Christ's Incarnation

Christ's Incarnation

Christ's Incarnation

Insufficiency of Adam's merit to restore nature Although the sin of the first parent infected the whole of human nature, neither his repentance nor any merit of his was able to restore nature in its entirety. Adam's repentance or any other merit of his was clearly the act of an individual person. But no act of any individual can affect the entire nature of the species. Causes that can affect a whole species are equivocal causes, not univocal. The sun is a cause of generation in the whole human species, but a man is only the cause of the generation of a particular man. Hence the individual merit of Adam (or of any other mere man) could not suffice to re-establish the whole of nature. True, all nature was defiled by a single act of the first man; but this effect followed only indirectly in the sense that, once the state of innocence had been devastated in him, it could not be conveyed through him to others.

Even if Adam were to recover grace through penance, he could not return to his pristine innocence, in view of which God had granted the gift of Original Justice. Moreover, the state of Original

Justice was manifestly a very special gift of grace. Grace, however, is not acquired by merits, but is given gratis by God. Therefore the jhinil

Aquinas's Shorter Summa Original Justice which the first man had from the beginning was not the result of his merit but was a gift of God. Much less, after his sin, could Adam merit it by his repentance or by the performance of any other work.

Ieee The restoration of human nature by Christ Nevertheless in the plan of Divine Providence it was decreed that human nature, which had been ravaged in the manner described, should be restored. It could not be admitted to perfect beatitude unless it were freed of its defilement.

Beatitude, being a perfect good, tolerates no defect, especially the defect of sin; for sin is, in its own way, opposed to virtue, which is the path leading to beatitude, as was established above."° And so, since man was made for beatitude — seeing that beatitude is his ultimate end — one might conclude that God's work in creating so noble a being was doomed to frustration. But this the Psalmist holds to be inadmissible, for he says in Psalm 88:48: "Hast

Thou made all the children of men in vain?"""' Accordingly, it was fitting that human nature should be restored.

Furthermore, divine goodness exceeds the creature's capacity for good. As long as man leads a mortal life in this world, we know that his condition is such that he is neither immovably confirmed in good nor immovably obstinate in evil."""

Hence the very condition of human nature implies that it is capable of being cleansed from the contamination of sin. Surely the divine goodness would hardly allow this capacity to remain

?20C£. chap. 172.

221 RSV: Ps, 89:47.

22C£ chaps. 144, 145.

Christ's Incarnation forever unrealized; but this would have been so had God not provided a remedy devised for man's restoration.

Restoration of man by God through the Incarnation We indicated above that the reparation of human nature could not be effected either by Adam or by any other purely human being."

For no individual man ever occupied a position of preeminence over the whole of nature; nor can any mere man be the cause of grace.

The same reasoning shows that not even an angel could be the author of man's restoration. An angel cannot be the cause of grace, just as he cannot be man's recompense with regard to the ultimate perfection of beatitude to which man was to be recalled. In this matter of beatitude angels and men are on a footing of equality.

Nothing remains, therefore, but that such restoration could be effected by God alone.

But if God had decided to restore man solely by an act of His will and power, the order of divine justice would not have been observed. Justice demands satisfaction for sin.

But God cannot render satisfaction, just as He cannot merit.

Such a service pertains to one who is subject to another. Thus God was not in a position to satisfy for the sin of the whole of human nature; and a mere man was unable to do so, as we have just shown.

Hence divine Wisdom judged it fitting that God should become man, so that thus one and the same person would be able both to restore man and to offer satisfaction. This is the reason for the 223C£. chap. 198.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa divine Incarnation assigned by the Apostle in 1 Timothy 1:15:

"Christ Jesus came into this world to save sinners."

Other reasons for the Incarnation There are also other reasons for the divine Incarnation. Man had withdrawn from spiritual things and had delivered himself up wholly to material things, from which he was unable by his own efforts to make his way back to God.

Therefore divine Wisdom, who had made man, took to Himself a bodily nature and visited man immersed in things of the body, so that by the mysteries of His bodily life He might recall man to spiritual life.

Furthermore, the human race had need that God should become man to show forth the dignity of human nature, so that man might not be subjugated either by devils or by things of the body.

At the same time, by willing to become man, God clearly displayed the immensity of His love for men, so that henceforth men might serve God, no longer out of fear of death, which the first man had scorned, but out of the love of charity.

Moreover, the Incarnation holds up to man an ideal of that blessed union whereby the created intellect is joined, in an act of understanding, to the uncreated Spirit. Since the time when God became united to man by taking a human nature to Himself, it is no longer incredible that a creature's intellect should be capable of union with God by beholding the divine essence.

Lastly, the Incarnation puts the finishing touch to the whole vast work envisaged by God. For man, who was the last to be created, returns by a sort of circulatory movement to his first beginning, being united by the work of the Incarnation to the very principle of all things.

Christ's Incarnation ZoZ The error of Photinus concerning the Incarnation This mystery of the divine Incarnation, Photinus'"' set aside, so far as he was able. Following Ebion," Cerinthus,"° and Paul of Samosata,"" he asserted that our Lord Jesus Christ was no more than a man and that He did not exist before the Virgin Mary, but earned the glory of divinity by the merit of a blessed life and by patiently enduring death; and thus He was called God not on account of His nature but by the grace of adoption. In this event no union of God with man would have been effected; only a man would be deified by grace. Elevation of this sort is not peculiar to Christ, but is common to all the saints, although some may be considered more highly endowed with such grace than others.

This error contradicts the authority of Sacred Scripture. In John 1:1 we read: "In the beginning was the Word." Shortly afterward the Evangelist adds: "And the Word was made flesh.'""®

Hence the Word that in the beginning was with God assumed flesh. But Scripture does not say that a man who lacked previous existence was deified by the grace of adoption. Likewise, in John

6:38 the Lord says: "I came down from Heaven not to do my own 224C£ St. Augustine, De haeresibus, 45 (PL, XLII, 34); Vigilius Tapsensis,

Contra Arianos dialogus, I, 4 (PL, LXII, 182).

225.C€ St. Augustine, De haeresibus, 10 (PL, XLII, 27). The Ebionites, an ancient Judaeo-Christian sect deriving their name from a Hebrew word meaning "poor," lived mostly in the region around the Dead Sea and in Syria. They claimed to be followers of the original Christian community in Jerusalem, who are called "the poor" in Romans 15:26 and Galatians

2:10. Their Faith was not completely uniform, but denial of Christ's divinity was characteristic of all of them.

226C£. St. Augustine, ibid., 8 (PL, XLII, 27).

227C£ St. Augustine, ibid., 44 (PL, XLII, 34).

2281 ohn 1:14.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa will, but the will of Him that sent me." According to the error of Photinus, Christ could not come down from Heaven, but could only go up to Heaven. Against him is the Apostle, who says in Ephesians 4:9: "That He ascended, what is it but because He also descended first into the lower parts of the Earth?" This enables us to understand clearly that the Ascension would have no place in Christ unless His descent from Heaven had preceded.

Error of Nestorius about the Incarnation Nestorius" wished to avoid this contradiction. In part he disagreed with the error of Photinus. For Nestorius held that Christ was the Son of God not only by the grace of adoption but by the divine nature in which He existed coeternal with the Father. In part, however, he sided with Photinus, because he taught that the Son of God was united to man by mere habitation in him, but not in such a way that there was only one person who was both God and man. And so that man who, according to Photinus, is called

God through grace alone, is called the son of God by Nestorius, not because he is truly God but because the Son of God dwells in him through the inhabitation effected by grace.

This error is also opposed to Scripture. For the union of God with man is called by the Apostle an "emptying"; in Philippians

2:6-7 he says of the Son of God: "Who, being in the form of God, thought it not robbery to be equal with God, but emptied Himself, taking the form of a servant." But there is no emptying of God when He dwells in a rational creature by grace. Otherwise the 22°Cf. St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, Ill, 3 (PG, XCIV, 993);

Theodore of Mopsuestia, Fragmentum de Incarnatione, VII (PG, LXVI, 976); Second Council of Constantinople, can. 4, 5 (Denz., 216, 217).

Christ's Incarnation Father and the Holy Spirit would be emptied out also, since they too dwell in the rational creature by grace. Thus in John 14:23 our

Lord says of Himself and the Father: "We will come to him and will make our abode with him." And in 1 Corinthians 3:16 the Apostle says of the Holy Spirit: "The Spirit of God dwelleth in you."

Moreover, the man in question could hardly use words signifying divinity unless He were personally God. He would have been guilty of supreme presumption in saying, as He does in John 10:30,

"I and the Father are one," and also in 8:58, "Before Abraham was made, I am." For the pronoun | indicates the person of the speaker, but He who uttered these words was a man. Hence the person of God and this man are one and the same.

To preclude such errors, both the Apostles' Creed and the Creed of the Nicene Fathers, after mentioning the person of the Son, add that He was conceived of the Holy Spirit, was born, suffered, died, and rose. Surely what pertains to the man would not be predicated of the Son of God unless the person of the Son of God and of the man were the same. What is proper to one person is, by that very fact, not said of another person; for example, what is proper to Paul is, for that precise reason, not predicated of Peter.

The error of Arius about the Incarnation In their eagerness to proclaim the unity of God and man in Christ, some heretics went to the opposite extreme and taught that not only was there one person, but also a single nature in God and man.

This error arose from Arius." To defend his position that those 230C£ St. Athanasius, Contra Apollinarium, 1, 15; II, 3 (PG, XXVI, 1121,

1136); St. Augustine, De haeresibus, 49 (PL, XLII, 39); and Council of Nicaea (Denz., 54).

Aquinas's Shorter Summa scriptural passages where Christ is shown as inferior to the Father, must refer to the Son of God Himself (in His assuming nature),

Arius taught that in Christ there is no other soul than the Word of God who replaced the soul in Christ's body. So when Christ says in John 14:28, "The Father is greater than I" or when He prays or is sad, such matters refer to the nature of the Son of God. If this were so, the union of God's Son with man would be effected not only in the person, but also in the nature. For, as we know, the unity of human nature comes from union of soul and body.

The falsity of this position, so far as regards the assertion that the Son is less than the Father, was brought out above when we showed that the Son is equal to the Father."' And with respect to the theory that the Word of God took the place of the soul in Christ, the absurdity of this error can be shown by reverting to a point previously set forth. For, as we demonstrated above, the soul is united to the body as the latter's form." But God cannot be the form of a body, as we also demonstrated above."» Arius could not counter by maintaining that this is to be understood of God the Father on high, since the same can be proved even of the angels

(namely, that they cannot, of their very nature, be united to a body in the manner of a form, seeing that by nature they are separated from bodies). Much less, then, can the Son of God, by whom the angels were made (as even Arius admits") be the form of a body.

Besides, even if the Son of God were a creature, as Arius falsely teaches, He nevertheless excels all created spirits in beatitude,

?31C£ chap. 41.

?32C£. chap. 90.

233C£ chap. 17.

?34CF the fragment of the Thalia preserved by St. Athanasius, Contra Arianos, 1,5 (PG, XXVI, 21); Epistola ad Alexandrum, in St. Athanasius,

De synodis, 17 (PG, XXVI, 709).

Christ's Incarnation according to the heresiarch himself."? But the beatitude of the angels is so great that they can suffer no sadness. Their happiness would not be true and complete if anything were wanting to their desires, since the notion of beatitude requires it to be the ultimate and perfect good wholly satisfying all desire. Much less can the Son of God be subject to sadness or fear in His divine nature. Yet we read that He was sad: "He began to fear and to be heavy" and "to be sad.""*° And He Himself gave witness of His sorrow, saying, "My soul is sorrowful even unto death.""*' Sadness, assuredly, pertains not to the body but to some substance capable of apprehension.

So, besides the Word and the body, there must have been in Christ another substance that could suffer sadness. This we call the soul.

Further, if Christ assumed what is ours in order to cleanse us of sin, and if our greater need was to be cleansed in soul, from which sin arises and which is the subject of sin, we must conclude that He assumed not a body without a soul, but a body together with its soul, for the soul was the more important part for Him to assume.

The error of Apollinaris in regard to the Incarnation These points also refute the error of Apollinaris,"'® who at first followed Arius in refusing to admit any soul in Christ other than the Word of God. However, he did not follow Arius in teaching

235 Thalia, in St. Athanasius, Contra Arianos, I, 5 (PG, XXVI, 21); also, another fragment of the same work in St. Athanasius, De synodis, 15 (PG,

XXVI, 707).

236 Mark 14:33; Matt. 26:37.

237 Mark 14:34.

238C£ St. Athanasius, Contra Apollinarium, 1, 2 (PG, XXVI, 1096); St.

Augustine, De haeresibus, 55 (PL, XLII, 40); St. Leo the Great, serm.

XXIV (In nativitate Domini, IV), 5 (PL, LIV, 207).

Aquinas's Shorter Summa that the Son of God was a creature; for many things are said of Christ which cannot be ascribed to the body and are inadmissible in the Creator, such as sadness, fear, and the like. He was, then, finally driven to grant the existence in Christ of some soul which gave sense life to the body and could be the subject of such passions.

Yet this soul was without reason and intellect and the Word Himself took the place of intellect and reason in the man Christ.

This theory is false on many grounds. First, the very concept of nature is incompatible with the opinion that a non-rational soul is the form of man, whose body nevertheless must have some form.

But nothing monstrous or unnatural can be thought of in connection with Christ's Incarnation. Secondly, this hypothesis would be inconsistent with the purpose of the Incarnation, namely, the reparation of human nature. Above all, human nature needs to be restored in the intellectual sphere, for that which can have part in sin is precisely the rational soul. Hence it chiefly befitted God's

Son. to assume man's intellectual nature. Besides, Christ is said to have marveled."" But surprise cannot be experienced without a rational soul, and of course is wholly inadmissible in God. Therefore, as the sorrow Christ experienced forces us to admit that He had a sensitive soul, so the wonderment He expressed compels us to acknowledge the existence of a rational soul in Him.

The error of Eutyches regarding union in nature To some extent, Eutyches also embraced the error of these heres-

iarchs.""

He taught that there was one nature common to both Ce e.g., Matt. 8:10: "And Jesus hearing this, marveled, saying. . .: I have not found so great faith in Israel."

CF. St. Leo the Great, epist. XXVIII, Ad Flavianum, 6 (PL, LIV, 777);

Christ's Incarnation God and man after the Incarnation. However, he did not hold that Christ was lacking in soul or in intellect or in anything pertaining to the integrity of nature.

The erroneousness of this theory is plainly apparent. The divine nature is perfect in itself and is incapable of change. But a nature that is perfect in itself cannot combine with another nature to form a single nature unless it is changed into that other nature

(as food is changed into the eater) or unless the other nature is changed into it (as wood is changed into fire) or unless both natures are transformed into a third nature (as elements are when they combine to form a mixed body). The divine immutability excludes all these alternatives. For neither that which is changed into another thing, nor that into which another thing can be changed, is immutable. Since, therefore, the divine nature is perfect in itself, it can in no way combine with some other nature to form a single nature.

Moreover, as we see if we reflect on the order of things, the addition of a greater perfection causes variation in the species of a nature. Thus a thing (such as a plant) that not only exists but lives, differs in species from a thing that merely exists.

And that which exists and lives and feels (such as an animal), differs in species from the plant, which merely exists and lives.

Likewise a being that exists, lives, feels, and understands (namely, a man), differs in species from the brute animal, which merely exists, lives, and feels. So if the single nature which the Eutychean theory ascribes to Christ has the perfection of divinity in addition to all these other perfections, that nature necessarily differs in species from human nature in the way that human nature differs

Boethius, De persona et duabus naturis, 5-7 (PL, LXIV, 1347-52); St. John Damascene, De fide orthodoxa, III, 3 (PG, XCIV, 993); Council of Chalcedon (Denz., 148).

Aquinas's Shorter Summa specifically from the nature of a brute animal. On this supposition, therefore, Christ would not be a man of the same species as other men, a conclusion shown to be false by Christ's descent from men according to the flesh. This is brought out by Matthew in his

Gospel, which begins with the words: "The book of the generation of Jesus Christ, the son of David, the son of Abraham.""*?

Refutation of the Manichaean error about the nature of Christ's body Photinus emptied the mystery of the Incarnation of all meaning by denying Christ's divine nature. Manichaeus did the same by denying Christ's human nature.'"" He held that the whole of material creation was the work of the Devil and that the Son of the good

God could not becomingly take to Himself a creature of the Devil.

Therefore he taught that Christ did not have real flesh but only phantom flesh. Consequently he asserted that everything narrated in the Gospel as pertaining to the human nature of Christ was done in appearance only and not in very truth.

This theory plainly gives the lie to Sacred Scripture, which relates that Christ was born of the Virgin, that He was circumcised, that He was hungry, that He ate, and that He had other experiences common to the nature of human flesh. Hence in recording such things of Christ, what is written in the Gospels would be false.

Besides, Christ says of Himself: "For this was I born, and for this came | into the world, that I should give testimony to the truth."

If He had displayed in Himself what really did not exist, He would 241 Mfatt. Lil.

°C St. Augustine, De haeresibus, 46 (PL, XLII, 37).

2437 ohn 18:37.

Christ's Incarnation have been a witness not of truth but rather of error; especially since

He foretold that He would suffer that which He could not suffer without a body (namely, that he would be betrayed into the hands of men, that he would be spat upon, scourged, and crucified).

Accordingly, to say that Christ did not have true flesh and that He suffered such indignities not in truth but only in appearance, is to accuse Him of lying.

Furthermore, to banish true conviction from men's minds is the act of a liar. Christ did expel a certain notion from the minds of His disciples. After His resurrection He appeared to the disciples, who thought that He was a spirit or a specter. To banish suspicion of this kind from their hearts, He said to them: "Handle and see: for a spirit hath not flesh and bones, as you see me to have." * On another occasion, when He was walking on the sea to the consternation of His disciples who thought He was an apparition, our

Lord said: "It is I, fear ye not.""" If the opinion entertained by the disciples about a spectral body is true, we have to concede that Christ was deceitful. But Christ is the Truth, as He testified of Himself.' Therefore the Manichaean theory is false.

The reality of Christ's earthly body, against Valentinus Valentinus'*' admitted that Christ had a real body. However, he insisted that our Lord did not take flesh from the Blessed Virgin,

2447 uke 24:39 (RSV: Luke 24:38).

245 Matt. 14:27.

246 John 14:6.

241C£ St. Irenaeus, Adversus haereses, I, 7; 11 (PG, VI, 513, 561); Tertullian, Adversus Valentinianos, 27 (PL, I], 581); St. Augustine, De haeresibus, 11 (PL, XLII, 28).

Aquinas's Shorter Summa but rather brought down with Him a body formed of celestial matter. This body passed through the Virgin without receiving anything from her, much as water passes through a canal.

This hypothesis, too, contradicts the truth of Scripture. In Romans 1:3 the Apostle says that God's Son "was made to Him of the seed of David, according to the flesh." And St. Paul writes in Galatians 4:4: "God sent His Son, made of a woman." Matthew likewise relates: "And Jacob begot Joseph, the husband of Mary, of whom was born Jesus, who is called Christ." Later, Matthew refers to her as Christ's mother: "When His mother Mary was espoused to Joseph."""

None of this would be true if Christ had not received His flesh from the Virgin. Accordingly, the doctrine that Christ brought with Him a celestial body is false.

It is true that in 1 Corinthians 15:47 the Apostle states that "the second man" Christ [as contrasted with Adam, "the first man'| was "from Heaven, heavenly." But this is to be understood in the sense that He came down from Heaven in His divinity, not according to the substance of His body.

Moreover, there would be no reason why the Son of God, bringing His body from Heaven, should have entered the Virgin's womb, if He were to receive nothing from her. Such a procedure would seem to be a kind of deceit if, coming forth from His mother's womb, He were to intimate that He had received from her a body which in fact He had not received. Since, therefore, all falsehood is foreign to Christ, we must acknowledge without reservation that He came forth from the Virgin's womb in such a way that He really took His flesh from her.

248 fact. 1:16.

249 fart. 1:18.

Christ's Incarnation

The teaching of Faith about the Incarnation We can gather together the various points established in the foregoing chapters and assert that, according to the true teaching of the Catholic Faith, Christ had a real body of the same nature as ours, a true rational soul, and, together with these, perfect deity.

These three substances are united in one person, but do not combine to form one nature.

In undertaking to explain this truth, some theologians have taken the wrong path. Persuaded that every perfection accruing to a being subsequent to its complete existence is joined to it accidentally (as a garment is joined to a man), certain theologians taught that humanity was joined to divinity in the person of the Son by an accidental union, in such a way that the assumed nature would be related to the person of God's Son as clothing is related toa man.

To bolster up this view, they brought forward what the Apostle says of Christ in Philippians 2:7, that He was "in habit found as a man." Likewise, they reflected that from the union of soul and body an individual possessed of rational nature is formed and that such an individual is called a person. If, therefore, the soul was united to the body in Christ, they were unable to see how they could escape the conclusion that a person would be constituted by such a union. In this event there would be two persons in Christ: the person who assumes and the person who is assumed. On the other hand, there are not two persons in a man who is clothed, because clothing does not possess what is required for the notion of a person. If, however, the clothes were a person, there would be

250C£ Peter Lombard, Sent., III, dist. 6, c. 4 (Quaracchi, II, 578f.). n4h

Aquinas's Shorter Summa two persons in a clothed man. To avoid this conclusion, therefore, some proposed that Christ's soul was never united to His body, but that the person of God's Son assumed soul and body separately.

This view, while trying to escape one absurdity, falls into a greater, for it entails the necessary consequence that Christ would not be true man. Surely true human nature requires the union of soul and body: a man is a being made up of both. A further consequence is that Christ would not be true flesh, and that none of His members would be a true member. For if the soul is taken away, there is no eye or hand or flesh and bone, except in an equivocal sense, as when these parts of the body are depicted in paint or fashioned in stone. Further, it would follow that Christ did not really die. Death is the privation of life. Obviously the divinity could not be deprived of life by death; and the body could not be alive if a soul were not united to it. A final consequence would be that Christ's body could not experience sensation; for the body has no sensation except through the soul united to it.

This theory falls back into the heresy of Nestorius, which it set out to overthrow. The error of Nestorius consisted in holding that the Word of God was united to Christ the man by the indwelling of grace, so that the Word of God would reside in that man as in His temple. It makes no difference, with regard to the doctrine proposed, whether we say that the Word is in the man as in a temple or whether we say that human nature is joined to the Word as a garment to the person wearing it, except that the second opinion is the worse, inasmuch as it cannot admit that Christ was true man. Accordingly, this view is condenined,"' and deservedly so. Moreover, the man who is clothed cannot be the person of the clothes or garment, nor can he in any way be said to be in the 21 By Alexander III, in Epist. ad Willelmum, "Cum Christus" (Denz., 393).

Christ's Incarnation species of clothing. If, therefore, the Son of God took human nature to Himself, He cannot in any sense be called the person of the human nature, nor can He be said to pertain to the same species as the rest of men. Yet the Apostle says of Him that He was

"made in the likeness of men.""" Clearly, therefore, this theory is to be utterly rejected.

Exclusion of two supposita in Christ Other theologians, wishing to avoid these absurdities, proposed that in Christ the soul was indeed united to the body and that this union constituted a certain man who, they maintained, was assumed by the Son of God in unity of person.""' By reason of this assumption they said that the man in question was the Son of God and that the Son of God was that man. Further, since this assumption had unity of person as its terminus, they admitted that in Christ there was one person of God and man. But since this man who, they maintain, is composed of soul and body, is a certain suppositum or hypostasis of human nature, they place two supposita and two hypostases in Christ: one of human nature, created and temporal; the other of divine nature, uncreated and eternal.

As far as words go, this view appears to recede from the error of Nestorius. But if we examine it a little more closely, we find that it slips into the heresy identified with Nestorius.

For a person, clearly, is nothing else than an individual substance possessed of rational nature. But human nature is rational.

Therefore by the very fact that a hypostasis or suppositum of human 252 Phil. 2:7.

253C£ Peter Lombard, Sent., III, dist. 6, c. 2 (Quaracchi, II, 574).

Aquinas's Shorter Summa nature, temporal and created, is admitted in Christ, a person that is temporal and created is also admitted in Him. This is precisely what the name of suppositum or hypostasis signifies (namely, an individual substance). Accordingly, if these people understand what they are saying, they must place two persons in Christ when they place two supposita or two hypostases in Him.

Another consideration is the following. Things that differ as supposita exist in such a way that what is proper to one cannot belong to another. Therefore, if the Son of God is not the same suppositum as the Son of man, it follows that what belongs to the Son of man cannot be attributed to the Son of God, and vice versa.

Hence we could not say that God was crucified or born of the Virgin: which is characteristic of the Nestorian infamy.

If anyone should undertake to protest, in reply to this, that what pertains to the man in question is ascribed to the Son of God, and conversely, because of the unity of person, even though the supposita may be different, his answer simply cannot stand. Evidently the eternal suppositum of the Son of God is nothing else than His very person. Hence whatever is said of the Son of God by reason of His person would also be said of Him by reason of His suppositum. But what pertains to the man is not said of Him by reason of His suppositum, for the Son of God is represented as differing from the Son of man in suppositum. Therefore what is proper to the Son of man (such as his birth from the Virgin, his death, and the like) cannot be said of the Son of God by reason of the person.

Furthermore, if the name of God is predicated of a temporal suppositum, this will be something recent and new. But any being that is recently and newly called God, is not God unless he has been made God.

What is made God, however, is God not by nature, but only by adoption. Consequently the man in question would be God, not

Christ's Incarnation in fact and by nature, but merely by adoption: which, again, pertains to the error of Nestorius.

ZA One suppositum and one person in Christ Accordingly, we must say that in Christ there is not only one person of God and man, but also that there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis. There is not, however, only one nature, but two natures.

To see that this is so, we have but to reflect that the names person, hypostasis, and suppositum signify a whole of a certain kind. We cannot say that a hand or flesh or any of the other parts is a person or a hypostasis or a suppositum, but the whole, which is this man, is such. But terms that are common to individuals in the line of substance and accident (such as individual and singular) can be applied both to a whole and to its parts. Parts have something in common with accidents, in the sense that they do not exist by themselves but inhere in other things, although in a different way.

We can say that the hand of Socrates or Plato is a certain kind of individual or singular thing, even though it is not a hypostasis or a suppositum or a person.

Furthermore, we should note that sometimes a union of various ingredients, considered just in itself, constitutes an integral whole, although in another being it does not constitute an integral whole because the addition of some other component is needed. Thus in a stone the combination of the four elements constitutes an integral whole; and so the object composed of the elements can, in the stone, be called a suppositum or hypostasis, which is this stone. It cannot, of course, be called a person, because it is not a hypostasis endowed with rational nature. But the combination of elements in an animal constitutes not an integral whole, but only a part

(namely, the body). Something else must be added to make up the

Aquinas's Shorter Summa complete animal, and this is the soul. Hence the combination of elements in an animal does not constitute a suppositum or hypostasis; rather, this whole animal is the hypostasis or suppositum.

Nevertheless the combination of elements is not, on this account, any less effectual in an animal than in a stone, but is rather more so, because it is ordained to the formation of a nobler being.

In all men save one the union of soul and body constitutes a hypostasis and suppositum, because in their case the hypostasis or suppositum is nothing else but these two components. But in our

Lord Jesus Christ, besides soul and body, a third substance enters in, namely, the Godhead. In Him, therefore, the composite of body and soul is not a separate suppositum or hypostasis, nor is it a person. The suppositum, hypostasis, or person is that which is made up of three substances (namely, the body, the soul, and the divinity). In Christ, accordingly, just as there is but one person, so there is but one suppositum and one hypostasis. But the way His soul is joined to His body differs from the way His divinity is united to both. His soul comes to the body as its self-existing form, so that one nature, which is called human nature, is composed of these two. But the Godhead does not come to the soul and body as a form or as a part: this is against the very concept of divine perfection. Therefore the divinity and the soul and the body do not constitute one nature: but the divine nature, complete in itself and existing in its purity, took to itself, in a way that is incomprehensible and indescribable, the human nature composed of soul and body.

This called for an exercise of God's infinite power. For we know from experience that the greater an agent's power, the more effectively he avails himself of the instrument he uses to carry out an undertaking. Therefore, as the divine power, because of its infinity, is infinite and incomprehensible, the way Christ united human nature to Himself, as a sort of organ to effect man's salvation, is

Christ's Incarnation beyond human expression and surpasses every other union of God with creatures.

We pointed out above that person, hypostasis, and suppositum signify an integral whole. So if the divine nature in Christ had the function of a part (like the soul in the composition of a man) and were not something whole, then the one person of Christ would not be accounted for by the divine nature alone but would be a certain composite of three elements, just as in man the person, hypostasis, and suppositum is a composite of soul and body. However, since the divine nature is an integral whole that took human nature to itself by a mysterious, ineffable union, the person is accounted for by the divine nature, as is the hypostasis and suppositum. Yet the soul and body are drawn to the personality of the divine person, so that He is the person of the Son of God and is also the person, hypostasis, and suppositum of the Son of man.

Some sort of example of this can be found in creatures. Thus subject and accident are not united in such a way that some third thing is formed from them. In a union of this kind, the subject does not have the function of a part, but is an integral whole, which is a person, hypostasis, and suppositum. But the accident is drawn to the personality of the subject, so that the person of the man and of the color of whiteness is one and the same, and the hypostasis or suppositum is likewise the same. In a somewhat similar fashion the person, hypostasis, and suppositum of the Son of God is the person, hypostasis, and suppositum of the human nature in Christ. Influenced by comparisons of this sort, some theologians went so far as to say that the human nature in Christ deteriorates into an accident and is accidentally united to the Son of God;"** they were unable to discriminate between literal truth and analogy.

254 Peter Lombard, Sent., Ill, dist. 6, c. 4 (Quaracchi, II, 578f.).

Aquinas's Shorter Summa In any case, the foregoing exposition makes it clear that there is no other person in Christ but the eternal person, who is the person of the Son of God. Nor is there any other hypostasis or suppositum. Hence when we say, this man, pointing to Christ, we mean the eternal suppositum. Nevertheless the name man is not for that reason predicated equivocally of Christ and of other men.

Equivocation does not follow diversity of supposition, but follows diversity of signification. The name of man, as attributed to Peter and to Christ, signifies the same thing, namely, human nature. But it does not have the same supposition; for in the one case it stands for the eternal suppositum of the Son of God, in the other case it stands for a created suppositum.

Since, however, we can predicate of a suppositum of any nature all that is proper to that nature to which the suppositum pertains, and since in Christ the suppositum of the human nature is the same as the suppositum of the divine nature, it is evident that everything belonging to the divine nature and everything belonging to the human nature can be predicated indifferently of this suppositum which pertains to both natures. This is true both when the name we use signifies the divine nature or person, and when it signifies the human nature. We can say, for example, that the Son of God is eternal, and that the Son of God was born of the Virgin.

Likewise we can say that this man is God, that He created the stars, and that he was born, died, and was buried.

What is predicated of a suppositum is predicated of it according to some form or matter. Thus Socrates is white according to the whiteness of his skin and is rational according to his soul. But, as we pointed out in the beginning of this chapter, in Christ there are two natures and one suppositum. Therefore, if reference is made to the suppositum, human and divine attributes are to be predicated indifferently of Christ. Yet we must heed the sense in which each attribute is predicated; that is, divine attributes are predicated of

Christ's Incarnation Christ according to His divine nature, and human attributes are predicated of Him according to His human nature.

Unity and multiplicity in Christ Since there are in Christ one person and two natures, we have to examine the relationship between them to determine what is to be spoken of as one, and what is to be spoken of as multiple in Him.

Whatever is multiplied in accord with the diversity of Christ's natures, must be acknowledged to be plural in Him. In this connection we must consider, first of all, that nature is received by generation or birth. Consequently, as there are two natures in Christ, there must also be two generations or births: one that is eternal, whereby He received divine nature from His Father, and one that occurred in time, whereby He received human nature from His mother. Likewise, whatever is rightly attributed to God and man as pertaining to nature, must be predicated of Christ in the plural. To God are ascribed intellect and will and their perfections, such as knowledge or wisdom, and charity, and justice.

These are also attributed to man as pertaining to human nature; for will and intellect are faculties of the soul, and their perfections are wisdom, justice, and the like. Therefore we must acknowledge two intellects in Christ, one human and one divine, and likewise two wills, as well as a double knowledge and charity (namely, the created and the uncreated).

But whatever belongs to the suppositum or hypostasis must be declared to be one in Christ. Hence if existence is taken in the sense that one suppositum has one existence, we are forced, it appears, to assert that there is but one existence in Christ. Of course, as is evident, when a whole is divided, each separate part has its own proper existence; but according as parts are considered

Aquinas's Shorter Summa in a whole, they do not have their own existence for they all exist with the existence of the whole. Therefore, if we look upon Christ as an integral suppositum having two natures, His existence will be but one, just as the suppositum, too, is one.

Since actions belong to supposita, some have thought that, as there is but one suppositum in Christ, so there is only one kind of action in Him.' But they did not rightly weigh the matter. For many actions are discerned in any individual, if there are many principles of activity in him. Thus in man the action of understanding differs from the action of sense perception because of the difference between sense and intellect. Likewise in fire the action of heating differs from the action of soaring upward, because of the difference between heat and lightness. Nature is related to action as its principle. Therefore it is not true that Christ has only one kind of activity because of the one suppositum. Rather, there are two kinds of action in Him, because of the two natures, just as, conversely, there is in the Holy Trinity but one activity of the three persons because of the one nature.

Nevertheless the activity of Christ's humanity has some part in the activity proper to His divine power. For of all the factors that come together in a suppositum, that which is the most eminent is served by the rest in an instrumental capacity, just as all the lesser faculties of man are instruments of his intellect. Thus in Christ the human nature is held to be, as it were, the organ of His divine nature. But it is clear that an instrument acts in virtue of the principal agent. This is why, in the action of an instrument, we are

255-Thus Macarius, patriarch of Antioch; Cyrus, patriarch of Alexandria; Sergius, patriarch of Constantinople; and others. See the Third Council of Constantinople, Actio 13, especially Actio 18 (Mansi, XI, 554f., 638f.;

Denz., 291f.). Cf. Leo II, Epist. 1V, Ad episcopos Hispaniae; Epist. V1, Ad Ervigium regem Hispaniae (PL, XCVI, 414, 419); St. John Damascene,

De fide orthodoxa, III, 15 (PG, XCIV, 1045).

Christ's Incarnation able to discern not only the power of the instrument but also that of the principal agent. A chest is made by the action of an axe, but only so far as the axe is directed by the carpenter. In like manner the activity of the human nature in Christ received a certain efficacy from the divine nature, over and above its human power.

When Christ touched a leper, the action belonged to His human nature; but the fact that the touch cured the man of his leprosy is owing to the power of the divine nature. In this way all the human actions and sufferings of Christ were efficacious for our salvation in virtue of His divinity. For this reason Dionysius calls the human activity of Christ theandric,'"° that is, "divine-human," because actions of this sort proceeded from His human nature in such a way that the power of the divinity was operative in them.

A doubt is raised by some theologians concerning sonship, whether there is only one filiation in Christ because of the oneness of the suppositum,'"" or two filiations because of the duality of His nativity.'*® It may seem that there are two filiations; for when a cause is multiplied, the effect is multiplied, and the cause of sonship is nativity. Since, therefore, there are two nativities of Christ, the consequence may seem to follow that there are also two filiations.

This view is not rejected by the fact that filiation is a personal relation (that is, that it constitutes a person). In the case of Christ, this is true of the divine filiation; the human filiation does not constitute a person, but comes to a person already constituted as 256De divinis nominibus, II, 6 (PG, III, 644).

257S¢. Bonaventure, III Sent., d. 8, a. 2, q. 2 (Quaracchi, III, 194); St. Albert the Great, III Sent., d. 8, a. 1 (ed. A. Borgnet, XXVIII, 163).

258This is the teaching of Robert Kilwardby, Comment. in Sent., lib. Il (Cod.

131, fol. 109r-v of Merton College, Oxford); cited by E. Longpré, O.F.M.., "De B. Virginis maternitate et relatione ad Christum," Antonianum, VII (1932), 295. Cf. Peter Abelard, Sic et non, 75 (PL, CLXXVIII, 1448).

Aquinas's Shorter Summa such. In the same way there is no reason why one man should not be related to his father and mother by a single filiation; he is born of both parents by the same nativity. Wherever the cause of a relation is the same, the relation is in reality but one, even though it may have many respects. There is nothing to prevent a thing from having a reference to another thing, even though no relation is really in it. Thus the knowable is referred to knowledge, although no relation exists in it. So, too, there is no reason why a single real relation should not have a number of respects. Just as a relation depends on its cause for its existence as a certain thing, so it also depends on its cause for the fact that it is one or multiple.

Therefore, since Christ does not proceed from His Father and His mother by the same nativity, there may seem to be in Him two real filiations because of the two nativities.

But there is one reason why several real filiations cannot be attributed to Christ. Not everything that is generated by another can be called a son; only a complete suppositum can be called ason.

Not a man's hand or foot, but the whole individual, Peter or John, is called son. Hence the proper subject of filiation is the suppositum itself. But we have shown earlier that the only suppositum in Christ is the uncreated suppositum,"' which cannot receive any real relation beginning in time. As we intimated above, every relation of God to creatures is purely mental."°° Consequently the filiation whereby the eternal suppositum of the Son is related to His virgin mother cannot be a real relation, but must be a purely mental relation.

However, this does not prevent Christ from being really and truly the Son of His virgin mother, because He was truly born of her. In the same way God is really and truly the Lord of His ee chap. 211.

Ley chaps. 54, 99.

Christ's Incarnation creatures, because He possesses real power to coerce them; yet the relation of dominion is attributed to God only by a mental operation. Of course, if there were several supposita in Christ, as some theologians have taught,' there would be nothing to keep us from admitting two filiations in Christ, for in that case the created suppositum would be subject to temporal sonship.

MS Perfection of grace and wisdom in Christ As was mentioned in the preceding chapter, the humanity of Christ is related to His divinity as a sort of organ belonging to it.

The disposition and quality of organs are gauged chiefly by the purpose, though also by the dignity, of the person using them.

Consequently we are to esteem the quality of the human nature assumed by the Word of God in accord with these norms. The purpose the Word of God had in assuming human nature was the salvation and reparation of human nature. Therefore Christ had to be of such excellence in His human nature that He could fittingly be the author of man's salvation. But the salvation of man consists in the enjoyment of God, whereby man is beatified; and so Christ must have had in His human nature a perfect enjoyment of God. For the principle in any genus must be perfect. But fruition of God has a twofold aspect: it requires satisfaction of the will and of the intellect. The will must adhere unreservedly to God by love; the intellect must know God perfectly.

Perfect attachment of the will to God is brought about by love and by grace, whereby man is justified, according to Romans 3:24:

"Being justified freely by His grace." For man is made just by union 261C£ Peter Lombard, Sent., Ill, d. 6, c. 2 (Quaracchi, II, 574.)

Aquinas's Shorter Summa with God through love. Perfect knowledge of God is effected by the light of wisdom, which is the knowledge of divine truth.

Therefore the incarnate Word of God had to be perfect in grace and in the wisdom of truth. Hence we read in John 1:14: "The Word was made flesh, and dwelt among us; and we saw His glory, the glory as it were of the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth."

The fullness of Christ's grace First we shall deal with the question of the fullness of grace in Christ. In this matter we should observe that the term grace may be understood in two senses.

According to one usage, it means "to be pleasing (gratum)": we say that someone is in the good graces of another because he is pleasing to him. In another sense, it means that "something is given gratis": a person is said to grant a grace to another when he confers gratis a benefit on that other.

These two meanings of grace are not wholly unconnected. A thing is given gratis to another because he to whom it is given is pleasing (gratus) to the giver, either simply or in some respect. The recipient is simply pleasing to the giver when he is pleasing to such an extent that the giver associates him with himself in some way.

For those whom we hold dear (quos gratos habemus) we attract to ourselves as far as we can, according to the quantity and degree in which they are dear to us. But the recipient is pleasing to the giver only in some respect when he is pleasing to the extent that he receives something from him, although not to the extent that he is taken into association by the donor. Clearly, therefore, every-one who has favor (qui habet gratiam) with another has something given to him gratis; but not everyone who has something given to

Christ's Incarnation him gratis is pleasing (gratus) to the donor. Hence we ordinarily distinguish between two kinds of grace: one, namely, which is only given gratis, and the other which, in addition, makes pleasing

(gratum facit).

A thing is said to be given gratis if it is in no way due. A thing may be due in two ways, either according to nature or according to operation. According to nature, whatever the natural order of a thing requires, is due to it; thus the possession of reason and hands and feet is due to man. According to operation, a thing is due in the way that a recompense is due to a worker. Therefore those gifts are given gratis by God to men, which exceed the order of nature and are not acquired by merits. However, even gifts that are conferred by God because of merits sometimes retain the name and character of grace, because the principle of meriting comes from grace, and also because rewards are given over and above what human merits require, as we learn from Romans 6:23: "the grace of God, life everlasting."

Among such gifts, some exceed the capacity of human nature and are not given for merits. However, the fact that a man has these gifts does not prove that he is thereby rendered pleasing to God. Examples are the gifts of prophecy, of working miracles, of knowledge, of teaching, or any other such gifts divinely conferred.

By these and like gifts man is not united to God, except, perhaps, by a certain similarity, so far as he shares to some extent in His goodness; but everything is assimilated to God in this way. Yet some gifts do render man pleasing to God and join man to Him.

Such gifts are called graces, not only because they are given gratis but also because they make man pleasing to God.

The union of man with God is twofold. One way is by affection, and this is brought about by charity, which in a certain sense makes man one with God in affection, as is said in 1 Corinthians 6:17:

"He who is joined to the Lord is one spirit." Through this virtue

Aquinas's Shorter Summa God dwells in man, according to John 14:23: "If anyone love me, he will keep my word, and my Father will love him, and we will come to him and will make our abode with him." It also causes man to be in God, according to 1 John 4:16: "He that abideth in charity abideth in God, and God in him." By receiving this gratuitous gift, therefore, man is made pleasing to God and is brought so far that by the love of charity he becomes one spirit with God: he is in God and God is in him. Hence in 1 Corinthians 13:1-3, the Apostle teaches that without charity the other gifts do not profit men: they cannot make men pleasing to God unless charity is present.

This grace is common to the saints. So the man Christ, when asking for this grace for His disciples in prayer, begs: "That they may be one," namely, by the bond of love, "as we also are one.""™

There is another conjunction of man with God that is brought about, not only by affection or inhabitation, but also by the unity of hypostasis or person, so that one and the same hypostasis or person is both God and man. And this conjunction of man with God is proper to Jesus Christ. We have already spoken at length of this union."® In truth, this is a singular grace of the man Christ, that He is united to God in unity of person. Clearly the grace was given gratis, for it exceeds the capacity of nature, and besides, there were no merits to precede this gift. But this grace also makes

Him supremely pleasing to God, so that the Father says of Him in a totally unique sense: "This is my beloved Son, in whom | am well pleased.""™ The difference between these two graces seems to be as follows.

The grace whereby man is united to God by affection exists in the soul as something habitual, for that union is accomplished through 202 ohn 17:22.

263Cf chap. 211.

264 Matt. 3:17; 17:5.

Christ's Incarnation an act of love, and perfect acts issue from habit; consequently some habitual grace is infused into the soul to produce that eminently perfect habit whereby the soul is united to God by love. On the other hand, personal or hypostatic being is constituted, not by any habit, but by the natures to which the hypostases or persons pertain. Therefore the union of human nature with God in unity of person is brought about, not by some habitual grace, but by the conjunction of the natures themselves in one person.

The closer any creature draws to God, the more it shares in His goodness and the more abundantly it is filled with gifts infused by Him. Thus he who comes closer to a fire shares to a greater extent in its heat. But there can be no way, nor can any be imagined, by which a creature more closely adheres to God than by being united to Him in unity of person. Therefore, in consequence of the very union of His human nature with God in unity of person, Christ's soul was filled with habitual gifts of graces beyond all other souls.

And so habitual grace in Christ is not a disposition for union, but is rather an effect of union.

This appears clearly in the very way of speaking used by the Evangelist when he says, in words previously quoted: "We saw

[Him as it were] the only begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth." The man Christ is, indeed, the only-begotten of the Father, inasmuch as the Word was made flesh. The very fact that the Word was made flesh entailed the consequence that He was full of grace and truth. But among things that are filled with any goodness or perfection, the one from which goodness or perfection flows out upon other things is found to be filled to greater repletion

(for example, what can shed light on other objects, shines more brilliantly than they). Therefore, since the man Christ possessed

265 ohn 1:14.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa supreme fullness of grace, as being the only-begotten of the Father, erace overflowed from Him to others, so that the Son of God, made man, might make men gods and sons of God, according to the Apostle's words in Galatians 4:4-5: "God sent His Son, made of a woman, made under the Law, that He might redeem them who were under the Law: that we might receive the adoption of sons."

Because of the fact that grace and truth come to others from Christ, it is fitting that He should be the head of the Church.

Sensation and movement are, in a way, conveyed from the head to the other members that are conformed to the head in nature. In like manner grace and truth are conveyed from Christ to other men. Hence we are told in Ephesians 1:22f., that God "hath made

Him head over all the Church, which is His body." Christ is not the head of men alone; He can also be called the head of the angels, at least with respect to His excellence and influence, if not with respect to conformity of nature in the same species. This is why, before the words just quoted, the Apostle says that God set

Him, namely Christ, "on His right hand in the heavenly places, above all principality and power and virtue and dominion."

In accord with this doctrine, a threefold grace is usually pointed out in Christ. The first is the grace of union, whereby the human nature, with no merits preceding, received the gift of being united in person to the Son of God. The second is the singular grace whereby the soul of Christ was filled with grace and truth beyond all other souls. The third is the grace of being head, in virtue of which grace flows from Him to others. The Evangelist presents these three kinds of grace in due order." Regarding the grace of union he says: "The Word was made flesh." Regarding Christ's singular grace he says: "We saw [Him as it were] the only begotten

266 Iohn 1:14, 16.

Christ's Incarnation of the Father, full of grace and truth." Regarding the grace of being head, he adds: "And of His fullness we all have received."

L106 The infinitude of Christ's grace The possession of infinite grace is restricted to Christ. According to the testimony of John the Baptist, "God doth not give the Spirit by measure" to the man Christ."® But to others the Spirit is given in measure, as we read in Ephesians 4:7: "To everyone of us is given grace according to the measure of the giving of Christ." If this refers to the grace of union, no doubt can arise about what is here stated.

To other saints is given the grace of being gods or sons of God by participation, through the infusion of some gift. Such a gift, being created, must itself be finite, just as all other creatures are. To Christ, on the contrary, is given, in His human nature, the grace to be the Son of God not by participation but by nature. But natural divinity is infinite. Through that union, therefore, He received an infinite gift. Hence beyond all doubt the grace of union is infinite.

Concerning habitual grace, however, a doubt can be raised as to whether it is infinite. Since such grace is a created gift, we have to acknowledge that it has a finite essence. Yet it can be said to be infinite for three reasons.

First, on the part of the recipient. The capacity of any created nature is evidently finite. Even though it is able to receive an infinite good by way of knowledge and fruition, it does not receive that good infinitely. Each creature has a definite measure of capacity in keeping with its species and nature. This does not prevent the divine power from being able to make another creature with a 267 ohn 1:16.

268 Tohn 3:34.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa greater capacity; but such a creature would no longer be of the same nature with regard to species. Thus if one is added to three, a different species of number will result. Consequently, when the divine goodness that is bestowed on anyone does not completely exhaust the natural capacity of his nature, we judge that what is given to him has been apportioned according to some measure.

But when the whole of his natural capacity is filled up, we conclude that what he receives is not parceled out to him according to measure. For although there is a measure on the part of the recipient, there is no measure on the part of the giver, who is ready to give all; if a person, for instance, takes a pitcher down to the river, he finds water at hand without measure, although he himself receives with measure because of the limited size of the vessel. In this way Christ's habitual grace is finite in its essence, but may be said to be given infinitely and not according to measure, because as much is given as created nature is able to receive.

Secondly, grace may be said to be infinite on the part of the gift itself that is received. Surely we realize that there is nothing to prevent a thing that is finite in its essence, from being infinite by reason of some form. Infinite according to essence is that which possesses the whole fullness of being; this, of course, is proper to God alone, who is being itself. But if we suppose that there is some particular form not existing in a subject (e.g., whiteness or heat), it would not, indeed, have an infinite essence, for its essence would be confined to a genus or species; but it would possess the entire fullness of that species. With respect to the species in question, it would be without limit or measure because it would have whatever could pertain to that species. But if whiteness or heat is received into some subject, the latter does not always possess everything that necessarily and invariably pertains to the nature of that form, but does so only when the form is possessed as perfectly as it can be (i.e., when the manner of possessing is equal to the thing's

Christ's Incarnation capacity for being possessed). In this way, then, Christ's habitual grace was finite in its essence, but is said to have been without limit and measure because Christ received all that could pertain to the nature of grace. Other men do not receive the whole: one man receives grace in this measure, another in that. "There are diversities of grace," as we learn from 1 Corinthians 12:4.

In the third place, grace may be called infinite on the part of its cause. For in a cause is contained, in some way, its effect. Therefore, if a cause with infinite power to influence is at hand, it is able to influence without measure and, in a certain sense, infinitely; for example, if a person had a fountain capable of pouring forth water infinitely, he could be said to possess water without measure and, in a sense, infinitely. In this way Christ's soul has grace that is infinite and without measure, owing to the fact that it possesses, as united to itself, the Word who is the inexhaustible and infinite principle of every emanation of creatures.

From the fact that the singular grace of Christ's soul is infinite in the ways described, we readily infer that the grace which is His as head of the Church is also infinite. For the very reason that He possesses it, He pours it forth. And since He has received the gifts of the Spirit without measure, He has the power of pouring forth without measure all that pertains to the grace of the head, so that His grace is sufficient for the salvation — not of some men only — but of the whole world, according to 1 John 2:2: "And He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but also for those of the whole world"; and, we may add, of many worlds, if such existed.

The fullness of Christ's wisdom We treat next of the fullness of wisdom in Christ. In this matter, the first point that comes up for consideration is the truth that since

Aquinas's Shorter Summa Christ has two natures, the divine and the human, whatever pertains to both natures must be twofold in Christ, as was stated above." But wisdom appertains to both the divine nature and the human nature. The assertion of Job 9:4: "He is wise in heart and mighty in strength," is spoken of God. At times Scripture also calls men wise, whether with reference to worldly wisdom, as in Jeremiah 9:23: "Let not the wise man glory in his wisdom," or with reference to divine wisdom, as in Matthew 23:34: "Behold, I send to you prophets and wise men and scribes."""° Hence we must acknowledge a twofold wisdom in Christ, conformably with His two natures: uncreated wisdom, which pertains to Him as God, and created wisdom, which pertains to Him as man.

Inasmuch as Christ is God and the Word of God, He is the begotten Wisdom of the Father, as 1 Corinthians 1:24 indicates:

"Christ the power of God and the wisdom of God." For the interior word of any intellectual being is nothing else than the conception of wisdom. And since, as we said above,' the Word of God is perfect and is one with God, He must be the perfect conception of the wisdom of God the Father.

Consequently, whatever is contained in the wisdom of God the Father as unbegotten is contained wholly in the Word as begotten and conceived. And so we are told, in Colossians 2:3, that in Him

(namely, in Christ), "are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge."

Indeed, even as man, Christ has a twofold knowledge. The one is godlike, whereby He sees God in His essence and other things in God (just as God Himself, by knowing Himself, knows all other things). Through this vision God Himself is happy, as is every

EO GE chap. 212.

270RSV: Matt. 23:33.

271C£. chaps. 41, 43, 52.

Christ's Incarnation rational creature admitted to the perfect fruition of God. Thus, since we hold that Christ is the author of man's salvation, we must also hold that such knowledge as befits the author of salvation pertains to the soul of Christ.

But a principle must be immovable and must also be preeminent in power. Hence that vision of God in which men's beatitude and eternal salvation consist, ought to be found to be more excellent in Christ than in others, and, indeed, ought to be found in Him as in an immovable principle.

The difference between what is movable and what is immovable comes to this: movable things, so far as they are movable, do not possess their proper perfection from the beginning, but acquire it in the course of time; but immovable things, as such, always possess their perfections from the first moment of their existence.

Accordingly, Christ, the author of man's salvation, should rightly have possessed the full vision of God from the very beginning of His Incarnation; propriety would not allow Him to have attained to it in the course of time, as other saints do.

It was also appropriate that that soul which was united to God more closely than all others should be beatified by the vision of God beyond the rest of creatures. Gradation is possible in this vision, according as some see God, the cause of all things, more clearly than others.

The more comprehensively a cause is known, the more numerous are the effects that can be discerned in it. For a more perfect knowledge of a cause entails a fuller knowledge of its power, and there can be no knowledge of this power without a knowledge of its effects, since the magnitude of a power is ordinarily gauged from its effects.

This is why, among those who behold the essence of God, some perceive more effects in God Himself or more exemplars of the divine works than do others who see less clearly. It is because of

Aquinas's Shorter Summa this fact that lower angels are instructed by higher angels, as we have previously observed.'

Accordingly, the soul of Christ, possessing the highest perfection of the divine vision among all creatures, clearly beholds in God Himself all the divine works and the exemplars of all things that are, will be, or have been; and so He enlightens not only men, but also the highest of the angels. Hence the Apostle says, in Colossians 2:3, that in Christ "are hid all the treasures of wisdom and knowledge" of God; and in Hebrews 4:13 he points out that "all things are naked and open to His eyes."

Of course the soul of Christ cannot attain to a comprehension of the divinity. For, as we said above,'" a thing is comprehended by knowledge when it is known to the full extent that it is knowable. Any object is knowable to the degree that it is a being and is true; but the divine being is infinite, as likewise is its truth.

Therefore God is infinitely knowable. But no creature can know infinitely, even if what it knows is infinite. Hence no creature can comprehend God by seeing Him. But Christ's soul is a creature, and whatever in Christ pertains exclusively to His human nature is created. Otherwise the nature of Christ's humanity would not differ from the nature of His divinity, which alone is uncreated.

However, the hypostasis or person of the Word of God, which is one in two natures, is uncreated. For this reason we do not call

Christ a creature, speaking absolutely, because the hypostasis is connoted by the name of Christ. But we do say that the soul of Christ or the body of Christ is a creature. Therefore Christ's soul does not comprehend God, but Christ comprehends God by His uncreated wisdom. Our Lord had this uncreated wisdom in mind when, speaking of His knowledge of comprehension, He said in ALY ay chap. 126.

23.C£ chap. 106.

Christ's Incarnation Matthew 11:27: "No one knoweth the Son but the Father; neither doth anyone know the Father but the Son."

In this respect we note that comprehension of a thing's essence and comprehension of its power are of the same nature; a thing is able to act so far as it is a being in act. Therefore, if Christ's soul is incapable of comprehending the essence of the divinity, as we have shown is the case, it cannot comprehend the divine power.

But it would comprehend the divine power if it knew all that God is able to accomplish and the ways in which He can produce

His effects. But this is impossible. Therefore Christ's soul does not know all that God can do, nor all the modes of activity open to Him.

However, since Christ, even as man, is placed by God the Father over every creature, it is fitting that in His vision of the divine essence He should perceive with full knowledge all things that in any way have been wrought by God. In this sense the soul of Christ is said to be omniscient, for it has complete knowledge of all things that are, will be, or have been. Among the other creatures that see God, some enjoy, in their vision of God, a more perfect knowledge, others a less perfect knowledge, of these effects.

In addition to this knowledge, whereby things are known by the created intellect in the vision of the divine essence itself, there are other kinds of cognition by which a knowledge of things comes to creatures. The angels, besides "morning" knowledge, whereby they know things in the Word, also have "evening" knowledge, whereby they know things in their proper natures.""4

This kind of knowledge pertains to men in one way, in keeping with their nature, and to angels in another way. For men, consistent with the order of nature, derive the intelligible truth of things

274See the Summa, la, q. 58, a. 6; St Augustine, De Genesi ad litteram, IV,

22-24 (PL, XXXIV, 312f.).

Aquinas's Shorter Summa from their senses, as Dionysius observes,"" in such a way that the intelligible species in their intellects are abstracted from phantasms under the action of the agent intellect.

But angels acquire knowledge of things through an influx of divine light. In the same way that things themselves come forth into being from God, representations or likenesses of things are imprinted on the angelic intellect by God. In men and angels alike, however, over and above the knowledge of things they have by nature, there is found a certain supernatural knowledge of divine mysteries, about which angels are enlightened by angels, and men, for their part, are instructed by prophetic Revelation.

Accordingly, since no perfection vouchsafed to creatures may be withheld from Christ's soul, which is the most excellent of creatures, a threefold knowledge is fittingly to be attributed to Him, in addition to the knowledge whereby He beholds the essence of God and all things in that essence.

One kind of knowledge is experimental, as in other men, so far as Christ knew some things through the senses, in keeping with His human nature. A second kind of knowiedge is divinely infused, granted to Christ so that He might know all truths to which man's natural knowledge extends or can extend. The human nature assumed by the Word of God ought not to have been lacking in any perfection whatever, since through it the whole of human nature was to be restored. But everything that exists in potency is imperfect before it is reduced to act. Therefore the human intellect is in potency to the intelligibles which man can know naturally. Hence the soul of Christ received knowledge of all such objects through species divinely infused: the entire potency of His human intellect was reduced to act.

Be: divinis nominibus, VII, 3 (PG, Ill, 885); cf. St Thomas, Expositio super Dionysium de divinis nominibus, lect. VII (ed. Mandonnet, II, 374).

Christ's Incarnation Furthermore, since Christ in His human nature was not only the restorer of our nature, but was also the fountainhead of grace,

He was endowed with a third kind of knowledge whereby He knew most perfectly all that can pertain to the mysteries of grace, which transcend man's natural knowledge, although they are known by men through the gift of wisdom or through the spirit of prophecy.

The human intellect is in potency with regard to the acquisition of such knowledge, even though an agency belonging to a higher sphere is required to reduce it to act. When there is question of knowing natural things, the mind is reduced to act by the light of the agent intellect; but it acquires knowledge of these mysteries through divine light.

This discussion clearly shows that the soul of Christ reached the highest degree of knowledge among all creatures as regards the vision of God, whereby the essence of God is seen, and other things in it. The same is true as regards knowledge of the mysteries and also as regards knowledge of things naturally knowable. Consequently Christ could not advance in any of these three kinds of knowledge.

But obviously He knew sensible things more and more perfectly with the passing of time, as He gained experience of them through the bodily senses. Therefore Christ could advance only with respect to experimental knowledge. That He actually did so we learn from Luke 2:52: the boy "advanced in wisdom and age."

However, this can also be understood in another way, so that Christ's increase of wisdom would mean, not that He Himself became wiser, but that wisdom increased in others, in the sense that they were more and more instructed by His wisdom.

This was done for a good reason: that He might show that He was like other men. If He had made a display of His perfect wisdom at a tender age, the mystery of the Incarnation might well have seemed phantastic.

Aquinas's Shorter Summa SAME The matter of Christ's body The foregoing exposition clearly indicates the way the formation of Christ's body ought to have taken place. God could, indeed, have fashioned Christ's body from the dust of the Earth or from any other matter, in the way He fashioned the body of our first parent. But this would not have been in keeping with the restoration of man, which is the reason why the Son of God assumed flesh, as we have pointed out.' The nature of the human race, which was derived from the first parent and which was to be healed, would not have been so well restored to its pristine honor if the victor over the Devil and the conqueror of death, under which the human race was held captive because of the sin of the first father, had taken

His body from some other source. The works of God are perfect, and what He means to restore He brings to perfection. He even adds more than had been taken away: through Christ the grace of God has abounded more than the offense of Adam, as the Apostle teaches." '' Hence it was fitting that the Son of God should assume a body from the nature propagated by Adam.

Moreover, the mystery of the Incarnation becomes profitable to men by faith. Unless men believed that He who appeared in the guise of a man was the Son of God, they would not follow Him as the author of salvation. This was the case with the Jews, who drew upon themselves damnation rather than salvation from the mystery of the Incarnation, because of their unbelief. In order, therefore, that this ineffable mystery might more readily be believed, the Son of God disposed all things in such a way as to show that He was a true man. This would not have seemed to be so if He had

276CE£. chap. 200.

?™ Romans 5:15, 20.

Christ's Incarnation taken His bodily nature from some other source than from human. nature. Fittingly, therefore, He assumed a body stemming from the first parent.

Furthermore, the Son of God, made man, brought salvation to the human race, not only by conferring the remedy of grace but also by giving an example that cannot be ignored. Doubts may be raised about the teaching and the life of any other man because of a defect in his human knowledge and his mastery of truth. But what the Son of God teaches is believed without hesitation to be true and what He does is accepted without misgiving as good. In Him we ought to have an example of the glory we hope for and of the virtue whereby we may merit it. In both instances the example would have been less telling if He had taken His bodily nature from another source than that from which the rest of men receive theirs.

Otherwise, if we tried to persuade a man that he should endure sufferings as Christ endured them, and that he should hope to rise as Christ rose, he could allege as an excuse the different condition of his body. Therefore, to give greater effectiveness to His example,

Christ ought to have assumed His bodily nature from no other source than from the nature that comes down from the first parent.

The formation of Christ's body Nevertheless the body of Christ could not becomingly have been fashioned in human nature in the same way as the bodies of other men are formed. Since He assumed this nature for the purpose of cleansing it from sin, He ought to have assumed it in such a way that He would incur no contagion of sin. Men incur Original Sin by the fact that they are begotten through the active human power residing in the male seed. This implies pre-existence, according to seminal principle, in Adam the sinner. Just as the first man would

Aquinas's Shorter Summa have transmitted Original Justice to his posterity along with the transmission of nature, so he actually transmitted Original Sin by transmitting nature; and this is brought about by the active power of the male seed. Hence the body of Christ ought to have been formed without male seed.

Moreover, the active power of the male seed operates naturally, and so man, who is begotten of male seed, is brought to perfection, not at once, but by definite processes. For all natural things advance to fixed ends through fixed intermediary stages. But Christ's body ought to have been perfect and informed by a rational soul at its very assumption; for a body is capable of being assumed by the Word of God so far as it is united to a rational soul, even though it was not at first perfect with regard to its full measure of quantity. Accordingly, the body of Christ ought not to have been formed through the power of the male seed.

The cause of the formation of Christ's body Since the formation of the human body is naturally effected by the male seed, any other way of fashioning the body of Christ was above nature. God alone is the author of nature, and He works supernaturally in natural things, as was remarked above."'® Hence we conclude that God alone miraculously formed that body from matter supplied by human nature. However, although every action of God in creation is common to the three divine persons, the formation of Christ's body is, by a certain appropriation, attributed to the Holy Spirit. For the Holy Spirit is the love of the Father and the Son, who love each other and us in Him. Since God decreed that 278CE£. chaps. 96, 136.

Christ's Incarnation His Son should become incarnate because of "His exceeding charity wherewith He loved us," as the Apostle says in Ephesians 2:4, the formation of Christ's flesh is fittingly ascribed to the Holy

Spirit.

Besides, the Holy Spirit is the author of all grace, since He is the first in whom all gifts are given gratis. But the taking up of human nature into the unity of a divine person was a communication of superabundant grace, as is clear from what was shown above." Accordingly, to emphasize the greatness of this grace, the formation of Christ's body is attributed to the Holy Spirit.

Another reason for the appropriateness of this teaching is the relationship between the human word and spirit. The human word, as existing in the heart, bears a resemblance to the eternal

Word as existing in the Father. And as the human word takes voice that it may become sensibly perceptible to men, so the Word of God took flesh that it might appear visibly to men. But the human voice is formed by man's breath or spirit. In the same way the flesh of the Word of God ought to have been formed by the Spirit of the Word.

279C£. chaps. 214, 215. ial

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