B. Reason and Faith: Scholarly Views
The belief in the resurrection of Jesus has raised many questions and provoked much thought throughout the history of the Christian church. Is such an event possible and in what sense, if any? Can it still be believed in today or not? This “question of the resurrection” has received an increased amount of attention, especially in recent years. One quite surprising fact is that the discussion surrounding this topic is no longer relegated just to the field of religion alone, as various scholars from other disciplines have also shown some interest.
No one doubts that such inquiry falls primarily into the field of theology. Therefore we will turn here first in order to view generally the present state of the question of Jesus’ resurrection. Later we will also deal briefly with the interest in this topic shown in two other areas—history and philosophy. The purpose of this chapter is primarily to note some present trends related to this question, keying on its importance for the Christian faith.
For the purposes of this paper, the resurrection will initially and briefly be defined in the terms of the New Testament concept. This event thus refers to the Christian belief that Jesus was actually dead but later was literally raised to life by God. Jesus was believed to have appeared afterward to his followers in a spiritual body, which was neither an unchanged physical body or a spirit. Rather, there were both objective and subjective qualities in this spiritual body. The Christian concept of resurrection therefore differs from other ideas concerning immortality in that Jesus was not reincarnated, neither did he simply experience the continuance of his personality beyond the grave, nor was his soul absorbed into some type of universal soul. To the contrary, Jesus was believed to have literally been raised from the dead, as he appeared to his followers before his return to heaven. It is this Christian belief in Jesus’ resurrection which must be investigated here. This definition will continue to broaden as this work expands.
Just before we turn to our first section certain cautions are in order. Because we are endeavoring to look at both sides of the argument and consider views that are “pro” and “con,” we must take as little as possible for granted at the outset. For this reason we will refrain in almost all instances from capitalizing pronouns for Jesus, lest we begin to decide the question in advance. Concerning the use of such words as “this event” or “this occurrence” when referring to the resurrection, we do not mean to imply that we have already decided that it has happened. Rather, these words refer to what the New Testament claims has happened. Whether it actually did or not must yet be determined. Indeed, many theologians also refer to the resurrection as an event and still mean that it happened in other than a literal way. These words, then, must not always refer to something literal and often do not, as we shall see. In these ways the issue will hopefully not be prejudiced ahead of time.
A. THEOLOGY AND THE RESURRECTION
1. THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RESURRECTION
Many theologians today consider the resurrection of Jesus to be the central claim of Christianity, whether they interpret this event literally or not. Such was often true of past theologians as well. In other words, even those who do not affirm the post-mortem bodily appearances but sometimes stress instead the “spiritual presence” or “continuing influence” of Jesus often feel that the resurrection is still the basis of the Christian faith.
For instance, German redaction critic Willi Marxsen believes that Jesus’ resurrection plays the most decisive part of theological discussion today. This scholar feels that its importance was precisely stated by the Apostle Paul in the first century AD when he wrote “if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain” (1 Cor 15:14, RSV). For Marxsen this event is therefore linked with the very faith of the church. An uncertainty about questions such as those raised above might cause a corresponding uncertainty in our faith today.
Another German theologian, Günther Bornkamm, agrees with the ultimate importance of the resurrection, even if it may be impossible to grasp exactly what took place. He remarks that
there would be no gospel, not one account, no letter in the New Testament, no faith, no Church, no worship, no prayer in Christendom to this day without the message of the resurrection of Christ.
Thus we see that for these two critical scholars, theological discussion and even theology itself finds its central aspect in the resurrection. This of course does not solve the problem of whether this event occurred or not and in what sense, as this must be given future consideration. Indeed, both Marxsen and Bornkamm do not believe we can prove it, but only affirm it by faith. However, such statements do help serve to demonstrate how important a place in the Christian faith it is given by many, and that is the primary object of this chapter.
Other scholars also verify these convictions. For instance, Laurence Miller likewise believes that the resurrection of Jesus is the very heart of New Testament theology. Like Marxsen, he finds the definitive statement of this belief in Paul (1 Cor 15:12–22). Merrill Tenney prefers to use the resurrection as a framework for all of Christian theology, even dealing with some of the doctrines that can be integrated under this theme. Charles Anderson, in a section devoted entirely to the importance of the resurrection, also speaks of some of the Christian doctrines that are explained in the New Testament on the basis of this event. Again 1 Corinthians 15:14 is used as a key.
Closely related views are held by other theologians as well. The former Anglican Archbishop of Canterbury, A. M. Ramsey, believes that the resurrection is not only the center of theology, but that it is also the starting place for studies revolving around the New Testament and its meaning. For Daniel Fuller the resurrection is the basis of redemptive history. Events such as the cross receive much of their redemptive meaning because they are closely associated with the belief in a risen Jesus. C. C. Dobson asserts that even those who oppose all accounts of the resurrection still admit its importance as the keystone of Christianity.
Every once in a while a thesis such as the importance of the resurrection for the Christian faith will receive a new “twist,” further demonstrating its relevance. This was achieved in recent years by Markus Barth and Verne H. Fletcher, who postulated that Jesus’ resurrection was also the basis for Christian ethics. This event was perceived to have definite implications as a foundation for human virtue and justice. In spite of its being a little-recognized theme, the authors believe that it is as relevant for us today in these matters as it is in a strictly theological context.
Even though many of the theologians above differ in other aspects of Christian belief, they all perceive that the resurrection is the center of theology even today. To be sure, they come from differing backgrounds, but they are all in agreement with Paul that if this event was to be completely abrogated, the Christian faith would be in jeopardy. As Marxsen states, if there is uncertainty or obscurity in the matter of belief in the resurrection, then Christianity becomes endangered. This demonstrates its importance as the center of theology today.
Before leaving the subject of the importance of Jesus’ resurrection, it should be mentioned that it is not only an integral part of today’s theology. In New Testament times it was also the doctrine upon which the Christian faith was built. We have already discussed Paul’s statement to this effect above, where he states “if Christ has not been raised, then our preaching is in vain and your faith is in vain” (1 Cor 15:14, RSV; cf. verses 12–20). It was Paul’s opinion that the resurrection of Jesus and the Christian faith stood or fell together. A stronger statement establishing the priority and importance of this occurrence for first-century Christianity could hardly be established.
Recent theological studies have recognized this importance for the early church. Eminent New Testament scholar Rudolf Bultmann, while not personally accepting any sort of literal resurrection of Jesus, still states that for the earliest Christians this event served the purpose of proving that God had substantiated the claims of Jesus by raising him from the dead. The early Christians also believed that the resurrection proved Jesus’ Lordship, his Messiahship, and even that he was the Son of God. According to the New Testament the resurrection also establishes the Christian doctrines of repentance, salvation and justification by faith, and judgment. James McLeman has pointed out that early Christianity also witnesses to the belief that God began new dealings with mankind through the risen Jesus.
Now we must be quick to point out once again that these beliefs by no means establish the fact of the resurrection. All we have demonstrated is that it is the center of Christian theology both in New Testament times and today. But this does not make it a proven fact. The importance of an event does not, of course, establish whether it has actually occurred or not.
2. THE CONTEMPORARY THEOLOGICAL APPROACH TO THE RESURRECTION
Perhaps the primary approach to the theological study of the resurrection today from a critical viewpoint is the application of the literary methods of form criticism and the related discipline, redaction criticism, to the New Testament texts. Two key works done on the resurrection from this standpoint are those by Willi Marxsen and Reginald H. Fuller.
According to Norman Perrin, the theological application of form critical literary techniques was insinuated in the work of Julius Wellhausen (1844–1918) and an early form of redaction criticism was first applied to theology in the writings of Wilhelm Wrede (1859–1906). After the First World War these studies were rejuvenated. Instead of a few theologians simply suggesting the form critical literary approach to Scripture studies, it became the common interest and a major emphasis of such scholars as K. L. Schmidt (1891–1956), Martin Dibelius (1883–1947) and Rudolf Bultmann (born 1884). Bultmann is probably the one who is best known for popularizing form criticism, applying it especially to the synoptic gospels and publishing the results in such essays as “The Study of the Synoptic Gospels.”
Briefly, according to this theory of interpretation, the synoptic gospels were the products of the faith of the earliest first-century Christian church. In other words, after years of orally spreading the gospel of Jesus Christ (and perhaps also by some written records which we no longer have, such as the Quelle document), the earliest church decided to write down what it could recall of the life of Jesus. But since the first Christians were not given a complete historical narrative of his life, their recollections could only be of independent occurrences. The gospels, then, can be broken down into these separate occurrences which in turn correspond to certain forms. When all of these occurrences are divided up into these forms, Bultmann notes that we have several classifications such as miracle stories, parables, and apocalyptic words.
Since the church was interested in a complete biography, however, these events had to be connected into a day-by-day account of Jesus’ life. One can find a good many of these editorial links that tie one story to another. This is how the likeness to “beads on a string” has come to be used for the form critical approach. A main object for theologians who employ this approach is to ascertain which of the accounts (or parts of accounts) in the gospels are actually historical stories and which were “constructed” by the faith of the early church.
Redaction criticism relies heavily on the procedures of form criticism and builds upon its premises. In fact, Perrin notes that these may be seen as being two stages of the same discipline.
Redaction criticism has developed significantly since the work done by Wilhelm Wrede at the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the twentieth centuries. Today more positive attention is given to the gospel authors, as they are seen as having more of an integral and original role to play in the choosing of material and in the written portrayal of it. Critics today also feel that a primary goal is to be able to trace the material through the various phrases of influence, through the various additions by redactors and then as closely as possible to the source(s). This will enable them to determine, among other things, where the facts originated and what is at the basis of the reports. The object is, of course, to ascertain the reliability of the data as much as possible, to see what is historical and what has been added to the original facts.
Three of the leading redaction critics today, at least in a chronological sense, are Günther Bornkamm, Hans Conzelmann, and Willi Marxsen. They worked independently on the synoptic gospels of Matthew, Luke and Mark, respectively. In a sense they have paved the way for similar studies today.
We have briefly investigated form and redaction criticism for two main reasons. First, its importance as the currently accepted literary approach to Biblical studies should not be underrated. We have noted above that some entire works and portions of others have been devoted to studies on the resurrection by scholars who favor these two disciplines. Thus form and redaction criticism will provide a basis for much of what will be said hereafter. Second, although this writer does not embrace many of the facets and conclusions of either form criticism or redaction criticism, we will adopt many of its procedures here as the most commonly accepted “rules of the trade.” With this background and theological foundation, it is advantageous to proceed now to two other fields of study which have also given recent attention to the subject of the resurrection.
B. HISTORY, PHILOSOPHY, AND THE RESURRECTION
We have already stated that one interesting aspect of current study on the resurrection of Jesus is that several scholars in other fields of study besides religion have also become interested in this question. These men have applied their various interdisciplinary backgrounds and educations to the problem and have understandably come to various conclusions. Although these trends are probably most observable in the disciplines of history and philosophy, they are by no means confined to these two areas. Other scholars (and their fields) who have shown as interest in this event include C. S. Lewis, the late Cambridge University professor of English literature, J. N. D. Anderson, a lawyer and the University of London’s director of Advanced Legal Studies, Peter L. Berger, professor of Sociology at Rutgers University, Louis Cassels, journalist and late columnist for United Press International, and scientist Henry Morris. Let us turn now specifically to the fields of history and philosophy to observe some of the current interest in the question of the resurrection.
1. HISTORY AND THE RESURRECTION
It is true that most modern historians do not show an extraordinary amount of interest in the resurrection. Neither are they usually concerned over whether it was a historical event or not. Generally the attitude taken in historical works toward this occurrence is one either of skepticism or one that relates the Biblical accounts of the death and resurrection of Jesus only after a short preface which states “the Bible claims,” or “early Christians believed that,” or another similar expression. This general non-interest in the resurrection by historians is understandable in view of the fact that many feel that this event is an item of faith, even if they believe that it actually occurred.
Yet there are some historians who have investigated this event to some extent. It is not our purpose here in this chapter to cover all areas of historical inquiry, but rather to briefly survey a sample of a few historians who have shown interest in the subject of the resurrection. Later the position of historian David Hume will be discussed in much more detail, as his views were extremely influential on the question of miracles.
Ancient historian Paul Maier has recently published a book entitled First Easter. This work is concerned to a large extent with the first Easter Sunday and the question “What did happen at dawn on Sunday morning?” His purpose is to try and ascertain if history can tell us what really happened that day. His method is first to investigate the original sources, comparing the various accounts of the early church which claim that Jesus rose from the dead. Alternate theories are then proposed and examined. Lastly, some interesting but seldom mentioned historical evidence that bears directly on this issue is studied.
Maier has also contributed other scholarly articles concerning the death and resurrection of Jesus. One, entitled “The Empty Tomb as History,” further examines the historical facts surrounding this event. The conclusion to the article is concerned with whether or not the resurrection can be said to be an actual datum of history. We will return to some of Maier’s conclusions later.
Another ancient historian, Edwin Yamauchi, has also written of the resurrection. His investigation is found in the two-part article entitled “Easter—Myth, Hallucination or History?” He explores carefully each of the possibilities named in the title—the resurrection seen as an ancient myth, as a hallucination, and as actual history. Yamauchi concludes first that the Christian concept of Jesus’ resurrection could not have been derived from the myths in ancient cultures such as those of the Sumerians, Babylonians, or Egyptians, which appear to espouse a belief in dying and rising vegetation gods. These latter myths reveal both far too superficial resemblances and even very questionable evidence concerning this belief in a “resurrection” to have been the basis of belief for Jesus’ rising.
Yamauchi’s second conclusion is that the hypothesis of hallucination is likewise not a strong enough impetus for belief in the resurrection of Jesus. None of the needed psychological prerequisites for visions are found in the New Testament accounts. For instance, the disciples were very despondent at the death of Jesus and failed to believe even after perceiving that he had risen, whereas hallucinations occur when individuals imagine beforehand that a certain thing has, in fact, happened. Visions are produced when people think so positively that they actually visualize what they desire and the disciples were certainly not in this frame of mind after Jesus’ death. The facts simply do not provide support for this theory at all. The conditions needed for hallucinations were plainly lacking.
The final conclusion reached by Yamauchi is that the resurrection of Jesus is a historical event and must be dealt with as such. It simply cannot be termed as an existential occurrence and neither can it be forgotten about as a simple myth or delusion.
We will at this point just quickly mention two other scholars in this field who also have dealt with the resurrection in their works. Historian and theologian John Warwick Montgomery has dealt with this question in several works which are directly concerned with historical methodology. Church historian William Wand has also fit the resurrection into an explicit historical framework. Rather than explore the views of these two men at this point, we will return to them much more fully in the chapter on history and miracles. Suffice it to say at this time that while historians as a whole have not been overly concerned with Jesus’ resurrection, it has been dealt with by several in this field. Thus it is the opinion of these scholars (and others) that this question is a historical one, to be decided by historical inquiry. Maier, Yamauchi, Montgomery, and Wand all agree that the question of the occurrence of the resurrection should be decided by the historical process of carefully weighing the evidence both for and against this event before a decision is made.
2. PHILOSOPHY AND THE RESURRECTION
As with most of the historians, so we also find that most contemporary philosophers are not often concerned with the question of Jesus’ resurrection. But we find that several of these scholars have also dealt with it as a part of their system of thought. As with the theologians, these philosophers offer a variety of approaches and answers to this event. Similar to the preceding short section on history, it is not our object in this chapter to treat every field of philosophy. To the contrary, the purpose here is simply to present a sample of a few philosophers who have dealt with the resurrection in their works. Later the positions of David Hume and Søren Kierkegaard will be examined in depth. Hume especially is recognized even by conservative theologians as offering a challenge to the belief in a literal resurrection and Kierkegaard also develops a popular philosophical view of this event. But at present it is our desire only to state the interest shown by a few philosophers of various intellectual inclinations.
Probably the best known philosopher who has investigated this occurrence is John Hick. In his essay “Theology and Verification” he approaches the ancient topic of the possibility of verifying the existence of God. This is done in an interesting and novel (if somewhat questionable) manner.
For Hick, one cannot prove God’s existence beyond any doubt. However, the author believes that one can reason logically to the probability of God’s existence by the use of what he terms “eschatological” (or future) verification.
The Christian faith (and various others as well) teach the reality of life after death. For Hick this concept of continued survival is one which will ultimately be verified after death. In other words, the future resurrection of mankind can be verified experientially by each individual after his own personal death. The post-mortem knowledge one gains would prove that life does survive death.
Concerning this odd-sounding apologetic for life after death, Hick attempts to explain how this is possible by the introduction of several interesting illustrations. He feels that ultimately the question of immortality may be likened to two men walking down the road of life. One says that there is life after death at the end of the road, the other disagrees. But for them it is an experiential question. Sooner or later they will each turn the last bend in life and die. Then one will have been proven right and one wrong. This is eschatological verification of immortality.
Even verification of the existence of God is to be found by the same future experience. Here Hick appropriates the role that Jesus plays. As we experience the risen Jesus and his reign in the Kingdom of God, and finally receive eschatological corroboration for this, we then also receive indirect verification of God. Thus the individual’s own resurrection is the ultimate, experiential proof both of life after death and of God’s existence. These truths are thus perceived as realities. Everyone will eventually prove the validity of these facts for themselves, however, because all will achieve this salvation and subsequent state of verification.
Unfortunately, Hick’s perception of the ability of one’s own resurrection to verify such key tenets of theology raises more questions than it answers. It is interesting, to say the least, but it fails to logically reason out (and even presupposes) too many beliefs such as life after death and the ability to verify something such as God’s existence even if the first was proven to be true. Hick realizes that his hypotheses and those of Ian Crombie, who also accepts eschatological verification, have both been met by disapproval from other philosophers and from theologians, but still feels that this is the best alternative in establishing the truth of theism. Thus, while we must conclude that none of these doctrines can really be proven in this way, it does show the interest of a certain segment of philosophy in the question of the resurrection.
But it is not only in the writings of Hick (and those who agree with him) that we find an interest in the subject of the resurrection. The recent popularity of process thought has apparently opened up a new area of interest in the formulating of, among other things, a Christology based on process philosophy. For instance, Schubert Ogden’s prospects for the development of a new theism have led him to a reinterpretation of the resurrection based on the love of God. Another example is Bernard Loomer’s attempt to explain the Christian faith, including the resurrection, in terms of process philosophy.
In the work Process Philosophy and Christian Thought, Peter Hamilton proposes a modern Christology with a special emphasis upon the resurrection. For Hamilton, process philosophy offers the proper framework within which one can more properly view and formulate theology. This philosophy is perceived to be especially helpful in dealing with the resurrection.
The key term that Hamilton adopts from process philosophy here is “immanence,” which refers to the possibility of one reality being immanent or indwelt by another. This is illustrated by the way we often refer to the experiences of one individual “living on” in another’s memory.
When applied to the relationship between God and the world, immanence is a reference both to God’s indwelling mankind and mankind’s indwelling God. As Hamilton applies this concept to Christology, we may now speak of the chief example of God’s indwelling mankind as having occurred in the incarnation. Here God indwelt Jesus. We can also perceive that the primary example of mankind’s indwelling God is to be found in the resurrection. Here Jesus is said to “live on” in God. By “live on” it is meant that it is Jesus’ experiences, ideas, and actions that were raised into God. We are therefore to understand that his resurrection is the most outstanding instance of God’s desire and purpose to raise into Himself everything else that compliments His own character as well.
It is obvious here that the resurrection is not interpreted literally. For Hamilton, the disciples had a God-given awareness (not self-generated, it is emphasized) that Jesus was somehow still both alive and present with them. This was the beginning of the Easter experience. But they did not have an actual encounter with the risen Lord as portrayed in the New Testament gospels.
Hamilton realizes, however, that there are some serious criticisms regarding his views. One is that the uniqueness of Jesus’ resurrection has not been properly maintained. Rather, this occurrence is only a model for other such actions of God.
Another criticism (which is admitted by Hamilton to be a stronger one) is that, according to this interpretation, the “risen” Jesus is not really alive although the disciples believed that he was because of the aforementioned God-given awareness of this fact. In other words, the New Testament writers witness to a risen Jesus who was really alive and the author agrees with this conviction as well. Otherwise there would be no origin for the Easter faith. Yet, this thesis does not allow for the type of resurrection that would give rise to such a belief. Hamilton admits that this criticism is a valid one to a certain extent.
The last scholar to be dealt with briefly at this time is Swiss philosopher Francis Schaeffer. Formerly an agnostic, Schaeffer became convinced through personal research that belief in God was rational. Afterward he became concerned to a large extent that rationality must be kept in religious belief and that knowledge must precede faith (but certainly not to the exclusion of faith).
Exploring this concept of rationality in Christian belief, Schaeffer came to espouse the view that God’s revelation occurred in history and is thus open to verification. An event which is reported to have happened can be examined and found to be either a valid claim or to be some sort of falsehood. This is the nature of historical revelation. For Schaeffer, the death and resurrection of Jesus are both verifiable in this way. They are referred to as actual historical facts which literally occurred in our space-time world.
We have in this chapter investigated both the importance of the resurrection of Jesus and the current theological approach to it as a religious occurrence. In addition, we have examined the views of several scholars from various other fields (especially history and philosophy) who have also shown varying degrees of interest in this event.
We have found that the resurrection is the central event in the Christian faith and thus of central importance in theology. Therefore the questions raised here concerning its character are both valid and consequential ones.
The contemporary theological approach to the resurrection was found to be one that utilizes the literary methodology inherent in form and redaction criticism. Hopefully through a study of this event, making use of these disciplines, we will be able to make a judgment as to its credibility.
We have also seen that there appears to be a surprising interest in the resurrection by scholars in other fields besides religion. This especially appears to be the case in history and philosophy. The purpose for our investigation of several views in these two specific fields is threefold. First, it enables us to understand that this question is not one that is isolated to the field of religion and theology alone. Second, it serves to familiarize us with some views of the resurrection that are surprisingly close to those proposed by some theologians which will be referred to constantly. Third, this previous discussion prepares the way for our later investigation of three scholars (one theologian, one historian, and one philosopher) who deal with these questions concerning the resurrection in much more depth, thus relating all three fields together in a “search for the truth” on this issue.
The question of whether or not miracles have occurred in the past (or whether they are possible today) is one that has far-reaching consequences much beyond the field of theology. We will turn now to an examination of some major possibilities.
In searching for a possible definition for “miracle,” one encounters many approaches and conclusions. However, there are several similarities and points concerning which most appear to be in agreement. We must realize, though, that the definition we arrive at actually has nothing to do with the problem of whether the events that are defined thusly really do occur. For example, many scholars who do not believe that miracles happen at all still define them as occurrences which are not caused by nature and which must be performed by God. They simply believe that no such events ever take place. Therefore we see that the definition does not mean that a certain type of phenomenon has happened.
Bultmann is just such a scholar who believes that our modern world is enough to make us reject all miracles. The ancient view of the world is obsolete and we no longer rely on its cosmology or mythological language. Even so, it is recognized that at least the New Testament defines miracles as events which occur due to the Supernatural intervention of God rather than by the power of nature. For Bultmann, the purpose of miracles is to express spiritual truths that may otherwise be unexplainable.
Historian and philosopher David Hume, who also rejects the miraculous, relates that
a miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.
Once again we find that while Hume clearly rejects the miraculous (as we shall perceive in more detail later), he defines these occurrences as the intervention of God or of another invisible agent. Philosopher Richard Swinburne accepts essentially the same definition, realizing that in so doing he is close to Hume’s view.
English scholar C. S. Lewis defines miracles as follows:
I use the word Miracle to mean an interference with Nature by supernatural power. Unless there exists, in addition to Nature, something else which we may call the supernatural, there can be no miracles. (The italics are Lewis’.)
Like the other definitions, here Lewis also conceives of miracles as having a direct effect on nature. But the miracles are seen as being brought less forcefully into the world. Lewis perceives of nature as an entity which can receive such extraordinary occurrences into its own pattern of events when they are caused by Supernatural power. Thus they do interfere with the laws of nature, but do not break them. These miracles are not taken for granted by the author, however, but are investigated to ascertain if they actually did occur.
The last definition of miracles which we will state is that of theologian John McNaugher, who agrees with Lewis in asserting that these occurrences are out of the normal sequence of events in nature. They cannot be explained by natural processes, but are due to the agency of God. They are obvious to the senses and designed for the purpose of authenticating a message.
In these five definitions of miracles there are obviously several similarities (as well as some differences). For instance, all five scholars are agreed (to varying extents) that real miracles require Supernatural intervention and are not to be explained naturally. All five also believe that these occurrences have a direct relation to the laws of nature, requiring some sort of interference. Some think that miracles have a purpose. But all are not agreed, for instance, as to whether these miracles actually occur or not. In other words, it is possible in this case to describe what an occurrence would entail if it were to happen, while not actually believing that there are such events. Nevertheless, there is a surprising amount of similarity in these definitions for scholars who disagree on this last point.
In this paper, the writer will refer to a miracle as an event which interferes with the laws of nature, but does not violate them. They cannot be explained by any natural causes (including man’s power) and thus must be accomplished by some type of Supernatural activity. They are effected for a purpose and may be perceived by man’s senses. The question now is to ascertain if there really are such events.
A discussion of miracles should ideally also include an inquiry into the meaning of myth. We will attempt to explore a couple of earlier meanings of the word and some modern definitions of it. We would thus endeavor to discover what myth is and what function it plays in society.
Originally, myths were generally defined by scholars as fictitious narratives containing very little or no factual content. They were mainly concerned with stories of gods, goddesses, and questions about the cosmos. Because of such content, myths were judged to be simply fiction. The definition was one which implied the essential contradiction between myth and history.
Later, the word also came to mean a fictitious story revolving around a historical personage, circumstance, or event, but one which was not really factual. Perhaps an example of this type of popular myth would be the narrative of how George Washington chopped down a cherry tree and chose the subsequent punishment rather than tell a lie concerning his actions.
There is much disagreement as to a suitable definition of myth today. This is made even more difficult by the variations in the definition utilized by scholars from different disciplines. One popular practice is to define myth as being the opposite of history, thereby signifying that it is almost completely untrue in a factual sense.
As used by most contemporary theologians and religious scholars, myth is not usually taken to be so unrealistic. The emphasis is clearly placed most often on the function of the myth and on what such a concept is supposed to accomplish in society. Thus, theologians are more interested in studying the message which the myth is meant to convey.
For nineteenth-century theologian David Strauss, myth is the clothing for the expression of religious truths. For this reason, one must endeavor to ascertain the societal function and meaning given to a myth, trying to understand the religious message being communicated by means of this imagery. The importance of Strauss’ view of myth is that before his time this concept was either not completely recognized or not applied consistently.
Rudolf Bultmann believes that New Testament myth is essentially unhistorical, but that its primary purpose is to express existential truths about man. Thus, this scholar also agrees that this question of the myth’s purpose is the key one. Bultmann freely admits that the actual imagery of the myth is not the most important part of mythology. Rather, the recovery of its message about human existence is the most essential thing. The stress here is also on understanding what the myth was intended to accomplish.
Few scholars have done more research on the idea of myth than has Mircea Eliade. For Eliade, myths are accounts of deeds which are always acts of creation, in that they speak of some reality coming into existence. Myths are very complex cultural factors whose main function is to serve as models for the rites and other important activities of humans. Thus myths present religious explanations for what is believed to have occurred. For this reason, a myth is perceived to be an actual reality in that it always depicts something that has happened, such as the beginning of the world or the fact of death.
Eliade stresses the symbolic character of such myths. They are capable of revealing something which is deeper than known reality. Such symbols point to various facets of human existence. Perhaps the most important aspect of mythical symbolism is that truths can be expressed by this mode which can be expressed coherently in no other way. It is therefore very important to study the message of the myth. Scholars who do not discover this function of myth fail in their endeavor to understand this concept.
For S. H. Hooke, myth is still viewed as being essentially nonhistorical, but it nevertheless is a result of a particular circumstance and therefore it does have a purpose. Thus the proper approach is not to try to determine how much actual truth it contains, but rather to determine what the real function of the myth is—what it is supposed to accomplish. As with Eliade, Hooke stresses that the function of a myth is to use imagery to express truths that otherwise could not be explained.
These definitions of myth have pointed to at least a few general conclusions with which many theologians seem to be in agreement, at least to a certain extent. Myths can be identified as the use of various types of imagery to portray different aspects of life (real or imaginary), including one’s beliefs, customs, or folklore. Myths are essentially nonhistorical, but they may reflect actual occurrences and teach religious or moral truths. Myths do have a societal function. They are often the devices by which one can express what otherwise would be inexpressible, whether it concerns cosmology, man’s existence, the Divine, or one’s religious and moral beliefs. In other words, myths serve the function of allowing various societies to speak of treasured beliefs, mysteries, and customs in a way that ordinary language might not quite be able to duplicate. This could be either because of a lack of proper words or a lack of the necessary knowledge needed to explain these things. For instance, mythical imagery could easily have been employed to explain certain cosmic events such as eclipses. In this way societies could pass on verbal or written accounts of their experiences. That this was an important function of myth is witnessed by the discoveries throughout various parts of the world pointing to this usage.
These general conclusions will be the basis for the definition of myth that will be used in this paper. Briefly, myth will mainly be utilized to refer to the essentially nonhistorical use of imagery by societies in order to express certain beliefs, customs, or events. They allow people to speak of realities that might be much harder to express apart from the use of this imagery.
The distinction between miracle and myth is an important one. It will be the purpose of the remainder of this paper to investigate the resurrection of Jesus in light of these definitions. Was this occurrence a myth voicing the beliefs of early Christendom, or was it a literal event requiring Supernatural action? Our investigation will thus view the evidence of each possibility in order to ascertain where it points in regard to this question. We agree with Wand in the assertion that it is very important to distinguish myth from history. The purpose of the myth must be determined and real history must not be confused with the myth. Therefore, each has its own purpose and it will be our task not to let the two become indiscriminately mixed.
B. TWENTIETH-CENTURY SCIENCE AND MIRACLES
It is a common practice today to conceive of science and the miraculous as being totally opposed. Bultmann, for instance, rejects early Christian cosmology on the grounds that it is opposed to modern science. All of our contemporary knowledge is based on science and this includes an application of its laws to the study of the New Testament. Thus Bultmann speaks of the relationship between science and miracles:
It is impossible to use electric light and the wireless and to avail ourselves of modern medical and surgical discoveries, and at the same time to believe in the New Testament world of spirits and miracles.
Thus this scholar believes that we live in too modern an age to believe in miracles. The world is closed to such occurrences. The Supernatural simply does not occur and is therefore quickly dismissed, often arbitrarily. Others also agree with Bultmann’s approach.
This line of reasoning is not very recent, however. For a couple of hundred years prior to the twentieth century many have also held that science ruled miracles out. The universe was usually seen as being a closed system, meaning, among other things, that it could not be interfered with by the Supernatural. James Jauncey defines it this way:
The standpoint of science was that nature was a ‘closed universe.’ This meant that everything within the universe was governed by an unvarying sequence of cause and effect. The universe was closed to any occurrences which deviated from this pattern.… Whenever you had a certain combination of factors operating, the result was always the same and could not be different. Miracles, on the other hand, could not be fitted into this framework of cause and effect.
This view of miracles is actually found very early in critical thought. We need not wait until the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries to find this opinion expressed against the possibility of miracles. For instance, seventeenth-century philosopher Benedict Spinoza (1632–1677) also opposed miraculous events which were said to break the laws of nature.
Since the beginning of the twentieth century, however, science has begun to change these former conceptions about the workings of nature. In man’s past history there have been many scientific revolutions. In the opinion of most, we are living today in the midst of just such a revolution. Jauncy states in his Introduction titled “The Scientific Revolution”:
The evidence is piling up that we are in the midst of the greatest evolution in human living since the Renaissance. This is due to the tremendous explosion in scientific knowledge which has been occurring within the last few years. Even for those of us who have been close to the frontiers of science all of our lives, it is hard to believe what is happening.
What are the results of these changes and how do they affect the possibility of miracles? Jauncy relates that one result of this scientific revolution is that today the idea of a closed universe is rejected. Scientific research has replaced this other view with a new understanding of nature. Clark also notes that the idea of causality was dropped by science about one hundred years ago and the belief in a mechanistic universe has also come under attack. The resulting new view of nature is sometimes referred to by such titles as the “Einsteinian-relativistic interpretation of ‘natural law’ ” and perceived as being essentially opposed to “the world of Newtonian absolutes.” Thomas S. Kuhn also believes that the theories of Einstein are incompatible with the older ones formulated by Newton. In fact, we can only accept this Einsteinian system after recognizing that the theories of Newton were incorrect.
A recent work by eminent German physicist Werner Schaaffs has succeeded both in describing these comparatively recent trends in physics and in dealing with the resultant influence on the possibility of miracles. Schaaffs informs us that the rejection of a closed universe by modern science took place about the turn of the century. In fact, the year 1900 is seen as being the turning point for modern physics. Therefore we can no longer scientifically hold to the belief in a closed universe as was the case in the nineteenth century.
Schaaffs refers to the replacing of the closed universe view with the present view of physics as “double negation.” This is because older opinions which were once used to negate all miracles are, in turn, negated themselves. The old law of causation has been replaced by statistical description and thus the law of probability. To this we will turn directly. But we must first remark that new theories in physics usually build upon older ideas and thus appear at least somewhat to be a process of development (rather than a case of total displacement). The old views are thus expanded and corrected by the modern ones. We will now take a closer look at some important developments in physics that have led to these conclusions.
We have been speaking of the modern view of physics and its negation of the eighteenth- and nineteenth-century belief in a closed universe where no outside intervention was believed to be possible. It should be mentioned in all fairness that not all scholars in these two centuries accepted this view of cause and effect in a mechanistic world although it was very popular. Therefore, before the twentieth century the world was, for the most part, conceived to be one of mechanical cause and effect. Any events which did not fit into this pattern, such as miracles, were often rejected immediately. It was the “reign of ‘unalterable law’ ” in which it was imagined that one could be sure of events and in which miracles were simply not possibilities.
With the emergence of the twentieth century experimentation in physics it was found that, contrary to the then accepted scientific belief, there was much uncertainty in our universe. It could not be predicted with complete accuracy how a particular event would occur. There were found variations and differences in principles that were once thought to be invariable. It was beginning to be apparent that the universe could not be expected to behave any one certain way all of the time.
Even though we have been discussing the field of physics, it should be pointed out that this information definitely has had an affect on other fields of knowledge as well. This was obvious because, if these facts were true, then other studies also had to adjust to them. Later, for example, the affect of these discoveries on the discipline of history will be shown. Schaaffs notes, for instance, that few actually understand that the significance of these findings extends far beyond the field of physics.
Some may object that these principles affect only questions which deal with the microcosm and therefore have no bearing on the topic of miracles. Schaaffs deals with this very problem, concluding that one can work from any of three directions to demonstrate that occurrences in the microcosm have a great bearing on events in the macrocosm. These reasons show that chain reactions can be caused by deviations in individual atoms which eventually have macroscopic results. Thus, minute and unpredictable changes in atomic processes cause major events to also become somewhat indeterminate and unpredictable. In fact, the uncertain pairing of microscopic transactions can either cause a macroscopic event to occur or keep it from occurring. Thus the macroscopic event itself becomes unpredictable and it is not within the reach of science to control it.
It is true that microscopic events are more unpredictable than macroscopic ones, but both are often found to be unexplainable. For these reasons, both microscopic and macroscopic events “can be interpreted only as a law of probability.” This means that a “statement in science is seldom now considered true in itself, but only within a certain limit of probability.” In other words, we can no longer consider a scientific statement as being absolute, but only probable to one extent or another. Statistical probabilities must be given to events according to the degree to which they can be expected to occur and not viewed as being positively certain as might be the case in a closed universe.
One use of statistics that is perhaps not at first obvious is that they “have enabled us to appreciate the extreme cases” because “the rarer an event, the harder it is to determine a precise time for its occurrence. One can only assign a probability to it.” Therefore more common events receive a higher probability and rarer ones a lower probability. Unique events are given still lower chances of occurring. But this is intriguing in the case of these very rare events because “even the greatest probability cannot rule out the possibility that the event will occur tomorrow.” There is an infinite number of possibilities for such events to occur daily and thus they cannot be thought to be impossible.
Can giving a probability to rare events, as described above, have any relevance to the possibility of miracles occurring? Schaaffs answers in the affirmative:
Though a miracle is a rare, or perhaps even unique, event or experience, quite out of the ordinary, it can with comparative ease, as our example shows, be placed in a statistical framework. It has no intrinsic peculiarity requiring that it be placed outside that framework. Thus, a miracle, though a rarity to be sure, is a phenomenon of natural law, for statistics are the essence of natural law.
Therefore we see that for this German physicist miracles are possible. We will also note here that Montgomery, for one, agrees with this above analysis and insists that the only way that an account of a miracle can be verified is by an “unprejudiced confrontation” with the sources which claim that such an event actually occurred. We need not try to ascertain a priori what is able to occur today (as was done in a closed universe), since almost anything is possible according to its statistical probability. In other words, the “question is no longer what can happen, but what has happened” because “the universe since Einstein has opened up to the possibility of any event” (the italics are Montgomery’s). Therefore, we can only determine what has happened by investigating the sources in order to ascertain which events probably are and which events probably are not a part of history.
Few understand how far-reaching these results in physics are and “how far beyond physics their significance extends.” The knowledge thus gained surpasses the bounds of physics and affects other fields such as theology. We have found that the belief in a mechanistic, closed universe is no longer valid and thus cannot be used to rule out miracles a priori, as in the past. We can only find out if an event has occurred or not by investigating the sources thoroughly. This could lead to either a positive or to a negative conclusion.
A key point we want to stress in this chapter is that these former worldviews can no longer be used, as contemporary theology often does, against the occurrence of miracles. We are certainly not saying at this point that miracles do occur. But they can only be disbelieved today on the merits of each. Montgomery drives this last point home in the following words, using the resurrection of Jesus as an example of a miracle:
To oppose the resurrection on the ground that miracles do not occur is, as we have noted earlier, both philosophically and scientifically irresponsible: philosophically, because no one below the status of a god could know the universe so well as to eliminate miracles a priori; and scientifically, because in the age of Einsteinian physics (so different from the world of Newtonian absolutes in which Hume formulated his classic anti-miraculous argument) the universe has opened up to all possibilities.
This is surely not to affirm that Einstein said that miracles would happen but only that there is always the possibility that they could, given our present concept of physics.
Concerning the conception of nature with which we have been working, we must mention that the results described above do not invalidate the idea of essential lawful order in nature. All are agreed that such a general order does exist, even though it must only be described statistically. In addition, as McNaugher explains, where there is no regularity in nature we cannot speak of any departure from it. In other words, if nature were disorderly, it would be impossible to know if something had occurred that could be described as irregular.
Thus, along with all recent studies, we also affirm the belief in the regularity of nature. A true miracle, then (if there is such an occurrence), must interfere with this regularity, according to our definition. Therefore, if miracles are to happen, nature cannot be the cause of them, but can only be open to their occurrence.
Thus we hold that modern scholarship can no longer deny miracles simply by referring to a closed universe and to our civilization as being “too advanced.” They can only be denied on the grounds of historical and philosophical (logical) research.
It may appear that there is too much reliance here on a current scientific worldview that may change again in the future to yet another understanding of nature. To this there are at least two valid responses.
First and most important, it must be pointed out that an investigation into the possibility of miracles does not require the contemporary relativistic view of nature in order to arrive at valid conclusions. It is true that this modern view of science does help considerably both in negating the old closed universe hypothesis and in allowing for the possibility that miracles do occur. However, it must be asserted that the procedure we will deal with later, namely, investigating an event first before any judgment is given concerning the probability of its occurring, does not depend on science. We cannot overstate this enough. If we were to rest upon an existing view of nature we would always be in danger of having our system upset because of new ideas when this need not be the case. Regardless of the contemporary state of physics, we hold that an account of a miracle (as defined above) should be investigated inductively to ascertain if it has occurred apart from any other worldview of what can or cannot happen. Such is a much more logical and scholarly approach than beginning with presuppositions as to what is possible. These conclusions could thus be maintained even if physics was not in the state in which we find it. Thus the conclusions to be reached do not depend solely upon our modern understanding of science, but are rather based upon this aforementioned investigation of the reported facts.
Second, Schaaffs answers this very question by asserting that physics is unlike other disciplines in that it does not regress backward: “Accurate knowledge and the results of earlier research are never simply discarded; rather, they serve as building blocks for further advances.” He adds later that “the knowledge discovered in the present century will remain valid within the framework in which it was obtained.” Present concepts in physics may even be broadened, but they do not disappear. This is because knowledge in this discipline is not discarded in order to return to older ideas. As mentioned, the truths discovered in physics remain valid. Therefore, even if we did rest our conclusions on the current scientific worldview (although we do not, as stated above), they would still appear safe.
Before proceeding to the next chapter, it must be mentioned in all fairness that most men of science do not hold that this current view of physics gives any preference to miracles. Therefore we will conclude this chapter with the assertion of philosopher Gordon Clark, who is cautious in his evaluation of the relationship between miracles and modern physics. He feels that while some theological conservatives have gone too far in their application of scientific principles to the Supernatural, others have gone too far in the opposite direction by presenting science as being totally opposed to anything which is really miraculous. Clark believes that we can at least minimally conclude that the once-popular theories of a closed and mechanistic universe can no longer be used to invalidate miracles. In addition, neither these older theories or contemporary scientific ones can be used as objections against the Supernatural. While we cannot agree with those who believe that science gives preference to miracles, neither can we agree with those who believe that it forbids them.
In other words, Clark’s conclusion is stated in negative terms. Rather than holding that the universe allows for the miraculous, Clark simply states that we can no longer appropriate a scientific worldview that rules out the miraculous. Thus he speaks not about what is possible in nature, as do many of the scholars we have dealt with above, but about what we cannot say about it. We cannot hold that science gives preferential treatment to miracles, but neither can the scientific worldview be used to show that they cannot occur. This, then, is the conclusion we will work with, one which directly favors neither opinion. Therefore we are also left with the conclusion which we reached earlier—that decisions concerning the probability of certain miracles (such as the resurrection of Jesus) must be determined by a thorough investigation of the reported facts in order to ascertain if they actually happened.
As stated above, this study is not based upon the findings of modern physics, but rather upon the idea that any accounts which claim that a miracle has occurred must be historically investigated in order for its veracity to be determined. Therefore we will look first at the concept of history that will be used in this work and then view the method of this investigation.
The term “history” is used in various ways by different scholars. There is no uniform definition which is agreed to by all scholars, as numerous approaches and interpretations are commonly utilized. Therefore it is not our purpose here to give a complete or exhaustive treatment of the contemporary definitions of history. However, it seems that there is at least some general agreement concerning the content of history.
Most historians are agreed that history includes at least two major factors—the actual events in particular and also the recording of these events. Thus this discipline is mainly concerned with what has happened and how these occurrences have been annotated. It is this conception which will form the core understanding of history as it will be used in this work. Other elements are surely involved, as will now be noted. But the inclusion of these two major ideas is essential and are thus the foundation of this concept as it will be used here.
Now we surely do not mean to affirm that the presence of these two elements is all that is involved in a definition of history. Rather, these are the ones which seem to reoccur most often. However, a few other factors that are part of this discussion should also be mentioned quickly.
First, there is always a subjective factor involved in the writing of history. For instance, the historian must select the material which he will (and will not) cover. The historical event is obviously objective. It is the recording of the event that introduces subjective factors. For W. H. Walsh, the subjectivity of the writer is present, but it is not a real serious roadblock to the obtaining of objective history. This subjectivity can be allowed for its efforts can be overcome. Wand agrees with Walsh in asserting that the best approach to take toward history is one of caution, as we should try and recognize this subjective bias and then make the proper allowance for it.
We will also endeavor to allow for this subjective factor in our investigation of the resurrection. This occurrence has been reported as an objective historical event and we must ascertain if it is the best explanation for the known facts.
Second, we find that history cannot reach the point where it is totally positive of its findings in all instances. As with physics, so there is also a certain amount of dependence on probability in history as well.
For instance, Ernest Nagel, who accepts a deterministic view of history, admits that he does so in spite of the convictions of contemporary physicists who almost unanimously hold the opposite viewpoint. The conclusions of these scientists have had an affect on historians, for the accepted scientific view against a deterministic universe has also helped to turn historians against a deterministic view of history.
Nagel lists five main reasons why historical determinism is generally rejected by so many historians today. First is the argument from the absence of any developmental laws or patterns in history. Second is the argument based on the inability to explain and predict events in human history. The third argument concerns the appearance of the novel in historical occurrences. Fourth is the argument from the chance events which are also a part of history. The fifth argument concerns the conflicting results when one attempts to make the concept of a deterministic world compatible with the freedom and moral duty of human beings.
It is because of these and other similar findings that so many historians have rejected the deterministic view of history. Nagel further states (to reiterate the point), that the findings of modern physics, which also oppose determinism, have been a key factor that has exercised a direct influence on a similar rejection of this concept by most historians. Montgomery concurs in this belief that contemporary science has made it impossible for historians to accept a closed system of natural causes.
The appearance of these chance and novel events mentioned above, together with the aforementioned inability to explain or predict many other occurrences, has helped to further the use of probabilities in historical studies (as well as in scientific investigation). Historians both recognize and utilize this concept of probability. For instance, Montgomery observes that historical studies can never reach the one hundred percentile level in certainty. Ronald VanderMolen agrees completely with Montgomery’s assessment and thus accepts the belief that historical scholarship is not completely positive of its findings. In fact, historians must not fail to allow for this amount of uncertainty. For this reason Montgomery opts for a critical investigation of the sources in question, with the decision about the occurrence of any specific event being based upon the probability of the evidence. In fact, probability is referred to as the only sufficient guide for a historian. Wand also notes that we cannot be as sure of historical investigation as was thought possible in the past. However, we must make our judgments as to which facts are most probable according to the historical evidence.
These elements, then, are to be included in a contemporary treatment of history. While it has not been our purpose to deal with this subject exhaustively, we have come to some conclusions on the concept of history as it will be used in this work. We will refer to history as both the occurrence of past events and the recording of them. Realizing that there is always a certain amount of the subjective in this recording, allowance must be made for it as much as is possible in order for objective data to be obtained. Realizing also that in speaking of history we are dealing with probabilities, it will be our desire to ascertain as nearly as is possible which facts best fit the evidence. With these probabilities and uncertainties there is always room for the possibility of any event, however high the probability may be against it. Events can therefore not be ruled out (either scientifically or historically) before they are researched. The only answer is a thorough investigation of the evidence.
B. INVESTIGATING THE HISTORICAL EVENTS
1. HISTORICAL RESEARCH AND INVESTIGATION
It is the opinion of most historians today that the veracity of past events can be discovered (within a certain probability) by a careful investigation of the facts. Walsh notes that since these events have occurred in the past, they are only accessible by a study of the historical evidence. Although the historian himself will not be able to participate in the event that has already occurred (unless he was originally there), he is able to inspect the relevant data such as written documents and various other records, structures, or archeological finds. Upon such confirmation as this the historian must obtain his evidence. This is what Walsh feels is the working principle of historical research.
Of course, what the existing data and written sources reveal is not usually automatically accepted as being true. It is therefore the job of the historian to critically investigate the available claims in order to ascertain as closely as possible what has happened. This includes the procedure of determining if the sources best support the claims that are made in them. The proper results can be obtained even though there exists this need to determine which facts best fit the evidence. Then it is the duty of the historian to formulate the facts based upon this groundwork. One is therefore to decide upon the evidence at hand—that which is shown to be the most probable conclusion.
Even claims of miracles must be investigated in this way, since they cannot be ruled out a priori, as noted above. On this subject Montgomery asserts:
But can the modern man accept a “miracle” such as the resurrection?… For us, unlike people of the Newtonian epoch, the universe is no longer a tight, safe, predictable playing-field in which we know all the rules. Since Einstein no modern man has had the right to rule out the possibility of events because of prior knowledge of “natural law.” … The problem of “miracle,” then, must be solved in the realm of historical investigation.
As Montgomery concludes, since we cannot decide in advance what can happen, we must determine, by historical research, what really has happened already.
We must quickly point out here that miracles are not to be believed simply because they are Supernatural. In fact, we would desire to be the more careful before accepting a miracle-claim as a historical event. But, on the other hand, we must also guard against the presupposition that miracles cannot occur at all. There is no real basis, either scientific or historical, for this presupposition. Although many are skeptical about the reality of miracles, it may be that a Supernatural explanation fits the facts best and is the most probable solution.
On this last point of skepticism Wand has made a very pertinent point. His words were specifically directed at the historical skepticism of theologian Van Harvey, but Wand points out that the same can also be applied to others of this persuasion as well. Harvey argued that we cannot accept the New Testament accounts of the empty tomb even though there is much historical evidence in favor of them and no convincing evidence contrary to them. To this Wand responds:
We may well ask Harvey how a critical historian can do anything else than decide on the evidence before him—unless indeed he already holds some secret which will invalidate in advance any evidence that can be brought in favor of the phenomenon in question? The plain fact is that in this kind of argument the skeptic is not functioning as a historian at all. He starts with the assumption that there could be no corporeal resurrection since that would be against nature.… That is to say, he rejects the evidence because he does not like a conclusion that it may be used to support.
It appears that Wand’s point is well taken here. What else can the historian do except investigate the available evidence and make a decision based on it? Since this is the way that other historical facts must be decided (as we have seen above) it seems that we do not have the right to demand different criteria simply because, as Wand notes, we do not like or agree with the conclusions. We must therefore approach this subject with an open mind, endeavoring to ascertain which explanation is the most probable.
Now some may judge that Wand’s conclusions are those of the theological “fundamentalist” who endeavors to prove every word of Scripture as being true. To this it should be remarked that not only does this Oxford scholar object to such beliefs, he holds to the quite contemporary theological opinion that while some of the New Testament is historical and trustworthy, some is also simply propaganda which was written without any claims to being objectively historical. Thus he cannot accept the view that the Bible itself is the guarantee and proof that all of Christianity was completely historical. Because of this, Wand believes that we should inquire into whatever mythical elements could possibly be present in the texts. But, at the same time, we cannot allow the portions that evidence indicates are historical to be labelled as myth.
Wand’s conclusion in these matters is that we must approach these ancient documents cautiously. Bias and subjective factors must be allowed for and dealt with accordingly. But, in spite of all of this, we may find that the Supernatural explanation is more historically probable than the natural one. In this case we must be prepared to accept the miraculous conclusion.
2. THE RESURRECTION AND HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION
According to Wand, the resurrection is the central claim of New Testament Christianity and as such it cannot simply be ignored. Neither should we be content to leave the question simply by affirming that the original disciples believed that Jesus had risen. Since it is the center of the Christian faith it should be carefully investigated. We must inquire into this belief in order to ascertain whether or not it is valid.
Other historians also agree to the need for such research. Ancient historian Paul Maier also believes that the historical evidence for the resurrection must be investigated. Then we can better judge whether it can be referred to as an actual part of history. Another ancient historian, Edwin Yamauchi, agrees that we must investigate this occurrence in order to conclude if it is best explained as myth or as history. We have already discussed Montgomery’s preference to historically investigate this event as well.
Therefore, after dealing with the problem of faith and reason in the next chapter, we will turn to this investigation. The New Testament authors certainly claimed that Jesus rose from the dead, meaning literally that he appeared to many of the early Christians after having actually died. No one doubts that this is what the accounts report. It remains for us to endeavor to determine the facticity of these claims.
We have in this chapter explained the concept of history that is to be used in this work. We have also determined that history, like science, cannot rule out the possibility of miracles a priori, that is, without investigating the available evidence and deciding upon it. To this end we have briefly described the approaches taken by several historians as to historical research and investigation. Procedures such as these will be used in our own investigation of the resurrection of Jesus.
It has been said that Christian history and thought is a history of the opposition between faith and reason. This is a reference to the continual conflict between these two aspects of the Christian life—the spiritual and the rational. There has always seemed to be a variety of views on this subject, often intermingled and overlapping. Historian of philosophy Etienne Gilson has dealt with several of these opinions in his work Reason and Revelation in the Middle Ages. For instance, early church theologian Tertullian believed not only that faith was primary, but that all reference to human philosophy or other teachings should be excluded. Passing to the twelfth century, we find Saint Bernard voicing a similar opinion in favor of faith alone.
A second view was that of Augustine, who held that one’s reason and understanding do play a part, but a secondary one since faith is to precede them. Therefore we must exercise faith first before we can understand. Another exponent of this view was Anselm.
Gilson finds that a third important view was voiced by the twelfth century Arabian philosopher Averroes. Although his was not a Christian system of thought, it did influence Christianity. For Averroes, reason was primary and faith was subordinated to it.
The fourth view was that of Thomas Aquinas, who endeavored to find harmony between faith and reason. He believed that some truths could be known only by revelation while others could be attained by reason.
This is just a sample of some of the possibilities when one views the history of opinions on the relationship between faith and reason. Some favor the use of either faith or reason exclusively. Some give a place to both, while subordinating one to the other. Either reason is seen as being subordinate to faith or vice versa. Others try to find a balance between the two methods. In this work a system will be set forth which is both a workable one and one that is justified by the facts.
A. REASON AND FAITH: DEFINITIONS
In order to lay a groundwork for our discussion on this topic, this study will begin with a look at the dictionary definitions of these two terms. The American Dictionary of the English Language defines reason as follows:
The basis or motive for an action, decision, or conviction.… A declaration made to explain or justify an action, decision, or conviction.… The capacity for rational thought, inference or discrimination.… To … think logically.… To talk or argue logically or persuasively.… To persuade or dissuade (someone) with reasons.
According to this definition, reason includes at least two concepts. First, reason is the capacity to infer, discriminate or even to think rationally. Second, reason is the explanation or outworking of this capacity. This second concept includes (among other things) several component parts. Reason is defined as being the basis or motive for one’s decisions or convictions, or a statement explaining or justifying these decisions or convictions. Reason is also the ability to think logically or to argue persuasively, including persuading (or dissuading) someone one way or another.
If this definition was shown to be a valid one, other conclusions could be drawn from these two concepts of reason as well. For instance, reason would be at the very basis of all of our knowledge, for one cannot even have the capacity to think apart from reason (by definition). Without reason the explanation or outworking of this capacity would also fail to be accounted for because rational thought is defined as being at the basis of all actions, decisions or convictions. In fact, we cannot even formulate these convictions or make these decisions (intellectual or otherwise) except by utilizing reason. Therefore reason is the beginning of knowledge since it becomes obvious that we could not even think in the sense which we are accustomed to, except by reason. Considering the definition, we would have to think without formulating any convictions, making any decisions or coming to any conclusions in order to do so apart from a rational process. Finally, any attempt to counteract these conclusions or argue otherwise is also reason, again by definition.
However, as we have stated above, dictionary definitions cannot in themselves solve philosophical problems such as this one. Therefore, after faith is defined, the views of those who argue in favor of these definitions will later be investigated.
The American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language defines faith as:
A confident belief in the truth, value, or trustworthiness of a person, idea, or thing.… A system of religious beliefs.
Faith, then, is trust or belief in a person, thing, idea, value or truth. Belief itself is defined as mental action centered in a conviction that is thought to be valid. We have already determined in our previous definition that the basis for such actions and convictions is reason. In addition, belief generally involves thinking of some sort, even if it is only the elemental thought that what one is told to believe is “good.” Both of these procedures of thinking about one’s faith, along with the convictions and decisions that often accompany them, are grounded in reason, by definition. Even the capacity to understand these beliefs is part of the cognitive process and has its basis in reason.
There are two general reasons why faith is usually exercised. Some believe by intuitive conviction, while others require reasonable persuasion and rational argument (indeed, some claim an interest in both). But the capacity for both is acquired by reason, as defined above. This is because the ability even to hold convictions and the ability to reason concerning them is rational.
Our study has thus far shown that faith must rely upon reason as its basis. However, this discussion has not so far been one of finding which of the two is the most important and it should not be construed as such. Therefore we will look briefly at this question now.
Even though reason composes the groundwork, we still hold that faith is the most important element of religious belief for two main reasons. First, it is not possible to logically and reasonably prove everything in the Christian faith. Thus faith extends beyond the reaches of this reason, which is more limited. Since we can only speak of varying degrees of probability, as stated above, any religious system which places such research at the apex of achievement will find that it is very limited in what is presented for belief. The realm of faith and hope would be narrowed considerably.
Second, although reason can yield true data from a logical investigation of the facts, faith is capable of transcending the rational when one puts trust in these facts. Therefore, one exercises faith based on the reasonable probabilities. Without such belief one could not speak of the Christian faith. God cannot be known by reasonable processes (beyond the knowledge that He exists), but rather a faith is needed which appropriates and trusts the evidence, with definite ethical implications for one’s life. Without this primary importance of faith and these accompanying ethical implications, Christianity would not be a faith system. This is almost the unanimous witness of Christianity through the centuries, and it has a sound basis. While reason and knowledge are very important, especially as a basis for belief, faith is more so. Reason is thus not the ultimate. This position is also accepted in this work. Faith should remain in this pre-eminent position, being careful to note that this is a reasonable faith based on the facts and not a leap in the dark. More will be said in favor of this opinion below.
So we now reach our conclusion pertinent to the results of these definitions and the roles they play in the issue between faith and reason. We have so far concluded that while reason is temporally primary, faith is the most important. Neither should be excluded and both should be used in its proper place. These definitions, however, will not be regarded as the final word in this discussion, nor will it be assumed that they can totally solve the issues. Therefore it is advantageous to turn now to those who also hold to some of the results arrived at here.
B. REASON AND FAITH: SCHOLARLY VIEWS
A study of definitions has revealed that reason must be the basis of all thinking processes, including the mental activity of faith. While reason is thus temporally first, when speaking in the context of Christian theology, faith is the most important.
Several contemporary scholars have come to similar conclusions based upon personal studies of the evidence. Secular theologian Paul Van Buren believes that faith always requires a thinking process. This is because faith usually includes both logical contemplation and a consideration of historical sources, and these, in turn, involve reasoning. Any type of Christian faith that neglects these processes is quite inadequate.
Theologian John R. Stott also believes that faith is not irrational. It is neither credulity or optimism. Rather, it is a trust based upon reason—a rational belief. As such faith does not contradict or oppose reason, but rather it is essentially complimented by it.
For philosopher Francis Schaeffer, rationality, knowledge, and faith are all related. Rationality is very important, but not to the exclusion of the other elements. A balance must be kept between each. Nevertheless, we cannot expect faith to be exercised prior to a rational investigation of the evidence, or before a proper knowledge and understanding of the truth has first been achieved. These conditions precede faith.
Theologian Wolfhart Pannenberg stresses the need for grounding faith on an objective, rational basis. In two essays entitled “Insight and Faith” and “Faith and Reason” he sets forth his rationale for this belief. Faith cannot stand alone and be its own criteria and proof for belief. This is because the subjective qualities of one’s own faith alone provide no solid reasons as to why it is also good for another individual. The original question as to whether the grounds of this faith are solid is never answered. There is no logical reason to accept it. Therefore a knowledge based upon reason must precede faith.
As pointed out earlier, Montgomery also holds that there must be an objective, historical basis for faith. Faith that is not based on some such reasonable evidence can give no logical reason as to why it should be accepted over other alternatives. Faith cannot verify itself and neither can an experience demonstrate its own validity in and of itself. Therefore we have no reason to accept any faith as being valid if there are no grounds upon which to base this claim.
We have briefly investigated the views of five scholars on the question of the relationship between reason and faith. We will turn now to the rationale behind these views, as to why reason is held to precede faith. The general conviction seems to be, first, that faith must be based upon knowledge and that, second, reason begins the entire process and provides the basis for this knowledge. We will examine these premises more closely.
First, faith must be based upon a knowledge of certain facts which are at least believed to be true. In order for one to have a faith-conviction there must ideally be this basis for belief. At the very least (in the absence of any intellectual or rational investigation), religious faith is trust in the existence of God or a reliance upon certain believed truths. Therefore, religious faith must be grounded on some sort of knowledge, even if it is only the belief that God does (or does not, in the case of atheism) exist. When we perceive that the Christian faith is thus based upon knowledge, we can then view this knowledge as preceding the faith. Even some of the end results of faith, such as various kinds of action or ethical involvement, are due at least partially to the attainment of this prior understanding.
Second, reason begins the process and provides the basis for this knowledge. We have seen that faith-conviction relies on knowledge and that this must involve some thinking, if only at the rudimentary level. Indeed, Van Buren states that real faith is only possible when one thinks and Stott asserts that one cannot have faith at all apart from such cogitation. But thinking is a rational process which requires the use of reason. Therefore, reason both begins this process and provides the framework for it.
In addition, faith must have an objective basis. Without such a foundation, one would never know if the grounds for one’s belief were solid or not. Apart from a foundation of reasonable knowledge, faith is not capable of substantiating itself. Its subjective qualities provide no rational basis or criteria according to which its trustworthiness may be ascertained. For instance, one cannot appeal to one’s personal spiritual experiences for the needed authority factor. Montgomery notes that an appeal to such private experiences is an unconvincing testimony, since it is sometimes hard to tell if the heartfelt experiences of another amount to anything more than heartburn! At first this appears to be simply a humorous illustration, but upon closer examination it is found to contain much truth. How can we even hope to differentiate between real experiences or beliefs and false ones if there are no factual criteria which gives us at least some idea as to what may be most trustworthy? A faith which is grounded upon rational facts and which rests upon an objective basis is in a much better position to ascertain its trustworthiness than is a faith which is admittedly irrational and subjective in its approach. It is true that one may prefer the latter, but this does not answer the question of how one might verify this faith even for oneself, let alone for others.
It is also true that the rational approach does not always lead to a valid faith. But it appears that it would be much better off in view of this question of verification than would a faith which does not (or cannot) utilize any rational method at all. Indeed, an intelligent investor does not often risk funds on an enterprise which gives no valid reasons to make such an investment seem worthwhile. Even hunches and premonitions are usually based on some sort of knowledge or reason, even if it is “secret information.” In a similar way, faith should also be based upon a rational groundwork.
Apart from an objective faith which is based upon a logical examination of the facts, there is no way to ascertain if such beliefs are valid or not. No amount of wishful thinking can make the facts any more truthful. No matter how intense one’s faith is, one cannot make this faith any more valid. Faith must therefore have an objective basis or else one would not be able to ascertain if it is simply spurious.
Pannenberg also believes that we must reject a subjective Christian faith which is based on one’s personal experiences. He does so for at least two reasons. First, such private experiences cannot be obligatory for others because they lack factual, objective evidence and therefore are usually only capable, at the most, of convincing oneself. Second, this subjectivism disregards the fact that the very center of Christianity is based on Divine initiative. Men everywhere are able to investigate the foundations of this religion in order to ascertain as closely as possible if events such as the resurrection have actually occurred. The opportunity to investigate the claims of Christianity is open to anyone who wants to study them and is not relegated to the perusal of a select few. Therefore, the Christian faith is most properly objective, open to a rational confrontation with the facts and not subjective or irrational.
The same conclusion that was reached with regard to trying to substantiate Christianity by one’s personal, subjective experience also applies to those who endeavor to point to the proclaimed message as the basis for the faith. This approach also fails in that the obvious question concerns whether there is a real reason to accept it or not. If the reason is unconvincing, it would seem that we would lack a sound basis for accepting it. Further, the message apart from any rational coercion cannot show why it should be accepted over another alternative, or even over a contrary view. In other words, the message is not self-authenticating but must also provide objective reasons to back up its claim to truth.
By “objective reason” we are referring to the need for faith to investigate the historical (or other) evidence and make its decision upon which facts best fit the case. For Schaeffer, faith is based upon just such an examination of the events which Christianity claims have already occurred in history, such as the resurrection. One cannot be asked to exercise faith in the Christian message until the evidence has been investigated. Montgomery agrees that faith begins in an investigation of the objective, historical events and rests in the probability of the findings. But we must remember that faith is based on the events and not vice versa. In other words, faith is not formulated apart from the facts, hoping that there is some evidence to support this venture. Rather, one believes because the facts appear reasonable. Pannenberg also stresses this last point, asserting that an individual does not bring an already existing faith to the events, but exercises this faith only after an open-minded look at the events.
As for the question of importance, we found earlier that reason was temporally primary while faith was more important in a theological context. We found this to be true for two main reasons. First, the whole of Christian teachings and belief cannot be explained completely in terms of reason. Second, when we speak in a theological context belief takes on a central importance, as it transcends reason. Faith must personally appropriate the facts, which involves ethical implications for one’s life. This is chiefly because we are dealing with the existence and teaching of God (the Greek theos, root word of theology), a doctrine which cannot be dealt with adequately in the realm of reason alone. The importance of faith is primary here, as witnessed by centuries of Christian thought.
Does contemporary thought offer similar reasons for giving faith the place of primary importance while placing reason first temporally? We must answer here in the affirmative. It is especially noteworthy that the same scholars who we have been dealing with in our previous discussion, those who hold that reason and knowledge are the foundation for belief, also place faith in the place of prime importance in the end. Even the same two reasons used above (or very similar ones) are employed. First, Pannenberg notes that the doctrines of Christianity can never be explained completely in terms of reason. There will always be a remainder. Second, Pannenberg further relates that no one can come to know God strictly by his own reason. A good example here is the Christian teachings concerning salvation. Even though reason provides the original basis, knowledge is still not capable of securing salvation because it depends finally upon the appropriation of faith and reliance in God and personal surrender to Him. Thus faith is based upon rational probabilities, but the final expression of it transcends the rational.
Montgomery also comes to similar conclusions. Faith is based upon the probabilities which emerge from an investigation of the objective facts and the final step of salvation is an appropriation of this fact by means of faith. As such, faith and commitment to God through Jesus Christ is the final step of salvation, as it accomplishes something which reason could never do.
Wand adds an interesting point here. While faith is dependent upon reason and builds upon its more conclusive basis, faith is still more important in that it is more intimate and personal than knowledge. Thus it makes use of the framework of reason and then goes beyond the rational.
It may become apparent at this point that reason and faith, when properly understood, actually compliment each other. Both have their own roles to play and each are very important. These roles, as we have shown above, consist of faith operating on the basis of reason. However, the two are not in competition with each other, but rather cooperate together. In this way they are found to be quite compatible. The result is that head and heart should ideally work with, not against, each other.
The conclusion which we have reached in this chapter is that faith can only be built upon reason, meaning that reason is temporally first in this process. This has been found to be the case both from an investigation of definitions and from a logical examination of the evidence. From the first study we found that we cannot even think in the way we are accustomed to, let alone exercise faith, apart from a rational process. For instance, real faith involves convictions and mental action. These can only be held by some variety of thinking and they also require reason, however naive. One can exercise valid faith, however, even if one is not able to personally investigate the facts, as mentioned above. From the latter study we have not only verified this, but we have concluded in addition that a subjective, irrational faith can provide no logical grounds as to why it should be accepted. If there is no rationale for this faith, there can be no objective criteria on which its claim to truth can be based. Therefore one cannot ascertain if the message based on such a faith should be accepted or not. Without any criteria or objective data on which to judge its contents, there is no logical way to distinguish one faith-message from a rival one. In fact, one is hard pressed for any evidence on which one’s religious experience may be distinguished from any other human emotion, unless it is grounded in logical reason and investigation. Even an intense faith apart from such an objective basis cannot make faith any more valid. Therefore, we hold that for faith to be intelligible it must be based on a rational knowledge.
We must be careful to point out once again that a rational approach to faith may not solve every last problem, but it does provide the best grounds on which to base faith, as shown above. Without this approach there would be no real way that one could verify these conclusions with any confidence. We thus encounter historical probabilities once again, as it appears that arguing from objective, historical data and logical evidence seems to provide the best way of arriving at the most probable results. So while the rational approach is not infallible, it does provide the best means of gaining a testable and verifiable foundation for faith. If we abandon the rational, we must also abandon our hopes of gaining such objective and verifiable results.
An irrational or strictly subjective faith is not capable of providing such answers. It cannot verify itself or demonstrate its own validity. Neither can it answer the question of whether its grounds for faith are solid or not. Because of this lack of evidence it cannot show why it should be accepted over other possibilities. Such a faith cannot provide a logical reason as to why it should be accepted, since there are no testable grounds on which to base this claim. Neither can such belief make faith any more truthful. There is no logical reason to accept this faith.
Although reason is temporally first, faith was found to be the most important as an end result. This is because, first, all of Christian belief cannot be accounted for rationally. Second, in the context of theology, faith can do what reason cannot quite accomplish in dealing with the existence and teachings of God. Although based upon reason, faith transcends the rational in providing a means by which one can trust in the reasonable findings of one’s aforementioned investigation, applying the results to one’s life.
Lastly, we discussed the need to bring reason and faith together. We must present them henceforth as being entirely compatible and not in competition with each other, recognizing that each has a role to play. Reason forms the basis and is temporally first while faith is more essential and important.
In the historical and logical investigation which will now follow, we will endeavor to combine the essentials of our last three chapters. The scientific worldview can no longer be used to rule out the miraculous. Rather we must speak in terms of probabilities and investigate each miracle-claim. Here history also plays a part. Utilizing the concept of historical investigation outlined above, we will examine the possibilities of belief and nonbelief in the resurrection of Jesus. Again we must decide upon historical probability and accept as factual that explanation which best fits the facts. The philosophical discussion just concluded will also be utilized here. We must maintain throughout this relationship between reason and faith.
It is advantageous to turn now to our historical and logical investigation of three key possibilities (and several related ones) concerning belief and nonbelief in the resurrection of Jesus. The findings in the fields of physics, history, and philosophy will be combined in an effort to ascertain which possibility best fits the facts.