Chapter VII: The personal union of these two natures in Christ is proved, § 101. Here there is discussion of its: (1) Ef

CHAPTER VII: ON THE PERSONAL UNION

§ 101. Concerning the personal union, let this be the first thesis. Thesis I: The two natures, divine and human, have been personally united in Christ, and for this reason that union is said to be hypostatic and personal.

In the union, two things must be considered: The act and the status. [1] The act of union is properly called “uniting,” “incarnation,” “assumption of the humanity into the deity,” as Athanasius defines it in his creed. It is the action by which the Son of God took a human nature, which was destitute of its own personality, into the unity of His person. [2] The status of the union is properly and specifically called a “union,” a “hypostatic oneness.” It is the most intimate interpenetration [] of two distinct natures that are most present to each other in one person, an unmixed and unconfused mutual-indwelling because of which one nature is not outside the other nor can it be while preserving the unity of the person. We establish the following distinction between the status and the act of the union: The act is transitory, but the status is permanent. The act is that of a simple person (that is, of the Word, who before His incarnation was a simple person), namely, [an act] toward the human nature; but the status is between the two natures, divine and human, in the composite hypostasis. The act consists in the assumption of His humanity made at the first moment of His incarnation, but the status consists in the most intimate cohesion of the natures and lasts forever. For this reason, some statements are spoken about this mystery inchoatively, as John 10:36, and some inchoatively and terminatively, as Luke 1:35.

The efficient cause of the union.

§ 102. Thesis II: The efficient cause of the incarnation is, in diverse respects, both the entire Holy Trinity and the Son alone, or the Second Person of the Trinity.

The external impulsive cause [causa ] is our extreme wretchedness; the internal impulsive cause [causa ] is His ineffable mercy. Nemesius, De opif., ch. 42, p. 106: “The embodying of God for our sakes is a very divine and exceedingly incredible work of care and philanthropy.”

With regard to the efficient cause, note that the work of incarnation is considered in two ways: (1) Inchoatively, with regard to its beginning and effecting. (2) Terminatively, with regard to the formal relationship and termination. With respect to the former, it is attributed to the entire Trinity; but with respect to the latter, it is attributed to the Son alone or to the Second Person of the Trinity. Augustine, Enchir. ad Laurent., ch. 38: “The entire Trinity made the creature that was conceived and birthed by the Virgin Mary, though it belongs to the person of the Son alone, for the works of the Trinity are not separable.” De Trinit, bk. 2, ch. 10: “The invisible Trinity worked the visible nature that belongs to the Son alone.” With regard to the Father, He is said to have “sent His Son into the world” (John 10:36); “He raised up a righteous branch to David” (Jer. 23:5); “He sent forth His firstborn Son, born of a woman” (Gal. 4:4); “He sent His Son in the likeness of sinful flesh” (Rom. 8:3); “He prepared a body for His Son” or clothed Him with a body, as the Syriac explains (Heb. 10:5). With regard to the Spirit, it is said (Luke 1:35): “The Holy Spirit will come upon you,” where the “coming upon” denotes an extraordinary action and heavenly operation not according to the ordinary, common course of nature but done in a completely special manner.

Meanwhile, neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit but the Son alone assumed that mass of human nature conceived and shaped in the womb of the Virgin into the unity of His person. The following passages speak about this: “The power of the Most High will overshadow you” (Luke 1:35). “The Word became flesh and dwelt among us” (John 1:14). “I came down from heaven” (John 6:38, 41–42). “I came forth from the Father and I came into the world” (John 8:42; 16:28). “The whole fullness of the deity dwells in Him bodily” (Col. 2:9). “God was manifested in the flesh” (1 Tim. 3:16). “Because the children share in flesh and blood, He Himself likewise shared with them…. He assumed not angels but the seed of Abraham” (Heb. 2:14, 16). “As He came into the world He said, ‘You have prepared a body for Me’ “ (Heb. 10:5). “The Son of God appeared ()” (1 John 3:8). “Jesus Christ came in the flesh” (1 John 4:2). From these we conclude what we must respond to the following question.

Questions about the efficient cause of the incarnation.

§ 103. (I) The question arises: How is the work of incarnation attributed to the Father and the Holy Spirit, yet in such a way that only the Son is said to have become incarnate? Here one must distinguish: (1) Between the sanctification of that mass from which the body of Christ was formed, through which sanctification every stain of sin was wiped from it, and (2) the formation of the body of Christ made by divine power from that sanctified lump, both of which actions are common to the entire Trinity; and (3) the assumption of that body into the hypostasis of the Word, which assumption is proper to the Son of God. For this reason, the work of incarnation is said to be proper to the entire Trinity as far as the act is concerned but to the Son alone as far as the terminus is concerned, the assumed flesh that belongs to the hypostasis of the Word. It is called an essential and external work [opus ad extra], or common to the entire Trinity, as far as the acting or production is concerned; it is called a personal or internal work [opus ad intra], or proper to the Son, as far as its termination or relation is concerned. The act of assumption proceeds from the divine power common to the three persons; the terminus of the assumption is the hypostasis that belongs to the Son. The sixth Council of Toledo, art. 1: “Although the entire Trinity together worked the formation of the assumed man, because the works of the Trinity are inseparable, nevertheless only the Son took up the humanity in the singularity of His person.”

Some distinguish in this way: The works of the Trinity are threefold: (a) Internal, (b) External, (c) Mixed, which are internal with regard to their terminus, external with regard to their beginning [principium]. The first are personal; the second, essential; the third, personal and essential. Incarnation is a mixed work. It belongs to the three persons efficiently and inchoatively, to the Son alone formally and terminatively.

We draw this clear conclusion from the statements of Scripture that speak about the work of incarnation: The Father sent the Son into the world. The Holy Spirit came upon the drops of blood, sanctified them, and cleansed them from sin, and from those the body of Christ was formed. For that reason, what was born of Mary is holy. This was worked in the blessed Virgin by the power of God that she should conceive offspring outside the order of nature without the seed of a man. The Son came down from heaven, overshadowed the Virgin, came into the flesh, became flesh by partaking of it, by revealing Himself in it, by assuming it into the unity of His person, etc. Damascenus, Orth. fid., bk. 1, ch. 13: “Neither the Father nor the Spirit has shared in the incarnation of the Word in any manner, except with regard to favor and with regard to working the unspeakable miracle.” Book 3, at the end of ch. 11: “The Father and the Holy Spirit do not in any way share in the flesh of the Word except with regard to the miracles and with regard to favor and will.”

The devout ancients make this clear with some comparisons. Augustine, Sermon 3 de temp:

The soul is one thing; reason is another. Yet reason is within the soul, and the soul is one. However, the soul does one thing; reason does another. The soul lives; reason understands. Life pertains to the soul; wisdom pertains to reason. Because they are one, the soul alone produces life; reason alone produces wisdom. Yet the soul does not do this without reason, nor does reason do this without the soul. Thus, though the Father and the Son are one and there is one God, the flesh pertains to Christ alone, just as wisdom pertains to reason alone, though it does not depart from the soul. In the sun, heat and brightness are in a single ray, but the heat dries things out, while the brightness illumines them. The heat produces one thing, the brightness another. Although the heat and brightness cannot be separated from each other, the brightness produces illumination and not warming, while the heat produces warming but not illumination. They do one thing together, they do another individually, yet they are not separated from each other. So also the Son has taken up the flesh but has not deserted the Father nor separated Himself from the Father. The Son, I say, has taken the flesh in ownership, yet the Father and the Holy Spirit were not lacking in majesty. In the divinity of equality, only the property of the Son is in flesh, but at no time has the divinity of the Father and of the Holy Spirit departed from Him. Therefore since there is one deity, one divinity, the Father and the Holy Spirit indeed did fill the flesh of Christ, but by majesty, not by assumption. In the playing of a lute there are three things: skill, the hand, and the strings, yet we hear a single sound. Skill dictates, the hand touches, the strings resound. The three work together, but only the strings make the sound that we hear. Neither skill nor the hand makes the sound, but these work together equally with the strings. So also neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit has taken up the flesh, and yet they work together equally with the Son. Only the strings cast out the sound; only Christ receives the flesh; the working consists in the three. But as the rendering of the sound belongs to the strings alone, so also the assumption of the human flesh belongs to Christ alone.

 

Anselm, De incarnat., ch. 4, uses the comparison of a spring, stream, and lake, with the stream alone running through a pipe.

Weidner, Loc. fid. Christ. praecip., treatise 2, p. 184:

In the same way, in fire, which is a substance, there are always brightness and heat—for you will not find the substance of fire without brightness and heat, nor will you find brightness at the same time along with heat without the substance of fire. But at times heat comes to us without brightness. For if you take a piece of metal and heat it so that from it you could heat another body and you press yourself against it, indeed you will feel the heat but will not see the brightness. Nevertheless at times there will be brightness without heat. You see, after we light a candle, we see its brightness from a distance, but we do not feel its heat. Just as brightness sometimes comes forth without heat and heat without brightness, and yet these cannot be separated from fire, so also the Son took up the flesh without the Father and the Holy Spirit, yet by doing this He did not depart from them nor did He divide the divine substance, which is one and indivisible.

 

From the Scholastics, Luther uses a comparison of three girls who clothe one of themselves in a dress or place a crown on one. A comparison can also be made between the manifestations of God. The Father and the Son formed the dove in which the Holy Spirit appeared, and yet this was the peculiar symbol of the Holy Spirit. (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., bk. 3, dist. 2, letter C; and Thomas, [ST,] p. 3, q. 3, art. 4.)

§ 104. (II) The question arises: Why did the Son and not the Father nor the Holy Spirit assume the flesh? We respond. (1) On account of the re-creation, or second creation. In the beginning all things were created through the Son (John 1:3). Therefore it was fitting that as the creating and the shaping belong to Him, the re-creating and reshaping belong to Him (Justin, Exp. fid), and that what had been corrupted in the work of God be reformed through Him. Athanasius, Ad Epictet.: “The Son was sent that the re-creating might be the work of Him to whom belonged the creating. For that reason we are called ‘new creatures’ in Christ (Gal. 6:15).” Augustine, . ex utroque test., q. 113: “It would be an insult to Him if the work made through Him were reformed through someone else.”

(2) On account of the restoration of the divine image. We had been created “after the image of God” (Gen. 1:27), “through the Son,” who is the substantial image of God (Col. 1:15; Heb. 1:3). However, man had lost this image through the fall (Eph. 4:24). Therefore it was fitting for the image of God to be renewed in us through Him who is the substantial image of the Father.

(3) Because of our adoption. We were “by nature the children of wrath” (Eph. 2:3). Therefore it was fitting that out of children of wrath we be made the children of grace and that we receive the adoption of sons through Him who is the natural and only-begotten Son of God (John 1:12; Gal 4:5).

(4) Because of reconciliation. We had to be reconciled to God from whom the human race had been separated through sin. This had to be done through Him who is the beloved Son.

(5) For the restoration of life. Through the fall, we had lost our spiritual and heavenly life, were “alienated from the life of God” (Eph. 4:18), and were all liable to the punishment of eternal death. Therefore it was fitting that life be restored to us through Him who is the Word of life (1 John 1:1), in whom the life of the first man existed (John 1:4).

(6) For the sake of communicating the knowledge of God. Through the fall, humans had become similar to the “animals without understanding” (Ps. 32:[9]; 49:[12]), because they had lost the light of the salutary knowledge of God. Therefore it was fitting that we be given the knowledge of God back again through Him who is the Word and the Wisdom of the Father (John 1:18; Matt. 11:[27]).

(7) Because of the condition of the Son. The Second Person of the Trinity is and is called the only-begotten Son of God. Therefore it was fitting that He who, according to the divine nature, was the Son of the Father become the Son of Man according to His human nature, that in this respect God and man would be one Son in the unity of the person and that the name “son” would not be attributed to another who is not the Son of the Father from eternity. Augustine, De eccles. dogmat., ch. 2: “Neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit assumed the flesh, but only the Son did, that He who was the Son of God in His divinity might become the Son of Man in His humanity, lest the name ‘son’ be transferred to another who was not the Son by eternal birth.”

(8) For the sake of mediation. The Son is the middle person between the Father and the Holy Spirit. Therefore that role of mediator between God and man was assigned to Him most fittingly.

§ 105. (III) The question arises: Why is the work of incarnation described by the angel as (“overshadowing”)? In Luke 1:35, the angel says to Mary, “The power of the Most High will overshadow you.” The devout ancients explain this in two ways. (1) Some take the word “power” essentially for the might and deity common to the three persons so that this indescribable miracle is described in such a way that each and every person of the deity was acting in this wonderful work. To this meaning the statements of Scripture can be applied in which “shading” and “overshadowing,” as they are attributed to God, denote a special divine operation, protection, and manner of presence. “God casts His shadow upon him” (Deut. 33:12). “He will cover you with His feathers” (Ps. 91:4). “You have overshadowed my head” (Ps. [140:7]). The Syriac rendered that with the word (“covered,” “protected”). Therefore just as God said to Moses, “I shall cover you with My wings” (or, with My hand) “until I pass by” (Exod. 33:22)—that is, I shall protect you with My gracious presence lest the majesty of divinity destroy you—so also the power of the Most High overshadowed the Virgin, lest she be consumed by the majesty of the divinity present in her womb in a singular manner.

(2) Some take the word “power” personally. These, again, are of two kinds. Some refer it to the Holy Spirit, as being an explanation of the preceding words: “The Holy Spirit will come upon you and the power of the Most High,” that is, the Holy Spirit, who is the power of the Most High (He who proceeds from God the Father), “will overshadow you.” To this explanation Luke 24:49 can be applied, where the Holy Spirit is said to be “the power from on high,” because what is said in Acts 1:8 (“You will receive power when the Holy Spirit comes upon you”) is explained in the aforementioned passage in this way: “You will be clothed with power from on high.” Likewise, in the transfiguration of Christ “a bright cloud overshadowed them” (Matt. 17:5; Mark 9:7; Luke 9:34), and this bright cloud was the symbol of the Holy Spirit, who appeared at the transfiguration in a bright cloud just as He appeared at His Baptism in the form of a dove.

Some refer it to the Son, the Second Person of the Trinity, who took up the flesh into the unity of His person. Rufinus, Expos. symb.: “See the simple Trinity working together. The Holy Spirit is said to come, and the power of the Most High is said to overshadow. Who is the power of the Most High except Christ Himself, who is the power and might of God? Whose power is this? That of the Most High. Therefore the Most High is present, the power of the Most High is present, and the Holy Spirit is present.” Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 2: “So, then, after the holy Virgin assented, she was overshadowed by God Most High’s wisdom and power subsisting in His own hypostasis [], the Son of God, consubstantial with the Father, as the divine seed; and from her chaste and very pure blood He constructed flesh endowed with a soul.”

** Just as the shadow of an opaque object protects from the heat of the sun, so the power of God overshadowed the Virgin when she conceived, lest the heat of concupiscence that generally is stirred up in a natural way in women at the time of conception touch her. See Ambrose (De iis, qui init., ch. 3) and Augustine (Homiliar., bk. 50, homily 44). To this, the ancients apply the Hebrew statement: “God will come from the south and the Holy One from Mount Paran” (or “the shadowy mountain”) [Hab. 3:3]. **

Although these interpretations may not be in conflict with the analogy of faith nor with each other, as one can understand from Question I, a more fitting explanation to the text appears to be that “the power of the Most High” is taken as a reference to the Son, because immediately following it says, “Therefore that holy thing that will be born of you will be called ‘the Son of God,’ “ that is, because the substantial power of God will assume the flesh in and of you through a miraculous overshadowing, therefore also that which will be born of you will be called and will be the Son of God. To this meaning, we can apply the fact that the Son of God is called the “power of God” also in other passages of Scripture (1 Cor. 1:24); “the mighty God” (Isa. 9:6); and that the type of the personal indwelling of the Word in the assumed flesh, that is, God’s special presence in the tabernacle of the covenant, is described in this way in Exod. 40:[34–]35: “The cloud covered the tabernacle, and Moses was unable to enter the tabernacle, because the cloud was overshadowing it.” Regarding the column of cloud in the wilderness, Num. 9:22: “As the cloud continued to overshadow them.” Let all the Old Testament appearances be referred to this, in which God is said to have “appeared in a cloud,” for those were symbols of the incarnation of the Word that would follow in the fullness of time.

Therefore, the word “overshadow” leads us: (a) To the miraculous union of the divine and human natures in Christ. “A shadow is formed only with an object [corpus] and light. Therefore the power of the Most High is said to have overshadowed the Virgin because, in her womb, noncorporeal Light assumed a body [corpus]” (Gregory, Moral., bk. 33, ch. 3). “He is covered with a cloud of flesh, not that the sun of the divine light may be obscured but that it may be tempered” (Augustine, on John, tractate 34).

(b) To the appearance of the divine majesty and glory in Christ. In the Old Testament, when God wanted to reveal His majesty in a special manner so that mortals could endure it, He overshadowed it with the shadow of a cloud. So also in this supreme and singular manner of the presence and indwelling of the Word in the assumed flesh, an overshadowing occurred so that the union of the divine majesty and human nature into one person, which exceeded all comprehension, even of the angels, could occur. Chemnitz, Harm., ch. 4, p. 122.

(c) To the special working of the entire Trinity in this mystery. The Holy Spirit came upon the Virgin, and the power of the Most High overshadowed her, that is, the entire Holy Trinity in a special manner worked in the formation, preservation, and defense of that offspring against every stain of sin. Theophylact says, “This metaphor is taken from the incubation of birds, so that the meaning is ‘the power of the Most High will make you fertile.’ “

(d) To the fruit of the incarnation. God is a consuming fire, but the incarnate Son of God provides us a shade, lest we be consumed by the fire of divine wrath because of our sins. After their admission of sin, our first parents hid themselves under the trees, but they could not be hidden. Whoever wishes to hide from the wrath of God must flee under this shade. The Son of God went ahead of the Israelites in the wilderness in a pillar of cloud and fire (Exod. 13:21), thus He furnished them with a shade by day and a light by night. Thereby the usefulness of His incarnation is prefigured for us.

(e) To a serious warning against rash investigation. We cannot know perfectly nor ought we investigate rashly how the incarnation of the Word took place. Rather, let us remember that a cloud was interposed and spread across, a cloud through which we ought not burst. Just as the cherubim cast their shadow over the ark of the covenant (2 Chron. 5:8), lest someone want to look closely upon the , or “divinity,” dwelling over the mercy seat, and just as the seraphim were covering their faces (Isa. 6:2), so also the power of the Most High interposed its shadow, lest we inquire into the manner of the incarnation too curiously. Chrysostom, on John 1, homily 7: “Do not inquire into how God became man. It happened just as He knew it would happen.”

§ 106. (IV) The question arises: Why is the conception of Christ attributed especially to the Holy Spirit? (1) For a holy conception, it was required that the poison of sin be wiped away from those drops of blood from which the body of Christ would be formed and that the mass be sanctified, that is, that it be cleansed and sanctified from sin so that “what would be born would be holy” (Luke 1:35) and “separated from sin” (Heb. 7:26). But now, sanctification is especially attributed to the Holy Spirit, for which reason He is also called “the Spirit of sanctification” (Rom. [1]:4).

(2) The work of incarnation is a work of the singular goodness and love of God. But now, love is especially attributed to the Holy Spirit, for which reason He is called “the Spirit of love” (2 Tim. 1:7), just as power is attributed to the Father and wisdom to the Son. Alcuin, De Trinit., bk. 3, ch. 3: “Is this said about the Holy Spirit because He caused Him to be born of the Virgin? Because this entire miraculous work was done by the gift of God, and the gift is properly said to be the Holy Spirit’s.”

(3) In the incarnation the divine and human natures were personally united. This uniting is especially ascribed to the Holy Spirit, who Himself is “the indissoluble bond of love between the Father and the Son,” as Bernard says (Sermon 3 in fest. Pentecost., col. 164), and “the ineffable communion of the Father and the Son,” as Augustine says (De trinit., bk. 5, ch. 11).

(4) Because the Law was written by the finger of God, it was fitting that the “Finger of God,” who is the Holy Spirit (Matt. 12:[28]; Luke 11:20), form in the womb of the Virgin Him who was going to fulfill the Law for us.

(5) Just as in the first creation the Holy Spirit “brooded over the waters” and fostered them and made them fertile (Gen. 1:2), so in the second creation the Holy Spirit made the Virgin fertile to conceive the Savior.

§ 107. (V) The question arises: Is the Holy Spirit correctly called “the Father of Christ” because of His special work in the conception of Christ? Not at all, because none of those actions attributed to the Holy Spirit in this work confer upon Him the quality and title of “Father.” The pious ancients refer that action to three chief points. The first is the immediate work—that He gave the Virgin the capability to conceive offspring without the seed of a man, outside the order of nature. The second is the miraculous consecration—that He sanctified that mass from which the body of the Son of God was formed, that is, He cleansed it from sin. The third is the indescribable union—that He united the divine and human natures into one person. The Holy Spirit was cause of the conception, not the seminal cause, but (a) the creating [], (b) sanctifying [], and (c) perfecting [] cause of it.

The pious ancients speak in this way about this threefold operation of the Holy Spirit, and even of the entire Trinity. Justin, Apol. 2. pro Christ., p. 58: “The power of God came upon the Virgin and overshadowed her. He caused her, being a virgin, to become pregnant.” And later: “The Spirit came upon the Virgin and overshadowed her not through intercourse; rather, through His power He made her to become pregnant.” In his Eκθ. π., p. 299: “The Word used the Virgin as an intermediary to carry out His ministration. He entered her womb as a divine seed and formed as a temple for Himself a whole man by taking a part of her nature, and by forming His temple He brought it into His substance. Clothed with this temple in the manner of the supreme union, the Son of God proceeded with both natures, for from it the Son is both God and man.”

Hilary, De Trinit., bk. 2, p. 20: “The Holy Spirit came upon the Virgin and sanctified her inner parts. He breathed upon them, for the Holy Spirit breathes wherever He wishes. He mixed Himself with the human nature of her flesh and by His might and power took to Himself what was alien to Himself. As the power of the Most High overshadowed the Virgin, lest anything be awry because of the weakness of her human body, He strengthened her weakness through the shadow that came down around her in order that the shadow of divine power might temper the bodily substance so that the Spirit’s sowing would be effectual.” (For that reason the body of Christ is called “a tent not made with hands, that is, not of this creation,” Heb. 9:11.)

Archbishop Proclus of Constantinople, Homily in nativ. Dom., p. 55: “The Virgin Mary is the intellectual [] paradise of the Second Adam, the workshop of the union of the natures, the festivity of the saving exchange, the bridal chamber in which the Word married the flesh.” Page 56: “This Mary is the loom of that tremendous dispensation, on which, in an ineffable way, the tunic of that admirable union was woven. The Holy Spirit was the weaver; the ‘power of the Most High overshadowing’ was the wool-worker; the skin of the old Adam was the wool; the pure flesh of the Virgin was the woof; the limitless grace of the Bearer was the shuttle; and the craftsman was the Word, who flowed in through hearing.”

Damascenus, Orth. fid., bk. 3, ch. 2: “After the assent of the holy Virgin, the Holy Spirit came down upon her and purified her, giving her the power to receive the divinity of the Word and the power to procreate.”

However, the Holy Spirit cannot be called “the Father of Christ” for any of these operations, because the flesh of Christ was not begotten of the essence of the Holy Spirit but of the substance of the Virgin Mary. “Of the Spirit” [Matt. 1:18] does not indicate the material but the efficient cause and operation. When we say “of Mary,” it is an “of” of material. When we say “of the Holy Spirit,” it is an “of” of power. Justin, Εκθ.: “Not through intercourse but through power.” Athanasius, Disput. contra Arium, p. 51: “ ‘She was found to be with child of the Holy Spirit’ [Matt. 1:18]—not that we are to call the Holy Spirit ‘the Father of Christ,’ so as to believe that there are two Fathers. Rather, the same Holy Spirit is the co-worker with the Father and the Son, and He is of their one power.” Ambrose, De Spiritu s., bk. 2, ch. 5: “That which is of something is either of its substance or of its power. ‘Of the substance’ is like the Son, who says, ‘I came forth from the mouth of the Most High’ [Sirach 24:3]. ‘Of the power’ is like ‘there is one God from whom are all things’ [1 Cor. 8:6]. Therefore if Mary was with child of the substance of the Holy Spirit, then the Holy Spirit was changed into flesh and bone, and this is certainly not the case. But if the Virgin conceived from His work and power, who will deny that the Spirit is the Creator?” Augustine, De inquisit. Trinit., ch. 100: “Surely the Son of God was not born from Him (the Holy Spirit) in the same way as He was born of her (Mary, His mother). Since the Son of God was born of that holy Virgin as of a mother, He was not born in the same way from Him as father, lest we say that there be two Fathers in the Holy Trinity.” Enchir., ch. 37: “We must not concede that what is born from something is immediately called the son thereof; otherwise those who are born of water and of the Spirit will have to be called the children of water.” Damascenus, loc. cit.: “Christ was conceived by the Holy Spirit not seminally but according to creation.” Christ was born of His mother materially; He was conceived by the Holy Spirit effectively. Bishop Faustus, De rat. fidei, ch. 4: “Christ was conceived not from the substance of the Holy Spirit but from His power, not from generation but from command and blessing.” (Cf. blessed Luther, on Genesis 38.)

Antithesis.

§ 108. (I) The Ebionites, Cerinthians, Carpocratians, and similar monsters have taught that Christ was born of marital intercourse. Irenaeus, bk. 3, ch. 24: “The Ebionites say that Christ was fathered by Joseph.” Epiphanius, Haeres. 30: “He said that Christ was fathered by copulation and the seed of a man, that is, of Joseph.” Irenaeus (bk. 1, ch. 25) says that Cerinthus taught “that Jesus was not born of the Virgin, because this seemed to him to be impossible, and that He was the son of Mary and Joseph in the same way as all other human beings.” Tertullian, De praescript., ch. 48: “Cerinthus proposes Christ as born of the seed of Joseph and contends that He is only a man, without divinity.” Epiphanius, Haeres. 28, p. 53: “He taught that Christ was born of Mary and of the seed of Joseph.” With regard to Carpocrates, Irenaeus says, bk. 1, ch. 24, p. 79: “Carpocrates taught that Jesus was born of Joseph and was just like all other human beings.”

(II) The Photinians and Vorstius say that Christ was born of material brought forth by God, as we have seen earlier.

The material of the personal union.

§ 109. Thesis III. The place of the material in the union is held by the two natures: the divine nature of the Word and the human nature.

I say that they have “the place of the material,” for, properly and carefully speaking, the two natures in Christ cannot be called material: (1) Because inasmuch as the divine nature of the Word is a spiritual, infinite, omnipotent essence, it is pure actuality. (2) Because the divine nature of the Word in the incarnation is rather active, while the human nature is passive, namely, in a grammatical rather than in a physical sense, for the former assumes while the latter is assumed. (3) Because from material parts a third thing is constituted that is distinct from them in reality, which¹ does not take place in the hypostatic union. As the pious ancients speak about the two natures, they are “those from which, those in which, and those which He is” []. Christ consists “of those” in the act of union; He subsists “in those” in the state of union; and “those,” personally united, are one Christ and man. Christ is not “something else from other things” [], but the two natures, personally united, are one Christ.

Hence, when the two natures in Christ are said to be the material cause of the union, this must be taken: (a) Analogically, because in other types of union the things that have been united are called the material. (b) Relatively, because with respect to the form of the union, the two natures are a material cause of the union, the latter being like the formal cause. The Scholastics call them “two things that have the capability of being one” [duo unibilia], one of which—namely, the divine nature—is what assumes, while the other—namely, the human nature—is assumed. Some of our people call them , “the extremes.” You see, as the subject and predicate (which in philosophy are called “the extremes”) are connected in the predicate with a copulative, so also the divine and human natures in Christ are united very intimately in the union of the hypostasis.² Earlier we proved the verity of both natures; here we had to discuss them according as they are considered in the union itself.

Antithesis.

§ 110. (I) The Patripassians taught that “the entire Trinity became incarnate, and the Father suffered too.”

(II) Origen (De princ., bk. 1, ch. 7) and Nemesius (Philosoph., bk. 2, ch. 6) claim that “the soul of Christ existed before its union with the body.” This was also the opinion of the Priscillianists and of Bishop John of Jerusalem, according to Jerome, Letter ad Pamm.

(III) Some of the Calvinists argue that the person of the Son, but not the divine nature (if we wish to speak literally), was incarnate, since the person is proper to the Son while the divine nature is common with the Father and the Holy Spirit. (See Beza, Resp. ad coll. Mompelg., part 1, p. 183; Danaeus, Exam. contra Chemnicium, ch. 4, p. 81; Zanchi, De incarnat. Filii, bk. 2, q. 1, p. 106; Sohnius, Exeg. Augustan. Confess., part 2, p. 192.)

(IV) On this point, Bellarmine (De Christo, bk. 3, ch. 8, § Tertia) connects himself with the Calvinists: “The union was made through the communication of that which is proper to the Son, not of that which is common with the other persons.”

To what end they argue in such a way becomes clear, namely, to be able with greater pretence to attack the communication of properties made to the flesh. However, observe: (1) When describing the personal union, Scripture mentions not only the person but also the divine nature. “In Christ dwells the entire fullness of the deity bodily” (Col. [1]:19). If the entire fullness of the deity dwells in His flesh, surely also the deity of the Word or the divine nature of the Son must be united to the flesh. After all, that which dwells in the flesh, and indeed bodily, is united with it. The entire fullness of the deity is not the bare subsistence without the deity of the Word. “God was manifested in the flesh” (1 Tim. 3:16). But now, “God” is not only the name of a person but also of the nature. (2) The deity of the Word and the person of the Word do not differ in reality; otherwise the Word really would be a composite of two things that are distinct in reality, and instead of the Trinity, a quaternity would be introduced. (3) In each person of the Trinity, there is the entire and perfect deity because of the infinity and simplicity of the divine essence; therefore by no means could the Second Person of the Trinity have become incarnate apart from His deity. (4) If the divine nature of the Word has not been united with the human nature, the Word, according as He is incarnate, will not be true God, for can He be God without deity? If the divine nature of the Word has not been united with the human nature, these personal propositions will be false: “God is man” and “man is God.” (5) The devout ancients make clear mention of the divine nature. Dionysius, Athanasius, and Cyril: “The divinity in one of its hypostases communed wholly with us.” Athanasius in his Creed defines the incarnation as “the assumption of the humanity into the divinity.” Augustine, De fide ad Petrum, ch. 2, says, “The divine nature was conceived and born.” Thomas explains this as follows ([ST,] p. 3, q. 35, art. 1): “Because of the identity that there is in God between the nature and the hypostasis, ‘nature’ is sometimes used instead of ‘person’ or ‘hypostasis.’ According to this, Augustine is saying that the divine nature is conceived and born, namely, because the person of the Son was conceived and born according to the human nature.” Damascenus, Orthod. fid., bk. 3, ch. 6: “In the incarnation of the Word of God, we say that in one of its hypostases the whole and complete nature of the divinity was united with the whole human nature, and not part united to part.” Ibid.: “When we speak of the nature of the Word, we mean the Word Himself, and the Word has both what is common of the essence and what is proper of the hypostasis.” In Disput. ann. 44 contra Scholasticos, Luther points out that hypostasis or “person in the Godhead is not a thing existing outside of and beyond the divine essence to which, afterward, the essence along with its essential properties has been communicated. Nor does the divine essence exist outside of or beyond the persons of the divinity, nor in a person of the Trinity do essence and hypostasis differ in reality or according to subject, though they may differ with regard to their respects.” (6) The Augsburg Confession, Art. III, states: “The two natures, divine and human, have been inseparably joined in the unity of the person.” But the Calvinists want to appear to be friends of the Augsburg Confession. (7) Therefore one must distinguish between the divine nature, in the common or absolute sense—as it is in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, in which way it is not said to have been united with the human nature because the incarnation is attributed terminatively to the Son alone—and the deity in a relative or determinate fashion, understood with a certain manner of existence and considered in the person of the Son alone, in which way it is called the deity of the Word, that is, united with the human nature. Polanus himself embraces this distinction (Syntagm., vol. 2, bk. 6, ch. 813), as does also Ursinus in Explicat. Catech., part 2, p. 274, and p. 184, where he says, “The divine essence is incarnate in the person of the Son alone.” On this basis we respond easily to the contrary arguments: “What is proper to the Son but not what is common to the Trinity has become incarnate.” Also: “If the divine nature has been united with the human, the Father, too, will have become incarnate.” You see, for the Father to be said to be incarnate it is not enough that the same divine nature that is in the Father be incarnate in the Son. In addition to this, it is required that the divine nature in the Father—and thus the person of the Father—be incarnate. (Cf. Peter Lombard, Sent., 3, dist. 5, letter F.) (8) Some of our people add that the substance of the Son of God is immediate but that the divine nature is mediate, namely, that it became incarnate by means of the hypostasis of the Word. (In Exeg., vol. 2, art. 3, p. 104, Sohnius also distinguishes between the immediate and mediate hypostatic union. The former he calls “the union of the person”; the latter, “the union of the nature of the Word with the human nature.”) However, because the hypostasis of the Word and the divine nature of the Word differ not really but only formally, this expression must be explained in a fitting way.

Questions about the material of the union.

§ 111. (I) The question arises: Was it necessary for the Word to become incarnate? We respond. Polanus (Thes. Theolog., part 3, p. 59), Zanchi (De incarnat., p. 92), Paraeus (Romans), Fridericus Broeckerus (Antidot. error. Vorstius, ch. 21, p. 68, col. b), and Sibrandus Lubbertus (Catal. error., p. 278) think that “God could have found another way for us to be reconciled to Him than through the death of His Son.” For this reason, on the basis of Peter Lombard and Thomas, they call the sending of the Son “hypothetical.”

What we should decide about this subject, however, can be given after being explained by certain distinctions. (1) One must distinguish between absolute and hypothetical necessity. The former is one of which the contrary is simply impossible; the latter has the necessity of a means with respect to a certain end. (2) One must distinguish between the incarnation of God and of the Son of God. It was necessary for God to become man not absolutely but hypothetically, namely, if the human race was to be redeemed from the slavery of sin, if divine wrath was to be satisfied, and if the goodness lost through the fall was to be restored—as the reasons prove because of which our Mediator had to be both God and man, as we showed earlier. It was necessary for the Son of God (or the Second Person of the Godhead) to become man neither absolutely nor hypothetically but as that befits divine wisdom, as the reasons prove because of which it was fitting for neither the Father nor the Holy Spirit but the Son to become flesh, as we showed earlier.

On the basis of this foundation we can easily explain the statements of the ancients, some of which assert that the incarnation of the Son of God was necessary, but some of which deny it. Cyril claims (Thesaur., bk. 5, ch. 7): “The incarnation and passion of Christ could have been the only means and remedy for our delivery.” Augustine, De Trinit., bk. 3, ch. 10: “God did not lack some other possible manner, but no more suitable means to heal our wretchedness did exist or could have existed.” Leo, Sermon 2 de nativ., col. 39: “Together with His mercy, though many things were at hand for Him to restore the human race in an indescribable manner, He selected especially this way of planning to use not the power of His might but the reckoning of justice to destroy the work of the devil.” We find similar statements in Bernard (Letter 100, col. 922), the author of the book De agone Christi (ch. 11), Thomas ([ST,] 3, q. 1., art. 2), Lombard (Sent., 2, dist. 44, § 3), etc.

§ 112. (II) The question arises: Is it correct to call the human nature of Christ “without hypostasis” []? “Without hypostasis” has a dual meaning. Something is said to be without hypostasis absolutely and simply if it subsists neither in its own nor in another hypostasis, if it has neither essence nor subsistence in itself nor in another, but is a negative nothing.³ We cannot say that the human nature of Christ is without hypostasis in this sense. Something is said to be without hypostasis relatively and in a certain respect if it indeed subsists not in its own hypostasis but in another’s, if it indeed has essence but not its own personality and subsistence, but subsists in another. In this sense the flesh of Christ is said to be without hypostasis, namely, because it is in a hypostasis [], subsisting in the Word Himself. Therefore when some people claim that the starting point of the incarnation is the flesh’s lack of hypostasis []—which comes between the subsistence by which that mass from which the body of Christ was formed subsisted as a part of the Virgin, [though] not proper to the Virgin nor her very subsistence, and between the subsistence by which the human nature formed by the working of the Holy Spirit from that sanctified mass began to subsist in the first moment of the incarnation, the very subsistence of the Word having been communicated to it—this must not be taken as though the flesh of Christ was ever at any time without a hypostasis. Instead, in our thinking the flesh’s lack of hypostasis before its reception into the subsistence of the Word is claimed as previous not in the order of time but in the order of nature. This flesh and soul were not previously united into one person, but at the same time: the flesh was formed by the Holy Spirit from the segregated and sanctified lump; the shaped flesh was endowed with a soul; the shaped and soul-endowed flesh was assumed into the subsistence of the Word; and the formed, soul-endowed, and subsisting flesh was conceived in the womb of the Virgin. “At the same time flesh, at the same time flesh of the Word, at the same time soul-endowed flesh of the Word,” as Damascenus says (bk. 3, ch. 2). Damascenus again, same book, ch. 12: “Three things occurred at the same time: the assumption, the coming into existence, and the deification of the flesh by the Word.” Some claim this order, that there were four “acts,” so to speak, in the incarnation: (a) the conception of the flesh, (b) the assumption of the conceived flesh, (c) the union of the assumed flesh, (d) the bringing of the united flesh into the light. However, those people are taking the word “conception” strictly, namely, for the sanctification of that seminal and bloody mass from which the Son of God built a soul-endowed flesh for Himself and for the formation of His human nature in the womb of the Virgin. The rest count conception in the last place and include the entire act of the conception—that is, all the things that were done in the conception—under that title.

§ 113. (III) The question arises: Did the Holy Spirit shape all the parts of the body of Christ in an instant or successively? The first is asserted by Basil (Orat. de hum. Christi generat.), Leo the Great (Sermon 8 de natal.), and Fulgentius (De fide ad Petrum, ch. 8). Damascenus, De orth. fid., bk. 3, ch. 2: “The Son of God constructed for Himself flesh endowed with a soul by the Holy Spirit, not gradually with additions until the shape was filled but perfected at once.” The commentator of Damascenus proves this from these prophetic statements: “A woman will enclose a man” [Jer. 31:22]. “Behold the man; the Rising Sun is His name” [Zech. 6:12]. Others press the point that “otherwise the whole Word would not have been united immediately with the entire flesh.” Basil emphasizes that the angel does not say “what is impregnated” but “what is begotten” [cf. Luke 1:35]. From this he concludes, p. 232: “The formation did not come into being for the Lord according to the common nature of the flesh, for that with which she was pregnant was immediately complete in the flesh. It was not given form by modeling it little by little.”

However, let us remember that a shadow was brought over this conception, lest we investigate its manner too precisely nor define it rashly. (1) Scripture says, “He had to be made like His brothers in every respect” (Heb. 2:17). (2) “Just as children share in flesh and blood, so also He shared in them in the same manner” (v. 14). But it is evident that all other infants are shaped successively in the womb. (3) Just as after His nativity and His coming forth into the light He advanced to maturity without any change or increase of the personal union (Luke 2:52), so also He was able to increase in the womb. (4) Dr. Chemnitz sets forth this rule (Harm. evang., ch. 8, p. 173): “In his description of the birth of Christ, Luke used common, ordinary words to show that we must not look for extraordinary miracles in the birth of Christ outside of the testimonies of Scripture. Rather, the things that take place naturally in birth after the conception of the offspring should be thought of with regard to this birth.” We can say the same thing about the conception. If we should wish to establish a miracle here, we must distinguish between the formation of the members and the increase of the formed members, for the former was instantaneous but the latter, successive. The commentator of Damascenus finally comes to this opinion. He says: “In the very womb of the mother there was a growing of the mass and of the quantity of the body and members of our Lord over a period of days, just as also after His birth, so that those which at first were smaller then, through the coming of nourishment, gradually became larger. Nevertheless the formation of the parts according to shape and distinction happened at the very first moment of the sacred conception, and this was perfected by the power of the Holy Spirit, the accomplisher of this work.” (See the various opinions of the Scholastics about the instantaneous conception of Christ in Ferdinandus Vellosillus, bishop of Lucca, Advertentiae theologiae scholasticae, above vol. 9; and Augustine, Quaestio 2, pp. 487ff., 1601 Venice edition.)

§ 114. (IV) The question arises: What was the moment of conception in which the human nature of Christ was formed in the womb of the Virgin? Let us remember, also here, to mind in order to be of sound mind []. Among the ancients three opinions occur about the moment of conception. (1) Some think that Mary conceived during the very greeting that the angel made. They urge the word [“graced,” Luke 1:28], which they apply to Christ, the source of all grace, who had already been conceived in the womb of Mary.

(2) Some claim that as soon as the blessed Virgin heard the voice of the angel saying, “You will conceive,” she conceived in her womb. They urge the particle [“behold,” Luke 1:31], which signifies present time. Nicephorus, bk. 1, ch. 8: “At the same time as the voice of Gabriel, the eternal Word who existed before the ages came down without moving and assumed our condition and nature.”

(3) Some claim that she conceived after she had given her assent to the message of the angel and said, “Behold the handmaid of the Lord” [Luke 1:38]. Therefore they think that the Virgin indeed did conceive at that hour when the angel told her, “You will conceive,” though not at the same moment, but after the angel had finished all his words and after Mary had said, “Let it be to me according to your word.” Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 2: “After the assent of the holy Virgin, the Holy Spirit came upon her.” This opinion seems preferable to the rest: (a) Because the verb [“will conceive”] is set in the future. (b) Because Mary had to be more fully instructed about the manner of her conception. (c) Because Luke says that the angel’s words, “And you will call His name Jesus,” which follow the verb “will conceive,” were stated before her conception (Luke 2:21). (d) Because just as in a spiritual conception and birth a trusting assent is required, so also in a physical conception the same thing undoubtedly happened. (Cf. Augustine, De peccat. merit. et remiss., bk. 1, ch. 20; Rupert, De operibus Spiritus s., ch. 9; Theophylact, on Luke 1; Casaubonus, Ad Baron., exercit. 1, ch. 27; Barradius, Harm.; etc.)

The form of the union.

§ 115. Thesis IV: The form of the union consists in the hypostasis of the Word becoming the hypostasis of the flesh, from which the union itself is called “hypostatic.”

The mode of this union is miraculously unique and uniquely miraculous, transcending the comprehension not only of all men but also of the angels. For this reason it is called “manifestly a great mystery” [1 Tim. 3:16]. “The assumption is beyond comprehension.” The Greeks call the economy the [“the incarnate epiphany”] (from 2 Tim. 1:10 and 1 Tim. 3:16) and the [“theophany,” “appearance of God”]. Damascenus calls it a [“an utterly unmixed union”], etc. (bk. 3, ch. 17).

But in order that we may be able to reach some understanding of it: (1) We shall weigh the statements of Scripture that speak about the form of the union. (2) We shall remove the less congruous unions from the one that we are discussing by removal. (3) We shall explain the true manner of the union by affirmation. (4) We shall gather some corollaries from it.

(I) These are the more important passages of Scripture that speak about the union of the two natures in Christ: “The Word became flesh” (John 1:14). “In Christ the whole fullness of the deity dwells bodily” (Col. 2:9). “God was manifested in the flesh” (1 Tim. 3:16). “Because children have shared in flesh and blood, He likewise partook of these same things” (Heb. 2:14). “He assumed not angels but the seed of Abraham” (v. 16).

Because all these are parallel, they must perpetually be connected in explaining the union. John says that the Word was made flesh, but lest anyone think that the Word was made flesh in the same way as the water was made wine (John 2:9), Paul says that God—that is, the Son of God—was manifested in the flesh and that He communed [] in flesh and blood. But now, a communion [] is at least between two distinct things; otherwise it would be a change and a natural junction []. The apostle says that God was manifested in the flesh, but lest anyone think that this was the sort of manifestation as there was in the Old Testament when either God Himself or the angels appeared in external shapes, John says that the Word became flesh, that is, that He assumed the flesh into His hypostasis in such a way that He never again put it down. The Son of God is said to have assumed the seed of Abraham; however, lest anyone think that this was the sort of assumption as there was when the angels temporarily assumed physical forms, it says that just as children share in flesh and blood, so also He participated in the same. But it is evident that children share in flesh and blood in such a way that, by being born, flesh and blood or human nature is communicated to them from their parents. The apostle describes the union as the indwelling of the Word in the assumed flesh; but lest anyone think that the Son of God dwells in the assumed flesh in the same way as God dwells by grace in the hearts of believers, he explicitly adds that “all the fullness of the deity” dwells in the assumed flesh and, in fact, “bodily” (denoting the dwelling place) or “personally” (expressing the manner of the union), for both meanings of “body” can apply here.

§ 116. (II) There are various and diverse modes of union, and these must be removed from the mode of the personal union. You see, just as the devout ancients say that one can know and describe what God is not, better than what God is, so also with regard to that divine and supernatural union of the two natures in Christ we can declare in truth that one can say more easily what its mode is not than what it is.

Gregory of Nyssa, De opif. mundi, says that there are three ways that things are united: (1) by alteration, as the elements; (2) by mixing, as water and wine; (3) by apposition, as plank to plank. However, none of these modes fits Christ.

Athanasius, Tractat. de definit., ch. , vol. 2, p. 56, lists five kinds of union: one is of commixture, such as that of water and wine; another is divisive, such as that of a man to a man; another is habitual, as that of gold to gold; another is of putting together, where many things are compounded among themselves. The holy, hypostatic union of natures into one hypostasis in Christ must be distinguished from all these.

Bernard, De consid. ad Eugenium, bk. 5, col. 148, lists eight kinds of union: “There is the collective unity when many stones make a single pile. There is also a constitutive unity when many parts make a single body or many parts constitute one whole thing. There is also a conjugal unity by which it happens that two are no longer two but one flesh. There is also a native union by which soul and body are born as one human being. There is also a unity of power by which a man always tries to be found as a man not of unstable, not of unlike, power, but always as one with himself. There is a unity of agreement when, through the love of many people, there is one heart and one soul. And there is a unity of will, when the soul adheres to God with all its vows and is one spirit with Him.” But because none of these kinds can be accommodated to the hypostatic union, he finally adds: “There is also a unity of appropriateness [unitas dignativa] by which our dust has been assumed by the Word of God into His one person.” Bernard again, Parv. serm., sermon 44, vol. 1, p. 215: “There is a natural unity, a carnal unity, a virtual unity, a moral unity, a spiritual unity, a social unity, a principal unity, a personal unity. The natural unity is between the body and the soul; the carnal, between a husband and wife; the virtual is that which unites a man with himself, so that he does not flow out into diverse things but, with the prophet, asks one thing from God; the moral, which joins us to our neighbor; the spiritual, which joins us with God; the social, among the angels, all of whom will the same thing; the principal, which is also the substantial [unity] in the Trinity; the personal, which is in Christ.”

Some make their distinctions in this way: A union is either natural or supernatural, that is, theological-natural. Natural is: (1) A union of mixing, which happens by destruction or by change or by commingling. (2) A union of contact, which is of things, of persons, of wills. (3) A union of aggregation. (4) A union of composition. The supernatural is: (1) Essential (according to essence), in the Trinity. (2) Mystical (according to grace), of the faithful with Christ and with one another. (3) Conjugal. (4) Sacramental. (5) Hypostatic, of the two natures in Christ.

Alexander of Hales distinguishes between one through unity and one through union (p. 3, q. 2, membr. 3). He says that one through union happens in two ways: with the natures of both either preserved or changed. If the first, this happens in two ways, for either a third thing is made, as in a composite substance, or one thing is made from the other, as in the grafting of a branch. If the nature is changed, that happens in two ways: either in both, as when neither is predominant (as in the union of water and honey), or in one of the two, as when one is predominant (if a small amount of water is mixed with a large amount of wine). All of these modes are one simply and of themselves. Something is one by accident or is one in a certain way through the apposition of the one to the other, one of which draws from the other either: only its property, as a fruit communicates its fragrance to one’s hand; or only its name, as the clothing by which one is said to be “tunic-clad”; or neither, as a stone is set next to a stone; or both property and name, as an accident to its subject. Later he adds that “the union of the two natures in Christ is like a union through the mode of insertion.”

§ 117. We shall proceed in this way: (I) The union of the two natures in Christ is not a bare proximity such as exists between two planks that are nailed together or between two persons who stand next to each other. This is because: (1) Proximity scarcely deserves to be numbered among the kinds of unions. (2) No sharing arises from proximity. (3) No mystery occurs therein.

(II) That union is not essential. Two modes of an essential union can be established: (1) Supernatural, in the persons of the Trinity, which participate in the divine essence that is one in number. However, here we should note that a unity should be claimed in the case of the persons of the Trinity rather than a union, because a union properly is of things that at one time were not one and that are separable at least in thinking. The union of the two natures in Christ is not such a union, because in the Trinity there are three hypostases, but in Christ there is only one hypostasis; in the Deity there is one essence, but in Christ there are two natures or essences.

(2) Natural, when one essence is made from several, as, for example, from matter and form there is one composite, from body and soul there is one man. This kind of union in a certain manner comes close to that which is under discussion, for which reason in the Athanasian Creed, as a model, it is used as a sort of comparison. But it is not similar in every detail, much less the same.

You see, properly and carefully speaking, we cannot claim that the union of the two natures in Christ is either natural or essential. It is not natural: (a) Because in nature there are many examples of things that are united naturally. However, this union is unique and singular, and there is no example of it in the entire universe. (b) Things that are united naturally are such that neither of them is complete without the other. However, Christ is complete man and complete God, and the Word was a complete person before His incarnation. (c) Things that are united naturally are such that some third thing is constituted from them. However, this cannot be said about Christ, for He is not , a different thing from different things. (d) Things that are united naturally are separable from each other. However, the two natures in Christ are united inseparably.

It is not essential: (a) Because an essential union constitutes one essence. However, the two natures in Christ coalesce together in neither a simple nor a composite essence, since the human nature is not changed into the divine nor the divine into the human nor has a third species been composed from the two different natures. Leo, Letter 11: “The Word has not been changed into the flesh nor the flesh into the Word. Rather, both remain in one and one remains in both: not divided by diversity, not mingled together [confusus] by mixture; not one [person] from the Father and another from the mother, but the same [person], though in the one way from the Father and in the other way from the mother.” (b) Where there is one thing and another [], there is no essential union. However, in Christ there is one thing and another. (c) Therefore the union is defined and named from the terminus of the uniting [terminus ] in which the united things come together. But the terminus of the uniting of the two natures in Christ is not essence. (d) In essential composites no constituting origin preexists as a person. However, the divine nature of the Word existed as a person before His incarnation. (e) Things that are united essentially are not perfect in every way outside the union, and from them a third thing is constituted. Neither of these can be said with regard to the two natures in Christ. (f) If the union were essential, the communication of properties that arises from the union would also be essential; thus the human nature according to its essence would be omnipotent.

Cyril and Bernard call it “essential and natural”: (1) Not with respect to its mode but with respect to its terminus, and indeed not with respect to its ending point [terminus ad quem] but from its starting point [terminus a quo], as Damascenus explains: “We say the union is ‘essential,’ that is, true and not according to illusion. We say that it is essential not in the sense of two natures resulting in one compound nature, but in the sense of two natures having been united truly into one compound hypostasis []” (bk. 3, ch. 3). (2) They do not oppose “essential” and “natural” to “personal” but to “accidental,” so that it is the same as “real.”

§ 118. (III) It is not accidental (as Scotus seems to want, Sent., 3, dist. 1, q. 1) because: (1) An accidental union is between a substance and its accident or between a substance and a substance, but united accidentally so that they do not constitute some one thing of themselves. However, neither nature in Christ is an accident, nor were the two united with each other accidentally. An accidental union cannot cause “a compound hypostasis.” (2) The terminus of the uniting in Christ is not an accident but the hypostasis. (3) If the union were accidental, God must be man by accident and man must be God by accident. Then the communication of properties would also be accidental. (4) If the flesh were an adjunct of the Word, surely it would have to be predicated of the Word in an oblique case⁴ rather than a direct case⁵ and, in fact, contingently and accidentally. And thus the Word would not be able to be called “man,” but only “human.” (5) No species of accidental union befits the union of the two natures in Christ; therefore it also cannot be called “accidental.” The logical connection is clear, because what the genus befits, a species of the genus ought also to befit. We prove the antecedent from an enumeration of the species. An accidental union is either absolute or respective, since every accident is either absolute or related. The hypostatic union is not a respective accidental union (a relative union), because this opinion was condemned by the fathers of Ephesus already a long time ago in Nestorius, according to Cyril, Anathem. 3. Nor is it absolute, because it would be so according to quantity, and this would be: Either continuous through agglutination (as when two planks are joined with a nail, chain, or glue). Or discrete through aggregation, apposition, heaping together. (However, none of these species befits the hypostatic union unless we should wish to thrust the divine nature into the category of quantity.) Or according to quality through a oneness of mind, a unity of consensus. But in this manner there would not be one Christ but two persons.

§ 119. (IV) It is not a properly integral union: (1) Because the mode of that union is merely among quantitative parts. However, the Word is not quantitative, nor does it have a part outside of the part.⁶ Therefore it cannot constitute one whole thing [unum integrum] with man. (2) One integral part is not predicated of the other in the affirmative, for a hand is not a foot. But man is predicated of God and God of man in the person of Christ.

Here we can cite what Damascenus brings out from the Greek fathers concerning the mode of the union (Orth. fid., bk. 3, ch. 3). He says that the union did not take place: (a) According to paste or dough (), as when a third thing is formed from flour and water, namely bread. (b) By pouring together (), as when one powder is made from various kinds of aromatics. (c) By mixing together (), as when mead is made from water and honey. (According to these three modes of union, or rather mixture, Eutyches and his followers imagined that the natures in Christ were mixed.) Nor did it happen: (d) By relationship (, through affection and friendship by which one heart is made out of two. (e) Nor according to dignity (), as though the man [Jesus] received from the Word the dignity of being Savior along with Him. (f) Nor according to thinking alike, harmony, being of the same mind (, ), as though the will of this man was always in harmony with the will of God. (g) Nor according to a sameness of honor (), that God the Word so exalted this man that He communicated all His honor to him. (h) Nor according to a sameness of name (), as though God communicated His name to him. (i) Nor according to good pleasure (), that in the assumed man the Word so pleases Himself and causes that man to please himself in the Word. (Nestorius imagined that the union in Christ occurred in these six modes.) In the Fifth Council, act. ult., canon 4: “If anyone says that the uniting to the flesh occurred according to grace or operation or dignity or equality of honor or relationship or affection or virtue, and not according to composition or according to the subsistence of the Word, let him be accursed.”

The fathers of the Council of Chalcedon (in Zonaras, Vita Marciani, part 3, p. 139; in Evagrius, bk. 2, ch. 4, p. 810; and in Nicephorus, bk. 15, ch. 6) claim, contrary to Eutyches and Nestorius, that the union of the two natures of Christ happened: (1) Without confusion or without mixture (), because from those two natures a third nature or essence was not made by mixing together. (2) Without change (), because the divine nature was not changed into the human nor was the human changed into the divine. (3) Without division (), because after the incarnation took place, the Word cannot be separated from the flesh nor the flesh from the Word. (4) Without separation (), because once the two natures have been united, they are never separated. Some of the ancients add that that union also took place without change [], without dissolution [], without interruption [], without change [], and without intermission []. (Cf. Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 2.)

We can also compare the personal indwelling of the Word in the assumed flesh through the mode of removal⁷ with the universal presence by which God is present to all creatures, with the presence of grace by which He dwells in the saints, and with the presence of glory by which He reveals Himself in heaven to the blessed angels and to the elect. After all, more intimate than all these modes is that by which the whole fullness of the deity dwells in the assumed flesh, not by type (as formerly in the temple at Jerusalem) nor by activity only (as in creatures) nor by grace only (as in the saints) nor by glory (as in the blessed and the angels), but bodily and hypostatically. A comparison can also be established between the appearance of the Holy Spirit “in bodily form” as a dove [Luke 3:22], which is a symbolic and separable union, and the manifestation of the Son of God in the flesh, which is a hypostatic and inseparable union.

§ 120. (III) Now that we have removed all the modes and species of union, we say that the union of the two natures in Christ happened according to hypostasis because the terminus of the uniting is the hypostasis of the Word. Although this was the hypostasis of only the divine nature before the incarnation, it also became the hypostasis of the flesh after the incarnation. Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 3: “We confess that the one hypostasis of the Son of God exists as a unit in two natures, and we say that the same hypostasis of the Incarnate One belongs to His divinity and His humanity.” Chapter 11: “ ‘The Word became flesh’ means ‘the same hypostasis of the Word unchangeably became the hypostasis of the flesh.’ “ For that reason, that union is called “hypostatic” and “personal.” In every union of disparate things, there is something that is like a bond or chain that connects them and through which they become one. The hypostasis is this sort of uniting bond that unites the disparate natures in Christ, for which reason it is called a hypostatic union.

However, when Damascenus (bk. 3, ch. 3) denies that it is a “personal union” [], this must be explained suitably on the basis of the author’s aim and intent. After all, he is arguing against Nestorius, who claimed that the union in Christ was “personal” not with regard to its ending point but with regard to its starting point, namely, that it was a union that occurred not in the person of the Son of God from two natures but rather from two persons through consensus, love, sameness of thinking, etc. For that reason, Damascenus makes himself clear, removes the kinds of union that are out of place, and adds that the union of the natures in Christ occurred by synthesis, that is, according to hypostasis. It is a union of natures, but not a natural union; it is a personal union, but not of persons.

Among the devout ancients it is called a union “according to the economy or dispensation” [] or even simply “economy” []. Ignatius and Justin (in Expositio fidei) call it and [“taking flesh” and “unifying”], the first of which denotes “the assumption of the flesh”; the latter, “the union of utterly disparate things” (p. 294). On p. 299 he calls it “the uniting of the Word to His body” and [“the highest union”]. Gregory of Nyssa: [“drawing near”]. Athanasius: [“descent”], [“manifestation in the flesh”], [“embodied presence”], [“embodiment”], [“joining”]. Nazianzen: [“coming together”]. Damascenus: [“coming together into one”] and [“joining of natures”]. Commonly they call it and [“incarnation”], etc. Proclus (Homily in nat. Dom., p. 74) says, “Do not divide the union, lest you be divided from God.”

However, Irenaeus (bk. 3, ch. 21) calls it “a commingling.” Nazianzen, Letter 1 ad Cledon.: “mixture and commixture.” Gregory of Nyssa: “mixing in and intermingling.” ** Luther, on John 14, German edition of Jena, vol. 7, fol. 91: “Both natures are mixed in the person.”⁸ ** This must be explained suitably, lest this be applied to the Eutychian confusion. In his creed, Athanasius defines this as “the assumption of the humanity into the divinity”; Epiphanius, as [“co-uniting”]. Damascenus explains it as [“interpenetration”]. Tertullian and Ambrose call it “incarnation, embodiment, pinning together, coupling.” Cyprian, Sermon de Bapt.: “the unity of Christ, the falling of the Word upon the Virgin, the coming together of the eternal divinity and the temporal humanity.” Origen: “confederation.” Augustine: “the assumption of the form of a servant.” Hilary, De Trinit., bk. 2: “a fellowship of mixture.” Jerome (on Isaiah 61) and Cyril (De rect. fid.): “the dispensation,” etc. Augustine, De civitat. Dei, bk. 10, ch. 29: “The Son of God put on man.” De civit. Dei, bk. 11, ch. 2: “After assuming man but not consuming God, the Son of God founded the faith.” Leo, Sermon 3 de nativit., p. 42: “The creature is being connected to the Creator.” Damascenus, Orat. 1 de imag. ex synod. Chalcedon., fol. 702: “Just as the Word became flesh without having its nature changed but remaining what He was, so also the flesh became the Word while not losing anything from what it is, instead having become identical with the Word according to hypostasis,” that is, made the same as far as the person is concerned.

§ 121. (IV) The corollaries that express that form of the union quite richly and clearly are as follows: (1) Because in the incarnation the hypostasis of the Word became the hypostasis of the flesh, therefore after the incarnation it is a composite hypostasis []. Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 3, on the basis of Nazianzen, Athanasius, etc.: “His natures are joined together by hypostasis, having one composite hypostasis.” Chapter 4: “We know that there is one composite hypostasis from both natures.” Also: “The hypostasis composited from the natures.” The hypostasis is called “composite” not because it became composite, having suffered in and of itself some change and destruction of its simplicity, but because after the incarnation it is the hypostasis of two natures, though before it had been only the hypostasis of the divine nature. Before the incarnation, the person of the Word was in itself utterly complete and simple; the hypostasis subsisted only in the divine nature. Through the incarnation it became a composite hypostasis consisting of the divine and human natures at the same time. Thus not only the divine but also the assumed human nature now belong to the integrity of the person of Christ now incarnate. Thomas speaks correctly ([ST,] p. 3, q. 2, [art]. 4): “It is called the composition of person from the natures not with regard to parts but rather with regard to number, just as that whole thing in which two things come together can be called the composite of them, to the extent that one thing subsists in two.” Therefore understand “composite” to mean not a subjective composition, not essential, not of contact, but personal, by which the same hypostasis that previously was naturally and essentially the hypostasis only of the Word (and remains the hypostasis of the same perpetually), in the incarnation became communicatively and personally the hypostasis of the flesh. Because the hypostasis of the Son of God after the incarnation is composite, therefore both natures belong to the person of the Son of God, and one does not subsist without or outside the other.

(2) Because the hypostasis of the Word became the hypostasis of the flesh, the hypostasis of the Word was communicated to the flesh. The Word has that hypostasis as proper within Himself, while the flesh has it as communicated through the union. (The hypostasis of the Word is the hypostasis of both natures: of the divine primarily and naturally, of the human secondarily and hypostatically.) Because the hypostasis of the Word does not befit the flesh through its nature or essence, or essentially from the principles of nature and the constituents of essence, therefore it had to be communicated to it. We proceed in this way: The flesh of Christ either is completely without hypostasis [] or it subsists in the hypostasis of the Word, for it does not have its own subsistence. Yet it is false to think that it is completely without hypostasis. Therefore it subsists in the hypostasis of the Word, which has to be communicated to it.

(3) Because the hypostasis of the Word became the hypostasis of the flesh, therefore the flesh of Christ subsists in a hypostasis []. You see, it does not have its own hypostasis nor is it self-existent, having its own subsistence; nor is it without hypostasis, having no subsistence whatsoever. Surely, then, it is in a hypostasis and subsists in the Word Himself. It is said to subsist in a hypostasis not by any kind of sustenance or carrying in the Word nor by a bare presence with the Word, but by the fullest communication of the hypostasis of the Word, since “the whole fullness of the deity” dwells in it (Col. 2:9). It subsists in a hypostasis not accidentally, as an accident in a subject, nor partially, as a part is in its whole, but personally and uniquely, as a nature in a person.

To the philosophers, signifies: (a) “Universal,” namely, that which does not subsist according to itself but has subsistence in persons or hypostases. Thus the species or nature of humans does not have its own hypostasis but is something in the hypostasis of Peter, Paul, and John. (b) It signifies a “part,” even the most important part. Thus the human body is not a hypostasis nor is the soul a hypostasis, but both are . The meaning with which it is being used here comes closer to the second than to the first.

Augustine, De fid. ad Petrum, ch. 17: “The Word-made-flesh has one person of the divinity and of His own flesh.” Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 2: “The Word was united, according to hypostasis, to flesh endowed with a soul, which flesh also obtained being in Him.” Chapter 7: “And thus the hypostasis in the flesh is called the hypostasis of God the Word.” Chapter 9: “Because the hypostasis of the Word has become the hypostasis of both natures, it is neither possible that one of them is without hypostasis nor can it be conceded that they have hypostases that differ from each other.” And later: “The flesh of God the Word did not subsist independently nor did there arise another hypostasis besides the hypostasis of God the Word. Rather, it subsisted in the same hypostasis.” Chapter 11: “The same hypostasis of God the Word became the hypostasis for the flesh.”

(4) Because the hypostasis of the Word became the hypostasis also of the flesh, after the incarnation there is an intimate interpenetration [] or “passing-into” of the united natures.

(There are some who establish the very form [of the union] in this interpenetration, for they make this distinction: A union is considered in two ways, according to root and according to form. The root or foundation of the union is subsistence or personation, but the form is immanence or permeation. However, interpenetration is more correctly established as a consequence rather than as the form of the union.)

After all, how would there be one hypostasis of those natures without such interpenetration? How would the whole fullness of the deity dwell in the assumed flesh without it? In fact, as there is an essential interpenetration among the persons of the Trinity because of the unity of essence, so there is a personal interpenetration between the two natures united in Christ because of the unity of person. Damascenus (bk. 3, ch. 4) calls it “the interpenetration of the natures into each other.” The interpreter rendered it as “the immanence and sitting of the natures in each other.” Chapter 5: “If they interpenetrate each other, then they do not permit a change or mutation of one into the other.” In ch. 7 he adds: “One must know that if we say that the natures of the Lord interpenetrate each other, we still know that the interpenetration comes from the divine nature.” (The interpreter has rendered this: “the passing-into comes forth.”) “Moreover, that is what reaches through all things, just as He wills, and nothing penetrates through it.” “Immanence,” then, according to Damascenus, is common to both natures, but “passing-into” is proper to the divine nature. Galatinus rendered it “circumcessio” [“coming around”] (De arcan., bk. 3, ch. 2). Some define it as “an unmixed unifying, wholly complete in all respects,” that is, “an utterly intimate passing-into, but unmixed,” because that immanence requires an utterly close and intimate presence from which it flows forth.

(5) Because the hypostasis of the Word became the hypostasis of the flesh, therefore these two natures are supremely present to each other. You see, a part was not united with a part, but the entire Word was united to the entire flesh, and the entire flesh was united to the entire Word. Therefore because of the sameness of the hypostasis and the interpenetration of the natures to each other, the Word is so present to the flesh and the flesh is so present to the Word that the Word is not outside the flesh nor is the flesh outside the Word. Rather, wherever the Word is, there He has the flesh supremely present to Himself; and wherever the flesh is, there it has the Word supremely present to itself. In fact, it is assumed into His hypostasis. Just as the Word is not outside His own deity, of which He is the hypostasis, so also His essence is not outside His own flesh, which indeed is finite, yet personally subsists in the Word. For as His own deity is proper to the Word through His eternal begetting by the Father, so also the flesh has become proper to the same Word through the personal union. Therefore just as the essential interpenetration in the persons of the Trinity and the one deity common to the three persons causes one person not to be outside another, but rather the Father to be in the Son, the Son in the Father, and the Holy Spirit in both, so also the personal interpenetration and one hypostasis common to the two natures causes the one nature in Christ not to be outside the other, but rather the whole Word to be in His own flesh and the entire flesh to be in the Word. And just as the unity of essence is undermined if you say that the Son is outside the Father and the Father outside the Son (in whatever manner and respect you may want that to be interpreted), so also the unity of person will be undermined if you wish to say that the Word is outside the flesh and the flesh is outside the Word (in whatever manner and respect you may want that to be interpreted).

Therefore this interpenetration requires a presence that is not only general, gracious, and glorious, which is common to the assumed flesh along with other creatures, but a presence that is unique, intimate, and supremely close, so that the one nature cannot be outside the other that is united to it. Otherwise it would not be interpenetration [] but side-by-side penetration [], because interpenetration requires not a partial presence but a total one so that the whole Word is present to the whole flesh and the whole flesh is present to the whole Word. It requires not a temporary and dissoluble presence but an eternal and indissoluble one. Justin, Εκθ. ., p. 305: “As we affirm that the indivisible Word is inseparably present in His own temple, and as we confess that the whole fullness of the deity is dwelling there, we also say that He Himself is present to all, but in a very similar fashion.”

(6) Because the hypostasis of the Word became the hypostasis of the flesh, therefore there is one subsisting thing [], one person, in Christ. There are and indeed remain two natures in Christ, but there is one person, because those two natures are united to constitute a single subsisting thing through the unity of the hypostasis that is common to both. For this reason He is called “one Lord” (1 Cor. 8:6; Eph. 4:6); “one human being” (1 Tim. 2:5); “one man” (2 Cor. 11:2); one Christ (2 Cor. 5:14). Leontius of Jerusalem writes beautifully in a disputation against those who used to say that our Lord Jesus Christ is one composite nature, as recorded in Justin, Exposit. rect. fid., p. 302: “There is one sun but two natures: the one of light but the other of the solar body. So also here, there is indeed one Son, the Lord Christ, the only-begotten, but two natures: the one above us, the other ours ().” Athanasius, Desanct. Trinit., dial. 5: “Christ is one composite person from God and from humanity.” Nazianzen, Ad Cledon: “Those things from which the Savior is are one thing and another, not one person and another—by no means!” Vincent of Lérins, Advers. prof. vocum novit., bk. 4: “In God there is one substance but three persons; in Christ there are two substances but one person. In the Trinity it is one person and another, but not one thing and another; in the Savior it is one thing and another, but not one person and another. The substance of the divinity is one thing; the substance of the humanity is another. Nevertheless the deity and the humanity are not one person and another. Rather, there is one and the same Christ, one and the same Son of God, just as in man the flesh is one thing, the soul another, but the soul and flesh are one and the same man.” In the Council of Chalcedon, the fathers, who numbered 630, exclaimed: “Accursed be he who divides and confounds” (namely, the one who divides the person and who confounds the natures), “because the natures are united without confounding, that they may be distinguished inseparably.” Galatinus, De arcan., bk. 3, ch. 2: “It is a union without confounding because of the duality of natures, and a distinction without division because of the unity of the person.” “Just as the three divine hypostases are one God, so these three—divinity, soul, and body—constitute one Christ” (Galatinus, loc. cit.).

(7) Because the hypostasis of the Word became the hypostasis of the flesh, therefore the flesh was allotted a nonlocal mode of subsisting. The human nature subsists in the Word Himself either locally or nonlocally. It is not the former, because otherwise the union would be local. Therefore it is the latter, and as a consequence it received from it a nonlocal, supernatural, and most sublime mode of presence in the Word Himself. This mode is personal, and for this reason the Word is nowhere and at no place where He does not have His flesh supremely present with Himself and, indeed, personally united with Himself. Therefore, though the incarnation occurred solely in the womb of His mother, the Virgin Mary, and the body of Christ at the time of its conception and gestation was not outside the womb of His mother according to natural place and local nearness, nevertheless because the terminus of the assuming and uniting is not a place but the very hypostasis of the Word—because He is nonlocal and transcends most highly all the extensions of places—therefore, in and through this union, the flesh of Christ was allotted a nonlocal mode of subsisting. You see, the human nature—according as it, having been united, does not have its own existence in a place but in the Word, and the Word has the flesh present to Himself not with respect to this or that place but in His hypostasis itself—the human nature, I say, was exalted. Otherwise the union would be local and changeable. It obtained its hypostatic being in the Word Himself, therefore it also obtained His peculiar mode of subsisting and personal actuality.

And because the hypostasis of the Word became the hypostasis of the flesh in such a way that it did not cease to be what it was—namely, the human nature—from this there arises the distinction between natural and personal actuality. You see, some things are predicated of Christ the man according to natural actuality, namely, those things that stem from the constitutive principles of human nature and that He has in common with all men. And some things are predicated according to personal actuality, namely, those that befit Him by reason of the personal union. The former befit Him naturally according to His essence; the latter, personally according to His existence. You see, what some people argue is false: that something cannot be said personally except about the person. But “subsisting in the Word” is predicated of the assumed flesh not essentially and not accidentally. Therefore it is predicated personally.

(8) Because the hypostasis of the Word became the hypostasis of the flesh, therefore the Word with His own flesh is the Second Person of the Trinity. Because the assumed nature does not exist separately nor does it constitute its own person but was exalted into the unity of the person of the Word (who subsists in both natures and is the Second Person of the Trinity), therefore it is very devout to believe and very correct to say that the assumed human nature belongs to the Trinity personally because it belongs personally to the Word, who is the Second Person of the Trinity. Also, as the human nature is not personally outside the hypostasis of the Word, so also it is not personally outside the Trinity. Ambrose, De resurrect.: “We must not despise the nature of human flesh, which deserved to enter into the consortium of the Holy Trinity through our Lord Christ,” that is, personally. Augustine, De dono persev., ch. 24: “He who assumed and what He assumed are one person in the Trinity.” (Cf. Dr. Chemnitz, De duabus natur., ch. 27.)

Of course, Beza argues (Volum. 2, fol. 275): “The assumed nature remains in the union outside of the Trinity,” and reproaches our churches with Schwenkfeldianism. We respond, however, that it became internal to the Trinity not essentially but personally. Whoever separates the assumed flesh from sharing in the Trinity separates the same from sharing in the Word.

Antithesis.

§ 122. Here we must be careful of falling into two errors: the Eutychian confounding of the two natures and the Nestorian tearing apart of the person. The Timotheans inclined toward the former. They used to teach that “the union took place by the conversion of the deity into humanity.” Whoever followed Eutyches also inclined toward the former. Paul of Samosata inclined toward the latter. He taught that “the divine Word dwelt in the man just as in any other prophet.” Whoever followed Nestorius also inclined toward the latter. (See Schroeder’s book, De Eutychianismo et Nestorianismo; the disputations of Runge in De Eutychianismo et Nestorianismo; etc.) However, we shall pass over the errors of the ancients and list the false teachings of our time regarding this point of doctrine.

The false teaching of the Papists.

(I) With regard to the form of the union, the Papists depart from the path of the truth: (1) When they take the communication of the hypostasis exclusively so as to oppose it to the communication of natures and of properties. Bellarmine, De Christo, bk. 3, ch. 8, § His igitur: “The hypostatic union consists in the communication of the subsistence of the Word, not in the communication of the attributes of the deity.” And later, § 3: “The union occurred through the communication of that which is proper to the Son, not of that which is common to the other persons. But only the subsistence is proper to the Son; all the essential attributes are common to all three persons. Therefore the hypostatic union occurred through the communication of the subsistence alone.” We find similar things in Busaeus, Contra Gerlachium, ch. 4, thesis 35, where he calls it a “union according to subsistence, not because one subsistence was made out of two natures but because this union attributes nothing other than subsistence to the united humanity.” On the contrary: (a) In Christ there is said to “dwell the whole fullness of the deity” (Col. 2:9), and “all the riches of wisdom and knowledge” are said “to be hidden” in Him (v. 3). Therefore not [only] was the nature of the subsistence alone secluded, [but] also the communication in the divine attributes occurred. (b) A proper and immediate effect ought not be opposed to its cause. Yet the communication of attributes is related to the communication of the hypostasis as the proper and immediate effect to its own cause, as we shall show later. (c) The hypostasis of the Word is not something really diverse from the divine nature of the Word and the essential properties thereof. (d) If the hypostasis of the Word is communicated to the flesh but the divine attributes are not, the consequence is that the hypostasis of the Word and His attributes are opposites, because opposites are not in one [thing]. (e) We can satisfy Bellarmine’s argument through the distinction given earlier between the divine nature considered absolutely or commonly and that nature considered relatively or determinately with a mode of existence.

(2) They depart from the path of truth when they define the union as bare sustenance. Bellarmine writes (De incarn., bk. 3, toward the end of ch. 8 and at the end of ch. 17): “Although the Word may be somewhere where the humanity is not, nevertheless even there the Word is man, because the Word, existing there, sustains the humanity as His own, proper humanity, though it exists elsewhere.” Therefore as the form of the union, they set forth the sustenance of the human nature in the Son of God. Luther already refuted this Thomistic error in the Wittenberg edition, vol. 2, fol. 228, in his Major. Confess. and in his book De conciliis.

(3) They depart from the way of truth when they declare the mystery of the personal union with comparisons that leave it completely empty. Salmeron, tome 16, disput. 2 on 1 John, p. 155, teaches that the hypostatic union can be conceived of in seven ways: “(a) As a thing attracted in something that attracts, as iron in a magnet, by His Spirit as intermediate. (b) As it is subjected in the subject, as a sensitive thing in an intellective thing, and as a triangle in a quadrangle. (c) As the greatest polygon in a circle, because it is carried off into another kind, and not through itself. (d) As the thing united in the unifying thing. (e) As two trees inserted in a circle. (f) As a river in the sea to which it is brought and which receives it. (g) As voice in a word and voice on a page, physics in Aristotle, a craftsman in an image, and as the son of a French father and a Spanish mother.”

Bellarmine had written (De Christo, bk. 3, ch. 8): “The flesh exists in the Word like an arm in a body,” but he deleted this in later editions. In the same work he compares the propositions “God is dead” and “the philosopher is dead,” and he compares this mystery to “a tree into which a branch of another species is engrafted.” However, though he may say that both of these lack similarity, nevertheless, because he writes in the explanation of the latter comparison: “Just as the tree after the engrafting sustains that branch which otherwise would be existing of itself, so also in like manner the divine Word like a great tree has received that little branch of the human nature miraculously engrafted therein,” and especially because he stubbornly denies the proper and immediate effect of the union (namely, the communication of properties), therefore, I say, because of these comparisons, we are right to charge him with the Nestorian “proximity” [].

Both of these comparisons are faulty in many ways. The first is faulty on this account: (a) Because philosophy and death are two accidents, neither of which pertain to the subsistences of man. (b) In the subject of the proposition “the philosopher is dead,” the name of the subject [suppositum] is not posited. (c) Nor is philosophy united personally with the nature that dies.

The second comparison is faulty: (a) Because the branch grafted onto the tree is not a complete tree but merely a part of a tree. (b) Before the branch was engrafted, it had its own subsistence, neither of which statements can be said about the assumed nature. (c) The branch becomes one with the tree onto which it is grafted through natural junction and fusing together, not through hypostatic union. (d) This comparison does not explain the personal actuality of the human nature but merely the effect of a union.

What Bellarmine says in the same book, ch. 4, belongs to this point. He explains the proposition “The Word was made flesh” with the following propositions: “Aaron was made a priest by God” and “David was made king.” In ch. 15 he compares the Word’s assuming of the human nature with a king who puts on his purple robe. In ch. 17 he compares the union of the two natures in Christ with the union of the sun and its orbit. If one observes all these closely, it will readily appear that what our blessed Luther declared was absolutely true: that “there are many Nestorians in the papacy” (De conciliis, vol. 7, Jena edition, p. 251). (See our De gloria Dei, disput. 2, § 11.) However, Alexander of Hales writes far more correctly and moderately: “It does not belong to a human being to define what sort of communication this is, by which the human nature is communicated to the Word” (part 3, q. 2, membr. 3). And Biel writes (Sent., 1, dist. 30, q. 4): “The union of the human nature with the Word is not only indescribable but is also incomprehensible according to that state of [our] intellect.”

The false teaching of the Calvinists.

§ 123. (II) The Calvinists: (1) Define the union as “adjunction.” Danaeus, Exam. cont. Chemnicium, p. 84: “In that union only the nature was adjoined to the already existing person who was fully subsisting of Himself.” Polanus (Logic.) and Goclenius (Problem. log., q. 40): “The flesh is an adjunct of the Word.” Martinius (Exam. Spic. contra D. Mentz., p. 49) asserts that “it is an accidental union.” (Against this, let the propositions cited above be urged.) To affirm this opinion, they set forth an argument of this sort: “Whatever is added to a being existing in actuality, that is its accident. The flesh was added to the Word, a being existing in actuality. Therefore it is an accident of Him.” Passing over the other parts of our response, we respond here to the major premise by objecting. The soul, divinely breathed into man, was added to a being existing in actuality (Gen. 2:7). Nevertheless it cannot be called its adjunct or accident. Therefore the major premise must be limited. Whatever is added to a being existing in actuality in such a way that it does not constitute with it one subsisting thing, that is its accident.

(2) They define it as a bare sustenance and carrying of the flesh in the hypostasis of the Word. Beza, Coll. Mompelg., p. 245: “We say that the humanity receives only sustentation from the Word.” Martyr, Dial., fol. 10, Pseudostereoma, letter h h h 1: “In Christ, the two natures are united in such a way that there is one subsisting thing, that is, that the human nature is carried by the Word so that the natures are inseparable in all eternity and that the human nature would be reduced to nothing unless it be sustained in this way.” On the contrary: (a) “Carrying” and “sustenance” are merely external works, but the union, with regard to its terminus, is an internal work. (b) “Carrying” is merely a secondary actuality,⁹ but we must define the form of the personal union as a primary actuality.¹⁰ (c) “Carrying” is common to the assumed nature along with all other creatures (Acts 17:28; Heb. 1:9). Therefore it does not express the sublimity of this mystery. (d) Bare carrying does not create a composite hypostasis. (e) “Carrying” is an action common to the entire Trinity, but the hypostatic union occurred solely in the person of the Son of God in which His human nature subsists, not in the person of the Father or of the Holy Spirit. (Cf. our commonplace On the Person of Christ [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 7], § 34; De gloria Dei, disput. 7.)

(3) They say that Christ is “all whole (), constituted of two natures as of integral parts, just as a foot and a man constitute one whole thing” (Keckermann, System. logic., pp. 197–98). Against this: (a) Nothing is all whole in its own integral part, for a man is not in his feet. However, the Word is said to have been manifested in the flesh. Therefore the Word and man do not constitute one whole integral thing. (b) No foot, no stomach can be said to have become man. However, the Son of God became man, and man became the Son of God. Therefore the assumed man and the Word do not constitute a whole integral thing. (c) The whole man is not totally in the feet, but the entire Word is in the entire assumed flesh and the whole flesh is in the whole Word. Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 6: “In His wholeness He took up the whole Me and My wholeness was united with His wholeness.”

(4) They claim that the two natures are one essential thing (Keckermann, ibid.). Against this, let the foundations set forth above be urged, by which we proved that that union is not according to essence.

(5) They deny that the union occurred to establish one subsisting thing. (See Danaeus, Contra Chemnicium, p. 83.) We proved the contrary in the aforementioned disputation, § 11.

(6) They deny the communication of the hypostasis. (See Grabius, Contra Hunnium de persona Christi, p. 49.) Alsted writes (Theolog. polem., p. 155): “Accurately speaking, the hypostasis of the Word was not communicated to the flesh, that is, it was not poured into it. Rather, through appropriation the latter subsists in the former, just as a branch subsists in a tree.”

** Wendelinus, Christ. theolog., bk. 1, ch. 16, p. 259: “Because the assumption of the human nature to the hypostasis of the Word can stand without the communication of the hypostasis, the hypostatic or personal sustenance of the human nature is enough for the hypostasis of the Word to be man through it.” (See also pp. 260–61.) **

However, they use the following argument against the communication of the hypostasis: “Subsistence does not differ in reality from essence. If, then, the infinite subsistence of the Word is communicated to the flesh, surely the flesh will be infinite by reason of its essence.” We respond. This holds with regard to one’s own personal subsistence but not with regard to the personal subsistence communicated by another. The personal subsistence by which the flesh subsists in the Word is not proper to it but has merely been communicated to it. Therefore it does differ from the essence of the flesh in reality. (See the aforementioned disputation, § 13.)

** Polanus himself (Syntagm., bk. 6, ch. 16) “proves the communication of the hypostasis with several arguments and removes the objections of the heretics.” Damascenus, De orth. fid., bk. 3, ch. 2: “The Word Himself, having become the hypostasis for the flesh ….” “Whatever has its own hypostasis of itself and naturally is a person. Whatever has a hypostasis communicated to it from another is indeed not a person but rather in a hypostasis and personated.” **

(7) They deny that the human nature was assumed into the divinity, and they say that the person and not the nature of the Word is incarnate. Earlier we showed the contrary.

(8) They assert that the entire Word is in the flesh in such a way that the whole Word is also outside the flesh. With regard to this assertion, they go off into two classes. Some say that both the nature and the hypostasis of the Word are in the flesh in such a way that they nevertheless are also outside the flesh. Zanchi, De nat. Dei, 2, ch. 6, p. 157: “The entire divine nature is in the human nature, and the entire divine nature is also outside the human nature.” Herbornensis, Spicil., p. 78: “The entire hypostasis of the Word is somewhere where the flesh does not exist.” Francis Junius, Defens. 1. Cathol. doctrina de trinit. contra Samosat., fol. 20: “The hypostasis of the Son is completely and totally in the body united with Himself, as is the Spirit. It is also outside the body united with Himself, just as totally as it is in the body, as it is infinite. Otherwise its infinity would take away its spiritual property—something that no man, not even a philosopher, will hold if he thinks about it.”

Some concede that the “hypostasis of the Word is not outside His own flesh.” Meanwhile, they say that “the divine nature of the Word is outside His own flesh because of its infinity.” Sohnius, Exeg. August. Confess., vol. 2, p. 207: “The Word is not outside the human nature nor is the human nature outside the Word, because there is one hypostasis of the assuming Word and of the assumed human nature. However, the divine nature of the Word is outside its own flesh because of its infinity. If the question, however, does not involve the essence and nature of both—of the assuming Word and the assumed nature—then the same Word is wholly within and outside His own body, for the divine essence of the Son is utterly simple and infinite.”

** Wendelinus, Christ. theol., bk. 1, ch. 16, p. 258: “The divine nature of Christ is not within the assumed flesh in such a way that it is not outside it at the same time.” **

To the question “Is the Word outside His own flesh after the union has occurred?” Wetzelius responds (Disput. 9, thesis 12): “As there are two presences—one of the humanity to the Word and of the Word to the flesh, and the other of Christ to creatures—so also there are two ‘outsides.’ The first presence is not outside the flesh, but the second is outside the flesh, and this does not take away the union.” Indeed, he is correct in claiming that in the mutual union of the natures and in the personal interpenetration we must reject that Nestorian “outside.” But he is incorrect in his thinking about the presence of Christ, the God-man, among His creatures. You see, if that “outside” conflicts by itself with the personal union, it cannot be changed with any respect to creatures because no creature can tear apart the personal union, nor can any creature be closer or nearer to the Word than His own flesh.

Against that Nestorian “outside” [extra] we set forth: (a) The definition of the hypostatic union given by the apostle: that the whole fullness of the deity dwells in the assumed flesh [Col. 2:9]. But if the entire Word is in the flesh in such a way that it is also entirely outside the flesh, we shall no longer be able to say that the whole fullness of the deity dwells in the flesh. (b) The designation of the Word outside the flesh. What is outside the flesh is not incarnate; it is not in the flesh. Therefore to the extent that one imagines that the Word after the incarnation is outside the flesh, He will not be in the flesh and will be not incarnate. He will not be a composite person but a simple one. Therefore He will also not be man. (c) A comparison with the body endowed with a soul. Just as, so long as the union of body and soul in a human being endures, the soul is not outside its body nor the body outside its soul, but the body is endowed with soul and the soul is embodied, so also, as long as the union of the divine and human natures in Christ endures, the Word is not outside the flesh nor the flesh outside the Word. Cyril, Letter 10: “The Word became flesh not as He dwells in the saints, but He makes for Himself the sort of indwelling such as the soul of a man is believed to have with its own body.” (d) The absurd consequence. If the Word were outside the flesh, the whole Word would be outside the flesh because it is indivisible. But if the whole Word were outside the flesh, the union would be dissolved because “the whole fullness of the deity dwells therein.” If the hypostasis of the Word is not outside the flesh because of the personal union, and if the divine nature of the Word is outside the flesh because of its infinity, it would follow that between the person of the Son of God and His humanity there is a personal union, and between the divine nature of the Word and the human nature there is no union. If the Word is in some places outside His own flesh, we shall have two Words: incarnate and not incarnate, in the flesh and outside the flesh. If we shall have to say that the nature of the Word is outside the flesh because of the infinity of the divine essence, we shall have to affirm the same thing about His person, because that, too, is infinite. Or if it is correct to say that the hypostasis of the Word—its infinity notwithstanding—is not outside the flesh, the consequence will be that the divine nature of the Word, too, is not outside the flesh, or we shall have to say that it is finite. Keckermann (System. theolog., p. 81) seeks a response to this argument and falls into the absurdity of denying that the person is infinite. (e) Parity. As the Word, after the incarnation, is not outside His own deity, so also He is not outside His assumed humanity. The reason is that the hypostasis is not of only one nature but of both, and the deity and humanity, united in it personally, subsist indivisibly and inseparably. (Cf. our commonplace On the Person of Christ [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 7], § 43, and De gloria

Dei, disput. 7, § 14.)

(9) They explain the union with the sort of comparisons that leave the mystery completely empty: a planet attached to its orbit, a gem set in a ring, a nail attached to a wheel, Antwerp adjacent to the sea, a line touching a circle at a single point, the head and feet united, the trunk and root of a tree, a writing pen and a writer. Fridericus Petri has collected several such comparisons in his Nestorianismus, p. 166. On the contrary: Whatever union is not of a whole with a whole, that union is not suited to represent the personal union by which, indeed, the entire Word has united to Himself the whole assumed humanity. However, in the examples cited there is not a union of a whole with a whole, but of a whole with a part; consequently, the union is partial and accidental, not personal according to hypostasis. (Cf. our commonplace On the Person of Christ [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 7], § 53, and our aforementioned disputat., § 18.) In his commentary on Colossians 2, Musculus uses the comparison of a demon and a demoniac. He says: “We use this adverb ‘bodily’ in a similar sense when we say that the devil is bodily in this man, for we are wanting to signify that he about whom we are speaking is completely diabolical, though the devil is noncorporeal in species. This is how the apostle speaks about Christ, that in Him dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily, that is, that He is not only a man but is very God, having all the fullness of the deity within Himself.” This comparison is quite close to blasphemy, though it is not unfamiliar to us. Athanasius, vol. 2, p. 363, compares the union of the two natures in Christ with the union of the serpent and the devil in Gen. 3:1.

(10) They deny that a communication of natures and properties follows from the union, as will become clear below. Therefore they are taking away the proper consequence of the union. Nestorius steadfastly denied that he took away the unity of the person, as is clear from Conc., vol. 2, p. 664, and Augustine, Letters 95 and 96. Nevertheless he was condemned by the fathers of Ephesus because he denied the communication of the natures and properties. Therefore the fathers were looking not so much at the words of Nestorius as at what is gathered from his teaching as a necessary consequence.

(11) They deny that the human nature of Christ was exalted in the very hypostasis of the Word above and outside of every place, and they claim that through the union and in the very hypostasis of the Word it has no other manner of existing than a local and natural manner, which any other man has in his own personality. Sadeel, Oper. theolog., p. 148, claims: “The human nature does not subsist in the Word Himself, because it exists only locally in a place.” Pezelius repeats the same thing in Contra Hunn., p. 279. See the refutation opposed to him in our aforementioned disputation, §§ 15–17.

(12) Some of them say that “Christ is not the Son of God personally according to His humanity or through the personal union” (Piscator, Not. ad collat. Vorst., p. 191; Paraeus, Iren., ch. 28, art. 11). See our aforementioned disputation, § 22.

The false teaching of Vorstius.

§ 124. (III) Vorstius plays along with both the Calvinists and Photinians. Consequently, we place him in the middle place. In his Exeg. apologet., ch. 17, p. 88, he thinks: “There is no error if someone should think that the divine hypostasis of the Word was communicated to the assumed humanity through some sort of arcane inflowing.” On the contrary: (1) Such an inflowing is merely a secondary actuality. (2) It brings in no communication of natures and properties. (3) It does not make the person composite. (4) On account of it, we cannot say that God became man or that man became God, because God communicates Himself to the saints, too, through this arcane inflowing, yet they are not God.

The false teaching of the Photinians.

§ 125. (IV) The Photinians laugh blasphemously at the union of the two natures in Christ, and for this reason they twist, with horrible audacity, the passages of Scripture that speak about the mystery of the union into a foreign meaning:

John 1:14: “The Word became flesh.”

(I) “The Word became flesh” (John 1:14). They offer the following distortion of this passage: “That Word was flesh, that is, He through whom God revealed His will to us and who consequently is called ‘the Word’ was man, liable to all miseries and pains, because human frailty is expressed with the word ‘flesh’ in Gen. 6:3 and 1 Pet. 1:24.” (See Socinus, Contra Bellarmin. et Wiek., ch. 5, p. 328; Franciscus Davidis, Colloq. Transsylv. act., day 9, letter G; Catech Racov., p. 107; Schmaltzius, Contra disp. 3. Frantz., p. 64.)

We respond: (1) We do not deny that the verb [“became”] at times is translated as “was” or “existed,” yet in such a way that it presupposes “became” (John 1:6; Luke 24:19). From this, however, one cannot infer that it must be taken in this passage in that sense, because in other passages of Scripture it means “to become” (John 1:3; 2:9; etc.). (2) Therefore our adversaries ought to prove that it ought to be translated that way in this passage as well, something that they cannot prove. We prove the contrary from other passages of Scripture that are parallel to this one. Thus, in Gal. 4:4, the Son of God is said to have been , “become or born of a woman.” This happened to Him not simply by receiving the source of being from and in her (because according to the divine nature He existed before Mary from eternity), but by assuming the human nature in her. Because this was assumed into the very hypostasis of the Word, the Son of God is truly said to have been born of Mary. In Rom. 1:3, the Son of God is said to have been [“become of the seed of David according to the flesh”]. (3) We do not deny that in Holy Writ “flesh” at times means frailty and infirmity, but we deny that it must be taken in that sense at all times, for at times it signifies the human nature by synecdoche, as we have shown earlier. (4) We concede that also in this passage it includes human frailty consequently and secondarily, namely, that the Son of God received not only His human nature but also our infirmities, but without sin. (The Photinians ineptly refer Gen. 6:3 to this, where the discussion is not about human frailty but human perversity.) We deny, however, that John is speaking in this passage about that frailty immediately and primarily, much less uniquely and solitarily. (5) You see, the evangelist adds that the Word became flesh in such a way that He “dwelt among men who have seen His glory,” not a common glory, but “as of the only-begotten of the Father” [John 1:14], and this term denotes the eternal Son of God. He revealed His glory before that profound humiliation, even to death on the cross (Phil. 2:[8]). (6) In the subject of this proposition, one must repeat the preceding parts of the description. That Word who “was in the beginning with God,” who is true God with the Father, “through whom all things were made,” in the fullness of time “became flesh,” that is, true man consisting of soul and body. (7) It is clear from parallel passages of Scripture that describe the mystery of this union (1 Tim. 3:16; Heb. 2:14, 16) that this is the true, proper, and genuine meaning of this passage. (8) After the evangelist had said, “The Word became flesh,” he no longer calls our Savior “the Word” in the entire Gospel, but “Jesus” or “Christ” or “the Son of Man” so that we would understand that with the name “Word” he wanted to express Him according as He was the Word even before the incarnation and not only because He revealed the will of the heavenly Father to us in time. (See our commonplace On God the Father and the Son [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 5], § 30.)

Colossians 2:9: “The whole fullness of the deity dwells in Christ.”

§ 126. (II) To the apostolic passage “In Christ dwells all the fullness of the Godhead bodily” (Col. 2:9), they provide this interpretation: “In the teaching of Christ, the will of God has been revealed to us fully and completely.” Schmaltzius (Contra Frantz., p. 67), the Catech. Racov. (p. 154), and Ostorodus (Disput. contra Tradelium, part 2, ch. 11, p. 195) urge the context of the passage, because the preceding verses deal with Christ’s teaching, and to them this statement is added so as to show the cause. (Cf. Eph. 4:20 and Heb. 13:8–9.)

We respond: (1) The context of the passage is not undermined through our interpretation. The Son of God fully revealed to us the plan and will of the Father regarding our salvation because He is “in the bosom of the Father” (John 1:18); because He is the true Son of God who “alone knows the Father” (Matt. 11:27); who is the true God, in whom the whole fullness of the Godhead dwells according to His human nature. (2) “All the fullness of the Godhead” is not the revealed will of God, because here “we know in part” (1 Cor. 13:9). Rather, it signifies the utterly perfect essence of God. Eniedinus sees that it is very difficult to understand “the fullness of the Godhead” with regard to the revelation of the divine will. Therefore, without any argument, he imagines that, “because of the carelessness of the scribes, [“Godhead, deity”] was written instead of [“godliness”].¹¹ (3) To the doctrines and teachings of men there is opposed not only the teaching of Christ (which one is compelled to accept under the name “Christ”) but also Christ Himself, who indeed is our Head, the source of all salutary wisdom necessary for eternal life, from whom all the streams of divine knowledge flow into the Church. (4) The apostle adds carefully that in Christ dwells all the fullness of the Godhead “bodily” in order to express either the dwelling place or the manner of indwelling. (See our locus On God the Father and the Son [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 5], § 75.)

1 Timothy 3:16: “God was manifested in the flesh.”

§ 127. (III) “God was manifested in the flesh” (1 Tim. 3:16). To this passage, they give this meaning: “The Father manifested Himself in Christ as Christ manifested Himself to the apostles, who were flesh.” Ostorodus (Contra Tradel., part 2, ch. 5, p. 109), the Catech. Racov. (p. 112), and Schmaltzius (Contra Frantz., disp. 3, de pers. Christi, p. 65) try to prove this from the fact that “the Vulgate translation does not have the word ‘God.’ “ (See Eniedinus, in his interpretation of this passage, p. 367.)

We respond: (1) The Greek codices, which the Photinians acknowledge with us as authentic, uniformly read [“God”]. (2) John carefully explains the subject of this proposition as referring to the Son of God: “The Son of God appeared for this …” (1 John 3:8). (3) “Manifestation in flesh” cannot be explained with regard to object as a reference to the manifestation made to mortal men who are subject to various calamities, because in this way God had already manifested Himself to people in the Old Testament (Heb. 1:1), and [it says] not that He was manifested “to flesh” but “in flesh.” (4) The expressions “to be in flesh,” “to come in flesh,” “to be manifested in flesh” are nowhere in Scripture attributed to God the Father, but rather to the Son, who took the flesh into the unity of His person, about whom it is stated in other passages of Scripture that He “became flesh” (John 1:14), that He “became a partaker of flesh and blood” (Heb. 2:14), that He “came in the flesh” (1 John 4:2), that He “was sent in the likeness of sinful flesh” (Rom. 8:3), that “He suffered in the flesh” (1 Pet. 4:1), that “having been made flesh, He manifested His glory” (John 1:14; 2:11), etc. (5) The apostle is speaking about the sort of manifestation that is “without controversy, a great mystery” [1 Tim. 3:16]. Yet in the way in which the Photinians set this forth, God had already revealed His will previously through the prophets. (6) The apostle says of the same one who was manifested in the flesh that “He was justified in the Spirit,” something he explains in Rom. 1:4: “Christ the Son of God was demonstrated in power according to the Spirit of holiness by His resurrection from the dead.” (7) It is said about the same one who was manifested in the flesh that He was “seen by the angels” [1 Tim. 3:16]. Here it deals not with the audible appearance or manifestation but with the visible, by which the Son of God, manifested in the flesh, was seen by angels and human beings. Instead of “God,” the Photinians substitute “the will of God,” and they explain that as follows: “The will of God regarding the salvation of man first became known to the angels.” (8) The apostle says about Him that “He was preached among the nations and was believed in the world.” It is clear from 1 Cor. 1:23 that we must take this as a reference to Christ. (9) He says about the same one that “He was taken up in glory”; this expression in the Scriptures usually describes the act of the Lord’s ascension (Mark 16:19; Luke 24:51; Acts 1:11). (The proper meaning of the word is “to be received on high.” See our Harm. de resurr., last chapter.) This was glorious, as we conclude from His subsequent sitting at the right hand of God. (10) All these ideas moved Franciscus Davidis to confess that this passage must be understood to refer to Christ (Disp. Albana, act. 3. diei), for which reason he uses another distortion: that “Christ, who is God manifested in flesh, was taken into glory.” However, the very text destroys this distortion, for the apostle does not say, “Christ is God manifested in the flesh.” Rather, he writes the word “God” as the subject.

Hebrews 2:16: “He assumed not angels but the seed of Abraham.”

§ 128. (IV) “He assumed not angels but the seed of Abraham” (Heb. 2:16). Of this text, they offer this paraphrase: “Christ assumed not angels but the spiritual seed of Abraham, that is, He took those who came to Him into grace, Gal. 3:29.” This is the rationale they offer for their explanation: that the text does not say that the Son of God “assumed” but “assumes the seed of Abraham.” (See Franciscus Davidis, Coll. Transsylv.; Catech. Racov., p. 107; Schmaltzius, Contra Frantz., disp. 3, p. 66.)

We respond: (1) We urge the meaning of the verb , which, placed by itself and absolutely without any limitation, does not mean “to take into grace” but simply “to receive,” “to take up,” “to assume.” In Luke 1:13, the verb is used concerning a taking into grace.

(2) We urge the context. After the apostle had said in v. 14, “The Son of God became a partaker of flesh and blood,” he declares in v. 16 from whose posterity or from whose race He received flesh, namely, of the seed of Abraham.

(3) The mystery of the incarnation is expressed with three emphatic words. The Son of God is said to [“share in flesh and blood”]. Here is not taken in a transitive sense, that is, “to make common among many,” but intransitively or correlatively, “to receive fellowship or association,” so to speak, just as children share in flesh and blood.

(Socinus, Defens. animadv., p. 19, thinks: “It deals with the sufferings, afflictions, and violent death to which Christ’s faithful are exposed, rather than simply the human nature, because this precedes: ‘It was fitting that He be perfected through sufferings.’ “ However, v. 14 does not refer back to the more remote v. 10 but to the nearer v. [11]: “He who sanctifies and those who are sanctified are all from one.” Nor is the apostle declaring the sharing of sufferings but that of the human nature in Christ and believers. Moreover, nowhere in Scripture does “share in flesh and blood” mean sufferings, afflictions, and death.)

He is said to (“become a partaker in flesh and blood”) not effectively, the way believers become partakers of Christ (Heb. 3:14) and of the Holy Spirit (Heb. 6:4), but substantially, as do children, to whose substance flesh and blood belong.

He is said to the seed of Abraham, which means “most firmly to lay hold on, keep, not dismiss, not put aside,” because what the Word once assumed, He never puts aside.

(4) All these taken together support the following argument: Whoever is said to assume the seed of Abraham in such a way that through this assumption he becomes a partaker of flesh and blood, just as children share in flesh and blood, that he becomes a brother of that seed, that is, of the descendants of Abraham, and similar to his brothers in every respect except for sin alone, this one is said to assume the seed of Abraham in such a way that he becomes true man through that assumption. The apostle declares this about the Son of God. Therefore.

(5) We compare parallel passages. Gen. 22:18: “All nations will be blessed in the seed of Abraham,” that is, in the Messiah who is to be born from the seed of Abraham. Rom. 1:3: “The Son of God became” (or “was born”) “of the seed of David according to the flesh,” hence also from the seed of Abraham, who is the Son of Abraham and the Son of David (Matt. 1:1). Rom. 9:5: “Christ is of the fathers” (and thus also of Abraham) “according to the flesh.” Heb. 7:14: “It is evident that our Lord sprang from Judah,” the great-grandson of Abraham, and thus also from Abraham.

(6) According to the interpretation of the Photinians, we could also say about the Father that He became a partaker of flesh and blood, that He was made like men except without sin, that He became the brother of the Seed of Abraham, because He Himself received the seed of Abraham into grace.

(7) The fact that the verb [“takes on”] is set in the present tense is not opposed to our interpretation. After all, who does not know that a change of tense is frequent in the Scriptures? We can also give the following paraphrase: “Nowhere (namely, in Scripture) does He assume angels”; that is, nowhere does Scripture testify that the Son of God would assume or had assumed an angelic nature. Thus Melchizedek is said to be “without genealogy, without father, without mother” (Heb. 7:3), namely, because in Scripture his parents and family are not mentioned.

1 John 4:2: “Jesus Christ came in the flesh.”

§ 129. (V) “Jesus Christ came in the flesh” (1 John 4:2). Of this passage, they give the following paraphrase: “Christ administered His office on earth without worldly splendor, and His infirmity was seen on the cross.” (See the Catech. Racov., p. 115; Socinus, Defens. animadv., p. 16.)

We respond: (1) Christ came in the flesh because the Word became flesh and God was manifested in the flesh. (2) The expression “come in the flesh” is never used as a reference to mere man who, by being born, takes the flesh and by taking the flesh is born and who has real subsistence before his birth. Therefore, because that phrase is taken in a special sense as a reference to the incarnate Son of God, it shows that He was a truly subsisting person before His incarnation. (3) We discussed the difference between the expressions “to come into the flesh” and “to come in flesh” in our Praelectio de Photinianismo. (4) “To come in flesh” is indeed the same thing as “to come with flesh”; meanwhile, it presupposes “to come into the flesh,” as the parallel passages of Scripture show. (5) The apostle establishes that the mark of the Antichrist is “denying that Christ has came in the flesh.” But who of the heretics ever denied that Christ administered His office free of human splendor and in very great weakness? However, what many have denied, and what the Photinians and their followers still deny, is this: that Jesus Christ is the true and eternal Son of God, who assumed the human nature into the unity of His person and came in the flesh. (6) Socinus presses the apostle’s expressions “to walk in the flesh,” “to live in the flesh,” “to remain in the flesh,” which are attributed also to other men (2 Cor. 10:3; Gal. 2:20; Phil. 1:24), but this is a confusion of distinct expressions. For “coming in flesh” is one thing, but “walking, living, remaining in the flesh” are something else entirely. The former befits no man except Christ Himself, who assumed flesh, that is, who first was a person, truly and really subsisting, before He was begotten as man. The latter is common to human beings who only begin to subsist when they are begotten.

Questions about the form of the union.

§ 130. (I) Here, the question arises: What does “hypostasis” in this mystery mean properly, and how is it distinguished from “essence”? We respond. The word “hypostasis” is taken in three ways: (1) Most generally for , in which regard it means the same thing as “existence.” In this sense, some of the ancients acknowledge in Christ two “hypostases,” that is, two “natures” in Christ. (2) More strictly and specifically, for suppositum or , in which sense it signifies an individual subsisting of itself, distinct from other individuals either of the same or of a different species, and attributed to inanimate as well as animate things, to beasts as well as to rational persons. (3) Most specifically and strictly, to signify an individual substance, intelligent, incommunicable to another hypostasis, not dependent on another nor existing as a part in a whole, but subsisting of itself as a perfect whole and absolute in its own genus.

Damascenus (Dial., ch. 42) indicates that the word “hypostasis” has two meanings: “Sometimes [it means] simply the existence [], according to which ‘substance’ and ‘hypostasis’ signify the same thing, and for this reason some of the holy fathers used to call the natures ‘hypostases’; but at other times [it means] an essence consisting by itself and properly, according to which what is signified shows an individual differing in number.”

In order to disguise the error of their teacher, the disciples of Nestorius said, “In Christ there is indeed one person but yet two subjects [supposita] or hypostases.” Thomas ([ST,] p. 3, q. 2, art. 3 and 6, in the conclusion) notes this from Lombard (Sent., bk. 3, dist. 6). Nestorius himself does the same thing, as we gather from the words of Justinian’s Edict. fidei, which we find in Concil., vol. 2, p. 497, col. 1, where he says, “The Council of Ephesus correctly condemned Nestorius because he affirmed that in Christ there was one person but not one subsistence.” From the distinction brought forth it is obvious what one must decide about this subject.

Furthermore, one must note carefully the difference between the hypostasis, properly speaking, and the essence, because, according to Damascenus, Orth. fid., bk. 3, ch. 2: “This is what causes the heretics to go astray, that they say that the nature and the hypostasis are the same thing.” Athanasius, vol. 2, treatise De defin., p. 53, sets forth the following difference: “ ‘Nature’ and ‘essence’ are called ‘general’ because they comprehend many persons or individuals; but ‘hypostasis’ is called ‘specific’ or ‘partial,’ which has a part of essence.” (This can be said with respect to the human nature compared with other individuals but not with respect to the divine nature, for according to it Christ does not have a part of the essence but the entire, infinite, and perfect divine essence.) Maxentius, Dial. 1. cont. Nestor.: “ ‘Person’ signifies one individual thing of nature. But we know that ‘nature’ declares a common material of which many persons can subsist. Therefore every person contains at the same time nature, but not every nature equally includes a person.” Cyril of Alexandria, Exposit. fidei: “The essence or nature characterizes that which is common, but the hypostasis or person characterizes what is proper to each.” Damascenus, Orth. fid., bk. 3, ch. 3: “We say that there is one nature of very many and different hypostases.” Chapter 6: “Essence is common as being a species, but hypostasis is specific. It is specific not as if it had part of the nature and had not the rest, but specific in a numerical sense as an individual. For it is in number and not in nature that hypostases are said to be different.” Chapter 11: “ ‘Deity’ signifies the nature and ‘Father,’ the hypostasis, just as ‘humanity’ also means the nature and ‘Peter,’ the hypostasis.”

To subsist is to exist of oneself. Therefore subsistence is “existing of oneself.” An opposite of this is “existing in something else that completes or determines it.” Therefore subsistence befits that substantial nature which is not in another as the terminus of its own existence but rather has a complete existence of itself. For this reason, among rational beings “subsistence” and “person” are spoken of, but among the rest, “subject” [suppositum] is spoken of. However, because the human nature [in Christ] does not have its own subsistence but subsists in the Word Himself, therefore it is not a person and something that subsists of itself but is only like a part of that person in which it exists.

§ 131. (II) The question arises: Is Christ, according to what is man, a “subject” [suppositum]? We respond. Bonaventure, Sentent., 3, dist. 10, q. 3, art. 2: “ ‘Subject’ is twofold: ‘in which’ and ‘of which.’ “ If “subject” is taken to mean “of which,” something else is predicated that is subjected to something superior. Then the proposition is true. Christ as man is a “subject.” If “subject” is understood to mean “in which,” as that in which the whole being is established and based, then the proposition is false.

§ 132. (III) The question arises: Do the person of Christ and the two natures of Christ differ? We respond. In reality, not at all, because as Damascenus says (bk. 3, ch. 3): “We do not offer as our dogma that Christ is of one compound nature or that He is one thing from other things, as a man is made of soul and body or as a body is made of the four elements. Rather, He is ‘from other things the same things’ []. For we confess that from deity and humanity He is and is said to be perfect God and perfect man, the same both of two natures and in two natures.” Meanwhile, we must note that the word “person” sometimes means (“subsisting things”) or the natures that subsist. Sometimes it means (“the subsistence itself”) or the personality through which the natures subsist. Sometimes it means both the subsistence and the subsisting natures, that is, all that subsists [totum ], the whole Christ, one subsistence subsisting in two natures. In the first way, the person differs from the natures neither really nor formally; but in the second and third ways, only formally, not in reality. When we say that the two natures concur to establish that which subsists [] in Christ, then we take the words “that which subsists” for the subsistence itself. You see, if it is taken for the thing that subsists, Christ and the are one. (Cf. Dr. Balduin, Disp. 4. in Artic. Visitat., § 137.) Roughly similar things occur in Runge, De Calvin., disp. 2, thesis 16. “Hypostasis” denotes either precisely the very subsistence or personality, which specifically and formally is called the “hypostasis,” as when I say, “The two natures are united in one person,” or it denotes the subsistence along with the subsisting things, which meaning is expressed by the word , as when I say, “The two natures are nothing other than the person.”

§ 133. (IV) The question arises: In what sense is the union called “personal”? We respond. It is not because person has been united with person, as Nestorius used to claim, nor because the divine and human natures in Christ constitute one person in the same way as soul and body constitute one man. For neither body nor soul existed of itself before the union and constituted a person in the way that the Word has existed from eternity of Himself and constituted a person before He assumed the flesh. Rather, it is because those two natures are united in such a way that there is one and the same hypostasis, and in this way Christ is only one person.

§ 134. (V) The question arises: Is it correct to define the union as “coupling” or “conjunction”? We respond. One must distinguish between the Nestorian meaning of the word and the orthodox meaning. If “coupling” or “conjunction” are used in the Nestorian sense for mere proximity [] without any communication, it is not correct to define the union as coupling, as Cyril says (Epistol. Synod. ad Nestor.): “The word ‘conjunction’ (as also ‘coupling’) is a word we avoid as not suitable to signify the secret of the unity.” You see, between things that are coupled there is not a mutual communication, as is clear from the example of planks fastened together. These only stick together lightly and can easily be pulled apart, and there is not an intimate interpenetration between them. Between the two natures in Christ, however, there is a mutual communication, an indissoluble union, and an intimate interpenetration. For this reason, Scripture, too, describes this mystery as “coming into being,” “sharing in,” “being made manifest,” “partaking of,” “assuming,” and “indwelling.” When the Augsburg Confession, Art. III, and the orthodox theologians who followed it describe the union with the word “conjunction,” they do this in the orthodox sense, so that by the word “conjunction” we understand the most intimate and indissoluble union connected with mutual interpenetration and communication. For this reason, the Augsburg Confession adds clearly that “the two natures, divine and human, have been inseparably conjoined in the unity of the person.”

§ 135. (VI) The question arises: Is there an interval between the assumption of the flesh into the hypostasis of the Word and the union of the flesh with the divine nature of the Word? We respond. Damascenus, bk. 3, ch. 11, writes: “ ‘Unifying’ “ (that is, in its general meaning) “is one thing, but ‘incarnation’ is something else, for ‘unifying’ signifies only the union but not that with respect to which the union occurs. But ‘incarnation’ “ (which is the same as saying “putting on humanity”) “signifies the union with flesh or with man, just as ‘the heating of iron’ signifies its union with the fire.” And later: “That the divinity became man or became flesh or put on the nature of man—that we have never heard. But we have learned that the divinity was united with the humanity in one of its hypostases.” The word “union” is more general and can refer to the conjunction of any things. But the word “incarnation” expresses the flesh or the human nature that the Son of God personally united with Himself.

Although there is not a real interval between the assumption of the flesh into the hypostasis of the Word and the union of the flesh with the divine nature of the Word (because, by assuming the flesh, the Word united it to Himself, and by uniting it to Himself personally, He assumed the same flesh), nevertheless we do notice here a formal distinction: (1) It is correct to say that the person of the Word assumed the nature, but it is not fitting to say that the person of the Word was united with the human nature because this is not a union of person and nature but a union of two natures. (2) The union is reciprocal because the divine nature of the Word is united with the human nature and the human nature is united with the divine. However, the assumption is not reciprocal, for we say that the Word assumes but the flesh is assumed, not that the flesh assumes and the Word is assumed.

§ 136. (VII) The question arises: Did the Word assume soul and body at one and the same time, or did He assume the soul immediately and the body mediately? We respond. The latter is affirmed by Origen (, bk. 2, ch. 6) and Nazianzen (Sermon de Pasch., p. 254; Sermon 1 de Filio, p. 282). Damascenus follows them and writes (bk. 3, ch. 6): “The Word of God was united to the flesh through the medium of the mind, which mediates between the purity of God and the dullness of flesh. For the mind has authority over soul and flesh. While the mind is the purest sort of animating force, God is the purest sort of mind.” The Scholastics follow Damascenus. Lombard, Sent., bk. 3, dist. 1, letter B: “The divine nature is of such great subtlety and simplicity that it did not befit it to be united with a body that was formed out of the mud of the earth, unless the rational soul or essence had been the means.” The same thing is claimed by Thomas ([ST,] part 3, q. 6, art. 2) and Bonaventure (Sent., 3, dist. 2). Of the more recent writers, Zanchi (De incarn., bk. 2, ch. 3, q. 7) and Martinius (De persona Christi contra Ubiquit., p. 579) affirm the same.

We have just doubts, however, about this “medium of congruence,” as they call it: (1) Because of the silence of Scripture. We ought to venerate and wonder at this mystery; we should not explore it beyond the limits of Scripture. But now, nothing has been revealed in Scripture about this medium. (2) Because of the restraint of the devout ancients, who taught that the incarnation of the Word and the union itself occurred at one and the same time and who have testified that they did not know the mode and medium. (See Justin, Expos. fid.; Ambrose, De incarnat. Dominicae sacram., ch. 7; Cyril, De vera fide ad Theodos.; etc.) (3) Because of the absurd consequence. You see, the soul would be established, in part, as that which assumes and as nearer and more present to the Word than the body is, and the union between the soul and the Word would be even more intimate than between the Word and the body.

Akin to this question is the question of the Scholastics: Does the personal union, by which the human nature is united with the Word, require a habit or a perfection poured into the human nature, through which the assumed nature¹² would obtain a special relation to the Word, through which it would be said to be united with the Word? Biel affirms this (Sent., bk. 1, dist. 30, q. 4), but Gregory of Rimini is more correct in denying it (Sent., bk. 1, dist. 28, q. 2, in solution 17): “In order to have the union, an entity other than the Word and humanity is neither required nor useful. But just as the rational soul and the flesh are one man without a middle entity, so God and man are one Christ without any entity binding them together, and I think that it would be naturally incomprehensible to any pilgrim what sort of thing that entity might be.”

§ 137. (VIII) The question arises: Does the form of the union consist in the communication of properties? Bellarmine (De Christo, bk. 3, ch. 8) attributes that opinion to us. However, he is deceived and deceives, for we claim that the communication of properties, properly and accurately speaking, is not the form, but the consequence and effect. When some of our people mention the communication of attributes in the actual definition of the union, they do this because Holy Scripture describes this very great mystery of the personal union a posteriori through the communication of attributes, because we are unable to understand it a priori and scientifically in the weakness of this life. Justin, Expos. fidei, p. 299: “Let no one interrogate me about the mode of the union, for I am not ashamed to confess my ignorance. In fact, on the contrary, I shall rather boast that I have faith in the secrets that are not at all to be divulged and that I am a priest and teacher of these sacred matters, and because of their debility, my reason and mind are too weak to perceive them.” Chrysostom, on John 1, homily 7: “I know that the Word became flesh, but I do not know how that happened. Are you surprised that I do not know? Every creature is ignorant thereof.” Therefore we describe this union through the communication: (1) Because something whose specific difference is hidden from us is often described through its effects. (2) Scripture itself precedes us (John 1:14; 3:35; Col. 1:19; 2:9). (3) Orthodox antiquity does the same thing, and it has this rule: “The union itself unites the two natures into one person.”

§ 138. (IX) The question arises: Can the assumption of the human nature be compared to the putting on of clothes? We respond. The devout ancients quite often use this comparison, and for this reason they say that the Word “put on our body” and that our body is “the garment of the Deity.” (See Cyprian, Sermon de nativ.; Cyril, bk. 11 on John 14; Athanasius, Contra Arianos; etc.) Augustine, Letter 56, col. 262: “The Word of God is clothed with man.” From Sedulius, the Church sings: “The blessed Creator of the world has put on the body as of a servant.”¹³ In fact, Scripture itself seems to lead us to that comparison: “He will wash His garments in wine and His vesture in the blood of grapes” (Gen. 49:11), that is, He will wash His flesh that the Deity has put on, as if soaking His clothing in His own very precious blood, which is the most excellent wine for refreshing Christians, as Chytraeus comments on this passage. Some apply to this what is read in Rev. 1:13: Christ, “clothed in a long robe,” appears to John. But that ankle-length robe properly indicates the priesthood of Christ. For the sake of comparison, one could mention here that Christ calls His own body “the temple” (John 2:19), that the apostles call it “a tent” (John 1:14; Heb. 9:11) and “the curtain” (Heb. 10:20). Therefore by no means can this comparison or way of speaking simply be rejected.

Meanwhile, one should note that this does not describe the mode of the union, as if union between the assuming Word and the assumed flesh were accidental, such as there is between a king clad in purple and his purple garb. It is in this sense that Bellarmine applies this comparison (De Christo, bk. 3, ch. 15): “The comparison of the purple garb of the king is suitable, for when the king puts on his purple robe and sits on his throne, he exalts the purple robe to that throne—not in such a way that the purple is said to sit and rule but that it is called the clothing of the one who sits and rules,” etc. Luther, vol. 1, Wittenberg edition, p. 415,¹⁴ thinks that in this sense “one can say nothing more heretical than that the human nature is, properly speaking, the clothing of the divinity,” because the clothing and body do not constitute one person in the way that God and man are one person in Christ. Between the clothing and the body the union is merely accidental and separable because the clothing is not assumed to the being of the subject [suppositum], but between the Word and the flesh there is a personal and inseparable union.

We can note here also many other points of difference, but the comparison of the clothing is used: (1) To demonstrate the Word’s own personality. Just as man is a perfect and complete person before he puts on a garment, so the Word was a perfect and complete person before He assumed the flesh. (2) To demonstrate the immutability of the Word. Just as clothes fit the body and not the other way around, and just as clothes are changed while the body remains unchangeable, so the Word assumed the flesh, not the flesh the Word, and the assumed flesh was in itself susceptible to suffering and mortal, while the Word remained unchangeable. (3) To signify the invisibility of the Word in visible¹⁵ flesh. Just as the body is not seen immediately when it is covered with clothes but is seen mediately by means of the clothing, so the invisible divinity and majesty of the Word lie concealed under the assumed flesh as being under a covering. However, just as sometimes a man is recognized from his clothes, so also in that visible,¹⁶ assumed nature, God, who is invisible, became visible to us. Therefore Bellarmine applies and explains this comparison more correctly in the same book, ch. 7: “The humanity is called the clothing of the Word, not because the Word is not truly and substantially man but because of the similarity that exists between clothing and His humanity. You see, as people are recognized through their clothing, so God is recognized through His humanity. Just as when we put on our clothes, the clothes fit the figure of our body, and just as clothes are changed but not the man, so also when the Word became flesh, the humanity was changed and the Word remained immutable.”

§ 139. (X) The question arises: What is to be decided about the rest of the comparisons that the devout ancients apply to this mystery? There are three chief comparisons of this kind: (1) From the body endowed with soul. (2) From red-hot iron. (3) From the original light and the body of the sun. Dr. Chemnitz treats the explanations and applications of these in his golden book De duabus naturis in Christo, ch. 6. However, we should note what Justin says about all comparisons in general in his Εκθ. ., p. 300: “The paradigm (taken from the union of the soul with the body) is fitting, if not in every detail, at least in some way.” Consequently, he demonstrates in this example not only the similarity but also the dissimilarity. Aslacus (Dissert. theolog. 3, § 22) explains the similarity and dissimilarity of the union between soul and body and of the hypostatic union between the divine and human natures.

(Beza, Resp. ad Coll., part 1, p. 128, establishes two kinds of hypostatic union: one in any man at all, the other in Christ—God and man—and he sets forth one common definition for both. “Hypostatic union” is the conjoining through which two natures, remaining distinct in themselves, along with their properties by which they are discerned from all other natures, come together to constitute some one person subsisting in actuality. Yet the hypostatic union of the two natures in Christ differs from the essential union of soul and body in man.)

The purpose of the incarnation.

§ 140. Thesis V: The proximate and immediate end of the incarnation is the redemption of the human race; the supreme and mediate end is the manifestation of God’s glory.

These passages of Scripture speak about the first end: “The woman’s seed will bruise the head of the serpent” (Gen. 3:15), that is, the Son of God will be born of a virgin mother as true man, to be able to destroy the power and rule of the devil and to ransom the fallen human race. “The Son of Man did not come to have Himself be served but to serve and to give His life as a ransom for many” (Matt. 20:28). “The Son of Man came to seek that which had been lost” (Luke 19:10). “There is one mediator of God and man, who gave Himself as the price of redemption for all” (1 Tim. 2:5). “Because the children have shared in flesh and blood, so also He Himself partook of the same things in order to destroy through death him who had the power of death, that is, the devil” (Heb. 2:14). “The Son of God appeared for this: to destroy the works of the devil” (1 John 3:8). The redemption of the human race includes not only privative goodness—that Christ freed us from sin, from the wrath of God, from death and hell—but also positive goodness: that He brought to us perfect righteousness, the grace of God, the gift of the Holy Spirit, and eternal life. In bk. 3, ch. 7, Damascenus says beautifully that the birth of Christ from the Virgin occurred “for our sake, like us, and above us. For our sake, because it was for our salvation. Like us, because He was born man of woman at the time of pregnancy.¹⁷ Above us, because it was not by seed but from the Holy Spirit and the holy Virgin, above the law of pregnancy.”¹⁸

The angels bear witness to the second end of the incarnation as they sing when Christ was born into the world, “Glory to God in the highest” (Luke 2:14). The devout ancients show how the glory of God was revealed in the work of incarnation in very sweet language. Gregory of Nyssa (Orat. de nativ., p. 75) and, from him, Damascenus (bk. 3, ch. 1) say:

In this work are shown at once the goodness and wisdom and justice and power of God. His goodness is revealed because He did not despise the weakness of His own handiwork and creation but had compassion on His creation when he fell and reached out His hand to him. His justice is revealed because when man was overcome, He caused the tyrant to be conquered by none other than man, nor did He snatch man from death by violence, but in His goodness and justice He made him who had become the slave of death through his sins again a conqueror and restored like by like, which was needed. His wisdom is revealed because He found the most fitting solution of a matter that was quite difficult and dubious. The perfect Son of God, being God, became perfect man, and this work was fulfilled, which was the newest of all new things, the only new thing under the sun through which the infinite might of God appeared. After all, what greater thing is there than for God to become man?

 

Antithesis.

§ 141. As regards the end or purpose of the incarnation, those who err are: (I) The Photinians, for they expressly deny that the Son of God became man in order to offer satisfaction for the sins of the human race and to redeem us.

(II) The Papists, when: (1) They deny that Christ is the mediator according to both natures, for in this way they undermine the end of the incarnation obliquely. (2) When they still demand our own satisfactions. (3) When they add associates and co-workers to Christ in the office of mediator. (4) When they claim that Christ became incarnate in order to merit something for Himself too.

(III) The Calvinists: (1) When they restrict the benefits of the incarnation to a few people who have been elected by an absolute decree of God and when they deny that the Son of God became flesh in order to make satisfaction for the sins of all people. (2) When some of them teach along with the Papists that Christ became incarnate to merit something for Himself. We shall say more about all these matters in their own place.

[Questions.]

§ 142. (I) Here the question arises: Would the Son of God have become incarnate even if man had not sinned? This is affirmed by: (1) Some of the ancients. Rupert of Deutz,¹⁹ De Trinit., bk. 3, ch. 20: “Even if Adam had not sinned, Christ still would have come, but in a flesh incapable of suffering and immortal.”

(2) Some of the Scholastics. Richard of Middleton and Biel (Sent., 3, dist. 1, q. 1, dub. 3) claim: “It could be defended with probability that even if sin had not occurred, nonetheless Christ would have come by force of some other decree by which God then would have preordained it for other reasons.” The following hold the same opinion: Scotus (Sent., 3, dist. 7, q. 3; dist. 19, q. 1), Alexander of Hales (part 3, q. 2, membr. 13), Albertus Magnus (Sent., 3, dist. 20, art. 4), Hugo de Prato (Serm. 1, letter H). They argue that “Christ would have come in a flesh that was incapable of suffering.”

(3) Osiander, in the disputation delivered on October 24, 1550.

(4) Some of the Calvinists: Zanchi (Hexaëm., part 3, bk. 3, ch. 2), Guilielmus Bucanus (Instit. theol., art. 10, p. 61), Andreas Willetus (bk. 1, De statu hominis, p. 29), Conrad Mylius (Meletem. catechet., p. 70).

(5) Some of the Papists: Tanner (in Thom., p. 3, disp. 1) cites Viguerius, Albertus, Pighius, and Fonseca for the affirmative side of the question. Didacus Stella makes the same claim in his commentary on Luke 15. (See also Ambrosius Catharinus, De eximia praedestinatione Christi.)

(6) The Photinians. Socinus, Praelect. Theol., printed at Racovia in 1609, ch. 10, p. 37; Disput. contra Puccium, p. 277:

Because it is certain that before the creation of the world God had made a decree about the sending of Christ—lest anyone conclude from this that the sins of men had been foreseen—it should be known that after men had sinned, Christ came to wipe away their sins. However, He still would have come, even if men had not sinned, because He was going to come to give us immortality, something that man lacked from the very beginning of creation. This immortality can by no means exist together with the fear of sins or with sins themselves. Therefore it is rightly said that the Son of God appeared to destroy the works of the devil, that is, to take away the fear of sins and sins themselves.

 

Schmaltzius, Contra Frantz., disp. 4, de justif., p. 124:

He ought to have known that the Messiah was predestined before the foundation of the world. Even if no man had ever sinned, nevertheless He was going to be sent, not to mend that injury which undoubtedly had occurred, but to lead man, whom God had decided to create as mortal from dirt, to the perfection that God intended in His counsel, that is, to immortality. Furthermore, it is not necessary that we give an account of all the actions of God.

 

They use especially the following arguments: (a) From the immutability of the divine decree. From eternity, God had decreed the sending of His Son. The decrees of God, however, are immutable. Therefore this decree could have been fulfilled even if man had not fallen. (b) From the usefulness of the incarnation. Whatever was necessary for perfect blessedness to have happened to man, that would not have been refused, since he was created for perfect blessedness. Yet in his state of integrity, man could not have aspired to perfect blessedness without the incarnation, as is clear from those things that are required for the perfection of blessedness, which are: confirmation in goodness, the exaltation of human nature, and the vision of the human nature assumed by the Word, none of which could have happened without the incarnation. (c) From the consequent absurdity. If the Son of God had not become flesh, the glory of God—that is, His goodness, wisdom, justice, and power—would not have been revealed so clearly, the suitability of the human nature for the hypostatic union with the divine nature would not have been brought into actuality, and, finally, marriage would not have signified the union of the two natures in Christ.

§ 143. The following accept the negative side of the question: (1) Almost all the ancients. Athanasius, Contra Arian., sermon 3: “When the Son of God is made man, then a reason is substituted because of which He had to wear flesh. In fact, the necessity and need of mankind is prior to His nativity. If that need had been removed, He would not have put on the flesh. After all, the Son of God appeared for this purpose: to destroy the works of the devil [1 John 3:8].” Nazianzen, Orat. 4. de Theol.: “What reason was there for God to take on humanity? Surely to prepare salvation for us. What other cause could be offered?” Augustine, Sermon 9 de verb. Dom.: “Christ our Lord had no reason for coming except to save sinners. Take away illnesses, take away wounds, and there is no reason for medicine.” Sermon 8 de verb. Apost.: “If man had not perished, the Son of Man would not have come. Man had perished through his free will; the God-man came through liberating grace.” We find similar things in Origen (on Numbers, homily 24), Hilary (De Trinit., bk. 2), Basil (De nativ. Christ.), Athanasius (Contra Arian., orat. 5, and in his book De incarnat.), Nazianzen (Orat. de Christi nativ., and in Orat. 2 de pasch., as recorded in Gregory of Nyssa, Orat. Catech., ch. 15), Chrysostom (on John 1, homily 10), Cyril of Alexandria (De incarnat. unigenit., ch. 1), Ambrose (De Dom. incarnat. sacram., ch. 6), Gregory the Great (Moral., bk. 3, ch. 11; Registri, bk. 4, ch. 3; and in the Bened. cerei paschal.²⁰), Leo (Sermon 3 Pentec.), Damascenus (De orth. fid., bk. 3, ch. 18), etc.

(2) Some of the Scholastics, such as Thomas ([ST,] part 3, q. 1, art. 2), Bonaventure (Sent., 3, dist. 1, art. 2, q. 1), Thomas of Strasbourg (Sent., 3, dist. 1, q. 1, art. 4), Capreolus (Sent., 3, dist. 1, q. 1, conclus. 1).

(3) Many of the Papists, though with hesitation, such as Gregorius de Valentia, Comm. theolog. in Thom., vol. 4, disput. 1, q. 1, point 7, p. 74: “He says that this thing is not sufficiently certain, but I have nevertheless concluded quite fittingly, quite probably, and quite wisely that Christ would not have come.” Bellarmine, De Christo, bk. 5, ch. 10: “Had Adam not sinned, the Son of God perhaps would not have assumed the flesh.” Maldonatus, on Matt. 18:31: “This is a great argument to refute the opinion of those who are accustomed to teach that Christ would have come even if men had not sinned.” In the corollaries placed under his Disputatio de vocatione ministrorum at Vienna in 1616, Becanus omits the doubting adverb “perhaps” and simply claims: “If Adam had not fallen through sin,²¹ Christ would not have become incarnate.”

(4) All of our people.

§ 144. They take their arguments: (1) From passages of Scripture, which: (a) Claim everywhere that the end or purpose of His incarnation and coming was the redemption of the human race and the restoration of that which had been lost (Matt. 18:11; 20:28); the destruction of the works and kingdom of the devil (Gen. 3:15; 1 John 3:5); the vanquishing of death and Satan (Heb. 2:16–17); the illumination of those who were sitting in darkness (Isa. 9:[2]; Luke 1:[79]); satisfaction for sins (John 1:29); reconciliation with God (2 Cor. 5:19); freedom from the condemnation of the Law (Gal. 4:5); the salvation of sinners (1 Tim. 1:15); etc. “The Son of Man came to save what had been lost” (Luke 19:10). “I have come that they may have life” (John 10:10). Yet if Adam had not fallen, none of these would have been necessary. Augustine, De peccat. merit. et remiss., bk. 1, ch. 26: “From the Scriptures it appears quite clear that our Lord Jesus Christ came in the flesh, accepted the form of a servant, and was obedient even to the death of the cross [Phil. 2:8] for no other reason but that, by this dispensation of His most merciful grace, He might vivify all to whom—constituted as members in His body—He is head, that they might reach the kingdom of heaven and that He might save them.” Thomas, loc. cit.: “The things that depend solely on the will of God and overcome every debt of the creature cannot be understood and learned except from Scripture, through which the divine will becomes known to us. For that reason, because Scripture everywhere indicates the sin of the first man as the reason for the incarnation, it is more fitting to say that it was as the remedy for sin.” (b) Contrast Adam as the source of sin and death to Christ as the source of righteousness and life (Rom. 5:12; 1 Cor. 15:45, 47). (c) Represent this very thing with types, parables, and comparisons. If there had not been a flood, the ark would not have been built (Genesis 6). If the fiery serpents had not struck the Israelites because of their sin, the bronze serpent would not have been lifted up (Numbers 21). If the storm had not developed on the sea, Jonah would not have been hurled off the ship (Jonah 1). If the servants of the king had not been rejected, the son would not have been sent (Matthew 21). If the sheep and the coin had not been lost, the lamp would not have been lit to look for the coin nor would the shepherd have gone off to look for the wandering sheep (Luke 15).

(2) From rational arguments. On the basis of this hypothesis, the hideousness of sin, the horribleness of divine wrath, and the immense goodness of God shine forth all the more.

The contrary arguments can be satisfied by observing the following rules: (a) The decree regarding the sending of the Son presupposes a foreknowledge of the fall of Adam and is not simply absolute but was determined for the condition of the fall. (b) The principal and primary end of the incarnation is the redemption of the human race; the secondary end is the exaltation of human nature. (c) Just as for the angels, so also for human beings there was no need for a God-man mediator in order to confirm goodness, if they had wished to persist in their concreated integrity. (d) The perfection of blessedness and of glory resulting from the vision of the humanity of Christ is greater than the perfection of blessedness and glory resulting from the vision of the divine essence, not intensively and essentially but extensively and accidentally. (e) The manifestation of divine glory through the incarnation was not simply necessary but hypothetically necessary.²²(f) Just as human nature would not have been restored had it not fallen, though it was restorable, so it would not have been united with the Word had man persisted in his state of integrity, though it was unifiable. The philosophers teach that not every potentiality is immediately in vain if it is not led to actuality. (g) Even if the affirming part of the question were more pleasing to reason, nevertheless in the mysteries we must stand on the authority of Scripture rather than on the probability of reason. Bonaventure says: “The former opinion is more representative of the judgment of reason, but the latter is more in harmony with the authorities of Scripture and of the saints and with the piety of faith. But we are to say nothing besides those things that are clear from the sacred words.”

§ 145. (II) The question arises: Why was the work of incarnation put off so long, and why did it not follow immediately after the fall of the first-created? Just as the Son became flesh because He wished, so He also became flesh when He wished. The devout ancients provide these reasons for the delay: so that people might acknowledge their wretchedness and desire the coming of the Messiah more ardently; so that they might consider the benefit awaited so long to be all the more precious and exercise themselves all the more carefully in faith in the promise. Leo, Sermon 3 de nativ., says, “To produce a more steadfast faith within us.” (Cf. Gregory of Nyssa, Orat. de Christi nativ.)

§ 146. The practical use is: (I) Consoling. The personal union of the two natures in Christ is the splendid union for our salvation and the very precious pearl divinely prepared for us as an effective antidote against the poison of sin and death. (1) The principal fruit of the incarnation is the healing of our nature. Just as pearls [uniones] produced in sea oysters from the dew of the sky²³ comfort the heart and drive the poison out of it, so Christ, born by the conception of the Holy Spirit in the womb of Mary, takes away the poison of sin and salutarily strengthens our soul. Bernard writes very beautifully: “From God and man a bandage was made to heal all our infirmities, and the Holy Spirit like a pestle sweetly mixes together (conjoins) these drugs in the womb of Mary.” No other medicine could heal the lethal wounds of our soul. Our first parents were seduced through the serpent (Gen. 3:2). He was not just a natural serpent, but in him hid the serpent of hell who injected the lethal poison of sin in them. They spread that into all their descendants and into the entire human race. The expulsion of this poison and the healing of our corrupt nature did not require a common nature but the sort to be prepared for us from the divine and human natures in Christ. Through his extreme malice the devil had infected the nature of man; therefore God wished to show us His immense goodness in healing us. The devil had expended all his craft in seducing man; therefore God applied His greatest wisdom to prepare a medicine for our fall. The poison of the fall introduced into us not only temporal death but also eternal death; therefore help could be prepared for us not through a worldly medicine but through a heavenly and life-giving medicine. The poison was from hell; therefore the antidote had to come from heaven. With his poison, the basilisk of hell had infected the entire human nature in our first parents; therefore the Son of God assumed the whole and perfect human nature to deliver the whole man from this poison. He whom the serpent has wounded fatally cannot prepare a medicine for himself. Thus we could not have prepared a cure for ourselves after we were struck by the infernal serpent. However, in the womb of Mary, God prepared the most precious medicine against those stings by uniting personally, through the operation of the Holy Spirit, the divine and human natures in Christ so that He would be our physician and our medicine, healing the wounds of our soul, soothing our pains, restoring our health. Just as a rational physician mixes various drugs when the illnesses are complicated, so because the illnesses of our soul were many and varied, He prepared a medicine for us from the divine and human natures. Just as very expensive medicines made of bezoar, gold, jewels, unicorn, etc., are used in very dangerous illnesses, so also nothing more precious or effective has been found in heaven or on earth through which the wounds of our soul could be cured than the Son of God, born as pure man of the Virgin. Archbishop Proclus of Constantinople, Homily in nativ. Domin., p. 61: “O belly, in which the promissory note of common liberty was completed! O womb, in which the weapons against death were made! O field, from which the Husbandman of nature came up without a seed! O temple, in which God was priest, not changing nature, but in which the Word became flesh!”

(2) Our reconciliation and union with God. Through the fall of our first parents our nature was severed and separated from God (Isa. 59:2). “We were by nature the children of wrath” (Eph. 2:3) and subject to eternal death. Just as a body becomes a stinking and abominable cadaver after the soul has been separated from the body, so the soul is wretched, hateful, and dead in God’s sight when the soul has been separated from the spiritual life that is in God. However, because God wished out of His immense mercy to turn our disgrace and misery away from us, to join us to Himself again, and to restore to our possession the goodness that was lost, He used this manner and means: that He personally united His Son with our nature that we might in turn be joined with God through Him who touches us by kinship and nearness of the human nature. Irenaeus, bk. 3, ch. 11, p. 181: “The Son of God became the Son of Man for this, that man, too, might become the son of God.” Book 4, ch. 37, p. 267: “The Word of God, our Lord Jesus Christ, became man among men in the last days to unite the end with the beginning, that is, man with God.” Book 5, ch. 1: “Because of His immense love, the Son of God became what we are, to perfect us to be what He is. He became a partaker of our nature to make us sharers in the divine nature.” Chapter 14: “The Word of God became man, assimilating Himself to man and man to Himself that, through the likeness that belongs to the Son, man might become precious to the Father.” Augustine, De civit. Dei, bk. 9, ch. 15: “The blessed and beatific God became a partaker of our humanity and provided us with the profit of participating in His divinity.” Book 1, ch. 15: “The Son of God, unique in His nature, became the Son of Man in His mercy for our sake, that we who by nature are sons of man might become sons of God by grace through Him.” Therefore in the incarnation of the Son of God, a type of Jacob’s ladder was fulfilled (Genesis 28 and John 1:51). You see, because Christ is consubstantial with the Father according to His divinity and with us according to His humanity, therefore in Him the highest is united with the lowest, heaven with earth, man with God. Through this mysterious and intimate union, He descended to us from heaven by assuming flesh, that we might be able to ascend into heaven to Him by clinging to Him by faith.

§ 147. (II) Exhorting us: (1) To acknowledge the goodness of God. What greater love could there have been than that God gave His Son to us? (See John 3:16.) How would He not have given us all things with Him? (See Rom. 8:32.) What goodness could have been more abundant, what love for mankind more intimate than that the highest majesty and sublimity were united with our dust and mud? What greater grace could there have been than that the richest became poor for our sake, the highest became humble, the holiest took on our sins? (2) To place our confidence in Christ. In the blessed union of the divine and human natures in Christ, everything has been restored again to the human race. Only this is required: that we be united with Him by true faith, that we cling to Him by faith and become “one spirit with Him” (1 Cor. 6:17), just as He became flesh for our sake. (3) To imitate His humility and love. What greater example of humility is there than that the Most High came down and assumed our mud into the unity of His person? Thereby He confounds all our arrogance. Augustine, Sermon 39 de verbo Dom.: “Deign to be humble for God’s sake, because God deigned to be humble for your sake. Blush, earth and ashes! God humiliates Himself, and you exalt yourself!” (See Bernard, Homily 2 super Missus est, col. 17.)

1  Read realiter ab illis distinctum, quod with Cotta and the Frankfurt/Hamburg editions, instead of with Preuss, who omits these words.

2  Read hypostaseos instead of hypostaseon.

3   “Negative nothing” (nihil negativum), or “negation,” is the absence of something in a subject that is inept for receiving it, for example, the absence of vision in a stone. A “negative nothing” is distinguished from a “privative nothing,” or “privation,” which is the absence of something in a subject to which it is due, for example, blindness in the eye of Peter.

4   That is, not in the nominative case. E.g., “the flesh of the Word” or “the flesh that belongs to the Word.”

5   That is, in the nominative case. E.g., “The Word became flesh” or “God is man.”

6   That is, being God, the Word is simple, not compounded like creatures.

7   That is, the uniqueness of the personal indwelling of the Word in the flesh can be contrasted to other forms of God’s presence.

8   Das 14. und 15. Kapitel S. Johannes durch D. M. Luther gepredigt und ausgelegt (1537–38), WA 45:465–733; AE 24.

9   That is, a work or operation.

10   That is, the form and integrity of a thing.

11   The Greek word has a broader meaning than (“divinity, deity”). While it could mean “divinity” or “deity,” it could also be used as a title of address for a Roman emperor, or even more generally as “sacred character.”

12   Read natura with Cotta instead of naturam.

13   From the Christmas hymn A solis ortus cardine, by Coelius Sedulius, ca. AD 450. Cf. Lutheran Service Book, 385.

14   Disputatio de divinitate et humanitate Christi [Disputation on the Divinity and Humanity of Christ] (1540), WA 39/2:93–121.

15   Read in visibili with Cotta instead of invisibili.

16   Read in visibili with Cotta instead of invisibili.

17   Read instead of .

18   Read instead of .

19   Read Tuiciensis instead of Turciencis.

20   That is, the “Exsultet” of the Easter Vigil liturgy, part of which reads: “O marvelous dignity of Your kindness toward us! O inestimable love of charity: to redeem a slave, You handed over Your Son. O certainly necessary sin of Adam, which was wiped out by Christ’s death! O happy fault, that merited having such and so great a Redeemer!” See Missale Gothicum, CCSL 159D, p. 438, lines 27–31; Philip H. Pfatteicher, Commentary on the Lutheran Book of Worship (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1990), 269.

21  Read per peccatum non lapso with Cotta instead of per peccatum lapso.

22   That is, necessary given man’s fall into sin and necessary for the purpose of redeeming mankind, but not necessary in and of itself.

23   The ancient theory was that oysters “conceive” pearls by means of the dew and that the quality of the dew affects the color of the pearl that is produced. See Pliny, Natural History, 9.54 (35).

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