Divine Providence

Divine Providence

Divine Providence f23 The universality of Divine Providence We can see from the foregoing that all things are governed by Divine Providence. Whatever is set in motion toward the end intended by any agent is directed by that agent to the end. Thus all the soldiers in an army are subordinated to the end intended by the commander (which is victory) and are directed by him to that end. We showed above that all things tend by their actions to the divine goodness as their end.'"* Hence all things are directed to this end by God Himself, to whom this end pertains. To be thus directed is the same as to be ruled and governed by Providence.

Therefore all things are ruled by Divine Providence.

Moreover, things that are subject to failure and that do not always remain constant, are found to be under the direction of beings that do remain constant. Thus all the movements of lower bodies, being defectible, are regulated in accordance with the undeviating movement of a heavenly body. But all creatures are

128C£. chap. 103.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa changeable and defectible. As regards intellectual creatures, their very nature is such that deficiency in voluntary action can develop in them. Other creatures have some part in movement, either by way of generation and corruption, or at least according to place.

God Himself is the only being in whom no defect can arise.

Consequently all creatures are kept in order by Him.

Furthermore, whatever has existence by way of participation is traced back, as to its cause, to that which exists in virtue of its own essence. For example, what is on fire has, in some way or other, fire as the cause that ignited it. Since God alone is good by His very essence and all other things receive their complement of goodness by some sort of participation, all beings must be brought to their complement of goodness by God. This, again, involves rule and government; for things are governed or ruled by being established in the order of good. So all things are governed and ruled by God.

God's plan of ruling lower creatures by higher creatures We can see from this that lower creatures are ruled by God through the agency of higher creatures. Some creatures are said to be higher because they are more perfect in goodness. Creatures receive their order of good from God inasmuch as they are under His rule.

Consequently higher creatures have a greater share in the order of divine government than lower creatures. But what has a greater share in any perfection is related to what has a smaller share in that perfection, as act is related to potency, and agent to patient.

Therefore higher creatures are related to lower creatures in the order of Divine Providence as agent is related to patient. Accordingly, lower creatures are governed by higher creatures.

Divine goodness has this characteristic, that it communicates a likeness of itself to creatures. This is the sense in which God is

Divine Providence said to have made all things for the sake of His goodness, as is clear from a previous chapter.'"' The perfection of divine goodness entails the double truth that God is good in Himself and that He leads other beings to goodness. He communicates goodness to creatures under both aspects: they are good in themselves and some lead others to goodness. In this way God brings some creatures to goodness through other creatures. The latter must be higher creatures, for what receives a likeness of both form and action from some agent is more perfect than what receives a likeness of form but not of action. Thus the moon, which not only glows with light but also illuminates other bodies, receives light from the sun more perfectly than do opaque bodies, which are merely illuminated but do not illuminate. Accordingly, God governs lower creatures by higher creatures.

Likewise, the good of many is better than the good of an individual, and so is more representative of divine goodness, which is the good of the whole universe. If a higher creature, which receives more abundant goodness from God did not cooperate in procuring the good of lower creatures, that abundance of goodness would be confined to one individual. But it becomes common to many by the fact that the more richly endowed creature cooperates in procuring the good of many. Hence the divine goodness requires that God should rule lower creatures by higher creatures.

The government of lower intellectual substances by higher ones Since intellectual creatures excel other creatures, as is clear from aes what we said earlier, ~~ we can readily understand that God governs

129C£ chap. 101.

130CF£ chap. 75. ey

Aquinas's Shorter Summa all other creatures through the agency of intellectual creatures.

Likewise, since some intellectual creatures excel others, God rules the lower through the higher. Accordingly, men — who occupy the lowest place in the order of nature among intellectual substances — are governed by the higher spirits. These are called angels (that is, "messengers") because they announce divine messages to men. Among angels, too, the lower are directed by the higher. For they are distributed among various hierarchies or sacred principalities; and each hierarchy is divided into different orders.

Rank and order of the angels Since every action of an intellectual substance, as such, proceeds from the intellect, diversity of operation, of prelature, and of order among intellectual substances follows diversity in their manner of understanding. In proportion to its eminence or dignity, the intellect can contemplate the natures of effects in their higher and more universal cause. Also, as we remarked above, the intelligible species of a higher intellect are more universal.'""

The first way of understanding suitable to intellectual substances is the knowledge imparted to them of effects, and hence of their own works, in the first cause itself, namely in God; for it is through them that God carries out lower effects. This knowledge is proper to the first hierarchy, which is divided into orders corresponding to the three characteristics discerned in any operative art. The first of these is the end from which the exemplars of the works are derived; the second is the exemplars of the works as existing in the mind of the artificer; the third is the application of 51C£ chap. 78.

Divine Providence the work to the effects. Consequently the first order has the privilege of being instructed about the effects of things in the supreme Good itself, regarded as the last end. For this reason angels of the first order are called seraphim, as though they were aflame or on fire, with reference to the fire of love; for the object of love is the good. The second order has the function of contemplating God's effects in their intelligible exemplars as they exist in God. Hence angels of this order are called cherubim, from the fullness of their knowledge. The third order has the office of meditating, in God Himself, how creatures share in intelligible exemplars as adapted to effects. And so angels of this order are called thrones, from the fact that God resides in them.

The second way of understanding is to consider the exemplars of effects as they exist in universal causes. This is suitable to the second hierarchy, which is divided into three orders which correspond to the three characteristics that pertain to universal causes, especially such as operate under the guidance of the intellect.

The first of these characteristics is to plan beforehand what is to be done. Thus, among artificers the highest arts are directive, and are called architectonic. From this fact angels belonging to the first order of this hierarchy are known as dominations; for direction and planning are functions of a master or dominus.

The second characteristic observed in universal causes is the initiating of action for an undertaking, with authority to oversee its execution. Therefore, angels belonging to the second order of this hierarchy are called principalities (according to Gregory'*') or virtues (according to Dionysius'), understanding virtues in the sense that to take the initiative in action is virtuosity in a high degree.

132S¢. Gregory the Great, In evangelia, II, hom. xxxiv, 7 (PL, LXXVI, 1249).

133 Pseudo-Dionysius, De coelesti hierarchia, VIII, 1 (PG, III, 240).

Aquinas's Shorter Summa The third characteristic discerned in universal causes is the removal of obstacles to execution. And so the third order of this hierarchy is that of the powers, whose office is to constrain whatever could impede the execution of the divine command; hence, also, the powers are said to hold demons in check.

The third way of understanding is to contemplate the exemplars of effects in the effects themselves. And this is proper to the third hierarchy, which is placed in immediate charge of us, who obtain knowledge of effects from effects themselves.This hierarchy, too, has three orders. The lowest of these is that of the angels, who are so called because they announce to men details that pertain to their government; hence they are also called guardians of men. Above this order is that of the archangels. The office of this order is to announce to men matters that transcend reason, such as the mysteries of Faith.

The highest order of this hierarchy is said by Gregory to be that of the virtues, '°* for the reason that they perform deeds beyond the power of nature, in proof of the messages, transcending reason, that they announce to us. Consequently the working of miracles is said to pertain to the virtues.'" According to Dionysius, however, the highest order of this hierarchy is that of the principalities;'*° in his reckoning we are to understand that the princes are they who have charge over individual peoples, while the angels have charge over individual men and the archangels announce to individual men those affairs that pertain to the salvation of all.'

Since a lower power acts in virtue of a higher power, a lower order performs actions proper to a higher order by acting in virtue

134 Gregory, loc. cit.

135Tbid., 10 (PL, LXXVI, 1251).

136Pseudo-Dionysius, Opacion xe (EG a llieeS)s 137qbid., 2 (PG, Ill, 257f.).

Divine Providence of that higher power. But the higher orders possess in a more eminent way whatever is proper to the lower orders. Thus all things are in a certain sense common to the various orders. However, they receive their proper names from properties that are characteristic of each order. Nevertheless the lowest order of all retains the common name of angels for itself, for the reason that it acts, as it were, in virtue of all the rest. Furthermore, since the higher naturally influences the lower, and since intellectual action consists in instructing or teaching, the higher angels, in instructing the lower angels, are said to purify, illuminate, and perfect them.

Higher angels purify the lower angels by removing what is wanting to their knowledge. They illuminate them by fortifying the intellects of the lower angels with their own light, thus enabling them to comprehend higher objects. And higher angels perfect lower angels by guiding them to the perfection of higher knowledge. These three operations pertain to the acquisition of knowledge, as Dionysius remarks.'*° This inequality does not prevent all the angels, even the lowest, from seeing the divine essence. Even though each of the blessed spirits sees God in His essence, some may behold Him more perfectly than others. This should be clear from a previous chapter." However, the more perfectly a cause is known, the more numerous are the effects discerned in it. The divine effects which the higher angels perceive in God more clearly than the other angels, constitute the subject matter in which they instruct the lower angels. But higher angels do not instruct lower angels concerning the divine essence, which they all perceive directly.

138}hid., VI, 3 (PG, Il, 209).

13°C£ chap. 106.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa

Control of lower bodies (but not man's intellect) by higher bodies Among intellectual substances, therefore, some are divinely governed by others, that is, the lower by the higher. Similarly, lower bodies are controlled, in God's plan, by higher bodies. Hence every movement of lower bodies is caused by the movements of heavenly bodies. Lower bodies acquire forms and species from the influence thus exercised by heavenly bodies, just as the intelligible exemplars of things descend to lower spirits through higher spirits.

However, since an intellectual substance is superior to all bodies in the hierarchy of beings, the order of Providence has suitably disposed matters in such a way that no intellectual substance is ruled by God through a corporeal substance. Accordingly, since the human soul is an intellectual substance, it cannot, so far as it is endowed with intelligence and will, be subject to the movements of heavenly bodies. Heavenly bodies cannot directly act upon or influence either the human intellect or the human will.

Again, no body acts except by movement. Hence whatever is acted upon by a body is moved by it. But the human soul, regarded as intellectual (according as it is the principle of the will) cannot be moved by bodily movement, since the intellect is not the act of any bodily organ. So the human soul cannot be subject, in its intellect or will, to any influence emanating from heavenly bodies.

Furthermore, impressions left in lower bodies from the impact of heavenly bodies are natural. Therefore, if the operations of the intellect and will resulted from the impression made by heavenly bodies, they would proceed from natural instinct. And so man would not differ in his activity from other animals, which are moved to their actions by natural instinct. And thus free will and deliberation and choice and all perfections of this sort, which distinguish man from other animals, would perish.

Divine Providence

Indirect influence of heavenly bodies on the human intellect Nevertheless we should not lose sight of the fact that the human intellect is indebted to the sense powers for the origin of its knowledge. This is why intellectual knowledge is thrown into confusion when the soul's faculties of phantasm, imagination, or memory are impaired.

On the other hand, when these powers are in good order, intellectual apprehension grows more efficient. Likewise, a modification in the sensitive appetite tends to bring about a change in the will (which is a rational appetite), as we know from the fact that the object of the will is the good as apprehended. According as we are variously disposed in the matter of concupiscence, anger, fear, and other passions, a thing will at different times appear to us as good or evil.

On the other hand, all the powers of the sensitive part of our soul, whether they are apprehensive or appetitive, are the acts of certain bodily organs. If these undergo modification, the faculties themselves must, indirectly, undergo some change. Therefore, since change in lower bodies is influenced by the movement of the heavens, the operations of the sensitive faculties are also subject to such movement, although only per accidens. And thus heavenly movement has some indirect influence on the activity of the human intellect and will, so far as the will may be inclined this way or that by the passions.

Nevertheless, since the will is not subject to the passions in such a way as necessarily to follow their enticement, but on the contrary has it in its power to repress passion by the judgment of reason, the human will is not subject to impressions emanating from heavenly bodies. It retains free judgment either to follow or to resist their attractions, as may seem to it expedient. Only the

Aquinas's Shorter Summa wise act thus; the masses follow the lead of bodily passions and urgings, for they are wanting in wisdom and virtue. zp Movement of man's will by God Everything that is changeable and multiform is traced back, as to its cause, to some first principle that is immobile and is one. Since man's intellect and will are clearly changeable and multiform, they must be reduced to some higher cause that is immobile and uniform. The heavenly bodies are not the cause to which they are reduced, as we have shown;'™ therefore, they must be reduced to yet higher causes.

In this matter the case of the intellect differs from that of the will. The act of the intellect is brought about by the presence of the things understood in the intellect; but the act of the will is accounted for by the inclination of the will toward the things willed. Thus the intellect is adapted by its nature to be perfected by something external that is related to it as act to potency. Hence man can be aided to elicit an act of the intellect by anything external that is more perfect in intelligible being: not only by God but also by an angel or even by a man who is better informed (but differently in each instance). A man is helped to understand by a man when one of them proposes to the other an intelligible object not previously contemplated, but not in such a way that the light of the intellect of one man is perfected by the other because each of these natural lights is in one and the same species.

But the natural light of an angel is by nature of a higher excellence than the natural light of man. So an angel can aid a M40C£ chap. 127.

Divine Providence man to understand, not only on the part of the object proposed to him by the angel, but also on the part of the light that is strengthened by the angel's light. However, man's natural light does not come from an angel, for the nature of the rational soul, which receives existence through creation, is produced by God alone.

God helps man to understand, not only on the part of the object proposed by God to man or by an increase of light, but also by the very fact that man's natural light, which is what makes him intellectual, is from God. Moreover, God Himself is the first truth from which all other truth has its certitude, just as secondary propositions in demonstrative sciences derive their certitude from primary propositions. For this reason nothing can become certain for the intellect except through God's influence, just as conclusions do not achieve certitude in science except in virtue of primary principles.

With regard to the will, its act is a certain impulse flowing from the interior to the exterior, and has much in common with natural tendencies. Accordingly, as natural tendencies are placed in natural things exclusively by the cause of their nature, the act of the will is from God alone, for He alone is the cause of a rational nature endowed with will. Therefore, if God moves man's will, this is evidently not opposed to freedom of choice, just as God's activity in natural things is not contrary to their nature. Both the natural inclination and the voluntary inclination are from God; each of them issues in action according to the condition of the thing to which it pertains. God moves things in a way that is consonant with their nature.

This exposition brings out the fact that heavenly bodies can exert an influence on the human body and on its bodily powers, as they can in the case of other bodies. But they cannot do the same with regard to the intellect, although an intellectual creature can.

And God alone can touch the will.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa

Government of the world by God Second causes do not act except through the power of the first cause; thus instruments operate under the direction of art. Consequently all the agents through which God carries out the order of His government can act only through the power of God Himself.

The action of any of them is caused by God, just as the movement of a mobile object is caused by the motion of the mover. In such event the mover and the movement must be simultaneous. Hence

God must be inwardly present to any agent as acting therein whenever He moves the agent to act.

Another point: not only the action of secondary agents but their very existence is caused by God, as was shown above.

!*!

However, we are not to suppose that the existence of things is caused by God in the same way as the existence of a house is caused by its builder. When the builder departs, the house still remains standing. For the builder causes the existence of the house only in the sense that he works for the existence of the house as a house.

Such activity is, indeed, the constructing of the house, and thus the builder is directly the cause of the becoming of the house, a process that ceases when he desists from his labors. But God is directly, by Himself, the cause of very existence, and communicates existence to all things just as the sun communicates light to the air and to whatever else is illuminated by the sun. The continuous shining of the sun is required for the preservation of light in the air; similarly God must unceasingly confer existence on things if they are to persevere in existence. Thus all things are related to God as an object made is to its maker, and this not only

M1C£ chap. 68.

Divine Providence so far as they begin to exist, but so far as they continue to exist. But a maker and the object made must be simultaneous, just as in the case of a mover and the object moved. Hence God is necessarily present to all things to the extent that they have existence. But existence is that which is the most intimately present in all things.

Therefore God must be in all things.

Moreover, whoever, through the agency of intermediate causes, carries out the order he has foreseen, must know and arrange the effects of these intermediate causes. Otherwise the effects would occur outside the order he has foreseen. The prearranged plan of a governor is more perfect in proportion as his knowledge and design descend to details. For if any detail escapes the advertence of the governor, the disposition of that detail will elude his foresight. We showed above that all things are necessarily subject to Divine

Providence;"* and Divine Providence must evidently be most perfect, because whatever is predicated of God must befit Him in the highest possible degree. Consequently the ordinations of His

Providence must extend to the most minute effects.

13] Immediate disposing of all things by God In the light of the foregoing, it is clear that, although God's government of things is effected through the agency of secondary causes, as far as the carrying out of His Providence is concerned, yet the plan itself or ordination of Divine Providence extends directly to all details. In arranging all matters from first to last, God does not turn over to others the disposal of the final particulars.

Men act thus because of the limitations of their knowledge, which 142.C£ chap. 123.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa cannot at any one time take in many items. This is why higher rulers personally take charge of great concerns, and entrust the management of unimportant affairs to others. But God can take cognizance of a multitude of things simultaneously, as was indicated above.'* Hence the fact that He attends to the slightest details does not keep Him from organizing the weightiest matters. ey) Objections to God's particular Providence

Some may think that details are not regulated by God. For no one disposes anything in his planning unless he has knowledge thereof.

But knowledge of particulars may well seem to be lacking in God, for the reason that particulars are known, not by the intellect, but by the senses. God, who is wholly incorporeal, can have no sense knowledge, but only intellectual knowledge. Consequently details may seem to lie outside the scope of Divine Providence.

Moreover, details are infinite and knowledge of infinity is impossible, since the infinite as such is unknown. Therefore details seemingly escape the divine knowledge and Providence.

Again, many particulars are contingent. But certain knowledge of such objects is out of the question. Accordingly, since God's knowledge must be absolutely certain, it seems that details are not known or regulated by God.

Besides, particulars do not all exist simultaneously, for some things decay only to have others take their place. But there can be no knowledge of non-existent things. Hence, if God has knowl edge of details, there must be some things which He begins and ceases to know, and this involves the further consequence that He

M3.C£ chap. 29.

Divine Providence is mutable. Apparently, therefore, He does not know and dispose particulars.

Solution of the foregoing objections These objections are easily answered if we but penetrate to the truth of the matter. God knows Himself perfectly, and therefore He must have knowledge of all that exists in Himself in any manner whatever. Since every essence and power of created being is from Him, and since whatever comes from anyone exists virtually in him, we necessarily conclude that in knowing Himself He knows the essence of created being and whatever is virtually contained in the latter. And thus He knows all particulars that are virtually in Himself and in all His other causes.

The knowledge possessed by the divine intellect is not like our knowledge, as the first objection urged. Our intellect derives its knowledge of things through the species it abstracts, and these are the likenesses of forms and not of matter or of material dispositions, which are principles of individuation. Therefore our intellect cannot know particulars, but only universals. But the divine intellect knows things through its own essence, in which, as in the first principle of being, is virtually contained not only form, but matter. And so God knows not only universals but also particulars.

Likewise God is able to know an infinite number of objects, even though our intellect cannot know the infinite. Indeed, our intellect cannot actually contemplate many things at the same time. Hence, if it knew an infinite number of objects, it would have to review them one after another as it contemplated them, which is contrary to the very notion of infinity. However, our intellect can know infinity virtually and potentially; for example, it can know all the species of numbers or of proportions, seeing

Aquinas's Shorter Summa that it possesses an adequate principle for knowing all things. But God can know many things simultaneously, as was noted above;'** and that whereby He knows all things (namely, His essence) is an adequate principle for knowing not only all that is, but all that can be. Therefore, as our intellect potentially and virtually knows those infinite objects for which it has a principle of cognition, so God actually contemplates all infinities.

Furthermore, although corporeal and temporal particulars do not exist simultaneously, God surely has simultaneous knowledge of them. For He knows them according to His manner of being, which is eternal and without succession. Consequently, as He knows material things in an immaterial way and many things in unity, so in a single glance He beholds objects that do not exist at the same time. And so His knowledge of particulars does not involve the consequence that anything is added to, or subtracted from, His cognition.

This also makes it clear that He has certain knowledge of contingent things. Even before they come into being, He sees them as they actually exist (and not merely as they will be in the future and as virtually present in their causes, in the way we are able to know some future things). Contingent things, regarded as virtually present in their causes with a claim to future existence, are not sufficiently determinate to admit of certain knowledge about them; but, regarded as actually possessing existence, they are determinate, and hence certain knowledge of them is possible.

Thus we can know with the certitude of ocular vision that Socrates is sitting while he is seated. With like certitude God knows, in His eternity, all that takes place throughout the whole course of time.

For His eternity is in present contact with the whole course of MACE chap. 29.

Divine Providence time, and even passes beyond time. We may fancy that God knows the flight of time in His eternity, in the way that a person standing on top of a watchtower embraces in a single glance a whole caravan of passing travelers.

God's detailed knowledge of contingent futures To know contingent futures in this way, as being actually in existence (that is, to have certitude about them) is evidently restricted to God alone, of whom eternity is truly and properly predicated. For this reason, certain prediction of future events is accounted a proof of divinity. This accords with Isaiah 41:23:

"Show the things that are to come hereafter, and we shall know that ye are gods." Knowledge of future events in their causes is, indeed, possible for others. Such knowledge, however, is not certain, but is rather conjectural, except as regards effects that necessarily flow from their causes. In this way a physician foretells future illnesses and a sailor predicts storms.

God's existence in all things by essence, power, and presence Thus there is no reason why God should not have knowledge of individual effects or why He should not directly regulate them by Himself, even though He may carry them out through intermediate causes. However, in the very execution He is, in some fashion, in immediate touch with all effects, to the extent that all intermediate causes operate in virtue of the first cause, so that in a certain way

He Himself appears to act in them all. Thus all the achievements of secondary causes can be attributed to Him, as the effect produced by a tool is ascribed to the artisan: when we say that a smith makes

Aquinas's Shorter Summa a knife, we are more correct than when we say that a hammer did it. God is also in immediate contact with all effects so far as He is per se the cause of their existence and so far as everything is kept in being by Him.

Corresponding to these three immediate modes of influence, God is said to be in everything by essence, power, and presence.

He is in everything by His essence inasmuch as the existence of each thing is a certain participation in the divine essence; the divine essence is present to every existing thing, to the extent that it has existence, as a cause is present to its proper effect. God is in all things by His power, inasmuch as all things operate in virtue of Him. And God is in all things by His presence, inasmuch as He directly regulates and disposes all things.

The working of miracles proper to God alone The entire order of secondary causes, as well as their power, comes from God. He Himself, however, produces His effects not out of necessity, but by free will, as was shown above.'" Clearly, then, He can act outside the order of secondary causes, as when He cures those who are incurable from the standpoint of natural causality or when He does something else of this kind that is not within the sphere of natural causes but is nevertheless consonant with the order of Divine Providence. What God occasionally does in this way, independently of the order of natural causes, is designed by Him for a definite end. When effects are thus wrought by divine power outside the order of secondary causes, they are called miracles; for when we perceive an effect without knowing its cause,

145C£ chap. 96.

Divine Providence our wonder is excited (mirum est). God is a cause that is completely hidden from us. Therefore, when some effect is wrought by Him outside the order of secondary causes known to us, it is called simply a miracle. But if an effect is produced by some other cause that is unknown to this or that person, it is not a miracle simply as such, but only with regard to him who is ignorant of the cause. Thus an event may appear marvelous to one person without seeming marvelous to another who is acquainted with its cause.

To act in this way, outside the order of secondary causes, is possible for God alone, who is the founder of this order and is not confined to it. All other beings are subject to this order; and so God alone can work miracles, as the Psalmist says: "Who alone doth wonderful things."'*° Therefore, when miracles are apparently worked by some creature, either they are not true miracles but are effects produced by the power of natural agents which may be concealed from us, as happens in the case of miracles wrought by demons with their magical arts; or else, if they are true miracles, someone obtains the power to work them by praying to God. Since such miracles are wrought exclusively by divine power, they are rightly appealed to in proof of the Faith, which has God alone as its author. For a pronouncement issued by a man with a claim to divine authority is never more fittingly attested than by works which God alone can perform.

Although such miracles occur outside the order of secondary causes, we should not simply say that they are against nature. The natural order makes provision for the subjection of the lower to the activity of the higher. Thus effects brought about in lower bodies in consequence of the influence emanating from the heavenly bodies are not said to be simply against nature (although they may

146. 71:18 (RSV: Ps. 72:18).

Aquinas's Shorter Summa at times be against the particular nature of this or that thing, as we observe in the movement of water in the ebb and flow of the tide, which is produced by the action of the moon). In the same way, effects produced in creatures by the action of God may seem to be against some particular order of secondary causes; yet they are in accord with the universal order of nature. Therefore miracles are not contrary to nature. aye Fortuitous events Although all events, even the most trifling, are disposed (as we have shown) according to God's plan,'*' there is nothing to prevent some things from happening by chance or accident. An occurrence may be accidental or fortuitous with respect to a lower cause when an effect not intended is brought about, and yet not be accidental or fortuitous with respect to a higher cause, inasmuch as the effect does not take place apart from the latter's intention.

For example, a master may send two servants to the same place, but in such a way that neither is aware of the mission of the other.

Their meeting is accidental so far as each servant is concerned, but not as regards the master.

So, when certain events occur apart from the intention of secondary causes, they are accidental or fortuitous with respect to those causes; and they may be said without further ado to be fortuitous, because effects are described simply in terms of their proximate causes. But if God's point of view is considered, they are not fortuitous, but foreseen.

Ge chaps. 130, 133.

Divine Providence

Fate and its nature This suggests what we ought to think of fate. Many effects are found to occur haphazard if they are regarded from the standpoint of secondary causes. Some thinkers are unwilling to refer such effects to a higher cause that ordains them.'** In consequence, they must utterly reject fate. On the other hand, others have desired to trace back these seemingly accidental and fortuitous effects to a higher cause that plans them. But, failing to rise above the order of corporeal entities, they attributed such devising to the highest bodies, namely, the heavenly bodies.'*" And so they contended that fate is a force deriving from the position of the stars and that this accounts for happenings of this kind. But we showed above that the intellect and will, which are the true principles of human acts, are not in any proper sense subject to heavenly bodies.'"°

Hence we cannot maintain that events which seemingly occur at random and by chance in human affairs are to be referred to heavenly bodies as to the cause that charts them.

There seems to be no place for fate except in human affairs, in which hazard has a part to play. It is only about such events that men are accustomed to inquire in their craving to know the future, and it is also about these that an answer is usually given by fortunetellers. Hence fate (fatum) is a word formed from the Latin verb fari ("to foretell"). To acknowledge fate thus understood is opposed to Faith. Since, however, not only natural things but also

148C£ Cicero, De divinatione, II, cap. 5: cap. 10. See also St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, V,9 (PL, XLI, 148.) 149 @ ccording to St. Augustine, this was a view common among astrologers.

See De civitate Dei, V, 7 (PL, XLI, 147).

150C£ chap. 127.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa human affairs are under Divine Providence, those events that seem to happen at random in men's lives must be referred to the ordination of Divine Providence. Thus, those who hold that all things are subject to Divine Providence must admit the existence of fate. Fate in this sense is related to Divine Providence as a real effect of the latter. For it is an explanation of Divine Providence as applied to things and is in agreement with the definition given by Boethius, who says that fate is a "disposition" (ie., an unchangeable ordination) "inherent in changeable things."

Yet, since we ought not to have even words in common with infidels, so far as possible, lest an occasion for going astray be taken by those who do not understand, it is more prudent for the faithful to abstain from the word fate, because fate is more properly and generally used in the first sense. Therefore Augustine says that if anyone believes in the existence of fate in the second sense, he may keep to his opinion but should correct his language." ee Contingency of some effects The order of Divine Providence as carried out in things is certain.

This is why Boethius could say that fate is "an unchangeable disposition inherent in changeable things."?? But we may not conclude from this that all things happen of necessity. For effects are said to be necessary or contingent according to the condition of proximate causes. Evidently, if the first cause is necessary and the second cause is contingent, a contingent effect will follow.

Thus in the case of lower bodies, the first cause of generation is the '51 De consolatione philosophiae, IV, pros. 6 (PL, LXIII, 815).

1521 ¢ civitate Dei, V, 1 (PL, XL, 140) 153 De consolatione philosophiae, IV, pros. 6 (PL, LXIII, 815).

Divine Providence movement of a heavenly body. Although this movement takes place necessarily, generation and corruption in those lower bodies occur contingently, because the lower causes are contingent and can fail. As we demonstrated above, God carries out the order of His Providence through the intermediacy of lower causes.' Thus, some of the effects of Divine Providence will be contingent, in keeping with the condition of the lower causes.

Divine Providence compatible with contingency The contingency of effects or of causes cannot upset the certainty of Divine Providence. Three things seem to guarantee the certainty of Providence: the infallibility of divine foreknowledge, the efficaciousness of the divine will, and the wisdom of the divine management, which discovers adequate ways of procuring an effect. None of these factors is opposed to the contingency of things.

God's infallible knowledge embraces even contingent futures, inasmuch as God beholds in His eternity future events as actually existing. But we dealt with this question above.'"? Moreover, God's will, since it is the universal cause of things, decides not only that something will come to pass but that it will come about in this or that manner. The efficaciousness of the divine will demands not only that what God wishes will happen, but that it will happen in the way He wishes. But He wills that some things should happen necessarily and that other things should happen contingently; both are required for the perfection of the universe. That events may occur in both ways, He applies necessary causes to some things and contingent causes to others. In this manner, with some things

154CF chaps. 124, 125, 127, 130.

155C£. chap. 133.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa happening necessarily and other things happening contingently, the divine will is efficaciously carried out.

Furthermore, it is clear that the certainty of Providence is safeguarded by the wisdom of the divine dispensation, without prejudice to the contingency of things. Even the providence exercised by man can enable him so to bolster up a cause which can fail to produce an effect that, in some cases, the effect will inevitably follow. We find that a physician acts thus in exercising his healing art, as also does the vine-dresser who employs the proper remedy against barrenness in his vines. Much more, then, does the wisdom of the divine economy bring it about that, although contingent causes left to themselves can fail to produce an effect, the effect will inevitably follow when certain supplementary measures are employed; nor does this do away with the contingency of the effect. Evidently, therefore, contingency in things does not exclude the certainty of Divine Providence.

Providence and evil The same process of reasoning enables us to perceive that, without prejudice to Divine Providence, evil can arise in the world because of defects in secondary causes. Thus in causes that follow one another in order, we see that evil finds its way into an effect owing to some fault in a secondary cause, although this fault is by no means the product of the first cause. For example, the evil of lameness is caused by a curvature in the leg, not by the motive power of the soul. Whatever movement there is in the progress of a lame man, is attributed to the motive power as to its cause; but the unevenness of the progress is caused by the curvature of the leg, not by the motive power. Similarly the evil that arises in things, so far as it has existence or species or a certain nature, is referred

Divine Providence to God as to its cause, for there can be no evil unless it resides in something good, as is clear from what we said above.'""° But with regard to the defect that disfigures it, the evil is referred to a lower, defectible cause. Accordingly, although God is the universal cause of all things, He is not the cause of evil as evil. But whatever good is bound up with the evil, has God as its cause.

God's goodness and the permission of evil God's permission of evil in the things governed by Him is not inconsistent with the divine goodness. For, in the first place, the function of Providence is not to destroy but to save the nature of the beings governed. The perfection of the universe requires the existence of some beings that are not subject to evil and of other beings that can suffer the defect of evil in keeping with their nature.

If evil were completely eliminated from things, they would not be governed by Divine Providence in accord with their nature; and this would be a greater defect than the particular defects eradicated.

Secondly, the good of one cannot be realized without the suffering of evil by another. For instance, we find that the generation of one being does not take place without the corruption of another being, and that the nourishment of a lion is impossible without the destruction of some other animal, and that the patient endurance of the just involves persecution by the unjust. If evil were completely excluded from things, much good would be rendered impossible. Consequently it is the concern of Divine Providence, not to safeguard all beings from evil, but to see to it that the evil which arises is ordained to some good.

156C£ chap. 117.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa Thirdly, good is rendered more estimable when compared with particular evils. For example, the brilliance of white is brought out more clearly when set off by the dinginess of black. And so, by permitting the existence of evil in the world, the divine goodness is more emphatically asserted in the good, just as is the divine wisdom when it forces evil to promote good.

Sin, Grace, and Eternity

God's special Providence over man by grace Accordingly, Divine Providence governs individual beings in keeping with their nature. Since rational creatures, because of the gift of free will, enjoy dominion over their actions in a way impossible to other creatures, a special Providence must be exercised over them in two respects: first, with regard to the aids God gives to rational creatures in their activity; secondly, with regard to the recompense allotted for their works. God gives to irrational creatures only those aids by which they are naturally moved to act. But to rational creatures are issued instructions and commands regulating their lives. A precept is not fittingly given except toa being that is master of his actions, although in an analogous sense God is said to give commands to irrational creatures also, as is intimated in Ps. 148:6:

"He hath made a decree, and it shall not pass away." But this sort of decree is nothing else than the dispensation of Divine Providence moving natural things to their proper actions.

The deeds of rational creatures are imputed to them in blame or in praise, because they have dominion over their acts. The actions of men are ascribed to them not only by a man who is

Aquinas's Shorter Summa placed over them, but also by God. Thus any praiseworthy or blameworthy action that a man performs is imputed to him by the person to whose rule he is subject. Since good actions merit a 157 vational reward and sin calls for punishment, as was said above, creatures are punished for the evil they do and are rewarded for the good they do, according to the measure of justice fixed by Divine

Providence. But there is no place for reward or punishment in dealing with irrational creatures, just as there is none for praise or blame.

Since the last end of rational creatures exceeds the capacity of their nature and since whatever conduces to the end must be proportionate to the end according to the right order of Providence, rational creatures are given divine aids that are not merely proportionate to nature but that transcend the capacity of nature.

God infuses into man, over and above the natural faculty of reason, the light of grace whereby he is internally perfected for the exercise of virtue, both as regards knowledge, inasmuch as man's mind is elevated by this light to the knowledge of truths surpassing reason, and as regards action and affection, inasmuch as man's affective power is raised by this light above all created things to the love of God, to hope in Him, and to the performance of acts that such love imposes.

These gifts or aids supernaturally given to man are called graces for two reasons. First, because they are given by God gratis. Nothing is discoverable in man that would constitute a right to aids of this sort, for they exceed the capacity of nature. Secondly, they are called graces because in a very special way, man is made gratus (or "pleasing to God") by such gifts. Since God's love is the cause of goodness in things and is not called forth by any preexisting

157C£. chaps. 103, 121.

Sin, Grace, and Eternity goodness, as our love is, a special intensity of divine love must be discerned in those whom He showers with such extraordinary effects of His goodness. Therefore God is said chiefly and simply to love those whom He endows with these effects of His love by which they are enabled to reach their last end, which is He

Himself, the fountainhead of all goodness.

Remission of sin by the gifts of grace Sins arise when actions deflect from the right course leading to the end. Since man is conducted to his end not only by natural aids, but by the aids of grace, the sins men commit must be counteracted not by natural aids alone, but also by the helps which grace confers.

Contraries exclude each other; therefore, as the aids of grace are taken from man by sin, so sins are forgiven by the gifts of grace.

Otherwise man's malice in committing sin would be more powerful in banishing divine grace than the divine goodness is in expelling sin by the gifts of grace.

Furthermore, God's Providence over things is in harmony with their mode of being. Changeable things are so constituted that contraries can succeed each other in them. Examples of this are generation and corruption in corporeal matter, and white and black in a colored object. Man is changeable in will as long as he lives his earthly life. Hence man receives from God the gifts of grace in such a way that he is able to forfeit them by sin; and the sins man commits are such that they can be remitted by the gifts of grace.

Besides, in supernatural acts, possible and impossible are regarded from the standpoint of divine power, not from the standpoint of natural power. The fact that a blind man can be made to see or that a dead man can rise, is owing not to natural power but

Aquinas's Shorter Summa to divine power. But the gifts of grace are supernatural. Therefore a person's capacity to receive them depends on divine power. To say that once a person has sinned he cannot receive the gifts of grace, is derogatory to the power of God. Of course, grace cannot coexist with sin; for by grace man is rightly ordered to his end, from which he is turned away by sin. But the contention that sin is irremissible impugns the power of God.

No sin unforgivable The suggestion might be put forward that sins are unforgivable, not through any lack of power on God's part, but because divine justice has decided that anyone who falls from grace shall never more be restored to it.

But such a position is clearly erroneous. There is no provision in the order of divine justice to the effect that, while a person is on the road, he should have assigned to him what belongs to the end of the journey. But unyielding adherence to good or to evil pertains to the end of life's course; immobility and cessation from activity are the terminus of movement. On the other hand, the whole of our present life is a time of wayfaring, as is shown by man's changeableness both in body and in soul. Accordingly, divine justice does not determine that after sinning a man must remain immovably in the state of sin.

Moreover, divine benefits do not expose man to danger, particularly in affairs of supreme moment. But it would be dangerous for man, while leading a life subject to change, to accept grace if, after receiving grace, he could sin but could not again be restored to grace.

This is so especially in view of the fact that sins preceding grace are remitted by the infusion of grace; and at times such sins are

Sin, Grace, and Eternity more grievous than those man commits after receiving grace.

Therefore we may not hold that man's sins are unforgivable either before or after they are committed.

Remission of sin by God alone God alone can forgive sin. For only the one against whom an offense is directed can forgive the offense. Sin is imputed to man as an offense not only by another man, but also by God, as we said above.' However, we are now considering sin as imputed to man by God. Accordingly, God alone can forgive sin.

Again, since by sin man is deflected from his last end, sins cannot be forgiven unless man is again rightly ordered to his end.

This is accomplished through the gifts of grace which come from God alone, since they transcend the power of nature. Therefore only God can remit sin.

Further, sin is imputed to man as an offense because it is voluntary. But only God can effect a change in the will. Consequently He alone can truly forgive sins.

Some articles of Faith on the effects of divine government This, then, is the second of God's effects, namely, the government of things, and especially of rational creatures, to whom God gives grace and whose sins He forgives. This effect is touched on in the Creed. When we profess that the Holy Spirit is God, we imply that all things are ordained to the end of divine goodness, since it

158C£. chap. 143.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa belongs to God to order His subjects to their end. And the words of the Creed which express our belief that the Holy Spirit is "the giver of life," suggest that God moves all things. For, as the movement flowing from the soul to the body is the life of the body, so the movement whereby the universe is moved by God is, so to speak, a certain life of the universe.

Further, since the entire process of divine government is derived from the divine goodness, which is appropriated to the Holy

Spirit who proceeds as love, the effects of Divine Providence are fittingly thought of in connection with the person of the Holy

Spirit.

As regards the effect of supernatural knowledge which God produces in men through faith, the Creed proclaims: "I believe in one holy Catholic Church"; for the Church is the congregation of the faithful. Concerning the grace which God communicates to men, the Creed states: "I believe in... the Communion of Saints."

And with respect to the remission of sin it says: "I believe in... the forgiveness of sins."

All creation is for man All things are directed to the divine goodness as to their end, as we have shown.'"? Among things ordained to this end, some are closer to the end than others and so participate in the divine goodness more abundantly. Therefore lesser creatures, which have a smaller share in the divine goodness, are in some way subordinated to higher beings as to their ends. In any hierarchy of ends, beings that are closer to the ultimate end are also ends with respect

159CE£ chap. 101.

Sin, Grace, and Eternity to beings that are more remote. For instance, a dose of medicine is administered to procure a purge; the purge is designed to promote slimness; and slimness is desirable for health. Thus slimness is, in a sense, the purpose of the purging, as the purging is the purpose of the medicine. And such subordination is reasonable. As in the order of efficient causes, the power of the first agent reaches the ultimate effects through intermediate causes, so in the order of ends, whatever is farther removed from the end attains to the ultimate end through the intermediacy of beings that are closer to the end.

Thus, in our example, the medicine has no relation to health except through purging. Similarly, in the order of the universe, lower beings realize their last end chiefly by their subordination to higher beings.

The same conclusion is manifest if we turn our attention to the order of things in itself. Things that come into being by a natural process, act as they are equipped by nature to act. As we observe, however, imperfect beings serve the needs of more noble beings: plants draw their nutriment from the earth; animals feed on plants; and these in turn serve man's use. We conclude, then, that lifeless beings exist for living beings, plants for animals, and the latter for men. And since, as we have seen,!® intellectual nature is superior to material nature, the whole of material nature is subordinate to intellectual nature. But among intellectual natures, that which has the closest ties with the body is the rational soul, which is the form of man. In a certain sense, therefore, we may say that the whole of corporeal nature exists for man, inasmuch as he is a rational animal. And so the consummation of the whole of corporeal nature depends, to some extent, on man's consummation.

160C£ chaps. 74, 127.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa

The ultimate end of man Man's consummation consists in the attainment of his last end, which is perfect beatitude or happiness; and this consists in the vision of God, as was demonstrated above.'®' The Beatific Vision entails immutability in the intellect and will. As regards the intellect, its questing ceases when at last it comes to the first cause, in which all truth can be known. The will's variability ceases, too; for, when it reaches its last end, in which is contained the fullness of all goodness, it finds nothing further to be desired. The will is subject to change because it craves what it does not possess. Clearly, therefore, the final consummation of man consists in perfect repose or unchangeableness as regards both intellect and will.

Consummation of man in eternity We showed in an earlier chapter that the idea of eternity involves immutability. As motion causes time, in which priority and posteriority are discerned, so the cessation of motion puts a stop to priority and posteriority; and so nothing remains but eternity, which is simultaneously whole. Therefore in his final consummation man attains eternal life, not only in the sense that he lives an immortal life in his soul — for this is a property of the rational soul by its very nature, as was shown above'®' — but also in the sense that he is brought to the perfection of immobility.

161CF chap. 104.

102C£ chap. 8.

1OCE chap. 84.

Death and Bodily Resurrection jhoy!

Reunion with the body is requisite for the soul's perfect happiness We should note that the disquiet of the will cannot be wholely overcome unless natural desire is completely satisfied. Elements that are by nature destined for union, naturally desire to be united to each other; for any being seeks what is suited to it by nature.

Since, therefore, the natural condition of the human soul is to be united to the body, as was pointed out above,'™ it has a natural desire for union with the body. Hence the will cannot be perfectly at rest until the soul is again joined to the body. When this takes place, man rises from the dead.

Besides, final perfection requires possession of a being's original perfection. But the first perfection of anything requires that it be perfect in its nature, and final perfection consists in attainment of the last end. In order, therefore, that the human soul may be brought to complete perfection with regard to its end, it must be perfect in its nature. This is impossible unless the soul is united to 164 chaps. 82, 90, 92.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa the body. For by nature the soul is a part of man as his form. But no part is perfect in its nature unless it exists in its whole. Therefore man's final happiness requires the soul to be again united to the body.

Moreover, the accidental and all that is contrary to nature cannot be everlasting. But a state wherein the soul is separated from the body is surely per accidens and contrary to nature, if naturally and per se the soul has a longing for union with the body.

Therefore the soul will not be forever separated from the body. So, since the soul's substance is incorruptible, as was shown above," we conclude that the soul is to be reunited to the body.

Separation of body from soul is both natural and contrary to nature We may have a suspicion that separation of the soul from the body is not per accidens but is in accord with nature. For man's body is made up of contrary elements. Everything of this sort is naturally corruptible. Therefore the human body is naturally corruptible.

But when the body corrupts, the soul must survive as a separate entity if the soul is immortal, as in fact it is.'™ Apparently, then, separation of the soul from the body is in accord with nature.

In view of these considerations, we must take up the question of how this separation is according to nature, and how it is opposed to nature. We showed above that the rational soul exceeds the capacity of all corporeal matter in a measure impossible to other forms.'*' This is demonstrated by its intellectual activity, which it exercises without the body. To the end that corporeal matter might

16C£ chap. 84.

166C£ chap. 84.

167C£ chaps. 74, 79.

Death and Bodily Resurrection be fittingly adapted to the soul, there had to be added to the body some disposition that would make it suitable matter for such a form. And in the same way that this form itself receives existence from God alone through creation, that disposition, transcending as it does corporeal nature, was conferred on the human body by God alone for the purpose of preserving the body itself in a state of incorruption so that it might match the soul's perpetual existence. This disposition remained in man's body as long as man's soul cleaved to God.

But when man's soul turned from God by sin, the human body deservedly lost that supernatural disposition whereby it was unrebelliously subservient to the soul. And hence man incurred the necessity of dying.

Accordingly, if we regard the nature of the body, death is natural. But if we regard the nature of the soul and the disposition with which the human body was supernaturally endowed in the beginning for the sake of the soul, death is per accidens and contrary to nature, inasmuch as union with the body is natural for the soul.

The soul's resumption of the same body Since the soul is united to the body as its form, and since each form has the right matter corresponding to it, the body to which the soul will be reunited must be of the same nature and species as was the body laid down by the soul at death. At the resurrection the soul will not resume a celestial or ethereal body, or the body of some animal, as certain people fancifully prattle.'©* No, it will resume a 168 Origen, Peri archon, Ill, 6 (PG, XI, 337); cf. St. Gregory the Great,

Moralia, XIV, 56 (PL, LXXV, 1077).

Aquinas's Shorter Summa human body made up of flesh and bones, and equipped with the same organs it now possesses.

Furthermore, just as the same specific form ought to have the same specific matter, so the same numerical form ought to have the same numerical matter. The soul of an ox cannot be the soul of a horse's body, nor can the soul of this ox be the soul of any other ox.

Therefore, since the rational soul that survives remains numerically the same, at the resurrection it must be reunited to numerically the same body.

Miraculous nature of the resurrection When substances corrupt, the survival of the species (but not the restoration of the individual) is effected by the action of nature.

The cloud from which rain is produced and the cloud which is again formed by evaporation from the fallen rain water, are not numerically the same. Accordingly, since the human body substantially dissolves in death, it cannot be restored to numerical identity by the action of nature. But the concept of resurrection requires such identity, as we have just shown. Consequently, the resurrection of man will not be brought about by the action of nature (as some philosophers have held in their theory that, when all bodies return to the position formerly occupied after untold cycles of years, then also men will return to life in the same numerical identity).'" No, the restoration of all who rise will be effected solely by divine power.

Moreover, it is clear that senses once destroyed and anything possessed as a result of generation cannot be restored by the 169 Thus Empedocles, in H. Diels, Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker, no. 126

(I, 270);

cf. Hippolytus, Philosophumena (Pseudo-Origen, Contra Haereses), I, 3 (PG, XVI, 3028).

Viz

Death and Bodily Resurrection activity of nature, for the simple reason that the same numerical being cannot be generated several times. If any such perfection is restored to anyone (for example, an eye that has been torn out or a hand that has been cut off), it will be through divine power which operates beyond the order of nature, as we said above.'""

Thus, since all the senses and members of man corrupt in death, a dead man cannot be brought back to life except by divine action.

The fact that, as we hold, the resurrection will be effected by divine power, enables us to perceive readily how the same numerical body will be revived. Since all things, even the very least, are included under Divine Providence, as we showed above,'"' the matter composing this human body of ours, whatever form it may take after man's death, evidently does not elude the power or the knowledge of God. Such matter remains numerically the same, in the sense that it exists under quantitative dimensions, by reason of which it can be said to be this particular matter and is the principle of individuation. If then, this matter remains the same, and if the human body is again fashioned from it by divine power, and if also the rational soul which remains the same in its incorruptibility is united to the same body, the result is that identically the same man is restored to life.

Numerical identity cannot be impeded, as some object, by the consideration that the humanity is not numerically the same as before. In the view of some philosophers, humanity, which is said to be the form of the whole, is nothing else than the form of a part, namely, the soul, and they admit that humanity is the form of the body also, in the sense that it confers species on the whole.'

If 10C¢£. chap. 136.

1C£ chaps. 123, 130.

172 A verroes, In Metaph., VI, comm. 21; comm. 34 (VIII, 80V; 87R). CE. St.

Thomas, In Metaph. Aristotelis, VII, lect. 9 (ed. Cathala, no. 1467).

Aquinas's Shorter Summa this is true, evidently the humanity remains numerically the same, since the rational soul remains numerically the same.

Humanity, however, is that which is signified by the definition of man, as the essence of anything whatever is that which is signified by its definition. But the definition of man signifies not form alone but also matter, since matter must be comprised in the definition of material things. Hence we shall do better to say, with others, that both soul and body are included in the notion of humanity," although otherwise than in the definition of man.

The notion of humanity embraces only the essential principles of man, prescinding from all other factors. For, since humanity is understood to be that whereby man is man, whatever cannot truly be said to constitute man as man, is evidently cut off from the notion of humanity. But when we speak of man, who has humanity, the fact that he has humanity does not exclude the possession of other attributes (for instance, whiteness, and the like). The term man signifies man's essential principles, but not to the exclusion of other factors, even though these other factors are not actually, but only potentially, contained in the notion of man.

Hence man signifies as a whole (per modum totius) whereas humanity signifies as a part (per modum partis) and is not predicated of man. In Socrates, then, or in Plato, this determinate matter and this particular form are included. Just as the notion of man implies composition of matter and form, so if Socrates were to be defined, the notion of him would imply that he is composed of this flesh and these bones and this soul. Consequently, since humanity is not some third form in addition to soul and body, but is composed of both, we see clearly that, if the same body is restored and if the same soul remains, the humanity will be numerically the same.

Li3C¢ Avicenna, Metaph. V, 5 (89VA). See St. Thomas, loc. cit. (ed.

Cathala, no. 1469).

Death and Bodily Resurrection The numerical identity in question is not frustrated on the ground that the corporeity recovered is not numerically the same, for the reason that it corrupts when the body corrupts. If by corporeity is meant the substantial form by which a thing is classified in the genus of corporeal substance, such corporeity is nothing else than the soul, seeing that there is but one substantial form for each thing. In virtue of this particular soul, this animal is not only animal, but is animated body, and body, and also this thing existing in the genus of substance. Otherwise the soul would come to a body already existing in act, and so would be an accidental form. The subject of a substantial form is something existing only in potency, not in act. When it receives the substantial form it is not said to be generated merely in this or that respect, as is the case with accidental forms, but is said to be generated simply, as simply receiving existence. And therefore the corporeity that is received remains numerically the same, since the same rational soul continues to exist.

If, however, the word corporeity is taken to mean a form designating body (corpus), which is placed in the genus of quantity, such a form is accidental, since it signifies nothing else than three-dimensional existence. Even though the same numerical form, thus understood, is not recovered, the identity of the subject is not thereby impeded, for unity of the essential principles suffices for this. The same reasoning holds for all the accidents, the diversity among which does not destroy numerical identity. Therefore, since union is a kind of relation (and therefore an accident), its numerical diversity does not prevent the numerical identity of the subject; nor, for that matter, does numerical diversity among the powers of the sensitive and vegetative soul, if they are supposed to have corrupted. For the natural powers existing in the human composite are in the genus of accident; and what we call sensible is derived, not from the senses according as sense is the specific

Aquinas's Shorter Summa difference constituting animal, but from the very substance of the sensitive soul, which in man is essentially identical with the rational soul.

Resurrection to new life Although men will rise as the same individuals, they will not have the same kind of life as before. Now their life is corruptible; then it will be incorruptible. If nature aims at perpetual existence in the generation of man, much more so does God in the restoration of man. Nature's tendency toward never-ending existence comes from an impulse implanted by God. The perpetual existence of the species is not in question in the restoration of risen man, for this could be procured by repeated generation. Therefore what is intended is the perpetual existence of the individual. Accordingly, risen men will live forever.

Besides, if men once risen were to die, the souls separated from their bodies would not remain forever deprived of the body, for this would be against the nature of the soul, as we said above.'"*

Therefore they would have to rise again; and the same thing would happen if they were to die again after the second resurrection.

Thus death and life would revolve around each man in cycles of infinite succession, which seems futile. Surely a halt is better called at the initial stage, so that men might rise to immortal life at the first resurrection.

However, the conquest of mortality will not induce any diversity either in species or in number. The idea of mortality contains nothing that could make it a specific difference of man, since it

N4C£ chap. 151.

Death and Bodily Resurrection signifies no more than a passion. It is used to serve as a specific difference of man in the sense that the nature of man is designated by calling him mortal, to bring out the fact that he is composed of contrary elements, just as his proper form is designated by the predicate rational; material things cannot be defined without including matter. However, mortality is not overcome by taking away man's proper matter. For the soul will not resume a celestial

M> i+ will resume a or ethereal body, as was mentioned above; human body made up of contrary elements. Incorruptibility will come as an effect of divine power, whereby the soul will gain dominion over the body to the point that the body cannot corrupt.

For a thing continues in being as long as form has dominion over matter.

Cessation of nutrition and reproduction after the resurrection When an end is removed, the means leading to that end must also be removed. Therefore, after mortality is done away with in those who have risen, the means serving the condition of mortal life must cease to have any function. Such are food and drink, which are necessary for the sustenance of mortal life, during which what is dissolved by natural heat has to be restored by food. Consequently there will be no consumption of food or drink after the resurrection.

Nor will there be any need of clothing. Clothes are necessary for man so that the body may not suffer harm from heat or cold, which beset him from outside. Likewise, exercise of the reproductive functions, which is designed for the generation of animals, must cease. Generation serves the ends of mortal life, so that what

1150. chap. 153.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa cannot be preserved in the individual may be preserved at least in the species. Since the same individual men will continue in eternal existence, generation will have no place among them; nor, consequently, will the exercise of reproductive power.

Again, since semen is the superfluous part of nourishment, cessation of the use of food necessarily entails cessation of the exercise of the reproductive functions. On the other hand, we cannot maintain with propriety that the use of food, drink, and the reproductive powers will remain solely for the sake of pleasure.

Nothing inordinate will occur in that final state because then all things will receive their perfect consummation, each in its own way. But deordination is opposed to perfection. Also, since the restoration of man through resurrection will be effected directly by God, no deordination will be able to find its way into that state; whatever is from God is well ordered.''° But desire for the use of food and the exercise of the reproductive powers for pleasure alone, would be inordinate; indeed, even during our present life people regard such conduct as vicious. Among the risen, consequently, the use of food, drink, and the reproductive functions for mere pleasure, can have no place.

Resurrection of all the bodily members Although risen men will not occupy themselves with such activities, they will not lack the organs requisite for such functions.

Without these organs the risen body would not be complete. But it is fitting that nature should be completely restored at the renovation of risen man, for such renovation will be accomplished

MCE Rom. 13:1: "Let every soul be subject to higher powers; for there is no power but from God; and those that are, are ordained of God."

Death and Bodily Resurrection directly by God, whose works are perfect. Therefore all the members of the body will have their place in the risen, for the preservation of nature in its entirety rather than for the exercise of their normal functions.

Moreover, as we shall bring out later, men will receive punishment or reward in that future state for the acts they perform now.'"'

This being the case, it is no more than right that men should keep the organs with which they served the reign of sin or of justice during the present life, so that they may be punished or rewarded in the members they employed for sin or for merit.

Absence of defects in the resurrection In like manner, it is fitting that all natural defects be corrected in the risen body. Any defect of this sort is prejudicial to the integrity of nature. So if human nature is to be completely renewed by God at the resurrection, such defects must be rectified. Besides, these defects arose from a deficiency in the natural power which is the principle of human generation. But in the resurrection there will be no active causality other than the divine, which does not admit of deficiency. Therefore such defects as are found in men naturally begotten, will have no place in men restored by the resurrection.

Resurrection restricted to what is necessary for true human nature These remarks about the integrity of risen men should be understood as referring to whatever pertains to the true state of human

17C£ chaps. 172, 173. ive

Aquinas's Shorter Summa nature. What is not required for the reality of human nature will not be resumed by risen man. Thus, if all the accretion of matter from the food that has been changed into flesh and blood were to be resumed, the size of risen man would exceed all bounds. The proper condition of any nature is regulated by its species and form.

Accordingly, all the parts that are consonant with the human species and form will be integrally present in risen man (i.e., not only organic parts, but other parts of like nature, such as flesh and sinews, which enter into the composition of the various organs).

Of course, not all the matter that was ever contained in those parts during man's natural life will again be taken up, but only so much as will be enough to constitute the species of the parts in integrity.

Even though not all the material elements ever possessed by man will arise, we cannot say on this account that man will not be the same individual or that he will not be complete. During the course of the present life, man evidently remains numerically the same from birth to death. Nevertheless the material composition of his parts does not remain the same, but undergoes gradual flux and reflux, in somewhat the way that the same fire is kept up although some logs are consumed and others are fed to the blaze.

Man is whole when his species and the quantity due to his species are preserved intact.

God's action in supplying what is lacking in the body For the same reason that God, in restoring the risen body, does not reclaim all the material elements once possessed by man's body, He will supply whatever is wanting to the proper amount of matter.

Nature itself has such power. In infancy we do not as yet possess our full quantity; but by assimilating food and drink we receive enough matter from outside sources to round out our perfect

Death and Bodily Resurrection quantity. Nor on this account does a man cease to be the same individual he was before. Surely, then, divine power can do the same thing much more easily, so that those who do not have sufficient quantity may be supplied from outside matter with whatever was lacking to them in this life as regards integrity of natural members or suitable size. Thus, although some may lack certain of their members during this life or may not attain to perfect size, the amount of quantity possessed at the moment of death makes no difference; at the resurrection they will receive, through God's power, the due complement of members and quantity.

Solution of possible objections This enables us to answer the objections that some raise against the resurrection. For instance, they say that a cannibal may have eaten human flesh, and later, thus nourished, may beget a son, who eats the same kind of food. If what is eaten is changed into the substance of the eater's flesh, it seems impossible for both to rise in their full integrity, for the flesh of one has been changed into the flesh of the other. The difficulty apparently grows if semen is the product of surplus food, as the philosophers teach;' for the semen whereby the son is begotten would then be derived from the flesh of another person. And so it seems impossible for a boy begotten from such seed to rise, if the men (whose flesh the father and the son himself devoured) rise intact.

But this state of affairs is not incompatible with a general resurrection. As was noted above, not all the material elements

ever present in any man need be resumed when he rises; '" only 178 Aristotle, De generatione animalium, I, 18 (726 a 26).

179C£ chap. 159.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa so much matter is required as suffices to keep up the amount of quantity he ought to have. We also pointed out that if anyone is lacking in the matter required for perfect quantity, divine power will supply what is needed.'®° We should note, moreover, that the material elements existing in man's body are found to pertain to true human nature in various degrees. First and foremost, what is received from one's parents is brought to perfection within the reality of the human species, as its purest element, by the parents' formative causality. Secondly, what is contributed by food is necessary for the proper quantity of the body's members. And lastly, since the introduction of a foreign substance always weakens a thing's energy, growth must eventually cease and the body must become old and decay, just as wine eventually becomes watery if water is mixed in with it.

Further, certain superfluities are engendered in man's body from food. Some of these are required for special purposes (for instance, semen for reproduction and hair for covering and adornment). But other superfluities serve no useful end and these are expelled through perspiration and other eliminating processes, or else are retained in the body, not without inconvenience to nature.

At the general resurrection all this will be adjusted in accord with Divine Providence. If the same matter existed in different men, it will rise in that one in whom it fulfilled the higher function. If it existed in two men in exactly the same way, it will rise in him who had it first; in the other, the lack will be made up by divine power. And so we can see that the flesh of a man that was devoured by another will rise not in the cannibal but in him to whom it belonged originally. But as regards the nutritive fluid present in it, it will rise in the son begotten of semen formed from 180C£ chap. 160.

Death and Bodily Resurrection

OME OR A

; that flesh.""'

The rest of it will rise in the first man in this series, and God will supply what is wanting to each of the three.

The resurrection of the dead as an article of Faith That we may give expression to our faith in the Resurrection, we are instructed to say in the Apostles' Creed: "I believe .

. in the resurrection of the body." The word body was inserted not without reason: even in the age of the Apostles there were some who denied the resurrection of the body'®' and admitted no more than a spiritual resurrection, whereby a man rises from the death of sin.

Therefore the Apostle, in 2 Timothy 2:18, has occasion to refer to certain individuals: "Who have erred from the truth, saying that the resurrection is past already, and have subverted the Faith of some." To abolish this error, so that belief in the future resurrection may be professed, the Creed of the Fathers'® proclaims: "I look for the resurrection of the dead."

Nature of risen man's activity We go on to consider the nature of the activity exercised by risen men. Each living being must have some activity that mainly

181 See St. Thomas, Summa, Ia, q. 119, a. 1 ad 3: "The nutritive fluid is that which has not yet completely received the specific nature, but is on the way to it: for example, the blood, and the like." Also, cf. ibid., a. 2:

"Nutritive power is said to serve generative power, because what was transformed by the nutritive power is received as semen by the generative power."

182C¢ Matt. 22:23; Acts 23:8, regarding the Sadducees.

183-That is, the Nicene Creed.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa engrosses its attention; and its life is said to consist in this occupation. Thus those who cultivate pleasure more than anything else are said to lead a voluptuous life; those who give their time to contemplation are said to lead a contemplative life; and those who devote their energies to civil government, are said to lead a political life. We have shown that risen men will have no occasion to use food or the reproductive functions,'* although all bodily activity seems to tend in the direction of such use. But even if the exercise of bodily functions ceases, there remain spiritual activities, in which man's ultimate end consists, as we have said; '" and the risen are in a position to achieve this end once they are freed from their former condition of corruption and changeableness. Of course, man's last end consists not in spiritual acts of any sort whatever, but in the vision of God according to His essence, as was stated above.'® And God is eternal; hence the intellect must be in contact with eternity. Accordingly, just as those who give their time to pleasure are said to lead a voluptuous life, so those who enjoy the vision of God possess eternal life, as is indicated in John

17:3: "This is eternal life: that they may know Thee, the only true God, and Jesus Christ whom Thou hast sent."

184CF chap. 156.

185C£ chaps. 107, 149.

186C£ chap. 107.

↑ Back to top