Chapter XI: Three genera of this communication of properties are established. The first is that by which the things prop

CHAPTER XI: ON THE FIRST GENUS

OF THE COMMUNICATION OF PROPERTIES IN PARTICULAR

§ 186. Thesis I: The first genus of the communication of properties is that by which the properties of both natures are predicated about the person of Christ.

With regard to this genus, notice: (I) Its foundation, which the Formula of Concord in the [Solid] Declaration, in the article On the Person of Christ, p. 770 [Fc SD VIII 36], explains as follows: “Because in Christ there are two distinct natures that are neither changed nor confused in their own essences and properties, but there is only one person of both natures, those things that are proper to only one nature are attributed to the other nature not as though separated and apart but to the entire person, who is at the same time God and man, whether He be named God or man.” Therefore the foundation of this communication is the unity of the person. Because, after the incarnation occurred, the one person of Christ subsists in two natures and of two natures, clad (so to speak) in the properties of each, therefore the properties of both natures, divine as well as human, are predicated about the one composite person of Christ.

(II) Its titles. This genus is called “exchange” and “mode of exchange.” Nazianzen calls it “linking of names” because “just as the natures are, so also the enunciations are united to the one person.” Cyril calls this “appropriation, because the entire person is claiming what is proper to one nature.” Theodoret (Dial. 2) calls it “the interchange¹ and communion of names.” Vigilius: “The communication by which the things proper to the natures become common to the person.” Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 4: “This is the manner of exchange, either nature giving in exchange to the other its own things through the sameness of the hypostasis and the interpenetration of the natures to each other.”

(III) Its subject. In predications of this genus, a pronoun of the person or of a nature—whether divine or human, whether of high things or of low things—or from both names is always set as the subject. You see, because Christ is neither only man nor only God but is God and man, the God-man, therefore both divine and human things are predicated about the one person of Christ. “It makes no difference what substance Christ is named from, because while the unity of the person remains inseparable, the entire Son of Man because of the flesh and the entire Son of God because of the one deity with the Father is the same,” as Leo says, Letter 41. Those people do not go off in a different direction from this opinion who say that as the subject there is sometimes placed the concrete of the nature, because the name of the person and the concrete of the nature do not differ really. In this first genus, when the concrete of the nature is set [as the subject], then this is not understood as the nature in the abstract but as the entire person, which, after the incarnation, is no longer simple, subsisting in only one nature, but is composite, because here one is discussing God Incarnate, not God without the flesh. Furthermore, the discussion does not involve bare man, but this man who in the unity of person is at the same time both God and man.

(IV) Its species and examples. The following kinds of propositions belong to this first genus of the communication of properties: (1) When a divine property is predicated about Christ the God-man, such as “Behold, I am with you all the days” (Matt. 28:20). “One Lord, Jesus Christ, through whom all things, and we through Him” (1 Cor. 8:6). “Jesus Christ is in you” (2 Cor. 13:5). “Christ is all things and is in all things” (Col. 3:11). “Jesus Christ, yesterday and today, that is, from eternity” (Heb. 13:8). (2) When a human property is predicated about Christ the God-man, such as “Christ was born of the Virgin Mary” (Luke 2:11). “Christ rose from the dead; Christ is of the seed of David” (2 Tim. 2:8). “Christ suffered and rose again” (Rom. 8:34). “Christ was crucified in weakness” (2 Cor. 13:4). (3) When a divine property is predicated about Christ our God, or about the person named from the divinity: “the things that the Father does, [these the Son also does likewise,]” etc. (John 5:19). (4) When a human property is predicated about Christ the man, or about the person named from the humanity: “The Son of Man is crucified” (Matt. 20:18). (5) When a divine property is predicated about Christ the man: “When you see the Son of Man ascending,” etc. (John 6:62). (6) When a human property is predicated about Christ our God: “The Lord of glory was crucified” (1 Cor. 2:8). Indeed, anyone will easily see what the communication of properties is when a divine property is predicated about Christ the man, or about the person named from the humanity, and when a human property is predicated about Christ our God, or about the person named from the divinity. However, it could be doubtful why a communication of properties is claimed when divine things are predicated about God and human things about man. But one must understand that the word “God” does not mean the fleshless Son of God but the incarnate Son, and that the word “man” does not mean bare man but this man who at the same time is true God in the unity of His person. Hence there is no less a communication of properties if I say, “The Son of Man suffers,” than if I say, “The Son of God suffers.”

(V) Its reciprocation. Because the union of the natures is reciprocal, therefore the propositions in this first genus of the communication of properties are also reciprocal. That is, divine and human things are predicated about Christ the God-man equally; human things are predicated about Christ our God as equally as divine things are predicated about Christ the man. As proper as Christ’s deity is to Him essentially through His eternal begetting from the Father, so proper, too, is the assumed flesh to Him personally from the very moment of His conception through and because of the personal union. Therefore, in reference to one and the same person, to one and the same Christ, both divine things are predicated on account of His deity and human things are predicated because of His humanity. Just as the personal propositions are reciprocal—”God is man, man is God”—so also the personal propositions in this first genus of the communication of properties are reciprocal. You see, because “man” is truly predicated about God, therefore human attributes are also predicated truly about the same. Because “God” is predicated truly about this man, therefore divine attributes are also predicated truly about the same.

(VI) Its distinctive particles. Just as the two natures have been personally united but nevertheless remain distinct in their own essences, so also in this first genus of the communication of properties the properties of each nature are predicated about the person. (Meanwhile, distinctive particles are used, and they show according to which nature something is being predicated about the person.) The properties of both natures are predicated about the person of Christ. Nevertheless they do not become the properties of both natures but remain the properties of that nature of which they are the property. They are attributed to the person because both natures have one common hypostasis. The Formula of Concord says (ibid.): “In this genus of predications it does not follow that those things that are attributed to the entire person are at the same time the properties of both natures. Rather, we must declare distinctly according to which nature something is attributed to the entire person.” Paul is speaking in this manner when he says about Christ: “The Son of God was born of the seed of David according to the flesh” (Rom. 1:3). And Peter says about Christ, “He was put to death in the flesh” (1 Pet. 3:18) and “He suffered in the flesh” (1 Pet. 4:1). Compare: “Christ is of the loins of David according to the flesh” (Acts 2:30). “Christ is from the fathers according to the flesh” (Rom. 9:5). “Christ was crucified from weakness but lives from the power of God” (2 Cor. 13:4).

Regarding these distinctive particles, one should note: First, with regard to their proper and genuine meaning they are not separative and divisive, as if through them the natures are separated and divided so that the human things are restricted only to the humanity and divine things only to the divinity. Rather, they are distinguishing (because they show according to what nature such things are being predicated about the person), they are discriminating of the natures and the natural properties, and they are indicative of the cause according to itself, showing the first cause, in and of itself,² why human things are attributed to God and divine things to man. Second, with regard to equivalence [aequipollentia] it is the same whether I say that Christ suffered “according to the flesh” (Rom. 1:3; 9:5) or “in flesh” (Eph. [2:15?]). In 2 Cor. 13:4 we have “from [weakness]” and in Heb. 10:20 there occurs the particle “through the veil,” that is, through His own flesh; “through His own blood,” Acts 20:28; Heb. 9:12. Sometimes it is set in the ablative³ case: “He was mortified in the flesh []” (1 Pet. 3:18), “Christ suffered in the flesh []” (1 Pet. 4:1). Third, with regard to use, they are opposed to both the Nestorian tearing apart of the one person and the Eutychian confusion of the two natures. After all, because divine and human things are being predicated about one and the same Christ, therefore the unity of the person is asserted against Nestorius. And the distinctive particles show according to which nature both divine and human things are being declared about Christ. Therefore the duality of natures is asserted against Eutyches. Note also that they are added not always actually and expressly but must be supplied from other passages of Scripture.

§ 187. (VII) The statements of the fathers. We cited some of them in our article On the Person of Christ [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 7], § 74. To these we must add the following: Justin, Expos. fidei, p. 209: “When you hear terms that differ from each other about the one Son, compare and distribute to the natures fittingly the things that are being said. If there is anything great and divine, ascribe this to the divine nature; but if there is anything small and human, impute this to the human nature. In this way, you see, you will avoid the dissonance of terms as a nature takes what it has engendered (which is innate in itself), and from the statement of Holy Writ you will confess the one Son begotten both before the ages and recently.” And, a little earlier: “Since the Son is both God and man, He canceled and wiped away the transgression and fall of Adam. According as He is man, He not only lived His life innocently without fault but also underwent voluntary death—indeed, by His highest and exact conduct removing the fall, and by His undeserved death extinguishing [our] deserved debt. But according as He is God, He both restored what was destroyed and completely destroyed death itself. Therefore there is one Son, who both was destroyed and restored what had been destroyed, for as man He was destroyed, but as God He restored.”

Irenaeus, bk. 3, ch. 21, p. 212: “The divine Scriptures bear witness of both with regard to Him: that He had the outstanding begetting beyond all people from His most high Father and that He enjoyed the outstanding birth, which was from the Virgin. And the Scriptures prophesied all these things about Him: that He was a man ugly and subject to suffering, that He rode on the foal of an ass, that He drank gall and vinegar, that He was despised among the people and descended all the way down to death, and that He is the holy Lord, wonderful counselor, beautiful of appearance, mighty God, coming on the clouds as judge of all. For just as He was man in order to be tempted, so also He was the Word in order to be glorified.”

Vincent of Lérins, Adv. prof. vocum novit., bk. 4: “The Church preaches that the unity of the person has this power, that because of it, it ascribes divine things to the man and human things to God by a wonderful and indescribable mystery. She does not deny that because of it the man descended from heaven, and she believes that God according to man was crucified on earth.”

Nazianzen, Orat. de Filio: “In brief, transfer the things that are more sublime to the deity or to the nature that is better than the passions and the body. But attribute the more humble things to the composite who emptied Himself and became incarnate for your sake.”

Gelasius, Contra Nestorian.: “Whatever belongs to the deity, the man and Son of Man has. Whatever belongs to the humanity, the Lord of majesty has.”

Vigilius, Contra Eutych., bk. 5: “It is wicked for a man to alienate from the Word those things that are proper to the flesh through the exception of propriety and to alienate from the flesh the things that are proper to the Word through the same law of exception, because both are common to them in Christ and Christ is both.”

Damascenus, Orthod. fid., bk. 3, ch. 3: “The Word appropriates the human things, for all that belongs to His holy flesh is His. He imparts to the flesh His own things according to the manner of exchange because of the interpenetration of the parts with each other and the personal unification.” Chapter 4: “When we speak of the hypostasis, whether we name it from both natures or from one of them, we still place upon it the properties of both natures. For Christ is both; He is called both God and man, both created and uncreated, subject to suffering and incapable of suffering. When He is called ‘Son of God’ and ‘God’ from one of His parts, He still receives the properties of the consubsisting nature, that is, of the flesh, being spoken of as God who suffers and as the Lord of glory crucified, not according as He is God but according as the same one is also man. Also, when He is called ‘man’ and ‘Son of Man,’ He [still] receives the glorious properties of the divine nature: a child before the ages and a man without beginning—not according as He is a child or man, but according as God, being before the ages, became a child in these last days. This is the manner of exchange: each nature giving in exchange to the other its own things because of the sameness of the hypostasis and their interpenetration with each other.”

Bernard, Sermon 3 in Vigil. nat. Dom.: “He also wished to exalt our weaknesses by His more abundant glory, and His majesty contracted itself that He might unite what better thing He had, namely Himself, to our mud, and that God and mud, majesty and weakness, such great sublimity and such worthlessness, might be united to each other in a single person. For there is nothing more sublime than God, nothing more worthless than mud. Yet with such esteem God descended into the mud, and with such dignity the mud ascended into God, that whatever God did in it, the mud is believed to have done; whatever the mud endured, God is said to have endured therein by a mystery as indescribable as it is incomprehensible.”

Theodoret, Dial. 2, p. 32, edition of Rome: “When we speak about the natures, it is fitting that we assign to each the things that agree with it and that we know that some are proper to the divinity and some to the humanity. Whenever we consider propositions about the person [], we must make the things proper to the natures common, and must attach both these and those to Christ the Savior, and must call the same [person] God, man, Son of God, Son of Man, Son of David, Lord of David, Seed of Abraham, Creator of Abraham, as well as all the others in the self-same way.” Dial. 3: “The union makes the names or attributes of the natures common.” (Cf. Chemnitz, De duab. nat., ch. 14, p. 180.)

Antithesis.

§ 188. Antithesis. The Formula of Concord, [Solid] Declaration, in the article On the Person of Christ, p. 770 [FC SD VIII 38], rightly and justly complains that: “Under this rule both the secret and open Sacramentarians, when it is said that what is proper to one nature is attributed to the entire person, conceal their destructive error when they indeed name the entire person but nevertheless take that to mean only one nature—a bare one, as we say—but they completely exclude the other nature as if only the bare human nature alone suffered for us.”

It is clear that this is a very just accusation from the following hypotheses of our adversaries: (1) They claim that the communication of properties is only a verbal predication. Danaeus, Exam., p. 291: “It is a verbal communication of honor.” Admon. Neostad., p. 250: “God really suffered death according as He is man, but He suffered death only in name according as He is God.” Page 70: “The predication of human things about God and divine things about the man is merely verbal as far as the natures are concerned.” The Belgian ministers, in their Epist. ad auctor. Formul. Conc., p. 22: “The communication of properties is a form of speech in which the property that befits one nature is attributed to the person in the concrete.” In the Disput. Ingolst., published in Wittenberg in 1604, thesis 29: “In the natures not even a grammatical or verbal communion of properties can take place.”

On the contrary, as is the union so also is the communication. But now, the union is real. Therefore the communication is also real. As is the communication of natures so also is the communication of properties. But now, the communication of the natures is real, as we showed earlier. Therefore the communication of properties is also real. Therefore against our adversaries we set forth Sohnius, who writes (Exeg., p. 306): “As is the truth of the thing itself so is the predication. That is, the predication is true just as the thing itself that is enunciated is true, for the speaking arises from the things. Nothing can be affirmed truly about anything if the thing itself is otherwise than the word signifies.” (Compare what we said in ch. 8, “On the Communication of the Natures” [§§ 148–54], and ch. 10, “On the Communication of the Properties in General” [§§ 174–85.].)

(2) They explain propositions of this first genus through such alteration [] by which they understand “the name of the person that has been set as the subject as merely that nature whose property is expressed in the predicate.” The Cons. orth., pp. 18 and 122, and the Admonit. Neost., pp. 70 and 250, have followed Zwingli, their patriarch.

On the contrary, if in these propositions the name of the person is explained through an abstract of the nature, the personal union is taken away, the Nestorian tearing apart follows, every true and real communion is denied, and the entire mystery of our redemption and salvation is destroyed, as will become more clear from the following.

Nor is what they object true, that “Damascenus, too, calls this first genus of communication ‘alteration,’ “ because the “alteration” of Damascenus and the “alteration” of Zwingli differ from each other entirely. Damascenus takes “alteration” to mean nothing other than “exchange” [], by which both divine and human things are predicated in reality about one and the same person, yet in different respects []. The distinctive particles show according to which nature anything is declared about the person. But the “alteration” of Zwingli substitutes the name of the nature for the name of the person, and in these propositions he invents a figure of speech by which one thing may be said but another understood. According to Damascenus, God truly and really suffered, but according to the other [], that is, according to His assumed humanity. According to Zwingli, God did not truly and really suffer, but only the human nature, united with the deity, suffered. We shall address this subject in greater detail a little later.

Questions about the first genus of communication.

§ 189. (I) The question arises: should we refer to the first genus of communication those predications in which the emptying, and the divine exaltation and majesty opposed thereto and communicated to Him according to the flesh, are predicated about Christ? Some people make this claim, and this is their hypothesis: that “the properties of humanity” predicated about Christ should be understood not only as the essential properties of the human nature but also in general as all the things that are said about the assumed man through the condition of nature or of majesty or of dispensation. From this they infer the following: Because “man” is predicated about the Son of God, not only are those things enunciated about the Son of God that are proper to man (such as “The Son of God was born, suffered, and died”), but also the things that belong to the man through the communication of majesty are enunciated (from which the Son of God is attributed with having been given “life,” “the power of judgment,” and “sitting at the right hand of God”). So also, in a similar manner, because “man” is predicated about Christ, too, not only are things proper to man predicated about Christ, but also the majesty communicated to the man and the emptying opposed to the majesty will be predicated about the same Christ.

Other people are opposed to this opinion and think that predications of this genus are referred more correctly to the second genus of the communication of properties, since the name of the person set as the subject should be explained as referring to the human nature, and according to this human nature the emptying and exaltation befit Christ.

But the explanation adduced here does not at all keep them from being referred to the first genus because, though emptying and exaltation have a place only in the human nature, nevertheless because of the unity of the person it is right to predicate them about the entire Christ. In fact, the reality itself compels us to refer propositions of this kind to the first genus, for in the second only divine glories are predicated about the assumed flesh but by no means the emptying, which has to do with lowly things, not sublime ones. Therefore we must distinguish between exaltation and the glories conferred in the exaltation. Whenever exaltation and the emptying opposed to it are predicated about Christ, there arises from this a predication of the first genus. But whenever the glories conferred in the exaltation—which are like the “material” of the exaltation—are predicated about Christ according to His human nature, there arises from this a predication of the second genus.

§ 190. (II) The question arises: From what source can one learn what things in this genus are being predicated about Christ according to the divine nature and what things are being predicated according to the human nature? We respond. The properties of either nature are predicated about the person either simply or with a specification and determination, and this specification is expressed either with the ablative case or through the distinguishing prepositions “in,” “of,” “through,” “according to” [], etc. If the specification is expressly added, it will readily appear according to which nature such things are being predicated about Christ. But if it is omitted, then one must seek out from the circumstances of the text and from the analogy of faith according to which nature the predicate is being attributed to Christ.

The things that mark the very essence of the Word or have to do with the time preceding the incarnation or that contain a property that overturns the essence of the human nature—these things we must take according to the property of the divine nature. In John 10:30, Christ says, “I and the Father are one.” This expresses the very essence of the Word and His consubstantiality with the Father; therefore we must take that statement according to the divinity. In John 8:56, Christ says, “Before Abraham was, I am.” This statement concerns the time before the incarnation, and therefore we must take it according to His divinity. Whenever Christ is said to be infinite and immense, a property is being put in the predicate that would overturn the essence of the human nature as being finite; therefore we must understand it according to His divinity. On the other hand, whatever expresses the suffering, change, alteration, or even the emptying and exaltation that happened in time—this must be understood as being attributed according to the human nature, because the divinity is unchangeable. Thus whenever Christ is said to have suffered, to have been emptied, to have become the Lord, etc., this cannot be understood according to His divinity but must be understood according to His humanity.

§ 191. Question (III): should the distinctive particles be referred to the subject or to the predicate? We respond. Scripture refers them to the predicate. “Christ suffered in the flesh” (1 Pet. 4:1). He was “put to death in the flesh” (1 Pet. 3:18). This very thing can be observed in all the other examples. To prop up their “alteration” [], the Calvinists prefer to refer them to the subject. However, they do not yet get what they are looking for, because it is one thing to say, “Christ according to the flesh suffered,” but another to say, “Only the flesh of Christ suffered,” as we shall prove a little later.

Practical use.

§ 192. Just as divine and human things are predicated about Christ because of the personal union of the two natures in Christ, so also through the spiritual union God and the faithful soul, and Christ and the Church, become one mystical thing, “one spirit” (1 Cor. 6:17), about which both human and divine things are predicated. Augustine, preface to Psalm 40:

We quite often commend and we are not ashamed to repeat what is useful to you to retain, that our Lord Jesus Christ very often speaks from Himself, that is, from His person, and says that He is our Head—and very often from the person of His body that we are also His Church. However, He speaks in such a way that the words sound as though from the mouth of one man, so that we understand that head and body are in a unity of wholeness and are not separated from each other, like that marriage about which it is said, “The two will be in one flesh.” If, then, we acknowledge two in one flesh, then we must acknowledge two in one voice.

 

Through this mystical exchange, Christ transfers our sins to Himself and grants His righteousness to us through faith. “He became sin for us that we might be made the righteousness of God in Him” (2 Cor. 5:21). This is not a bare and verbal predication but a most effective and, so to speak, most real imputation. Christ took our sins into Himself (Isa. 53:12; John 1:29; 1 Pet. 2:24). Because of this taking, He attributes them to Himself. “O God, You know my foolishness, and my sins have not been hidden from You” (Ps. 69:5). This taking of our sins is so true, real, and effectual that Christ is forced to endure the punishments for our sins. “He was wounded for our iniquities, He was bruised because of our crimes” (Isa. 53:5). “He became a curse for us” (Gal. 3:13). In turn, Christ grants His righteousness to believers, and the heavenly Father imputes it to believers (Rom. 4:5), on account of which they are called “righteousness,” that is, perfectly righteous in Christ (2 Cor. 5:21). This imputation, too, is true, real, and most effective, so that we are absolved from the punishments for our sins and are written down as heirs of heavenly life. Luther, commentary on Galatians 2:

As far as justification is concerned, it is necessary for Christ and me to be joined most closely so that He lives in me and I in Him. However, because He lives in me, therefore whatever grace, righteousness, life, peace, and salvation is in me is of Christ Himself. Yet that very thing is mine because of the joining and adhering that is through faith, through which Christ and I become one body, so to speak, in the Spirit. Because Christ dwells in me, therefore grace, righteousness, life, and eternal salvation must at the same time be with Him.

 

Also: “Through faith you are so joined to Christ that He and you become one person, so to speak, out of two. This cannot be separated but must adhere to Him forever so that you can say with faith, ‘I am Christ,’ that is, ‘The righteousness, victory, and life of Christ are mine.’ And in turn Christ Himself may say, ‘I am that sinner,’ that is, ‘His sins, death, etc., are Mine.’ “ So, then, we are sinners in ourselves; we are righteous in Christ. We are weak in ourselves; we are strong in Christ. We are needy in ourselves; we are rich in Christ. “As having nothing, yet possessing everything” (2 Cor. 6:9–10).

The appropriating predications.

§ 193. Thesis II: Those predications in which the properties of the human nature are predicated about the Son of God also belong to the first genus of communication.

Some people claim that there is a distinct genus of communication in those, but these can be referred quite fittingly to the first genus as a species thereof, as will become obvious from the following. Therefore we must note regarding this genus: (1) Its foundation. Because in the fullness of time the Son of God assumed the human nature into the unity of His hypostasis, therefore He truly and really appropriates all the properties of that human nature to Himself—so truly and really as if He had them in His own deity. You see, after the incarnation took place, the hypostasis is common and the same to both the divine and human natures.

(2) Its names. This genus is called “appropriation” [] because the Word appropriates to Himself the properties of the assumed flesh. Cyril (Defens. anathem. 12 ad Evod.) calls it “dispensative appropriation.”

(3) Its subject. In these propositions the concrete of the divine nature is set as the subject: “the Word,” “the incarnate Son of God.”

(4) Its examples. “Jehovah says, ‘When they look at Me whom they have pierced …’ “ (Zech. 12:10). “God handed over His only-begotten Son” (John 3:16). “You have killed the Author of life” (Acts 3:15). “God acquired the Church by His own blood” (Acts 20:28). “We have been reconciled to God through the death of His Son” (Rom. 5:10). “God’s own Son was handed over into death for us” (Rom. 8:32). “They have crucified the Lord of glory” (1 Cor. 2:8). “The Son of God loved me and gave Himself up” (into death) “for me” (Gal. 2:20). “Christ, being the Son of God, learned obedience in those things that He suffered” (Heb. 5:8). “The Jews killed the Lord Jesus” (1 Thess. 2:15). “Our Lord was crucified” (Rev. 11:8). Here we can place also the passages in which Christ is said to have “handed Himself over for us,” such as Eph. 5:[2], 25; Heb. 9:26; etc.

(5) Distinctive particles are also used here at times. “The Son of God was born of the seed of David according to the flesh” (Rom. 1:3).

(6) Statements of the fathers. Some of these statements were listed in the article On the Person of Christ [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 7], § 76, and to them we add the following. Irenaeus, bk. 5, ch. 16, p. 339: “The very Word of God Incarnate was hanged on the tree.”

The fathers of the Council of Ephesus, Anathema 12: “If anyone does not confess that the Word of God suffered in the flesh, was crucified in the flesh, tasted death in the flesh, was made the firstborn of the dead, according to which He is life and life-giving as God, let him be accursed.” In the letter to Nestorius, Conc., vol. 1, p. 557: “We confess that the very same one who was born of God the Father, God the only-begotten Son, though according to His own nature He was free from suffering, nevertheless according to the Scriptures He endured for us and was bringing the sufferings to Himself in the crucified body of His own flesh impassibly.”

Epiphanius, Haeres. 37, p. 433: “Just as from the sprinkling of blood there is a dyeing on the clothing, but the body of the one wearing the clothes is not stained, and the dyeing of the clothing is accounted not to the clothing but to the person wearing it, so also the suffering,” etc. Epiphanius again, Contra Dimoeritas: “The suffering did not fall upon the divinity, but it happened in the humanity. However, it was not reckoned to the humanity alone but was also reckoned to the divinity of the divinity that does not suffer.”

Athanasius, around the middle of his Letter ad Epictetum: “In some way a nail held up the Word Himself. When He saw them nailed into His body, though that noncorporeal one was able to prohibit them, He did not prohibit, but claimed those things that were the properties of His body for Himself as His own.” And later:

What the human body was suffering, the Word that was joined with the body brought to Himself, that we might be permitted to become partakers of the deity of the Word. Yet that very thing was extremely strange—that the same one was suffering and not suffering. Indeed, He was suffering insofar as His own body, in which He was, was suffering, but not suffering insofar as God by nature is impassible. He, as noncorporeal, existed in a body capable of suffering, and in turn the body was holding the Son of God, incapable of suffering, who was taking away bodily infirmities.

 

Leo, Letter 10 ad Flavian.: “We say that the Son of God suffered and died not in the property of the divine nature but in the assumed weakness of the human nature.”

Damascenus (bk. 3, ch. 25) teaches that there is a twofold appropriation. One is “natural and essential,” the other is “personal and relative.” He says:

The “natural and essential” one is that by which the Lord, because of His love for man, took upon Himself our nature and all that belongs to our nature, having become man in nature and truth and having become acquainted with what belongs to our nature. The “personal and relative” one is when anyone assumes the person of someone else relatively, for example, out of mercy or love, and in his place speaks things about him that do not belong to him per se.

 

Chapter 26:

The very Word of God then endured all things in the flesh while His own nature, which alone was incapable of suffering, remained free of suffering. Because the one Christ—composed of divinity and humanity, being in divinity and humanity—truly suffered, that part that was capable of suffering suffered as it naturally should have suffered, but that part that was incapable of suffering did not suffer with it.

 

He clarifies this with similar and dissimilar examples. He says:

Because the soul is capable of suffering when the body is cut, the soul itself is not cut, but it suffers and hurts with the suffering body. But⁴ the divinity that is incapable of suffering does not share the suffering with the body. One must know this: we say that God suffered in the flesh, but we do not say that the divinity suffered in the flesh or that God suffered through the flesh. For just as when the sun shines on a tree, if the ax cuts the tree, the sun remains unchopped and incapable of suffering, so all the more will the impassible divinity of the Word, coupled with the flesh according to the hypostasis, continue incapable of suffering while the flesh suffers. If someone pours water over fiery iron, it is that which suffers naturally from the water (that is, the fire) that is extinguished. But the iron continues unharmed, for it is not its nature to be damaged by water. All the more, then, as the flesh suffered, the nonsuffering divinity alone did not admit suffering while remaining inseparable from it.

 

Finally, he points out that these examples are not absolutely similar in every respect and adds a memorable statement: “In divine things, it is impossible to find an example that is similar in every respect, whether we are dealing with theology or with economy.”⁵

Antithesis.

§ 194. (I) With regard to the Valentinians, Irenaeus (bk. 1, ch. 1, p. 24) reports that they taught that “the Savior who came down into Christ at His Baptism in the form of a dove remained impassible,” and, consequently, “the Spirit of Christ who had been placed within Him was removed when He was brought before Pilate, and it was the animate [] Christ who suffered.” (Cf. Eusebius, Hist., bk. 3, ch. 27–28, and bk. 7, ch. 23.)

(II) With regard to Basilides, Irenaeus (bk. 1, ch. 23, p. 78) mentions that he taught that “Jesus did not suffer, but a Cyrenean called Simon was forced to carry His cross for Him; this Simon was transfigured by Him and through ignorant error was crucified, so that they thought that he was Jesus; Jesus Himself received the form of Simon and stood there laughing at them.”

(III) Nestorius took suffering away from God completely and attributed it to the humanity alone. For this reason he would concede the proposition “Christ suffered” but would deny the other, “God suffered.” Frequently that well-known statement was on his lips: “Do not brag, Jews, for you have crucified not God but a man.” (See Concil. Colon., vol. 1, 534; Hist. Tripart., bk. 12, ch. 4; and Augustine, De haeres., ch. 91.) The beginning of the error lies in this: that by tearing apart the unity of the person, he thought that Christ was one person but that God or the Son of God was another—though there is one person who is called Christ from both natures at the same time: God or the Son of God from the divine nature, man from the human nature. Luther urges against Nestorius this explanatory syllogism: “This person suffers. This person is God. Therefore God suffers.” In his Dialog., Theodoret, too, is rather discontented with this proposition: “The Word or God suffered for us in the flesh.” He claims it must be said in this way: “Christ suffered in the flesh.”

(IV) In the Qur’an, the Muslims blaspheme and say, “It was not Christ, the Son of Mary, much less the Son of God, but someone similar to Christ who was crucified,” according to Schweiger, Alcor., bk. 2, ch. 10.

(V) The ancient and more recent Arians, likewise, deny the proposition “God suffered.” In fact, they struggle to conclude from His suffering that Christ is not true God, since it is unworthy of God to suffer, to die, to be crucified, etc. The Photinians walk in their footsteps.

(VI) The Jesuits do not explain the proposition “God suffered” correctly, because they do not explain the personal proposition “God is a man” correctly, and they deny the real communication of properties. (Bellarmine, 1., De Christo, bk. 3, ch. 8, compares it with the proposition “The Philosopher is dead.”)

§ 195. (VII) The Calvinists analyze the proposition “God suffered” in such a way that in the final analysis they return to this point: “Only the human nature suffered.” (Steinius, Vindic. conc. irenicae, f. 45, denies that the Calvinists exclude the hypostasis of the Word from communing in suffering and death. But the former will remain true as long as they defend this axiom of theirs: “Properties cannot be communicated in reality to another subject, even one that has been united.” Their own words testify against them.) For this reason, Zwingli explains that proposition through “alteration” []. Consens. orth., pp. 18 and 122, and Admon. Neostad., p. 250: “God really suffered and died insofar as He is man, but only in name insofar as He is God.” Danaeus, Contra Chemnic., p. 321: “The suffering of Christ is attributed to God only by dialectical predication without any real communication.” Page 24: “Christ the man died for us. That is, only the human nature of Christ, which is considered not of itself in a separate hypostasis but in the one person of Christ, died.” In the Colloqu. Mompelgard., p. 213: “We explain this enunciation, that God is said to have suffered, in this way: God, that is, the flesh united with the deity, suffered.” [Beza,] Resp. 1. ad act. coll. Mompelg., pp. 19, 87, 107, 123: “If those propositions by which the Lord of glory is said to have been crucified and others of this genus are taken in their proper sense, they are not real but only verbal.” Martinius,⁶ spic., p. 164: “Being afflicted, dying, being crucified belong only to the human nature. Being equal to God belongs only to the Word.” (Note here the opposition of the human nature and the person of the Word.) Page 184: “Only the human nature died, but the whole person destroyed through death Him who has the power over death.” Page 161: “The humanity suffered in the flesh.” Apol. Anhald., p. 246: Only “the human nature in Christ suffered.” (See also Piscator, Resp. ad elench. Busch., p. 153.) Fr. Junius (Thes. theol., disp. 27, § 20) calls “this mode of speaking most highly improper.” Ursinus, Explic. Catech., pp. 293 and 295. Calvin goes so far as to write (Instit., bk. 2, ch. 17, sect. 1): “I, indeed, confess that if someone wanted simply and of itself to oppose Christ to the judgment of God, there would justly not be a place for this, because one will not find in man the dignity that has the power to deserve God.” Tilenus, in his Not. ad lib. Bellarmin. de Christo, p. 13, analyzes as follows: “Christ, in whom there is deity having a conjoined humanity, suffers.” [Piscator, of] Herborn, Rudim., bk. 2, p. 100: “Only the human nature of Christ died, not the deity, not the entire person.”

Against this Nestorian tearing apart we set forth: (1) The clarity of the passages of Scripture. Nowhere does Scripture say, “Only the flesh suffered,” but “God suffered in the flesh” [cf. 1 Pet. 3:18; 4:1], “the Prince of life was killed” [Acts 3:15], “the Lord of glory has been crucified” [1 Cor. 2:8], “the Son of God has been handed over into death,” etc.

(2) The unity of the person. There are not two persons in Christ but only one person who is both God and man. Whatever things are declared about Christ, therefore, must be taken as a reference to the person. Otherwise if only human things were predicated about the man and only divine ones about God, two persons would be introduced. Amid His act of suffering, Christ confessed publicly that He was the Son of God, lest anyone doubt that the very Son of God suffered (Matt. 26:63; 27:54; Mark 14:62; Luke 22:70). All His works, all His sufferings are attributed not to the nature but to the person. But if we pull apart the works, we will also divide the person.

(3) The truth of appropriation. As the Son of God truly and really appropriated the flesh to Himself through the union, so truly and really did He appropriate to Himself the properties of the flesh. As God truly and really is man, so truly and really is it predicated about God that something is human. To whomever a subject is truly proper, to him also the sufferings of that subject are truly proper. But now, shed blood is proper to the Son of God (Acts 20:28). Therefore shedding, too, is truly proper to Him, namely, not by a natural and essential property but by a personal one. The Word appropriated to Himself the human nature and all its properties by assuming it into the unity of His person. Therefore suffering and death, though they do not belong to the divinity through the condition of the nature, nevertheless because of the intimate and ineffable communion of natures and appropriation of the properties of the flesh, they belong no less to the Son of God than if He had endured them in the divine nature itself, just as a man is truly and properly called “wounded” even if only His body is wounded.

Athanasius, De Trinit., vol. 2, dial. 4, p. 208: “Just as He makes the body and the soul His own, so also He appropriates to Himself the sufferings of both.” Cyril, Ad Regin., bk. 2: “The Word made proper to Himself all the things that are proper to the body and to the soul.” De incarnat. unig., ch. 26: “The suffering in the incarnation [] was His own, as the Word indeed says—those that are proper to the flesh because of the indescribable union. However, He remained outside the suffering insofar as His nature is concerned.” Vigilius, Contra Eutychen, bk. 2: “Although God did not suffer in the property of His (divine) nature, nevertheless He suffered in the union of the person,” that is, in the human nature, which He assumed into the unity of the person.

(4) The authority of the philosophical canon. Aristotle, De anim., 1, ch. 3: “All actions and sufferings are in a composite substance, but because of the natures of which it is composed.” Thomas, [ST,] 2, 2, q. 58, art. 2: “Actions belong to subjects [supposita] and to wholes, but not, properly speaking, to parts and forms or powers. For it is not proper to say that the hand strikes, but that man strikes through his hand, nor is it proper to say that heat makes something hot, but that fire makes something hot through heat.” Scaliger, Exerc. 307, sec. 36: “It is truly and properly man who understands, though this is proper only to the soul and though he understands only by means of the soul and not by means of the body.” Weighing these points, Keckermann (Logic., bk. 1, part 1, ch. 20, p. 180) writes more correctly: “The subject of the suffering is the entire Christ; the subject-in-which is His holy flesh, according to the statement of the apostle, ‘God suffered in the flesh.’ “

(5) The price and dignity of the ransom. If the suffering of Christ is only the suffering of the human nature, it cannot be of infinite price and worth. If the active and passive obedience rendered by Christ is attributed solely to the human nature and excludes the Word, it will not be satisfactory for the sins of the whole world. Ps. 49:7: “Truly no man can redeem his brother nor give to God the price of his redemption.” Cyril, Ad Regin., bk. 1: “If Immanuel had been a common man, how would the death of the man have been useful? The death of Christ saved, because the one dying is God by nature, and it was His own body that was sacrificed.” Book 2: “If God Incarnate be understood, then all creation is small compared to Him, and the death of one flesh suffices for the redemption of the world, for it was the Word’s own flesh.”

Therefore we draw the following conclusion against our adversaries: “The suffering of the flesh alone, no matter how righteous it is, does not make satisfaction for itself, even less for others, and least of all for the entire world. The suffering of Christ is the suffering of the flesh alone. Therefore the suffering of Christ does not make satisfaction for the whole world.” But this is absurd. The major premise is utterly true, and Franciscus Junius sets it forth in the same words in Defens. 1. Cathol. doctr. de trinitat. contra samosaten., sect. 29. The minor premise is in the Orth. cons. (pp. 18 and 122), in Sadeel (De verit. human. nat., pp. 88 and 109), Danaeus (Contra Chemnic., p. 304, etc.), and Paraeus (Endliche Überweisung, p. 177). Therefore their conclusion persists, which destroys the entire mystery of the redemption.

(6) The parity of examples. If I say, “God is man,” truly and without any figure of speech, surely also I say, “God suffered,” truly and without any figure of speech. If Scripture asserts truly and without any figure of speech that the Son of God was born of the Virgin Mary (Luke 2:[16]; Gal. 4:4), surely also we must accept it truly and without any figure of speech when it asserts that “the Lord of glory was crucified” and that “God suffered.” If I say truly and without any figure of speech that a man is being wounded when his own body has been wounded, surely I also say truly and without any figure of speech that God sheds blood when He shed the blood that is His own.

(7) The absurdity of a figure of speech. There is not a figure of speech or trope in a proposition until the subject or predicate takes off its own native meaning and puts on another, figurative meaning. But in the proposition “God suffered,” the words themselves, as they are properly expressed and sound, are also to be taken properly. It is one predication when I say that when the mystical Body of Christ suffers, Christ Himself suffers; but it is another when I say that when Christ suffers in His own, personal body, the Word suffers. The former predication was enunciated only relatively and metaphorically, because it is true according to metaphor, relation, and reference in this way: that the suffering which the mystical Body endures pours over to Christ Himself, who is the Head of this mystical Body, in the same way as an insult brought against an ambassador flows over to the one who sent him (2 Sam. 10:6). But in the latter predication, it is not a mere relation nor does a metaphor have a place in this. Rather, in a completely unusual and incomprehensible manner, the suffering of the assumed flesh is predicated truly and really about the very Son of God. If only the humanity suffered, the consequence is that the person did not suffer for us because the humanity alone is not a person. If the person did not suffer for us, the Son of God did not suffer for us, for the Son of God is the person. The consequence conflicts with Scripture (Acts 20:28; Rom. 8:32; 1 John 1:7). If this were an article of the Christian faith, that God’s Son Himself did not properly and really suffer through the true appropriation but that only the flesh that was personally united to Him did, then this article would have been expressed somewhere literally. If there were a synecdoche of the whole for a part in the words “God” and “Christ,” there would emerge propositions that are inept and tautologous: “God, that is, blood, acquired the Church with its own blood.” “God or Christ, that is, the flesh of Christ, suffered in the flesh,” etc. One cannot express this mystery more aptly and clearly than blessed Luther did in his Confess. major. de coena, vol. 2 of the Wittenberg edition, f. 188, which passage the Formula of Concord also cites, [Solid] Declaration, article On the Person of Christ, p. 770 [FC SD VIII 39–42], which says:

Zwingli calls that an alloeosis [“alteration”] when something is said of the divinity of Christ that really belongs to the humanity, or vice versa. For example, when it is said in Scripture, “Ought not Christ to have suffered these things and thus to have entered into His glory?” [Luke 24:26]. Here Zwingli is jesting that the word “Christ” is taken for the human nature. Beware, beware, I say, of this alloeosis! For it is a mask of the devil that finally manufactures the sort of Christ according to whose reckonings I would certainly not want to be a Christian. For that alloeosis intends this: that Christ should be nothing more or accomplish nothing more with His suffering and life than any other saint. For if I permit myself to be persuaded that only the human nature suffered for me, then surely Christ is to me not a Savior of great worth but will Himself finally need a savior. In a word, it is unspeakable what the devil seeks through this alloeosis.

 

And later:

If that witch, Lady Reason, the grandmother of the alloeosis, would cry out, “Divinity cannot suffer nor die,” you shall reply: “That is true. Yet because in Christ divinity and humanity constitute one person, Scripture, because of that hypostatic union, also attributes to the divinity all those things that happen to the humanity and, in turn, to the humanity all those things that happen to the divinity.” And it is so in reality, for you must certainly confess, this person (meaning Christ) suffers and dies. But this person is true God. Therefore it is correct to say, “The Son of God suffers.” For though the one part (so to speak), namely, the divinity, does not suffer, nevertheless that person who is God suffers in His other part, namely, in His humanity. For in truth God’s Son has been crucified for us, that is, the person who is God. For the very person, the person, I say, has been crucified according to the humanity.”

 

Luther again, De concil. et eccles., Wittenberg edition, vol. 7, f. 530, and Jena edition, vol. 7, p. 264b: “If our sins and the wrath of God due to our sins be set on one pan of a scale, and on the other pan be placed the death of only the human nature or only the man who suffered for us, then the one pan would sink us all the way down to hell. But if the suffering of God, the death of God, the blood of God, or the God who suffered and died for us be placed on the opposing pan, then that pan will be heavier and more weighty than all our sins and all the wrath of God.” See the statements of the fathers in Chemnitz, De duab. natur., ch. 16, p. 104, and ch. 17, p. 112.

Questions about the appropriation.

§ 196. (I) The question arises: Does the subject in these propositions denote the simple or the composite person? We affirm the latter. (1) The God who is said to have suffered is the one who has flesh; the God who is said to have redeemed the Church is the one who has blood, because He is said to have suffered in the flesh and to have redeemed the Church with His own blood. But now, God or the Word or the Son of God without flesh, who is a simple person, has neither flesh nor blood, neither essentially nor personally. But God or the Word Incarnate does, and He is a composite person. Therefore not the unincarnate but the incarnate Word is said to have suffered.

(2) Just as the divine nature of the Word is incapable of suffering, so also the simple hypostasis of the Word, that is, the hypostasis of only the divine nature, is also incapable of suffering. Therefore, when the Word is said to have suffered, that is understood as the Word Incarnate and the composite person.

(3) The proposition “God suffered” is explained through the proposition “Christ suffered.” To be sure, in the school of the Nestorians these are opposites, but in the school of the orthodox they are equivalent as far as the thing itself is concerned. But now, the name “Christ” is the name of the composite person.

§ 197. (II) The question arises: In what respect is suffering attributed to the Son of God? We respond. Not as passible and changeable, as if in the divine nature itself He underwent a change and suffering, but instead: (1) Hypostatically, according as the assumed flesh, which endured pains and torments, was exalted into the very hypostasis of the Word and with it constituted one person. Athanasius, De Trinit., dial. 4, vol. 2, p. 204: “It was not a mere man who was crucified but the Son of God who is truly God. Because He wanted to be crucified for us, He united to Himself a rational body endowed with soul that could be crucified by suffering willingly.” And later: “The Word suffered not in the nature of divinity but by the dispensation [] of the union, that is, by the body, united to Himself, that could suffer.” Contra Arian., orat. 4, p. 274: “The Word bore the infirmities of the flesh as His own, for it was His own flesh.” Page 275: “Just as this body was His own, so also the sufferings of the body are called His own sufferings. Yet they do not extend to the divinity.” Epiphanius, Haeres. 77 (contra Dimoeritas), bk. 3, vol. 2, p. 333: “When the flesh was suffering, the divinity and humanity were not divided or separated. Rather, His divinity and humanity were together, because Christ suffered in the flesh on the cross.” Vigilius, Contra Eutych., bk. 2: “Suffering properly belongs to the flesh according to the nature but to the Word according to the person, because the person of both the Word and the flesh is one.” By no means, therefore, does the personal union of the impassible deity and the suffering flesh cease to exist in suffering, but it remains unmoved. Nor does the hypostasis of the Word cease to be the hypostasis of the flesh in the suffering of the assumed flesh. Rather, as Christ suffers in the flesh, God’s Son Himself must suffer because of the sameness of the hypostasis, because there is not one Son who suffered and another who did not suffer, but one and the same Son of God, who is impassible and unchangeable in the divine nature, and who suffers in the flesh.

(2) According to appropriation, because by appropriating flesh to Himself through the union, the Son of God also appropriated to Himself the sufferings of the flesh through communication. Now if Christ appropriates to Himself the sufferings that His mystical and spiritual body endures, how much more ineffably does the Word appropriate to Himself the sufferings that He endured in His own, personal body. Cyril, De incarnat. unig., ch. 12: “As far as the impudence of scoffers is concerned, He would have suffered in His divinity if He could have, but as God He is and remains impassible.” Athanasius, De Trinit., dial. 4, vol. 2, p. 208: “He was reckoning the sufferings of the humanity as His own sufferings.” Epiphanius, loc. cit.: “His suffering was not referred to the human nature alone, lest in the dispensing of salvation that passage be fulfilled: ‘Cursed be everyone whose hope is in man.’ Rather, it was reckoned also to the deity, though the deity did not suffer, so that the deliverance from suffering of the holy Church of God may be reckoned in the deity.”

(3) Objectively and relatively (). The blasphemies, insults, and reviling that people hurled against the very Son of God were aimed especially at His eternal divinity (John 10:33; Matt. 26:63, 65; Matt. 27:40, 43). The dishonor brought on the suffering Christ flowed to the Word no less than if He had endured that suffering in the deity itself, because the entire hypostasis of the Word became the hypostasis of the flesh and, hence, always remains the hypostasis of both natures indivisibly and inseparably. By no means does the suffering of Christ belong to the Word only relatively; rather, it belongs also hypostatically. Meanwhile, a relation [] is not simply to be excluded.

(4) Voluntarily. Christ did not suffer because He was forced to, but voluntarily. Therefore the Word consented to the suffering through divine approval []. “Behold, I come” (Ps. 40:[7]). “He was sacrificed because He so willed” (Isa. 53:7). “Christ was delivered up according to the definite plan and foreknowledge of God” (Acts 2:23). “Herod and Pilate came together to do what Your hand and plan had decreed to take place” (Acts 4:28). The Word was not excluded from this counsel of the most holy Trinity. Epiphanius, loc. cit.: “The divinity gave freely to the humanity and gave its consent to the blessings [].” Epiphanius again: “Because the Son of God wished to suffer for the salvation of mankind, since the divinity, which in itself is impassible, could not suffer, He assumed our passible body, so that in it He might consent to suffer and take on our sufferings, while the divinity was coexisting in the flesh.”

(5) Permissively. The divinity could have rejected all sufferings from His flesh with a single command, but for the salvation of the human race He permits the flesh to be treated in such undignified ways. Christ calls that permission “forsaking” (Ps. 22:1; Matt. 27:46). Irenaeus (Adv. haeres., bk. 3, ch. 21) and, from him, Theodoret (Dial. 3): “Just as He was man in order to be tempted, so also He was the Word in order to be glorified—the Word resting in His suffering, crucifixion, and death.” Philip Melanchthon cites these words in his Loci and adds: “With singular insight, Irenaeus here used this outstanding description, ‘the Word resting,’ that is, not exerting its power in rejecting suffering and death.” Cyril, Dial., bk. 6: “The divine nature rested for the suffering of the flesh so that according to it the Son of God might be able to suffer, be crucified, and die.” Leo, De pass., sermon 16: “The Lord did not send the wicked hands of madmen on Himself, but permitted them.” Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 17: “The divinity permitted.”

(6) Effectively, and indeed in two ways: First, with regard to the suffering human nature, by sustaining, strengthening, and preserving it, so that in addition to the external sufferings of the body He might be able to bear up the immense burden of our sins and of the divine wrath due to them. “My own arm brought salvation to Me” (Isa. 63:5). Irenaeus, loc. cit.: “On the one hand, the Word was at rest, and, on the other hand, the Word assisted the man that He might be able to conquer, endure, show kindness, arise, and ascend.” Gregory of Nyssa: “In all things the humanity was moved by God.” Second, with regard to His suffering, by His divine and infinite power, He rendered them precious before God, satisfactory for the sins of the whole world. Cyprian, Expos. symb.: “Like a fishhook, the divine power of the Son of God had been hidden in the garment of human flesh so that, having been devoured by the serpent Leviathan, He might catch and overcome that powerful, armed foe through the weakness of His suffering and death.” Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 15: “The divinity was joined with the suffering flesh while remaining impassible and rendering the sufferings salutary and life-giving.”

§ 198. (III) The question arises: Should abstractive predications by used in this genus, such as “The deity suffered,” “The divinity died”? Some people think that they can be used, but in such a way that they add: “The deity suffered in the flesh.” The Württemberg theologians in their Exam., ch. 6, p. 510: “From this it is apparent that the divine nature of the Son in reality does suffer.” (See Jacob Andreae, Disp. respond. Puchenio, theses 248, 299, and 301; and Brenz, Contra Bulling., f. 11.) In Widerlegung der Auflagen, p. 192, Selnecker rejects the expression of Theodoret: “Inasmuch as He is God, He was not liable to suffering.” Some people also speak in this way: “Christ suffered with respect to both natures, though not in the divine nature nor according to it.”

However, it is better to abstain from these abstractive propositions. We prove this: (1) From the silence of Scripture. Nowhere does Scripture say that the deity suffered, but it does say that God suffered and that the Son of God was handed over to death. It also adds the distinctive particles by which it shows that suffering is attributed to Christ not according to His divinity but according to His humanity (1 Pet. 3:18; 4:1; etc.).

(2) From the nature of the deity. The deity is impassible, immutable, and unalterable. Therefore suffering cannot be attributed to it. The deity is common to the whole Trinity or to all three persons of the Godhead. If the deity were said to have suffered in itself, the entire Trinity would have suffered, and the error of the Sabellians and Patripassians would be brought back into the Church. They counter that “they are not saying simply, ‘The deity suffered’ but ‘The deity of the Son suffered by means of the flesh’ or ‘in the flesh.’ “ We respond. Indeed, Scripture does not speak in this manner, but it says, “Christ suffered in the flesh” or “God suffered in the flesh.” For this reason the devout ancients imitated the expression of Scripture and rejected the proposition “The deity suffered in the flesh.” Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 18: “We have never heard that the nature of the Word suffered in the flesh, but we have learned that Christ suffered in the flesh.” Chapter 26: “One must know that we say that God suffered in the flesh but that we in no wise say that the divinity suffered in the flesh or that God suffered through the flesh.”

(3) From the peril. We must be afraid of infecting our churches, because of our use of these propositions, with the error of the Theopaschites, who taught that the divinity in Christ felt pain and suffered when His flesh was nailed to the cross. See Augustine, De haeres., ch. 73; Nicephorus, bk. 15, ch. 28; etc. (Their leaders were Bishop Dioscorus of Alexandria under Emperors Martian and Valentinian and Peter Gnaphaeus under Zeno.) Cedrenus and Zonaras report that the error of the Theopaschites was refuted with an elegant stratagem. When Alamundurus, prince of the Saracens, had been baptized, the monk Severus sent two bishops to infect him with the stain of Eutychianism. He refuted them and said, “On this very day I have received a letter saying that the archangel Michael is dead.” When they declared that that message was false because death does not befall angels, he followed with: “How, then, do you affirm that the divinity is dead because in His own flesh He passed into a new nature, though not even angels die?” So the legates of Severus left in shame.

(4) From the condition of the union. The difference of the natures was not removed through the union, but the hypostasis of the Word became the hypostasis of the flesh to establish one composite person. Therefore something can be predicated about the entire person according to the human nature; still, the consequence will not at all be that the same thing must be attributed to the divinity. The acts and sufferings belong to the person and not to the nature. Therefore I am correct in saying, “God suffered in the flesh,” but I cannot say, “The divinity of the Word suffered in the flesh.” For that reason the acts of the Council of Chalcedon (act. 15, vol. 1, Concil., p. 885) rightly defined it: “The two natures in Christ, divine and human, were united without confusion, without changing, without division, and without separation, the difference of the natures in no wise being taken away through the union, but rather the identity of each nature being preserved and running together into one person and one hypostasis.”

(5) From the inequality between the first and second genera. “The divine nature communicates its own glorifications to the flesh but itself remains free of the sufferings of the flesh,” says Damascenus (bk. 3, ch. 7), and the reason depends on its supreme perfection and immutability. Therefore in the second genus I can say, “The flesh is vivifying,” but in the first I cannot say, “The deity suffered.”

(6) From the authority of the ancients. Conc., Cologne edition, vol. 1, p. 884: “Those who dare to ascribe the suffering of the only-begotten to His deity and thus dare to assert that His divinity is passible, those people the holy and ecumenical Council of Chalcedon rejects from the council of priests.”

What is contained in the profession of the catholic faith that Damasus sent to Paulinus is in harmony with this (Histor. tripart., bk. 6, ch. 16): “If anyone says that the Son of God endured pain in the suffering of the cross by His divinity and not by the flesh and rational soul that He assumed in the form of a servant, as Holy Scripture has said, let him be accursed.”

Athanasius, De incarnat. Verbi, vol. 2, p. 37: “The holy Church condemns anyone who says that the deity of the Son is passible.”

Cyril, Apolog. contra Theodoret: “It is one thing to say that God or the Son of God suffers in the flesh and another to say simply that the nature of the divinity suffers. In fact, because the same Son of God is simultaneously God and man, He is impassible according to the nature of the divinity and passible according to the humanity. It is not absurd if He be said to have suffered in the nature that can suffer, while the impassible nature knew no suffering.”

Epiphanius, bk. 3, tome 2, p. 333: “We confess that the Lord marvelously suffered in truth and that He was free of suffering in truth. The deity did not suffer because of its immutability⁷ and freedom from suffering and coessentiality with the Father. But He did suffer in the flesh without the deity being separated from its presence in the flesh in His suffering,” etc.

Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 6: “We cannot say that the nature of the Word suffered, for the deity did not suffer in Him.”

Luther repeats the same statement in his Confess. major. de coena, Jena edition, vol. 3, p. 542: “It is correct to say, ‘The Son of God suffers.’ For even though one part (so to speak) of Him, namely, His divinity, does not suffer, nevertheless that person that is God suffers in its other part, namely, in its humanity.”

The Formula of Concord, [Solid] Declaration, article On the Person of Christ, p. 766 [FC SD VIII 20]: “Because of the hypostatic union, which cannot be thought of nor subsist without the true communication of natures, it is not the bare human nature alone (whose property it is to suffer and to die) that suffered for the sins of the whole world. Rather, God’s Son Himself truly suffered and died, nevertheless according to the assumed human nature, though the divine nature can neither suffer nor die.” Similar statements occur in the Apolog. Form. Concord., p. 57; in D. Rungius, Refut. Catech. Ubiq., p. 84; and Gerlach, Assert., p. 322.

§ 199. Supporters of the opposite position urge the following arguments. (1) “If I can rightly say that the deity of the Son is incarnate, surely I can also rightly say that the deity of the Son suffered.” We respond. The logic is different. You see, “becoming incarnate” is not a property only of the human nature but expresses the union of the two natures, because as the Nicene Creed explains the incarnation: “The Son of God came down from heaven and was made man.” Therefore in the incarnation there is expressed at the same time the divine nature of the Word, which stooped down into the flesh and assumed it into the unity of His person, and the assumed human nature, which was exalted into the very hypostasis of the Word. However, suffering is a property of the assumed flesh.

** The divine nature is incarnate. Therefore it is also assumed, because the human nature is assumed.⁸ In De orth. fid., bk. 3, ch. 6, Damascenus makes a distinction between propositions that describe the act of incarnation and those that describe the state of the Incarnate One. **

(2) “The Word⁹ and the deity of the Word do not differ in reality. If I can say that the Word suffered, then surely I can also say that the deity of the Word suffered.”

We respond. (a) Scripture says, “The Lord of glory was crucified,” but nowhere does it say that the deity was crucified.

(b) The deity of Christ and the person Christ do not always admit equal predicates. The Word, the Second Person, is said to have become flesh, but the deity of the Word is not said to have become flesh. The deity of the Son is the deity of the Father and of the Holy Spirit, but the person of the Son is not the person of the Father nor of the Holy Spirit.

** The Word and the hypostasis of the Word are the same thing. Therefore if the Word is a man, the hypostasis will also be a man.¹⁰ **

(c) When we say that the two natures are one Christ and that the one Christ is two natures, the meaning is not that whatever is declared about Christ is declared about the two natures, from which many absurdities will follow. ** (The whole Christ is both His natures. Therefore each nature is both natures. This does not follow.) ** Rather, we mean that Christ is not some third thing beyond the two natures, for which reason Damascenus (bk. 3, chs. 3 and 11) shows that there is a distinction between the hypostasis of the Word and the deity.

(d) Regarding the Word without flesh, we concede that between the deity of the Word and His hypostasis there is no real difference. In these propositions, however, the incarnate Word is set as the subject, because He expresses the divine and human natures inseparably united in the unity of His person. Therefore though there is no real difference between the hypostasis of the Word and the deity of the Word with respect to the simple person or to the Word without flesh, nevertheless one cannot infer that the same holds between the incarnate Word and His deity, because after the incarnation occurred, the hypostasis of the incarnate Word is the hypostasis of not only the divinity but also of the assumed nature.¹¹ Hence it is not right to attribute whatever one declares about the incarnate Word to His hypostasis without further ado.

(3) “The apostles are said to have seen with their own eyes and to have touched with their hands the very Word of life that was from the beginning (1 John 1:1). Therefore we can say truly that the very Word of life that was from the beginning suffered and, hence, that the deity of the Word also suffered.” We respond. The Word without flesh, who was from the beginning, and the Word¹² Incarnate whom the apostles saw, are not different persons. Therefore John was able to say correctly that the apostles saw that very Word of life who was from the beginning. In this sense, we readily concede, too, that that very Word which was from the beginning suffered. But the apostles saw and touched the Word not in His own deity, according to which He was from the beginning or from eternity, but in the assumed flesh (for immediately these words are added: “and the life was manifested,” v. 2, namely, “in the flesh,” 1 Tim. 3:16). In the same way we must add that the Word suffered not in His own deity but in the assumed flesh, and, hence, that the deity did not suffer but that God suffered in the flesh.

(4) “To suffer for the life of the world is not the property of the flesh but of the whole person according to both natures. Therefore suffering should be attributed to the deity too.” We respond. “Christ suffered” and “Christ suffered for the life of the world” are distinct propositions. In the former, a property of the human nature is being predicated about the person in the concrete. Therefore it belongs to the first genus of communication. In the latter, a common effect [] is being predicated about Christ according to both natures and in both natures¹³ as they act. Therefore it belongs to the third genus of communication. Suffering and dying, considered in and through themselves, are the property of the human nature, but suffering for the sins of the human race and dying for the life of the world are not the property of the human nature alone. Rather, because of their infinite weight, price, and might, they pertain to the entire person, and, hence, they are the effect of Christ the Mediator and Redeemer, which are attributed to Him according to both natures. In the effects [], the properties are also clothed, properties that are claimed for His natures through distinctive particles. But now, suffering and death, as they are such, are properties of His flesh. But life-giving and redeeming suffering and death, as they are such, are an effect [].

(5) “The deity suffers communicatively or approbatively.” We respond. Therefore one could also say (a) that the humanity is infinite or (b) that the deity was exalted communicatively.

(6) “The devout ancients say, ‘Life dies on the tree. Deity is pierced with nails.’ Augustine, Medit., ch. 6: ‘The deity that put on my flesh went up to the beam of the cross and in the assumed flesh bore the sad punishment.’ “ We respond. These and similar statements should be explained according to the analogy of faith. “Life dies on the tree,” that is, the Prince of life was killed, and “The deity is crucified,” that is, “God was crucified in the flesh.” For this is what they want to express: that it was not a mere man who suffered and was crucified and that the Passion ought not be referred to the humanity alone, but that it should be attributed to the person, who is truly God and truly man. Nevertheless He sustained the suffering not in the divinity but in the flesh.

Practical use.

§ 200. Just as from the personal union there results the sort of communication by which the Word appropriates to Himself the properties and sufferings of the assumed flesh, so also from the spiritual union of Christ and the faithful there arises the sort of communication by which Christ, through an appropriation, attributes to Himself those good and evil things that are conferred on the faithful. Nevertheless we must distinguish this appropriation from the former, for the latter is merely relative and representational, but the latter is natural and essential, as Damascenus says (bk. 3, ch. 25). The latter is figurative; the former, literal. The former, personal; the latter, spiritual. “Whoever touches you touches the pupil of My eye” (Zech. 2:8). “Whoever receives you, receives Me” (Matt. 10:40). “Whatever you have done or denied to one of the least of these My brothers, you have done or denied to Me” (Matt. 25:40, 45). “Saul, Saul, why do you persecute Me?” (Acts 9:4). In fact, these can fittingly be taken in such a way that the injury inflicted on the ambassador overflows to the Lord Himself. Therefore because the apostles and ministers of the Church “perform the office of ambassador in the name of Christ” (2 Cor. 5:20), whatever good or evil is inflicted on them overflows to God Himself. “They have not rejected you but Me” (1 Sam. 8:7). However, the analogy of faith and the circumstances of the text show that this refers to that mystical union that exists between the Church and Christ, and between every faithful soul and God. Because the Father and the Son make a dwelling in the hearts of the devout (John 14:23) and because Christ dwells through faith in the hearts of believers (Eph. 3:17), because the faithful are members of Christ and a mystical Body of which Christ is the Head (1 Cor. 12:12; Col. 1:18), therefore Christ appropriates to Himself the good things that are given to the devout and the evils that are inflicted on them. For this reason, the apostle says explicitly, “I complete what is lacking in Christ’s afflictions in my flesh for the sake of His Body, which is the Church” (Col. 1:24). And: “We carry in our body the death of Jesus Christ” (2 Cor. 4:10). Augustine, Sermon 40 de temp.:

When Paul was still Saul, he heard, “Saul, Saul, why are you persecuting Me?” because the body is joined to the head. But now, when the preacher of Christ suffers from others what the persecutor himself had done, “that I may fill up,” as he says, “what oppressions are lacking in my flesh,” he is showing that what he was suffering belongs to the afflictions of Christ. This cannot be understood as a reference to the Head, which is now suffering no such thing in heaven, but to the Body, that is, to the Church.

 

Augustine again, preface to Psalm 142:

He who deigned to die for us made us His members. Sometimes He speaks from the person of His members, sometimes from His own person as our head. The apostle says, “That I may fill up what afflictions of Christ are lacking in my flesh.” He says, “That I may fill up what afflictions” not “of mine,” but “of Christ, that are lacking in” not “the flesh of Christ,” but “in my flesh.” He says, “Christ still suffers affliction” not “in His flesh,” in which He ascended to heaven, but “in my flesh,” which still labors on earth. He says, “Christ suffers affliction in my flesh. For I live, yet not I, but Christ lives in me.” For if Christ were not in His members, that is, in His faithful, He Himself would suffer the affliction. Saul on earth would not be persecuting Christ seated in heaven, etc.

 

These words show: (1) A very serious exhortation to do good. Whatever good is shown to the faithful members of Christ is presented to Christ Himself. He who feeds a poor man feeds Christ Himself. (2) A warning, that people should not inflict injustices on their neighbor and persecutions on the Church. He who touches the devout touches the pupil of Christ’s eye. Therefore He will by no means allow this with impunity. (3) Consolation in adversities. What greater comfort could we have in adversities than that Christ Himself counts our cross His own, that “we bear on our body the scars and death of Christ that the life of Christ may be revealed in us” (Gal. 6:17)?

1  Read with Cotta instead of .

2  Causa per se, a cause that produces an effect by its own power.

3  Read casus sextus with Cotta instead of casus rectus.

4  Read At instead of An.

5  That is, whether we are dealing with God the Holy Trinity per se or with God the Son incarnate.

6  Reading with Cotta, instead of Martinus.

7   Read non passa propter immutabilitatem with Cotta instead of non passa immutabilitatem.

8   This appears to be an argument from the absurd. Gerhard seems to say, if it were true that “The divine nature suffered” is the logical conclusion of “The divine nature is incarnate,” then one could also make the absurd statement “The divine nature was assumed.”

9   Read with Cotta instead of .

10  This appears to be another argument from the absurd.

11  Read etiam naturae assumtae est hypostasis with Cotta instead of etiam naturae est hypostasis.

12  Read ab initio, & with Cotta instead of ab initio .

13  Read in utraque natura with Cotta instead of in utraque naturae.

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