The Moral Plausibility of Penal Substitution
The Moral Plausibility of Penal Substitution
In order to establish the moral framework that grounds the central claim of penal substitution it will be argued that (1) punishment is an appropriate human response to intentional human wrongdoing and (2) it is good in some circumstances for humans to exact that punishment. We will then proceed to argue from the human context to the divine context: (3) punishment is an appropriate divine response to human wrongdoing, (4) it is good in some circumstances for God to exact that punishment on human wrongdoers, and (5) the goodness of such punishment can still be achieved by God's taking that punishment upon Himself in the person of Jesus Christ.11 Let's look at these premises in turn.
The first premise of the argument is: (1) punishment is an appropriate human response to intentional human wrongdoing. The support for this premise depends on what is meant by punishment. Allow me to suggest the following definition: punishment is the forcible withdrawal of certain rights and/or privileges in response to the intentional misuse of those rights and/or privileges. When we punish, we take away from the wrongdoer, by force if needed, the right and/or privilege to interact freely with persons or the possessions of those persons when the wrongdoer has intentionally abused that right and/or privilege. For instance, if you loan me your car and I intentionally crash it, it would seem that not only do you have the right to demand that I pay for the damages (what we typically call “reparation”), but you also have the right to withhold from me the privilege of borrowing your car again (what is here termed “punishment”). Or if little Johnny pushes his playmate Susie down “just because,” Johnny's mother has the right to demand an apology from Johnny (what might be termed “confession”) and withdraw from Johnny the privilege of playtime (this would be the “punishment”).
The basic idea of punishment is that it is permissible to withdraw a right and/or privilege from an offender when that right and/or privilege has been intentionally abused by the offender.12 While you certainly could withhold punishment and lend me your car again and while the mother could withhold punishment and let Johnny continue to play with Susie, there is something equally fitting (if not more fitting in these cases) about exacting the punishment that is due. Offenders (particularly in severe cases) do not deserve to continue to have the rights and/or privileges that they have abused, and it seems that they deserve to have those rights and/or privileges withdrawn.13 There are certainly special circumstances in which the punishment otherwise deserved should not be exacted (e.g., mental incapacity), but what is being argued here is that punishment is an appropriate response in principle to intentional offenses. Common intuitions such as these are what give credence to claim 1 that punishment is an appropriate human response to intentional human wrongdoing.
But even if this is right, why think punishment should ever be exacted? While it is permissible to punish, is it not better (even virtuous) simply to forgive without demanding punishment? You might demand reparation for the damage I caused to your car but mercifully extend to me the privilege to borrow your car again. Or the mother might accept a contrite confession from Johnny and choose not to withdraw him from playtime. What can be said in favor of claim 2, that it is good in some circumstances for humans to exact the appropriate punishment? For one, when punishment goes unaddressed, there is a potential of trivializing the wrongdoer and the wrong done as well as the potential to express further devaluing of the victim.14 On the other hand, when punishment is exacted, the wrongdoer and the wrong done are treated with utter seriousness, and the punishment objectively expresses the value of the victim in contradistinction to the devaluing expressed by the wrong done to the victim. When you refuse to let me borrow your car in response to my abuse of that privilege, you take me and my act seriously and I am given the opportunity to take my offense toward you more seriously than I otherwise would. The gravity of treating you and your property responsibly is objectively expressed in punishment, and this can be subjectively appreciated by both the victim and the offender. Or when mother suspends Johnny's playtime, the value of his playmate Susie and the importance of treating her in accordance to her value is objectively affirmed. If playtime goes on more or less as is (even with the apology), the lack of punishment can communicate to Susie that Johnny's treatment of her is not that big of a deal and Johnny can get the impression that his choices in relationships with others are not so significant after all. Of course, it doesn't follow from this that punishment appropriate to the offense should always be exacted, but it does seem to support claim 2, that it is good in at least some circumstances for humans to exact the punishment deserved.15
All that has been done so far is to argue that punishment between human persons is appropriate and that for human persons to exact such punishment is good in some cases. But what can be said in favor of claim 3, that punishment is an appropriate divine response to human wrongdoing? If punishment is understood as the forcible withdrawal of certain rights and/or privileges in response to the intentional misuse of those rights and/or privileges, then the first question to ask is whether humans have misused any rights and/or privileges over which God has some claim. Of course, the prevailing Christian response is that humanity's gravest offense is against God Himself (e.g., Ps 51:4). We have been given the incredible privilege to live our earthly lives in loving dependence on God so that we might flourish in relationship with one another as stewards over the created order. No doubt we have each in our own ways abused this privilege, failing to trust wholly in God and subsequently failing to flourish in our relationships with one another and as stewards over the earth. The crucial question is whether our abuse of the privilege of human life and the opportunity for communion with God is such that we deserve to have those good gifts withdrawn. In other words, do we humans deserve a second, third, fourth, fifth, etc., chance in living human life as we were intended? It is clear from the Christian point of view that by God's mercy and grace we have been given more chances, but it is merciful and gracious precisely because we do not deserve it. The privilege of growing in communion with God and living out that loving communion with others on earth has been so intentionally abused by human persons (time and time again) that we, individually and collectively, do not deserve to have that privilege extended any longer—which is to say, we deserve to have the privilege withdrawn. But if that is the case, then claim 3 would follow: punishment is an appropriate divine response to human wrongdoing.
If one has come this far, then the question becomes: What is God going to do with the punishment human sinners deserve? Clearly it could be argued that God's moral nature, God's holiness and justice, demands that the punishment be exacted. But here, in claim 4, I would like to argue something slightly different: it is good in some circumstances for God to exact the punishment deserved from human sinners.16 Why might it be good that God withdraw the privilege of having the opportunity to live life on earth in growing communion with Himself (what might be called the privilege of physical and spiritual life)? Wouldn't it be better, and more in keeping with His mercy, if He continued to offer the opportunity for physical and spiritual life even though we continue to abuse this opportunity? The ultimate answer is that it is more in keeping with God's mercy for Him continuously to extend the offer of physical and spiritual life to human persons who do not deserve it. But at least one danger of so doing is analogous to what was considered before. That is, when punishment goes unaddressed, there is a potential diminishing of the wrongdoer's responsibility and of trivializing the wrong done as well as the potential to express further devaluing of the victim. On the other hand, when punishment is exacted, the wrongdoer and the wrong done are treated with utter seriousness, and the punishment objectively expresses the value of the victim in contradistinction to the devaluing expressed by the wrong done to the victim. In this case punishment that is not exacted has the potential to trivialize the human person and his abuse of God's offer of physical and spiritual life as well as the potential to express further devaluing of God Himself. When God demands that the punishment be exacted, He makes clear that He takes human persons and their acts seriously and objectively reaffirms the value of the Godhead that is devalued in human sin. It seems that, as claim 4 notes, it is good in some circumstances for God to exact the punishment deserved from human sinners.
Such goods are likely only some of the many benefits that would be achieved by exacting the punishment human persons deserve. But absent the articulation of these other benefits, one might think that if these were the only goods that would be achieved by exacting the punishment due sinners, then God out of His mercy would forego the punishment due human sinners. But what if there were a way for Him both to accomplish these goods (as well as other putative goods) and to forego the punishment due human sinners? That is, what if there was a way that, as claim 5 suggests, the goodness of punishment can still be achieved by God Himself taking that punishment on Himself?
The demand that human persons lose the opportunity for physical and spiritual life is tantamount to a demand of physical and spiritual death. Of course, physical and spiritual death is what humans deserve for their abuse of God's offer of physical and spiritual life (e.g. Gen 2:17; Rom 6:23). We do not deserve the physical life we have been given here on earth, and we do not deserve the spiritual life we have been given to live in communion with God. Indeed, we deserve to have our physical and spiritual life taken away. The consequence of physical and spiritual death would take sinners and their sin with due moral seriousness and would objectively reexpress the value of the Godhead in response to the devaluing of the Godhead expressed by sin. And yet the exaction of such a penalty would mean the loss of life for human sinners. So God mercifully takes on the punishment we deserve in the incarnate Christ's voluntary submission to physical and spiritual death on the cross.17 God as the victim of wrongdoing has the right to demand the exaction of the punishment due in a manner proportional to the wrong done. The goodness of the punishment is still seen in that Christ's going to the cross for our sins takes sinners and their sin with utter seriousness and objectively reexpresses the value of the Godhead in response to the devaluing of the Godhead expressed by human sin. By looking to the cross, we too can perceive the importance God attaches to us, to the gravity of our offense, and to the right valuing of the Godhead.18
While much more could be said, it has been argued here that a moral framework makes morally plausible the claim that Christ suffered the penal consequences of human sin on behalf of sinners.