Chapter 9 of 16

The Humanity of Christ

The Humanity of Christ

Prologue

Faith in the humanity of Christ As was remarked in the beginning of this work, the Christian Faith revolves about two main doctrines: the divinity of the Trinity and the humanity of Christ.""" In the foregoing treatise on the Divine

Trinity,' we reviewed the truths that pertain to divinity and its effects. We now turn to a consideration of matters pertaining to the humanity of Christ.

Since, however, as the Apostle remarks in 1 Timothy 1:15, "Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners," we shall do well to inquire first how the human race fell into sin, so that we may understand more clearly how men are freed from their sins through Christ's humanity.

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213 Chaps. 2-184.

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Adam, Eve, and Original Sin

The commands given to Adam and his perfection in the pristine state We saw above that man was originally constituted by God in such a condition that his body was completely subject to his soul.""*

Further, among the faculties of the soul, the lower powers were subject to reason without any rebelliousness; and man's reason itself was subject to God. In consequence of the perfect subjection of the body to the soul, no passion could arise in the body that would in any way conflict with the soul's dominion over the body.

Therefore neither death nor illness had any place in man. And from the subjection of the lower powers to reason there resulted in man complete peace of mind, for the human reason was troubled by no inordinate passions. Finally, owing to the submission of man's will to God, man referred all things to God as to his last end, and in this his justice and innocence consisted.

Of these three subordinations, the last was the cause of the other two. Surely man's freedom from dissolution or from any

214C£ chap. 152.

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Aquinas's Shorter Summa suffering that would be a threat to his life did not come from the nature of his body, as we see if we regard its component parts; for the body was made up of contrary elements. Similarly, the fact that man's sense faculties were subservient to reason without any rebelliousness did not come from the nature of the soul, since the sense powers naturally tend toward objects that cause pleasure in the senses, even when, as often happens, delights of this sort are at odds with right reason.

This harmony came from a higher power, the power of God. It was God who, in the first instance, united to the body the rational soul that so immeasurably surpasses the body and the bodily faculties, such as the sense powers. Likewise it was God who gave to the rational soul the power to control the body itself in a manner that exceeded the natural condition of the body, and also to govern the sense faculties so that they would function in a way befitting a rational soul.

In order, therefore, that reason might firmly hold the lower faculties under its sway, reason itself had to be firmly kept under the dominion of God, from whom it received this power so greatly surpassing the condition of nature.

Accordingly, man was so constituted that, unless his reason was subservient to God, his body could not be made subject to the beck of the soul, nor could his sense powers be brought under the rule of reason. Hence in that state life was in a certain way immortal and impassible; that is, in that state man could neither die nor suffer, so long as he did not sin. Nevertheless he retained the power to sin, since his will was not yet confirmed in good by the attainment of the last end. In the event that this happened, man could suffer and die.

It is precisely in this respect that the impassibility and immortality possessed by the first man differ from the impassibility and immortality to be enjoyed after the resurrection by the saints, who

Adam, Eve, and Original Sin will never be subject to suffering and death, since their wills will be wholly fixed upon God, as we said above.""' There is another difference: after the resurrection men will have no use for food or the reproductive functions. But the first man was so constituted that he had to sustain his life with food and he had a mandate to perform the work of generation; for the human race was to be multiplied from this one parent. Hence he received two commands, in keeping with his condition. The first is that mentioned in Genesis 2:16: "Of every tree of Paradise thou shalt eat." The other is reported in Genesis 1:28: "Increase and multiply and fill the Earth."

The state of Original Justice This wonderfully ordered state of man is called Original Justice. By it, man himself was subject to God on high and all lower creatures were subordinate to man, as is indicated in Genesis 1:26: "Let him have dominion over the fishes of the sea and the fowls of the air."

And among the component parts of man, the lower were subservient to the higher without any conflict. This state was granted to man, not as to a private individual, but as to the first principle of human nature, so that through him it was to be handed down to his descendants together with human nature.

Moreover, since every one ought to have a habitation befitting his condition, man thus harmoniously constituted was placed in a most temperate and delightful region, so that all inconvenience, not only of internal annoyance but also of external surroundings, might be far removed from him.

215CF£ chap. 166.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa

The tree of knowledge of good and evil This state enjoyed by man depended on the submission of the human will to God. That man might be accustomed from the very beginning to follow God's will, God laid certain precepts on him.

Man was permitted to eat of all the trees in Paradise, with one exception: he was forbidden under pain of death to eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evil.

Eating of the fruit of this tree was prohibited not because it was evil in itself, but so that at least in this slight matter man might have some precept to observe for the sole reason that it was so commanded by God. Hence eating of the fruit of this tree was evil because it was forbidden. The tree was called the tree of knowledge of good and evil not because it had the power to cause knowledge, but because of the sequel: by eating of it man learned by experience the difference between the good of obedience and the evil of disobedience.

Seduction of Eve by the Devil The Devil, who had already fallen into sin, saw that man was so equipped that he could arrive at everlasting happiness, from which the Devil himself had been cast out. Yet, as he knew, man could still sin.

So he sought to lead man astray from the straight path of justice by attacking him on his weaker side; that is, he tempted the woman, in whom the gift of light or wisdom shone with a lesser brilliance. The more easily to induce her to break the command, he lyingly drove from her mind the fear of death and he promised her what man naturally desires (the overcoming of ignorance).

Adam, Eve, and Original Sin "Your eyes shall be opened,"""° he said and in adding: "You shall be as gods," he held out to her the excellence of greatness. He further promised perfect knowledge, with the words: "knowing good and evil." On the part of his intellect man naturally shuns ignorance and desires knowledge; and on the part of his will, which is naturally free, he desires high station and perfection, so that he may be subject to no one, or at any rate to as few as possible.

The woman's sin The woman craved both the promised exaltation and the perfection of knowledge. Added to this were the beauty and sweetness of the fruit, which drew her to eat of it. And so, scorning the fear of death, she violated God's command and ate of the forbidden tree.

Her sin has many aspects. First, there is a sin of pride, whereby she inordinately desired her own excellence. Second is a sin of curiosity, whereby she coveted knowledge beyond the limits fixed for her. Third is a sin of gluttony, whereby the sweetness of the fruit enticed her to eat. Fourth is a sin of infidelity, growing out of a false estimate of God, so that she believed the words of the Devil who gave the lie to God. Fifth is a sin of disobedience, consisting in a transgression of God's command.

19] The man's sin The sin came to the man through the woman's blandishments. He, however, as the Apostle says in 1 Timothy 2:14, "was not seduced,"

216Gen. 3:5.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa as the woman was. That is, he did not believe the words the Devil spoke against God. The thought could not cross his mind that God would utter a lying threat or that He would forbid the use of a thing for no good purpose. Yet he was drawn by the Devil's promise to an undue desire of excellence and knowledge. As a result, his will fell away from the right pursuit of justice and, consenting to his wife's importunities, he followed her in transgressing the divine command and ate of the fruit of the forbidden tree.

Effect of the sin in the rebellion of the lower faculties against reason The harmonious integrity of the original state depended entirely on the submission of man's will to God. Consequently, as soon as the human will threw off the yoke of subjection to God, the perfect subjection of the lower powers to reason and of the body to the soul likewise disintegrated. As a result, man experienced in his lower, sensitive appetite the inordinate stirrings of concupiscence, anger, and all the other passions. These movements no longer followed the order set by reason but rather resisted reason, frequently darkening the mind and, so to speak, throwing it into confusion. This is that rebellion of the flesh against the spirit which Scripture mentions.''' For, since the sensitive appetite, like all the other sense powers, operates through a bodily instrument, whereas reason functions without any bodily organ, what pertains to the sensitive appetite is rightly ascribed to the flesh, and what pertains to reason is attributed to the spirit. This is why substances that are without bodies are commonly called spiritual substances.

217C£ Rom. 7:23: "But I see another law in my members fighting against the law of my mind and captivating me in the law of sin that is in my members." eee

Adam, Eve, and Original Sin

The punishment as regards the necessity of dying A further consequence was that the defect which consists in corruption was experienced in the body, and so man incurred the necessity of dying; his soul was no longer able to sustain the body forever by conferring life on it. Thus man became subject to suffering and death, not only in the sense that he was capable of suffering and dying as before, but in the sense that he was now under the necessity of suffering and dying.

Evils affecting the intellect and will Many other defects began to appear in man. Inordinate stirrings of passion quickly followed one another in the lower appetites and at the same time the light of wisdom, which supernaturally illuminated man as long as his will was submissive to God, grew dim in his intellect. The result of this was that man turned his love to sensible objects. Immersed in these, he wandered far from God and fell into repeated sins.

Further, he gave his fidelity to unclean spirits he thought would help him to live a life of sensual pleasure and to acquire material goods. In this way, idolatry and other sins arose in the human race.

The more man yielded to their baneful influence, the farther he left behind the knowledge and desire of spiritual and divine goods.

Transmission of these evils to posterity The blessing of Original Justice was conferred by God on the human race in the person of its first parent in such a way that it

Aquinas's Shorter Summa was to be transmitted to his posterity through him. But when a cause is removed, the effect cannot follow. Therefore, when the first man stripped himself of this good by his sin, all his descendants were likewise deprived of it. And so for all time — that is, ever since the sin of the first parent — all men come into the world bereft of Original Justice and burdened with the defects that attend its loss.

This is in no way against the order of justice, as though God were punishing the sons for the crime of their first father. For the punishment in question is no more than the withdrawing of goods that were supernaturally granted by God to the first man for transmission, through him, to others. These others had no right to such goods, except so far as the gifts were to be passed on to them through their first parent. In the same way, a king may reward a soldier with the grant of an estate which is to be handed on by him to his heirs. If the soldier then commits a crime against the king, and so is adjudged to forfeit the estate, it cannot afterwards pass to his heirs. In this case the sons are justly dispossessed in consequence of their father's crime.

Privation of Original Justice as sin in Adam's descendants But there remains a more pressing question: whether the privation of Original Justice can have the nature of sin in those who descend from the first parent. The notion of sin seems to require, as we said above, that the evil known as culpable should be in the power of him to whom it is imputed as fault.''® No one is blamed for that which is beyond his power to do or not to do. But it is not in the 718C£. chap. 120.

Adam, Eve, and Original Sin power of the person begotten to be born with Original Justice or without it. Hence we might be inclined to judge that such a privation cannot have the character of sin.

This question is easily solved if we but distinguish between person and nature. As there are many members in one person, so there are many persons in one human nature. Thus, by sharing in the same species, many men may be thought of as one man, as Porphyry remarks."" In this connection we should note that in the sin of one man different sins are committed by different members.

Nor does the notion of sin require that the various sins be voluntary by the wills of the members whereby they are committed, for it is enough that they be voluntary by the will of that which is most excellent in man, that is, his intellectual part. For the hand cannot but strike and the foot cannot help walking, when the will so commands.

In this way, then, the privation of Original Justice is a sin of nature, in the sense that it has its origin in the inordinate will of the first principle in human nature, namely, of the first parent.

Thus it is voluntary with respect to nature, that is, by the will of the first principle of nature. And so it is transmitted to all who receive human nature from him, for they are all, as it were, his members.

This is why it is called Original Sin, for it is transferred from the first parent to his descendants by their origin from him. Other sins

(that is, actual sins) pertain immediately to the person who commits them; this sin directly touches nature. The first parent infected nature by his sin, and nature thus contaminated thereupon

19 sagoge: De specie, in H. Busse, Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca (Berlin, 1887), IV.1, 6, 21. Cf. Boethius, Commentaria in Porphyrium, III

(PE AEXIV Eh).

Aquinas's Shorter Summa infects the persons of the children who receive their nature from the first parent.

Not all sins are transmitted to posterity It does not follow, however, that all other sins, either of the first parent or of other parents, are handed down to posterity. For only the first sin of the first parent extirpated in its entirety the gift that had been supernaturally granted to human nature in the person of the first father. This is the reason why sin is said to have corrupted or infected nature.

Subsequent sins do not encounter anything of this sort that they can uproot from the whole of human nature. Such sins do, indeed, take away from man (or at least tarnish) some particular good, namely, a personal good; but they do not corrupt nature except so far as nature pertains to this or that person. Since man begets his like not in person but only in nature, the sin that defiles the person is not handed down from a parent to his descendants.

Only the first sin that defiled nature as such is thus transmitted.

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