The meaning of a concept in itself, apart from its relation to other facts or concepts. For example, in the proposition “It is possible for one sitting to run,” if running is taken in the composite sense with sitting, the proposition is false because one cannot sit and run at the same time. But if running is divided from sitting, or taken in the divided sense, the proposition is true because the one who is now sitting can run later. See sense, composite.
species, intelligible. Conceptual images that represent real objects to one’s intellect.
subject (suppositum). An individual subsisting of itself, distinct from other individuals either of the same or of a different species; attributed to inanimate as well as animate things, to beasts as well as to rational persons.
subordinates. Noncontradictory things or propositions of which one is contained under the other. For example, Gerhard says that the Holy Spirit and the water of Baptism are related to each other as subordinates in the giving of salvation, not as opposites. The water of Baptism is a means by which the Holy Spirit gives salvation, and thus the one does not rule out the other in the giving of salvation (Commonplace XXIII, On Holy Baptism, § 104. See also Commonplace XXX, On the Resurrection of the Dead, § 101).
subsist. To exist of oneself and not in another.
subsistence. That by which a thing exists in itself and not in another. It only belongs to substances. Something is said to subsist if it has essence of itself, not as an accident inhering in a subject, like a part bound to a whole. Subsisting substances are called subjects (supposita). If these are rational, they are called persons. “Subsistence” is often used by Gerhard as a synonym for “hypostasis” or “person.” See hypostasis.
substance. A concrete reality, that which exists. See: accident.
terminatively. With regard to the formal relationship and goal or aim of an action. For example, though the incarnation was the work of the entire Trinity in a certain sense, it is the work only of the Son terminatively, because only the Son became incarnate.
terminus a quo. “Limit from which,” “starting point.” The point from which a movement begins.
terminus ad quem. “Limit to which,” “ending point.” The point at which a movement comes to rest or ends.