Chapter X: (2) The communication of properties, which is dealt with in general, § 174.
CHAPTER X: ON THE COMMUNICATION
OF THE PROPERTIES IN GENERAL
§ 174. Thesis I: From the union and communication of natures arises the communication of properties [communicatio idiomatum], which can be described in general as follows: it is the participation of the properties [propria] of the divine and human natures in Christ the God-man, who is named from one or both natures simultaneously, which participation flows forth from the hypostatic union.
The explanation: We must explain two terms here: (1) communication, (2) properties. “Communication” is named from “common.” “Common” (
) is some one thing that multiple persons or things share. Therefore “communication” will be the distribution of one thing that is common to several to those several that have it in common. “Communication,” taken generally, is either only verbal or real. The former happens: (a) Through a trope, as when Herod is said to be a fox [Luke 13:31–32]. (b) Or according to dignity, as when a wife is named from her husband. (c) Or through fiction, as when the pope is called the head of the Church.
The real communication is either natural [
] or supernatural [
]. The former is: (a) Between substance and substance, as in fiery iron. (b) Between substance and accident, as in hot water. (c) Between accident and accident, as in a white-haired philosopher.
There are five types of supernatural real communication: (a) Essential, between the persons of the Trinity. (b) Spiritual, between God and the faithful soul (1 Cor. 6:17). (c) Sacramental (
), between the bread and the body of Christ, between the wine and the blood of Christ. (d) Symbolic, between the Holy Spirit and the likeness of a dove, between God and the assumed figures in which He appeared to the fathers. (e) Personal, in Christ, consisting of the two natures, divine and human. This is a communication either of the natures or of those things that follow from the natures, namely, the natural properties and the workings. We discussed the communication of the natures in the preceding paragraphs. It now remains for us to speak about the communication of those things that follow from the natures.
The communication of properties is either of the nature to the person or of the nature to the nature. In the communication of one nature to the person, the property fitting one nature is attributed to the person in the concrete. This constitutes the first genus of the communication of properties, as it is commonly called. In the communication of the divine nature to the human nature, the divine nature of the Word communicates its proper glory and excellence while it remains without the sufferings of the flesh. This constitutes the second genus. The communication of workings is the working of each nature in the person of the Word, by which each nature in Christ works with the communication of the other that which is proper to each. This constitutes the third genus.
§ 175. Communication takes place either according to participation or according to coupling. Communication according to participation is an essential participation by which one thing passes across into the essence and definition of the other, or one thing participates in the definition and essence of the other. A communication of properties also follows from this participation of the essence. Thus man, as species, participates in the essence and definition of animal as genus, and for this reason he obtains with the essence of animal also its ability to sense.
Communication according to coupling is that which happens according to the association of two diverse natures through which one of the united things is connected with the other in such a way that, while the essence remains distinct, nonetheless the one truly receives and puts on the property, force, and efficacy of the other without any confusing, through and because of the communion that has occurred. We have examples in the fiery iron and the body endowed with soul.
The communication of properties that we establish here: (a) Is not only verbal. (b) Is not a 
, the pouring of the properties of one subject into the other. (c) Is not a communication according to participation. (d) Is not such an essential participation in which a third thing arises from the mixing [confusio] of essences and essential properties, as in hydromel. (The human nature is not essentially one with the divine nor has it become, through its essence, what the Word that assumes it is.) (e) It is not such a causation in which a cause attributes some effect to the other subject, as God is said to communicate His goodness to His creatures and a teacher, his art to his pupil. Rather, it is a true and real communication, hypostatic and supernatural, coming close to that [communication] which is called “according to coupling.” Briefly, as the union is not essential nor only verbal nor through mixture or alteration [
] or mingling or proximity, and as it is not merely external [
] or sacramental, so also the communication is not of that sort.
§ 176. Up to this point we have been explaining the term “communication.” Now, the attributes and properties of each nature are called “properties,” by which the two natures are distinguished from each other in the unity of the person. Thus being from eternity, being infinite, being immense, being invisible, being omnipotent are proper to the divine nature. Proper to the human nature are being born in time, suffering, dying, etc. With regard to these properties [
], observe: (a) There is one manner of the divine properties but another of the human ones. The properties of the divine nature are the very essence of the Word and are not distinguished from it in reality. The properties of the human nature are consequences of the nature, not constitutive of but consecutive to the essence. (b) About the human properties and affections, we pointed out earlier that some befit the entire composite but some fit only the individual parts; also, that some are essential but some are accidental. (c) When three genera of the communication of properties are commonly claimed, the word “properties” is taken generically so that it includes not only the attributes, properly speaking, but also their workings, because the properties show themselves through workings and effects [
].
§ 177. We prove the thesis: (I) From the union itself. In the assumption of the human nature, whatever comes under the union also comes under the communication. But now, the properties come under the union, because no nature lacks its own properties, because a nature that lacks properties lacks existence too; furthermore, the two natures in Christ were united not bare or divested of their properties, but whole, without defect, and suffering no cutting off of their properties. Therefore their properties also come under the communication.
If you remove the necessary consequence, you also deny the immediate antecedent. But now, the communication of properties is the necessary consequence of the union, the union being that which is immediately antecedent. Therefore if you deny the communication of properties, you deny the union itself. For this reason the fathers of the Council of Ephesus concluded against Nestorius: “Whoever denies that the flesh of Christ is life-giving dissolves the union.”
(II) From the condition of the union. Only the lowest level of union—through agglutination, aggregation, apposition, heaping together, and mere proximity—lacks communication. But now, the union of the two natures in Christ is by far the closest and most perfect union. Therefore one cannot consider nor say about it that it produces no communication of those things that have been united.
(III) From the absurd consequence. (Some people simply conclude as follows: “Regarding those things that are one in reality, if one of them has been communicated, the other is communicated too. But now, the hypostasis of the Word and the essential attributes of the Word do not differ in reality. Therefore if the hypostasis is communicated, the essential attributes must be communicated too.” But because the major premise in the divine mysteries permits some objections, we are more correct in using a reduction to the absurd [
] and, in fact, of this sort:)
If the communication of properties is completely denied, there will be two persons in Christ, which is Nestorian. We prove the connection: the assumed human nature is either completely without a hypostasis or it has a hypostasis. We cannot say the first because a real being, substantial and subsisting, cannot lack a hypostasis. If we say the latter, the assumed human nature either will have its own hypostasis or a communicated one. That is, either it has its own hypostasis1 and is self-existent, or it is in a hypostasis, subsisting in the Word Himself. We cannot say the former, otherwise there would be two hypostases in Christ. Therefore the latter remains, namely, that the human nature has the communicated hypostasis of the Word. Yet if the hypostasis of the Word has been communicated to the flesh, surely there is a communication of properties, because the hypostasis is something characteristic, by which a person in the Godhead is distinguished from the other persons inwardly [
], and it is supremely proper to each person.
(IV) From specific enumeration. There are distinct classes of Scripture passages that speak about that communication of properties which arose from the hypostatic union, as will become obvious in the paragraphs that follow. Therefore there is also a communication of properties, and it is not of one genus but of diverse genera.
Antithesis.
§ 178. Antithesis: (I) Just as Paul of Samosata and Nestorius denied the communication of natures, so also they completely denied the communication of properties. Therefore they erred in defect. Just as Eutyches introduced an essential mixing of the natures, so also he introduced an essential mixing of the properties. Therefore he erred in excess.
(II) The Jesuits completely reject the real communication of properties. Gregorius de Valentia, Defens. disputat. contra fund. ubiquitatis, p. 51: “ ‘Properties’ should be understood as bare names or manners of speaking.” Bellarmine (De Christo, bk. 3, ch. 8) opposes “the communication of subsistence and the communication of the attributes of the deity” to each other and concedes the prior to the union but denies the latter. In ch. 10 he denies that “properties of the one nature are really communicated to the other by virtue of the hypostatic union.” (Cf. the Theses Jesuiticae Ingolstadianae, which were reprinted by the Sacramentarians at Wittenberg in 1571.)
(III) The Calvinists: (1) Call the real communication of properties “a Scholastic fiction” and even “a Eutychian lie.” See Beza, Opera theolog., vol. 1, p. 615, and Resp. ad act. Colloq., p. 93, where he speaks as follows: “To posit any communication that is an effect of the union and other than the actual and usual uniting that they call ‘grace,’ I say, that is nothing other than intolerable Eutychianism.” Ibid., in the antithesis: “We teach on the basis of the hypostatic definition of the union that neither the deity nor the properties of the deity can be said about the humanity in any way, not even in the union.” Nevertheless in Quaest. et resp., part 1, p. 17, Beza contradicts himself in a certain way by conceding abstract expressions. He says, “If you want, I will concede this, too, that the humanity of Christ is present—but in another way, that is, not in itself or of its essence, but insofar as it coheres by hypostatic union with the Word who is everywhere, not to mention in the Supper, the body of Christ is really present.” In almost the same way, Zanchi writes (De incarnat., bk. 2, p. 579): “If the Lutherans understand that the human nature has been so enriched personally with the divine nature’s own properties in the same way as the whole fullness of the Godhead dwells personally in it, I certainly would not contradict. In this way, all learned and devout people concede that the human nature of Christ is personally omnipotent and present everywhere.”
** Alsted, Controv. 8, p. 546, v. 2: “Christ the man is called ‘omnipotent King’ no differently from the way the elector’s wife is called ‘Electoress,’ though she actually is not an electoress and does not elect the emperor.” **
What tricks lie hidden in these concessions, however, we shall uncover below in the second genus of communication.
(2) The Calvinists claim that the communication of properties “is only a verbal predication.” Beza, Opera, vol. 1, p. 638, calls it “real,” but in the Coll. Mompelg., which he himself published, p. 157, he explains his intent in this way:
We call the communication of properties “verbal” insofar as this is a figurative expression of speech. Yet at the same time we call it “real” and “utterly true” because it is said about the entire person against Nestorius, according as it is one. But if they are said about the natures, as our adversaries take this, we claim that it is neither verbal nor real, but blasphemy, something to be hated, because it is pure Eutychianism.
(Cf. the things said in the antithesis, ch. 8, about the communication of natures [§ 152].)
Questions regarding the communication of properties.
§ 179. (I) The question arises: Is the communication of properties the form or rather the consequence of the hypostatic union? We affirm the latter. The Papists falsely accuse us of the former. Bellarmine (De Christo, 3, ch. 8), Gregorius de Valentia (vol. 4, Disput. 1, q. 2, p. 126): “The Ubiquists2 teach that the human nature has been united with the divine Word hypostatically hereby: that the whole fullness and working [
] of the divinity of the Word has been communicated thereto in reality and has been transfused into it,” etc. In this charge, the Papists are supported by the Calvinists, Breviar. Ubiquit., art. 9, p. 64, [who point to] the fact that Jacob Andreae (Apolog., ch. 37) claims that the communication of properties is “the specific difference of the hypostatic union.” However, it should be noted that: (1) He is arguing against those who define the union as “the communication of the hypostasis alone” and completely exclude the communication of properties. (2) The specific difference and internal form of a thing are very often described through effects a posteriori. Meanwhile, properly and accurately speaking, the union of the natures and the communication of properties differ as antecedent and consequence, namely, in the order of nature, not of time, as cause and effect, as prior and posterior. (Compare what we said earlier, ch. 7, thesis 4, q. 8 [§ 137].)
§ 180. (II) The question arises: Is it correct to define the communication of properties as predication? The Jesuits and Calvinists do this, and against them we set forth these fundamental points: (1) If, when one thing of two has been posited, the other is not immediately posited, then these differ in reality, and the one entire thing cannot be defined essentially through the other. But now, when communication has been posited, predication is not immediately posited, because the communication happened immediately in the first moment of the incarnation and will last throughout eternity, even if there were no one to actually enunciate it in the predication. (2) Things that differ as prior and posterior are not completely one thing. Communication and predication differ as prior and posterior, because predication requires communication before itself, according to the rule of logic: “Speaking requires being-in-something” [dici requirit inesse]. (3) A first notion is not a second notion,3 nor can the latter be the genus in the definition of the former. However, “predication” is a word of second intention, while “communication” is a word of first intention. Therefore. (4) Whatever things differ in subjects differ also in reality. Communication and predication differ in subjects. The subject of communication is the incarnate Word or Christ’s two natures united personally. The subject of predication is our mental or uttered word.
On the other hand, they urge the fact that Luther, Philip, and Chemnitz call the communication of properties an “expression and predication.” We respond. This is not to be taken exclusively, as if it were only a verbal predication, but as notifying, that it is the sort of way of speaking to which the actual thing corresponds. For they understand such an expression and declaration under which the thing actually is, just as Luther explains his intent very clearly in his commentary on Isaiah 53 and on John 14. Therefore we proceed in this way: Communication is considered either only as real or simultaneously as real and as nominal, just as is brought out in a predication. In the former sense it is not a predication, but in the latter sense it is, thought not only verbal but also a real one, namely, to which the reality in Christ truly corresponds. You see, the properties of the human nature are predicated about the person for this reason: because in Christ the properties of the natures became common to the person. However, the Jesuits and Calvinists take away the foundation of the matter—the communication—and leave only the bare forms of speaking.
Practical use.
§ 181. Practical use. Just as the personal communication of properties arises from the personal union of the two natures in Christ, so also from the spiritual union of Christ and the Church there arises a spiritual communication of God and the faithful soul, both in the kingdom of grace in this life and in the kingdom of glory in the life to come. For this reason, St. Peter (2 Pet. 1:4) says that we “have become partakers of the divine nature.” What this communication is shall be explained specifically in the following paragraphs. Here we are considering in general that it exists. The apostle says, “He who is joined to God is one spirit with Him” (1 Cor. 6:17). He who is joined to the Lord through faith and love is one spirit with Him not by an essential conversion but by a spiritual union. He has been united with God through the Spirit, namely, through the Holy Spirit, because he is ruled and driven to every good thing by the Spirit of God. Just as the personal nuptials are established because of the union of the two natures in Christ (Matt. 22:2), so also because of the union of Christ and the Church, the spiritual nuptials of God and the faithful soul are established (Rev. 19:7). Just as one passes judgment about the true and intimate union of the natures in Christ on the basis of the communication of properties, so also one can understand from the communion whether or not someone has a true, spiritual union with God. “If we walk in the light as He is in the light, we have communion with each other” (1 John 1:7). “Whoever keeps His word, in him truly the love of God is perfected. By this we know that we are in Him: He who says that he abides in Him ought to walk in the same way in which He walked” (1 John 2:5–6). “By this we know that we abide in Him and He in us, because He has given us of His own Spirit” (1 John 4:13).
The three genera of the communication of properties.
§ 182. Thesis II: Three genera of the communication of properties are commonly established. In the first, the properties of the natures are predicated about Christ: the divine because of His deity, the human because of His humanity. In the second, His divine majesty, glory, and power are predicated about Christ according to His human nature through and because of the hypostatic union. In the third, the names and works of His office are predicated about Christ according to each nature.
The foundation for this distribution depends: (1) On the condition of the union itself. After the unification of the two natures in Christ, the natures do not subsist and do the things proper to each as though being alone and apart from each other, but the person subsists in the two natures and does all things according to the property of each. From this there arises the first genus of the communication of properties. Next, nothing is added through the union to the divine nature (which is self-sufficient, unchangeable, and utterly perfect), but the human nature acquires divine excellences from the hypostatic union beyond and outside its own essential properties. From this there arises the second genus of the communication of properties. Finally, in the works of the office, one nature does not rest lazily or privately and do its own business alone while the other acts and suffers, but each nature acts with the communication of the other. From this there arises the third genus of the communication of properties.
(2) On the consideration of diverse passages of Scripture. However many classes there are to which the passages of Scripture that deal with the communication of attributes can be referred fittingly, there also ought to be that many grades or genera of the communication of properties. But now, there are three classes to which such passages of Scripture can be referred. Therefore. The minor premise will become clear from what follows.
Here we should quote the statements of the fathers that occur in their works regarding any kind of communication. By these, the confession of our churches is freed from the accusation of novelty. Damascenus (De orth. fid., bk. 3, ch. 3, and bk. 4, ch. 19) likewise sets up three genera of communication. He calls the first “from the less,” because that which is inferior and by nature foreign to the divine nature is attributed to the whole person. The second, “from the greater,” because more excellent and divine things are declared about the human nature of Christ, and he explains this in bk. 3, ch. 7 as follows: “The deity communicates its proper glories to the flesh but remains without partaking in the sufferings of the flesh.” Third is “from both,” where each nature is considered simultaneously, where Christ works either divine or human things in each form with the communication of the other. Either the Word attributes to Himself those things that are of the flesh, or He gives and communicates to the flesh His own things because of the interpenetration, or Christ works either divine or human things in each form with the communication of the other.
§ 183. Antithesis. The Calvinists speak the same way but think differently about the three genera of the communication of properties, something that Irenaeus said was the “mark of heretics” (Adv. haeres., preface to bk. 1). Danaeus (Isagog. Christ., part 1, ch. 47) acknowledges “a triple species of communication”: One is “of properties, because those that are proper and essential to only one nature are nevertheless attributed to the other nature in the concrete or with a word signifying the entire person of Christ.” The second is “of workings and effects,” which he admits is common [to each nature] but with distinct workings and actions that are also, as he says, communicated to the other. The third he calls “exaltation,” because “the nature assumed by the Word is said to have, in addition to its natural and essential properties, every grace and endowment of the Word to the greatest extent possible for any creature.” Bilstenius (Catech., p. 21) proposes three modes of speaking: first, “through the grace of the union”; second, “through the grace of the head”; and third, “through habitual grace,” by which the created properties are attributed to Christ according to body and soul. How they pervert each genus of the communication of properties will become clear from the following.
§ 184. (I) Here the question arises: Is it more correct to establish four genera of communication than three? Some people think so. Their opinion is that the predications in which the properties of the human nature are attributed to the Son of God must be distinguished from the predications in which the properties of either nature are enunciated about the whole person of Christ. In this way, they set up four genera of communication or modes of predications. Thus the proposition “Christ suffered” would belong to a class different from the other proposition, “God suffered.”
That opinion can be proved on the following bases: (1) These genera of communication are being distinguished by title. The former, in which the properties of either nature are predicated about the person, is called “exchange” [
]; the latter, in which the properties of the human nature are predicated about the Son of God, is called “appropriation” [
].
(2) They are distinguished by definition, as is clear from their statements.
(3) By subject. In propositions of the first genus, a concrete of each nature is set as the subject, that is, the name of the composite person named from each nature, divine and human. In propositions of the second genus, a concrete of the divine nature is set as subject, which nevertheless has the human nature personally united to it. To be sure, when suffering and death are attributed to the Son of God, then that is understood to mean God Incarnate, because God in His own divine nature, which is incapable of suffering [
] and unchangeable, cannot suffer and die. Nevertheless from this one cannot infer that the following propositions are completely of the same genus: when I say that Christ suffered and when I say that God suffered. (In the school of the Nestorians, the propositions “Christ suffered” and “God suffered” are opposed, but in the school of the orthodox they really do not differ.) For though Christ and God Incarnate are really (
) the same, nevertheless through the name “Christ” there is understood formally (
) the concrete of the person, and through the name “God,” the concrete of the divine nature. It is clear from this argument that a difference can be established between these two. This God, who assumed human nature, suffered, as is clear from the apostle’s words: “God obtained the Church with His own blood” (Acts 20:28). The full analysis of this passage is as follows: God took blood into the unity of His person and by shedding it He acquired the Church. I now add the minor premise: The Son of God, born from eternity of the substance of the Father, is that God who assumed the human nature. Therefore the Son of God, born of the Father from eternity, did Himself suffer, namely, in the assumed flesh. But if, in the minor premise of this syllogism, you wanted to place the name “Christ” as the subject, that is, the concrete of the person, you will not be proceeding correctly, because the name “Christ” denotes the composite person consisting of the divine nature that anoints and the human nature that is anointed. Therefore properly and accurately speaking, one cannot say, “Christ assumed the human nature.”
(4) If we distinguish these genera of communication and these propositions, we can all the better drag Nestorius and the Nestorianizing heretics out from their dens into the light. You see, Nestorius and his followers concede the proposition “Christ suffered,” but they stubbornly deny the other, “God suffered,” as is evident from the confession of Nestorius: “Do not boast, Jews, for you did not crucify God, but a man.”
(5) The very mystery of the incarnation and redemption considered devoutly shows that four distinct genera of communication are to be acknowledged. The Son of God, established as mediator from all eternity, assumed the human nature from the Virgin Mary in the fullness of time and, consequently, by assuming the flesh into the unity of His hypostasis, appropriated to Himself the properties of the human nature. From this, one genus of communication is born, namely, appropriation [
]. By assuming the human nature into the unity of His person, the same Son of God exalted that nature to His own throne of divine majesty and highness. From this, the second genus of communication is born, namely, exaltation [
]. Through this incarnation of the Son of God and through the assumption of the flesh into His very hypostasis, Christ was established as one person consisting in two natures. Divine and human things are predicated about this person because of the sameness of the person, and from this, the third genus of communication is born, namely, exchange [
]. Finally, the entire Christ, according to both natures, completed the work of redemption because of which He had assumed the flesh, and from this, the fourth genus of communication is born, namely, making common [
]. As far as the order is concerned, there is nothing for us to be too worried about, as to which of these comes first, which should be put second, etc., provided we agree about the matter itself.
(6) Some people who delight in dichotomy use this inference too: The communication of properties is either of the humanity or of the divinity. The properties of the humanity are communicated either to the person or to the Word. The communication of the properties of the humanity has been appropriated to the person whenever the properties of the human nature are enunciated about Christ in the concrete, such as “Christ suffered.” There has been a communication of the attributes of the humanity to the Word whenever the properties of the human nature are attributed to the Son of God, the Word, or the divinity of Christ in the concrete: “God suffered.” The properties of the divinity are communicated either to the person or to the man. There has been communication of the properties of the divinity to the person whenever the divine properties are enunciated about Christ in the concrete, such as “Christ is omnipresent.” The communication of the attributes of the divinity has been appropriated to the man and is a true and real imparting by which the Word communicates the majesty of His divine loftiness to the flesh assumed into His personhood, such as “Christ the man is omnipotent.”
However, we cannot approve of this enumeration, because: (a) According to it, five genera of communication must be claimed: in addition to the four genera of communication already enumerated, that which is called “the communication of workings” would have to be added, by which the names of the office are predicated about Christ according to each nature. In this way, there would be five genera of communication in all. (b) The propositions in which the properties of the divine and human natures are predicated about the person can be referred fittingly to one genus because, just as the person consists of two natures and in two natures, so also the properties of both natures are correctly predicated about this person. (c) Human things are not predicated about the divinity of Christ in the same way as divine things are predicated about the humanity of Christ. You see, because the divine nature is highest and unchangeable, therefore it cannot be exalted in itself to a higher position nor can it be brought down to a more humble position. But because the human nature is weak and changeable, it was able to be perfected and exalted above the condition of its own nature, as Hafenreffer correctly writes in his Loc. de pers. Christi, p. 338.
Therefore we pass over this sixth argument and concede that there is a bit of strength in the prior five arguments for establishing four genera of communication. Meanwhile, lest we abandon the usual manner of teaching prescribed in our symbolical book, the Formula of Concord, we shall keep the three genera of communication, but in such a way that in the first genus we deal with those predications in which the properties of the human nature are attributed to the Son of God, which can be applied fittingly to the first genus as a particular species of it.
§ 185. (II) The question arises: Is it more correct to put that imparting [
], by which the Word communicates His own glory and majesty to the assumed flesh, in the second or third place among the genera of communication? The Formula of Concord puts this in the third place, because this genus, as the most controversial, had to be treated and explained in greater detail. However, if we wish to respect the order of nature, we shall have to put it in the second place, because the human nature in the works of its office acts not only according to its essential properties but also according to the divine glory communicated to it through the hypostatic union, as shall be taught in greater detail in its own place. For this reason, some of our people, following the authority of our symbolical book, set it in the third place. But some insist on the order of nature and clarity of teaching and put it in the second place. This diversity should not disturb anyone because it does not concern the matter itself.
1 Read 
instead of 
.
2 The term “Ubiquist” or “Ubiquitarian” was a slur against the Lutherans, who believed that the humanity of Christ is everywhere (Latin: ubique) that His divinity is. Cf. the Book of Concord, FC SD VIII 27–28.
3 Notions (notiones or 
) are ideas or concepts of the mind about certain things. “Intention” is a synonym here for “notion.” “First notions” (notiones primae, also called “formal concepts”) represent things themselves as they really are, such as the concept of a dog in the mind. “Second notions” (notiones secundae, also called “objective concepts”) are concepts of concepts, because the mind looks at the first concepts by means of another concept. Examples of second notions include logical concepts such as genus and species, grammatical concepts such as masculine and feminine (for languages such as Latin whose nouns have gender), and rhetorical concepts such as trope and figure. See Micraelius, s.v. noema and conceptus.