Creation from Nothing
Creation from Nothing
The effects produced by God After considering the truths which pertain to the unity of the divine essence and to the Trinity of persons, we turn to a study of the effects produced by the Trinity. The first effect wrought by God in things is existence itself, which all other effects presuppose and on which they are based. Anything that exists in any way must necessarily have its origin from God. In all things that are arranged in orderly fashion, we find universally that what is first and most perfect in any order is the cause of whatever follows in that order.
Thus fire, which is hot in the highest degree, is the cause of heat in all other heated bodies. Imperfect objects are always found to have their origin from perfect things. Seeds, for instance, come from animals and plants. But, as we proved above,
'° God is the first and most perfect Being. Therefore He must be the cause of being in all things that have being.
10 Cf. chaps. 3, 21.
Aquinas's Shorter Summa Again, whatever has some perfection by participation is traced back, as to its principle and cause, to what possesses that perfection essentially. Thus molten iron has its incandescence from that which is fire by its essence. We showed above" that God is existence itself; hence existence belongs to Him in virtue of His essence, but pertains to all other things by way of participation.
The essence of no other thing is its existence, for being that is absolute and per se subsistent cannot be more than one, as was brought out above.'" Therefore God must be the cause of existence of all things that are.
Creation from nothing Thus it is clear that in creating, God does not need preexisting matter from which to fashion things. No agent needs, prior to his action, what he produces by his action; he needs only what he is unable to produce by his action. The builder requires stones and lumber before he can set to work, because he is unable to produce these materials by his action. On the other hand, he does not presuppose a house, but produces it by his activity. But matter must be produced by God's action since, as has just been proved, everything that exists in any way at all has God as the cause of its existence. Therefore the conclusion follows that God does not presuppose matter in His activity.
Besides, act naturally precedes potency, and hence the notion of principle primarily befits act. But any principle that in creating would presuppose some other principle, would verify the concept of principle only in a secondary way. Accordingly, since God is the 71 CF. chaps. 6, 11.
" Cf. chap. 15.
Creation from Nothing principle of things as the first act, whereas matter is a principle as a being in potency, it is unthinkable that matter should be presupposed before God can act.
Furthermore, the more universal a cause is, the more universal its effect is. Particular causes make use of the effects of universal causes for something determinate; and such determination is related to a universal effect as act to potency. Hence any cause that causes something to be in act, utilizing preexisting material that is in potency to that act, is a particular cause with respect to some more universal cause. But this sort of procedure cannot pertain to God, since He is the first cause, as we showed above." Consequently God does not need matter as a prerequisite to His action.
Therefore He has the power to bring things into existence from nothing or, in other words, to create. This is why the Catholic
Faith professes that He is the Creator.
Creation is possible for God alone From this it appears, further, that God alone can be Creator. For to create is the prerogative of that cause which does not presuppose another cause that is more universal, as we saw in the preceding chapter. But such causality pertains to God alone. He alone, therefore, is Creator.
Besides, the more remote a potency is from act, the greater must be the power that reduces it to act. But whatever distance may be imagined between potency and act, the distance will ever be still greater if the very potency itself is withdrawn. To create from nothing, then, requires infinite power. But God alone is infinite in ® Cf. chap. 68.
Aquinas's Shorter Summa power, since He alone is infinite in essence. Consequently God alone can create.
Hl Matter is not the cause of diversity in things The foregoing exposition shows clearly that the cause of diversity in things is not diversity on the part of matter. For, as we have proved," the divine action which brings things into being does not suppose the pre-existence of matter. The cause of diversity in things could not be on the side of matter unless matter were needed prior to the production of things, so that the various forms induced would follow diversity in matter. Therefore the cause of diversity in the things produced by God is not matter.
Again, the plurality or unity of things is dependent on their existence. For, to the extent that anything is a being, it is also one.
But forms do not possess existence on account of matter; on the contrary, matter receives existence from form. For act is more excellent than potency; and that which is the reason for a thing's existence must be the more excellent component. Consequently forms are not diverse in order that they may befit various types of matter, but matter is diversified that it may befit various forms. fa The cause of diversity If the unity and multiplicity of things are governed by their being, and if the entire being of things depends on God, as has been shown
"4 CE. chap. 69.
Creation from Nothing to be the case," the cause of plurality in things must be sought in God. How this comes about, must now be examined.
Any active cause must produce its like, so far as this is possible.
The things produced by God could not be endowed with a likeness of the divine goodness in the simplicity in which that goodness is found in God. Hence what is one and simple in God had to be represented in the produced things in a variety of dissimilar ways.
There had to be diversity in the things produced by God, in order that the divine perfection might in some fashion be imitated in the variety found in things.
Furthermore, whatever is caused is finite, since only God's essence is infinite, as was demonstrated above.'° The finite is rendered more perfect by the addition of other elements.
Hence it was better to have diversity in created things, and thus to have good objects in greater number, than to have but a single kind of beings produced by God. For the best cause appropriately produces the best effects. Therefore it was fitting for God to produce variety in things.
#2 Diversity in things according to degree and order Diversity among things was rightly established according to a definite order, so that some things might be more excellent than others. For this pertains to the lavishness of the divine goodness, that God should communicate a likeness of His goodness to created things, so far as possible. God is not only good in Himself, but exceeds other beings in goodness, and guides them toward goodness. Consequently, that the likeness which created beings bear to ™ Cf. chap. 69.
76 Cf. chap. 18.
Aquinas's Shorter Summa God might be heightened, it was necessary for some things to be made better than others, and for some to act upon others, thus leading them toward perfection.
The basic diversity among things consists chiefly in diversity of forms. Formal diversity is achieved by way of contrariety; for genus is divided into various species by contrary differences. But order is necessarily found in contrariety, for among contraries one is always better than the other. Therefore diversity among things had to be established by God according to a definite order, in such a way that some beings might be more excellent than others.
Te:
Incorporeal substances requisite for the perfection of the universe A being is noble and perfect in the measure that it approaches likeness to God, who is pure act without any admixture of potency.
Therefore beings that are supreme among entities must be more in act and must have less of potency, whereas inferior beings must be more in potency. How this is to be understood, we must now examine.
Since God is eternal and immutable in His being, those things are lowest in the scale of being, as possessing less likeness to God, which are subject to generation and corruption. Such beings exist for a time, and then cease to be. And, since existence follows the form of a thing, beings of this kind exist while they have their form, but cease to exist when deprived of their form. Hence there must be something in them that can retain a form for a time, and can then be deprived of the form. This is what we call matter.
Therefore such beings, which are lowest in degree among things, must be composed of matter and form. But beings that are supreme among created entities approach most closely to likeness with God. They have no potency with regard to existence and
Creation from Nothing non-existence; they have received everlasting existence from God through creation.
Since matter, by the very fact that it is what it is, is a potency for that existence which is imparted through form, those beings which have no potency for existence and non-existence, are not composed of matter and form, but are forms only, subsisting in their being which they have received from God. Such incorporeal substances must be incorruptible. For all corruptible beings have a potency for non-existence; but incorporeal beings have no such potency, as we said. Hence they are incorruptible.
Furthermore, nothing is corrupted unless its form is separated from it, for existence always follows form. Since the substances in question are subsisting forms, they cannot be separated from their forms, and so cannot lose existence. So they are incorruptible.
Between the extremes mentioned, there are certain intermediate beings which have no potency for existence and non-existence, but which have a potency for ubi, or presence in place. Such are the heavenly bodies, which are not subject to generation and corruption, since contrarieties are not found in them. However, they are changeable according to local presence. Thus in some beings there is found matter as well as motion. For motion is the act of a being in potency. Accordingly, such bodies have matter that is not subject to generation and corruption, but is subject only to change of place.
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The Human Soul
Intellectual substances The substances mentioned above, which are called immaterial, must also be intellectual. A being is intellectual because it is free from matter. This can be perceived from the way it understands.
The intelligible in act and the intellect in act are the same thing.
But it is clear that a thing is intelligible in act because it is separated from matter; we cannot have intellectual knowledge of material things except by abstracting from matter. Accordingly, we must pronounce the same judgment regarding the intellect; that is, whatever is immaterial, is intellectual.
Furthermore, immaterial substances hold the first place and are supreme among beings; for act naturally has precedence over potency. But the intellect is clearly superior to all other beings; for the intellect uses corporeal things as instruments. Therefore immaterial substances must be intellectual.
Moreover, the higher a thing is in the scale of being, the closer it draws to likeness with God. Thus we observe that some things
(e.g., those pertaining to the lowest degree, such as lifeless beings) share in the divine likeness with respect to existence only; others,
Aquinas's Shorter Summa however (such as plants), share in the divine likeness with respect to existence and life; and yet others (such as animals), share in the divine likeness with respect to sense perception. But the highest degree — and that which makes us most like to God — is conferred by the intellect.
Consequently the most excellent creatures are intellectual.
Indeed, they are said to be fashioned in God's image for the very reason that among all creatures they approach most closely to likeness with God.
Freedom of choice in intellectual substances This fact shows that such beings have freedom of choice. The intellect does not act or desire without forming a judgment, as lifeless beings do, nor is the judgment of the intellect the product of natural impulse, as in brutes, but results from a true apprehension of the object.
For the intellect perceives the end, the means leading to the end, and the bearing of one on the other. Hence the intellect can be the cause of its own judgment, whereby it desires a good and performs an action for the sake of an end.
But what is a cause unto itself is precisely what we call free.
Accordingly, the intellect desires and acts in virtue of a free judgment, which is the same as having freedom of choice. Therefore the highest substances enjoy freedom of choice.
Furthermore, that being is free which is not tied down to any one definite course. But the appetite of an intellectual substance is not under compulsion to pursue any one definite good, for it follows intellectual apprehension, which embraces good universally. Therefore the appetite of an intelligent substance is free, since it tends toward all good in general.
The Human Soul Tit Order and degree among intellectual beings Intellectual substances are superior to other substances in the scale of perfection. They must also differ from each other in degree. They cannot differ from each other by material differentiation, since they lack matter. If plurality is found in them, it must be caused by formal distinction, which establishes diversity of species. In beings that exhibit diversity of species, the degree and order in them must be considered since, just as addition or subtraction of a unit causes variation of species in numbers, so natural entities vary in species by the addition or subtraction of differences. For instance, what is merely alive differs from what is alive and endowed with sense perception; and the latter differs from what is alive, endowed with sense, and rational. So the immaterial substances under discussion must be distinct according to various degrees and orders.
Order and degree in intellectual operation Because the nature of a being's activity is in keeping with its substance, higher intellectual substances must understand more perfectly, since they have intelligible species and powers that are more universal and are more unified. On the other hand, intellectual substances that are less perfect must be weaker in intelligence, and must have species that are more numerous and less universal.
Inferiority of man's intellectual nature Infinite progression is impossible in any series. Among intellectual substances, one must ultimately be found to be supreme, namely,
Aquinas's Shorter Summa the one which approaches most closely to God. Likewise, one must be found to be the lowest, and this will be the most intimately associated with corporeal matter.
This can be explained in the following way. Understanding is proper to man beyond all the other animals. Evidently, man alone comprehends universals, and the relations between things, and immaterial objects, which are perceptible only to the intelligence.
Understanding cannot be an act performed by a bodily organ in the way that vision is exercised by the eye. No faculty endowed with cognitive power can belong to the genus of things that is known through its agency. Thus the pupil of the eye lacks color by its very nature. Colors are recognized to the extent that the species of colors are received into the pupil; but a recipient must be lacking in that which is received. The intellect is capable of knowing all sensible natures. Therefore, if it knew through the medium of a bodily organ, that organ would have to be entirely lacking in sensible nature; but this is impossible.
Moreover, any cognitive faculty exercises its power of knowing in accord with the way the species of the object known is in it, for this is its principle of knowing. But the intellect knows things in an immaterial fashion, even those things that are by nature material; it abstracts a universal form from its individuating material conditions. Therefore the species of the object known cannot exist in the intellect materially; and so it is not received into a bodily organ, seeing that every bodily organ is material.
The same is clear from the fact that a sense is weakened and injured by sensible objects of extreme intensity. Thus the ear is impaired by excessively loud sounds and the eye by excessively bright lights. This occurs because the harmony within the organ is shattered. The intellect, on the contrary, is perfected in proportion to the excellence of intelligible objects; he who understands the higher objects of intelligence is able to understand other objects
The Human Soul more perfectly rather than less perfectly. Thus, if man is found to be intelligent, and if man's understanding is not effected through the medium of a bodily organ, we are forced to acknowledge the existence of some incorporeal substance whereby man exercises the act of understanding. For the substance of a being that can perform an action by itself, without the aid of a body, is not dependent on a body. But all powers and forms that are unable to subsist by themselves without a body, cannot exercise any activity without a body. Thus heat does not by itself cause warmth; rather a body causes warmth by the heat that is in it. Accordingly, this incorporeal substance whereby man understands, occupies the lowest place in the genus of intellectual substances, and is the closest to matter.
Different kinds of intellect and ways of understanding Since intellectual being is superior to sentient being (just as intellect is superior to sense) and since lower beings imitate higher beings as best they may (just as bodies subject to generation and corruption imitate in some fashion the circulatory motion of heavenly bodies), it follows that sensible beings resemble, in their own way, intellectual beings. Thus from the resemblance of sense to intellect we can mount tosome knowledge of intellectual beings.
In sensible beings a certain factor is found to be the highest; this is act (i.e., form). Another factor is found to be the lowest, for it is pure potency; this is matter. Midway between the two is the composite of matter and form.
We expect to find something similar in the intellectual world.
The supreme intellectual being, God, is pure act. Other intellectual substances have something of act and of potency, but in a way that befits intellectual being. And the lowest among intellectual
Aquinas's Shorter Summa substances, that whereby man understands, has, so to speak, intellectual being only in potency. This is borne out by the fact that man is at first found to be only potentially intelligent, and this potency is gradually reduced to act in the course of time. And this is why the faculty whereby man understands is called the possible intellect.'
8] Reception of intelligible forms in the possible intellect As was stated above, the higher an intellectual substance is in perfection, the more universal are the intelligible forms it possesses.
Of all the intellectual substances, consequently, the human intellect, which we have called possible, has forms of the least universality. This is the reason it receives its intelligible forms from sensible things.
This can be made clear from another point of view. A form must have some proportion to the potency which receives it.
Therefore, since of all intellectual substances man's possible intellect is found to be the closest to corporeal matter, its intelligible forms must, likewise, be most closely allied to material things.
7 To explain the process of knowledge, scholastic philosophy distinguishes between two faculties of the intellectual soul: the possible intellect and the agent intellect. The agent intellect or active intellect (intellectus agens) illuminates the phantasm, abstracting from it the intelligible species, which are spiritual likenesses of objects, disengaged from all particularizing conditions of matter. See chapter 83 below. According to St. Thomas,
"the agent intellect causes the phantasms received from the senses to be actually intelligible through a process of abstraction" (Summa, Ia, q. 84, a. 6). The possible (that is, potential) or passive intellect (intellectus possibilis) is actuated and informed by the intelligible species resulting from this abstractive operation, and is thereby enabled to elicit the act of understanding.
The Human Soul
Man's need of sense faculties for understanding However, we must realize that forms in corporeal things are particular, and have a material existence. But in the intellect they are universal and immaterial. Our manner of understanding brings this out. That is, we apprehend things universally and immaterially.
This way of understanding must conform to the intelligible species whereby we understand. Consequently, since it is impossible to pass from one extreme to another without traversing what lies between, forms reaching the intellect from corporeal objects must pass through certain media.
These are the sense faculties, which receive the forms of material things without their matter; what lodges in the eye is the species of the stone, but not its matter. However, the forms of things received into the sense faculties are particular, for we know only particular objects with our sense faculties. Hence man must be endowed with senses as a prerequisite to understanding. A proof of this is the fact that if a man is lacking in one of the senses, he has no knowledge of sensible objects that are apprehended by that sense. Thus a person born blind can have no knowledge of colors.
Necessity of the agent intellect This discussion brings out the truth that knowledge of things in our intellect is not caused by any participation or influence of forms that are intelligible in act and that subsist by themselves, as was taught by the Platonists" and certain other philosophers who 78 Cf. Plato, Phaedo (100 D); Timaeus (28 A; 30 C). See also Aristotle,
Metaph., 1, 6 (987 b 7); 1,9 (991 b 3).
Aquinas's Shorter Summa followed them in this doctrine. No, the intellect acquires such knowledge from sensible objects, through the intermediacy of the senses. However, since the forms of objects in the sense faculties are particular, as we just said, " they are intelligible not in act, but only in potency. For the intellect understands nothing but universals. But what is in potency is not reduced to act except by some agent. Hence there must be some agent that causes the species existing in the sense faculties to be intelligible in act. The possible intellect cannot perform this service, for it is in potency with respect to intelligible objects rather than active in rendering them intelligible. Therefore we must assume some other intellect which will cause species that are intelligible in potency to become intelligible in act, just as light causes colors that are potentially visible to be actually visible. This faculty we call the agent intellect, which we would not have to postulate if the forms of things were intelligible in act, as the Platonists held.
To understand, therefore, we have need, first, of the possible intellect which receives intelligible species, and secondly, of the agent intellect which renders things intelligible in act. Once the possible intellect has been perfected by the intelligible species, it is called the habitual intellect (intellectus in habitu), for then it possesses intelligible species in such a way that it can use them at will; in other words, it possesses them in a fashion that is midway between pure potency and complete act. But when it has these species in full actuality, it is called the intellect in act. That is, the intellect actually understands a thing when the species of the thing is made the form of the possible intellect. This is why we say that the intellect in act is the object actually understood.
? Cf chap. 82.
The Human Soul
Incorruptibility of the human soul A necessary consequence of the foregoing doctrine is that the intellect whereby man understands is incorruptible. Every being acts in a way that is conformable to its existence. The intellect has an activity which it does not share with the body, as we have proved." This shows that it can act by itself. Hence it is a substance. subsisting in its own being. But, as was pointed out above, intellectual substances are incorruptible." Accordingly the intellect whereby man understands is incorruptible.
Again, the proper subject of generation and corruption is matter. Hence a thing is immune to corruption to the extent that it is free from matter. Things composed of matter and form are per se corruptible; material forms are corruptible indirectly (per accidens), though not per se. Immaterial forms, which are above material conditions, are wholly incorruptible. The intellect by its very nature is elevated completely beyond matter, as its activity shows: we do not understand anything unless we separate it from matter. Consequently the intellect is by nature incorruptible.
Moreover, corruption cannot occur without contrariety; for nothing is corrupted except by its contrary. This is why the heavenly bodies, which do not admit of contrariety, are incorruptible.
But all contrariety is far removed from the nature of the intellect, so much so that things which are contraries in themselves, are not 8° Cf. chap. 79.
81 On the use of the word intellect for the intellectual soul, see the Summa, la., q. 79, a. 1 ad 1: "The intellectual soul is sometimes called simply intellect from its chief power." The same usage occurs in Aristotle, De anima, I, 4 (408 b 18) and in St. Augustine, De Trinitate, IX, 2 (PL, XLII,
962) and elsewhere.
82 Cf. chaps. 74, 79.
Aquinas's Shorter Summa contraries in the intellect. The intelligible aspect of contraries is one, inasmuch as one thing is understood in terms of another.
Thus it is impossible for the intellect to be corruptible.
Unity of the possible intellect An objector may say: the intellect is indeed incorruptible, but there is only one intellect in all men; and so what remains after the corruption of all men is but one. That there is only one intellect for all men, the objector may continue, can be established on many grounds.
The first is on the part of the intelligible species. For if | have one intellect and you have another, there will have to be one intelligible species in me and another in you. Thus there will be one object that I understand and another that you understand.
Hence the intelligible species will be multiplied according to the number of individuals, and so it will not be universal but individual. The conclusion would then seem to follow that it is understood not in act, but only in potency; for individual species are intelligible in potency, not in act.
Moreover, since the intellect, as we have seen, is a substance subsisting in its own being," and since intellectual substances that are numerically many do not belong to one species, as we have also seen," it follows that if | have one intellect and you have another that is numerically different, the two must differ specifically. And so you and I would not belong to the same species.
Further, since all individuals share in one specific nature, there must be something besides specific nature whereby individuals
83 CF. chap. 84.
84 C£ chap. 77.
The Human Soul may be distinguished from one another. Accordingly, if there is one specific intellect in all men, but many intellects that are numerically distinct, something must be found that will make one intellect differ numerically from another. This cannot be anything pertaining to the substance of the intellect, since the intellect is not composed of matter and form.
Consequently any difference that might be admitted on the part of the substance of the intellect would be a formal difference that would cause diversity in the species. The only possibility left is that the intellect of one man cannot differ numerically from the intellect of another man except by reason of the diversity of their bodies. Therefore, when the various bodies corrupt, it seems that only one intellect, and not a plurality of intellects, would remain.
The absurdity of this whole position can easily be perceived. To make this clear, let us proceed as one would proceed against those who deny fundamental principles. That is, let us first establish a truth that simply cannot be denied.
Let us suppose that this man (for example, Socrates or Plato) understands. Our adversary could not deny that the man understands, unless he knew that it ought to be denied. By denying he affirms, for affirmation and denial are intelligent actions. If, then, the man in question understands, that whereby he formally understands must be his form, since nothing acts unless it is in act.
Hence that whereby an agent acts, is his act; just as the heat by which a heated body causes warmth, is its act. Therefore the intellect whereby a man understands is the form of this man, and the same is true of another man.
But the same numerical form cannot belong to numerically different individuals, for numerically different individuals do not possess the same existence; and yet everything has existence by reason of its form. Accordingly, the intellect whereby a man understands cannot be but one in all men.
Aquinas's Shorter Summa Perceiving the force of this difficulty, some®' endeavor to find a way of escaping it. They say that the possible intellect, of which there was question above," receives the intelligible species by which it is reduced to act. These intelligible species are, in some way, in the phantasms. Hence the possible intellect is continuous and is joined to us so far as the intelligible species is both in the possible intellect and in the phantasms that are in us. It is thus that we are able to understand through the agency of the possible intellect.
Unfortunately for this solution, it is utterly valueless. In the first place, the intelligible species, as it exists in the phantasms, is a concept only in potency; and as it exists in the possible intellect, it is a concept in act. As existing in the possible intellect, it is not in the phantasms, but rather is abstracted from the phantasms.
Hence no union of the possible intellect with us remains. Secondly, even granting that there may be some sort of union, this would not suffice to enable us to understand. The presence of the species of some object in the intellect does not entail the consequence that the object understands itself, but only that it is understood; a stone does not understand, even though a species of it may be in the possible intellect. Hence, from the fact that species of phantasms present in us are in the possible intellect, it does not follow that we thereupon understand. It only follows that we ourselves, or rather the phantasms in us, are understood.
This will appear more clearly if we examine the comparison proposed by Aristotle in Book III of De anima, where he says that the intellect is to the phantasm what sight is to color.*' Manifestly,
85 The Averroists. Cf. Averroes, In De an., III, comm. 5 (VI, 164V); St.
Thomas, De unitate intellectus, III (ed. Keeler, p. 40 f.).
8° Cf. chap. 81.
87 De anima, Ill, 7 (431 a 14).
The Human Soul the fact that the species of colors on a wall are in our vision does not cause the wall to see, but to be seen. Likewise, the fact that the species of the phantasms in us come to be in the intellect, does not cause us to understand, but to be understood. Further, if we understand formally through the intellect, the intellectual action of the intellect must be the intellectual action of the man, just as the heating action of fire and of heat are the same. Therefore, if intellect is numerically the same in me and in you, it follows that, with respect to the same intelligible object, my action of understanding must be the same as yours, provided, of course, both of us understand the same thing at the same time. But this is impossible, for different agents cannot perform one and the same numerical operation. Therefore it is impossible for all men to have but a single intellect. Consequently, if the intellect is incorruptible, as has been demonstrated,** many intellects, corresponding to the number of men, will survive the destruction of their bodies.
The arguments advanced to support the contrary view are easily answered.
The first argument has many defects. First of all, we concede that the same thing may be understood by all. By the thing understood I mean that which is the object of the intellect.
However, the object of the intellect is not the intelligible species, but the quiddity of the thing. The intellectual sciences are all concerned with the natures of things, not with intelligible species
(just as the object of sight is color, not the species of color in the eye). Thus, although there may be many intellects belonging to different men, the thing understood by all may be but one (just as a colored object which many look at is but one).
88 Cf. chap. 84.
Aquinas's Shorter Summa Secondly, the consequence does not necessarily follow that, if a thing is individual, it is understood in potency and not in act.
This is true only of things that are individuated by matter. Of course, what is understood in act must be immaterial. Accordingly, immaterial substances, even though they may be individuals existing by themselves, are understood in act. The same holds for intelligible species, which are immaterial; although they differ numerically in me and in you, they do not on that account lose their property of being intelligible in act. The intellect that understands its objects by means of them reflects upon itself, thereby understanding its very action of understanding as well as the species whereby it understands. Moreover, we should realize that, even if we admit but one intellect for all men, the difficulty is still the same. There would still remain many intellects, because there are many separate substances endowed with intelligence. And so it would follow, pursuing our adversaries' line of reasoning, that the objects understood would be numerically different, hence individual and not understood in first act. Obviously, therefore, if the objection under discussion had any cogency, it would do away with a plurality of intellects simply as such, and not merely in men.
Since this conclusion is false, the argument manifestly does not conclude with necessity.
The second argument is readily answered, if we but consider the difference between an intellectual soul and separate substances. In virtue of its specific nature, the intellectual soul is meant to be united to some body as the latter's form; the body even enters into the definition of the soul. For this reason, souls are numerically differentiated according to the relation they have to different bodies, which is not the case with separate substances.
This also indicates how the third argument is to be answered.
In virtue of its specific nature, the intellectual soul does not possess the body as a part of itself, but has only an aptitude for union with
The Human Soul the body. Therefore it is numerically differentiated by its capacity for union with different bodies. And this remains the case with souls even after their bodies have been destroyed: they retain a capacity for union with different bodies even when they are not actually united to their respective bodies.
The agent intellect is not one in all men There were also some philosophers who argued that, even granting the diversification of the possible intellect in men, at any rate the agent intellect was but one for all." This view, while less objectionable than the theory discussed in the preceding chapter, can be refuted by similar considerations.
The action of the possible intellect consists in receiving the objects understood and in understanding them. And the action of the agent intellect consists in causing things to be actually understood by abstracting species. But both these functions pertain to one particular man. This man (for example, Socrates or Plato) receives the objects understood, abstracts the species, and understands what is abstracted. Hence the possible intellect as well as the agent intellect must be united to this man as a form. And so both must be numerically multiplied in accord with the number of men concerned.
Moreover, agent and patient must be proportionate to each other. Examples are matter and form, for matter is reduced to act by an agent. This is why an active potency of the same genus corresponds to every passive potency; for act and potency pertain to one genus. But the agent intellect is to the possible intellect
89 Averroes, In De anima, III, comm. 18 (VI, 169V); comm. 19 (VI, 170R); Avicenna, De anima, V, 5 (25RB); Metaph., IX, 3 (104RB).
Aquinas's Shorter Summa what active potency is to passive potency, as is clear from this discussion." Hence they must both pertain to one genus. Therefore, since the possible intellect has no separate existence apart from us, but is united to us as a form and is multiplied according to the number of men, as we have shown," the agent intellect must likewise be something that is united to us as a form, and must be multiplied according to the number of men.
The possible intellect and the agent intellect in the essence of the soul Since the agent intellect and the possible intellect are united to us as form, we must acknowledge that they pertain to the same essence of the soul. Whatever is formally united to another thing is united to it either in the manner of a substantial form or in the manner of an accidental form. If the possible intellect and the agent intellect were united to man after the fashion of a substantial form, we would have to hold that they share in the one essence of that form which is the soul, since one thing cannot have more than one substantial form. On the other hand, if they are united to man after the fashion of an accidental form, neither of them, evidently, can be an accident of the body. Besides, the fact that their operations are performed without a bodily organ, as we proved above," shows that each of them is an accident of the soul. But there is only one soul in one man. Therefore the agent intellect and the possible intellect must inhere in the one essence of the soul.
Furthermore, every action that is proper to a species proceeds from principles that emanate from the form which confers the °° See especially chap. 83.
91 C£ chap. 85.
92 Cf. chap. 79.
The Human Soul species. But the action of understanding is an operation proper to the human species. Therefore the agent intellect and the possible intellect, which are principles of this action, as has been shown," emanate from the human soul, whence man has his species. However, they do not issue from the soul in such a way as to extend to the body, because, as we have said,"* the operation in question takes place independently of a bodily organ. Since, therefore, action pertains to the same subject as does potency, the possible intellect and the agent intellect inhere in the one essence of the soul.
The way these two faculties are united in the same essence of the soul We have still to consider how this union is possible. Some difficulty may seem to arise in this matter. The possible intellect is in potency with respect to all that is intelligible, whereas the agent intellect causes what is intelligible in potency to be intelligible in act, and so must be related to what is intelligible as act to potency. But the same thing, seemingly, cannot be both in potency and in act with respect to the same object. Thus it would appear that the possible intellect and the agent intellect cannot be united in the same substance of the soul.
This doubt is easily resolved if we examine how the possible intellect is in potency with respect to intelligible objects, and how the agent intellect renders them actually intelligible. The possible intellect is in potency with regard to intelligible objects in the sense that it does not contain within its nature any determinate form of sensible things. In the same way the pupil of the eye is in °3 Cf. chaps. 81, 83.
94 Cf. chap. 79.
Aquinas's Shorter Summa potency with regard to all colors. To the extent, then, that phantasms abstracted from sensible things are likenesses of definite sensible things, they are related to the possible intellect as act to potency. Nevertheless the phantasms are in potency with regard to something that the intellectual soul possesses in act, namely, being as abstracted from material conditions. And in this respect the intellectual soul is related to the phantasms as act to potency.
No contradiction is involved if a thing is in act and potency with regard to the same object according to different points of view. Thus natural bodies act upon each other and are acted upon by each other, for each is in potency with respect to the other. The same intellectual soul, therefore, can be in potency with regard to all intelligible objects and nevertheless, without any contradiction, can be related to them as act, if both a possible intellect and an agent intellect are acknowledged in the soul.
This will be seen more clearly from the way the intellect renders objects actually intelligible. The agent intellect does not render objects actually intelligible in the sense that the latter flow from it into the possible intellect. If this were the case, we would have no need of phantasms and sense in order to understand. No, the agent intellect renders things actually intelligible by abstracting them from phantasms (just as light, in a certain sense, renders colors actual, not as though it contained the colors within itself, but so far as it confers visibility on them). In the same way we are to judge that there is a single intellectual soul that lacks the natures of sensible things but can receive them in an intelligible manner, and that renders phantasms actually intelligible by abstracting intelligible species from them.
The power whereby the soul is able to receive intelligible species is called the possible intellect, and the power whereby it abstracts intelligible species from phantasms is called the agent intellect. The latter is a sort of intelligible light communicated to
The Human Soul the intellectual soul, in imitation of what takes place among the higher intellectual substances.
Radication of all the faculties in the essence of the soul Not only the agent intellect and the possible intellect, but also all the other powers that are principles of the soul's operations are united in the essence of the soul. All such powers are somehow rooted in the soul. Some of them, indeed, such as the powers of the vegetative and sensitive parts, are in the soul as in their principle but in the composite as in their subject because their activities pertain to the composite, not to the soul alone; for power and action belong to the same subject. Some of them, on the other hand, are in the soul both as principle and as subject, for their operations pertain to the soul apart from any bodily organ. These are the powers of the intellectual part. But a man cannot have several souls. Accordingly, all the powers must pertain to the same soul.
Unicity of the soul That there cannot be several souls in one body is proved as follows.
The soul is evidently the substantial form of any being possessing a soul because a living being is constituted in genus and species by its soul. But the same thing cannot have several substantial forms.
A substantial form differs from an accidental form in this, that a substantial form causes a particular thing simply to be, whereas an accidental form is added to a particular being already constituted as such and determines its quality, quantity, or mode of being.
Hence, if several substantial forms belong to one and the same
Aquinas's Shorter Summa thing, either the first of them causes it to be this particular thing or it does not. If it does not, the form is not substantial; if it does, then all the subsequent forms accrue to what is already this particular thing. Therefore none of the subsequent forms will be the substantial form, but only some accidental form.
Clearly, therefore, one and the same thing cannot have several substantial forms; and so one and the same person cannot have several souls.
Furthermore, it is evident that a man is said to be living because he has a vegetative soul; that he is called an animal because he has a sensitive soul; and that he is a man because he has an intellectual soul. Consequently, if there were three souls in man (namely, vegetative, sensitive, and rational), man would be placed in a genus because of one of his souls and in a species because of another. But this is impossible. For thus genus and specific difference would constitute not what is simply one, but what is one per accidens, or a sort of conglomeration, such as musical and white; but such is not a being that is simply one. Accordingly, a man can have only one soul.
Arguments advanced to show a multiplicity of souls in man Certain considerations seem opposed to our doctrine. In the first place, specific difference is to genus what form is to matter. Animal is the genus of man and rational is the difference that makes man what he is. Accordingly, since animal is a body animated by a sensitive soul, it seems that a body animated by a sensitive soul is still in potency with respect to the rational soul. Thus the rational soul would be distinct from the sensitive soul.
Moreover, the intellect does not possess a bodily organ. But the sensitive and nutritive powers do possess bodily organs. Hence it
The Human Soul seems impossible for the same soul to be both intellectual and sensitive because the same thing cannot both be separated and not separated from another thing.
Further, the rational soul is incorruptible, as we saw above."
On the other hand, the vegetative and sensitive souls are corruptible, as they are acts of corruptible organs. Therefore the rational soul is not the same as the vegetative and the sensitive souls, for the same thing cannot be both corruptible and incorruptible.
Besides, in the generation of man the life conferred by the vegetative soul appears before the fetus is observed to be an animal from its sense activity and motion; and this same being is discerned to be an animal through its sense activity and movement before it has an intellect. So if the soul is the same (by which the fetus first lives the life of a plant, then the life of an animal, and thirdly the life of a man), it follows that the vegetative, sensitive, and rational principles come from an outside source or else that the intellectual soul arises from the energy in the semen. Both of these alternatives are inadmissible. On the one hand, since the operations of the vegetative and sensitive soul are not exercised apart from the body, their principles cannot be without a body. On the other hand, the operation of the intellectual soul is exercised without a body; and so, apparently, no bodily energy can be its cause. Therefore the same soul cannot be vegetative, sensitive, and rational.
Refutation of the preceding objections To set aside such quibbles, we should reflect that in material things, one species surpasses another in perfection in the way that, in 95 Cf. chap. 84. oO
Aquinas's Shorter Summa numbers, species are diversified by adding one to another. Whatever perfection is found in lifeless bodies, plants also possess — and more besides. Again, whatever plants have, animals have, too — and something else in addition. And thus we proceed until we come to man, the most perfect of bodily creatures. All that is imperfect is related as matter to what is more perfect. This is clear in. the various classes of beings.
The elements constitute the matter of bodies that are composed of similar parts; and again, bodies having similar parts are matter with respect to animals. And this is likewise to be observed in one and the same being. Among natural things, that which is endowed with a higher degree of perfection has, in virtue of its form, whatever perfection is found in lower nature; and in virtue of the same form it has, besides, its own added perfection. Through its soul, the plant is a substance, is corporeal, and besides is an animated body. Through its soul, an animal has all these perfections and, moreover, is sentient. In addition to all this, man is intelligent through his soul. Thus, in any object, if we consider what pertains to the perfection of a lower grade of being, this will be material when compared with what pertains to the perfection of a higher grade. For example, if we observe that an animal has the life of a plant, this life is in some fashion material with respect to what pertains to sensitive life, which is characteristic of an animal.
Genus, of course, is not matter, for then it would not be predicated of the whole. But it is something derived from matter; for the designation attaching to a thing in terms of what is material in it, is its genus. Specific difference is derived from the form of a thing in the same way. This is the reason why living or animated body is the genus of animal, and sensitive is the specific difference that constitutes it. Similarly, animal is the genus of man, and rational is the difference that constitutes him. Therefore, since the BL
The Human Soul form of a higher grade of being comprises within itself all the perfections of a lower grade, there is not, in reality, one form from which genus is derived and another from which specific difference is derived. Rather, genus is derived from a form so far as it has a perfection of lower degree; and specific difference is derived from the same form so far as it has a perfection of higher degree.
Thus, although animal is the genus of man and rational is the specific difference constituting him, there need not be in man a sensitive soul distinct from the intellectual soul, as was urged in the first argument.
This indicates the solution of the second difficulty. As we have pointed out, the form of a higher species comprises within itself all the perfections of lower classes of being.
We must note, however, that the species of a material being is higher in proportion as it is less subject to matter. And so the nobler a form is, the more it must be elevated above matter. Hence the human soul, which is the noblest of all forms of matter, attains to the highest level of elevation, where it enjoys an activity that is independent of the concurrence of corporeal matter. Yet, since the same soul includes the perfection of lower levels, it also has activities in which corporeal matter shares.
However, an activity is exercised by a thing in accordance with the thing's power. Therefore the human soul must have some powers or potentialities that are principles of activities exercised through the body, and these must be actions of certain parts of the body. Such are the powers of the vegetative and sensitive parts.
The soul has also certain powers that are the principles of activities exercised without the body. Such are the powers of the intellectual part, whose actions are not performed by any organs.
For this reason both the possible intellect and the agent intellect are said to be separate; they have no organs as principles of their actions — such as sight and hearing have — but inhere in
Aquinas's Shorter Summa the soul alone, which is the form of the body. Hence we need not conclude, from the fact that the intellect is said to be separate and lacks a bodily organ (whereas neither of these is true of the senses) that the intellectual soul is distinct from the sensitive soul in man.
This also makes it clear that we are not forced to admit an intellectual soul distinct from the sensitive soul in man on the ground that the sensitive soul is corruptible whereas the intellectual soul is incorruptible, as the third objection set out to prove.
Incorruptibility pertains to the intellectual part so far as it is separate.
Therefore, as powers that are separate, in the sense mentioned above, and powers that are not separate, are all rooted in the same essence of the soul, there is nothing to prevent some of the powers of the soul from lapsing when the body perishes, while others remain incorruptible.
The points already made lead to a solution of the fourth objection. All natural movement gradually advances from imperfect to perfect. The same quality is receptive of greater and less; hence alteration, which is movement in quality, being unified and continuous in its progress from potency to act, advances from imperfect to perfect.
But substantial form is not receptive of greater and less, for the substantial nature of each being exists indivisibly. Therefore natural generation does not proceed continuously through many intermediate stages from imperfect to perfect; rather, it is clear that at each level of perfection a new generation and corruption must take place.
Thus in the generation of a man the fetus first lives the life of a plant through the vegetative soul; next, when this form is removed by corruption it acquires, by a sort of new generation, a sensitive soul and lives the life of an animal; finally, when this soul is in turn removed by corruption, the ultimate and complete form
The Human Soul is introduced." This is the rational soul, which comprises within itself whatever perfection was found in the previous forms.
Production of the rational soul This ultimate and complete form, the rational soul, is not brought into existence by the power that is in the semen but by a higher cause. For the power that is in the semen is a bodily power. But the rational soul exceeds the whole nature and power of the body, since no body can rise to the heights of the soul's intellectual activity.
Nothing can act in a way that surmounts its species, because the agent is nobler than the patient and the maker excels his product.
Hence the power possessed by a body cannot produce the rational soul, nor, consequently, can the energy inherent in the semen do sO.
Moreover, a thing that has new existence must also have a new becoming; for that which is, must first become, since a thing becomes in order that it may be. Thus things which have being in their own right must have becoming in their own right; such are subsistent beings. But things that do not possess being in their own right do not properly have a becoming; such are accidents and material forms. The rational soul has being in its own right because it has its own operation, as is clear from our previous discussion.
Therefore becoming is properly predicated of the rational soul.
Since the soul is not composed of matter and form, as was shown above," it cannot be brought into being except by creation. But 96 Needless to say, the theory of the generation of living beings here expressed differs considerably from the teaching of modern biology.
9? C£. chaps. 79, 84.
Aquinas's Shorter Summa God alone can create, as we said above."® Consequently the rational soul is produced by God alone.
We can readily understand why this should be so. In all arts that are hierarchically related to one another, we observe that the highest art induces the ultimate form whereas the lower arts dispose matter for the reception of the ultimate form. The rational soul, evidently, is the ultimate and most perfect form that the matter of beings subject to generation and corruption can achieve.
Therefore natural agents, which operate on lower levels, appropriately cause preliminary dispositions and forms, whereas the supreme agent, God, causes the ultimate form, which is the rational soul.
The rational soul is not derived from God's substance However, we are not to imagine that the rational soul is derived from the substance of God, as some have erroneously thought."
We demonstrated above that God is simple and indivisible.'™ Therefore He does not join the rational soul to a body as though
He had first severed it from His own substance.
Furthermore, we pointed out above that God cannot be the form of any body.'" But the rational soul is united to the body as the latter's form. Hence it is not derived from the substance of God.
°8 CE. chap. 70.
°? For example, Varro, according to St. Augustine, De civitate Dei, VII, 6 (PL, XLI, 199); Macrobius, In Somnium Scipionis, 1, 14.
100C£ chap. 9.
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The Human Soul Besides, we showed above that God is not moved either in Himself or by reason of some other thing that is moved." But the contrary of this takes place in the rational soul, which is moved from ignorance to knowledge, from vice to virtue. Accordingly, the soul is not of the substance of God.
10.C£ chaps. 4, 17.
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