Notes
Notes
Introduction
University Microfilms has since changed its name to ProQuest.
Years later, I began lecturing and publishing about these types of doubt: Habermas, Dealing with Doubt (Chicago: Moody, 1990); The Thomas Factor: Using Your Doubts to Grow Closer to God (Nashville: Broadman & Holman, 1999); and Why is God Ignoring Me? What to Do When It Feels Like He’s Giving You the Silent Treatment (Carol Stream, IL: Tyndale, 2010). The first two of these volumes are freely available on my website, www.garyhabermas.com, under the books tab.
Gary R. Habermas, Forever Loved: A Personal Account of Grief and Resurrection (Joplin, MO: College Press, 1997).
The vast majority of more critical scholars agree in identifying the authentic epistles of Paul as these seven: Romans, 1 and 2 Corinthians, Galatians, Philippians, 1 Thessalonians, and Philemon. Bart Ehrman refers to these seven texts as “undisputed” (Ehrman, The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings, 2nd ed. [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000], 262, 290).
This list of minimal refutations remains in my files to this day and is dated just a few years prior to the completion of my dissertation.
A couple of items need to be carefully noted here. These last comments, just like many in this introduction, are not to deny that any number of considerations from the Gospels or elsewhere could turn out to be stronger than the more narrowly established arguments. I imagine that many critical scholars would agree with this comment. But again, virtually all sides recognize the narrower, critically-derived research. Further, much of what I am describing throughout this introduction reflects where I was at that specific time in my thoughts and in my research, along with my doubts. So that is not to say that I would reiterate all of these opinions now, as already stated elsewhere in this introduction. These are crucial distinctions to be made.
N. T. Wright, “Towards a Third ‘Quest’? Jesus Then and Now,” ARC 10, no. 1 (1982): 20–27. Wright makes a later reference to this article in “Jesus, Israel and the Cross,” in SBL 1985 Seminar Papers, edited by K. H. Richards (Chico, CA: Scholars Press), 75–95. Wright also discussed at an early date a number of pertinent details regarding the Third Quest; see Stephen Neill and Tom Wright, The Interpretation of the New Testament: 1861–1986, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 288n1, 379–403.
Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of Its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede, trans. W. Montgomery (1906; repr., New York: Macmillan, 1968).
James M. Robinson, A New Quest of the Historical Jesus, Studies in Biblical Theology 25 (London: SCM, 1959).
Many of these examples are summarized by Ben Witherington, with supporting scholars listed in each category, concluding that Jesus was exemplified best as a cynic philosopher, a man of the Spirit, an eschatological prophet, a prophet of social change, the wisdom of God, or as a Jewish messianic figure. See Ben Witherington III, The Jesus Quest: The Third Search for the Jew of Nazareth (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995), with a summarized listing, closing words, and critique in chapter 9.
Witherington III, The Jesus Quest, 41.
For various critiques of the Jesus Seminar, especially Wright’s, see Jesus and the Victory of God, vol. 2 of Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996), 29–45, 78–82; also Neill and Wright, The Interpretation of the New Testament, 288, 379, 397–98; Ehrman, The New Testament, 236; Luke Timothy Johnson, The Real Jesus: The Misguided Quest for the Historical Jesus and the Truth of the Traditional Gospels (New York: HarperSanFrancisco, 1996), see chapter 1, especially pages 1, 5, 8, 25, 95–101; James D. G. Dunn, “Remembering Jesus: How the Quest of Jesus Lost its Way,” in The Historical Jesus: Five Views, eds. James K. Beilby and Paul R. Eddy (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2009), 221–23.
A few examples of these huge sets of research include John P. Meier’s five volume study, A Marginal Jew: Rethinking the Historical Jesus (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1991–2016), James D. G. Dunn’s three large texts, Christianity in the Making (Eerdmans, 2003–2015), as well as N. T. Wright’s four volume investigation, Christian Origins and the Question of God (Fortress, 1992–2013).
This depends in part on which camp the Jesus Seminar was thought to belong. But even if grouped with the Third Quest scholars, the basic conclusion above regarding the at least somewhat more conservative trajectory would still hold true, if to a lesser degree, both because of the strong criticisms of the Seminar made by the other Third Quest scholars, as well as the fact that some members of the Jesus Seminar themselves weighed in separately on these research areas, as will be seen below.
Even as a partial list of the large numbers of these early traditions, Bultmann cites the following two dozen passages, among many others that are also found in his works: John 12:32; Acts 1:22; 2:33; 3:15; 5:30; 9:14; 10:40–41; 13:34; 22:16; Rom 1:3–4; 3:24; 4:25; 10:9; 1 Cor 11:23–26; 12:3; 15:3f.; 16:22b; Phil 2:6–11; 2 Tim 2:8; 2:22; 4:18; Jas 2:7; Rev 5:9–10, 12; 22:20 (Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, vol. 1, trans. Kendrick Grobel [New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1951, 1955], 46–47, 82–83, 125–26, 293–94, 312).
Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, vol. 1, 46–52, 80–83, 294–96.
The latter point of Bultmann’s rejection of any actual supernatural or miraculous events are found throughout his many works, including Theology of the New Testament, vol. 1, 45, 83, 295; “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth: A Theological Debate, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch, rev. trans. Reginald H. Fuller (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), 4–5, 34–35, 38–43; Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958), 61–62, 71–72, 80, 84.
Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, vol. 1, 51–52, 295, 298–99, 302, 345–46; also, Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology, especially 16–17.
These volumes included Oscar Cullmann, The Earliest Christian Confessions, ed. Gary R. Habermas and Benjamin Charles Shaw (London: Lutterworth, 1949; repr., Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2018), especially 13, 16, 49–50, 53, 56–58; C. H. Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1936; repr., Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1980), 11, 15–34; Vernon H. Neufeld, The Earliest Christian Confessions, ed. Bruce M. Metzger, New Testament Tools and Studies (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1963), especially 8–12, 140–46; Max Wilcox, The Semitisms in Acts (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1965), particularly 79–80, 163–67, 171–79.
Some researchers even asserted that the critics who were losing their influence either had not studied the contrary literature in the first place or were simply unwilling to engage it. See Edwin M. Yamauchi, Pre-Christian Gnosticism: A Survey of the Proposed Evidences (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1983; repr., Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2003), 163–249 in particular; E. P. Sanders, Jesus and Judaism (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1985), 29; Larry W. Hurtado, How on Earth Did Jesus Become a God? (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2005), particularly 18.
James D. G. Dunn, Beginning from Jerusalem, vol. 2 (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2009), 41.
As expressed so well by Carl H. Holladay, Theios Aner in Hellenistic Judaism: A Critique of the Use of the Category in New Testament Christology, Society of Biblical Literature Dissertation Series 40, ed. Howard C. Kee and Douglas A. Knight (Missoula, MT: Scholars Press for The Society of Biblical Literature, 1977), especially 1–14, 44, 235–42; Larry W. Hurtado, “New Testament Christology: A Critique of Bousset’s Influence,” Theological Studies 40 (1979): 306–17; Hurtado, How on Earth Did Jesus Become a God?, 16–20, 24, 37, 47–48; Dunn, Beginning from Jerusalem, 36–42, 372–73; Neill and Wright, The Interpretation of the New Testament, 365, 369–73, 377; W. D. Davies, Paul and Rabbinic Judaism: Some Rabbinic Elements in Pauline Theology, 4th ed. (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1980); Sanders, Jesus and Judaism, 26–31; David Wenham, Paul: Follower of Jesus or Founder of Christianity? (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 1995), 2–13, 17–18. Bart Ehrman presents a detailed critique of some of the more fanciful beliefs regarding ancient pagan incursions in Did Jesus Exist? The Historical Argument for Jesus of Nazareth (New York: Harper Collins, 2012), 207–30.
Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony (Grand Rapids, MI: Eerdmans, 2006), 264–71; James Ware, “The Resurrection of Jesus in the Pre-Pauline Formula of 1 Cor 15.3–5,” New Testament Studies 60 (October 2014): 475–98, especially 475, 489. Actually, Reginald H. Fuller drew a similar conclusion in 1979 regarding the “remarkable unanimity” of critical scholars even at that time. Reginald H. Fuller, “The Resurrection Narratives in Recent Study,” in Critical History and Biblical Faith: New Testament Perspectives, ed. Thomas J. Ryan (Villanova: Villanova University Press, 1979), 91–107, particularly 93–94.
Raymond E. Brown, An Introduction to New Testament Christology (New York: Paulist, 1994), 4–15, 102.
Habermas, “Resurrection Research from 1975 to the Present: What are Critical Scholars Saying?,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus, vol. 3 (2005), 136.
Habermas, “Resurrection Research from 1975 to the Present,” 136–39.
Habermas, “Resurrection Research from 1975 to the Present,” 140–45.
A few years earlier I had also published on this naturalistic development: Habermas, “The Late Twentieth-Century Resurgence of Naturalistic Responses to Jesus’ Resurrection,” Trinity Journal 22 (Fall 2001): 179–96.
Habermas, “Resurrection Research from 1975 to the Present,” 144–45, 147–48.
In his famous 1941 essay, “New Testament and Mythology,” Bultmann remarks that the historian might “reduce the resurrection appearances to a series of subjective visions,” without doing so himself (page 42). Though Bultmann is critical of the religionsgeschichtliche Schule of Bousset, Pfleiderer, and others (pages 14–15), he still drinks fairly deeply from their conclusions; and this, too, could retain naturalistic theories as viable options in the first half of the twentieth century. Thus Bultmann’s death in 1976 would very possibly have signaled a decline of these options, especially in the face of the new historical searches that were beginning.
In a recent, unpublished PhD dissertation, my research assistant Benjamin Shaw summarized the research of almost two dozen of the scholars who provided various listings of accepted historical data pertaining to aspects of Jesus’ life. It is noteworthy that of the lists pertaining more generally to Jesus’ life as a whole, more than half of the examples are from liberal scholars. Benjamin C. F. Shaw, “Philosophy of History, Historical Jesus Studies, and Miracles: Three Roadblocks to Resurrection Research” (PhD diss., Liberty University, 2020), Appendix, 153–68.
Bart D. Ehrman, How Jesus Became God: The Exaltation of a Jewish Preacher from Galilee (New York: Harper Collins, 2014), 164, also 164–65, 173, 186–87.
Habermas, “Mapping the Recent Trend toward the Bodily Resurrection Appearances of Jesus in Light of Other Prominent Critical Positions,” in The Resurrection of Jesus: John Dominic Crossan and N. T. Wright in Dialogue, ed. Robert B. Stewart (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 91.
Habermas, “Resurrection Research from 1975 to the Present,” 141.
Gary R. Habermas, Theological Update, “Experiences of the Risen Jesus: The Foundational Issue in the Early Proclamation of the Resurrection,” Dialog: A Journal of Theology 45 (Fall 2006): 292.
Mark M. W. Waterman, The Empty Tomb Tradition of Mark: Text, History, and Theological Struggles (Los Angeles: Agathos, 2006), 192–93.
Crossan, “Opening Statement,” 24–25; also, Crossan, “Appendix: Bodily-Resurrection Faith,” 175–76, both in Stewart, ed., The Resurrection of Jesus. See also this agreement spelled out in Habermas, “Resurrection Research from 1975 to the Present,” 147.
N. T. Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, vol. 3 of Christian Origins and the Question of God (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 85–479.
Michael R. Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus: A New Historiographical Approach (Downers Grove, IL: IVP Academic, 2010), especially 400–37, 469.
Robert H. Gundry, Sōma in Biblical Theology: With Emphasis on Pauline Anthropology (Grand Rapids, MI: Zondervan Academic, 1987), particularly chapter : “The sōma in death and resurrection,” 159–83.
Habermas, “Mapping the Recent Trend toward the Bodily Resurrection Appearances of Jesus in Light of Other Prominent Critical Positions,” 91.
Wright, “Opening Statement,” in The Resurrection of Jesus, ed. Stewart, 21.
Crossan, “Opening Statement,” in The Resurrection of Jesus, ed. Stewart, 24, 25, 29.
Crossan, “Opening Statement,” in The Resurrection of Jesus, ed. Stewart, 26. Crossan’s emphasis.
Wright, “Dialogue,” in Stewart, ed., The Resurrection of Jesus, 42–43 (Wright’s emphasis).
Many details can be found elsewhere, such as Habermas, “The Minimal Facts Approach to the Resurrection of Jesus: The Role of Methodology as a Crucial Component in Establishing Historicity,” Southeastern Theological Review 3 (Summer 2012): 15–26.
Were I to rewrite my thesis today, I would not say some of the things that are contained in the original; others I would keep but nuance and hone differently. But that is to be expected with the growth of ideas over the intervening decades!
A few of the applicable page numbers from the dissertation will be listed parenthetically throughout the introduction, and in this section particularly.
See pages 256, 257–58 of my dissertation.
Earlier in my process, they were also termed the “Core Events.”
In the dissertation, I do begin with ten initial “known historical facts” (pages 256–58) and then reduce these to a list of seven (pages 258–60), but these later seven facts highlight the evidential considerations from the longer list rather than providing “minimal” data. Hence, these seven are not called minimal facts and do not correspond to any of the data on the minimal facts list that was published initially in 1980 and again afterward. For example, the empty tomb is present in the longer list in the dissertation, as it usually is, but the empty tomb never appears in the minimal facts listings, for reasons that I have explained repeatedly elsewhere. The initial appearance of the minimal facts (referred to here as both core and minimal data) is found in Habermas, The Resurrection of Jesus: An Apologetic (Grand Rapids, MI: Baker, 1980), 38, 40.
It should be noted that throughout these methodological considerations, the minimal facts are never explicitly stated as simply true apart from the recognition that many facts stand behind each of them, establishing their credibility in the first place. This well-evidenced quality is precisely what accounts for the initial scholarly assent. The same is the case with the almost two dozen liberal, moderate, and conservative scholars referred to in footnote 31 who likewise provide their own lists of historical data, which generally contain much in common. They all likewise employ accredited reasons behind each of these data points that allow their facts to be stated usually without challenge.
In the dissertation, several of the seven evidences (pages 258–60) are certainly thoughtful and have their place, but I would no longer use them today in the first tier of defense—not because they have been weakened, but because there are so many stronger points to make. These include the responses of the Jewish leaders, the birth of the Christian church, and Sunday worship.
For just a few of the equally in-depth critiques of naturalistic options, see Gary R. Habermas and Michael R. Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids, MI: Kregel, 2004), 81–150, 290–318; Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 465–610, 618–20; Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, 27–28, 77, 80–81, 318, 550, 638–39, 686, 689–91, 697–706, 709–10; William Lane Craig, Assessing the New Testament Evidence for the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus (Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen, 1989), 374–79, 397–404, 412–18.
Habermas, “Experiences of the Risen Jesus: The Foundational Issue in the Early Proclamation of the Resurrection,” 289–93. Many accompanying reasons are provided in this article in favor of these eight indications that all point to the appearances of the risen Jesus. Similarly, though configured differently, see also Habermas, “The Resurrection Appearances of Jesus,” in In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History, ed. Gary R. Habermas and R. Douglas Geivett (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Academic, 1997), especially 265–70.
The latter list alone includes Acts 1:21–22; 2:22–36; 3:13–16; 4:8–10; 5:29–32; 10:39–42; 13:28–31; cf. 17:1–3, 30–31.
As mentioned above and everywhere else in this research, the argument for the empty tomb is taken from the longer list of known facts in my dissertation rather than from the more recent, briefer minimal facts.
See especially Dodd, The Apostolic Preaching and its Developments, 11, 15–34; Max Wilcox, The Semitisms in Acts, particularly 79–80, 163–67, 171–79.
Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist? 22, 27, 92–93, 97, 111–12, 131–32, 141, 144–45, 155–58, 163–64, 170–73, 251, 254, 260–63. Some of the primitive traditions in the sermon summaries of Acts came from this same time, as well (see pages 108–11, 131, 158, 194, 216–17 of the dissertation).
Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist? 131, 144–45, 261; Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 138.
Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist? 144–46, 148.
Gerd Lüdemann, The Resurrection of Jesus: History, Experience, Theology, trans. John Bowden (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1994), 38 (Lüdemann’s emphasis); see also 181–84, where his rejection of Christianity is mentioned.
Lydia McGrew, Hidden in Plain View: Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels and Acts (Chillicothe, OH: DeWard, 2017), 220–21.
Robert H. Stein, Gospels and Tradition: Studies on Redaction Criticism of the Synoptic Gospels (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1991), 158–85.
Stein, Gospels and Tradition, raises a large number of important questions concerning the criteria (160–61, 163, 166, 168, 170–71, 174–75, 178–79, 181–83) while still defending their use at each of these points, usually in a narrower form (159, 161–62, 166, 168, 171, 176, 179, 181, 183–84); also, Norman Perrin, Rediscovering the Teaching of Jesus (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), 20–22, 29, 37–47; Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist? 262, 271, 288–93; Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 101.
Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist? 74, 156–58, 163–64, 173, 290–92, 327–31.
Gary R. Habermas, The Risen Jesus and Future Hope (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), chapters 2–6; Habermas, The Resurrection of Jesus, chapters 2–5 and Appendix 3; Habermas and Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, chapter 11; Wright, The Resurrection of the Son of God, chapters 12, 19; Wright, Surprised by Hope: Rethinking Heaven, the Resurrection, and the Mission of the Church (New York: Harper Collins, 2008), chapters 10–12.
Part 1: Approaching the Question of the Resurrection of Jesus
Chapter I: The Present State of the Question
Willi Marxsen, The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth, translated by Margaret Kohl (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1970), p. 12. This quote from 1 Corinthians 15:14 and other Biblical quotes in this work are from the Revised Standard Version of the Bible (New York: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1946, 1952).
Günther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth, translated by Irene and Fraser McLuskey (New York: Harper & Row, 1960), p. 181.
Marxsen believes that it is now impossible to prove the resurrection event (op. cit., pp. 112–13, 119, 122), but we can still accept the offer of faith in Jesus even if he is dead (Ibid., pp. 128, 147). Bornkamm agrees that the resurrection cannot be demonstrated or proven to have occurred (op. cit., pp. 180–186; especially pp. 180, 184). But we can still exercise faith in Jesus apart from any such proof (Ibid., pp. 183, 184). More will be said about the logic of this type of reasoning later—how it can be held by some that one can have faith in Jesus whether or not he has risen (and even if he is still dead!).
Laurence Miller, Jesus Christ Is Alive (Boston: W. A. Wilde, 1949), p. 9.
Merrill C. Tenney, The Reality of the Resurrection (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 7–8.
Charles C. Anderson, The Historical Jesus: A Continuing Quest (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1972), pp. 157–59.
A. M. Ramsey, The Resurrection of Christ, 2nd ed. (London and Glascow: Collins, 1965), pp. 9–11.
Daniel P. Fuller, Easter Faith and History (Grand Rapids: William Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 18, 19.
C. C. Dobson, The Empty Tomb and the Risen Lord, 2nd ed. (London and Edinburgh: Marshall, Morgan and Scott, n.d.), pp. 24–25.
Markus Barth and Verne H. Fletcher, Acquittal by Resurrection (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1964), Foreward, pp. v–viii, cf. p. 3.
Rudolf Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, edited by Hans Werner Bartsch, translated by Reginald H. Fuller (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), p. 39 referring to Acts 17:31.
Marxsen, op. cit., p. 169, referring to Acts 17:30f.; Fuller, op. cit., pp. 14–15, referring to Romans 10:9.
Rudolf Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, translated by Kendrick Grobel (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, n.d.), Part I, p. 27, referring to Acts 2:36 and Romans 1:4. Cf. also Fuller, op. cit., p. 15, referring to Acts 2:22–36.
Fuller, op. cit., pp. 15–16, referring to Romans 1:4.
Marxsen, op. cit., p. 169, referring to Acts 16:30f.
Anderson, op. cit., pp. 158–59, referring to Romans 4:25; 10:9; cf. also Barth and Fletcher, op. cit., p. 4 and Tenney, op. cit., p.8.
James McLeman, Resurrection Then and Now (New York: J. B. Lippincott Company, 1967), p. 92; cf. 87 also.
It should be noted that neither form or redaction criticism is actually theology. Rather, these are literary methods that have been used in diverse endeavors, such as in studying classical literature. They are therefore utilized here as literary approaches which are presently being applied to the New Testament. These methods are thus referred to as the current theological approach to the resurrection because they are employed by theologians and not because these disciplines are mistakenly being referred as theology themselves. For the relationship between form and redaction criticism, see Norman Perrin’s What is Redaction Criticism?, edited by Dan O. Via (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1971), p. 13 for instance.
The aforementioned The Resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth by Marxsen.
Reginald H. Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1971).
Perrin, op. cit., pp. 13–15. Some of Bultmann’s conclusions on the importance of the resurrection in the early church have already been noted above.
Rudolf Bultmann, “The Study of the Synoptic Gospels,” in Form Criticism, translated by Frederick C. Grant (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), pp. 11–76.
Perrin, op. cit., pp. 1–3, 13.
Bornkamm’s belief in the importance of the resurrection for Christian theology has been noted above.
Some of Marxsen’s contributions to the current study of the resurrection have also been noted above.
See, for instance, Marxsen’s and R. Fuller’s work above, footnotes 21 and 22 respectively, which are entirely devoted to the resurrection. Portions of many works have also dealt with this subject, like those of Bultmann and Bornkamm cited above, footnotes 12 and 2, respectively.
C. S. Lewis’ work Miracles (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1965) deals with the resurrection on pp. 148–55.
J. N. D. Anderson has at least two writings dealing with the resurrection. See Christianity: The Witness of History (London: Tyndale Press, 1969), pp. 84–108 and the booklet The Evidence for the Resurrection (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1966).
Berger’s work, A Rumor of Angels (New York: Doubleday Publishing Company, 1970) does not deal directly with the resurrection, but rather with the possibility of miracles and Supernatural events occuring.
Cassels has written at least two books which deal with the question of the resurrection. See This Fellow Jesus (New York: Pyramid Publications, 1973), pp. 84–90 and Christian Primer (New York: Doubleday and Company, 1967), pp. 23–26.
One of Morris’ books Many Infallible Proofs (San Diego: Creation-Life Publishers, 1974), devotes a chapter to the resurrection, pp. 88–97.
H. G. Wells, The Outline of History, 2 vols. (Garden City: Garden City Books, 1949), vol. 1, pp. 539–40.
Shepard B. Clough, Nina G. Garsoian and David L. Hicks, A History of the Ancient World, 3 vols. (Boston: D. C. Heath and Company, 1967), vol. 1, Ancient and Medieval, p. 127.
Paul L. Maier, First Easter (New Yorks: Harper & Row, 1973).
Ibid., p. 93. The italics are Maier’s.
“Can history tell us what actually happened on that crucial dawn?” (Ibid., p. 114. The italics are Maier’s).
Ibid., cf. especially pp. 93–122.
See, for instance, Paul L. Maier, “Who Was Responsible for the Trial and Death of Jesus?” Christianity Today 18, no. 14 (April 12, 1974): 8–11.
Paul L. Maier, “The Empty Tomb as History,” Christianity Today 19, no. 13 (March 28, 1975): 4–6.
Edwin M. Yamauchi, “Easter—Myth, Hallucination or History?,” Christianity Today 18, no. 12 (March 15, 1975): 4–7; and 18, no. 2 (March 29, 1975): 12–16 (two parts).
Ibid., March 15, 1974, pp. 4–6.
Ibid., pp. 6–7. We will turn to this theory in greater depth later in this paper.
Ibid., p. 7 and March 29, pp. 12–16.
For instance, see John Warwick Montgomery’s, The Shape of the Past: An Introduction to Philosophical Historiography (Ann Arbor: Edwards Brothers, 1962) and Where Is History Going? (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1969).
William Wand, Christianity: A Historical Religion? (Valley Forge: Judson Press, 1972).
Maier, “The Empty Tomb as History,” op. cit., p. 6.
Yamauchi, op. cit., March 29, 1974, p. 16.
Montgomery, Where Is History Going?, op. cit., pp. 71, 93.
Wand, op. cit., pp. 93–94; cf. also pp. 51–52, 70–71.
John Hick, “Theology and Verification,” in Religious Language and the Problem of Religious Knowledge, edited by Ronald E. Santoni (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1968). This article first appeared in Theology Today, vol. 17, 1960, pp. 12–31.
Cf. Ibid., pp. 375–76 for instance, where Hick admits that it would be easy to conceive of after-life experiences that would not at all verify theism, but he does not entertain the objections.
Schubert M. Ogden, “Toward a New Theism,” in Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, edited by Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr. and Gene Reeves (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1971), p. 183. Cf. also Ogden’s examination of a modern approach to the resurrection in his work The Reality of God and Other Essays (New York: Harper & Row, 1966). pp. 215–20.
Bernard M. Loomer, “Christian Faith and Process Philosophy,” in Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, Ibid., pp. 91, 95 for his treatment of the resurrection.
Peter N. Hamilton, “Some Proposals for a Modern Christology,” in Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, Ibid., pp. 371, 376, 379, 381.
Francis Schaeffer, Escape from Reason (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1968), see pp. 84–85 for instance.
Francis Schaeffer, The God Who Is There (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1968), pp. 112, 142.
Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, Ibid., p. 92; see also Schaeffer’s Escape from Reason, op. cit., p. 77.
Schaeffer, Escape from Reason, Ibid., pp. 79, 90 and Schaeffer’s The Church Before the Watching World (Downer’s Groves: InterVarsity Press, 1971), pp. 98–99.
Chapter II: The Possibility of Miracles Today
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., pp. 1–5.
David Hume, Essential Works of David Hume, edited by Ralph Cohen (New York: Bantam Books, 1965), p. 128n3. The italics are Hume’s.
Richard Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle (London: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1970), p. 11.
Ibid., pp. 148–69 for instance.
John McNaugher, Jesus Christ the Same Yesterday, Today and Forever (New York: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1947), pp. 91–92.
In the case of Bultmann we are referring to this scholar’s references to what “miracle” meant in the New Testament, as mentioned above. Like Hume he does not believe they occur, but grants that this was still believed to be the definition of the word in first-century Christian thought.
For a very brief introduction to the question of some older theories concerning the origins of myth, see Daniel Dodson’s introductory essay “What is ‘Myth’?” in Thomas Bulfinch’s The Age of Fable (Greenwich: Fawcett Publications, 1961), pp. 6, 9. For an examination of the origins of myth according to many historians of religion, see Burton H. Throckmorton’s The New Testament and Mythology (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1959), pp. 81–85.
Wand, op. cit., p. 40; see also James K. Feibleman’s article “Myth” in the Dictionary of Philosophy, edited by Dagobert Runes (Totowa: Littlefield, Adams and Company, 1967), p. 203.
For instance, see Mircea Eliade, The Quest: History and Meaning in Religion (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1969), p. 72f. See also Throckmorton, op. cit., p. 80.
See Victor Turner’s article “Myth and Symbol,” in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, edited by David L. Sills (no city: The Macmillan Company and The Free Press, 1968), vol. 10, pp. 576–82. For the definition of “myth” employed in literature, see for example James F. Knapp, “Myth in the Powerhouse of Change,” The Centennial Review 20, no. 1 (Winter 1976): 56–74. Cf. Wesley Barnes, The Philosophy and Literature of Existentialism (Woodbury: Barron’s Educational Series, 1968), pp. 34–40.
See S. H. Hooke, Middle Eastern Mythology (Baltimore: Penguin Books, 1966), who lists this view as one which is still employed in current treatments of this subject (p. 11). See also Wand, op. cit., p. 40.
See Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, translated by W. Montgomery (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1968), pp. 78–79; cf. David Strauss’ work The Old Faith and the New, translated from the sixth edition by Mathilde Blind (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1874), pp. 56–59 for instance.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth op. cit., especially pp. 1–11. Cf. Schubert Ogden, Christ Without Myth (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), pp. 39–40.
Throckmorton, op. cit., p. 23; cf. John Macquarrie, An Existentialist Theology (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), pp. 172–73.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., pp. 10–11.
Mircea Eliade, Myth and Reality, translated by William R. Task (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), pp. 5–14.
Mircea Eliade, Mephistopheles and the Androgyne: Studies in Religious Myth and Symbol, translated by J. M. Cohen (New York: Sheed and Ward, 1965), pp. 201–8.
For Paul Ricoeur’s understanding of the intermingling of theology and culture, see his work History and Truth, translated by Charles A. Kelbley (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1965), pp. 177–79 for example.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., pp. 1–10.
Ibid., pp. 4–5; cf. Montgomery, Where Is History Going?, op. cit., p. 194, especially footnote number 37.
Bultmann, Ibid., p. 38; cf. Macquarrie, op. cit., pp. 185–86.
Cf. for example John A. T. Robinson’s Honest to God (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963). pp. 13–18.
James H. Jauncey, Science Returns to God (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1966), p. 37. Cf. also philosopher Gordon Clark’s statements about the mechanism of the nineteenth century in his essay “Bultmann’s Three-Storied Universe,” in Christianity Today, edited by Frank E. Gaebelein (Westwood: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1968), pp. 218–19.
Benedict Spinoza, The Chief Works of Benedict De Spinoza, translated by R. E. M. Elwes, 2 vols. (New York: Dover Publications, 1951), vol. 1, p. 87.
See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, vol. 2, no. 2 of the International Encyclopedia of Unified Science, edited by Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and Charles Morris (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971).
Clark, “Bultmann’s Three-Storied Universe,” in Gaebelein, op. cit., pp. 218–19.
John Warwick Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology (Minneapolis: Bethany Fellowship, 1970), pp. 263, 320.
Werner Schaaffs, Theology, Physics and Miracles, translated by Richard L. Renfield (Washington, DC: Canon Press, 1974) pp. 26, 31, 37–38. Cf. Jauncey, op. cit., p. 37.
Ibid., pp. 63–64; cf. pp. 44–45.
Kuhn, op. cit., pp. 67, 149; cf. Schaaffs, Ibid., p. 64.
For instance, David Hume firmly rejected cause and effect. See O. W. Heick, History of Protestant Theology, vol. 2 of A History of Christian Thought by J. L. Neve, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: The Muhlenberg Press, 1946), p. 65 and also J. Bronowski and Bruce Mazlish, The Western Intellectual Tradition (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 474.
Schaaffs, op. cit., pp. 63–64 and Clark, “Bultmann’s Three-Storied Universe,” in Gaebelein, op. cit., p. 218.
Ibid., p. 38; for this principle as it is applied to physics, see Schaaffs, op. cit., pp. 57–61 and Otto Blüh and Joseph Denison Elder Principles and Applications of Physics (New York: Interscience Publishers, 1955), pp. 760ff.
Schaaffs mentions three approaches in noting the affect of the microcosm on the macrocosm. One way would be to work from the microscopic elements to the macroscopic ones, noting the affect single atoms can have on whole processes or events. Or one might work in the opposite direction, beginning with the macrocosm and endeavoring to find the minute particles that affect it. Lastly, Schaaffs has experimented with de Broglie’s equation of the matter-wave demonstrating that it can also be applied to the macrocosm, just as it can be applied to the microcosm (Ibid., pp. 80–81).
Ibid., pp. 52–53, 71, 79–81. This last point is illustrated by Schaaffs (pp. 52–53).
Ibid., pp. 16, 71. Cf. Blüh and Elder, op. cit., pp. 806–7, 803.
Montgomery, Where Is History Going?, op. cit., p. 93; cf. pp. 73, 168–69.
Schaaffs directs some of his criticisms against Bultmann (Ibid., pp. 13, 24–25) and other theologians who insist on using these outdated worldviews (Ibid., pp. 8, 15, 31, 60, 64).
Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology, op. cit., pp. 262–63.
See Schaaffs, op. cit., pp. 64, 71; cf. also Swinburne, op. cit., pp. 23–26.
McNaugher, op. cit., p. 92; cf. Swinburne, Ibid., pp. 26–29.
Note that we are showing the result on nature if miracles were to occur. We have not yet established if they actually do or not.
We wish to make it plain, however, that our study of contemporary physics is an extremely important one and not simply a “nice addition” to this work. Although this study is based on an investigation of the facts to determine if an event has occurred and not upon a current scientific worldview, this chapter has still provided some insight into the question of what is possible in today’s world. Understanding the current scientific outlook has demonstrated at least that our beliefs must not exclude miracles a priori. Also, it makes us realize that there is a scientific basis for our historical approach to investigating a purported event.
See Bernhard Ramm, Protestant Christian Evidences (Chicago: Moody Press, 1953), pp. 146–49.
Schaaffs, op. cit., p. 14. The italics are Schaaffs.
Cf. Ernst Cassirer, Determinism and Indeterminism in Modern Physics, translated by O. Theodor Benfrey (New Haven: Yale University Press), p. 193 for instance.
Clark, “Bultmann’s Three-Storied Universe,” in Gaebelein, op. cit., pp. 218–19.
Chapter III: History and Miracles
See Patrick Gardiner’s article “The Philosophy of History” in the International Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences, edited by David L. Sills, op. cit., vol. 6, pp. 428–33 for some of these interpretations.
Most historians also recognize these two factors—the events themselves and the records of these events—as being an essential part of history. For such related views, see Carl L. Becker, The Heavenly City of Eighteenth-Century Philosophers (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1969), pp. 17–18; Bronowski and Mazlish, op. cit., pp. xi–xii; Clough, Garsoian, and Hicks, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 1; Runes, op. cit., p. 127; Wand, op. cit., p. 22.
W. H. Walsh, Philosophy of History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1960), pp. 101, 103.
Ibid., p. 31. See also Patrick Gardiner’s article “The Philosophy of History,” in Sills, editor, op. cit., pp. 432–33.
Ernest Nagel, “Determinism in History,” in Dray, op. cit., p. 355.
Montgomery, Where Is History Going?, op. cit., p. 71.
See Schaaffs, op. cit., cf. pp. 52–53, 64 for instance.
Montgomery, Where Is History Going?, op. cit., pp. 168–69.
Ronald VanderMolen, “‘Where Is History Going?’ and Historical Scholarship: A Response,” in Fides et Historia 5, nos. 1–2 (1972/1973): 110.
Montgomery, Where Is History Going?, op. cit., pp. 71–74.
Ibid., pp. 30, 51–52, 156, 167.
Walsh, op. cit., p. 18. For a good example of such an investigation with regard to ancient historical events, see Delbrück’s methods of determining how ancient battles had been fought in the times of the Greek and Roman empires. It is fascinating to perceive how this scholar was able to arrive at historical facts concerning how large the opposing armies were, how they maneuvered, and other such facets of specific battles in ancient times by examining the ancient historical records. For instance, see Edward M. Earle, editor, Makers of Modern Strategy (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1943), especially pp. 264–68 with regard to Delbrück’s historical method.
Ibid., pp. 18–19; cf. Daniel Fuller, op. cit., p. 22 for these same conclusions.
John Warwick Montgomery, History and Christianity (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1972), p. 75. Cf. also Montgomery’s Where Is History Going?, op. cit., p. 71.
Ibid., cf. also Where Is History Going, pp. 168–69.
Maier, First Easter, op. cit., pp. 105–122 and “The Empty Tomb as History,” op. cit., pp. 4–6.
Yamauchi, op. cit., March 15, 1974 pp. 4–7 and March 29, 1974, pp. 12–16.
Montgomery, Where Is History Going?, op. cit., pp. 71–73, 93, 168–69 for instance.
It is important to note that historical studies have also been made about other miracle-claims in ancient history. M. I. Finley, for instance, investigates Homer and his claims of miraculous intervention into early history, such as with the Trojan war. Or for another example, various scholars have examined claims of tongue-speaking, or glossolalia, in ancient history. For Finley’s work, see The World of Odysseus (New York: The Viking Press, 1954), especially pp. 10–19. For a historical discussion of speaking in tongues, see George Barton Cutten, Speaking with Tongues Historically and Psychologically Examined (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1927), pp. 36–47 for instance. For another example, see Frank Stagg, E. Glenn Hinton, and Wayne E. Oates, Glossolalia: Tongue Speaking in Biblical, Historical and Psychological Perspective, (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1967), pp. 48–57.
Chapter IV: Reason and Faith
See Manfred T. Brauch, “Head and Heart Go to Seminary,” Christianity Today 19, no. 9 (June 10, 1975): 11–12.
Etienne Gilson, Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1966).
Ibid., pp. 37–62. See especially pp. 42–48.
Ibid., see especially pp. 82–83.
This writer realizes that philosophical conclusions such as these cannot be based soley on dictionary definitions. Since dictionaries only show how a word is used by most intelligent people, we would be epistemologically naive if we were to assume that such definitions are capable of settling these philosophical issues. Nevertheless, such an approach can be very valuable as a groundwork for later conclusions and this is how these definitions are to be used here. They serve as guidelines for the more sophisticated scholarly views which will be presented afterward to further corroborate these usages. The definitions themselves can point to a consensus of opinion as they reveal how these words are often defined. However, this will be corroborated by later references to scholars who verify these statements.
William Morris, editor, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language (New York: American Heritage Publishing Company, 1970), p. 1086.
One may object that many have exercised religious faith because they were told to do so or for other reasons which require no real contemplation. But we would hold that if one was capable of understanding his faith he would have been required to have thought about it at some time, if only in a naive and simple way. This is because faith would even involve affirmation of what others have dictated. However simple, it would be an acceptance of the existence of God or some such belief. Real faith involves at least some thinking as a part of this conviction or it could not be said to be such. For this reason, if one has never thought about his belief in any way it can only be because real faith was never exercised in the first place.
Cf. the New Testament’s primary emphasis on faith in such verses as John 20:29; Ephesians 2:8; Hebrews 11:1, 6.
Paul M. Van Buren, The Secular Meaning of the Gospel (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1963), pp. 174–175.
John R. W. Stott, Your Mind Matters: The Place of the Mind in the Christian Life (Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1973), pp. 33–36.
Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, op. cit., pp. 112–13, 141–43.
These two essays are found in one of Pannenberg’s collections of other such works entitled Basic Questions in Theology, translated by George H. Kehm, 2 vols. (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), see vol. 2, pp. 28–35, 53–54 for instance. We will further elaborate on Pannenberg’s theories on reason and faith below.
See the appendix of History and Christianity, op. cit., pp. 99–101, 106–8. Cf. also Montgomery’s debate with “God is dead” theologian Thomas Altizer, where Montgomery charges that Altizer’s irrational faith provides no reason for others to believe him because it is based on no objective evidence. This debate is recorded in The Altizer-Montgomery Dialogue (Chicago: InterVarsity Press, 1967). See pp. 26, 59–60, 72, 76 and others where this charge is made. As with Pannenberg, so we will return to this reasoning below.
Even the case of atheism is no exemption here. If one designates atheism as a “religious faith,” then it still must be acknowledged that it is also based on the knowledge of certain facts which are believed to be true. In this case, this would be the non-existence of God.
Cf. Van Buren, op. cit., op. 174–75; Stott, op. cit., p. 57; Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, op. cit., pp. 143–45; Pannenberg, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 37, 45; Montgomery, History and Christianity, op. cit., pp. 106–8. It is extremely important to note here, in addition, that the reason or knowledge upon which faith is based is not always a very sophisticated one. As asserted in footnote number 15 above, faith must be based on some knowledge, even if it is an uncomplicated and simple belief in what one is told. But even in this case acceptance of belief in God (or whatever it is that one is told to believe) still involves the acceptance of the knowledge that these beliefs are true. Anything short of this is not real faith. At no point in this work is the assertion ever made that one must be capable of a logical investigation of the facts before one can believe. Such is clearly not the case. A reasonable faith can be shown to be more valuable, but a faith based upon a less sophisticated knowledge is not thereby invalid. If the Christian faith can be shown to be based on a logical investigation of the facts, then faith in these facts is valid even if one is not capable of demonstrating the evidence for oneself.
Pannenberg, Ibid., p. 32, footnote and also Wolfhart Pannenberg, editor, Revelation as History, translated by David Granskou (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1969), pp. 139, 157, note 15. Cf. Schaeffer, Ibid.
See Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, op. cit., pp. 141–43.
Montgomery, History and Christianity, op. cit., p. 101; cf. pp. 99, 107.
It might be objected that perhaps one does not care to make his faith obligatory for others, thus keeping it simply on the subjective level. But here we must remember, first, that Christianity claims to be a propagating faith interested in bringing others to accept this same grace of God that it has received. It therefore does not thrive on one’s keeping faith to oneself. Second, we have reasoned here that Christianity is most properly based on one’s exercising faith as a result of facts which are believed to be true and not upon irrational explanations or private experiences apart from these facts. Thus this aforementioned objection falls prey both to the idea that the Christian faith is to be propagated and to the conviction that faith is based upon objective facts as opposed to subjective feelings. For some of these ideas see Pannenberg’s Basic Questions in Theology, op. cit., vol. 2, especially pp. 53–54; cf. pp. 28, 30–32.
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, op. cit., pp. 135–39.
Ibid., especially p. 138. See also Basic Questions in Theology, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 30, 53–54.
See Pannenberg’s Basic Questions in Theology, Ibid., vol. 2, pp. 33–34.
Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, op. cit., p. 141; cf. p. 92.
Montgomery, History and Christianity, op. cit., pp. 75–76, 79–80, 107–8.
Pannenberg, Revelation as History, op. cit., p. 137.
Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 48.
Ibid., p. 37 and Revelation as History, op. cit., pp. 137–39.
Montgomery, History and Christianity, op. cit., pp. 79–80, 107.
Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 36–37.
Schaeffer, The God Who Is There, op. cit., p. 113 and Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 28.
Notice that in all three instances we have concluded that probabilities play a decisive part. Science has demonstrated the need to explain issues statistically, thus relying on probabilities. As we have shown above, history has also adopted this procedure as the best method of discerning facts about the past. Even in the philosophical treatment of reason and faith we spoke of the importance of faith making its decision on the probability of the rational investigation. Thus faith acts upon the most probable solution as well. We have here a striking confirmation of this belief.
Part 2: Possible Solutions to the Question of the Resurrection of Jesus
Chapter V: Possibility Number One: That the Resurrection Did Not Occur
In each of the three possible approaches to the resurrection which are covered in this work, we will likewise concentrate on one major scholar who we think is a representative example of that view. In the introductions to each chapter we will also outline the reasons for such choices. However, we will not be confined to just these three single opinions but in all three instances we will also entertain other similar views in the next chapter.
See, for example, McNaugher’s treatment of miracles, which also deals with Hume’s essay, op. cit., pp. 91–118.
Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology, op. cit., p. 38.
Wilbur M. Smith, The Supernaturalness of Christ (Boston: W. A. Wilde, 1954), p. 142.
Later we will deal more fully with Hume’s influence on theology, specifically viewing other scholars who also reject all miraculous events and who believe that Hume’s essay is the apex of critical thought on this subject.
Heick, op. cit., p. 52. Heick does note, however, that Hume differed from deism at several points, such as the reliance upon reason and the desire to prove the existence of God. By turning from such notions, Hume contributed to the demise of deism by taking this stance in favor of empiricism (Ibid., pp. 65–66).
Ibid., pp. 51–52; cf. also Vergilius Ferm’s article “Deism,” in Runes, op. cit., p. 75.
This essay can be found in Owen C. Thomas, editor, Attitudes Toward Other Religions (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 32–48. Of course, not all scholars of this period held to all of these more radical beliefs. For instance, see John Locke’s The Reasonableness of Christianity, edited by I. T. Ramsey (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1958). Cf. here also Ferm, “Deism,” in Runes, Ibid.
Heick, op. cit., pp. 53–58, 65.
See Hume’s position in his work edited by Cohen, op. cit., pp. 124–25.
Becker, op. cit., pp. 38–39; cf. pp. 33–35.
David Hume, The History of England, 6 vols. (London: Gilbert and Revington, 1848).
E. W. F. Tomlin, The Western Philosophers (New York: Harper & Row, 1967), pp. 194–95.
Hume, “Of Miracles,” in Essential Works of David Hume, op. cit., p. 128. See the discussion of Hume’s definition of miracle above. We will also return to this topic in the critique below. It is important to note here that this is not an obscure essay by Hume. This well known essay on miracles is Section X of his work An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding. See Ibid., pp. 123–42.
Ibid., pp. 125–29. See Edwin A. Burtt, Types of Religious Philosophy, rev. ed. (New York: Harper & Row, 1939), pp. 212–16. Cf. Swinburne, op. cit., pp. 13–14.
Hume “Of Miracles,” in Essential Works of David Hume, op. cit., pp. 129–34; cf. Swinburne, op. cit., pp. 15–18.
W. Edgar Moore, Creative and Critical Thinking (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1967), p. 188 for instance.
Cf. Swinburne, op. cit., p. 15 and Ramm, op. cit., pp. 126–28.
See McNaugher, op. cit., p. 92.
Hume, “Of Miracles,” in Essential Works of David Hume, op. cit., see pp. 127–29, 133, 139.
Cf. Lewis, op. cit., p. 60, McNaugher, op. cit., pp. 99–103 and Ramm, op. cit., p. 128, for instance.
Hume, “Of Miracles,” in Essential Works of David Hume, op. cit., see the obvious examples of this attitude on pp. 127–128, 139.
See Lewis’ essay “The Laws of Nature,” contained in a collection of some of his other works of this type entitled God in the Dock, edited by Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1973), pp. 76–79, especially p. 77.
Lewis, Miracles, op. cit., p. 106.
See Burtt, op. cit., p. 213, footnote 5 where it is also asserted that Hume fails to entertain this view which allows God to interfere with nature’s pattern from outside the system.
Hume, “Of Miracles,” in Essential Works of David Hume, op. cit., p. 128. Italics are Hume’s.
See McNaugher, op. cit., p. 101 for a similar charge against Hume.
Montgomery agrees that Hume’s a priori and circular argument obligates no one to accept such a view of experience (Suicide of Christian Theology, op. cit., p. 38).
Smith, op. cit., p. 147; McNaugher, op. cit., pp. 101–3.
Hume, “Of Miracles,” in Essential Works of David Hume, op. cit., p. 124.
Lewis, Miracles, op. cit., p. 106.
Hume asserts that these four supportive points, which are summarized above, prove all miracles to be untrustworthy. We will briefly restate these four here. First, no historical accounts of miracles are attested by enough reputable witnesses. Second, people delight in telling miraculous stories, even lying in order to spread these teachings. Third, miracles are found mostly among people of backward nations. Fourthly, accounts of miracles in one religion nullify the accounts of those in other belief systems. See Hume’s essay “Of Miracles,” in Essential Works of David Hume, op. cit., pp. 129–34.
Hume, “Of Miracles,” in Essential Works of David Hume, op. cit., pp. 135–37, especially footnote number two.
Our purpose here is by no means to determine if these Jansenist miracles actually occurred or not. Rather, we purpose to determine exactly what Hume’s own reaction is when a miracle admittedly fulfills his four conditions. This we will perceive later.
Hume, “Of Miracles,” in Essential Works of David Hume, op. cit., pp. 135–37.
Ibid., p. 137. However, Hume seems to believe that just because the fourth point does not hold in this instance because of the superior testimony of the authorities involved (Ibid.), it still may apply in other instances (Ibid., pp. 137–38).
We must state here once again that we are not ourselves concerned as to whether these Jansenist claims are valid or not.
Hume, “Of Miracles,” in Essential Works of David Hume, op. cit., p. 137.
Philosopher Swinburne arrives at similar conclusions about this exact passage in Hume’s work. He also realizes that Hume dismisses the Jansenist miracles not because the evidence is not adequate, but because such evidence is seen to be irrelevant (op. cit., p. 16). We might wonder just how Hume is able to disregard such an admittedly adequate amount of experience for these events when such examination and research is the foundation of history. The acceptance of past events as having actually occurred is based upon the existence of an adequate amount of historical evidence. But even though Hume realizes that such as been produced he still rejects the miracle, as Swinburne also notes. Such a double standard of rejecting miracles when they are evidenced by the same (or an even greater) amount of experience which is viewed as being adequate in other instances of establishing historical fact certainly seems unscholarly. It is such circular reasoning that invalidates his argument.
Hume, “Of Miracles,” in Essential Works of David Hume, op. cit., pp. 128–29.
Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology, op. cit., 43–44, footnote 13.
If such miracles can be shown to exist, of course. We are still not making any judgment about the facticity of the Jansenist miracles, or saying that they are probable. This is because we have relied on Hume’s presentation of the evidence and therefore have not investigated the evidence for ourselves. As mentioned above, the main object here was to perceive how Hume viewed occurrences which he thought were well-documented. This was accomplished here.
For Hume’s rejection of cause and effect, see, for instance, his work entitled A Treatise of Human Nature, edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1964), Book I, Part III, Section II, pp. 73–78, especially p. 76. Cf. also Heick, op. cit., p. 65.
David Hume, An Abstract of A Treatise of Human Nature (Cambridge: The University Press, 1938). For a perceptive discussion concerning the author of this work, see the Introduction by J. M. Keynes and P. Spaffa, pp. v–xxxi; cf. Bronowski and Mazlish, op. cit., p. 474, footnote number three.
Hume, Ibid., especially p. 16. Cf. Bronowski and Mazlish, Ibid., pp. 474–75.
Cf. Bronowski and Mazlish, Ibid. See chapter above.
Hume, “Of Miracles,” in Essential Works of David Hume, op. cit., p. 128.
Lewis, Miracles, op. cit., pp. 105–6. Italics are Lewis’.
Hume’s rejection of cause and effect has been noted above. For his emphasis on probability, see, for instance, his work Essays, Literary, Moral and Political (London: Ward, Lock and Bowden, Limited, n.d.), pp. 341–43 and also the essay “Of Miracles” in Essential Works of David Hume, op. cit., pp. 125–29.
Montgomery also feels that Hume’s argument against miracles is based on a closed view of the universe. See Montgomery’s Suicide of Christian Theology, op. cit., pp. 262–63, 351, note 15. Once again, we also believe that there are laws in nature, as pointed out above. To speak of miracles as out of the ordinary there must be an ordinary course of nature. The question is not if these laws exist, but if they can be temporarily suspended.
Even William Hordern, a scholar sympathetic to certain trends in contemporary, critical theology, states that Hume argues circularly in this essay. See his work A Layman’s Guide to Protestant Theology (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1956), p. 37.
Chapter VI: Possibility Number One: Other Similar Views
Briefly, we will refer to religious liberalism in this work as the predominant trend of theological thought in the nineteenth century (cf. Daniel Fuller, op. cit., chapter 3). More specifically we might date this movement’s prominence from the publishing of Schleiermacher’s work On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers in 1799 to Karl Barth’s The Epistle to the Romans, which appeared in 1918. Cf. here this work by Schleiermacher, translated by John Oman (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1958). See the Introduction by Rudolf Otto, especially pp. ix, xii. Cf. also Burtt, op. cit., p. 284 and William Hordern, Introduction, vol. 1 of New Directions in Theology Today, edited by William Hordern, 7 vols. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1966), p. 15.
John Herman Randall, Jr., The Making of the Modern Mind, rev. ed. (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company, 1940), pp. 553–54. Concerning Randall’s statement that liberalism rejected miracles because of the influence of Hume’s essay, it appears that Randall is also speaking of liberalism as a predominately nineteenth-century movement (Ibid.).
Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology, op. cit., pp. 27–28.
David Friedrich Strauss, A New Life of Jesus, 2nd ed., 2 vols. (London: Williams and Norgate, 1879), vol. 1, p. 199.
Friedrich Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, edited by H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart, 2 vols. (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), vol. 1, pp. 71, 178–84; vol. 2, pp. 448–49.
Schleiermacher, On Religion: Speeches to Its Cultured Despisers, op. cit., pp. 88–89, 113–14, explanation number 16.
Albert Schweitzer, The Quest of the Historical Jesus, translated from the 1906 German edition, op. cit., p. 154.
Ernst Renan, Life of Jesus, vol. 1 of The History of the Origins of Christianity (London: Mathieson and Company, n.d.), pp. 147–55, especially p. 148.
Adolf Harnack, What is Christianity?, translated by Thomas Bailey Saunders, 3rd ed. (London: Williams and Norgate, 1912), pp. 25–31.
Randall asserts that from Hume’s time until today few learned men have questioned his conclusions against miracles (op. cit., p. 293).
Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology, op. cit., pp. 37–38; cf. p. 28.
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, 3 vols. (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1971), vol. 1, pp. 115–17. Cf. Alexander J. McKelway, The Systematic Theology of Paul Tillich (New York: Dell Publishing Company, 1964), pp. 81–83.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., pp. 4–5.
John A. T. Robinson, Honest to God (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1963), pp. 11–18, 64–68.
Heick, op. cit., pp. 92–102, 119–27; especially p. 92.
Daniel Fuller, op. cit., p. 38; cf. Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 51, 53.
Schweitzer, Ibid., pp. 49, 51–53.
For some of those who held this view, see Ibid., pp. 46–47, 64, 161–66; cf. pp. 43, 60.
Strauss, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 412.
Cf., for instance, McNaugher, op. cit., p. 148; Smith, op. cit., p. 208; Miller, op. cit., pp. 37–38.
Anyone who has had the misfortune of even stepping on a nail knows the discomfort and pain so caused, including the forced limp! This writer has done so several times. Once only a small nail was enough to incapacitate him for three days, making it impossible to recover completely until the fourth and fifth day. Imagine the results of crucifixion with a spike bearing one’s weight for several hours! We could not avoid Strauss’ illustration of the condition in which a wounded crucifixion victim would emerge from the grave. Considering the feet only (even if we were to momentarily disregard the other wounds), it would not be possible to walk so soon afterward. Detection of such a wounded victim would indeed be both inescapable and inevitable. He would not pass for someone who was resurrected, at any rate.
This portion is quoted from Maier’s The First Easter, op. cit., pp. 78, 80. Page 79 contains three photographs of the above-mentioned crucified victim’s bones, which were affected by the piercing of the nails.
For the most likely reasoning behind the breaking of these men’s legs in order to speed up their deaths, see Jim Bishop’s analysis in The Day Christ Died (New York: Harper & Row, 1965), cf. p. 280 with pp. 289–90.
For a few of those who hold one of these views, see Renan, op. cit., p. 244–45; McNaugher, op. cit., p. 148; Miller, op. cit., pp. 38–39; Charles C. Anderson, op. cit., p. 168; Maier, op. cit., p. 112.
Meier, The First Easter, op. cit., p. 80. Italics are Meier’s.
For this last point, see Charles C. Anderson, op. cit., p. 168.
What of Jesus’ embalmed body? Could he move the stone in front of the tomb? How and where did he actually die? Questions such as these are most difficult for this theory. Cf. Charles C. Anderson, op. cit., p. 168.
James Orr, The Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1908 edition reprinted in 1965), p. 92.
Karl Barth, The Doctrine of Reconciliation, vol. 4, part 1 of Church Dogmatics, edited by G. W. Bromiley and T. F. Torrance, 13 vols. (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1961), pp. 340–41.
Frank Morison, Who Moved the Stone? (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1962), p. 96. It is true that this theory reappears from time to time, almost always establishing many of the older presuppositions and often, once again, in the form of a novel. One such modern attempt is Hugh Schonfield’s The Passover Plot (New York: Bantam Books, 1967). That such attempts to revive this theory are generally met with scholarly disdain (see, for instance, Montgomery, The Suicide of Christian Theology, op. cit., p. 39 and especially note number 44 on p. 46 and J. N. D. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 63–65; cf. pp. 93–94) is easily conceivable since this theory still has to adequately answer the objections raised here and other similar problems.
Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 71–72, 96–120. Cf. Charles C. Anderson, Critical Quests of Jesus (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1969), p. 18.
Schweitzer, Ibid., pp. 70–72, 96–97, 111.
Strauss, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 199–201; vol. 2, pp. 149–280. Cf. Schweitzer, Ibid., pp. 82–83.
Strauss, Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 408–12.
Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 427–29; cf. also Strauss’ work The Old Faith and the New, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 81–82.
Strauss, The New Life of Jesus, Ibid., vol. 1, pp. 430–37 and The Old Faith and the New, Ibid.
Strauss, The New Life of Jesus, Ibid., vol. 1, p. 440.
Strauss, The Old Faith and the New, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 83.
Renan, op. cit., pp. 249, 309–10; Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 170, 187. Renan’s work has already been cited above. Ghillany, writing an imaginative life of Jesus under the pseudonym of Richard von der Alm, also preferred this view. Other liberals accepted this theory as well.
Comparatively few scholars hold the vision theory today. More common are views which are based upon some personal experience of the disciples which convinced them that Jesus was somehow still alive. The exact details vary from one view to the next. Charles Anderson (The Historical Jesus: The Continuing Quest, op. cit., pp. 169–71) and Paul Maier (First Easter, op. cit., p. 107) rightly include such views in the same category with the vision theory because, even though hallucinations are rejected here, a subjective experience of one sort or another is generally perceived to be based upon some form of pre-existent faith on the part of the disciples. Thus it is still a case of these believers becoming convinced of the resurrection because of their own projected faith issuing forth into a belief in objective reality. Probably the best-known theory of this type is Paul Tillich’s “restitution theory.” For Tillich, the resurrection is not to be conceived of in terms of the reappearance of either a person or a spirit. In fact it is not any type of literal appearance of any kind. Rather, the disciples experienced the spiritual presence of Jesus. Like Strauss, Tillich feels that it was actually an ecstatic experience which convinced them that Jesus was the New Being. It is possible for believers today to have this same experience (Tillich, op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 156–58. For a similar interpretation of Tillich’s view, see McKelway, op. cit., pp. 170–71, 181–82). Theories such as Tillich’s will also be included in this treatment of visions (as Charles Anderson and Paul Maier also do). Most of the problems involved in postulating a pre-existent faith and in the subsequent application of subjective criteria to objective conviction also apply here and render such an experience quite impossible, as will be shown below.
Schleiermacher, The Christian Faith, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 420.
Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 54–55.
See, for instance, Strauss’ The New Life of Jesus, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 440.
W. J. Sparrow-Simpson, The Resurrection and the Christian Faith (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1911 edition reprinted in 1965), pp. 113–115. The theory popularized by Keim is commonly referred to as the “telegram theory.” According to this hypothesis, Jesus rose spiritually from the dead (not bodily) and returned to God. Afterward he communicated the knowledge of his spiritual existence to the apostles by means of “telegrams” or messages from heaven. The appearances of Jesus recorded in the New Testament were therefore not subjective visions or hallucinations but objective impressions sent by both Jesus and God. Keim admits that this communication to the disciples of the truth that Jesus had risen required Divine intervention (Ibid., pp. 117, 119; McNaugher, op. cit., pp. 155–56). But such a theory falls prey to at least four major criticisms. First, is this view any less a miracle than the view recorded in the New Testament? The miraculous is admittedly involved here as well and we still have the teaching that Jesus actually rose and is alive (although in spiritual form). Second, would God and the risen Jesus send messages and reveal appearances which would deceive the disciples into thinking that Jesus was physically there with them? Such deception has moral (or amoral!) implications and fails to explain why Jesus did not actually appear instead of sending the impression that he had actually done so. Third, these impressions would not be objective enough to make them think that Jesus had actually risen bodily. Fourth, it fails to explain the empty tomb. (For these and similar criticisms, see Tillich, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 156; McNaugher, Ibid.; Lewis, Miracles, op. cit., pp. 152–53; Smith, op. cit., pp. 219–20; Tenney, op. cit., pp. 189–92.)
Sparrow-Simpson, Ibid., pp. 113–15; Orr, op. cit., p. 219; McNaugher, Ibid., p. 155.
McNaugher, Ibid., p. 152. See especially George E. Ladd, I Believe in the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1975), p. 138.
Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, translated by Lewis L. Wilkins and Duane A. Priebe (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1968), p. 96.
Raymond E. Brown, The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus (New York: Paulist Press, 1973), p. 84.
William Barclay, The Mind of Jesus (New York: Harper & Row, 1961), pp. 304–5.
Strauss, The New Life of Jesus, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 430–31. Cf. also Sparrow-Simpson, op. cit., pp. 111–12.
The narratives sufficiently establish this point. See Luke 24:12, 21; John 20:9, 19; cf. the Markan appendix, 16:10. Cf. also Brown, op. cit., p. 106, footnote 176.
The witness to this is even greater than that of the previous point. See Matthew 28:17; Luke 24:11, 22–24, 27; John 20:25; 21:4; Cf. the Markan appendix, Mark 16:11, 13, 14. Cf. also Brown, op. cit., p. 106, footnote 176.
Reginald Fuller, op. cit., pp. 81–82; cf. pp. 100–101.
Even Gordon Kaufman, one of the comparatively few scholars who still hold the vision theory today, realizes that a prior belief must exist before visions can be produced. However, he fails to show what positive factors there were that would be sufficient to give rise to this optimistic faith, a faith which would absolutely have to be present before the events themselves. This is quite damaging to his viewpoint, especially in view of the fact that he admits that the disciples were quite disillusioned at Jesus’ death and were therefore subject to despair. He realizes that their hope had disappeared. But we may wonder what spontaneous factors caused such a reversal of thought and made the disciples believe that Jesus was alive before they received any confirmation of the fact. See these admissions in Kaufman’s Systematic Theology: A Historicist Perspective (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1968), especially pp. 415, 422.
Ibid., p. 421; footnote 20; Orr, op. cit., p. 219.
Edwin G. Boring, Herbert S. Langfield and Harry P. Weld, editors, Foundations of Psychology (New York: John Wiley and Sons, 1956), p. 216; Yamauchi, op. cit., March 15, 1974, p. 6; McNaugher, op. cit., p. 153; Smith, op. cit., p. 217.
Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., pp. 96–97.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., p. 42. See Orr, op. cit., p. 115, with regards to this admission by critic Kirsopp Lake.
Johannes Weiss, Earliest Christianity: A History of the Period A.D. 30–150, edited by Frederick C. Grant, 2 vols. (Magnolia: Peter Smith, Publishers, 1959), vol. 1, p. 28.
Bultmann, Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., p. 39; cf. Reginald Fuller, op. cit., p. 29. See also Archibald T. Robertson, Word Pictures in the New Testament, 6 vols. (Nashville: Broadman Press, 1931), vol. 4, p. 188.
See Ramsey, op. cit., pp. 61–62.
Orr, op. cit., p. 176. Cf. Reginald Fuller, op. cit., p. 107.
This conclusion was verified for the writer by a discussion with a psychology professor on Dec. 18, 1969, who spoke of the various impossibilities of relying on visions in this instance.
Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., p. 97.
Sparrow-Simpson, op. cit., p. 114.
See Reginald Fuller, op. cit., pp. 32, 170.
Sparrow-Simpson, op. cit., p. 114.
See, for instance, William James, The Principles of Psychology, 2 vols. (Dover Publications, 1950), vol. 2, pp. 114–15. Cf. also Yamauchi, op. cit., March 15, 1974, p. 6 and Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., p. 95.
Yamauchi, Ibid.; Pannenberg, Ibid., pp. 94–95, footnote number 93.
Kaufman admits that the objection that the vision theory is too subjective to account for such objective appearances of Jesus is a strong one. He also notes that his work had thus far (op. cit., pp. 426–27) not sufficiently handled this problem.
Marxsen, op. cit., p. 67; Reginald Fuller, op. cit., pp. 81–82; cf. pp. 100–101; Brown, op. cit., pp. 84, 106, footnote 176.
Reginald Fuller, Ibid., pp. 32, 170. Cf. Marxsen, Ibid., pp. 100–102.
See, for example, Orr, op. cit., p. 197. See also Reginald Fuller, Ibid., pp. 71–154.
Luke 24:36–43 relates this scene. The disciples though that they were viewing a bodiless apparition or spirit (Greek pneuma; cf. Matt 14:26, 27). Jesus had to convince them otherwise by presenting his body for observation. We are told that they only believed that they were not seeing “ghosts” when it was thus proven to them. See Robertson, op. cit., vol. 2, p. 296. Other verses where it is either stated or implied that Jesus’ body was handled include Matthew 28:9; John 20:17, 26–28; cf. Acts 1:3.
Cf. Robert M. Grant, Miracle and Natural Law (Amsterdam: North-Holland Publishing Company, 1952), pp. 229–30; Brown, op. cit., pp. 85–89; Charles Anderson, op. cit., pp. 161, 163–66; Smith, op. cit., pp. 194–95. Concerning Paul’s list being based upon eyewitness testimony, see Brown, Ibid., p. 92 and Reginald Fuller, op. cit., pp. 28–29.
Brown, Ibid., p. 91; Ladd, op. cit., p. 138; cf. p. 105.
Cf. Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., p. 39 and Reginald Fuller, op. cit., p. 29.
This is also reported by Ignatius in section three of his Epistle to the Smyrneans. See J. B. Lightfoot, editor and translator, The Apostolic Fathers (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1971), p. 83; cf. p. 85.
See Sparrow-Simpson, op. cit., p. 110.
For instance, if the vision theory were true, the empty tomb would be left unexplained. And what happened to Jesus’ body? In addition, this writer has compiled a list of 34 total reasons why this theory is inadequate.
Theories like those of Tillich (op. cit., vol. 2, pp. 156–58) and Van Buren (op. cit., pp. 132–33) which rely on some unexplained subjective experience of the disciples face practically all of the same difficulties. For instance, the disciples’ despondency and doubt must still be changed to faith before the experience itself in order for these to occur in the first place, which encounters the difficulties raised above. There is likewise the same problem of how many would have been convinced in this manner, as well as with the various time and place factors. Even more acute is the disciples’ mistaking such subjective experiences for objective ones and how they became convinced that Jesus had literally risen from the dead. The disciples knew the difference between the resurrection appearances and later experiences, as explained above. We also find psychological causes lacking here. What would give rise to such experiences? As with visions, there is also the objection that cautions were deliberately taken in the narratives to prove that the experiences were objective and not subjective. These are a few of the key objections to these subjective theories. As we have observed, they are practically the same as those listed above. See McKelway (op. cit., pp. 170–71, 181–83), Charles Anderson (op. cit., pp. 169–73) and Maier (The First Easter, op. cit., pp. 112–13) for similar criticisms and other objections to this theory.
Brown, op. cit., p. 75, footnote number 127.
Raymond E. Brown, “The Resurrection and Biblical Criticism,” Commonweal (November 24, 1967): 233, 235.
Bornkamm, op. cit., pp. 184–85.
McLeman, op. cit., pp. 212–13.
Charles C. Anderson, Critical Quests of Jesus (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdman’s Publishing Company, 1969), pp. 55–57.
Anderson, Critical Quests of Jesus, op. cit., pp. 55–56; Orr, op. cit., p. 235.
Anderson, Ibid., p. 56; Orr, Ibid., p. 238; McNaugher, op. cit., p. 157.
Cf. for instance, Pfleiderer’s work The Early Christian Conception of Christ (London: Williams and Norgate, 1905), see pp. 63–83 for his account of some of the similarities between Jesus’ miracles and those found in other ancient religions.
Otto Pfleiderer, Primitive Christianity, translated by W. Montgomery, 4 vols. (Clifton: Reference Book Publishers, 1965), see vol. 1, pp. 1, 5, 23–25 for instance.
Orr, op. cit., pp. 235–61; McNaugher, op. cit., p. 157.
Pfleiderer, Primitive Christianity, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 5–6, 24–25; vol. 2, pp. 186, 371–72; vol. 4, p. 76. See also The Early Christian Conception of Christ, op. cit., pp. 84–133.
Friedrich Ghillany was another nineteenth-century scholar who likewise combined visions with legends which were influenced by myths from other ancient religions (Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 167, 170).
Pfleiderer, The Early Christian Conception of Christ, op. cit., p. 157–58; Primitive Christianity, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 10–14; vol. 2, pp. 115–16, 125.
For instance, Hooke favors the partial use of this view. See his work used above (op. cit., pp. 173–79).
Bultmann does not actually offer much rationalization for the resurrection. Neither does he appear very interested in developing theories as to why it did not occur. Therefore it is hard to label him at this point. However, he does believe that this occurrence is a myth, in some ways similar to other ancient myths, as will be perceived below. Because his treatment is nevertheless quite similar in several ways to these we have been discussing, we will include him here. The critique of this theory also applies to his views about this event.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., p. 10, footnote number two, and pp. 15–16.
Bultmann, “The Study of the Synoptic Gospel,” in Form Criticism, op. cit., pp. 36–39.
See, for instance, Ibid., pp. 66, 72.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., p. 42.
Ibid., pp. 15–16; see also Bultmann’s History and Eschatology (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 7.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, Ibid., p. 40 and Theology of the New Testament, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 345; vol. 2, p. 153.
Cf. the references in footnote 129 with History and Eschatology, op. cit., pp. 54–55.
Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, op. cit., vol. 1, pp. 31, 82.
Bultmann, “The Study of the Synoptic Gospels,” in Form Criticism, op. cit., pp. 60–61.
Randall, op. cit., pp. 553–54; cf. p. 293.
Otto Pfleiderer, Philosophy and Development of Religion, 2 vols. (Edinburgh: William Blackwood and Sons, 1894), vol. 1, pp. 5–6.
Bultmann, “New Testament and Mythology,” in Kerygma and Myth, op. cit., pp. 4–5.
We note here once again that since the vision theory has been perceived above to be an inadequate explanation to account for the resurrection, we will not reopen the subject here even though both Pfleiderer and Bultmann seem to also prefer this theory along with the mythical or legendary theory.
Pfleiderer, Early Christian Conception of Christ, op. cit., pp. 91–93.
Pfleiderer, Early Christian Conception of Christ, op. cit., pp. 94–95; Orr, op. cit., p. 237; Yamauchi, op. cit., March 15, 1974, p. 4.
Orr, op. cit., p. 235 and Pfleiderer, Primitive Christianity, vol. 1, pp. 5, 23–25 for instance.
Reginald Fuller, op. cit., p. 10; Marxsen, op. cit., p. 80. Even Bultmann recognizes this (Theology of the New Testament, op. cit., vol. 1, p. 45).
See, for example, Marxsen, Ibid., pp. 52, 80; cf. p. 86; Brown The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, op. cit., p. 81; Reginald Fuller, Ibid., pp. 10–14, 28.
Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., p. 90.
Brown, The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, op. cit., p. 81; Reginald Fuller, op. cit., p. 10; Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., p. 90; Ladd, op. cit., pp. 104–5.
Reginald Fuller, Ibid. Fuller lists some of these phrases which are foreign to Paul’s speech patterns in footnote number 1, chapter 2, p. 199.
For an evaluation of this conclusion see Brown, The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, p. 81, footnote number 140 and Reginald Fuller, Ibid., pp. 10–11.
Reginald Fuller, op. cit., p. 10; Ladd, op. cit., p. 105.
Ibid., pp. 14, 28; Brown, The Virginal Conception and Bodily Resurrection of Jesus, op. cit., p. 92; Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., p. 90; Ladd, op. cit., p. 105.
Reginald Fuller, op. cit., pp. 48–49, 70.
Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., p. 90.
Reginald Fuller, op. cit., p. 48; Morison, op. cit., p. 107.
Pannenberg, Jesus—God and Man, op. cit., p. 91. Italics are Pannenberg’s.
J. N. D. Anderson, op. cit., pp. 90–91.
Reginald Fuller, op. cit., pp. 29–50; Marxsen, op. cit., p. 81.
It is not within the scope of this paper to thoroughly examine the question of the authorship of the four gospels. But suffice it to say that most critical scholars recognize at least some eyewitness testimony behind these four books. Matthew is often taken to be the author of the Q document and thus is an eyewitness testimony for one of the major sources of the first gospel. The author of the second gospel is usually asserted to be John Mark, who is believed to have recorded the testimony of Peter, another eyewitness and apostle. Most scholars believe that Luke is the author of the third gospel and the book of Acts, with many recognizing that Luke claims to have collected his information from eyewitnesses (Luke 1:1–4). Part of the reason for the new resurgence of interest in the authority of the fourth gospel is that it is often recognized that this book is very close to the eyewitness testimony of the apostle John. For these and similar conclusions, see Archibald M. Hunter, Introducing the New Testament, 2nd ed. (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1957), pp. 41–43, 49–50, 55–56, 61–63; Ladd, op. cit., pp. 74–78; Robert M. Grant, An Historical Introduction to the New Testament (London: Collins, 1963), pp. 119, 127–29, 134–35, 160; George A. Buttrick, editor, The Interpreter’s Bible, 12 vols. (New York and Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1951–1956) vol. 7, p. 242 and vol. 8, pp. 9–10, 440–41; Raymond E. Brown, New Testament Essays (Milwaukee: The Bruce Publishing Company, 1965), pp. 129–31; William Hamilton, The Modern Reader’s Guide to John (New York: Association Press, 1959), pp. 13–15; Daniel Fuller, op. cit., pp. 188–94.
For the traditions concerning the martyr’s deaths suffered by all of the twelve apostles (except John) and other early prominent Christians like Mark and Luke, see Marie Gentert King, editor, Foxe’s Book of Martyrs (Westwood: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1968), pp. 11–13 for instance. Cf. also the witness of Eusebius’ Ecclesiastical History, translated by Christian Frederick Cruse (Grand Rapids: Baker Book House, 1969), pp. 58, 75–80.