Chapter VIII: From the personal union there arises: (1) The communication of the natures, § 148.
CHAPTER VIII: ON THE COMMUNICATION OF THE NATURES
§ 148. Thesis: From the personal union arises the communication of natures, because of which the concrete1 of one nature is predicated of the concrete of the other nature.
Explanation: We have said that the communication that arose from the personal union is dual: both of natures and of those things that follow the natures, namely, of the natural properties and of the operations. Here we are discussing the first. We shall discuss the second in later chapters. Some add a communication of hypostasis by which the Word, by assuming the human nature, communicated His own person to it so that He subsists in and through it. We certainly do not deny this communication of hypostasis, but we claim that it pertains to the form rather than to the consequence of the union. You see, because “the Word became flesh” is the same as the hypostasis of the Word having become the hypostasis of the flesh—but the hypostasis of the Word did not cease to be the Word’s own hypostasis nor did the Word transfuse His hypostasis into the flesh essentially—it remains that the hypostasis of the Word became the hypostasis of the flesh through communication. Consequently, it is not wrong for one to suppose that the form of the union consists in that communication of the hypostasis.
The communication of natures in the person of Christ is the utterly close and intimate communion and coupling of the divine nature of the Word and His assumed human nature. Through this, the Word assumes the human nature personally; unites to Himself what He has assumed; permeates, perfects, and dwells therein with an intimate and utterly profound interpenetration; and appropriates it for Himself, so that from each, communicating with the other, He becomes one incommunicable thing—namely, one person—and so that predications result, through which the concrete of one nature is truly and really said about the concrete of the other nature.
§ 149. We demonstrate this communication of the natures in Christ: (I) From passages of Scripture. Col. 2:9: “In Christ dwells the whole fullness of the Godhead bodily.” In whatever the whole fullness of the Godhead dwells, between it and the divine nature there is a communication. The whole fullness of the Godhead dwells in the flesh of Christ or in His assumed human nature. Therefore between the assumed human nature of the Word and His divine nature there is a communication. The major premise is clear: (1) If something dwells within another in such a way that it brings that other into actuality, the dwelling place also has a communication with it. (2) The dwelling of God in the saints, both in this life as well as in the life to come, is not without a communion. All the more, therefore, will the indwelling of the Word in the flesh not be without a communication. (3) Because the whole fullness of the Godhead is purest actuality, it cannot dwell in another without true and real communication. (4) If the fullness of the Godhead dwells in anything, that possesses (so to speak) the Godhead through personal indwelling.
We prove the minor premise: (1) From the word “bodily,” which expresses that dwelling place in which the whole fullness of the Godhead lives, and that is the body or the assumed human nature that John 2:21 calls “the temple.” Jerome, in his commentary [on Col. 2:9]: “All the fullness of His divine nature dwells in His flesh.” This is explained in the same way by Athanasius (Contra Arianos, orat. 4), Cyril (bk. 4, on John, ch. 23; and Ad Reginas, bk. 2), Leo (De incarnat., sermon 10, and Homily 7 de Epiph.), Augustine (Letter 53: “in His body, or in the temple”), Cyril (bk. 12, on John, ch. 15: “The body of Christ truly is a temple, for in it the whole fullness of the Godhead wanted to dwell bodily”), Damascenus (bk. 3, ch. 6: “ ‘bodily,’ that is, in His flesh”). (2) Unless the fullness of the Godhead is said to dwell in Christ in such a way that it dwells in His flesh, the distinction is removed between the one who indwells and the dwelling place, and the divinity will be said to dwell within itself. (3) All things in God are essential, or in the essence. Therefore, with respect to that, the one who indwells cannot be distinguished from the dwelling place. (4) Whatever is predicated of Christ is predicated of Him according to His divine nature alone or according to His human nature alone or according to both natures. “The whole fullness of the Godhead dwelling in Him” cannot be understood of the divine nature alone, for nothing dwells in it. Rather, the divine nature is the same as all things that are in it. Also, it cannot be understood of both natures. Therefore we must take it as referring to the human nature, in this sense: that the assumed human nature is the divine nature’s own dwelling place. (5) The aim of the apostle is to compare Christ as man with other saints, showing that the fullness of the Godhead dwells in Him in a far different way than in the rest of the saints, that is, personally. (6) As the fruit of that indwelling, the apostle establishes this: that, according to His human nature, Christ is the Head of the Church. Surely, then, He establishes the human nature of Christ as the dwelling place.
Therefore the conclusion stands: there is a communication between the divine nature of the Word and the assumed human nature. “Just as children communicate in flesh and blood, He Himself likewise partook of the same” (Heb. 2:14). These words describe the personal union. Meanwhile, we can conclude from these with the best logic that that union did not happen without 
[“communion”]. You see, just as there is a communion between flesh and blood, that is, between the body and the soul in man, so also is there a communion between the divine and human natures in Christ. Chrysostom, Theophylactus, and Cyril add the words of John 1:14: “The Word became flesh and dwelt [
] among us.” They think2 that the latter part was added to guard against a confounding of the natures3 and to show their distinction. They interpret it in this way: that the Word dwells personally in the assumed flesh, just as the soul is said to dwell in its own body as its tent (2 Cor. 5:6). However, it is easier to take this as a reference to His presence among men at the time of His humiliation and to apply here the economic meaning of “tent” [
], by which it is taken for the tents in which the patriarchs and Israelites used to dwell, as also in the military and camp sense, because it is taken for the tents in which soldiers, opposed to their foes, live.
§ 150. (II) From rational arguments: (1) From what is equal. If the hypostasis of the Word is truly and really communicated to the assumed flesh, surely there is also a true and real communication between the divine nature of the Word and the assumed human nature. The logic of the connection is that the hypostasis of the Word and the divine nature of the Word do not differ in reality. However, we have shown before that the hypostasis of the Word has been communicated to the flesh. Therefore. If the properties of the Word have been communicated to the assumed flesh, surely there has also been a communication of the divine nature to it, because this is nothing other than the divine properties are. But the former is true, as we shall demonstrate in its own place.
**Can “becoming flesh” be attributed to the Word really, yet in such a way that there is no true communion between the essence of the Word and the flesh? Or will the whole fullness of the Godhead dwell in the humanity of Christ without any communion at all?**
(2) From what is lesser. If a communion arises from the spiritual union of believers with Christ and of the devout with God, all the more will a communion arise from the personal union of the divine and human natures in Christ, which is far closer and more intimate than the former one. But the former is true. In 2 Pet. 1:4 and Acts 9:4 the devout are called “partakers [
] of the divine nature.”
(3) From what follows. The mode of predicating follows the mode of being, and for something to be said about something, it is required that it be in it. If, in the person of Christ, God truly and really is and is said to be man, and man truly and really is and is said to be God, surely there is a communion between the divine and human4 natures in Christ. You see, nothing can truly and really be named from another if it does not have a communication with it. Therefore just as the Son of God is called “the Son of Man” because He communicated His hypostasis in reality with the assumed humanity, and just as the Son of Man is called “the Son of God” because the assumed human nature in reality became a partaker of the hypostasis of the Son of God, so God in truth and in reality is man because He truly communicated His own nature with the assumed humanity, and the man in truth and in reality is God because the human nature in reality became a partaker of the divine nature.
(4) From the absurd. If there is no real communication of the natures: The Son of God will not be truly and really a man. The attributes of humanity will not be able to be attributed to the Son of God. The proper works of the Word will not be able to be predicated truly and really of the assumed humanity, etc. It will be false to say that through the death of the Son we are reconciled to God or that the blood of Christ cleanses us from sin.
(5) From the nature of things that are united. Whatever things are united are constituted in such a way that one of them is like “actuality” [
],5 but the other is like “potentiality” [
].6 These are not united without some communication. But the two natures that have been united in Christ are such that one of them, the divine, is like the “actuality,” but the human is like the “potentiality.” Therefore.
(6) From mutual interpenetration. Whatever things are united in such a way that an interpenetration takes place between them by which they remain within each other most deeply and intimately, there is a communion between them. But between the divine nature of the Word and the assumed human nature there is a mutual interpenetration, as we showed earlier. Therefore.
§ 151. (III) From similar things. The soul and body acquire a communion through their mutual union, because of which the soul is said to be “embodied” and the body is said to be “animated” or “endowed with soul” because the soul (as the actuality [
]) perfects the body (as the potentiality [
]), dwells in it, and communicates its nature with it in such a way that with the body it constitutes one composite and subject [suppositum], that is, man. In the same way, the divine and human natures in Christ through the personal union partake of the sort of communion that the divine nature of the Word dwells in the human nature, perfects it, appropriates it to itself, and with it constitutes a single person that is and is called “Christ.”
Iron and fire are united in such a manner that a communion develops between them, because of which the iron is said to be “fiery.” In the same way, because of the union of the divine and human natures in Christ, the man is called “God” and God is called “man.” (Cf. Sigwartus, Contra iren. Paraei, p. 542.)
(IV) From the statements of the fathers. Irenaeus, bk. 4, ch. 34: “Through the union, a communion of God and man has taken place.” Athanasius (Ad Epictet.) calls the union “a communion of the Word to the flesh.” Basil, Homily de nat. Christi: “Just as the Son of God became a partaker of flesh and blood, so also the human flesh of the Lord became a partaker of deity.” The Council of Ephesus, canon 5: “If anyone dares to call the man Christ ‘God-bearer’ and will not rather have called Him ‘God’ truthfully as the Son by nature, according to the fact that the Word became flesh and communicated in the same way as we partake in flesh and blood, let him be accursed.”
Antithesis.
§ 152. Antithesis: (I) Suidas (f. 737) mentions that Paul of Samosata taught that “the two natures in Christ are completely separate and incommunicable toward each other, so that Christ Himself is one thing and the Word of God dwelling in Him is something else.”
(II) In the same way, the Jesuits also deny the communication of the natures. Busaeus, Disp. de pers. Christi, thesis 14: “Not only the Catholics but even some Calvinists teach clearly that the natures and their properties in Christ neither were communicated nor could have been communicated, neither in reality nor in name.” Bellarmine, De Christo, bk. 3, ch. 9, § Secunda: “The communication of properties that followed from the hypostatic union is not real with respect to the natures themselves, as the Lutherans want, nor is it completely verbal, as Beza and Martyr want. Rather, it is real with respect to the hypostasis of both natures but not with respect to the natures themselves.” Yet if there is a real communication with respect to the hypostasis, surely there is one also with respect to the natures themselves, because there is one hypostasis of both natures, and the divine nature does not differ in reality from its hypostasis. Moreover, what Bellarmine infers does not follow: “The divinity did not become passible. Therefore there is no real communication with respect to the natures.” This does not follow, because for a real communication of the natures, it is enough for the concrete of one nature to be predicated truly and really about the concrete of the other nature, though in the abstract the natures are not predicated about each other.
(III) The Calvinists overturn the communication of the natures. Beza, Colloq. Mompelg., p. 203: “Admitting the communication, that is, the union of the natures, in which each nature continues to remain distinct by itself in its properties, even in the union, without any other communication.” The Admonitio Neostad.: “The predication of human things to God and of divine things to man as far as the natures are concerned is merely verbal.”
** Chamier asserts (Panstrat. Cath., vol. 2, bk. 4, ch. 2, p. 56): “It is in harmony with the truth to say that the communion with respect to the natures is said to be completely verbal.” **
The Medulla Catech., published at Marburg in 1606, q. 45; Herborn., Spic., p. 25, find it reprehensible for anyone to say, “The incarnate Word really has flesh and blood.” Danaeus, Exam. lib. Chemnic., p. 290: “The communication of the Word and the human nature is only in name or a verbal communication of honor because of that indissoluble nexus of the united natures.” Paraeus tries to ward off this weapon from himself and his associates in his Irenicum, p. 264: “Christ the man is God not verbally but really, in fact, utterly really, because the union of the divine and human natures in the person of Christ is not verbal but real, in fact, utterly real, and moreover, if they wish, utterly substantial.” But besides the fact that he speaks inappropriately when he calls the union “substantial, in fact, utterly substantial,” though it is personal, he is having fun with the mere juggling of words and is trying to impose this on the incautious. You see, in explaining his intention more fully, he immediately adds: “Really and substantially, Christ the man is God with His deity, and Christ our God is man with His humanity. What more do they want? That we should say that Christ the man is God with His humanity and that Christ our God is man with His humanity too? Let the Eutychians be accursed.” But if the man is not God with His humanity (personally), how will the real communication of natures7stand? How will the Son of God be said to have communicated His hypostasis to the flesh in reality? How will Mary be the God-bearer [
]? How will the name that is above every name be given to the man Christ? And what need is there of more? Those people will not be able to protect the orthodoxy about the true and real communication of the natures in Christ who: (1) Deny the communication of the hypostasis and do not think correctly about the personal union. (2) Pervert the personal propositions with explanations that are out of place. (3) Deny the communication of properties. That the Calvinists do this is evident partly on the basis of what has been said and partly will become more clear from what we are going to say.
§ 153. The question arises here: Ought or can it be said, because of the real communication of the natures, that the divine nature is human and that the human nature is divine? The Jesuits and Calvinists have so persuaded themselves that, because the divinity cannot be predicated in the abstract of the humanity nor the humanity of the divinity, they deny the real communication of the natures. But they do this very ignorantly. You see: (1) An essential change or conversion is one thing, but a real communication is another. If the divinity has been changed and converted essentially into humanity, or if the humanity has been absorbed by the divinity, then finally it would be right and true to say, “The divinity is the humanity, and the humanity is the deity.” However, because we claim not a conversion of natures, not a change of essence, not the abolition of one or the other nature but the real communication of the natures resulting from the personal union, therefore we say that God is man and that the man is God.
(2) Whatever is communicated with one of the two according to the union is predicated of it not in the abstract but in the concrete and by a derived name [
]. (See Regius, Disp. Logic. de praedicat., bk. 1, p. 260.) Therefore because that communication of natures (which we claim is in Christ) has occurred 
(“through and because of the personal union”), we do not say in the abstract, “The divinity is the humanity,” but in the concrete, “God is man.”
(3) Because of the communication of the hypostasis, I say that the human nature of Christ is “in a hypostasis,” “subsisting in the Word Himself” and, as the devout ancients say, “endowed with Word” [
], “divinized” [
], and, as the Scholastics say, “personated.” But I do not say that it is the actual hypostasis of the Word. In the same way, because of the communication of the natures, I do not say that the human nature is divine and that the divine nature is human, but that God is man and that the man is God.
(4) Because of the union of iron and fire according to coupling, I do not say that the iron is fire but that the iron is fiery. And because of the union of body and soul, I do not say that the soul is body and the body is soul, but that the body is “endowed with soul” and the soul is “embodied.” In the same way, because of the personal union of the Word and the flesh, I do not say that “the humanity is the deity and the deity is the humanity,” but: “the man is God,” that is, not essentially but hypostatically; the human nature has been deified, anointed with deity; the body is deified, filled with deity (
); the flesh is deified (
); etc. You see, all these forms of speaking occur among the devout ancients.
Practical use.
§ 154. The practical use is consoling. The very mystery of human redemption and the foundation of our salvation depends on the true and real communication of the natures in Christ. Between the assuming Word and the assumed human nature there is a true and real communication, and for that reason the seed of the woman could crush the head of the serpent (Gen. 3:[15]). For that reason, the Son of Man could give His own flesh for the life of the world (John 6:51). For that reason, He could shed His blood for the remission of sins (Matt. 26:28). For that reason, the blood of Christ can cleanse us from our sins (1 John 1:7). On the other hand, if there is no real communication of the natures: The woman’s seed could not have bruised the serpent’s head. The flesh of Christ could not have been given for the life of the world. His blood could not have been shed for the remission of sins. This is because the blood of the human nature that is not God in essence and that does not have a real communion with God cannot be shed for the forgiveness of sins, and the flesh of the human nature that is not God in essence and that does not have a real communion with the divine nature cannot be given for the life of the world, because it lacks that infinite might and efficacy that is required to provide satisfaction to the justice of God.
1 The “concrete” of a nature is that which denotes one of the natures in Christ, but with the connotation of the hypostasis, for example, “God,” or “Man.”
2 Read putant with Cotta instead of putat.
3 Read naturarum with Cotta instead of naturae.
4 Read divinam & humanam with Cotta instead of divinam humanam.
5 Or “primary actuality” or “essential form” or “perfection.” That which gives being and actuality to a material. For Aristotle, the term could be used for the soul, which was considered as that which gives life to a natural, organic body that has the potential for life.
6 Or “passive potential” or “material.” That which is given being by its form.
7 Read naturarum with Cotta instead of naturae.