Chapter XIII: The third genus of the communication of properties is that by which, in the works of Christ’s office, each
CHAPTER XIII: ON THE THIRD GENUS
OF THE COMMUNICATION OF PROPERTIES
§ 282. Thesis: The third genus of the communication of properties is that by which, in the works of [Christ’s] office, each nature does what is proper to itself with the communication of the other.
Regarding this genus, one should likewise note: (I) Its foundation. The Son of God assumed the human nature so that in, with, and through it He might perform the work of redemption and the functions of His mediatorial office (1 John 3:8; etc.). Hence, in the works of His office, He does not act as God alone nor as man alone but as the God-man, and, what is the same, the two natures in christ do not act divisively but unitedly in the works of the office. From the unity of the person flows forth the unity of the effect [
].
(II) its titles. In Letter 29, Cyril calls this genus 
and 
[“common working”], because the person is acting according to both natures and is doing the works of the office, which are common to both. He calls it a 
, the “communication of operations,” the “communication of the proper [works] of each nature to the person.” In bk. 3, ch. 19, Damascenus calls it a “periphrasis” when we include the workings of both natures in one statement.
(III) its subject. In propositions belonging to this third genus, as the subject we always have the name of the person consisting in both and of both natures or, what is the same, the name of each nature subsisting in the one person, because the person is not a third thing distinct from each nature. Rather, the two natures, personally united, are one Christ, 
[“from which, in which, and which”], as the devout ancients say. Therefore in this genus it is the same whether you say that the person of Christ “works according to both natures,” or that the person of Christ “works in each form or nature with the communication of the other,” or that each nature in Christ works with the communication of the other what is proper to each.
(IV) its species and examples. To this genus belong all the propositions in which the names and works of Christ’s office are predicated about Him: “Christ died for our sins” (1 Cor. 15:3). “Christ gave Himself for our sins” (Gal. 1:4). “Christ loved us and gave Himself for us as a sacrifice and offering to God” (Eph. 5:2). Therefore because the office of Christ is threefold—prophetic, priestly, and royal—three classes of propositions can also be established that pertain to this genus.
§ 283. (V) Reciprocation. In this genus of propositions, reciprocation does and does not take place, in different respects. It does take place in the effects (
) that come forth from the action of both natures, which the ancients call 
[“the divine-human working”]. Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 19:
We say that the actions are not divided and that the natures do not act dividedly but in a united way, each in communication with the other doing that very thing that was proper to itself. You see, the human nature was not doing [only] human things, for He was not only man. And the divine nature did not do only divine things, for He was not only God, but He is God and man at the same time. Therefore we must note with regard to our Lord Jesus Christ that at times we speak about His two natures but sometimes about His one person, and we refer both the former and the latter to the one [person]. For the two natures are one Christ, and the one Christ is the two natures. Therefore it is the same to say that Christ is acting according to both of His natures and that each of the two natures is acting in Christ with the communication of the other.
In ch. 15 he had explained this with the example of a burning cut. He says:
In the case of a fiery sword, just as the natures of the fire and steel are preserved so also are their two actions and achievements preserved. For the steel has the power to cut and the fire has the power to burn. The cut is the achievement of the steel’s work and the completion of its action, and the burning, of the fire. The difference between these is preserved in the burnt cutting and the cut burning, though neither the burning is done apart from the cutting nor the cutting from the burning. We do not say that because the natures have two actions there are two fiery swords, nor do we introduce a confusion of their substantial difference because there is one fiery sword. So also, in Christ, His divinity has a divine and omnipotent action, but His humanity has a power such as ours. It was the achievement of His humanity that took the hand of the girl and raised her up, but it was that of His divinity that gave her life.
Reciprocation does not take place in the formal principle of acting or in truth and actuality [
]. Because the human nature of itself and of its essential properties is not equipped with the sort of divine power that is required for carrying out the works of Christ’s office, therefore the divine nature communicates it personally to the human nature, as we showed in the second genus of communication. Hence the human nature in the works of the office acts not only according to its natural powers and properties but also according to the divine power personally communicated to it. Yet this sort of communication of properties and passions of the flesh to the divine nature does not take place. Damascenus writes about this as follows (bk. 3, ch. 15):
The divinity worked the divine signs but not without the flesh, and the flesh did its human works but not without the deity. The deity had been joined to the suffering flesh yet remained impassible and made the sufferings salutary. The holy soul had been joined with the working divinity of the Word of God, and that soul understood and saw what was being accomplished. Therefore the divinity communicates to the flesh its own glories but remains immune to the sufferings of the flesh. The divinity of the Word was working through the flesh, but His flesh was not similarly suffering through the divinity in this way, for the flesh is the instrument of the divinity,
namely, a united instrument, not separated and external. In ch. 17, he makes this more clear:
The flesh of the Lord was enriched with the divine workings [
] because of the utterly pure union with the Word, that is, the hypostasis, without suffering the loss of any of its natural properties. You see, it is not according to its own working [
] but because of the Word united with it that it works divine things, the Word showing its own working through the flesh. The fiery steel burns not in the natural manner, possessing the burning action, but possesses it from the union of fire to the steel. Therefore the flesh itself was mortal because of itself and life-giving because of its union with the Word according to the hypostasis, etc.
We must set forth these ideas against those who argue that Christ’s human nature in the works of His office and redemption does only those things that are human, just as the divine nature does those things that are divine. They are committing the fallacy of composition and division1 when they set forth an insufficient definition of this genus. Certainly it is very true that “in the works of His office, both natures of Christ act, each doing what is proper to itself,” but this does not state the entire definition. Rather, one must also add to it what the canon of the Council of Chalcedon adds: “with the communication of the other.” We have already explained in preceding paragraphs how this communication is constituted. But if one pays very careful attention, the words “with the communication of the other” contain the specific difference of this genus: for if this phrase were not added, there would be no communication of properties in this genus at all.
Therefore in this genus we must note three points carefully, so that the communication [
] may be more evident. The first is that the workings of both natures come together in one effect [apotelesma] and to one effect. Second, in the office of mediation and redemption, one nature is not idle and doing nothing while the other is doing something; even less is it separated from the other. Rather, it remains personally united with the other that is acting. Thus while the humanity is suffering, the divinity is not idle but is present personally with the suffering nature, strengthening and sustaining it so that it can endure the immense burden of the sins of the whole world and of divine wrath due to those sins, and making those sufferings salutary and precious before the whole world. Third, in the works of the office, the human nature not only does the things that are proper to itself through its own essential properties but also does those things that are truly divine through the majesty and power communicated to it. You see, some works of the office are such that the divine nature cannot do them without the assumed humanity (such as to give His body for the life of the world, to shed His blood for the forgiveness of sins, to give His soul as a ransom for many); but some, though He could accomplish them from the deity alone, yet due to divine good pleasure and His free and good will He uses the assumed human nature as an instrument personally and inseparably united with Himself to do them. Here the human nature is acting not of its natural properties and powers but of the divine power communicated to it through the hypostatic union.
§ 284. (VI) Its distinctive particles. In the description of the office, sometimes a property of the human nature is involved that must be explained carefully, lest a confusion of the natures result. Thus to suffer and die are properties of the human nature, but to suffer for the sins of the whole human race and to die for the life of the world are works of the office and a common effect, in which the properties of both natures concur. “By His bruise we are healed” (Isa. 53:5). “God redeemed the Church with His own blood” (Acts 20:[28]). “Having been justified in His blood, we shall be saved from wrath through Him” (Rom. 5:9). “Through His death Christ destroyed him who had the power over death” (Heb. 2:14). “You have been redeemed by the precious blood of the spotless Lamb” (1 Pet. 1:18[–19]). Healing, justifying, redeeming the Church, destroying the kingdom of the devil, etc., are works of the office, works that are predicated about Christ according to both natures. Nevertheless we do not say that Christ suffered and died according to both natures but that Christ suffered in the flesh, that Christ died according to the flesh, as we showed in the first genus of communication.
§ 285. Furthermore, because the works of the office are predicated about Christ according to both natures in such a way that the difference between the natures is kept safe and whole, one should note from Damascenus (De orth. fid., bk. 3, ch. 15) the distinction between “working” [
] and “effect” [
]. He says:
We say that there are two workings in Christ, for as God and being consubstantial with the Father, He similarly and equally had the divine working, and as man and being consubstantial with us, He had the working of the human nature. However, one must know that “working” [
] is one thing, the “working thing” [
] is another, the “work” [
] is another, and “the worker” [
] is still another. The “working” is the effectual and substantial movement of the nature. The “working thing” is the nature, from which the working comes forth. The “work” is the effect of the working and the very thing accomplished. The “worker” is the user of the working, that is, the hypostasis. The “working” is also called “work” and the “work” is called “working,” as also a “creature” is called a “creation.” After all, we say “all creation” when we mean “creatures.” One must also know that “working” is an activity, and, really, it is worked rather than itself working. If there is a “working,” it has been worked, that is to say, it will not work and, as soon as it has been worked, it will cease.
He illustrates all these things with the example of the soul-endowed body and the fiery iron, and he applies these to Christ in this way:
In Christ our Lord (he says), the power of miracles was the working of the divinity. And the deeds of His hands, the willing and the saying, “I will; be clean,” were the working of His humanity. The effect of the humanity was the broken bread and that the leper heard, “I will.” But the multiplication of the bread and the cleansing of the leper belonged to His divinity. You see, through the workings of both soul and body, He shows one and the same related and equal action of His own. For as we understand that His natures were united and have interpenetration with each other, and as we do not deny their difference but even number them and acknowledge that they are inseparable, so also we know the union of the wills and works, and we recognize their difference.
And later:
He is one, being both this and that, willing and working both according to this and according to that, that is to say, divinely and humanly. Therefore it is necessary to affirm two workings [
] in Christ because of His duality of nature. After all, if the nature of things is different, the working of those things is different, and if the working of things is different, the nature of those things is also different. And, on the other hand, if the nature of things is the same, the working of those things is the same, and if the working of things is one, the nature of those things is also one, according to the fathers who interpret the divine [writings].
The rule of the Scholastics is in harmony with these points cited from Damascenus: “Doing belongs to the subject [ suppositum], person, or hypostasis, but the form or nature is the cause of the doing.” Scaliger, Ex. 251: “As actions are unique, they belong to unique [agents].”
The philosophers distinguish between the “subject which” and the “subject by which.” The “subject which” is the actual subject or composite that works. The “subject by which” is the power to act, the power by which it works. Thus, in our argument, the “subject which” is Christ, the person who is both God and man. The “subject by which” is the human or divine nature according to which Christ is said to work, to act, or even to suffer. Here, nevertheless, the word “nature” is taken to mean the properties of the nature. “Working” [ 
] is the actual operation or motion or action that proceeds from the nature or natural property, because here nature is considered according as the ability or power to work is in it. “Work” [ 
] is the effect of the working; therefore it is referred to this or that nature. “Effect” [
] is the effect worked in common, proceeding from the operation of both natures, and this Damascenus calls 
["divine-human working"] (loc. cit.).
We can explain this with the example of a man. A man is a worker, namely, the whole subject. In that one man there is body and soul—these are his essential parts; the nature of each is different,2 the property of each is different, and therefore also the working is different. Therefore some things are attributed to the entire Christ according to one or the other part, namely, with regard to the soul or to the body. But some are attributed to both parts, namely, those in which the nature, property, efficacy, and action of both body and soul concur, as when I say, “The man is speaking, writing, sees,” etc.
§ 286. We cited the statements of the fathers in our locus On the Person of Christ [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 7], § 80, and to those we can add the following: Athanasius, Contra Arianos, orat. 5: “Reaching out His hand, the Word healed the one with the fever. Uttering a human voice, He raised Lazarus. Extending His arms on the cross, He prostrated the prince of the air.”
Cyril (Letters 10 and 29) teaches that “regarding the words in the Gospel that are attributed to the one person of Christ, some befit His divinity, some befit His humanity, and some words, he says, are of middle order and are somehow communicative and have to do with both at the same time—both the humanity and the divinity.” De rect. fid. ad Theod.: “The soul that was given union with the Word descended into hell and by divine power said to those in chains: ‘Come forth!’ ”
Nazianzen, Orat. 4 de Theolog.: “Some things that are affirmed about Christ are not proper to just one nature but are common to both.”
Leo, De pass., sermon 1: “The Word there was not separated from the man nor was the man disassociated from the Word. The humility was not scorned, because the majesty was not diminished. Nothing injured the inviolable nature, which was inflicted on the passible3 nature. And that entire mystery was consummated by both the humanity and the deity.” Letter 81: “The deity and humanity were connected into such a unity from the conception of the Virgin that divine things were not done without the man nor human things without God.”
Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 3: “He was one and the same, working both divine and human things in each form with the communion of the other.” Chapter 14: “He wills and works in each form with the communion of the other.” In ch. 19 he cites a statement of Dionysius: “He truly became man from men, beyond men, and above men, so that later it was not that He worked divine things according to God and human things according to man. Rather, being the God-man, or God-made-man, He administered to us a new divine-human [
] action.”
The commentator of Damascenus, on bk. 3, ch. 15: “The human activity of Christ has divine power as a co-accomplisher. His divine activity has human working as a co-worker in the manner of a connected instrument. In this way the divine activity is not bereft of human activity nor the human of divine.”
Antithesis.
§ 287. (I) The Monothelites claimed that there was one and the same will in Christ’s two natures. Thus they confused the distinction between “the thing that wills” [
], the “willing” [
], the “will” [
], and “the thing willed” [
], and even between “working” [
] and “effect” [
]. The Sixth Universal Council was held against them under Constantine V Pogonatus around AD 681. In that council they condemned Bishop Sergius of Constantinople, the instigator of this heresy, who drew it from the swamps of the Monophysites, who claimed that there was one nature in Christ after the union took place. The stain of this error penetrated all the way to the Roman see itself, which people imagine is immune to every error. For Pope Honorius writes as follows to Sergius: “As we look on it with forethought and circumspection, we praise what your brotherhood has written. We confess that there is one will of our Lord Jesus Christ,” etc. In the same place he says: “One should not ask about one or two workings [energiis] of Christ; they are grammatical and philosophical. It is enough if we believe and confess that our Lord Jesus Christ is one worker of the divine and human natures and that He works in both natures divinely and humanly.” He also adds this argument: “If we say that there are two workings, this can appear to be Nestorian; if one, Eutychian.” This letter of Honorius, however, was read in that aforementioned Sixth Universal Council, was publicly condemned, and ordered to be burned (act. 13). In the Pontificale it is said of Leo II that “he held the Sixth Synod in which Sergius and Honorius were condemned, who claimed that there was one will and working in Christ.” The Council of Rome held by Hadrian II clearly confesses: “Honorius was condemned because of a charge of heresy.” The Seventh Synod, last act., pronounces a curse on Honorius and the other Monothelites. The Eighth Synod, act. 7, approves of the letter of the council of Rome under Hadrian II, in which letter the pope asserts along with the council that “Honorius was condemned after his death by the Sixth Synod because he had been accused of heresy.” The defenders of the Roman see took this hard—Baronius, Bellarmine, Gretserus, etc. Therefore they twist themselves into various shapes, sometimes asserting that “the acts of the synod were corrupted,” sometimes contending that “no errors are contained in Honorius’s letter.” In addition to the rest of the points, we also set against them the fact that Melchior Canus (Loci, bk. 6, last chapter) confesses without circumlocution that “Honorius was a Monothelite.”
Against this error we set forth: (1) The clarity of passages of scripture. “Not as I will, but as You will” (Matt. 26:39). “I came down from heaven not to do My will but the will of Him who sent Me” (John 6:[38]). (2) The verity and integrity of the human nature. The Son of God assumed a complete and perfect human nature. Therefore He also assumed a true soul, endowed with the ability to understand and will. (3) His natural duality. Whatever things have the same working [ 
], those things also have the same nature, and whatever things have diverse natures, those things also have diverse operations; a distinct operation flows from a distinct will. Damascenus cites the statements of the devout ancients in De orth. fid., bk. 3, ch. 14ff., where he also responds to the arguments of the Monothelites. (Cf. Cent. Magd. 7, ch. 5, p. 129; ch. 7, p. 224; ch. 9, p. 414.)
§ 288. (II) The Calvinists argue: (1) “Christ’s human nature in the works of His office does only human things from its natural properties.” In this way they overturn that canon of the Council of Chalcedon that “each nature does what is proper to it with the communication of the other.”
On the contrary, in the second genus we proved that Christ’s flesh “completed the divine workings because of its pure union with the Word,” as Damascenus says, bk. 3, ch. 17. You see, because the offices and benefits of Christ the Mediator, Savior, and Redeemer are such that in many or the majority of them the human nature in Christ, solely by its natural powers and essential properties, cannot cooperate with the divine nature, therefore from the hypostatic union and the sitting at the right hand of God the human nature was given truly divine and infinite gifts beyond its natural properties. These exerted themselves effectually in the works of His office, and for this reason Athanasius, Cyril, and Damascenus call Christ’s flesh an “instrument,” namely, not separated or divided but united; not idle and unoccupied, but active and effectual; in, with, and through this “instrument” Christ carries out the duties of mediator. Athanasius, Contra Arian., bk. 4, p. 259: “The human nature was made the instrument of the deity, to exercise its working [
] through it.” Cyril (bk. 4, on John 14) calls the human nature “the co-worker of the deity in performing miracles.”
(2) They say that “Christ’s flesh concurred in performing miracles as only a bare and idle instrument, revealing to the ears or eyes of people whatever the deity of the Word was accomplishing.” Danaeus, Epist. ad frat. Tubing., in Opera, p. 1513: “Christ’s flesh contributes no more to the working of miracles than the edge of [Christ’s] garment contributed to curing the woman with a flow of blood.” Sadeel, De verit. hum. nat., p. 141: “Christ’s flesh contributed no more to the performance of works of giving life, healing, etc., than the apostles’ flesh brought to the miracles that they performed or than the rod of Moses helped Moses do his miracles.” (See also Danaeus, Exam. Chemnic., ch. 4, pp. 118 and 156; Adm. Neostad., p. 270.)
On the contrary: (a) The difference between these examples is extreme. After all, the flesh of the apostles, much less Moses’ rod, was not assumed into the hypostasis of the Word, nor was it elevated to the right hand of God, as was the flesh of Christ. Nowhere does Scripture say that the staff of Moses was endowed with miracle-working power as Christ is said to have been “endowed with the Spirit and with power to perform miracles” (Acts 10:38). (b) The consequence would be that the human nature is merely an external accident of the Word, an idle instrument, that Christ’s flesh is life-giving in name alone, etc. (c) What will become of those emphatic oracles of Scripture? “Jesus perceived in Himself that power had gone forth from Him” (Mark 5:30). “Power went out from Him and was healing everyone” (Luke 6:19). About this working of miracles, compare what we cited from Scripture and from the fathers in the immediately preceding chapter.
(3) They completely exclude Christ’s flesh “from the works of the royal office and from the application of the benefits acquired by the death of Christ.” In Exam., p. 285, Danaeus denies that Christ’s flesh is life-giving. Page 371: “Christ’s blood does not pardon our sins.” Herborn. denies that “salvation is applied to us through the flesh” (spic., p. 120), etc.
Questions about the third genus of the communication of properties.
§ 289. (I) The question arises: Is there a communication of properties in this genus of propositions? Some deny this and use this argument: “The effect or name of the office and the property thereof differ greatly.” We respond. (1) Where definition has a place, there one cannot deny what has been defined. However, in this genus, the definition of the communication of properties does have a place. The Council of Chalcedon defines it thus: “Each nature does what is proper to itself” (here you have what is particular or proper [
]) “with the communication of the other” (here you have the communion [
]). But if you connect the “proper” and the “communion,” you will have the communication of properties. Cyril, Letters 10 and 29: “Some words of the Gospel that are attributed to the one person of Christ are in some way communicative (
), which have to do with both natures at the same time, divine and human, and which are understood to be about the true person according to both natures.”
(2) If there is a true communication of properties when a property of one nature is predicated about the person, surely there will be a communication of properties when a property of both natures is at the same time attributed to the person and predicated about it. The former is obvious from the first genus of communication. Therefore the latter cannot be denied. The logic of the connection in the major premise should be taken from the purpose of the incarnation, which is the execution of the office of redemption and salvation.
(3) Christ’s blood cleanses us from all sins [1 John 1:7] either outside of the communication of properties or through it. The former cannot be said because by its natural power blood cannot cleanse from sins. Therefore the latter is left. Clearly Christ’s human nature does not act in the works of the office only by natural power but also by divine power communicated to it from the hypostatic union.
(4) One cannot draw a conclusion in this way: “The names of the office befit Christ according to both natures, and an effect distinct from the working is predicated about Christ according to both natures. Therefore in those predications there is no communion of properties.” The canon of Chalcedon expressly contradicts this and affirms that each nature “does what is proper to itself with the communication of the other.”
(5) Therefore one must distinguish between the theological and philosophical meanings of the word “proper” [proprium]. To philosophers, “proper” is that which in essence is later adjoined to its subject only and always befits it; for this reason it is called 
and a “second component of the nature” [secundum naturae momentum].4
They also distinguish “proper” as primary actuality from “operation” as secondary actuality. On the other hand, theologians generally take the term “proper” to mean everything that befits just one thing always, whether it be essence or adjunct or effect, or whether it comes by some other name. Thus they refer the communication of divine glories to the communication of properties, though those divine glories nevertheless are not adjuncts of the Word, like accidents distinct from it, but one and the same with the Word.
§ 290. (II) The question arises: How does this genus differ from the preceding two? It differs from the first in this way: The former takes for its own any of the properties of its own nature, but the latter unites or connects both in the office of Christ. It differs from the second with regard to the subject, because in the former, the name of the human nature is set as the subject, but in the latter, the name of the person or of both natures is set as the subject. And it differs also with regard to the predicate, because in the former, divine glories are being predicated, while in the latter, the works of the office are being predicated.
§ 291. (III) The question arises: Paraeus writes (Iren., p. 267): “How would we teach that Christ the man did not perform miracles with His own power, since we believe that He is God by His own, proper deity?” Does this sufficiently deflect the accusation of Nestorian sundering that was made against him?
We respond. (1) Paraeus is contradicting both himself and his associates in the faith—himself, because in the same place he asserts that Christ the man worked miracles with a “proper power,” though he elsewhere leaves nothing to Him except the external action of His will, voice, authority, etc.; his associates, because they say that Christ’s flesh contributed no more to His miracles than the rod of Moses contributed to performing miracles.
(2) One question is being asked; another is being answering. The question involves Christ the man, that is, Christ’s humanity as it is personally united with the Word. But he answers with regard to Christ our God, whom He indeed correctly asserts is God by His own, proper deity; but this is out of place, if it is referred to the question set forth.
(3) Through Zwinglian alteration [
] he takes the word “man” to mean only the Word, for that is what he understands by the word “man” in the first part, that He works miracles not with an alien power but with a proper power, and that He is God by His own, proper deity, as is apparent from the second part. But now, Christ performs miracles by His proper power not as man but as God, and He is God by His own, proper deity not as man but as God. As man, He works miracles not with His own proper power but with the power personally communicated to Himself by the Word. Therefore Paraeus here does not understand Christ as man but, through the Zwinglian alteration, as God.
(4) How can he assert that Christ the man or according to His human nature performed miracles by divine power when on pp. 265 and 268 he expressly writes that the 
for working miracles was not really communicated to Christ’s humanity by the Word?
Practical use.
§ 292. As there is a “making common” from the personal union, so also from the spiritual union between God and the faithful soul, between Christ and the Church, a spiritual “making common” arises that consists in the production of a common effect toward which God and the believer concur. Christ the King and Priest of the Church makes believers “kings and priests” before God (Rev. 1:6), “that they may rule over the earth” (Rev. 5:10); that they may be “a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation, a people of His possession, to declare the power of Him who called them out of darkness into His wonderful light” (1 Pet. 2:9); to be “a holy priesthood to offer up spiritual sacrifices acceptable to God through Christ” (v. 5); “to present their bodies as a living sacrifice, holy and pleasing to God” (Rom. 12:1); “to offer up a sacrifice of praise to God always, that is, the fruit of lips that confess His name” (Heb. 13:15). In these and similar effects, God does not act alone, and believers do not act alone, but believers are God’s co-workers (1 Cor. 3:9). For they are “driven by the Spirit of God” (Rom. 8:14) in such a way that they themselves also act. John 15:5: “I am the vine, you are the branches. Whoever remains in Me and I in him, the same brings forth much fruit, because without Me you can do nothing.” Augustine, De corrept. et grat., ch. 2: “They should understand that, if they are the children of God, they are driven by the Spirit of God so that they do what must be done. And when they act, they give thanks to Him by whom the action occurred.” Just as the union of the two natures in Christ occurred so that the Son of God might execute the works of mediator in and through the assumed human nature, so also the spiritual union between God and the faithful soul comes together in such a way that those works that please God and are salutary for the Church are done.
If you want to know, then, whether that spiritual union between Christ and your soul is taking place, whether “Christ dwells in your heart through faith” (Eph. 3:17), whether “Christ is in you” (2 Cor. 13:5), whether “He lives in you” (Gal. 2:20), consider this: Are the spiritual works of king and priest being accomplished by you? Do you control your own flesh? Do you overcome the world, that is, “the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes, and the pride of life” through faith? Are you offering God the fruit of your lips? Do you present your body as a living sacrifice, etc.? For unless these works follow externally, you boast in vain about the interior indwelling of Christ, for when Christ lives and dwells in someone’s heart, He is not idle but effectual through love and other exercises of piety, etc.
1 An invalid argument that confuses statements in the divided sense with statements in the composite sense. On “divided sense” and “composite sense,” see the Glossary, p. 332.
2 Read utriusque alia est natura with Cotta instead of utriusque est natura.
3 Read passibili instead of possibili.
4 That is, an affection or accident of the nature. Micraelius (col. 786–87) explains momentum primum and momentum secundum in this way: “For metaphysicians, components are noncomplex principles, namely, essence and existence. For essence is called first component; existence, second component. On account of this, it is right to say that a being is posited in two components, namely, through the internal principles, or through matter and form, in the first; through affections or accidents in the second. Thus also a composition is said to be either of the first component, from matter and form; or of the second component, of subject and accidents.”