3. In this disposition, thinking it right to accustom He
While studying Platonism, he meets a Christian.
to happiness, unless you are first grounded in such studies Dial.
Try PH.
3. as wean the mind from the objects of sense, and render it capable of entertaining those of the intellect, so that it may be enabled to discern the beautiful and the very essential of good ?"
When he had spoken much in favour of these sciences, and of the necessity of their attainment, he sent me avi^ay, as I confessed my ignorance of them.
I was naturally much cast down at having my hopes thus disappointed, and the more so, as I really thought him a man of some knowledge.
But when I considered, on the other hand, how long a time one must spend on these subjects, I could not endure the delay, and whilst I was in this difficulty, it occurred to me to try the Platonists too ; for they also enjoyed a high reputation ; I accordingly devoted as much time as possible to a Sage, who had lately arrived at our citys, and who was distinguished among that school; with him I improved, and made rapid advances daily.
The Platonic conception of incorporeals greatly captivated me, and their theory of ideas* "added wings to my thoughts,"' "^«so that within a short time I considered myself to have ^otrV become a wise man, and in my vanity I hoped shortly to see '^P^^'^God, for this is the object of the philosophy of Plato.
In this disposition, thinking it right to accustom He myself to extreme quietness, and absence from the haunts ^^^^^_ of men, I was in the habit of going to a spot not far from ger, and the sea, which as I one day approached, intending to spend christisome time there by myself, an aged person of a reverend ^^'^y"* aspect, and mild and venerable carriage, followed me at a little distance ; but when I turned and looked at him somewhat keenly,
*' Do you know me ?" he asked.
I replied, that I did not. "Why then, "said he, "do you look at me so closely?"
"I am surprised," I answered, "at your being in the same place with me, for I did not expect to see any one here."
"I am anxious," he replied, "about some absent members of my family, and I came to look out whether they will come in S This was most probably Flavia natives.
Or it may have been, as some Neapolis, now Nablous ; a city built think, Ephesus.
The Benedictine near the ancient Sichem, and of which considers it to have been Alexandria, S.
Justin, in the beginning of his but he offers no sufficient reason for longer Apology, describes his family as this opinion.
The Platonic notion of Philosophic happiriess, Just, sight from any quarter.
But you yourself, why are you here ?
*' I take pleasure," I replied, " in such walks as these, in which there is nothing to distract my attention, and where I can converse with myself without fear of interruption
; for it is in such places that a lover of arguments'' can make most > (piKo1 improvement."
" Are you ^ a lover of mere arguments," he ^ <pi\6said, '^and not of deeds and of truth; and do you not \oyos. endeavour to become a master of practice, rather than of i ?" sophistry " What can one do better,"
I answered, " than thus prove, that reason^ beareth rule over ail things, and that a man who hath taken hold of it and is supported by it, can look down on the wanderings and the pursuits of others, and see that they do nothing that is sane, nothing that is pleasing to God; for without philosophy and right reason none can possess prudence.
Every man should therefore give himself up to philosophy, and account it the greatest and most precious of gains, all other things being in comparison of second or third rate value ; and if taken in connection with it, they should be held in moderate estimation, as worthy to be received ; but if deprived of it and separated from it, even hurtful and degrading to those v/ho take them in hand."
" Does philosophy then confer happiness ?" he enquired.
*' It does indeed, I said, and it alone."
" But v/hat is philosophy?" he said; " and tell me, if you have no objection, what is the happiness which it bestows?"
3toO "Philosophy," I said, ''is the knowledge of ^that which h Used for the skill of reasoning and reasonings, as distinguished from in general, and not merely for false realities. reasoning.
It had however come to ^ Xhe Ben. Editor observes, that he be taken in a bad sense, for unreal uses the word At^yos, but in the merely wisdom, and is thus opposed to ' Phiphilosophical sense, and premises to losophy.' prove in his work on the Divinity of * The terms (pLXoXoyla and (pi\6Christ, book iii. that the personal \oyos are here used by S. Justin and meaning was not current with the his preceptor in somewhat different Platonists.
See book iv. c.
1. of that senses.
The former taking \6yos in work.
He is more full in the Preface its wider meaning of reason or philoto S. Justin, pt. ii. c. i.
The World, sophical argument, and the latter which embodies the ideas, not the replying as if he had intended to pro- \6yo5 in which they reside, is the fe.s.s himself occupied with mere words Plato7iic Son of God.
and of the ivay of knowing God.
is, and the discernment of truth ; and happiness is the Dial. reward of this knowledge, and of wisdom."
Tuyph.
*' What do you define God to be ?" he enquired.
'^ That which is ever one and the same, and the cause of being to all creatures, such without doubt is God."
This was my reply, and he heard it with pleasure.
" Then," he asked again, " is not knowledge a term common to different things ? for whoever is skilled in any of the arts, in that of strategy for instance, or of navigation, or of medicine, is said to have knowledge of it.
But this cannot be asserted equally well of things divine and human: is there any science, for instance, which gives us the knowledge of things divine and human, and likewise of the divinity and righteousness in them ?"
'^ Certainly there is," I answered.
"What then," he exclaimed, "can we know God and man, in the same way as we may know music, arithmetic, astronomy, and the like ?"
" By no means," I replied.
"You have not answered me correctly then," he said, " for of some things v/e have knov/leclge by study or application, of others by sight.
If any one were to tell you that in India there is a living creature unlike all others, of such or such a shape, multiform, and of various colours, you would have no positive knowledge of it until you had seen it, nor could yon give any description of it, except you had heard from an eye-witness."
" True," I replied.
"How then," he enquired, "can Philosophers think rightly, or speak with truth, of God, when they have no knowledge of Him, Whom they have neither seen nor heard.?"
" The Deity, father," I answered, " is not to be viewed by the organs of sight, like other creatures, but He is to be comprehended by the mind alone, as Plato declares, and I believe him."
4. " Have our minds then," he asked, " any power of such The soul nature and extent, as can conceive that which has not first "^Jj^^^^ been communicated to them by the senses?
Or will the see God.
The sight of God is not merely intellectual.
Just, mind of man ever see God, if it be not instructed by the ^^^^Holy Spirit?"
" Plato tells us," I answered, " that the eye of the mind is of such a nature, and was given us to such an end, as to enable us to see with it by itself, when pure, that very Being Who is the source of whatever is an object of the mind itself. Who has neither colour, nor shape, nor size, nor any thing which the eye can see, but Who is above all essence. Who is ineffable, and undefinabie. Who is alone beautiful and good, and Who is at once implanted into those souls who are naturally well born, through their relationship to and desire of seeing Him."
"What relationship then," he enquired, "have we with God ? or is the soul divine and immortal, and a part of that very supreme Mind ?
And as It sees God, so can we in like manner with our mind comprehend Him, and thus obtain happiness even now ?"
" Certainly it is so," I returned.
"Do all the souls then," he asked, "of all animals comprehend Him? or is the soul of man of one kind, and that of a horse or ass of another ?"
" Not so," I replied, " but the souls of all creatures are alike."
" Shall horses and asses see God then?" he said, "or have they done so at any time?"
"No,"
I answered, "for not many men see Him, but only those who have lived uprightly, and who are made pure by righteousness, and the practice of every virtue."
" Man does not see God then," he answered, " through his relationship with Him, nor because he has mind, but because he is temperate and just."
"Yes,"
I answered, "and because he is endowed with that by which he is able to think of Him."
" What then," he answered, " do goats or sheep injure any one ?"
" No one," I said, "in any way."
" Shall these animals then," according to your reasoning, " see God ?"
"No, for their bodies being such as they are prevent them."
Supposed transmigration of souls.
" If these animals could speak," he said, " be assured Dial. that theJ would with much more justice find fault with our
''^^5*'*'* bodies.
But let us leave this for the present; and granting it to be as you say, tell me, does the soul see God whilst it is in the body, or when it is delivered from it ?"
"Even whilst it is in a human form, it is able to 'rest' eyy^upon God, through its mind, but especially when freed ''*'^^"* from the body, and existing by itself, does it possess that which it loved wholly a.nd for ever."
"Does it remember this when again united to a human body?"
" I suppose not," was my answer.
" What good then accrues to those souls who have seen God ? or what advantage has the man who has seen Him
• over him who has not, if he cannot remember even so much as that he has seen Him V " I cannot tell," I replied.
" But what do they suifer who are judged unworthy of this sight ?"
" Their punishment is to be imprisoned in the bodies of certain beasts."
" Do they know, then, that it is for this reason, namely, their having committed sin, that they are enclosed in such bodies ?"
" I think not."
*' As it appears, then, they gain no advantage from such punishment, and, in fact, cannot be said to be punished at all, if they are not conscious of it."
" Assuredly not."
" Souls then do not see God, nor do they pass into other bodies', or they would have^ known that they were thus punished; and have feared thereafter to commit even the least sin ; but I grant you," he continued, " that souls are able to comprehend that there is a God, and that righteousness and piety are good."
" You speak truly," I replied.
5. "These Philosophers then," he continued, ^' know^hesoul ^ not of itself iramor- ' Jebb ap. Ben. refers to the same Al. Eel. Proph. n.
17. TertuUian de tal. argument in S. Irenffius, lib. 2. S. Clem.
Aniraa, cap. ii.
Christian doctrine of the human soul.
111 ART* i« .> — soul IS.
Just, nothing of such points, for they cannot even tell what the " It appears not."
" Nor can the soul be termed immortal ; for if it were, it » a-y^vmust have been ^ingenerate as well."
" It is both ingenerate v-nTos.
^j^^ immortal,"
I replied, "according to some who are termed Platonists."
" Do you then," he asked, " consider the world ingenerate ?"
** There are some who do," I said, '^ but for myself I do not agree with them."
"You are right; for what reason is there to suppose that ^avTiTv-Si body possessed of such solidity and of the power ^of '^*"*' resistance, which is of a compound nature, is mutable, decays, and is renewed every day, did not derive its origin from some first cause ?
And if the v, orld was generated, souls were of necessity generated also, and perhaps there was a time when they did not exist; for they were generated for the sake of men and other animals, even if you say that they were generated separately by themselves, and not with their own bodies."
" This opinion appears to be correct.
They are not immortal then ?"
" No, for we have seen that the world itself was generated"."
" But at the same time I affirm, that souls never perish, 3"Ep^ai-for this would be indeed a ^godsend to the wicked.
What then befalls them ? The souls of the good are consigned to a better place, and those of the evil and unjust to a worse, there to await the day of judgment.
Thus such as are <or, 'are worthy to see God ^ die no more, but others shall undergo worthy punishment as long as it may please Him that they shall of God.' exist and be punished".
Is not your doctrine then the ™The doctrine of S. Justin on the but be and live, and must therefore have immortality of the soul, is precisely always been in being.
It is in this that of Tatian, " The soul is not of its sense that St. Paul teaches, that God own nature immortal, but yet it does alone " has immoitality." 1 Tim.vi. 16. not die."
Sect.
13. beginning.
The ° S.
Justin is not to be supposed soul is here stated by S. Justin not to from these words, even if they had be immortal, in the sense of being been spoke:i by himself instead of his absolutely incapable of destruction, preceptor, to doubt or deny the eternity which is only true of That which cannot of punishment, as is proved by his words
God alone is essentially immoi^fal.
same as that of Plato in his Timasus about the world, where Dial. he says, that it is subject to corruption because it was q created, but that it shall not be destroyed nor be subject to death, because God so wills; do you think that the same may be asserted of the soul and of all other things as well ?
For whatever exists now, or shall exist hereafter, beside '
* lit.
' after.'
God, must necessarily be corruptible, and capable of total destruction, for God alone is ingenerate and incorruptible, and therefore it is that He is God, but all other things beside Him are generated and corruptible.
Hence souls both die and are punished, for if they were ingenerate they could not have sinned, nor have been infected with folly, nor have felt fear, and again become courageous, nor would they ever have entered voluntarily into swine, or serpents,
" or dogs ; nor w^ould it have been possible for them to be coerced, if they were ingenerate, for one ingenerate must necessarily resemble and be equal to and the same as another ingenerate, nor can one be preferred to another in power or honour.
Hence it is impossible that there should be several ingenerates, othervv^ise, if there were any points of difference between them, you could never by any amount of search discover the cause of it, but when you had allowed your mind to wander through infinity, it would fix at last after all its labour on some one Ingenerate, and this one you would confess to be the cause of all things ; were Plato then, and Pythagoras, ignorant of these truths, wise men as they were, and the walls and bulwarks of our philosophy ?"
" I pay no regard," he ansv/ered, '' to Plato, or PythaPlato goras, or any one else who holds such opinions, but that the phjio. truth is so you may learn from hence.
The soul either is^P'^" life or receives life.
If it is life, it would cause something not thi?. else to live and not itself, as motion is the source of moving to something extraneous rather than to itself; now that the soul lives, no one will deny ; and if it does live, it lives not as being itself life, but as partaking of life
; but that which in the 45th section of this dialogue, thnt souls do not exist of themselves, " Some shall indeed be sent into the but of the will of God, who if He judgment and condemnation of the pleased could reduce them again to eten:al fire to be tnrraented," and in nothing, of which He first created other partsofhiswritings—"buttoshew them."
Otto in loc.
The old Christian recommends the Prophets.
Just, partakes is different from that of which it does pai'take.
Mart.
...
'- The soul partakes of life, since God wills it to live ; and hence it will cease to have life whenever He may please that it sliall live no longer, for it is not the property of the soul to have life in itself as it is the property of God, but as man exists not for ever, nor is his body always united to his soul ; but whenever it is expedient that this conjunction should be dissolved, the soul leaves the body, and the man exists no longer ; so also when the soul is to live no more, the spirit of life is taken from it, and the soul exists no more, but itself returns again to whence it came."
Truth 7.
" Whom then,"
I asked, " shall a man take as lus only by master, or whence shall he derive any instruction, if the *^^^''°' truth is not with these philosophers ?"
" There once lived men," he replied, *' called Prophets, who were anterior to any of those who are considered philosophers, and who were blessed, just, and beloved by God.
These spoke by the Holy Ghost, and foretold what should happen thereafter, and what is now taking place.
And they alone knew and taught the truth, neither regarding nor fearing any man, nor being them.selves carried away by the love of glory, but declaring those things alone which p they saw and heard when filled with the Holy Ghost.
And their writings still remain to us, and whoever reads them will derive much instruction about the first principles and the end of things, together with all that a philosopher ought to know w^hen he believes them.
They have not indeed given demonstrations in their writings, for they are in fact above all demonstration as faithful witnesses of the truth
; but the events that have happened already, and those which are taking place even now, compel you to receive their testimony.
Even indeed for the miracles which they performed are they worthy of our belief, and especially since they glorified God the Father and Maker of all things, and taught of Christ His Son, Who was sent by Him, which the false prophets who were filled with a spirit of falsehood and uncleanness neither did nor do ; but these presume to »5uj/(£. perform certain 'wonders to astonish mankind, and set '^^'^ forth the praises of lying spirits and devils.
But do you above all things pray that the gates of light may be opened