Chapter X: Possibility Number Three: Other Similar Views
As Kierkegaard greatly influenced the views of Barth, so did Barth greatly influence the views of the many theologians who followed him. This is especially true on the question of Jesus’ resurrection. Many prominent neo-orthodox theologians in particular accepted these views.
For instance, Swiss theologian Emil Brunner apparently affirms belief in the resurrection of Jesus as having actually occurred. But like Barth, he concludes that this occurrence is not part of the realm of normal, verifiable history. He relates that the resurrection is not an event which can be reported as is possible with other events. In addition, we also learn that this occurrence cannot be the basis for the Christian faith. Brunner is careful to stress his view that the Christian’s belief in Jesus’ resurrection is not based upon any records contained in the New Testament, including the testimony concerning the appearances. We cannot resort to historical or other means of verification of this event. Faith comes apart from any demonstrations or proofs that Jesus is alive. One simply accepts this by faith.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer likewise relegates the resurrection to a realm other than normal history. He asserts,
The historicity of Jesus Christ thus comes under the twofold aspect of history and faith. Both aspects are closely associated. The Jesus of history humbled himself; the Jesus who cannot be grasped by history is the subject of faith in the resurrection.
We are therefore to understand that Jesus’ resurrection is not an event which can be understood historically. It cannot be verified or proven, but only accepted in faith. Bonhoeffer thus believed that the resurrection really occurred, but that it had to be received by faith, apart from any historical research.
Reinhold Niebuhr rejected the resurrection of Jesus as an event in his early years at Yale when he was still under the influence of liberal theology, and it appears that he never changed his mind. The physical resurrection of Jesus had to be abandoned as an actual occurrence. Nevertheless, he treated it as parahistory. Speaking of the death and resurrection narratives concerning Jesus, he concludes,
The story of this triumph over death is thus shrouded in a mystery which places it in a different order of history than the story of the crucifixion.
Once again we find the belief that the resurrection did not happen in history in the same way that the crucifixion did and therefore cannot be demonstrated to have occurred.
Barth’s influence extended even further than the neo-orthodox theologians on the question of the resurrection. Günther Bornkamm sounds surprisingly like Barth in his belief that the resurrection is not open to historical verification. It can neither be proven or observed like other events. Yet it is said to have occurred. As such it can be understood properly only by faith.
Reginald Fuller speaks of the resurrection as a metahistorical and eschatological event. Something occurred as revelation from God. However, this event cannot be verified or otherwise proven because it is comprehended only by faith, having taken place on the boundary between this world’s history and the metahistory of the eschatological age that is coming.
Hans Grass also follows a line of thought somewhat similar to Barth’s. For Grass, the historical method provides no basis for investigating the resurrection. This occurrence cannot be approached by such methods of reason. But he differs from Barth in postulating that Jesus’ appearances were spiritual and not physical at all.
Jürgen Moltmann believes that the resurrection occurred, but that it cannot be historically demonstrated to have happened in the past. The theologian’s object should not be to examine such past events, but to look to the future for the significance of them. Anyways, if we were to examine the resurrection by modern historical standards, it would be found to be historically impossible and meaningless.
Moltmann’s answer is to look for a new formulation of the concept of history. The resurrection is an eschatological event and as such it can be grasped historically only when it is viewed as to its future significance. Thus, while Moltmann seemingly rejects the view of prehistory, he still holds that the resurrection should be relegated to a different, eschatologically-oriented concept of history. He is quite specific in his belief that the resurrection was not observable and that this event cannot be verified at present. Thus he also takes flight to a different sort of history in which past events such as the resurrection cannot be historically proven to have occurred apart from future vindication.
We have already presented a critique of these theological attitudes while discussing Karl Barth’s position. Almost the exact same criticisms also apply to the others (at least to the neo-orthodox theologians which we have discussed). Perhaps the main criticism involves placing the resurrection in prehistory or parahistory. While details as to what realm this is may differ somewhat (we have studied Barth’s view in depth above), sociologist of religion Peter L. Berger’s criticisms still apply. First, this category has no meaning for a scholar who desires to empirically investigate the data. One who supports such a view of parahistory has already chosen to leave the empirical realm of investigation. This concept is meaningless in this context. Second, this method is resigned to the few who feel that they have already attained the proper outlook with regard to theology.
With a few variations, the following summary of criticisms applies at least to Barth and scholars like Brunner and Bonhoeffer. They are also more or less applicable to the others covered here, at least in part. First, history knows of no such concept as prehistory. It is not possible to measure or investigate such a realm. In addition, the inclusion of both historical and nonhistorical characteristics renders such a category contradictory. Real history can be investigated and examined to determine if it is valid or not. One cannot make the claim that an event is real history and then not subject it to investigation. Even if a metahistorical event were possible, it must either be verifiable or not claim to be real history at all. Therefore this concept must be rejected. Second, the stress on one’s affirming the resurrection by faith and the refusal to demonstrate this event by any other method means that this view is not objective enough to provide sufficient reason for one to know if the Christian faith is valid. An intense belief cannot make this faith any more valid. With no such methods of investigation we cannot know if such faith is simply in vain.
Third, neo-orthodox theology contends that God’s revelation does not primarily occur in actual history in the modern sense of the word. Yet Barth, for instance, bases the revelation in the death of Christ on what he admits to be an actual historical fact, while refusing to do this in the case of the resurrection. He is therefore internally inconsistent in holding that the resurrection cannot likewise be based on actual historical fact. Fourth, at least Barth contends that the New Testament does not attempt to prove the resurrection. The others at least agree that his event cannot be demonstrated. But Barth’s contention is not based on the available evidence. Contrary assertions in the New Testament invalidate these claims and thus cannot be used to support this thesis.
For these reasons, it is our conclusion here that such an approach to the resurrection is untenable. One cannot remove this event and, subsequently, the entire Christian faith, from the realm of investigation. There are simply too many difficulties for one to hold to such a position. But as with Kierkegaard’s view, so Barth’s emphasis on faith and its importance can remain. We have mentioned above how that Barth conceived of the death of Christ as being a substitutionary death to pay for the sins of those who surrender their life to God in faith. This view of faith must be retained. As it was concluded earlier in chapter , faith must remain the most important element in a theological system. This is even shown to be more true if there is an objective basis on which to rest this faith.
A. WOLFHART PANNENBERG: AN INTRODUCTION
The third major possibility to be dealt with in this work is that Jesus’ resurrection really did occur and that this occurrence can be demonstrated. We will begin by examining the position of a very important scholar in contemporary theology today who holds this view. This theologian, Wolfhart Pannenberg (born 1928), is without much doubt the best-known representative of this viewpoint today.
Pannenberg has received much acclaim in recent years because of his defense of the historicity of the resurrection. In fact, he has been viewed by many as “the theologian of the resurrection.” It is this event which forms the basis for his polemic and which sets the stage for his theological system. Now it is by no means unique either to defend the historicity of the resurrection or to use it as the basis for one’s theological system. But Pannenberg is probably the theologian who is best known for these tendencies. Therefore he becomes the logical choice as the primary scholar to be dealt with here.
Wolfhart Pannenberg is often connected with a new school of theology in Germany which is usually referred to as the “theology of hope.” This generally optimistic understanding of theology was welcomed in the United States in the late 1960s by some of the leading newspapers and magazines. These publications seemed to be more than willing to report the demise of the pessimistic and short-lived reign of the “death of God theology” and greet instead its more hopeful and reassuring “successor.”
The motif of hope in many ways presented a novel approach to theology, being part of one of the first theological schools of thought that was not a development of the earlier dialectic theology of Karl Barth and those who followed him. Among others, those usually connected with the theology of hope are German theologians Pannenberg, Jürgen Moltmann, Johann Metz, and sometimes Karl Rahner. However, it is actually difficult to be overly suggestive when speaking of those who favor this approach, and it is really only possible to speak rather generally of any group of “hope theologians.”
While Pannenberg was earning his doctorate at the University of Heidelberg in the early 1950s, a group of graduate students began meeting and exchanging ideas on the nature of Divine revelation. Apparently in opposition to Pannenberg’s own wishes, this group began to be referred to as the “Pannenberg circle.” The combined work of four of the members—Pannenberg, Rolf Rendtorff, Trutz Rendtorff, and Ulrich Wilkens—produced the volume Offenbarung als Geshichte in 1961. It represented years of study and discussion together.
Although this work was not the first one of Pannenberg’s to be translated into English, it was still significant in that it helped to bring this German scholar to the attention of other theologians. Perhaps Pannenberg’s most significant work to date, Jesus—God and Man, was translated into English in 1968. It was his first major work to appear in an English translation. This Christology has been recognized by some theologians as one of the most significant to appear in many years.
It soon became evident that Pannenberg’s thesis was opposed to many aspects of Barth’s and Bultmann’s theology. For instance, Pannenberg was opposed to the subjectivism exercised by both of these theologians. He also objected to Barth’s concept of revelation, especially with regard to Barth’s view that certain events such as the resurrection happened in a nondemonstrable, nonverifiable type of history. Pannenberg believed that such events both can and should be historically investigated, in opposition to Barth. This, of course, also means that Pannenberg likewise objected to Bultmann’s even more complete divorce of history from faith.
With this introductory background, it is now advantageous to turn to Pannenberg’s argument concerning the resurrection of Jesus. Both a presentation of these views and a critique of them will be given. It should be remarked that the following is not a presentation or discussion of the entire theology of hope, but only of Pannenberg’s views on these subjects.
B. WOLFHART PANNENBERG’S ARGUMENT AND A CRITIQUE
To put Pannenberg in proper perspective, it should be mentioned that the theology of hope stresses eschatological theology and the coming Kingdom of God in particular. The coming of the Kingdom has political and ethical repercussions, as well as theological ones. Also stressed is the death and resurrection of Jesus as historical events which set the stage for this eschatology, as will be perceived below.
One of Pannenberg’s chief aims is to restore to contemporary theology the concept of a functionally imminent Kingdom of God. Most of contemporary theology is perceived to have failed in its approach to the Kingdom in that the eschatological centrality of this concept has been lost. But for Pannenberg, the teaching about the Kingdom must be the central message in Christian theology.
The future Kingdom of God holds a special interest for Pannenberg with regard to God’s existence. God is identified with the coming Kingdom in such a way that, in a certain sense, God does not exist as yet. It is only with the arrival of the future Kingdom that the existence of God is shown to be a definite reality.
But this by no means signifies that God is not now present in this age or that He was not present in the past. The idea that God’s existence is fully revealed in the future therefore does not disqualify Him from present existence. From His future existence God dominates both the past and the present.
At first this concept of the existence of God appears contradictory. The key for understanding it lies in Pannenberg’s ideas about the retroactive power of history and the ability of the future to reach backward into the past. God exists at present (and in antiquity) in the sense that His future is reaching back into the past. He thus exists at present as the partial arrival of the future.
According to Pannenberg’s concept of theology, it is God who will usher the Kingdom into human society. God thus works in the future as well as in the present. This Kingdom is not synonymous with the church, and neither will it arrive by man’s power. He is quite emphatic that it will become part of history by the future actions of God Himself, even though there are present ramifications of the Kingdom as well.
But it is not only the existence of God which reaches into the present from the future. In fact, all occurrences eventuate from the future. As Neuhaus explains, we therefore cannot only refer to the future of an event simply as something which will happen, but rather as something which reaches back into the present and which is now in existence. Although one can perceive the final state of something only in the future, the affects are present.
For instance, the authority of God was retroactively present in the teachings of Jesus. This is shown to be the case especially by Jesus’ resurrection from the dead. In a similar way the Kingdom has also reached back into this present time, although it has not arrived in its fullness. It is through such a stress on the fundamental importance and priority given to the future that Pannenberg can speak of the end time having participated in the life of Jesus.
In Revelation as History Pannenberg wrote two key essays. In one, entitled “Dogmatic Thesis on the Doctrine of Revelation,” he postulated seven theses which are crucial to the understanding of his thought. This essay sets forth much of the foundation of Pannenberg’s theological system and expands on the points raised above. These theses are especially instrumental in pointing out the extremely important place that the resurrection of Jesus holds. Seeing this event in the context of Pannenberg’s theological enterprise will allow for a much better understanding of this scholar and will also make the ensuing critique more accurate and meaningful. For these reasons the seven theses are presented below, with a short discussion of each included. Related key thoughts of Pannenberg’s on Christology and eschatology will also be presented in the appropriate places.
Pannenberg’s first thesis is that God’s Self-revelation is not direct, but indirect, being effected by God’s historical acts. After a brief survey of some of the prominent views on Divine revelation, Pannenberg asserts that God did not reveal Himself to man by the announcement of His name to the Israelites, or by the inspiration of the Scriptures, or by the giving of the law on Mount Sinai or by any other direct means. To the contrary, God revealed Himself indirectly through historical acts in both the Old and New Testament. He made Himself known by means of a revelation grounded in history. The chief purpose of Pannenberg’s essay is to explore this indirect revelation and to ascertain its value as God’s chosen method of revealing Himself.
An interesting aspect of this belief in the indirect self-manifestation of God in human history is that Pannenberg conceives of this revelation as permeating all of human history. God therefore does not simply reveal Himself in some small segments of history exclusive of other areas. Rather, the indirect revelation of God occurs in all of man’s history. For this reason, Pannenberg relates that there can be no such thing as Supernatural events or miracles. Since God works in history as a whole, this means that we cannot speak of Supernatural history versus natural history. No such dichotomy exists. We are thus to perceive that God reveals Himself in all of human history, and since He works in all of history we are not to think of separate miracles or Supernatural events apart from the whole of historical revelation. Pannenberg realizes that this is not a new conception of revelation, as similar views were expressed in German idealism.
The key to his thesis one is thus that God does not reveal Himself directly. Any understanding of the concept of revelation that asserts otherwise is therefore not correct. God only allows Himself to be known indirectly, and that is through His acts in the whole of human history.
Pannenberg’s second thesis is that God’s revelation is not known totally at the beginning, but rather at the conclusion of revelatory history. Since God only reveals Himself indirectly, Pannenberg believes that it is therefore correct to link this revelation with the end of history. Thus the early events in the history of Israel whereby they learned of Yahweh were not the final or the most important of God’s acts. The most important revelation will occur only at the end of history.
Some of the logic of this position has been presented above. It has been stated that Pannenberg conceived of the end of history in such a way that the future can have a retroactive affect upon both the past and the present. As such, all occurrences eventuate from the future. According to this understanding, God can be more or less identified with the coming Kingdom and still have existed so as to have dominated the past and the present. In a similar way, the resurrection is the sign that God’s activity was also retroactively present in the life of Jesus.
Pannenberg thus accepts the priority of the future. Even at present the future is more important. This is seen, for instance, by this scholar’s belief that all events reach into the past and the present from the future. Since these postulates are believed to be valid, one can therefore perceive how Pannenberg further held that the final truth and result of an event is determined by the future of that event and not only by its present appearances.
The natural outworking of this concept is that in the resurrection of Jesus the future already participated in the past. Through this event one can gain a preview of the future. Through this event the God of the coming Kingdom retroactively acted in the life of Jesus. It is an event such as this that illustrates the second thesis concerning how God’s indirect revelation will be accomplished primarily at the end of revelatory history rather than at the beginning. Another pointer to this second thesis is Pannenberg’s belief that it is only with the arrival of the end of history that God will prove Himself to be a definite reality. Again revelation is perceived to be complete at the end of revelatory history.
The third thesis which is presented by Pannenberg is that God’s historical revelation is not restricted to special or private situations, but is open for all men to see. In this sense, revelation is universal. Thus one is not to understand revelation as something secret or mysterious. It is not an entity known only to those who have been initiated into the life of faith. In fact, an individual need not even have faith first in order to see God’s revelation. This is because one’s faith is inspired by seeing the revelatory events. In other words, faith need not precede the perception of revelatory events, but arises after the recognition of them.
As to the nature of the revelatory events in question, Pannenberg asserts that God has acted throughout the history of Israel all the way to Jesus’ resurrection. These events communicate meaning to those who perceive and appropriate them. They are comprehended by reason and are open to the examination of all.
By postulating that God’s revelation is open for all to see and examine, Pannenberg is giving further explanation to this belief that Christianity is a rational faith. One is not required to make a leap of faith so that one might be able to believe in God. Such irrationality has no place in the Christian faith. One believes because the facts are found to be reliable and trustworthy.
Pannenberg realizes that there is a subjective factor involved when one speaks of a historical verification of one’s faith and that one therefore cannot reach absolute results when studying history. Yet history is the proper method to use in examining the claims of Christian revelation, as it is capable of leading one to highly probable conclusions. Therefore, historical examination of events such as the resurrection is needed to ascertain whether the reports are true or not. One thing which Pannenberg insists upon in this research is that the investigator must be open to the results of the research and not have made up his mind in advance as to what did or did not happen.
Pannenberg’s fourth thesis is that God’s universal revelation of His deity is not yet known in Israel’s history. Rather, it was first revealed in Jesus’ fate in that the end of history is already anticipated in this event. Pannenberg is convicted that, in the ancient history of the Jews, God did not show Himself to be the God of all mankind. Rather, He was seen as the God of Israel. But in the New Testament, God was shown to be the God of all of mankind by His act of raising Jesus from the dead. Through this act all men can look to the God of Israel as the only true God. Through the life and teachings of Jesus, the offer of the Kingdom is extended to all people.
It is obvious that the resurrection holds a place of great importance in Pannenberg’s theological enterprise. Indeed, this scholar’s works reflect the Pauline conviction that if Christ had not risen, all faith would be in vain. It is therefore important for one to know if this occurrence is a historical fact which can be demonstrated. Pannenberg advocates examining the sources to see if any alternate explanations could account for the rise of the resurrection faith. He entertains such hypotheses as the subjective vision theory, the legend or myth theory, and Barth’s view of the resurrection happening in prehistory. After a careful look at such theories, Pannenberg concludes that the resurrection of Jesus from the dead is the only adequate explanation for the subsequent faith of the disciples. Those who seek to deny the reality of this event must be prepared to provide a more adequate explanation. Pannenberg believes that the inevitable conclusion is that the resurrection can be verified as having occurred in human history.
The fifth thesis which Pannenberg presents is that the deity of God is not revealed in the Christ event as an independent or isolated fact, but only as the event is part of Israel’s history. The Christ event cannot be separated from Israel’s history because the God of Christ is also the God of the Old Testament. Jesus’ mission and fate must therefore be understood from within the framework and context of Israel’s history. As such the resurrection remains the revelation of God whereby the end times have retroactively taken part in Jesus’ fate.
Pannenberg’s sixth thesis is that the universality of God’s eschatological participation in Jesus’ fate found its actual expression in the Gentile Christian church’s non-Jewish understanding of revelation. The coming of the gospel to the Gentiles was a natural and necessary consequence of the eschatological significance of Christ. But Pannenberg asserts that there were differences between the Gentile and the Jewish conceptions of revelation. The influence of gnosticism is said to have brought some non-Jewish elements into the Gentile understanding of God’s revelation. For instance, gnosticism taught that revelation was direct and that it was imparted by means of secret initiation and knowledge, thus meaning that it was not available to the scrutiny of all men. It has already been pointed out how Pannenberg conceived of Jewish revelation as being both indirect (by means of God’s historical acts) and open for all to perceive.
Pannenberg believes that even though these important differences existed between the Jewish and Gentile ideas of revelation, the Christian conception of God’s acting in Jesus in a final and universal manner still made its way extensively into the Gentile-gnostic concept of revelation. But one should not attempt to rule out portions of the New Testament which reveal a gnostically inclined view of revelation, for these portions still served to make God understandable to both Gentiles and to Jews. In other words, even though Pannenberg believes that gnosticism influenced portions of the New Testament teaching on the revelation of God in a way opposed to the Jewish concept, it must be realized that this still helped the Gentiles to know that God was the God of the Gentiles as well as of the Jews. God’s actions in Jesus’ fate therefore were shown to be universal in scope in that the Gentiles responded to this revelation and accepted it as having been extended to them as well.
The seventh thesis presented by Pannenberg asserts that the imparting of God’s word is related to revelation by its foretelling, forthtelling, and report. Even though Pannenberg understands that any reference to the Biblical word of God as the direct revelation of God is influenced by gnosticism, there is still a threefold relationship between these two concepts. First, the indirect revelation through historical acts confirms the promises which God had given beforehand. Here the word sets the stage for the revelatory actions by foretelling the promises of God which are then fulfilled in the revelatory future. Second, the words of God confirm His acts in history in the sense that they follow the revelation as forthtelling. In this sense, the actions of God establish the words that follow, such as with the Law or other commandments which were given to the people after they had seen God act. Third, emerging in the New Testament one finds that the kerygma acts as a report of what historical acts God has already performed. There can be no universal significance of God’s revelation apart from some proclamation of these events. Thus this third relationship between word and revelation points to a spoken proclamation regarding the preceding revelation.
None of these relationships between revelation and word give any revelatory nature to the word. The word of God, either spoken or written, is therefore conceived by Pannenberg as supplementing the actual revelation without being the revelation itself. The word may precede the indirect revelation in the form of a promise as to what God will do in the future (foretelling), or the word may follow the revelation, having been established by the acts of God (forthtelling). Yet again, the word may be a proclamation of the revelation (report). Thus the word may serve to explicate or proclaim revelation, or else the word may itself be expanded, verified, or established by the revelation. At any rate, the word is therefore related to the revelation without being the revelation itself. From Pannenberg’s presentation of these seven theses one can perceive how the past revelatory acts of God (both in Israel’s history and the life of Jesus) and the future revelation of God are believed to be intricately interwoven. This scholar has indeed developed a theological system which seeks to explain the Biblical concept of God’s indirect Self-revelation through His actions in history. However, Pannenberg fails noticeably in at least four key areas of his work, which will be investigated here.
The first major criticism of Pannenberg concerns his concept of God. This criticism is directed against the aforementioned understanding of God as reaching from a future existence into the past. Pannenberg believes that this view of God is confirmed by the Scriptures and especially by the preaching of Jesus. In the view of this scholar, Jesus conceived of God’s claim to this world exclusively in futuristic terms. God is said to be in a process of coming to exist and so in a certain sense does not exist at present.
In order to make the assertion that the New Testament also expounds this futuristic view of the existence of God, it appears that Pannenberg has to ride roughshod over the Scriptural evidence to the contrary. It is agreed that the main emphasis in Jesus’ teaching is on the coming Kingdom of God and the resulting present faith-obedience to God. But this is far from sufficient proof to require God’s primary existence as issuing into the present from the future. In fact, Jesus seems to indicate the origin of God’s existence as being different than what Pannenberg asserts.
For instance, when Jesus refers to the eschatological judgment of the future, he likens it to the past judgment that God meted out both in the days of Lot and in the days of Noah (Luke 17:26–30, 32; cf. Matt 24:37–39). When on another occasion Jesus was asked for a sign, he did not point forward to any events in the future, but backward to the prophet Jonah, who was to be a sign of his resurrection form the dead (Matt 22:39; cf. Matt 16:4; Luke 11:29–30). Also, when questioned about divorce, Jesus informed the questioner that God has acted out of the past in making provision for marriage. Jesus refers his listeners to the mighty act of the creation of God for their answer concerning the seriousness of divorce (Mark 10:6–8; Matt 19:4–6).
Therefore it is obvious that Pannenberg is not correct in his statement that Jesus spoke exclusively of God in terms of His future rule. To the contrary, several portions of the gospels indicate rather that Jesus also looked into the past for the unveiling of God’s power. Jesus thus does not speak of God exclusively in futuristic terms, unless one has already assumed in advance that God works from the future into the past.
Now Pannenberg can admittedly explain these verses in which Jesus refers to God’s power as also being demonstrated in the past. These were not supposed to be verses which he could not explain. They simply show that Jesus looked to the past as well as to the future in order to reveal the workings of God. There are admittedly many verses which do indeed refer to future acts of God, but there are also ones dealing with His past actions. However, the significant point here is that Pannenberg can interpret the past actions of God according to his system only by utilizing the prior presupposition that God is already in the future, working into the remote past. His view that God reveals Himself only from the future is an unsupported assertion, and it is shown to be so simply by the fact that it must be assumed to be true before it can be accepted, as will be shown in the third criticism of Pannenberg below. He cannot point to these verses as ones which support his ideas, for they do not. He can only interpret them according to already existing assumptions.
But from whence does the actual idea that God exists primarily in the future arise? One might stress verses on the other end of the spectrum and build a case around the thesis that God exists primarily in the past and is revealed particularly through His creation. From this past existence He would then reveal Himself in the present and in the future. Verses pertaining to the future Kingdom of God would then be applied to the final and complete revelation of God. As clever as such systems can be made to sound, they appear to be based more upon philosophical speculation than upon theological revelation.
The point here is therefore not that Pannenberg cannot deal with these preceding verses, but rather that he must assume the primary importance of the future in order to do so. Both his thesis and the contrived one that perceives God to have acted mainly from the past through the creation event thus have the same problem. There is a lack of proof. Both views have inadequate reasoning to justify such a view of revelation. For instance, there is no support in the New Testament accounts of Jesus’ teachings to justify the position that God does not yet exist, in whatever sense this may be taken. Neither does Jesus teach that God is in a process of coming into existence. It is plain that in other similar ways as well, Pannenberg’s overall conception of God appears to be based more upon philosophical speculation than upon revelation. There is a decided lack of evidence for his view.
The second major criticism of Pannenberg concerns his hypothesis that God reveals Himself indirectly only through His actions in human history. For this scholar, God did not reveal Himself through any direct means, such as by the inspiration of the Scriptures, but only indirectly through the events of human history.
Many theologians are of the persuasion that God acts in history and that this is one means of revelation. But fewer are convinced that this is the only means of God’s revelation. Certainly another shortcoming of Pannenberg’s is in not recognizing the self-witness of the Scriptures as being another revelation of God, especially in portions which could not have been influenced by gnosticism.
Pannenberg contends that the New Testament witness to the direct revelation of God in the Scriptures reflects the early influence of gnosticism, as already shown above. This direct Scriptural revelation is held to be contrary to the Jewish understanding of God’s indirect revelation in history. To be sure, he does allow a close connection between the written words and this revelation. But it appears that Pannenberg ignores the Old Testament witness to God’s revelation in Scripture and through the prophets. This attestation would of course be removed from the influence of first century gnosticism.
A very clear reference to God’s speaking through the Old Testament prophets is found in Numbers 12:6, 8. Here we are specifically told that God used this means to make Himself known to the Jewish nation. This is both an early and quite clear reference to the Jewish belief that God did reveal Himself to the Jews through the prophets. Statements such as this one in Numbers could be multiplied considerably. In fact, hundreds of times in the Old Testament the phrase “thus said the Lord” serves to introduce a revelation of God for the people.
The Jews were even responsible for distinguishing between the prophet who spoke the words of the Lord and one who did not. The sign that the prophet was relaying a revelation from God was that the prophecy would occur in history. Thus, the true prophet was one who correctly received revelation directly from the Lord and then proclaimed it to the people, with his word being confirmed by history (see Deut 18:20–22). The Old Testament therefore not only teaches that God’s indirect revelation is manifested in history, in this instance by the fulfillment of prophecy, but also that God’s direct revelation is given to the prophets, through whom God makes Himself known.
However, the Old Testament witnesses report that God not only revealed Himself through the preaching of the prophets, but also through the written Scriptures. There is even a relationship between the revelation given to the prophets to speak and the recording of this revelation in written words, as the prophets were quite often required to record the words of their prophecies. For instance, Moses was commanded not only to speak the words of God, but also to write the words which had been revealed to him. This means that God’s revelation also comes through the written words of the Scriptures.
Other prophets besides Moses are also commanded to write the revelation which was communicated to them by God. This is found to be the case with Isaiah (Isa 8:1; 30:8), Jeremiah (Jer 36:2), and Habakkuk (Hab 2:2). It is recorded that David also both spoke and wrote God’s revelations to him.
It is now plain from this preceding brief survey that Pannenberg’s limitation of revelation to God’s acts in human history is only presenting a part of the whole. In spite of this scholar’s claim that his view faithfully represents that of ancient Judaism, it has been shown here that this is not the case. The Jewish concept of revelation also includes at least the revelation given to prophets to speak the word of God and the revelation which is written in the form of the Scriptures. It is true that the Jews believed that God revealed Himself indirectly through historical acts. But it is also true that the Jews believed that God revealed Himself directly through the prophets and through the written word in the Scriptures. A proper view of Jewish revelation must include all of these factors and not just the first, as Pannenberg’s does.
It is Pannenberg’s opinion that only gnosticism teaches such direct revelation, yet it has been shown that even in the earlier Old Testament writings this view is found. To claim the influence of gnosticism here is therefore clearly impossible. Rolf Rendtorff also asserts that God never revealed Himself in the prophetic word, yet it has also been shown that several Old Testament passages teach the contrary view. Especially noteworthy here is Numbers 12:6:
If there is a prophet among you, I the LORD make myself known to him in a vision, I speak with him in a dream. (Num 12:6, RSV, italics added)
As if to say that this Self-revelation of God was not direct enough in some instances, Numbers 12:8 adds concerning Moses,
With him I speak mouth to mouth, clearly, and not in dark speech; and he beholds the form of the Lord (Num 12:8, RSV).
There can be no question about the intention of these two verses. God made Himself known to the prophets, but He revealed Himself even more directly to Moses. The Lord’s making Himself known must necessarily involve Self-revelation. Other verses pointed out above also assert these beliefs. By making known His present admonitions for holy living by exhorting the Jews to keep the Law and by revealing the future by His prophets, it was believed that God was revealing Himself directly to the people. This was done by God’s chosen messengers through both the spoken and the written word.
Pannenberg’s view of revelation therefore fails in its attempt to present the only revelation of God as being indirect by means of God’s acts in human history. This is just a part of the Jewish concept, which also includes direct revelation through the oral proclamation and through the written word.
The third major criticism of Pannenberg is one which recurs throughout much of his work and is especially obvious in his presentation of his seven theses. Pannenberg’s view of revelation in its relation to the future contains several inadequately supported statements. His theological system does include many intriguing and alluring points, some of which are certainly valid. But the overall framework for this system, especially concerning God’s revelation of Himself from the future, sometimes appears to be composed of assumptions which lack proper evidence. This has been perceived to some extent in the first objection above. Thus McDermott notes here that Pannenberg is sometimes guilty of inserting reality into a future which has obviously not yet arrived, and that he has done so without the proper clarification and evidence.
Instances of this lack of evidence are readily available, and clearly affect the framework of Pannenberg’s theological system. Pannenberg admits that his work rests upon two presuppositions, these being the reality of the future’s power and the single future which exists for every event. These two presuppositions are quite apparent in his seven theses, but strangely without supportive evidence in many cases.
For instance, the second thesis calls for a relationship between revelation and the end of all history. This relationship is said to be the result of the indirect nature of this aforementioned revelation. In fact, the connection of revelation with history’s end is said to be the direct result of the indirectness of revelation. But even if one were to grant the indirect nature of God’s revelation in history, how does this cause revelation to be known primarily at the end of history? Pannenberg never succeeds in demonstrating how indirect revelation automatically means that this revelation must be connected with the end of history. God could quite conceivably be acting indirectly in history from out of the present. In other words, Pannenberg has not shown why futurity must follow from indirect revelation. One must assume that his view of God is the definitive one to even begin to arrive at this conclusion, and we have already seen that this view is quite arbitrary and problematical as well.
Another example of Pannenberg’s arbitrary theology occurs in the fourth thesis, where Jesus’ fate is also connected with the end of history. Because of this formulation, Pannenberg asserts that there will be no further Self-revelation of God after the resurrection of Jesus.
But this thesis also lacks conclusive evidence. Indeed, it raises several problems of its own. For instance, if revelation is mediated in all of history as Pannenberg claims, why should the indirect Self-revelation of God then end with the fate of Christ? Why should revelation not extend beyond this point? One could still hold that the supreme Self-revelation of God occurred in the Christ event, but that this revelation still progresses beyond this point. Is not Pannenberg’s abrupt halt at the fate of Jesus a rather arbitrary termination of revelation? Indeed, it does appear to be simply a desired stopping point. But there is obviously a need for a logical reason to support such an abrupt halt. Pannenberg entertains this same objection at the end of his introductory essay, stating that he hopes this problem will be answered later. But he never quite seems to come back to it with an appropriate answer.
Even if Pannenberg was successful in showing why revelation should end here, would it not then demand an adjustment in his previous concept of this revelation? It would appear that the previous notion that God’s indirect Self-disclosure occurs in all of history—in everything that happens—must be revised. How can one assert that everything which occurs is revelation and then later arbitrarily drop this notion after the Christ event becomes past history? Logically, according to Pannenberg’s system, revelation should continue past this point.
A closely related problem with this fourth thesis is that if God’s revelation occurs in all events of human history, why single out one strand, namely Jewish history, in which to concentrate almost all attention? To do so favors the Biblical witness, to be sure, but what is the rationale behind such an assertion if one begins with Pannenberg’s presuppositions? As Daniel Fuller aptly points out, Pannenberg must deal with the problem of how God reveals Himself in all of history and yet all of the most important revelation occurs especially to a select group of Jews and Christians.
Also, since God is said to act in all of history, how can one ascertain when He acts in a special way in just one event like the fate of Jesus? Some may look at an event and see God working, others may look at the same event and not notice this at all. Perhaps these points indicate that Pannenberg’s view of revelation occurring in all of history needs adjustment.
It is therefore possible to perceive areas of Pannenberg’s theological system which contain several inadequately supported assertions. These problems seem especially related to his view of the future and how it affects the present. Pannenberg’s statements are not self-authenticating. Yet he often fails to provide reasonable facts to back his claims. As a result, his theology remains quite problematical in that the logical demonstration in key areas is often lacking.
The fourth major criticism of Pannenberg concerns both his view of the nature of the resurrection appearances of Jesus and his treatment of the naturalistic alternative views. During a discussion of the historicity of this event, to which we will return briefly below, Pannenberg introduces his conception of the appearances of Jesus to the disciples and to Paul. For this scholar, the resurrection appearances involved several elements. Those who saw the resurrected Jesus saw a spiritual body, not a natural, earthly one. This appearance was accompanied by an audition and, at least in the case of Paul, a phenomenon of light. These were appearances from heaven and were recognized by all as the risen Lord.
However, Pannenberg asserts that these appearances of Jesus were not very palpable ones. The nature of these occurrences was more similar to “objective visions,” or visions which were not produced by the subjective consciousness of those perceiving the phenomena. In other words, the appearances of the resurrected Jesus were realities outside of the apostles in spite of a lack of corporeal qualities. Pannenberg specifically opposes the subjective vision theory, which makes the resurrection a concept in the minds of the disciples with no objective reality. His contentions against this view were presented above. The resurrection was rather an objective reality showing the disciples that Jesus was alive. As such it was an actual historical event.
In spite of Pannenberg’s more than adequate defense of the historicity of the resurrection, his stance against more objective appearances of Jesus is unwarranted. Pannenberg appears to feel that it is essential to choose between Paul and the gospels when discussing the nature of the resurrection body. Since he conceives of all the appearances being of a similar nature, Jesus must have always appeared as he did to Paul.
It has been shown above that both the gospels and Paul maintain that Jesus’ resurrected body was both similar to and different from his natural body. The emphasis in the gospels on the disciples’ ability to touch Jesus’ body and to otherwise verify his appearances to them has also been discussed above. This evidence in the gospels will therefore not be studied here again. But the gospels also reveal the conviction that Jesus’ body was somehow changed, having new qualities and powers.
Paul’s testimony is likewise that the resurrection body is a “spiritual body” different from one’s physical body. Nevertheless, it is the resurrection of a spiritual body and not simply the resuscitation of a spirit. This is recognized by most theologians today. As William H. Johnson correctly contends, theological justice must be done to both words in the Pauline phrase “spiritual body.” Neither word must be over-stressed at the expense of the other. Thus, Jesus did not rise as a spirit or in a physical body, but as a spiritual body.
Yet, it is not recognized as often that Paul also gives some evidence for objective appearances of Jesus. Although he possessed a new body, the Jesus who appeared to the disciples and Paul was the same Jesus who had died on the cross and was afterward buried. Another indicator of the objectivity of Jesus’ appearances was that he appeared to many on different occasions (see 1 Cor 15:5–8). It is especially Jesus’ appearance to the 500 people at once (v. 6) which helps us to determine how objective these experiences were for the disciples. It is this appearance in particular which points to an objective manifestation. Paul’s conception of Jesus’ resurrection body was such that it could be seen by a group this size. It would therefore appear to require more than just a mystifying light and auditory phenomenon, along with an objective vision.
Ladd also disagrees with Pannenberg’s conception of “objective visions,” which pattern all of Jesus’ appearances after the one to Paul. The evidence shows that the gospels were written under the influence and control of various eyewitnesses of these events. There must be an underlying factual tradition behind these reports as well. Besides, once it is granted that Jesus actually rose from the dead, there is no reason why he could not have appeared various ways to various individuals.
To reinforce this last statement, one must remember that, in the books of Luke-Acts, the author Luke does not seem to be aware of any contradiction in recording both the more objective appearances to the disciples and the more “spiritual” conversion appearance to Paul. Similarly, many theologians also feel that the witness of the gospels is essentially compatible with that of Paul, in spite of the different stresses in each. The conclusion often is therefore that Jesus appeared in an objective way that could be verified, but in a new spiritual body.
It is somewhat surprising that Pannenberg does not place even more stress than he does on the objectivity of Jesus’ appearances. For the reasons just outlined here, it is therefore with good evidence that this fourth major criticism of Pannenberg remains valid. Eyewitness testimony witnessed to these objective appearances through such men as Luke (cf. Luke 1:1–4 with Luke 24:36–43; Acts 1:3). Such eyewitness testimony which has already been shown to exist behind the gospel traditions therefore reflects valid witness to the objectiveness of Jesus’ appearances to the disciples. Even Paul refers to the original disciples’ testimony of the resurrection appearances (1 Cor 15:11–15). The testimony of the Gospels is thus compatible with Paul.
The second part of this fourth criticism concerns Pannenberg’s treatment of the naturalistic theories which have been proposed against the resurrection. Apart from his criticism of the subjective vision theory, his overall treatment of the other alternative theories is not entirely complete. He is still successful in refuting the other hypotheses, but he fails to disprove them as sufficiently as is possible. This is an important point, for since all of Christianity rests upon the validity of the resurrection, as was determined earlier, then refutations of rival views must be as complete as possible in order to more clearly ascertain if this event actually occurred. It is especially important to the validity of this third solution to the resurrection (that this event can be demonstrated) that there are no probable solutions other than Jesus’ resurrection from the dead. This therefore points to the need for as thorough an investigation and refutation of the major naturalistic theories as is possible. In addition, it is true that the more thorough such a refutation of the alternate views is, the more convincing the resulting probability of the resurrection of Jesus is made.
Wolfhart Pannenberg has built a theological system which contains many intriguing and interesting ideas. However, his work has been shown to fall prey to four major criticisms. First, his view of God as being fully revealed only in the future is an arbitrary one which lacks the proper evidence. The Scriptures, including Jesus, do not unanimously refer to God this way at all. Second, Pannenberg’s view of God’s indirect Self-revelation as occurring only in historical acts is only a part of the Biblical presentation of revelation. It was found that God also revealed Himself directly through the prophets and through the written word of God.
Third, the overall theological system of this scholar lacked conclusive evidence in several places. This is especially true with regard to Pannenberg’s seven theses. There was a decided lack of evidence needed to demonstrate such items as the futurity of revelation and the end of all Self-revelation of God occurring in the Christ-event. Fourth, it was shown that Pannenberg’s concept of the nature of the resurrection appearances was not objective enough and did not allow properly for the evidence for more objective manifestations of Jesus. In addition, his refutation of the naturalistic theories against the resurrection was not as complete as it should have been.
It is easily perceived that the resurrection of Jesus is one of the central concepts in Pannenberg’s theological system. The examination of the resurrection is also the strongest aspect of his theology. His treatment of this event has been dealt with above, but a few comments are in order here. Pannenberg logically investigates the resurrection with regard to its historicity. Rival theories which seek to explain this event naturalistically are entertained and dispelled, even though such procedures are not as complete as they should have been. Anyone who disputes the claim that Jesus rose from the dead is welcome—in fact, required—to arrive at an alternative theory which is adequate enough to account for the facts.
It is Pannenberg’s conviction that when one conducts such an investigation of the facts, one arrives at the probability that the resurrection did, indeed, occur in actual human history. An examination of the facts reveals the probable conclusion that Jesus did rise from the dead after the crucifixion. The resurrection is thus demonstrated to be an actual historical event. In this conclusion Pannenberg is thorough and difficult to refute. His own refutation of alternate views is valid and does indeed show that the resurrection is the most probable solution. Therefore, this conclusion appears to be quite valid.
Other scholars besides Pannenberg also hold that Jesus rose literally from the dead and that this can be demonstrated to be the most probable conclusion in this issue. This is surely not to affirm that these scholars followed Pannenberg in their conclusions, for most have not derived their inspiration from him, nor do they consider themselves part of the “theology of hope” school of thought. Therefore one finds that the techniques vary here, but the final result is similar.
One such theologian who believes that Jesus’ literal resurrection from the dead can be demonstrated to be the most probable conclusion is Daniel Fuller. In his work Easter Faith and History, Fuller surveys most of the major theological approaches to the question of the relationship between faith and history. As the title of this work suggests, this question is surveyed particularly by examining the various views of the resurrection.
Beginning with Enlightenment rationalism and continuing through present contemporary theology, this scholar investigates most of the major theologians and their views of the historical and rational content of faith. After viewing the attempts of the major theological schools of thought down to the present, Fuller turns his attention to attempts to accept the resurrection as fact from three different standpoints. Attempts to hold belief in this event apart from historical reasoning, by partial historical reasoning and totally by historical reasoning are then investigated. Fuller’s conclusion is that none of these views are entirely acceptable, as each falls prey to various criticisms which he presents. It should be noted that Fuller does agree with the principle of historical verification of the resurrection, as will be shown below. But he objects here to these methods by which such attempts are made.
Fuller’s solution is to examine the first-century approach to the resurrection of Jesus which is taken by Luke in the New Testament work Luke-Acts. After reviewing several key hypotheses concerning the theme of Luke-Acts, Fuller sets forth what he believes is the major theme of these two books.
The Lukan prologue (Luke 1:1–4) sets forth some key information concerning the intentions of the author. Here Luke claims that he received the information in this work from the original eyewitnesses (Luke 1:2). Fuller points out that while Luke was thus not himself an eyewitness of Jesus’ ministry, he received the information from those who did originally participate in the events. However, Luke did share first hand in the fulfillment of the resurrection event, namely, the mission of the Christian church to the Gentiles. Luke therefore experienced the result of the resurrection faith firsthand.
Fuller finds that an important emphasis in Luke-Acts is Luke’s writing so that his readers could know the certainty of what had transpired in the life of Christ and especially in his resurrection. In fact, Luke’s purpose in writing to these early believers was to inform them that they could be sure of what had been reported to them pertaining to the Christ event. This certainty which was available to each reader applied in particular to the surety that Jesus was raised from the dead (see Luke 1:4).
Upon what was such certainty based? Fuller explains that for Luke, the early Christian mission to the Gentiles was the fulfillment of the resurrection of Jesus. Without the appearances to the disciples and the others and later to Paul, there could have been no such Gentile mission. In other words, the existence and continuance of the effort to evangelize the Gentiles depended upon the ministry of Paul and upon the authority and action of the other apostles. But Paul’s involvement in such a work cannot be explained by anything other than the appearance of the risen Jesus to him, as recorded in Acts. Paul, the enemy and persecutor of the church in earlier years, would have no other impetus for such behavior. Likewise, the disciples were not very accustomed to the idea of taking the gospel to the Gentiles (at least in the form of a ministry) until they received just such a commission from the risen Lord who appeared to them after his death. Only such an appearance could account for their realizing that the offer of the Kingdom of God had also been extended to the Gentiles.
In a sense, Luke taught that there were therefore two key points in the present which pointed backward to the resurrection. First, Paul’s conversion could be explained no other way than his having seen the risen Jesus. No other conclusion is sufficient to account for this change in the life of a non-believing enemy of the early church. Second, the outreach of the early Jews to the Gentiles, spearheaded by the disciples, pointed to a directive beyond the exclusivism of Judaism. Apart from the directives issued by the risen Jesus, there is no other probable reason for the Jewish mission to the Gentiles, since the Jews considered themselves as the sole heirs of God’s blessings. Therefore, these two events point unequivocally to the historical resurrection of Jesus.
For these reasons, Luke stood at a critical point in that he was both able to receive knowledge of the Christ event of the past via the eyewitnesses and also to participate in the present and future fulfillment of this event. From his vantage point he realized that the resurrection was the only logical explanation for occurrences such as the conversion of Paul and the Jewish outreach to the Gentiles with the gospel. Thus he encouraged Theophilus and his other readers to reason from these two events in the present to the resurrection of Jesus in the past, realizing that the present reality could only be explained by the factualness of the past event.
After presenting Luke’s position here, Fuller is careful to point out that the resurrection is the solution to these two present events only if the objections against the resurrection have been answered. Earlier he entertained various alternate theories against the historical and verifiable nature of this event. At this point, after a presentation of Luke’s attempts to show that the resurrection was verifiable, Fuller turns to the question of Paul’s conversion. Alternate theories to explain this event are also investigated and refuted.
Fuller’s final investigation deals with Luke’s arguments for the historicity of the resurrection. For Luke, history is viewed as having two sections, an “upper” and a “lower.” In the first or lower section, all historical events are “natural” ones, as they originate from other historical events. But Supernatural events from the second, or higher section, do enter the first. These events could never be the results of occurrences in the first section, but do enter the first from the second “layer.” Here they do not disturb other events, but also follow the patterns of history in the first section after they enter. Thus, for Luke, the resurrection can have a Supernatural origin and still be a historical event, known by historical reasoning.
Luke’s approach is found to be quite satisfying, according to Fuller. He agrees with Luke that the resurrection of Jesus can be verified. Given the possibility of believing in this event apart from historical reasoning or in holding that it is based upon evidences that can be historically verified, Fuller opts for the latter. The resurrection can be shown to be a historical event, both by the investigation of the original eyewitness testimony concerning the appearances and by viewing the fulfillment of this event in history in the conversion of Paul and in the Gentile mission. Belief in this event is thus based upon empirical claims.
Fuller’s approach to the resurrection sometimes appears to reach overly easy conclusions. This is most evident in his refutation of alternate views both with regard to Jesus’ resurrection and in the appearance to Paul. Fuller desires to explore such theories and does refute the major alternatives, as shown above. But the various refutations often appear irresolute and are generally, as with Pannenberg, not as thorough and strong as should be expected. As noted above, it is imperative that the alternative views are refuted as completely as possible in order to reveal if there is a probable naturalistic answer to the resurrection faith, which is rightly viewed as the central tenet of Christianity. It follows that the more thoroughly these alternative hypotheses are refuted, the more probable the resurrection becomes.
It is also possible that Fuller depends too much on the Gentile mission as demonstrating the resurrection, almost as if this conclusion could stand apart from any other investigation of the facts and alternate theories. It must be stressed once again that the Gentile mission can be a pointer to the resurrection only if other objections to this event are completely answered. Fuller does recognize this, but seems to neglect the conclusion that if a valid alternate theory to the resurrection is found, a valid alternate theory would also have to be applied to the Gentile mission. We once again perceive the need to refute alternative theories as completely as possible.
In spite of these criticisms, however, it is most difficult to annul Fuller’s contention that the resurrection can be demonstrated. He does provide enough evidence to establish this event as probable. In so doing he avoids the pitfalls of Pannenberg’s theological system and still succeeds in showing how the literal resurrection of Jesus can be verified as a historical event.
Another theologian who likewise concludes that Jesus’ resurrection is the best explanation for the facts is New Testament scholar George E. Ladd. This scholar realizes that the modern concept of historical methodology argues for a reality in which God does not act in human history. Ever since the Enlightenment, the prevailing view has been that historical events must have origins which are grounded in history. Therefore, miracles with Supernatural origins are ruled out from the outset.
In opposition to this view, Ladd proposes the use of the inductive method of historical inquiry, which allows for the conclusion which best fits the facts. Historical events which claim Supernatural intervention must be investigated to perceive if they are the best explanations for what is known to have occurred. Possible alternative theories must also be examined to see if these hypotheses are able to better account for the factual evidence.
In the case of the resurrection of Jesus, Ladd points out that even if this occurrence were established as an actual event, it must still be counted as “nonhistorical” with regards to its origin. Since such an event would require a Supernatural origin, it could not be said to be historical in the sense that other events are, whose starting point is history itself. Therefore, when judged by modern historical methodology, the resurrection is not a historical event. It is unlike other events in its unique entrance into history.
However, looking at the resurrection only from the standpoint of its origin yields only a portion of the overall picture. For Ladd, historical inquiry cannot prove the resurrection, but it can establish it as the most probable explanation for what occurred. In fact, it is asserted that this event is the only explanation of the facts which adequately explains what is known to have happened.
The belief that this event can be demonstrated to be the only possible solution which accounts for all of the facts is based upon the idea that there must be an adequate explanation for any event occurring in history. To this end, Ladd enumerates the core historical facts surrounding the resurrection which are known to be credible. Later he investigates the major alternative theories which seek to account for these facts by naturalistic means. Each is examined and critiqued. Ladd concludes that each theory fails to explain these resurrection facts.
It should briefly be noted however, that one of the same problems which appears in Pannenberg and Daniel Fuller is also apparent in Ladd with regard to the naturalistic theories of the resurrection. Although Ladd provides a good critique of the subjective and objective vision theories and generally does a better overall job here than Fuller, his treatment of the other theories is not developed thoroughly enough. In fact, the other theories are said to need very little refutation. This lack of a more complete refutation is very important in that it must be ascertained as thoroughly as possible if the resurrection actually happened—if this Supernatural event is more probable than other explanations. The resurrection can be shown to be more probable when other alternate theories are more thoroughly shown to be less so.
As pointed out above, the explanation which best accounts for the historical facts is the one which is given the status of probability. Here Ladd arrives at the conclusion that Jesus’ resurrection from the dead is the most probable explanation. It gives the most adequate explanation to the available facts. The only reason to reject this conclusion is that one has a closed mind to the occurrence of the Supernatural.
Thus, while the resurrection differs from other occurrences in that it has a different origin into the historical processes, it is nevertheless an event in history. It therefore achieves the status of entering the historical process by means of a nonhistorical, Supernatural origin but still becoming a historical event.
Ladd offers a logical approach to the resurrection which seeks to examine the most probable conclusion to this issue. However, he comes perilously close to making some of the same mistakes as Karl Barth.
It has been stated that Ladd explains the resurrection as being nonhistorical in that it enters history Supernaturally. Because of this origin, this event is not historical in the same sense as other events. Therefore, if evaluated in terms of the modern concept of history, the resurrection is not a historical fact.
But Ladd moves even closer to Barth’s position at other points. For instance, he concludes that even though the resurrection can be shown to be the best historical explanation for what occurred, it is still primarily perceptible to the “eye of faith.” Thus, a historian looking at this event can only ascertain that something wonderful happened. The conclusion that Jesus was risen remains a tenet of faith. In fact, it is Ladd’s opinion that even having actually seen the risen Jesus would still not prove the facticity of this event. The appearances thus speak of the need for faith to approach this event.
Admittedly, Ladd’s position does differ from Barth’s in other major facets. Unlike Barth, Ladd opts for investigating the historical evidence for the resurrection. There is therefore an interaction between history and faith, as faith is logical and not simply a leap in the dark. Also unlike Barth, Ladd admits that his faith would be seriously affected if an alternate theory were found to be plausible. Thus he takes considerable effort to refute the leading alternate theories against the resurrection.
Probably the biggest difference with Barth is Ladd’s contention that the resurrection can be demonstrated to be the most probable explanation for the facts. The only logical conclusion is that Jesus actually rose from the dead in history. Other naturalistic theories are found to be unacceptable. Here one finds that faith is reinforced by studying the evidences. Barth opposed all such historical reasoning as an assistance to faith.
In spite of the differences between these two theologians (especially Ladd’s emphasis on the ability to demonstrate that the resurrection is the most probable conclusion), Ladd is still guilty of retreating to the concept of metahistory when confronted by modern historiography. In so doing, history is split into two divisions—the secular and the divine. As mentioned with regards to Barth, history knows of no such differentiation and no such concept of prehistory. Montgomery points out that by making the resurrection a part of this questionable realm of history and by asserting that it can be known primarily by faith, Ladd makes this event only perceptible in any meaningful way to the believer. Thus the non-Christian is not able to benefit from the evidence in favor of this event.
Ladd’s concern with pointing out that the resurrection would require a Divine origin has been noted above. But one can recognize that the origin of this event is Supernatural and still not resort to the concept of metahistory. Daniel Fuller and C. S. Lewis, for instance, have both done creditable jobs in showing how an event can have a Supernatural origin and still be normally connected with history once it enters the historical process. Thus, the matter of Divine causation should not automatically determine that the event must be metahistorical and that it must be known only by the processes of faith. Once it enters history, this event could partake of the historical pattern without impeding other natural events. Therefore, in spite of the origin of a Supernatural miracle, it would become a historically verifiable event upon entering history.
To agree with Barth (and others) in holding that a Supernatural event remains metahistorical even after it enters the historical process is, once again, to divide history into the two component parts of the secular and the divine. But, as has been pointed out in the critique of Barth in chapter , this formulation is faulty. The criticisms directed against Barth will not be repeated here, as it has been sufficiently shown that such a concept is not valid.
To be sure, Ladd accepts critical examinations of the Christian faith. He believes that the inductive historical approach, which accepts the event which best fits the evidence, will demonstrate that the resurrection actually did occur. Here he differs from Barth. But where Ladd does adopt Barth’s metahistorical concept, it must be agreed that he errs in committing some of the same mistakes as Barth. If the Supernatural is found to occur it must happen in historically verifiable history and not in metahistory. This is recognized by Pannenberg, Daniel Fuller, Lewis, and others.
Ladd does not retreat completely into the realm of metahistory as does Barth. His emphasis on being able to demonstrate the resurrection is therefore, like the attempts of Pannenberg and Fuller, a positive aspect of his theology. All three theologians have succeeded in investigating the facts before arriving at a final solution and all three scholars have found the resurrection to be the most probable explanation of what occurred. These findings are further strengthened by the failure of any naturalistic theories to adequately account for what happened.
However, it is not only certain theologians who are convinced of this conclusion. Paul Maier is an ancient historian who also believes that the resurrection is the most probable answer for what occurred. Although Maier is not the only historian to reach such conclusions, his approach is probably the most thorough from the standpoint of historical studies.
For Maier, the discipline of history is very valuable in helping to ascertain what occurred on the first Easter morning. While many ancient historical events are based upon only one source, and two sources often render an event “infallible,” there are several ancient sources which point to the event of the resurrection of Jesus. Even outside of the New Testament sources, there is important extra-biblical evidence especially for the empty tomb, and thus also for the resurrection.
Maier points to such early historians as Tacitus and Josephus, who either infer or specifically mention the belief in the resurrection on the part of the disciples and the early church. Tacitus’ reference to first century Christianity in Rome and to the “superstition” which broke out in Judea after the death of Jesus is perceived to imply the Christian teaching of the resurrection of Jesus. Maier also deals with the problem of a possible interpolation in Josephus’ more specific reference to the resurrection of Jesus and finds that there is very good reason to believe that Josephus did compose this statement concerning Christ minus a few of the more “Christianized” phrases. Thus we see that, in all probability, Josephus reported the early Christian belief in the resurrection and thereby acknowledged that the tomb was empty.
The evidence presented by Josephus and implied by Tacitus is further corroborated by a few other sources. In the first century it was reported that the Jews spread the story that the disciples stole the body of Jesus in order to proclaim his resurrection from the dead. It is related that this story was still being voiced in the second half of the first century. In formulating this totally inadequate view, the Jews not only did not succeed in offering a substantial objection to the resurrection, but in so doing they also admitted the empty tomb.
This Scriptural report is confirmed by second century scholar Justin Martyr, who reports in his Dialogue with Trypho (about 150 AD) that the Jews sent specially taught men across the Mediterranean Sea in order to counter the Christian claims of the resurrection. The explanation spread abroad by the Jews, once again, was that the disciples stole their dead Master’s body. The Jews therefore continued to admit the empty tomb.
As pointed out by Maier, the book of Acts gives further evidence that the tomb was empty on the first Easter morning. As the disciples and early Christians first began to proclaim the resurrection of Jesus from the dead, the Jewish authorities objected strenuously. But in several confrontations with the disciples, the Jewish elders never did what might have been most expected—they never led the disciples to the tomb for an investigation. Discovering the body of Jesus would of course have destroyed Christianity, as the Jewish leaders desired to do anyway. The obvious reason that they did not try to locate the body is because they knew that the tomb was empty. Maier asserts that even the impartial historian must admit this historical evidence for the empty tomb. This implicit admission further pointed to the empty tomb mentioned by Josephus, Matthew, and Justin Martyr, and also implied by Tacitus.
Maier also utilizes circumstantial evidence of two kinds. First, Christianity could not have had its beginnings at Jerusalem, as it did, if Jesus’ grave was still occupied just outside the gates of the city. This is the last place that the church could have begun if Jesus’ body was still in the tomb. Here an investigation of the grave would have revealed the body and Christianity would have been destroyed before it really began. The birth of the church in Jerusalem can only be explained by the fact that Jesus’ tomb was indeed empty.
Second, the spread of Christianity around the Mediterranean region all the way to Rome itself by slightly after the first half of the first century is simply an astonishing feat to have been accomplished in so short a period of time. Approximately thirty years after the death of Jesus this amazing expansion had taken place. It is Maier’s view that such expansion of any teaching or philosophy is unparalleled in ancient times. Could the preaching of and belief in the resurrection have provided the impetus for such growth, as the New Testament attests?
Another piece of evidence has only a possible connection directly with Jesus’ resurrection. A valuable archaeological discovery revealed a marble slab found in Nazareth which contained a warning from Caesar to all who were caught robbing graves in Palestine. Other such Roman edicts against grave robbing prescribed a fine against the offender, whereas this edict condemns the offender to capital punishment. Most scholars believed that the inscription was the command of emperor Tiberius or emperor Claudius. Why was the punishment to be so great in Palestine? Could this command have been prompted by the Jewish report of Jesus’ stolen body or by the preaching of the resurrection?
Theological evidence is also cited by Maier in his effort to deal historically with the resurrection. This historian points to at least three other factors which lead to the final conclusion. First, the aforementioned change in the disciples caused them to believe that Jesus had risen from the dead. Such a radical difference must be based upon some real experience and points to an actual encounter with the risen Lord, just as the New Testament claims. Second, the very existence of the Church points to some event which is worthy of such an enterprise. The New Testament claims this event was the resurrection. Third, there must have been a reason for the early church to have changed the day of meeting from Saturday, the Jewish Sabbath, to Sunday, the Lord’s day. Again, the New Testament claims that the resurrection caused this change in order to commemorate the day on which Jesus had risen.
The last type of evidence employed by Maier is of both a historical and theological nature. Maier entertains the objections raised by eight different naturalistic theories which are aimed at disproving the resurrection of Jesus. Each is then investigated and refuted by the available historical data. He finds that all of these naturalistic theories fail to provide a valid historical answer to what happened on the first Easter day. They must be rejected strictly on the basis of historical inquiry, as well as by theological reasoning.
As for the question of discrepancies in the resurrection accounts, Maier admits that they do exist, as in the rest of the gospels. However, he holds that it is illogical to conclude that this event did not occur because of these variations. Other historical reports also contain similar discrepancies and there is no question about the events they report. For instance, the reports of the great fire of Rome offer even greater conflicts than do the resurrection accounts. Some reports claim that the entire city was affected by the burning flames while others claim that only three sectors of the city were destroyed. There are also differences of opinion as to how the fire started. In spite of these problems, the great fire of Rome is unquestionably a historical fact. In a similar way the resurrection of Jesus is also a historical fact. The various sources simply point to the different traditions, all of which provide evidence that Jesus actually rose from the dead.
Maier concludes that the will not to believe has kept many from accepting the historical evidence on the question of the resurrection. The empty tomb is found definitely to be a datum of history according to the laws of historical research. This conclusion is even strengthened by the “hostile evidence” which has been presented here. The strongest type of historical evidence is facts which are stated about an event by a source which is hostile to that event. When such a source claims that an event is factual when it is not advantageous to do so, this fact is in all probability a genuine one. The empty tomb is attested directly or indirectly by Josephus, Tacitus, and by the witness of Matthew, Luke (Acts) and Justin Martyr as to Jewish practice with regards to the resurrection. Such Jewish and Roman evidence is hostile evidence, for it was not advantageous to either the Jews or to the Romans to acknowledge the empty tomb. Other historical and theological evidence, circumstantial and otherwise, has also pointed to this fact. Therefore it can be asserted that the empty tomb is historical fact.
From the empty tomb Maier then argues to the probability of the resurrection. Evidence such as that presented above (especially the threefold theological proof and the refutation of the naturalistic theories) points to the resurrection of Jesus. The historical evidence is not as strong as that for the empty tomb, but the evidence on the periphery of this event points to the probability that the event itself is historical.
Maier has added a very valuable dimension to the study of the resurrection of Jesus in that he has pursued this subject from the standpoint of history. He thus approaches this question from the standpoint of the historian looking at theology. In his works, then, Maier certainly does not look at this question as one for theology only. Yet he arrives at the conclusion that the empty tomb and resurrection are historical events according to all probability.
Admittedly, his treatment of the naturalistic theories and refutation of them could have been developed more. It has already been shown above how important a complete refutation of alternative theories is in order to more fully determine how probable the resurrection is in actuality. Maier does a fairly creditable job in this respect, but still does not treat these naturalistic hypotheses as thoroughly as is possible.
Perhaps some will object that his treatment of the theological question did not deal with theology enough. Yet this letter criticism does not rightfully apply since his whole purpose is to approach this event as a historian and not as a theologian. Thus he cannot be judged for this second point.
Therefore, his overall effort has been a very successful one. He has logically and historically shown that naturalistic theories do not solve the historical needs on the one hand and that valid historical pointers to the resurrection do exist on the other hand. This combination makes a strong case for the historicity of the resurrection.
After investigating the claims of three scholars who believe that the resurrection can be demonstrated, it must be concluded that the positions of Daniel Fuller, Ladd, and Maier are positive in their overall approaches and conclusions. We have found that these three also present some difficulties. However, a logical approach that is both historical and theological reveals that these positions are better supported by the evidence than the others which were discussed earlier. It yet remains for us to finally ascertain if this third possibility of demonstrating the resurrection is the one that best fits the facts.