169 Orr, Ibid. , p. 236 .
Even Bultmann admits this, as we saw above (“New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., p. 42). There is a difference between saying that the resurrection was a legend or myth and that it was fraud. The former, which is the theory we are discussing here, advocates that the disciples and other early Christians formulated the stories because they really believed Jesus was alive (such as the view of Pfleiderer and Bultmann). The second theory advocates that the disciples simply invented the story in spite of believing that Jesus was dead. Some still hold the former theory (legends or myths). But it is obvious why the latter (fraud) is rejected. The psychological improbabilities of someone dying only for a known fraud, as well as the other reasons against this theory as listed above, therefore make it impossible.
This theory, usually referred to as the “fraud theory,” is not held today among theologians to the knowledge of this writer. This is because of the reasons given above. This also includes theories of the disciples stealing the dead body of Christ, for this would once again involve their lying about the appearances when they would have known that Jesus was not alive. Men do not die for a known lie. For these and the other objections already given, this expansion of the fraud theory is also unanimously rejected.
This point is admitted by both Pfleiderer (The Early Christian Conception of Christ, op. cit., pp. 157–58) and by Bultmann (“New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., p. 34).
Orr, op. cit., p. 236; Pfleiderer, Ibid., p. 102.
Orr, op. cit., p. 246; McNaugher, op. cit., p. 157.
Ibid., p. 247, footnote number .
Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., p. 91.
Lewis, Miracles, op. cit., pp. 117–18, 120.
Pfleiderer, The Early Christian Conception of Christ, op. cit., pp. 153–54, 159.
Ibid., pp. 153–55; cf. p. 103.
Ibid., p. 103; cf. p. 155; Orr, op. cit., p. 252.
Hooke, op. cit., pp. 21–22; Yamauchi, op. cit., March 15, 1974, p. 4.
Hooke, Ibid., p. 40; Pfleiderer, The Early Christian Conception of Christ, op. cit., p. 99.
Yamauchi, op. cit., March 15, 1974, p. 4: Orr, op. cit., p. 250
Yamauchi, Ibid., p. 5. See also J. N. D. Anderson, Christianity and Comparative Religion (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1974), p. 39.
Yamauchi, Ibid.; Anderson, Ibid., p. 38.
Orr, op. cit., pp. 242–43, 251.
See, for instance, Ibid., p. 257
Yamauchi, op. cit., March 15, 1974, p. 5. Cf. Hooke, op. cit., p. 68.
Orr, op. cit., pp. 247, 256–57. Cf. also Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., p. 91. For some of the general disbelief in the Judaeo-Christian concept of resurrection, note the Hebrew and Greek responses to the idea in Mark 12:18; Acts 17:31–32; 26:8.
Other reasons could also be given against the legendary or mythical theory. For instance, we are left without any adequate explanation for the beginnings of the church or for the belief in the empty tomb if this theory were correct. This writer has formulated a list of 33 total reasons (revolving around points such as these enumerated in the four major criticisms above) for rejecting this theory.
Orr, op. cit., pp. 245–46, 253.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., pp. 4–5 for instance.
Schaaffs often directs his attack specifically at Bultmann for using an outdated scientific worldview, a criticism which nullifies Bultmann’s rejection of the miraculous. It is not possible to handle miracles in such a way, as if they were strictly impossible from the start. See Schaaffs, op. cit., pp. 13, 15, 24–25, 31, 60, 64.
Clark also realizes that Bultmann’s defective scientific understanding cannot be used to rule out miracles today. See Clark, “Bultmann’s Three-Storied Universe,” in Gaebelein, op. cit., pp. 218–19.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., p. 38 for example.
Macquarrie, op. cit., pp. 185–86.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., p. 42.
Brown, “The Resurrection and Biblical Criticism,” op. cit., p. 233.
Pannenberg, Jesus—God, and Man, op. cit., pp. 90–91.
Chapter VII: Possibility Number Two: That the Resurrection Did Occur, but that It Cannot Be Demonstrated
For the relation between Barth and the nineteenth-century liberal theology which his thought was to replace, see the brief summation in chapter , footnote number 1. Barth’s neo-orthodox theology as a whole was indebted to Kierkegaard for much of its framework and foundation, and for many of its key facets. See, for instance, Bernard Ramm, A Handbook of Contemporary Theology (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1966), pp. 89–92.
See Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 80–84; cf. Ramm, Ibid., pp. 74–76, 79–80, 89–92. In the next chapter we will discuss some of these theologians who were influenced by Kierkegaard in their acceptance of the resurrection with the stipulation that it cannot be demonstrated.
See, for example, Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), pp. 61–62, 71–72, 80, 84.
Martin J. Heinecken, “Søren Kierkegaard,” in A Handbook of Christian Theologians, edited by Martin C. Marty and Dean G. Peerman (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 125–26.
Søren Kierkegaard, The Point of View for My Work as an Author, edited by Benjamin Nelson, translated by Walter Lowrie (New York: Harper & Row, 1962) pp. 76–80. Cf. also Heinecken, Ibid., p. 125.
Kierkegaard, Ibid., see Appendix A, written by the translator, pp. 162–63; Heinecken, Ibid., pp. 126–27.
Kierkegaard, Ibid., see Appendix B, written by the translator, pp. 163–65; cf. Kierkegaard’s own assessment, pp. 94–95. Cf. also Heinecken, Ibid., p. 128.
Kierkegaard’s polemic against the “Christianity” of his day is especially strong in his work Attack Upon “Christendom,” translated by Walter Lowrie (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972). For his evaluation of Danish Christianity such as spoken of here, compare pp. 132–33, 139, 145, 149, 164–65 for instance, or see the essay “What Christ’s Judgment is About Official Christianity,” Ibid., pp. 117–24. For a brief discussion of Kierkegaard’s attack against the influence of Hegelianism upon Danish Christianity as mentioned above, see also Heinecken, Ibid., pp. 127–28, 134–35.
For Kierkegaard’s own evaluation of what a real Christian is, including these points just mentioned, see Ibid., pp. 23, 149, 210, 213, 221, 268, 280, 287, 290 for example. Heinecken agrees with this summary, Ibid., pp. 131, 134.
This work is translated by David Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
This work is also translated by David Swenson (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1974).
Kierkegaard, The Point of View for My Work as an Author, op. cit., pp. 13–14, 53, 97.
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, op. cit., pp. 86–97, 115–343 for example.
Ibid., p. 323. For instance, see Philosophical Fragments, op. cit., pp. 93–110. For the importance of these two texts as the writings of Kierkegaard which most influenced contemporary theology and philosophy, see Heinecken’s “Søren Kierkegaard,” in Marty and Peerman, op. cit., pp. 131–32.
In addition to the references listed above, see James Collins, “Faith and Reflection in Kierkegaard,” in A Kierkegaard Critique, edited by Howard A. Johnson and Niels Thulstrup (Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1962), pp. 141–42, 147–48. Cf. Lev Shestov, Athens and Jerusalem, translated by Bernard Martin (No city: Ohio university Press, 1966), p. 242.
Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 80–81, 84; Heinecken, “Søren Kierkegaard,” in Marty and Peerman, op. cit., pp. 127, 142. Cf. Runes, op. cit., p. 124.
See, for example, Wesley Barnes, The Philsophy and Literature of Existentialism, op. cit., pp. 48, 56–57, 100–102; Ramm, A Handbook of Contemporary Theology, op. cit., pp. 46–47.
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, op. cit., title of part 2, chapter 2, p. 169.
Ibid., p. 176 and Ramm, A Handbook of Contemporary Theology, op. cit., p. 97.
Kierkegaard, Ibid., pp. 117–16, 178–79.
Ibid., p. 178 and Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, op. cit., pp. 55–57.
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Ibid., pp. 42, 116.
Ibid., p. 178 and Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, op. cit., pp. 49, 55; cf. Robert L. Perkins, Søren Kierkegaard (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1969), p. 17.
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Ibid., pp. 86–97. See also James Brown, Kierkegaard, Heidegger, Buber and Barth (New York: Collier Books, 1967), pp. 57–60.
Gotthold E. Lessing, Lessing’s Theological Writings, edited by Henry Chadwick (London: A. and C. Black, 1956), p. 53.
Ibid., this essay about Reimarus appears on pp. 9–29. Cf. Daniel Fuller, op. cit., p. 32.
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, op. cit., p. 88. Cf. Fuller, Ibid., pp. 34–35.
Lessing, op. cit., p. 53; cf. p. 54. See Fuller, Ibid., p. 34.
Immanuel Kant, Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone, translated by Theodore M. Greene and Hoyt H. Hudson (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), pp. 58–59, note. Cf. Fuller, Ibid., p. 37.
Kant, Ibid., p. 119, note. Cf. Fuller, Ibid., pp. 37–38.
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, op. cit., p. 89; cf. p. 47.
See Ibid., pp. 38, 89, 190 and Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, op. cit., pp. 108–9 for instance. See footnote number 46 below.
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Ibid., p. 33, 42, 45. On Kierkegaard’s belief that history is an objective approach, compare Ibid., p. 173 for instance, in addition to the discussion above.
Ibid., pp. 188, 194. See also Heinecken, “Søren Kierkegaard,” in Marty and Peerman, op. cit., p. 131; cf. p. 138 and Brown, op. cit., p. 59.
Kierkegaard, Ibid., pp. 189–90; cf. p. 30. Cf. Ramm, A Handbook of Contemporary Theology, op. cit., pp. 7, 94–95.
Kierkegaard, Ibid., pp. 42–43 and Kierkegaard’s Philosophical Fragments, op. cit., p. 108. Cf. Brown, op. cit., p. 59.
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, Ibid., pp. 46–47.
See Brown, op. cit., pp. 57–59; Perkins, op. cit., p. 17; Ramm, A Handbook of Contemporary Theology, op. cit., p. 79 and Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, op. cit., p. 21. Kierkegaard does not accept this idea exactly as it appears in Lessing, however. For Lessing the leap is made by persons who are removed from the historical events by time (perhaps by hundreds of years), but who still wish to exercise faith. The leap from history to faith would not be needed if we had all been contemporaries of the event in question. But for Kierkegaard, the lean from historical events in the life of Jesus to faith in these events must be made by all believers because there is no benefit in being a contemporary (see Kierkegaard, Ibid., p. 89; cf. Brown, Ibid., pp. 58–59).
Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, op. cit., p. 53.
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, op. cit., p. 306.
Kierkegaard, Philosophical Fragments, op. cit., pp. 53, 55, 57.
Ibid., pp. 53–55 and Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, op. cit., pp. 118, 209 for instance.
To be sure, Kierkegaard did not assert that there were no objective truths. He did allow for such. However, objective approaches simply cannot lead to eternal truth and neither can the objective be the basis for faith. See Heinecken’s “Søren Kierkegaard,” in Marty and Peerman, op. cit., pp. 139–41.
We also found scholarly support of this definition as well, so as not to attempt to settle such philosophical issues simply by referring to definitions.
For Kierkegaard’s use of logic and reason in his polemic, see Heinecken’s “Søren Kierkegaard,” in Marty and Peerman, op. cit., p. 132; cf. pp. 127–28.
Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, op. cit., p. 89. See also Brown, op. cit., pp. 38–39 and Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 34–35.
For this definition of faith by Kierkegaard, see his Attack Upon “Christendom,” op. cit., pp. 149, 210, 213, 221, 280, 287, for instance. See especially Heinecken, “Søren Kierkegaard,” in Marty and Peerman, op. cit., pp. 131, 133, 134, 138 for the same summary.
Chapter VIII: Possibility Number Two: Other Similar Views
See the introduction to Kierkegaard in chapter for many of these details. Cf. also Heinecken, “Søren Kierkegaard,” in Marty and Peerman, Ibid., p. 136.
Ramm, A Handbook of Contemporary Theology, op. cit., pp. 74–76, 79–80, 89–92.
Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, translated by Ian W. Robertson (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1960).
Ibid., pp. 18–20, 80, 86, 128, 152.
See Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Theology of Karl Barth, translated by John Drury (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), p. 148 and Herbert Hartwell, The Theology of Karl Barth (London: Gerald Duckworth and Company, 1964), pp. 49, 56, 184.
Barth, Anselm, op. cit., pp. 18–20, 128, 39–40; cf. von Balthasar, Ibid., p. 128.
Among other facets, neo-orthodox theology (also termed dialectical theology) affirms that there is a vast gulf between God and man. As a result, there exists a tension between the things of God and the things of man. An answer of both “Yes” and “No” is therefore given by these theologians to certain questions pertaining to this relationship. A possible example of such a seemingly contradictory position is that the Bible is both the Word of God and the word of man. Thus one might answer both “Yes” and “No” to the question of whether the Bible is the work of human writers. See Ramm, A Handbook of Contemporary Theology, op. cit., pp. 35–36.
Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, op. cit., p. 30.
See the penetrating analysis by Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 82–84.
Barth, The Epistle to the Romans, op. cit., p. 204.
Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man, translated by Douglas Horton (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1957), p. 89. The essays in this book are dated 1916–1923.
Karl Barth, The Resurrection of the Dead, translated by H. J. Stenning (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1933).
Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 89–90.
Barth, The Resurrection of the Dead, op. cit., pp. 134, 138, 139.
Carl F. H. Henry, editor, Jesus of Nazareth: Saviour and Lord (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1960), p. 11.
Karl Barth, Theology and Church: Shorter Writings 1920–1928, translated by Louise Pettibone Smith (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 62.
See Montgomery, Where Is History Going?, op. cit., pp. 111–12; cf. p. 115 and Charles C. Anderson, The Historical Jesus: A Continuing Quest, op. cit., p. 157, footnote number 3 for instance. We will return later to Barth’s conception of the resurrection as having occurred in a history different from that of other events.
Concerning Barth’s earlier primary interest in dialectics and his later primary interest in the analogy of faith, see von Balthasar, op. cit., pp. 78–80, 90, 92–93.
Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 147–48.
This greater emphasis on the reality of Jesus’ resurrection is especially perceptible in Barth’s Church Dogmatics, op. cit., vol. 4, part 1, pp. 302, 309, 318, 336–37, 351–52, for instance. See also Barth’s Dogmatics in Outline, translated by G. T. Thompson (New York: Harper & Row, 1959), pp. 122–23. Cf. Hartwell, op. cit., pp. 122–23.
Karl Barth, How I Changed My Mind (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1966), see p. 69 for an example of his attitude.
Karl Barth, The Faith of the Church, edited by Jean-Louis Leuba, translated by Gabriel Vahanian (New York: Meridian Books, 1958), pp. 96–99.
Barth, Church Dogmatics, op. cit., vol. 4, part 1, p. 335.
Ibid., p. 336; cf. Barth’s The Faith of the Church, op. cit., p. 99.
Ibid., especially p. 335; see also pp. 300, 341.
Cf. Barth’s work The Resurrection of the Dead, op. cit., p. 135 with Ibid., p. 335.
Indeed, in The Faith of the Church, Barth notes that he is utilizing a different definition of history when he affirms that events such as the resurrection occurred (op. cit., pp. 98–99).
Barth, Church Dogmatics, op. cit., vol. 4, part 1, pp. 336–37, 351–52.
More will be said about this criticism later.
See especially Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript, op. cit., pp. 188–90 and the discussion above on Kierkegaard. Cf. Brown, op. cit., p. 59.
Cf. Barth’s The Word of God and the Word of Man, op. cit., p. 90.
Barth, Church Dogmatics, op. cit., vol. 4, part 1, pp. 300–301, 334, 336.
Barth uses these descriptive words to refer to his concept of redemptive or spiritual history. See Ibid., p. 336 and The Resurrection of the Dead, op. cit., pp. 134, 139.
Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., p. 99.
Montgomery, History and Christianity, op. cit., pp. 87–88.
Montgomery, Where Is History Going?, op. cit., pp. 111–12; cf. p. 115.
In addition to those listed above, see, for instance, Henry, op. cit., pp. 11–12 and Henry’s own comments in the debate on the resurrection (he was a participant) recorded in the appendix of Montgomery’s History and Christianity, op. cit., pp. 85, 96, 105. The contradictory aspect of Barth’s concept was also confirmed by Clark Pinnock in personal correspondence with this writer, dated July 19, 1971. See also Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 82–84; cf. pp. 69, 71. Charles Anderson, in The Historical Jesus: A Continuing Quest, op. cit., pp. 157–58, footnote number 3, and Ramm, in A Handbook of Contemporary Theology, op. cit., p. 90, also note Barth’s position.
For example, see especially Barth’s Church Dogmatics, op. cit., vol. 4, part 1, p. 335.
Montgomery, History and Christianity, op. cit., pp. 99–101, 106–7.
Ramm, A Handbook of Contemporary Theology, op. cit., p. 90.
Barth, Church Dogmatics, op. cit., vol. 4, part 1, p. 336; cf. p. 334.
Ibid., pp. 248–54 for instance. See Ramm, A Handbook of Contemporary Theology, op. cit., pp. 16, 108.
See Henry, Jesus of Nazareth: Saviour and Lord, op. cit., p. 10 where this criticism is also developed.
This tendency to believe that the New Testament never intends to demonstrate that the resurrection really did happen is evident in both the early and in the late Barth. See his earlier work The Resurrection of the Dead, op. cit., pp. 131–38 and his later opus Church Dogmatics, op. cit., vol. 4, part 1, p. 335.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., p. 39.
Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, vol. 1, p. 82.
See Barth’s Church Dogmatics, vol. 4, part I, pp. 334–36.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., p. 39.
Reginald Fuller, op. cit., p. 29.
Besides this portion and 1 Corinthians 15:4–8, see such passages as Matthew 28:8–9; John 20:17 (in the Greek); 20:19–31; Acts 10:39–41.
Bultmann also believes that the Gospels and Paul endeavor to prove that Jesus had appeared to the apostles. He likewise recognizes that 1 Corinthians 15:3–8 and Luke 24:39–43 are good examples of this tendency. See “The New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., p. 39.
See W. E. Vine, An Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words, four volumes in one (Old Tappan: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1966), vol. 3, pp. 220–21. See also Robertson, op. cit., vol. 3, p. 6.
This is admitted by both Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., p. 39 and by Marxsen, op. cit., p. 169. Marxsen notes that the preaching of repentance and belief in the Lordship of Jesus are both based on the proof that Jesus rose from the dead, according to these verses.
See Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 27.
These four criticisms will be briefly summarized at the conclusion of the next section.
Emil Brunner, The Christian Doctrine of Creation and Redemption, vol. 2 of Dogmatics, translated by Olive Wyon, 3 vols. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1952) p. 366. See also Brunner’s work The Mediator, translated by Olive Wyon (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, p. 153.
Brunner, The Mediator, Ibid., p. 573.
Brunner, Dogmatics, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 369; cf. p. 153.
Ibid., pp. 366–372; cf. Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 155–56.
Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Christ the Center, translated by John Bowden (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), p. 76.
Ronald J. Stone, Reinhold Niebuhr: Prophet to Politicians (Nashville; Abingdon Press, 1972), pp. 22–23, 82.
Reinhold Niebuhr, Faith and History (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1949), p. 147.
Bornkamm, op. cit., pp. 180, 183–84.
Reginald Fuller, op. cit., pp. 23, 48, 81.
See Daniel Fuller’s treatment of Grass’ position for additional criticisms of it (op. cit., pp. 150–56).
Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope, translated by James W. Leitch (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 165–202. See especially pp. 165, 172, 174, 177, 188–89, 197. Cf. Nelson R. Chamberlain, “Jürgen Moltmann; Apostle of Christian Hope?,” Christianity Today 18, no. 19 (June 21, 1974): 7, 8.
Moltmann, Ibid., see especially pp. 178–82, 190, 202.
Jürgen Moltmann, Religion, Revolution and the Future, translated by M. Douglas Meeks (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1969), especially pp. 50–51.
Moltmann, Theology of Hope, op. cit., pp. 177–82, 190, 197. Cf. Robert J. Blaikie, “Secular Christianity” and God Who Acts (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1970), pp. 129–34. See the next chapter on Pannenberg for a critique of a position somewhat similar to Moltmann’s, one which also gives the future the place of priority. Many of the criticisms offered in the next chapter also apply to Moltmann.
Ramm, A Handbook of Contemporary Theology, op. cit., pp. 90, 108.
Barth, Church Dogmatics, op. cit., vol. 4, part 1, pp. 248–54 for example.
Chapter IX: Possibility Number Three: That the Resurrection Did Occur and that It Can Be Demonstrated
When it is asserted that this event can be demonstrated, reference is being made to probabilities. These scholars hold that this event can be demonstrated to a high probability by a reasonable approach to the Christian faith which includes a historical examination of the known facts.
See editor Richard John Neuhaus’ introductory essay “Wolfhart Pannenberg: Profile of a Theologian,” in Pannenberg’s Theology and the Kingdom of God, (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1969), pp. 9–50. See especially pp. 10–11 for this statement.
Pannenberg, Revelation As History, op. cit., pp. 142–44 for instance.
See this proclivity in such scholars as Daniel Fuller, op. cit., p. 144; Montgomery, History and Christianity, op. cit., pp. 72–80; McNaugher, op. cit., pp. 144–85 and Smith, op. cit., pp. 187–228.
Editor Neuhaus in Pannenberg’s Theology and the Kingdom of God, op. cit., p. 9.
For instance, M. Douglas Meeks deals primarily with Moltmann in his work Origins of the Theology of Hope (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1974). See p. 2 for his conviction that others like Pannenberg and Metz cannot be connected completely with Moltmann.
This work was edited by Pannenberg and published in English under the title Revelation as History, translated by David Granskou (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968).
See editor Neuhaus in Pannenberg’s Theology and the Kingdom of God, op. cit., p. 16 and Daniel Fuller, op. cit., p. 178.
Ibid., p. 30 See the treatment of Barth above, including Pannenberg’s view. See also Pannehberg’s Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., p. 99; of. his Revelation as History, op. cit., pp. 9–10. More will be said later concerning his views of the resurrection as a demonstrable event.
Neuhaus, Ibid., p. 37 and Daniel Fuller, op. cit., p. 178.
Brian O. McDermott, SJ, “Pannenberg’s Resurrection Christology: A Critique,” Theological Studies 35, no. 4 (December 1974): 711–21. See also Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, op. cit., p. 53.
Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 51–53, 73.
Editor Neuhaus in Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 42.
Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 133–35, 142–43; see McDermott, op. cit., p. 714.
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, op. cit., p. 127; see McDermott, Ibid., p. 711; 715–17.
Editor Neuhaus in Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 25; cf. p. 42.
See Pannenberg, Revelation as History, op. cit., p. 139 for instance and Theology and the Kingdom of God, Ibid., pp. 54, 63. Cf. Neuhaus, Ibid., p. 41.
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, Ibid., pp. 125–31.
Ibid., pp. 125–27; cf. Daniel Fuller, op. cit., p. 182 and Blaikie, op. cit., pp. 156, 162.
Ibid., pp. 7, 16; cf. Blaikie, op. cit., pp. 156–58, 162.
Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 16, 19. For instance, Schleiermacher’s view is that all events, even the most mundane ones, are miracles. It is not simply the strange or unexplained event alone which is Supernatural. See the discussion of Schleiermacher’s view of miracles above. See also Schleiermacher’s work On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, op. cit., pp. 88–89, 113–14, explanation number 16 for instance.
Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 131–35.
The logic of this assertion will be challenged below.
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, op. cit., pp. 132–34.
Ibid., p. 127; see also Pannenberg’s Theology and the Kingdom of God, op. cit., pp. 62–63, 68, 70–71.
Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, Ibid., pp. 54, 63, 70.
Neuhaus in Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 42.
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, op. cit., pp. 141–43. See McDermott, op. cit., pp. 713–14.
Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 134 and Pannenberg’s Theology and the Kingdom of God, op. cit., p. 62.
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, Ibid., pp. 135–39.
Cf. Pannenberg’s Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., p. 99 with editor Neuhaus in Pannenberg’s Theology and the Kingdom of God, op. cit., pp. 20, 38, 46.
See Neuhaus, Ibid., pp. 20–21 and Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 180–81 for some of Pannenberg’s techniques in investigating evidence.
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, op. cit., pp. 139–45.
Ibid., pp. 141–43. On the universal aspect of the offer of the Kingdom, see Pannenberg’s Theology and the Kingdom of God, op. cit., pp. 73, 76, 85, 88 for example.
Editor Neuhaus in Pannenberg’s Theology and the Kingdom of God, Ibid., p. 41; cf. p. 10. For the apostle Paul’s stance, see 1 Corinthians 15:13–19.
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, op. cit., p. 137; cf. Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 181–82.
Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., pp. 95–97.
See Ibid., p. 99 and Pannenberg’s Basic Questions in Theology, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 15–16. Cf. editor Neuhaus in Pannenberg’s Theology and the Kingdom of God, op. cit., p. 30 and Blaikie, op. cit., pp. 156, 206.
Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 145–48.
Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 145–48.
Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, op. cit., pp. 56, 68.
See Ibid., pp. 50, 53, 73, 81, 133.
In the use of the New Testament Scriptures which are to follow, the issue is not to defend these words and argue if they were actually spoken by Jesus or not. Rather, we are primarily concerned at this point with what the Scriptures teach about the nature and existence of God, not about who said which words.
Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, op. cit., p. 56.
For Pannenberg’s connection of these ideas with Jesus’ teachings, see Ibid., p. 56. But he strangely gives no references for these assertions.
For Pannenberg’s assertions against the “direct” views of inspiration, see Revelation as History, op. cit., pp. 9–13, 152. For his own view see pp. 125ff.
For example, see Ladd, op. cit., pp. 17, 144; cf. Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 186, 230, 237; cf. p. 234. At this point, Pannenberg’s contention of revelation in history is correct.
There is no attempt here to employ any kind of circular reasoning concerning the inspiration of Scripture by first asking what the self-witness of the Scriptures is and then assuming that this is true. This would not be a correct procedure. It is not our purpose here to even discuss whether this self-witness to inspiration is valid. Rather, the concern is that Pannenberg does not accept the New Testament’s claim to revelation in the Scriptures because of what he feels is the influence of gnosticism (see Revelation as History, op. cit., pp. 10–12, 152). It is this claim which must be examined, especially as regards the clearly non-gnostic portions of Scripture. This examination is very important, since Pannenberg is interested in developing an understanding of what the Jewish conception of revelation consisted. This will be our endeavor here as well.
Cf. for example Numbers 22:38; 23:12, 16, 26: Jeremiah 1:6–9; 26:2; Ezekiel 3:10–11.
One such instance is Jeremiah 15:19–21.
See G. Ernest Wright’s exegesis of “The Book of Numbers,” in The Interpreter’s Bible, edited by George Arthur Buttrick, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 450–51.
A general reference to the written words of the prophets occurs in Zechariah 7:12. The words here would probably be the written ones, since the reference is to prophets of former times whose writings were in existence.
Moses is referred to as a prophet in Deuteronomy 34:10.
See Exodus 17:16; 24:4; 34:27–28: Deuteronomy 31:9, 24–26.
As with the other Old Testament verses listed in this section, it is not our purpose here to debate who is the author of these words. It is rather our concern to ascertain what the Jewish view of revelation was, especially as spoken and written by chosen men of God. These verses are therefore very valuable in reflecting this belief.
Cf. Mark 12:36; Matthew 22:43–46; Luke 20:42 with 2 Samuel 23:2. One cannot object to the use of the New Testament verses here, because the Old Testament verse also confirms that the Lord spoke through David. Both express the direct revelation of God to him.
Rolf Rendtorff, in his essay, “The Concept of Revelation in Ancient Israel” (in Pannenberg’s Revelation as History, op. cit., pp. 46–47), also recognizes a close relationship between word and revelation. However, like Pannenberg, he insists that the word is not really revelation. His view likewise falls prey to the same criticisms raised here. For instance, in order for a prophet to foretell an act of God in history, he must have received such word from the Lord. This is the whole point of Deuteronomy 18:20–22. This word is God’s revealing the future through the prophet before the event in history occurs. Pannenberg especially misses this point in his exposition of the similarities between word and revelation (Ibid., 152–55). Without such revelation through the prophet there would be no foretelling of the event.
Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 12; cf. p. 152.
Rendtorff in Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 46.
Many scholars also believe that the Biblical witness provides written revelation of God. For this view see, for instance, Norweigan theologian Sigmund Mowinckel’s work The Old Testament as Word of God, translated by Reidar B. Bjornard (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1959), pp. 10–12, 23–26. See also Charles C. Anderson, The Historical Jesus: A Continuing Quest, op. cit., pp. 9–51 and Bernard Ramm, Protestant Christian Evidences, op. cit., pp. 224–49.
To be sure, there are some strong, carefully reasoned points in Pannenberg’s work. The strongest part of his theology will be discussed later.
Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, op. cit., p. 59.
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, op. cit., p. 131.
As we have already noted, many would perhaps be more willing to grant that one of God’s methods of revelation is His acting in history, in addition to other modes of revelation. See Ladd, op. cit., pp. 17, 144; Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 186, 237.
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, op. cit., pp. 142, 143.
Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 184–86.
See Blaikie, op. cit., p. 159.
See editor Neuhaus in Pannenberg, Theology and the Kingdom of God, op. cit., p. 42.
Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., pp. 92–93.
The key passages teaching the objective nature of Jesus’ appearances include such portions as Matthew 28:9; Luke 24:36–43; John 20:17 (in the Greek); 20:20, 26–29; Acts 1:3.
For instance, the gospels assert that Jesus was already gone from the grave before the stone was rolled away, implying that he evacuated by means other than the doorway (Matt 28:2–6). It is also reported that Jesus left the graveclothes behind, undisturbed, showing that he passed through them rather than having to unravel them (John 20:6–9; cf. Luke 24:12). He was also able to appear and disappear at will, even into locked rooms (Luke 24:30–31, 36; John 20:19, 26). See Ladd, op. cit., pp. 84–96, 126.
See especially 1 Corinthians 15:42–50.
For instance, see Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., p. 92; Ladd, op. cit., pp. 111, 114–18; Brown, The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, op. cit., pp. 85–89 and Brown’s “The Resurrection and Biblical Criticism,” op. cit., p. 236; Reginald Fuller, op. cit., p. 179. See footnote number 113 below for others who also recognize this.
William Hallock Johnson, “The Keystone of the Arch,” Theology Today 6, no. 1 (1949/1950): 20.
See 1 Corinthians 15:3–4. For the reality of the empty tomb, see Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., pp. 100–104; Reginald Fuller, op. cit., pp. 69–70, 179; Brown, The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, op. cit., p. 122, footnote number 204, and p. 126; see also Brown’s article “The Resurrection and Biblical Criticism,” op. cit., p. 235. For the view that Paul also implied the empty tomb in 1 Corinthians 15:4, see Reginald Fuller, Ibid., pp. 48–49, 69; Ramsey, op. cit., p. 44. In addition, see Robert M. Grant, A Historical Introduction to the New Testament, op. cit., p. 369 and Clark H. Pinnock, “On the Third Day,” in Henry, op. cit., p. 15
Cf. Ladd, op. cit., p. 105; see also p. 138 and Brown, The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, op. cit., p. 91.
Luke records the more objective appearances to the disciples (see Luke 24:36–43; Acts 1:3; 10:40–41) right along with the three passages which narrate Paul’s conversion (Acts 9:1–9; 22:6–11; 26:12–18).
See Ladd, op. cit., pp. 126, 137–38; Brown, “The Resurrection and Biblical Criticism,” op. cit., p. 236; cf. Grant, Miracles and Natural Law, op. cit., pp. 229–30; see also Charles C. Anderson, The Historical Jesus: A Continuing Quest, op. cit., pp. 163–66; J. N. D. Anderson, op. cit., p. 99; McNaugher, op. cit., pp. 164–65; Smith, op. cit., pp. 194–95.
There are other substantial criticisms of Pannenberg’s thought which have not been mentioned here. For instance, Neuhaus has pointed out that Pannenberg’s concept of the Kingdom of God as a possibility to be worked for in human society is perilously close to some of the ideas of the social gospel movement of the nineteenth century. The view that the Kingdom of God could become established in the social order through the effort of men failed. See Neuhaus in Pannenberg’s Theology and the Kingdom of God, op. cit., pp. 31–33. Cf. Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 77, 79, 80, 84.
Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., pp. 88–106.
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, op. cit., p. 147.
Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., see this conclusion on p. 105.
Even those who do not accept Pannenberg’s view of the resurrection find his defense of this event to be quite sophisticated. See for instance, Reginald Fuller, op. cit., pp. 22–23.
Chapter X: Possibility Number Three: Other Similar Views
The word “demonstrated,” once again, is not used here in the sense of absolute proof, but rather as it is related to probabilities. Thus, this section deals with the conviction that the factual evidence is such that the resurrection of Jesus is the most probable conclusion.
Daniel Fuller, op. cit. The examination of these various schools of thought and the subsequent evaluation of these three positions with regard to history is found on pp. 27–187.
Preliminary questions such as the authorship and date for Luke-Acts are discussed by Fuller, Ibid., pp. 190–99.
Luke-Acts is addressed to Theophilus in particular (Luke 1:3; Acts 1:1), but there may have been other indirect recipients as well.
Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 189–90, 223 for instance.
Ibid., see especially pp. 217, 219, 226.
Commands such as those recorded in Luke 24:47–48 and Acts 1:8.
Daniel Fuller, op. cit., see, for example, pp. 223, 226–29, 246–47.
Ibid., see especially pp. 190, 223, 235.
For instance, see Fuller’s discussion and refutation of Paulus’ swoon theory (Ibid., pp. 38–39), Lessing’s and Kierkegaard’s attempts to remove this event from all verification (Ibid., pp. 35, 255–56), and Barth’s modification of this approach (Ibid., pp. 83–84, 88–90, 155–56). Luke’s proofs for the resurrection also serve as a refutation of Strauss’ vision theory (Ibid., cf. 45–49 with pp. 231–32).
Ibid., pp. 252–61. See especially pp. 252–53.
Ibid., especially pp. 255–59. See also pp. 220, 231–32.
See Ladd’s book, I Believe in the Resurrection of Jesus, op. cit.
Ibid., pp. 13–14. Concerning the need specifically to examine the resurrection, see pp. 27–28, 132–133.
Ibid., cf. p. 27 with pp. 13, 27, 139–41. See footnote number 1 above.
Ibid., pp. 13, 91–94. Ladd does not simply enumerate facts just because they are recorded in the New Testament. Rather, he lists those which are known to be historically plausible.
Ibid., see pp. 133–39, where Ladd discusses five major alternative theories concerning the resurrection.
Ibid., p. 140. It must be noted here that the objection against Ladd is not due to his position that the resurrection is primarily known by faith, per se. It has already been pointed out above (chapter ) that faith is more important than reason, and so it is with the resurrection. But to remove the resurrection to any type of metahistory is to begin to remove it from certain types of reasonable verification. This is to be guarded against. The problem is therefore in Ladd’s tendencies to begin to remove the resurrection away from the grasp of history (see Ibid., pp. 101–2, 139–40).
Ibid., pp. 12, 27, 140. It will be recalled that Barth opposed all such historical investigation of the resurrection and other modes of interaction between history and faith. As an example, see Barth’s Church Dogmatics, op. cit., vol. 4, part 1, pp. 335, 341.
Ladd, Ibid., pp. 27, 132–42. As mentioned above, Barth asserts that it makes no significant difference if the tomb was opened or closed. In fact, sometimes a naturalistic theory is preferable to one’s trying to treat the resurrection as actual, fully objective history. See Barth’s The Resurrection of the Dead, op. cit., pp. 135–38 and The Word of God and the Word of Man, op. cit., p. 90.
Ladd, Ibid., pp. 13, 27, 139–41. It is because of Ladd’s emphasis on the ability of the resurrection to be demonstrated as the only adequate solution and because of the efforts to refute other alternate theories that he is included in this section and not with Barth in the former section. Ladd’s entire emphasis on the ability of faith to be investigated and reinforced by positive findings was the deciding factor here.
See the discussion of Barth above. Compare his Church Dogmatics, op. cit., vol. 4, part 1, p. 335.
This is Blaikie’s criticism of Ladd’s position, op. cit., pp. 128–29, 134.
Montgomery, Where Is History Going?, op. cit., pp. 114–16. However, Montgomery does not seem to be aware of Ladd’s belief that investigation of the resurrection is still possible even if it can primarily be known only by faith.
Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 252–61 in particular.
Lewis, Miracles, op. cit., see especially pp. 56–63.
Ladd, op. cit., pp. 12–13, 27, 139–41.
It is actually difficult to ascertain how much Ladd does agree with Barth here. See indications of a partial acceptance of Barth’s understanding of the resurrection in Ladd, Ibid., pp. 21, 25, 101–2, 140. See also Montgomery, Where Is History Going?, op. cit., p. 115.
By historically verifiable we are referring to the approach to history which accepts the event which best supports the known facts. To this Ladd, Pannenberg, Daniel Fuller, and C. S. Lewis all agree. In chapters and of this work this same conclusion of ascertaining historical events was also found to be the correct procedure. But we are also speaking here of the need to realize that God’s raising Jesus from the dead is therefore a theological and historical explanation of a historical event. Thus we must not resort to any type of metahistory to explain the resurrection. With this Ladd seems to disagree (Ibid., pp. 101–2, 139–40).
Maier’s chief work on the resurrection is his book First Easter, op. cit. See also “The Empty Tomb as History,” in Christianity Today, op. cit.
We have discussed above the position of theologian and historian John Warwick Montgomery as well as ancient historian Edwin Yamauchi, both of whom also believe that the resurrection can be demonstrated to have occurred.
Montgomery, for instance, more often combines history and theology, being quite adept in both disciplines.
Maier, First Easter, op. cit., p. 114.
Ibid., and Maier’s “The Empty Tomb as History,” op. cit., pp. 4, 5.
Maier, “The Empty Tomb as History,” op. cit., p. 4. J. N. D. Anderson concurs in this position, op. cit., p. 19.
See Josephus, Antiquities, 18.3.
Maier, First Easter, op. cit., p. 114. Other scholars also agree that Josephus did write this portion of Jesus (or at least one very similar to it), except for several “Christian” words. This position is held for at least three major reasons. First, there is no textual evidence against this section in spite of various readings in other places. Second, there is very good manuscript evidence for these statements about Jesus and it is therefore difficult to ignore it. Third, this portion is written in Josephus’ own style of writing. It is thus a warranted conclusion that there are several good reasons for accepting at least that Josephus did write of Jesus, mentioning several facets of his career. It is also a justified conclusion to say that, in all probability, Josephus at least recorded the belief in the resurrection without actually acknowledging that he accepted such a fact. For these three reasons and the concluding facts given here, see, in addition to Maier, J. N. D. Anderson, op. cit., p. 20. See especially F. F. Bruce’s two works, Jesus and Christian Origins Outside the New Testament (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1974), pp. 32–41, especially pp. 36–41 and The New Testament Documents: Are They Reliable?, 5th ed. (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1967), pp. 102–112. Bruce, the Manchester scholar of Biblical criticism, has done much work on Josephus’ reference to Jesus and comes to a conclusion quite similar to Maier’s.
See Matthew 28:11–15 for this report. It has already been shown above that the theory of the stolen body (or other such fraud on the part of the disciples) fails miserably in its attempt to explain the resurrection of Jesus (see chapter , footnote numbers 163, 164, and the discussion corresponding to these remarks). Briefly, this theory ignores at least five key objections. First, men do not die willingly for what they know to be simply a falsehood. Second, the tremendous psychological transformation of the disciples from backward fishermen to bold preachers cannot be explained by any fraudulent action, or else there would not have been this change. Third and closely related, none of the disciples ever recanted even at the threat of losing his life, which would be the normal thing to do rather than die for a lie. This was totally opposed to their actions before the resurrection, such as in fleeing when Jesus was taken captive and by Peter’s subsequent denials. Fourth, the quality of the ethical teachings promulgated by the disciples precludes such actions. Fifth, it is admitted by all that the disciples at least believed that Jesus had risen from the dead. They would of course not believed that this event had actually occurred if they were the ones who had perpetrated the fraud. For these reasons (see also footnote numbers 61 and 62 below), no reputable scholar holds this view today. There is little doubt that this is one of the weakest theories ever formulated against the resurrection, yet it was the one chosen by the early Jewish leaders.
Ibid., pp. 114–15. In addition to the point made here by Maier, it should also be noted that the behavior of the Jewish leaders in Acts also constitutes another objection to the stolen body (fraud) theory. If the Jewish rulers really believed that the disciples stole the body, they would not simply have commanded the disciples not to preach about Jesus (such as Acts 4:18, 21; 5:28, 40), but they would have forced them to admit and recant of their actions.
Maier, “The Empty Tomb as History,” op. cit., p. 5.
Maier, First Easter, op. cit., pp. 119–20.
Ibid., pp. 115, 121–22; “The Empty Tomb as History,” op. cit., p. 5.
Maier, First Easter, Ibid., pp. 105–13, 122; cf. also pp. 77–80 and “The Empty Tomb as History,” Ibid., p. 5.
Maier, First Easter, Ibid., pp. 94, 96.
Ibid., p. 105 and “The Empty Tomb as History,” op. cit., p. 5.
Maier, First Easter, Ibid., this conclusion is stated on p. 120.
Maier, “The Empty Tomb as History,” op. cit., pp. 5–6.
Ibid., pp. 4–5 and First Easter, op. cit., pp. 120–22.
Maier, First Easter, Ibid., especially pp. 105–13, 120–22.
For a very positive review of Maier’s work First Easter and one which recognizes the excellent job done by Maier in his historical demonstration of Jesus’ resurrection, see Lawrence E. Martin, “The Risen Christ,” Christian Century 90, no. 20 (May 1973): 577.
Part 3: An Evaluation of the Solutions to the Question of the Resurrection of Jesus
Chapter XI: An Evaluation of Possibility Number One
Randall, op. cit., pp. 293, 553–54.
Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology, op. cit., pp. 28, 37–38.
Strauss, The New Life of Jesus, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 199–201.
Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, op. cit., see especially vol. 1, pp. 179, 181, 183. Cf. also vol. 1, pp. 71, 178–84; vol. 2, pp. 448–49; and Schleiermacher’s On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, op. cit., pp. 88–89, 113–14, footnote number 16.
Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 51–53.
Renan, Life of Jesus, op. cit., pp. 147–55.
Pfleiderer, The Philosophy and Development of Religion, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 5–6.
Harnack, What is Christianity?, op. cit., pp. 25–31.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., pp. 4–5.
Tillich, Systematic Theology, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 115–17.
Robinson, Honest to God, op. cit., pp. 11–18, 64–68.
This summary of the criticisms of Hume is necessarily a brief one and thus the logic for these four criticisms cannot be properly analyzed from this presentation. For a complete analysis of the reasoning behind these statements, see chapter .
See the above references to these ten theologians for these beliefs (to varying extents) on the part of each of them. In order to ascertain how similar the beliefs of these theologians are to Hume’s stance against miracles, compare chapter .
See footnote numbers 1–3 above and the corresponding discussion.
J. Gresham Machen, Christianity and Liberalism (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1923), pp. 107–9.
The major theories advanced to explain the resurrection have been discussed earlier. It was found that formulations based upon a swoon, subjective or objective visions (including the “telegram theory” and ideas of the continuing spiritual presence of Jesus’ personality in the minds of the disciples), the influence of other ancient myths, and the growth of legends or fraud (including the stolen body theory) all failed to account for the known facts. See especially chapter above.
See the conclusions against each of these theories, especially in chapter . Cf. for example, Maier, First Easter, op. cit., p. 113 and Ladd, op. cit., pp. 139–41.
See the discussion of these facets in chapter above.
Admittedly, no one is able to convince everyone that his view is right. However, if there was a naturalistic theory which was probable, one would think that those who otherwise objected to the facticity of the resurrection would be able to agree on that theory. However, the point being stressed here is not so much that the liberal scholars could not agree on any one theory, but rather that the inherent weaknesses in each were pointed out. In other words, these scholars provided adequate refutations of each of the theories and thus revealed that they were not capable of accounting for the facts.
Bultmam, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., pp. 38, 42 for example.
Ibid., pp. 41–43. R. Lofton Hudson reaches a similar conclusion concerning Jesus’ being alive in the preaching of the church. See R. Lofton Hudson, “What One Easter Meant to Me,” Christian Century 90, no. 16 (April 1973): 450–52, especially p. 451.
Ibid., pp. 77, 110, 128, 141, 144.
Ibid., cf. pp. 128–29 with p. 147.
Marxsen does suggest just this (op. cit., pp. 144–45).
Maier, “The Empty Tomb as History,” op. cit., p. 5 and Maier’s First Easter, op. cit., p. 115.
Brown, The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, op. cit., p. 75, footnote number 128.
Ibid., pp. 152–53, footnote number 5.
Foremberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., especially p. 100.
At this point in the above quote, Ladd supplies a footnote in which he states his view that those who believe that Jesus is still alive but who insist that he did not rise bodily from the tomb are voicing all illogical opinion. Jesus either arose or he is dead (Ladd, op. cit., pp. 152–53, footnote number 5).
Machen notes that this interpretation was also prevalent in the older liberalism of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (op. cit., pp. 108–9).
Such theories would of course be rejected regardless of whether a theologian, historian, philosopher, or other such scholar formulated the hypotheses. The field of specialty makes no difference here, as the alternative theory would still be forced to answer the same objections as were raised above.
Chapter XII: An Evaluation of Possibility Number Two
See Blaikie, op. cit., pp. 122–36 and Montgomery’s History and Christianity, op. cit., pp. 87–89 and Where Is History Going?, op. cit., pp. 115–16.
Barth makes this claim, for instance, in his Church Dogmatics, op. cit., vol. 4, part 1, pp. 335–36.
For the reasoning for these first two criticisms, see chapter above.
The logical steps for these three criticisms of Kierkegaard cannot be completely ascertained from this brief summary. See chapter for an indepth study of this critique.
These four criticisms of Barth were later altered in chapter so that they also applied to the scholars who followed him.
For example, see 1 Corinthians 15:4–8, especially verse 6; Luke 24:36–43; John 20:24–28; Acts 1:3; 10:40–41. Christian doctrines are also said to be true because of the resurrection (see Acts 17:30–31; Romans 1:4).
As with Kierkegaard, the reasons for these four criticisms cannot be fully gleaned from this brief survey. See especially chapter for the rationale here.
This was the result of the logical study of faith and reason in chapter .
For Kierkegaard’s view, see especially Attack Upon “Christendom,” op. cit., pp. 149, 210, 213, 280, 287; cf. Heinecken’s “Søren Kierkegaard,” in Marty and Peerman, op. cit., pp. 131, 133, 134. For Barth’s view, see in particular his Church Dogmatics, op. cit., vol. 4, part 1, pp. 248–54.
Chapter XIII: An Evaluation of Possibility Number Three
Ladd’s conception of the resurrection occurring in history does differ somewhat from the others, and this has already been considered above. All four scholars agree that this event is the best explanation of the historical facts and thus they also agree in accepting it as the most probable conclusion.
The significance of this criticism against all four of these scholars will be more fully explained in the last chapter.
See, for example, Pannenberg, Revelation as History, op. cit., p. 147 and Maier, First Easter, op. cit., p. 120.
Chapter XIV: A Concluding Demonstration
See Montgomery, History and Christianity, op. cit., pp. 88–89 and Where Is History Going?, op. cit., pp. 115–16; Blaikie, op. cit., p. 135; Daniel Fuller, op. cit., p. 188; Ladd, op. cit., pp. 12–13; Maier, “The Empty Tomb as History,” op. cit., p. 5.
There are very few (if any) reputable theologians today who doubt that Jesus actually died on the cross.
Ladd adds here the historicity of the account of the graveclothes being found in the empty tomb (op. cit., p. 94), since the description of them bears the marks of eyewitness testimony.
For similar lists, see Ladd, Ibid., pp. 13, 91–94, 132–33.
We will return to a final evaluation of these alternate theories later.
Ladd, op. cit., pp. 27, 140–41, in reference to Helmut Thielicke’s name for this evidence.
As was shown earlier, even those who do not accept overly objective appearances of Jesus often accept the belief in the empty tomb. See Reginald Fuller, op. cit., pp. 48–49, 69–70, 179–80 and Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., pp. 100–104.
When speaking with an “agnostic” on the subject of Jesus’ resurrection a few years ago, this writer was told that the stance taken by the Jewish leaders in the book of Acts was the strongest demonstration of the reality of this event.
See Acts 1:21, 22; 2:24, 32; 3:15, 26; 4:10; 5:30, etc.
Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 242–50.
“Positive” evidence is a reference to events which point directly to the resurrection, while “negative” evidence is that which is received from refuting the naturalistic theories. Of course, both are positive as far as the reality of the resurrection is concerned.
Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 188–261.
Maier, First Easter, op. cit., pp. 114–22 and “The Empty Tomb as History,” op. cit., pp. 4–6.
Carl Braaten, History and Hermeneutics, vol. 2 of New Directions in Theology Today, edited by William Hordern, 7 vols. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966) p. 78.
Reginald Fuller, op. cit., p. 48.
Ramm, Protestant Christian Evidences, op. cit., p. 194.
Even critical theology accepts this belief on the part of the disciples. For instance, see Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., p. 42.
Other naturalistic theories refuted here in addition to these three include the objective vision theory (including the telegram theory), the hypothesis of the continuing spiritual presence of Jesus’ personality in his disciples’ minds, and the fraud theory (including the stolen body hypothesis). See especially chapter for these refutations.
Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., pp. 88–106.
Daniel Fuller, op. cit., see pp. 38–39, 45–49, 67–68 for examples of this.
Maier, First Easter, op. cit., pp. 105–13.
See Morison’s book Who Moved the Stone?, op. cit., especially the Preface and pp. 9–12; cf. pp. 88–102 for instance. The first chapter appropriately tells of the original book that could not be written against the resurrection and life of Jesus because of the facts.
This work was reprinted in 1965 (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House).
See Josh McDowell, Evidence that Demands A Verdict (San Bernadino: Published by Campus Crusade for Christ International), especially pp. 199–200. See also the tape by McDowell distributed by this same organization, entitled “Resurrection: Fact or Fallacy?”
Viggo Olsen, The Agnostic Who Dared to Search (Chicago: Moody Press, 1974). For Olsen’s discussion of the resurrection, see pp. 36–37, 39, 46–47 of this booklet.
Stott records a letter written by Clarke with the above affirmations. See John R. W. Stott, Basic Christianity (Chicago: InterVarsity Press, 1965), p. 46.
McDowell, op. cit., pp. 196–202.
See Reginald Fuller, op. cit., pp. 37, 177–78; Raymond Brown, The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, op. cit., p. 94, footnote number 160, and p. 95; Ladd, op. cit., pp. 104–6 for a few examples of this belief.
William Hamilton, The New Essence of Christianity (New York: Association Press, 1961), p. 116, note.
John A. T. Robinson, Exploration Into God (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1967), p. 113.
Ibid., pp. 30, 51–52, 70–71, 101.
Even secular theologian William Hamilton opposes the contemporary view which gives existential importance to the concept that Jesus is alive but denies that he literally rose from the dead. Hamilton also asserts that without the historical event of the resurrection, Christian faith loses all meaning (op. cit., p. 116, note). Here he perceives the case quite well.