The Purpose of Man
The Purpose of Man
Finality of God's creative activity We showed above that God has brought things into existence, not through any necessity of His nature, but by His intellect and will."
Any agent that works in this way, acts for an end: the end is a principle for the operative intellect. Accordingly, everything that is made by God necessarily exists for an end.
Moreover, things were produced by God in a supremely excellent way; for the most perfect Being does everything in the most perfect way. But it is better for a thing to be made for an end than to be made without the intention of achieving an end; for the goodness that is in things which are made comes from their end.
Hence things were made by God for an end.
An indication of this is seen in effects produced by nature.
None of them is in vain, all are for an end. But it is absurd to say that things produced by nature are in better order than is the very constituting of nature by the first Agent, since the entire order of 109C£ chap. 96.
Aquinas's Shorter Summa nature is derived from the latter. Clearly, therefore, things produced by God exist for an end.
The divine goodness as the ultimate end The ultimate end of things is necessarily the divine goodness. For the ultimate end of things produced by one who works through his will is that which is chiefly and for its own sake willed by the agent.
It is for this that the agent does all that he does. But the first object willed by the divine will is God's goodness, as is clear from a previous discussion.''' Hence the ultimate end of all things made by God must necessarily be the divine goodness.
Furthermore, the end of the generation of everything that is generated is its form. Once this is achieved, generation ceases. For everything that is generated, whether by art or by nature, is in some way rendered similar to the agent in virtue of its form, since every agent produces an effect that has some resemblance to the agent himself. Thus the house that is realized in matter proceeds from the house existing ideally in the mind of the architect. In the realm of nature, likewise, man begets man. And if anything that is generated or effected by natural processes is not like its generating cause according to species, it is at any rate likened to its efficient causes as imperfect to perfect. The fact that a generated product is not assimilated to its generating cause according to species, is explained by its inability to rise to perfect likeness with its cause; but it does participate in that cause to some extent, however imperfectly. This occurs, for example, in animals and plants that are generated by the power of the sun. Hence in all things that are
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The Purpose of Man made, the end of their generation or production is the form of their maker or generator, in the sense that they are to achieve a likeness of that form. But the form of the first agent, who is God, is nothing else than His goodness. This, then, is the reason why all things were made: that they might be assimilated to the divine goodness.
The reason for diversity in things This enables us to grasp the reason for diversity and distinction in things. Since the divine goodness could not be adequately represented by one creature alone, on account of the distance that separates each creature from God, it had to be represented by many creatures, so that what is lacking to one might be supplied by another. Even in syllogistic conclusions, when the conclusion is not sufficiently demonstrated by one means of proof, the means must be multiplied in order to make the conclusion clear, as happens in dialectic syllogisms.''' Of course, not even the entire universe of creatures perfectly represents the divine goodness by setting it forth adequately, but represents it only in the measure of perfection possible to creatures.
Moreover, a perfection existing in a universal cause simply and in a unified manner, is found to be multiple and discrete in the effects of that cause. For a perfection has a nobler existence in a cause than in its effects. But the divine goodness is one, and is the simple principle and root of all the goodness found in creatures.
Hence creatures must be assimilated to the divine goodness in the way that many and distinct objects are assimilated to what is one and simple. Therefore multiplicity and distinction occur in things
111 4 dialectic syllogism is one in which the means of demonstration do not exceed probability, as St. Thomas explains in Post. Anal., I, lect. 1.
Aquinas's Shorter Summa not by chance or fortune but for an end, just as the production of things is not the result of chance or fortune, but is for an end. For existence, unity, and multiplicity in things all come from the same principle.
The distinction among things is not caused by matter; for things were originally constituted in being by creation, which does not require any matter. Moreover, things which issue purely from the necessity of matter have the appearance of being fortuitous.
Furthermore, multiplicity in things is not explained by the order obtaining among intermediate agents, as though from one simple first being there could proceed directly only one thing that would be far removed from the first being in simplicity, so that multitude could issue from it, and thus, as the distance from the first simple being increased, the more numerous a multitude would be discerned. Some have suggested this explanation.''" But we have shown!" that there are many things that could not have come into being except by creation, which is exclusively the work of God, as has been proved.''* Hence we conclude that many things have been created directly by God Himself. It is likewise evident that, according to the view under criticism, the multiplicity and distinction among things would be fortuitous, as not being intended by the first agent. Actually, however, the multiplicity and distinction existing among things were devised by the divine intellect and were carried out in the real order so that the divine goodness might be mirrored by created things in variety, and that different things might participate in the divine goodness in varying degree. Thus, the very order existing among diverse things
'l2Thus Avicenna, Metaph., IX, 4 (104VA). Cf. Contra Gent., II, 42.
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The Purpose of Man issues in a certain beauty, which should call to mind the divine wisdom.
The divine goodness as the end of action and movement in creatures The divine goodness is not only the end of the creation of things; it must also be the end of every operation and movement of any creature whatever. The action of every being corresponds to its nature. For example, what is hot, causes heat. But every created thing has, in keeping with its form, some participated likeness to the divine goodness, as we have pointed out." Therefore, too, all actions and movements of every creature are directed to the divine goodness as their end.
Besides, all movements and operations of every being are seen to tend to what is perfect. Perfect signifies what is good, since the perfection of anything is its goodness. Hence every movement and action of anything whatever tends toward good. But all good is a certain imitation of the supreme Good, just as all being is an imitation of the first Being. Therefore the movements and actions of all things tend toward assimilation with the divine goodness.
Moreover, if there are many agents arranged in order, the actions and movements of all the agents must be directed to the good of the first agent as to their ultimate end. For lower agents are moved by the higher agent, and every mover moves in the direction of his own end.
Consequently the actions and movements of lower agents must tend toward the end of the first agent. Thus, in an army the actions of all the subordinate units are directed, in the last instance, to 1I5C£ chap. 102.
Aquinas's Shorter Summa victory, which is the end intended by the commander-in-chief. But we showed above that the first mover and agent is God, and that His end is nothing else than His goodness.''® Therefore all the actions and movements of all creatures exist because of the divine goodness, not, of course, in the sense that they are to cause or increase it, but in the sense that they are to acquire it in their own way by sharing to some extent ina likeness of it.
Created things attain to the divine likeness by their operations in different ways, as they also represent it in different ways conformably to their being. For each of them acts in a manner which corresponds to its being. Therefore, as all creatures in common represent the divine goodness to the extent that they exist, so by their actions they all in common attain to the divine likeness in the conservation of their being and in the communication of their being to others. For every creature endeavors, by its activity, first of all to keep itself in perfect being, so far as this is possible. In such endeavor it tends, in its own way, to an imitation of the divine permanence. Secondly, every creature strives, by its activity, to communicate its own perfect being, in its own fashion, to another; and in this it tends toward an imitation of the divine causality.
The rational creature tends, by its activity, toward the divine likeness in a special way that exceeds the capacities of all other creatures, as it also has a nobler existence as compared with other creatures. The existence of other creatures is finite, since it is hemmed in by matter, and so lacks infinity both in act and in potency. But every rational nature has infinity either in act or in potency, according to the way its intellect contains intelligibles.
Thus our intellectual nature, considered in its first state, is in potency to its intelligibles. Since these are infinite, they have a N6C£ chaps. 3, 101.
The Purpose of Man certain potential infinity. Hence the intellect is the species of species, because it has a species that is not determined to one thing alone, as is the case with a stone, but that has a capacity for all species. But the intellectual nature of God is infinite in act, for prior to every consideration it has within itself the perfection of all being, as was shown above.'!' Accordingly, intellectual creatures occupy a middle position between potency and act. By its activity, therefore, the intellectual creature tends toward the divine likeness, not only in the sense that it preserves itself in existence or that it multiplies its existence, in a way, by communicating it; it also has as its end the possession in act of what by nature it possesses in potency. Consequently the end of the intellectual creature, to be achieved by its activity, is the complete actuation of its intellect by all the intelligibles for which it has a potency. In this respect it will become most like to God.
The end of the intellectual creature A thing may be in potency in two ways: either naturally (that is, with respect to perfections that can be reduced to act by a natural agent) or else with respect to perfections that cannot be reduced to act by a natural agent but require some other agent. This is seen to take place even in corporeal beings. The boy grows up to be a man; the spermatozoon develops into an animal. This is within the power of nature. But that lumber becomes a bench or that a blind man receives sight, is not within the power of nature.
The same is the case with our minds. Our intellect has a natural potency with regard to certain intelligible objects, namely, those
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Aquinas's Shorter Summa that can be reduced to act by the agent intellect. We possess this faculty as an innate principle that enables us to understand in actuality. However, we cannot attain our ultimate end by the actuation of our intellect through the instrumentality of the agent intellect. For the function of the agent intellect consists in rendering actually intelligible the phantasms that of themselves are only potentially intelligible. This was explained above.''® These phantasms are derived from the senses. Hence the efficacy of the agent intellect in reducing our intellect to act is restricted to intelligible objects of which we can gain knowledge by way of sense perception. Man's last end cannot consist in such cognition.
The reason is that once the ultimate end has been reached, natural desire ceases. But no matter how much we may advance in this kind of understanding whereby we derive knowledge from the senses, there still remains a natural desire to know other objects.
For many things are quite beyond the reach of the senses. We can have but a slight knowledge of such things through information based on sense experience. We may get to know that they exist, but we cannot know what they are, for the natures of immaterial substances belong to a different genus from the natures of sensible things and excel them, we may say, beyond all proportion.
Moreover, as regards objects that fall under sense experience, there are many whose nature we cannot know with any certainty.
Some of them, indeed, elude our knowledge altogether; others we can know but vaguely. Hence our natural desire for more perfect knowledge ever remains. But a natural desire cannot be in vain.
Accordingly, we reach our last end when our intellect is actualized by some higher agent than an agent connatural to us, that is, by an agent capable of gratifying our natural, inborn craving for UBC chap. 83.
The Purpose of Man knowledge. So great is the desire for knowledge within us that, once we apprehend an effect, we wish to know its cause. Moreover, after we have gained some knowledge of the circumstances investing a thing, our desire is not satisfied until we penetrate to its essence. Therefore our natural desire for knowledge cannot come to rest within us until we know the first cause, and that not in any way, but in its very essence. This first cause is God. Consequently the ultimate end of an intellectual creature is the vision of God in His essence.
Knowledge of the divine essence by the created intellect The possibility of such knowledge must be investigated. Manifestly, since our intellect knows nothing except through an intelligible species of the thing known, the species of one thing cannot disclose the essence of another thing. In proportion as the species, whereby the mind knows, is remote from the thing known, the less perfect is the knowledge that our intellect has of that thing's essence. For example, if we should know an ox by the species of an ass, we would have an imperfect knowledge of the essence of the ox, for our concept would be limited to its genus. Our knowledge would be still more defective if we were to know the ox through the medium of a stone, because then we would know it by a more remote genus.
And if our knowledge were gained through the species of a thing that did not agree with the ox in any genus, we could not know the essence of the ox at all.
Previous discussion has brought out the fact that no creature is associated with God in genus.' " Hence the essence of God cannot
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Aquinas's Shorter Summa be known through any created species whatever, whether sensible or intelligible. Accordingly, if God is to be known as He is, in His essence, God Himself must become the form of the intellect knowing Him and must be joined to that intellect, not indeed so as to constitute a single nature with it but in the way an intelligible species is joined to the intelligence. For God, who is His own being, is also His own truth, and truth is the form of the intellect.
Whatever receives a form, must first acquire the disposition which is requisite to the reception of that form. Our intellect is not equipped by its nature with the ultimate disposition looking to that form which is truth; otherwise it would be in possession of truth from the beginning. Consequently, when it does finally attain to truth, it must be elevated by some disposition newly conferred on it. And this we call the light of glory, whereby our intellect is perfected by God, who alone by His very nature has this form properly as His own. In somewhat the same way the disposition which heat has for the form of fire can come from fire alone.
This is the light that is spoken of in Psalm 35:10: "In Thy light we shall see light."'"°
Fruition of natural desire in the Beatific Vision Once this end is reached, natural desire must find its full fruition.
The divine essence thus united to the intellect of the one who sees God, is the adequate principle for knowing everything, and is the source of all good, so that nothing can remain to be desired. This, too, is the most perfect way of attaining likeness with God: to know
God in the way He knows Himself, by His own essence.
120R evised Standard Version (RSV): Ps. 36:9.
The Purpose of Man Of course, we shall never comprehend Him as He comprehends Himself. This does not mean that we shall be unaware of some part of Him, for He has no parts. It means that we shall not know Him as perfectly as He can be known, since the capacity of our intellect for knowing cannot equal His truth and so cannot exhaust His knowability.
God's knowability or truth is infinite, whereas our intellect is finite. But His intellect is infinite, just as His truth is; and so He alone knows Himself to the full extent that He is knowable; just as a person comprehends a demonstrable conclusion if he knows it through demonstration but not if he knows it only in an imperfect way, on merely probable grounds.
This ultimate end of man we call beatitude. For a man's happiness or beatitude consists in the vision whereby he sees God in His essence. Of course, man is far below God in the perfection of his beatitude. For God has this beatitude by His very nature, whereas man attains beatitude by being admitted to a share in the divine light, as we said in the previous chapter.
Beatitude is essentially in the act of the intellect We should note that since advance from potency to act is motion, or at least is similar to motion, the process of arriving at beatitude has points of resemblance with natural motion or change. In natural motion we may consider, first, a certain property whereby the mobile object has a proportion to such and such an end, or is inclined in its direction. We observe this, for instance, in the Earth's gravity with respect to whatever is borne downward. No object would move naturally toward a definite end unless it had a proportion to that end. We may consider, secondly, the motion itself toward its end; thirdly, the form or place toward which there
Aquinas's Shorter Summa is motion; and fourthly, the repose in the form educed or in the place reached.
Similarly, with regard to intellectual movement toward an end, there is, first, the love inclining toward the end; secondly, the desire which is a sort of motion toward the end, and the actions issuing from such desire; thirdly, the form which the intellect receives; and fourthly, the resulting delight, which is nothing else than the repose of the will in the end as reached.
In the same way, the end of natural generation is a form and the end of local motion is a place. However, repose in a form or a place is not the end, but follows upon the attainment of the end; and much less does the end consist in motion or in proportion to the end. Likewise the ultimate end of an intellectual creature is the direct vision of God, but not delight in God. Such delight accompanies attainment of the end and, as it were, perfects it. Much less can desire or love be the ultimate end, because they are present even before the end is reached.
Good and Evil
The error of placing happiness in creatures Clearly, therefore, they are in error who seek happiness in various things outside of God. Some look for happiness in carnal pleasures, which are shared even by brute animals. Others seek happiness in wealth, which is rightly directed to the sustenance of those who have such possessions; this is an end common to every created being.
Others place their happiness in power, which is ordained to the communication of one's own perfection to others; this, too, we said,'"' is common to all beings. Yet others seek happiness in honors or reputation, which are due to a person because of the end he has already reached or because of the noble dispositions which equip him to reach an end. Finally, happiness does not consist in the knowledge of any created things whatever, even though they may be far above man; for man's desire comes to rest in the knowledge of God alone.
CE chap. 103.
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Aquinas's Shorter Summa
The essential goodness of God; the participated goodness of creatures All this brings to light the different relationship that God and creatures have to goodness. We may examine this difference from the standpoint of the two kinds of goodness discerned in creatures.
Since the good has the nature of perfection and of end, the twofold perfection and end of the creature disclose its twofold goodness. A certain perfection is observed in the creature inasmuch as it persists in its nature. This perfection is the end of its generation or formation. The creature has a further perfection which it reaches by its motion or activity. This perfection is the end of its movement or operation.
In both kinds of perfection the creature falls short of the divine goodness. The form and existence of a thing are its good and perfection when considered from the standpoint of the thing's nature. But a composite substance is neither its own form nor its own existence; and a simple substance, although it is its own form, is not its own existence. God, however, is His own essence and His own existence, as was shown above."
Likewise, all creatures receive their perfect goodness from an end extrinsic to them. For the perfection of goodness consists in attainment of the ultimate end. But the ultimate end of any creature is outside the creature. This end is the divine goodness, which is not ordained to any ulterior end. Consequently God is His own goodness in every way and is essentially good. This cannot be said of simple creatures, because they are not their own existence and also because they are ordained to something external as to their ultimate end. As for composite substances, clearly they are not 122C£ chaps. 10, 11.
Good and Evil their own goodness in any way. Hence God alone is His own goodness and He alone is essentially good. All other beings are said to be good according as they participate, to some extent, in Him.
God's goodness is incapable of being lost The foregoing account clearly shows that God cannot in any way be deficient in goodness. For what is essential to a being cannot be lacking. Animality, for instance, cannot be dissociated from man.
Hence it is impossible for God not to be good. We can use a more appropriate example to illustrate this: as it is impossible for a man not to be a man, so it is impossible for God not to be perfectly good.
11] Insecurity of the creature's goodness Let us consider how goodness may be wanting in creatures. In two respects goodness is clearly inseparable from the creature: first, goodness pertains to the creature's very essence; secondly, the creature's goodness is something determinate.
As regards the first point, the goodness which is the form of simple substances is inseparable from them, since they are essentially forms. As regards the second point, such substances cannot lose the good which is existence. For form is not like matter, which is indifferent to existence and non-existence. On the contrary, form goes with existence, even though it is not existence itself.
Therefore simple substances cannot lose the good of nature wherein they subsist, but are immutably established in such good.
But composite substances, which are neither their own forms nor their own existence, possess the good of nature in such a way that they can lose it. This is not true, however, of those things whose
Aquinas's Shorter Summa matter is not in potency to various forms or not in potency to being and non-being. Such is the case with heavenly bodies.
BP Defectibility of the creature's goodness in activity The goodness of a creature may also be regarded otherwise than as the creature's subsistence in its nature; for the perfection of its goodness is realized in its destiny to its end. And since creatures are to attain their end by their activity, we have still to inquire how creatures may be lacking in goodness from the point of view of their actions, whereby they are destined to attain their end.
In this connection we should first note that a judgment concerning natural operations is equivalent to a judgment concerning the nature which is the principle of these operations. Therefore in beings whose nature cannot suffer defect, no defect in natural operations can develop; but in beings whose nature can admit of defect, a defect in activity can occur.
Thus in incorruptible substances (incorporeal or corporeal) no defect in natural activity can take place. Thus angels forever retain their natural power of exercising their proper activity. Likewise the movements of heavenly bodies never leave their appointed orbits.
But in lower bodies many defects in natural activity result from the corruptions and defects incidental to their natures. Thus from a defect in some natural principle come the sterility of plants, monstrosities in the generation of animals, and other such disorders. ile The twofold principle of activity and the possibility of defect therein
There are certain actions whose principle is not nature but the will.
The object of the will is the good, which consists primarily in the
Good and Evil end and secondarily in whatever leads to the end. Voluntary action is related to the good as natural action is related to the form by whicha thing acts. Consequently, just as a defect in natural activity cannot ensue in things that do not admit of defect in their forms, but can occur only in corruptible things whose forms are defectible, so voluntary actions can be deficient only in beings whose will can deflect from their proper end. Hence, if the will cannot deflect from its proper end, deficiency in voluntary action is clearly impossible.
The will cannot be deficient with regard to the good which is the very nature of the being that wills; for every being seeks in its own way its perfection, which is each one's good. But as regards an external good the will can be deficient, by resting content with a good connatural to it. Therefore if the nature of the being that wills is the ultimate end of its will, no deficiency in voluntary action can arise.
Such is the case with God alone. For His goodness, which is the ultimate end of things, is His very nature. But the nature of other beings endowed with will is not the ultimate end of their will.
Hence a defect in voluntary action can occur in them, if their will remains fixed on their own good and does not push on to the supreme good, which is the last end. Therefore in all created intellectual substances a deficiency in voluntary action is possible.
The meaning of good and evil in things A question worthy of consideration arises at this point. As the term good signifies "perfect being," so the term evil signifies nothing else than "privation of perfect being." In its proper acceptance, privation is predicated of that which is fitted by its nature to be possessed, and to be possessed at a certain time and in a certain manner. Evidently, therefore, a thing is called evil if it lacks a
Aquinas's Shorter Summa perfection it ought to have. Thus if a man lacks the sense of sight, this is an evil for him. But the same lack is not an evil for a stone, for the stone is not equipped by nature to have the faculty of sight.
HES) Impossibility of an evil nature Evil cannot be a nature. Every nature is either act or potency or a composite of the two. Whatever is act, is a perfection and is good in its very concept. And what is in potency has a natural appetite for the reception of act. But what all beings desire is good. Therefore, too, what is composed of act and potency participates in goodness to the extent that it participates in act. And potency possesses goodness inasmuch as it is ordained to act. An indication of this is the fact that potency is esteemed in proportion to its capacity for act and perfection. Thus, no nature is of itself an evil.
Likewise, every being achieves its fulfillment according as it is realized in act, for act is the perfection of a thing. However, neither of a pair of opposites achieves fulfillment by being mixed with the other, but is rather destroyed or weakened thereby. Therefore evil does not realize its full capacity by sharing in good. But every nature realizes its full capacity by having existence in act; and so, since to be good is the object of every being's natural tendency, a nature achieves fulfillment by participating in good. Accordingly, no nature is an evil.
Moreover, any nature whatever desires the preservation of its being and shuns destruction to the full extent of its power. Consequently, since good is that which all desire, and evil, on the contrary, is that which all shun, we must conclude that for any nature existence is in itself good, and non-existence is evil. To be evil, however, is not good; in fact, not to be evil is included in the notion of good. Therefore no nature is an evil.
Good and Evil
Good and evil as specific differences and as contraries We have next to inquire how good and evil may be regarded as contraries, genera of contraries, and differences constituting species of a sort (namely, moral habits). Each member of a pair of contraries is some kind of nature. For non-being can be neither genus nor specific difference, since genus is predicated of a thing according to what it is (in eo quod quid) and difference according to what sort of thing it is (in eo quod quale quid).
We must note that, as physical entities receive their species from their form, so moral entities receive their species from the end which is the object of the will and on which all morality depends. In physical entities, moreover, the presence of one form entails the privation of another, as, for instance, the form of fire entails the privation of the form of air. In moral entities, similarly, one end involves the privation of another end. Since the privation of a due perfection is an evil in physical entities, the reception of a form which implies the privation of the form that ought to be possessed, is an evil — not, indeed, because of the form itself — but because of the privation its presence involves. In this sense, to be on fire is an evil for a log of wood.
In the field of morality, likewise, the pursuit of an end that entails the privation of the right end is an evil, not on account of the end itself but because of the privation necessarily implied. In this way two moral actions directed to contrary ends differ as good and evil. Thus the corresponding contrary habits differ in good and evil as by specific differences and as being contrary to each other.
This is so not because of the privation from which evil receives its designation, but because of the end which involves the privation.
This is the sense in which some philosophers have understood Aristotle's assertion that good and evil are actually genera of
Aquinas's Shorter Summa contraries'"° (namely, of moral contraries). But if we closely examine the matter, we shall find that in the sphere of morals, good and evil are differences rather than species. Hence it seems better to say that good and evil are called genera according to the opinion of Pythagoras, who reduced everything to good and evil as to supreme genera.' This position does, indeed, contain some truth, in the sense that in all contraries one member is perfect, whereas the other is deficient. This is clear in the case of white and black, sweet and bitter, and so on. But invariably, what is perfect pertains to good and what is deficient pertains to evil.
Impossibility of essential or supreme evil Knowing that evil is the privation of a due perfection, we can easily understand how evil corrupts good; this it does to the extent that it is the privation of good. Thus blindness is said to corrupt sight because it is the privation of sight. However, evil does not completely corrupt good, because, as we remarked above," not only form, but also potency to form, is good; and potency is the subject of privation as well as of form. Therefore the subject of evil must be good, not in the sense that it is opposed to evil but in the sense that it is a potency for the reception of evil. This brings out the fact that not every good can be the subject of evil, but only such a good as is in potency with respect to some perfection of which it can be deprived. Hence in beings which are exclusively act or in which act cannot be separated from potency, there can, to this extent, be no evil.
'23 Categories, XI (14 a 25).
'4CF Aristotle, Metaph., I, 5 (986 a 26).
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Good and Evil As a result, nothing can be essentially evil since evil must always have as its foundation some subject, distinct from it, that is good. And so there cannot be a being that is supremely evil in the way that there is a being that is supremely good (because it is essentially good).
Further, we see that evil cannot be the object of desire and that it cannot act except in virtue of the good connected with it. For only perfection and end are desirable; and the principle of action is form. However, since a particular perfection or form involves the privation of some other perfection or form, it can happen incidentally that privation or evil may be desired and may be the principle of some action — not precisely because of the evil, but because of the good connected with it. An example of what I mean by incidentally is the musician who constructs a house, not in his capacity of musician, but in the capacity of being also a builder.
From this we may also infer that evil cannot be a first principle, for a principle per accidens is subsequent to a principle that is such per se.
Foundation of evil in good as its substratum Some may feel impelled to lodge a difficulty against this presentation: good cannot be the substratum of evil, for one of a pair of opposites cannot be the substratum of the other, nor do extremes ever exist together in other kinds of opposition. But let such quibblers reflect that other kinds of opposition belong to some definite genus, whereas good and evil are common to all genera.
Every being, as such, is good; and every privation, as such, is evil.
The substratum of a privation must be a being, hence good. But the subject of a privation need not be white or sweet or endowed with sight, because none of these predicates belongs to being as
Aquinas's Shorter Summa such. And so black is not in white, nor blindness in the person who sees; but evil is in good, just as blindness is in the sense that is the subject of sight. The reason why the subject of sight, in the case of a blind man, is not called seeing, is that seeing is not a predicate common to every being.
Two kinds of evil Since evil is privation and defect, and since defect, as is clear from what we said above, '"° can occur in a thing both as regarded in its nature and as regarded in its relation to an end by its action, we may speak of evil in both senses: that is, by reason of a defect in the thing itself (thus blindness is a certain evil in an animal), and by reason of a defect in a creature's action (thus lameness connotes action with a defect). Evil in an action that is directed to an end in such a way that it is not rightly related to the end, is called fault
(peccatum) both in voluntary agents and in natural agents. A physician is faulty (peccat) in his action, when he does not proceed in such a way as to procure health. Nature, too, is faulty in its activity when it fails to advance a generated being to its proper disposition and form; this is why monsters occur in nature.
Three kinds of action, and the evil of sin We should observe that sometimes action is in the power of the agent. Such are all voluntary actions. By voluntary action I mean an action that has its principle in an agent who is conscious of the 126C£ chaps. 111, 112.
Good and Evil various factors constituting his action. Sometimes actions are not voluntary. In this class are violent actions (whose principle is outside the agent), natural actions, and actions performed in ignorance. These do not proceed from a conscious principle. If a defect occurs in non-voluntary actions that are directed to an end, it is called simply a fault (peccatum). But if such a defect occurs in voluntary actions, it is called not only fault, but sin (culpa). For in this case the voluntary agent, being master of his own action, deservedly draws blame and punishment on himself. If actions are mixed, that is, are partly voluntary and partly involuntary, the sin is diminished in proportion to the admixture of the voluntary element.
Since natural action follows the nature of a being, a fault in natural activity clearly cannot occur in incorruptible things, for their nature is incapable of change. But the will of an intellectual creature can suffer defect in voluntary action, as has been shown above.'"' Consequently freedom from evil in nature is common to all incorruptible things. But freedom from the evil of sin in virtue of natural necessity — of which rational nature alone is capable
— is found to be an exclusive property of God.
The evil of punishment Just as defect in voluntary action constitutes fault and sin, so the withdrawing of some good, in consequence of sin, against the will of him on whom such privation is inflicted, has the character of punishment. Punishment is inflicted as a medicine that is corrective of the sin and also to restore right order violated by the sin.
27C£ chap. 113.
Aquinas's Shorter Summa Punishment functions as a medicine inasmuch as fear of punishment deters a man from sinning; that is, a person refrains from performing an inordinate action, which would be pleasing to his will, lest he have to suffer what is opposed to his will. Punishment also restores right order. By sinning, a man exceeds the limits of the natural order, indulging his will more than is right. Hence a return to the order of justice is effected by punishment, whereby some good is withdrawn from the sinner's will. As is quite clear, a suitable punishment is not assigned for the sin unless the punishment is more galling to the will than the sin was attractive to it.
1s Punishment variously opposed to the will Not all punishment is opposed to the will in the same way. Some punishments are opposed to what man actually wills; and this kind of punishment is felt most keenly. Some punishments are opposed not to the actual but to the habitual tendency of the will, as when a person is deprived of something (for instance, his son or his property) without his knowledge. In this case, nothing actually thwarts his will; but the withdrawal of the good would be against his will if he were aware of what was happening. At times a punishment is opposed to the will according to the very nature of that faculty. For the will is naturally turned to what is good. Thus if a person is lacking in a virtue, this need not always be opposed to his actual will, for he may, perhaps, despise this virtue; nor need it be against his habitual will, for he may, perhaps, have a habitual disposition of will toward what is contrary to the virtue. Nevertheless such a privation is opposed to the natural rectitude of the will, whereby man naturally desires virtue.
Consequently, as is evident, the degrees of punishment may be measured by two standards: first, by the quantity of the good of
Good and Evil which a man is deprived for his punishment; secondly, by the greater or less opposition it arouses in the will. For withdrawal of a greater good is more opposed to the will than withdrawal of a lesser good.
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