The Literal Meaning of Genesis (continued)
202 NOTES
1, Bourke 242-43, and G. Verbeke, L'Evolution de la doctrine du Pneuma du stoicisme a s. Augustin (Paris 1945) 371-72, 502, and passim.
14This theory is developed in ch. 32 infra. 15Here "spirit" does not have the special meaning it has elsewhere in this book explained in n. 13 supra. In this place it means an immaterial reality. The argument here is based on a disjunction which presents four possibilities:
1. Body: a) seen with the eyes of the body (in which case St. Paul would be just as certain about the manner of seeing as about the thing seen); or b) seen without the eyes of the body (but the possibility of this kind of vision is doubtful; and if it could occur, it probably would be so different from corporeal vision as to leave no doubt about the manner in which the object was seen).
2. Spirit: a) represented by an image of a body (in which case he would doubt just as much whether it was a body as whether it was seen in the body); or b) perceived immediately by the intellect (in which case it would be certain that it was not seen by the body). The possibility of the case mentioned under 1b is so doubtful that Aug. relegated it to the end. This accounts for the curious order of the argument: the obvious possibilities are discussed first, and then a conceivable but unlikely case is taken up for the sake of completeness. The upshot of the argument is that St.
Paul could not be at the same time certain about the object seen and doubtful about the manner of seeing. About what, then, does he doubt? If we suppose that the soul alone was carried away, there will remain a doubt about the relation that meanwhile existed between body and soul; and this is the doubt expressed in the words, whether in the body or out of the body, I do not know. Aug. explains this in the next paragraph.
'6Both things: the object seen and the manner of seeing. \7Etiam si possunt vidert is the reading of P, R, S, Bru, Val, Vat,
BOOK TWELVE
and m. The reading of z, non possent, is based on E. The reading st possunt seems to be demanded by the sense: see the analysis of the argument of this passage in n. 15 supra.
'8Aug. modestly proposes a possible explanation of Paul's doubt, namely, that while his soul alone was carried away to the vision, the doubt centered around the relation that the soul meanwhile had to its body. Two kinds of relations are possible: (1) the soul remained united with the body as its form (and thus it was in corpore), while the mind was carried away in contemplation; (2) the soul was separated from the body (and thus it was extra corpus), so that the body during the vision lay in death.
'9Aug. frequently uses the word intentio in describing the soul's activity in the body. See his Epist. 166 De origine animae hominis ad Hteronymum 2.4 (CSEL 44.551,7-9 Goldbacher; ML
33.722): "For the soul pervades the whole body that it animates not by a local distribution of parts (non locali diffusione) but by a vital impulse (quadam vital intentione)." In addition to this vital impulse (vitalis intentio), the activity or influence by which the soul vivifies the body, there is the attention (intentio) of the soul, by which it observes the modifications of the sense organs: see 7.19.25 supra. In the case of a soul in ecstasy, the vitalis intentio continues while the other intentio is inoperative.
20The three types of vision here described are distinguished by the objects seen and the power of the soul that sees: bodies seen by the soul through the instrumentality of the body, likenesses of bodies seen by the spirit (see n. 13 supra), and immaterial realities seen by the intellect. For a discussion of these three types of vision, see Michael Schmaus, Die psychologishce
Trinitatslebre des hl. Augustinus (Minsterische Beitrage zur Theologie 11, Miinster 1927) 365-69; Cuthbert Butler, Western Mysticism (2nd ed. London 1926) 50-55; Matthias E. Korger, "Grundprobleme der augustinischen Erkenntnislehre: Erlautert am Beispiel von de Genesi ad litteram XII," Recherches augustiniennes, Supp. a la REAug 2 (Paris 1962) 33-57; Matthias E. Korger and Hans Urs von Balthasar, Aurelius Augustinus, Psychologie und Mystik (Sigillum 18, Einsiedeln 1960) 6-23; Bourke 24246; Agaésse-Solignac 49.575-85. 21Zycha, following E, reads corpora corporalia, an obvious dit-
304 NOTES tography. All other MSS reported omit corpora. See Taylor 'SRext 3e
220Quo absentia corporalia cogitantur. The verb cogitare, which comes from co-agitare, refers to the action by which the mind gathers together and considers images stored in the memory. See Augustine's explanation in Conf. 10.11.18 and again in De
Trin. 11.3.6 (CCL 50.340; ML 42.988).
23A true image (e.g. Augustine's image of Carthage) is elsewhere called phantasia; a fictitious image (e.g. his image of Alexandria) is elsewhere called phantasma. See De Trin. 8.6.9 (CCL 50.281; ML 42.954-55); De musica 6.11.32 (ML 32.1180); Epist. 120.2.10 (CSEL 34.712,22-24 Goldbacher; ML 33.457). 24Tn intellectual vision there is no image like the object seen but not identical with it. In this respect intellectual vision differs from spiritual, for in the latter vision there is an image like the object but not identical. The imaginative representation of a man or a tree is similar to its object but not actually the real object. If I close my eyes and gaze upon these images, I am beholding images resembling their objects but not identical with them. But Aug. maintains that it is otherwise when the intellect gazes upon an immaterial object such as love (di/ectio): one man may see it more clearly than another, but each sees the same object (dilectio). The man with the less perfect intuition does not see an image of dilectio; he sees dilectio itself less clearly.
25See especially 1.9.17, 1.16.31, 3.5.7, 4.7.13, 4.24.41, 5.16.34, 7.13.20, 7.19.25, 8.5.9, 8.16.34, 8.25.47, 8.27.49, 9.2.34, 9.14.25. 26See n. 13 supra. *7Col 2.9. 28Religious observances of the Old Testament: sacramenta veteris testamenti. For the meaning of sacramentum, see n. 20 to
Book 8 supra.
a9] Cor,-15.44.
30Ps. 148.8. 31Fccle. 3.21 (according to the OL). 32Cf. 3.20.30 supra. 33Eph. 4.23-24. The "new man" is human nature restored by grace. mn
35Rom. 7.25. mesa STF: 37John 4.24. 38] Cor. 14.14. Augustine's exegesis of mvevma (spirit) in this passage is questionable. St. Paul is talking about a man with the gift of tongues, and he says that it is the man's spirit that prays (not his mind). The spirit, then, is here the soul in so far as it is under the influence of the Holy Spirit: see Max Zerwick, Analysts philologica Novi Testamenti graeci (Rome 1953) 384. arp or. 14-2: 40Cf. De doctr. christ. 2.1.1 (CSEL 80.33,23-25 Green; ML 34.35): "For a sign is a thing which, besides the impression it makes on the senses, causes something else to come into the mind as a consequence of itself."
411 Cor. 14.16. 421 Cor. 14.6. 43Gen. 41.1-32. 44Dan. 2.27-45; 4.16-24. aor. F415: 46See 12.24.51 infra. 47It is not certain whom Aug. has in mind, but he may be thinking of Victorinus. See Pierre Hadot, Porphyre et Victorinus (2 vols. Paris 1968) 1.100.
48Jean Pépin, "Une curieuse déclaration idéaliste du 'De Genesi ad litteram' (XII, 10, 21) de saint Augustin, et ses origines plotiniennes ('Ennéade' 5,3,1—-9 et 5,5,1-2)," Revue d'bistoire et de philosophie religieuses 34 (1954) 373-400, argues that in this passage
Aug. considers "intellectual" and "intelligible" as coextensive and so practically identical. But, although Aug. says that every intellectual being is intelligible, he considers dubious the proposition that every intelligible being is intellectual. For his present purpose he says that the third and highest type of vision can be called "intellectual" or "intelligible," but this does not thereby make him an idealist in the sense that he would identify being with the objects of thought. See Agaésse-Solignac 49.566-68.
49Matt. 22.39. 50For the senses as messengers, see n. 16 to Book 3 and n. 35 to Book 7 supra.
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51This explanation is repeated in 12.24.51 infra. In describing the production of the image in the "spirit," Aug. uses a passive expression: continuo fit imago eius in spiritu. Thus he points out a temporal concomitance of the internal image with the modification that takes place in the eyes, and he avoids any expression that would imply that the sense object or the eyes exercise any causality on the soul.
Dan. 3.2: 53By means of a bodily sensation: per corporis sensum. According to Augustine, a sensation is an impression made upon the body that of itself does not go unnoticed by the soul: passto corporis per seipsam non latens animam (De quantitate animae 25.48
[ML 32.1063]). The body does not in any way act on the soul in Augustine's theory of knowledge. Hence per corporis sensum denotes not the agent acting on the soul but the instrument used by the soul in acting on itself (or used by God or an angel in acting on it). It follows, then, that when Aug. says here, "... immediately the image of a corporeal object was impressed on his spirit," he means that it was impressed by the soul itself, the spirit acting on the spirit. See 12.16.32-33 infra.
54Dan. 5.25-28. 55Acts 10.11-16. 5¢Acts 10.17-28. 57The reading of E is visione, not vistones as z reports. 58See n. 19 supra. 59Belief in divination was widespread in the Roman world; it was part of the popular religion and was systematized in the official state religion. See W. Warde Fowler, The Religious Expertence of the Roman People (London 1911) 292-313. Plato had no use for diviners (Laws 913b, 933d-e), and Aristotle argued that socalled prophetic dreams were not caused by God (De divinatione per somnia), but the Stoics upheld the popular belief in divination and incorporated it into their system: see R. D. Hicks, Stoic and Epicurean (New York 1910) 41. Divination is defined by Chrysippus as the power of "knowing, seeing, and explaining signs that are given by the gods to men" (Cicero, De div. 2.130).
It was thought to take place through such means as egstasy, dreams, inspection of the entrails of animals, and the observation of unusual natural phenomena and other signs (ibid. 2.2627). ©°4d hoc adiuvari is the reading of all the MSS, and I believe it should be followed. See Taylor "Text" 90.
takes up every explanation that might be offered: the aid might come from (1) nothing, or (2) a body, or (3) a spirit. The first two explanations are too absurd to need refutation; they are dismissed with a rhetorical question: the first (from nothing) for obvious reasons, the second (from a body) for the reason that body cannot act on spirit according to Aug. (see
12.16.32 infra). It only remains then (proinde restat) to take up the third (from a spirit).
freed from the necessity of observing what takes place in the body, the soul is able to turn its attention within and gaze on images to which it would otherwise not attend. In translating quasi relaxetur et emicet eius intentio, | have rendered emicet by the English "is illuminated." Aug. explicitly asserts in 12.30.58 infra that in the spiritual order there is an incorporeal light proper to it, illuminating the likenesses of bodies seen in the spirit.
S22. Corahi: 14. ©4They deceive men by inducing an error in judgment. According to Aug., sensation is an appearance and as such is infallible. The senses perceive what they perceive, and there is an end of it; error with regard to sense objects is due to the judgment: see Contra acad. 3.11.26 (CSEL 63.66 Knoll; ML 32.947). But it should be noted that Aug. did not deny the validity of sense knowledge: see Charles Boyer, L/dée de vérité dans la philosophie de saint Augustin (Paris 1920) 41-44.
65 Again in 12.25.52 infra, Aug. insists that there can be no error in intellectual vision: "For either it [the intellect] understands, and then it possesses truth; or if it does not possess truth, it fails to understand." The objects of intellectual vision are realities "'which are not bodies and have no forms similar to bodies" (12.24.50); and Aug. immediately proceeds to give examples of such realities, including the mind, good dispositions of the 308 NOTES soul, the intellect itself, the virtues, and finally God Himself. Again, in 12.31.59, he cites piety, faith, hope, and patience as examples of objects seen by the intellect under illumination. As Agaésse-Solignac 49.579 point out, when here and elsewhere Aug. gives examples of objects seen by the intellect illuminated by God, the examples are mostly of the ethical or theological order. When illumination is applied to objects known by experience involving sense knowledge, such as an arch or a man, it is not for the purpose of forming the concept but rather for the purpose of formulating the law of the object known or of defining what it must be: see Gilson 90-91.
66The impossibility of error in the soul's vision of eternal truth was maintained in the preceding paragraph. But the same soul can pass judgments on the changeable objects of sense, and these judgments are liable to error. But this sort of error is not harmful to the soul so long as the soul does not lose its vision of eternal truth. It is the ratio superior that knows eternal truth, and in this consists wisdom (sapientia); it is the ratio inferior that judges sensible things, and in this consists knowledge (sctentta): see De Trinitate 12 and Gilson 115-26. The one is immune from error, the other is liable to it. But they are not two distinct faculties; they are two offices of the one mind or intellect.
67The imaginary objector asserts that a danger threatens good men when they are deceived into thinking that a secretly wicked man is good. Aug. denies that there is any real danger, provided that the mind falls into no error in regard to Goodness itself.
68 Acts 12.7-9. 69Acts 10.14. 70The context seems to suggest that gua, which is found in Bru and m, is the correct reading. See Taylor "Text" 90.
phantasia. For the distinction between phantasia and phantasma, see n. 23 supra.
72In this chapter Aug. summarizes his theories on the psychology of sensation, which he has developed at greater length in 3.4.6-3.5.7, 7.13.20, 7.15.21, and 7.19.25—7.20.26 supra.
73See n. 51 to Book 1 supra. 74See 3.4.6 supra.
75] think Aug. has nodded here. It is in Books 3 and 7 that he has treated this matter: see n. 72 supra. But it is true that in 4.34.54 he does mention the theory of light rays going forth from the eyes.
De Gen. ad litt. inperfectus liber 8.29 (CSEL 28/1.479,16— 19 Zycha; ML 34.232), where Aug. asserts that heavenly bodies are far superior to bodies on this earth.
77Cf. De libero arbitrio 3.5.16 (CSEL 74.103-4 Green; ML 32.1278-79). 78The power that conjures up the images of bodies must be more excellent than even the starry heavens, for it is the immaterial soul itself.
79The fundamental principle of Augustine's theory of sensation is here set down in syllogistic form. The same argument is put in a slightly different form in De musica 6.5.8 (ML 32.1167-
68). 80Aug. does not wish us to suppose that the eyes see, for he has already said in ch. 4 that the body does not see, but the soul through the body. Hence he means that the soul sees using the body as an instrument, but he puts the matter in popular terminology.
81From this statement and from 12.22.48 infra, it is evident that Aug. holds that angels, good and bad, can read our thoughts. With regard to the secrets of the heart (secreta cordis), i.e., our innermost thoughts that pertain to our future free acts, the Fathers of the Church generally held that angels could not read them: see G. Bareille, DTC 1 (1909) s.v. "Angéologie d'aprés les Péres," 1200-1201. Aug. here (ch. 17), in speaking of Job's temptation, and in Enarr. in Ps. 7.9 (CCL 38.42-43; ML
36.1034), is in agreement with the traditional teaching. But in Retract. 2.56 or 2.30 (CSEL 36.167 Knoll; ML 32.643), he speaks of demons knowing the dispositiones of men, and he doubts whether they have this knowledge by their perception of some bodily change hidden to the human eye or by some direct spiritual means. It is not clear that by dispositiones he means what other theologians understand by secreta cordis, and in any case he is not positive in his assertions.
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82For Augustine's opinion on the question of angels' bodies, see n. 60 to Book 2.
830 f this case, W. Montgomery, "St. Augustine's Attitude to Psychic Phenomena," Hibbert Journal 25 (1926) 101, says that there are many questions one would like to ask if it were possible to examine the witnesses. But he adds: ".. . the case makes a strong impression both of genuineness and of being accurately recorded. And once again the sobriety of the handling is remarkable."
84A mong us: apud nos. When Aug. returned to Tagaste in A.D. 388, he set up a little monastery, and he moved it to Hippo when he became bishop. As the boy mentioned here was pursuing a life of sanctity at this time (see the last sentence of this chapter), it is quite likely that he was a novice in the religious community and that apud nos means "in our monastery."
85Following Val and m, I read quale where z reads mist. See Taylor "Text" 90.
86 Aug. argues that the continual production of images in the soul is more mysterious and marvelous than the extraordinary occurrence of an ecstasy. Seneca, Nat. quaest. 7.1, argues in a similar vein in considering the marvels to be observed in the daily movements of the heavens. The wonderful to be found in the ordinary is a favorite theme with Aug.: see e.g. Sermo 126.3.4 (ML 38.699).
87Catus: "shrewd," "wise," "sharp," a Sabine word, cognate with acutus, used by Cic., De Jeg. 1.16.45, with the apology, ut ita dicam; not common in classical prose. See TLL 3.623,18-73.
88In this chapter Aug. briefly explains the unusual changes that affect body and soul. He proceeds as follows: I. Unusual changes in the body are caused by: A. the body, e.g. through humors or food, or B. the soul, e.g. through fear or shame.
II. Unusual experiences of the soul are due to: A. something in the body, as happens in dreams and delirium, or B. something in the soul, as when (though the body is normal) the mind is carried away to a vision: .