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1 For a comparison of Dostoyevksy's and Allen's stories, see E. Chances, “Moscow Meets Manhattan: The Russian Soul of Woody Allen's Films,” American Studies International 30/1 (April 1992): 65–78.
2 D. Boonin, The Problem of Punishment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008).
3 For some recent objectors, see J. B. Green and M. D. Baker, Recovering the Scandal of the Cross: Atonement in New Testament and Contemporary Contexts (Downers Grove, IL: IVP, 2000); S. Chalke and A. Mann, The Lost Message of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2003); S. Chalke, “The Redemption of the Cross,” in D. Tidball, D. Hillborn, and J. Thacker, eds., The Atonement Debate: Papers from the London Symposium on the Theology of Atonement (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2008), 34–45; J. B. Green, “Must We Imagine the Atonement in Penal Substitutionary Terms? Questions, Caveats, and a Plea,” in Tidball et al., eds., The Atonement Debate, 153–71.
4 K. Ward, Ethics and Christianity (London: Allen & Unwin, 1970), 240.
5 P. K. Moser, The Elusive God: Reorienting Religious Epistemology (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 174. See also P. K. Moser, “The Crisis of the Cross: God as Scandalous,” in J. Gracia, ed., Mel Gibson's Passion and Philosophy (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 2004), 204–17.
6 I have yet to find an opponent of penal substitution who finds the doctrine morally sensible and only thinks it biblically unsupported. Rather, the claim is typically that the doctrine is morally inadequate, and only then the claim is made that it is not taught in Scripture. This is not to say that the moral adequacy of the doctrine is irrelevant to the exegetical analysis but rather to highlight the importance of defending the moral coherence of penal substitution as part of an overall biblical-theological defense of penal substitution.
7 Some recent biblical investigation of penal substitution can be found in D. Tidball, The Message of the Cross (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2001); I. H. Marshall, “The Theology of the Atonement,” in Tidball et al., eds., The Atonement Debate; C. E. Hill and F. A. James III, eds., The Glory of the Atonement: Biblical, Historical and Practical Perspectives (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2004); S. Jeffery, M. Ovey, and A. Sach, Pierced for Our Transgressions: Rediscovering the Glory of Penal Substitution (Nottingham, UK: InterVarsity Press, 2007).
8 Perhaps no one has sought to make this point more clear than Dallas Willard. For instance, see D. Willard, The Divine Conspiracy (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), 42–50.
9 For an array of complementary meanings of the cross, see C. E. Gunton, The Actuality of the Atonement: A Study of Metaphor, Rationality and the Christian Tradition (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 2004). Consider also, J. B. Green, “Kaleidoscopic View,” in J. K. Beilby and P. R. Eddy, eds., The Nature of the Atonement: Four Views (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2006), 157–201.
10 For a discussion on this, see chapters 10 and 11 in N. Jabbour, The Crescent Through the Eyes of the Cross (Colorado Springs, CO: NavPress, 2008).
11 Another example of arguing from human moral notions to the divine context when it comes to the atonement is R. Swinburne, Responsibility and Atonement (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989).
12 This definition is meant to be a definition of “retributive” punishment. The basic idea of retributive punishment is that punishment is permissible despite positive or negative consequences that might proceed from the punishment. This is not to say that positive or negative consequences should not be taken into account but that the initial justification of punishment does not depend on an assessment of those consequences. For the retributivist there is something inherently appropriate about punishment in response to wrongdoing irrespective of the consequences. For a contemporary defense of retributivism, see J. Jacobs, “Luck and Retribution,” Philosophy 74 (1999): 535–55.
13 Distinctions are made when it comes to retributive punishment between strict and moderate forms of retributivism. A strict theory would require that the punishment deserved is always exacted in full while a moderate form of retributivism would only maintain that it is permissible to exact the punishment deserved. On a moderate retributivism one could forego punishment altogether or reduce the penalty. For more on these distinctions, see J. R. Lucas, Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon, 1993), 281.
14 This has been termed the “expressive value” of retributive punishment. See J. Hampton, “The Retributive Idea,” in J. G. Murphy and J. Hampton, eds., Forgiveness and Mercy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 111–61; J. E. Hare, The Moral Gap (Oxford: Clarendon, 1996), 243–59.
15 Of course there are other potential goods that exacting punishment could bring about, but for the purposes of this paper, these will not be treated. For more extensive treatment, see S. L. Porter, “Rethinking the Logic of Penal Substitution,” in W. L. Craig, ed., Philosophy of Religion: A Reader and Guide (Edinburgh: University of Edinburgh Press, 2002), 596–608; S. L. Porter, “Swinburnean Atonement and the Doctrine of Penal Substitution,” Faith and Philosophy 21:2 (April 2004), 228–41.
16 It is not that the stronger claim is indefensible. Rather, I find a moderate theory of retributive punishment more in keeping with the biblical record and with compelling moral intuitions. While God has the right to punish sin in full, in some cases He either withholds that punishment for a time, limits the punishment, or forgoes punishment altogether. This also seems to be the way human persons punish—that is, we don't always exact from the offender the full penal debt. There is greater room for grace and mercy on a moderate retributivism.
17 For more on the coherence of penal substitutes, see D. Lewis, “Do We Believe in Penal Substitution?” in Philosophical Papers 26 (1997): 203–9.
18 It might be wondered how the humiliation of Christ on the cross actually expresses the value of the Godhead. Once we understand that Christ is suffering the just penalty of human sin on the cross (i.e., physical and spiritual death) in order to demonstrate that sin against God is not a trivial matter, we are also in a position to see that the value of the Godhead makes the exaction of punishment good. Just as Susie's value is expressed in the exaction of the punishment Johnny deserves, God's value is expressed in the exaction of the punishment humans deserve. Of course, in the latter case God in Christ suffers the punishment humans deserve. Nonetheless, the Godhead's value is being expressed once it is understood that Christ is taking the place of human sinners.
19 There are alternative interpretations of what “the cup” refers to in this passage, but I take the crucifixion as well as the events leading up to the crucifixion to be the most plausible referent. See C. S. Keener, A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 637–38; M. J. Wilkins, Matthew: The NIV Application Commentary (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 2004), 841–43.
20 For a detailed presentation of this theme, see M. J. Gorman, Cruciformity: Paul's Narrative Spirituality of the Cross (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2001).
21 It is important to remember that the reality of the cross is a transformational reality. For a discussion of the transformational implications of a penal substitutionary view of the cross, see J. Coe, “Resisting the Temptation of Moral Formation: Opening to Spiritual Formation in the Cross and the Spirit,” Journal of Spiritual Formation and Soul Care 1/1 (2008): 55–78. I am grateful to the Seal Beach Philosophy Group (Jason Baehr, Josh Blander, Tom Crisp, Michael Pace, Dan Speak, and Greg TenElshof) for discussion and encouragement on this chapter.