A. Karl Barth
A. DAVID HUME: AN INTRODUCTION
The first possibility to be dealt with here is that the resurrection did not literally occur. We will begin by investigating the views of one very important scholar who held this opinion, turning later to several other related views. The scholar we will use as a representative example is historian and philosopher David Hume (1711–1776).
This choice of Hume as the primary scholar to be dealt with here is one based on several closely related reasons. It is quite doubtful that an author could be chosen who has had more influence on this question of miracles. Hume’s essay “Of Miracles” has been so influential that one can hardly even deal with this question at all without discussing his work. The importance of this short writing has been reflected by its enormous affect upon contemporary theology and philosophy. Even conservative theologian Wilbur M. Smith admits that this essay contains the strongest argument ever presented against the belief in miracles. Therefore Hume is an excellent example of one who rejects belief in any miracle such as the resurrection. The popularity and high repute of his essay among other scholars who hold similar views further reflects the trustworthiness of this choice.
In order to more correctly understand Hume’s contribution to the question of miracles, it is important to look briefly at some of the intellectual trends of the time in which he lived. According to Heick, English deism is a movement which may arbitrarily be said to have covered the century and a half from Herbert of Cherbury in 1624 to Hume in 1776. Deistic trends were intrinsically in agreement with similar proclivities in French and German thought.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries in England we find the popularity of various types of deism that sometimes allowed for varying amounts of Divine revelation. However, these brands of deism were generally not of the variety which is often referred to today as “the clockmaker’s theory,” whereby God was said to have made the world and later abandoned it to its own existence without any guidance whatsoever. This is a later definition of the word, formulated when it became necessary to differentiate between atheism, theism and pantheism. In eighteenth-century England, therefore, the word was not often used as a conscious attempt to differentiate between deism and theism, as it is today. Rather, the word was used to describe scholars who were opposed to atheism.
In defending religion, the deists of this period depended upon reason to justify faith. In fact, reason was usually perceived to be the most important part of one’s belief. Traditional Christian dogmas were attacked as not conforming to the application of this reason. Some of the emerging views were quite radical for these times. For instance, the results included doubts of traditional revelation and authority, and an opposition to Supernatural miracles and wonders. There was a growing conviction that the search for a natural religion was valid and that a “common ground” should be found among other religions, since all were believed to be ways to God. Attempts at formulating such a natural approach to faith based upon the different religions were developed in works such as Herbert of Cherbury’s “Common Notions Concerning Religion.”
One major development of a large portion of English deism was the emerging emphasis on empiricism, culminating in Hume. Experience was believed to be the criterion for obtaining knowledge. Even a very brief survey of some of these trends reveals this emphasis. An early empiricist, Francis Bacon, based his experiments and other observations upon the experience arrived at by the senses. This experience was gained by an application of the inductive method of ascertaining truth. Thomas Hobbes also sought to base all knowledge upon the criteria of sense experience. For John Locke, men acquire ideas by experience. In fact, even Divine revelation is perceived by reason and experience.
Hume also followed the emphasis on experience. He believed that this experience was the foundation for all knowledge. Although this method is not infallible, postulates were to be judged according to the probability of the experience. As we shall see below, this forms the center of his polemic against miracles.
Hume’s work is by no means limited to this field of philosophy. He is well known in this area, but in the middle of his scholarly career he turned away from such studies to other interests like history and ethics. In fact, his best known work is very probably his multi-volumed masterpiece entitled The History of England. It was poorly received by the public in the initial stages, but soon became a well-recognized and very popular work. It was considered a classic for many years.
Earlier several reasons were observed for choosing David Hume as a representative example of one who holds that the resurrection, as a miracle, could not occur. Also just completed was a brief look at the background of the period in which he lived. It is desirable now to turn our attention to his extremely influential essay “Of Miracles.”
B. DAVID HUME’S ARGUMENT AND A CRITIQUE
In his essay “Of Miracles,” David Hume argues from what he is convinced is mankind’s experience against all real miraculous events. At the outset, miracles are defined as events which violate nature’s laws. Hume postulates further that such events, if proven to have occurred, must be caused by some Supernatural power or other such agency.
In order to determine if such events have actually happened, one must test the available data empirically. This consists of viewing the experiential evidence for the miracle-claim on the one hand and the experience of the reliability of the laws of nature on the other. Then one can ascertain which is more strongly attested. This test is therefore one based, once again, on the testimony of experience. The experience of miracles is pitted against the experience supporting the uniformity of nature. Here Hume concludes that it is more probable that the experience favoring the laws of nature is more reliable and the miracle is therefore rejected. Since each case of miracle comes against similar experiential data, these occurrences are rejected as a whole. An important note here, however, is that Hume realized that his argument had not disproved the existence of God.
Thus we perceive that for this scholar, the experience of miracles is to be rejected in favor of the experience of the laws of nature. In addition to the reasoning given above, Hume also makes use of four supportive points. First, there are no historical accounts of miracles which are attested by enough reputable men so as to make the event probable. Second, people are inclined to want to speak of extraordinary experiences, even to the point of fabricating the miraculous in order to spread religious truths. Third, miracles are cited as having occurred mainly in areas of ignorance or even barbarism. Fourth, the miraculous events in one religion destroy the probability that those of another faith are also true and vice versa. Therefore, accounts of such Supernatural events in different religions nullify each other. Thus, all are eliminated by the others.
Now at the outset we must agree that this appears to be quite a reliable system in which to test relevant data. Hume seems to have found a valuable method and one can easily see how it has appealed to scholars. But in order to ascertain if these first impressions are correct ones, let us proceed to the text itself. It is the conviction of this writer that there are at least four major problems with Hume’s approach to miracles—four chief criticisms which endanger the very heart of his polemic.
The first major criticism of Hume’s essay is that he incorrectly defines both the essence of a miracle and the nature of the evidence for and against it. He states:
A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature; and as a firm and unalterable experience has established these laws, the proof against a miracle, from the very nature of the fact, is as entire as any argument from experience can possibly be imagined.
As in the actual definition of miracles stated by Hume above, we again observe that these events are perceived to contradict and violate nature’s laws. They are said to do so because the totality of experience relates that these laws cannot be interfered with or broken. This experience is “firm and unalterable.” Later Hume describes it as “uniform experience.”
Immediately we can perceive a logical error in reasoning here. Hume fails to begin the investigation with an impartial look at the facts. Rather, his very definition rules miracles out because of an arbitrary and unproven assumption and it is therefore not a valid one. His definition is based upon the idea that the totality of experience rests against the miracle, when such is far from proven. There definitely are miracle-claims that are experientially based, but these are brushed aside by the assumed superiority of other varieties of experience. But Hume cannot know if the claims made by supernaturalists are able to invalidate the claims made against miracles apart from an investigation of the facts.
An example of this could readily be provided. Hume is definitely thinking at least somewhat in terms of the miracles of Jesus. But rather than speaking specifically concerning the chief miracle-claim of the Christian faith, which is the resurrection of Jesus, he speaks only generally of the resurrection of any dead individual and then promptly informs his readers that such an occurrence has never happened when he has not presented any examination of the facts. He has no evidence that this has never occurred. He further concludes from this (without any new evidence) that in a similar way all experience opposes every miracle. Therefore we have here a good example of circular reasoning. Dead men are assumed never to rise, and because all experience is arbitrarily perceived to stand against such an event, all experience also must oppose other miracles as well. The evidence for miracles is simply ruled out. But this can only logically be done after an investigation of the evidence. Thus Hume assumes that which he must demonstrate.
Oxford scholar C. S. Lewis also recognizes this weakness and develops it into a trenchant criticism of Hume’s position. Lewis relates:
Now of course we must agree with Hume that if there is absolutely “uniform experience” against miracles, if in other words they have never happened, why then they never have. Unfortunately we know the experience against them to be uniform only if we know that all reports of them are false. And we can know all the reports to be false only if we know already that miracles have never occurred. In fact, we are arguing in a circle.
Lewis has clearly perceived the problem here. Hume can only claim that all experience supports his view if he has first ascertained that all other experience is false. But since he has not investigated the other evidence, he can only state that it is false by assuming that miracles cannot occur. Thus he reasons circularly.
It goes without saying that one cannot disallow miracles simply by defining them so that they cannot happen. Circular definitions are clearly unsatisfactory. But, as we have seen, Hume defines miracles to be impossible in light of the experience which testifies to the existence of laws in nature. This is done without any real investigation to determine if the experience on behalf of miracles can establish their validity. He must somehow know this latter experience to be false and he can only know that it is so by assuming that miracles cannot occur in the first place, as Lewis explains.
It may be that one agrees with Hume’s conclusions that nature does rule out miracles. But the point here is that one cannot define this to be the case or arrange the “facts” in such an order that this assumption is supported. It is a matter of philosophical and historical debate.
A further issue here is the place that should be given to experience for the laws of nature. We mentioned above in chapter that we also agree with Hume in asserting that nature behaves by certain laws. We could not speak of miracles as being abnormalities apart from recognizing a normal pattern. But Hume asserts that the existence of these laws is sufficient to disprove all experience of miracles. At this point there are many scholars who would disagree. Just because there are laws in nature does not mean that occasional abnormalities cannot occur. Such laws regulate the inner workings of nature and describe what will happen if the system is left to itself. But these laws do not dictate the possible results of Supernatural interference from the outside. Now we have not as yet established if such Supernatural influence is possible. But the point here is that Hume is simply begging the question when he assumes that the experience for the laws of nature is superior to experience (if established) for the miraculous. This is so in that the very experience which he dismisses as non-existent or as inferior, if established to be probable, would overrule the supposedly stronger experience for the laws of nature. This is because miracles involve the Supernatural intervention into nature, and if such intervention was shown to be probable via a miracle, it would show that the laws of nature could be temporarily suspended. Thus, valid experience for a miracle would actually be superior to experience for the laws of nature. Yet Hume fails to sufficiently investigate this experience for the miraculous. Therefore Hume cannot use the laws of nature as an absolute rule which cannot ever be broken.
C. S. Lewis also accepts this last criticism of Hume as a valid one. He points out:
Probabilities of the kind that Hume is concerned with hold inside the framework of an assumed Uniformity of Nature. When the question of miracles is raised we are asking about the validity or perfection of the frame itself. No study of probabilities inside a given frame can ever tell us how probable it is that the frame itself can be violated.
In other words, Lewis charges Hume with only answering questions which fall into the framework of his assumed view of a completely uniform nature, when in reality we should be asking whether the frame itself can be violated. Thus Hume is concerned with things which might or might not occur within a limited system when he should rather be concerned with the system outside of this restricted area. Is it possible that this little system of nature, as trustworthy as it might be in and of itself, could be interrupted from the outside (as with a miracle)? Burtt levels a similar criticism at Hume.
It is now easier to understand why experience in favor of miracles, if found to be probable, is so important here. If such was found to be the case, it would demonstrate that the laws of nature could be temporarily suspended, thus making the empirical claims in favor of the miracle dominant over the empirical claims for nature’s laws. But by refusing to investigate such miracle-claims, Hume thereby rejects evidence that could easily disrupt his assumptions and show a miracle to be probable.
Therefore we see that Hume is guilty both of formulating a circular definition and of begging the question with regard to the importance of experience concerning the laws of nature. But these two errors are in turn used improperly as the heart of his polemic. Hume further states about miracles:
There must, therefore, be a uniform experience against every miraculous event, otherwise the event would not merit that appellation. And as a uniform experience amounts to a proof, there is here a direct and full proof, from the nature of the fact, against the existence of any miracle.
Here we see three more obvious errors of logic. First, Hume persists in formulating a circular definition of miracles, assuming that they cannot occur from the very outset. As we have said above, he can only know that there is uniform experience against all miracles if he has investigated all of the serious claims. Since he has not done so, he can only know that all experience opposes miracles by ruling that they cannot happen in the first place. This is clearly circular and has already been adequately shown to be an incorrect procedure. In addition, he still is working only within the framework of the laws of nature and thus does not take account of possible interferences from the outside. This, likewise, has been shown to be incorrect.
Second, we perceive an additional misuse of experience. Experience is now uniformly allied against all miraculous events. As we mentioned above, the reason all experience is assumed to agree with Hume’s first prohibition against miracles is that these events have already been determined not to take place, by definition. Therefore, all reliable experience will indeed coincide with this since the opposite is defined as an impossibility. But it is clearly not possible to assume an important statement like this. It is not logically correct to argue circularly in order to answer supernaturalists who cite experience for miracles simply by defining all experience so that it opposes or even eliminates miracles. But this is exactly what Hume does, as experience is explicitly defined so that if it does not provide evidence against such events, then the said occurrence “would not merit that appellation.” This is a new prohibitive placed against miracles by experience. In other words, unless all experience stands against an event, it cannot be referred to as a miracle. In order for a miracle to be claimed as such, its existence must immediately be opposed by all experience. This is done without proof or investigation of the miracles. Is this a proper approach? Thus a second circular definition and subsequent begging of the question is introduced and the problem is further compounded. First, experience of nature, and second, the uniformity of experience are both placed against miracles in such a way (without any evidence) that these events are said to be impossible. The burden of the second (uniformity of experience) rests on the solidity of the first (experience of nature), whose solidity has all but been proven. The moment an event becomes designated as a miracle, it is snuffed out of existence arbitrarily.
Third, and in spite of all of this lack of proper evidence, Hume insists on stating that this constitutes a proof—“a direct and full proof” against any brand of miraculous event. The argument thus moves from a first circular definition and begging of the question to a second of the same and on to the concluding “proof.”
But this “proof” turns out to be nothing more than an assumed conclusion. It is a good example of an ipse dixit or an unsupported assertion. If one premise of a syllogism breaks down, the whole is invalidated. One can demonstrate anything if definitions are allowed to be all-inclusive and contain the conclusion which is to be proven as a given. Therefore we perceive that Hume’s “proof” fails. It indeed relies on the previously given definition of a miracle. It is a solid example of circular reasoning.
It is easier now to see why many scholars have objected to various aspects of Hume’s approach to miracles. He assumes here that which he wishes to prove, but which he has not investigated. In spite of claiming to deal with the miracles of the Christian faith, he refuses to deal with any specific New Testament miracles, but simply rules them out as being impossible. In fact, one scholar notes that Hume felt so strongly about the impossibility of miracles which are part of the basis of faith for religious systems that claims to the contrary did not even have to be examined specifically. This sounds like anything but an honest attempt to arrive at the proper facts concerning opinions which disagree with one’s own! It is indeed an intellectually secure person who can know that these events can never occur without any investigation whatsoever. But judging from the work in question, this appears to be the attitude of this scholar.
Again, C. S. Lewis points to yet another example of circular reasoning in this essay on miracles. For Hume the two questions “Do miracles occur” and “Is the course of nature absolutely uniform?” are one and the same, simply asked differently. But “by sleight of hand” Hume answers “Yes” to the second question and then uses if for answering “No” to the first question. The real issue which he endeavors to answer is never really dealt with at all. We still do not know if nature’s patterns can be interrupted or not and thus we do not really know if miracles occur. Therefore Hume “gets the answer to one form of the question by assuming the answer to another form of the same question.” Again we find an example of circular reasoning.
We have found, first of all, that Hume commits a series of logical errors. In particular, these usually consist of arguing circularly (especially with regard to a definition of miracles) and by begging the question in using unproven and unsupported assumptions (especially in reference to the believed absolute authority of the laws of nature and the negligible value of any experience of miracles). These arguments alone are enough to invalidate Hume’s entire thesis against miracles. We could also “prove” that miraculous events do occur by definition and by accepting all experience for miracles, while rejecting all experience for the laws of nature. Then we could conclude that all other experience must agree with this. To do so would of course prove nothing. But it could be made as logically valid as Hume’s argument. However, there are yet three other points of attack that we must make with regard to Hume’s work on miracles.
The second major criticism of Hume’s essay concerns his use of the four supportive points which appear to expand his beliefs against miracles. It is our contention that he then ignores a series of miracles which he even admits fulfills these four “conditions,” leaving the way open to the possibility that other miracles also fulfill them. The case in question concerns a series of reputed miracles performed among the Jansenists in seventeenth-century France. Hume’s own investigation of these occurrences proves very interesting indeed, in light of his four supportive points.
Pertaining to the first point, Hume admits that these miracles were “proved upon the spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit and distinction” and lists several very reputable persons who were reported either to have witnessed them personally or who investigated the cases later. These include such persons as a well-known and respected lieutenant of police, a number of physicians, a duke, a well-respected cardinal, 120 witnesses who were quite influential in Paris and even a list of several famous scholars (including Pascal and Racine). Surely these can be counted as a satisfactory number of reputable witnesses.
As for the second point, Hume also admits that these reported miracles were investigated by the Jesuits and other groups who were enemies of these teachings. This group included the previously mentioned lieutenant of police, whose job it was to expose or suppress the reported miracles. His attempt was unsuccessful. The Molinist party also tried to discredit these occurrences and ended up attributing the miracles to the devil, thus admitting that they occurred. In another instance, the acting queen of France also wished to expose these miracles. She sent her personal physician to investigate them, only to have him return as a Jansenist convert. In fact, none of the antagonists who were sent to investigate this situation were apparently able to uncover any falsehoods at all. We are not making any judgments as to what may or may not have happened here. But it is plain to see that the many enemies of these reports were not lying to make the miracles appear plausible. Nor were they trying to delight in the spreading of these reports, for it was their own desire to expose these facts. Indeed, they had a private interest in disproving them. Even Hume admits to the fact that many of the witnesses were reliable. Therefore we can assert that these witnesses have not upheld the second point.
Concerning the third supportive point, neither can we hold that these events occurred among ignorant and backward peoples. Not only did they occur in one of the more advanced countries of the world not long before Hume’s own time, but Hume explicitly states that all of this happened “in a learned age.” Once again he admits that the conditions stated in one of his points do not pertain to these miracles.
Hume’s fourth supportive point also fails as an adequate explanation here. Even if the miracles purported to have occurred in some religions were able to cancel those in other faiths (which is a dubious assertion), the logical procedure would be first to investigate instances of these reports. If there were some instances which appear to be better documented than others, as in the case cited here, it would not be logical to abrogate these because of the existence of so-called lesser miracles which are also reported in other religions. It would be more reasonable to uphold the events which best fit the facts, as outlined above. Here it is curious to note that Hume adopts a similar procedure. He investigates what he feels are two such lesser miracles before discussing the Jansenist reports. The first two are clearly found to be falsehoods. Later he recognizes that the Jansenist reports fit the facts better. But he apparently does not endeavor to rule out the latter accounts by using the former two, and logically so.
Hume’s fourth point would only be plausible if one assumed that all accounts of miracles were true, thereby causing some to believe that there was a possible conflict of ideologies. But since all are clearly not factual, we are left most logically with the need to investigate each case on its own merits. Thus we cannot rule out an event which is well-attested simply because other accounts of miracles also exist, for we cannot know but that the latter ones are the falsehoods and the former one factual. This can only be determined by an investigation of the miracle-claims. Therefore the last point is also found not to be applicable here as a critique of these miracles.
For these reasons we can perceive that Hume’s four supportive points do not succeed as a valid critique of the miracles in the case of the Jansenist reports. Nor have they disproved the testimonies. In other words, these four prerequisites for miracles have all been fulfilled. In fact, Hume seems willing to admit his assertion. The following statement could be construed as his acknowledgment that the first three in particular meet the requirements. Speaking of the Jansenist claims he states:
But what is more extraordinary; many of the miracles were immediately proved upon the spot, before judges of unquestioned integrity, attested by witnesses of credit and distinction, in a learned age, and on the most eminent theatre that is now in the world.
Here Hume informs us that there were reputable witnesses of these occurrences (point one), men of sufficient integrity and unquestioned character so as to militate against the charges both of lying (or forgery) and of the unscrupulous spreading of tales in order to tickle the ears of men (point two). In addition, these reports were proclaimed to have happened in an intellectual age in one of the most advanced countries of the world (point three). We have already shown above that the fourth point also cannot be used here because we cannot rule out a well-attested event a priori simply because of the testimony of other similar events which often do not fit any of the facts at all. We can only judge on the evidence at hand. Neither does Hume specifically assert that the fourth point applies here.
We have now established that Hume felt that the Jansenist miracles were well-attested cases. The human testimony in favor of these occurrences is impressive, especially in view of the fact that it concerns claims of Supernatural events. Therefore it would be very valuable to see how Hume responded to the question of whether these were valid claims to the miraculous or not. To this suggestion Hume responded concerning these events:
Where shall we find such a number of circumstances, agreeing to the corroboration of one fact? And what have we to oppose such a cloud of witnesses, but the absolute impossibility or miraculous nature of the events, which they relate? And this surely, in the eyes of all reasonable people, will alone be regarded as a sufficient refutation.
It appears that Hume’s dismissal of the miraculous is here a very arbitrary one. Even when all of the information adds up in support of a fact, it cannot be maintained to be true if it is Supernatural in origin. Even if it is one of the most corroborated facts in terms of human testimony and experience, Hume says we must reject it simply because miracles are impossible. A more blatant case of circular reasoning may be difficult to produce. When evidence is found for a miracle, it is held not to apply simply because such events do not occur when this may be the very evidence capable of demonstrating that they do occur. One would just naturally assume that Hume was really interested in exploring the possibility of miracles in an essay of this scope. Rather, we find that his belief is that miracles do not occur and that no examination of experience for them can establish that they even probably do. Thus we hold that Hume first assumes that miracles could never occur and then disregards the evidence on behalf of them.
Even if one could show that Hume did have an adequate reason to distrust these reported Jansenist miracles, the former charge that he arbitrarily dismisses possible evidence in favor of miracles for faulty reasons can still be maintained for two reasons. First, he makes a similar statement earlier in the essay which is not related to the Jansenist issue. After his circular definition of miracles which is dealt with above, he remarks that
no testimony is sufficient to establish a miracle, unless the testimony be of such a kind, that its falsehood would be more miraculous, than the facts, which it endeavors to establish … always reject the greater miracle.
Again we perceive that Hume is convinced that no amount of testimony can establish a miracle. Even when his criteria (the presence of sufficient experience of the event) has been satisfied he holds that miracles are impossible. Therefore, as explained in the first major objection to Hume’s essay given above, Hume is also guilty of employing unsupported assumptions. Miracles are rejected just because they are Supernatural even when they are found to have adequate experience supporting their reality.
Second, even if Hume continued to rely on other conclusions (such as the miracles in other religions) to oppose the miraculous in the instance of the Jansenist reports, he disregards the fact that the available evidence might be sufficient to establish this experience as miraculous even if no other miracles had ever occurred. In other words, the evidence that is dismissed might be enough to demonstrate the reality of these events as the supreme example of the Supernatural whether other such claims were valid or not. If an event has occurred it is made no less realistic because there are other claims to similar occurrences in existence.
Therefore we find that this second major criticism of Hume’s essay is also valid. His four supportive points are highly objectionable in the first place, mainly because a large portion of our currently accepted history would be subject to much doubt if these were viewed as the norm by which facts are to be judged as being correct. For instance, how much of our accepted world history is made up of events which were not attested by a goodly number of unquestionably intelligent and educated men who in themselves are sufficient to guard against all kinds of error and delusion? One might indeed question large amounts of history because of a lack of conformity to this rule. Or how much of our history is prejudiced by the fact that the person reporting stood to gain much by the acceptance of these events, such as Julius Caesar’s reports of his victories over the barbarians? And surely many other events took place among ignorant or backward nations? Since Hume includes the Greek and Roman civilizations as falling into this category (because miracles were reported by them), are we to doubt the history of these entire periods, to say nothing of ancient Babylon, for instance? One begins to note the many problems involved in such an application of these four criteria to history. Yet this history is accepted as being quite reputable and trustworthy. As Richard Whately once so aptly noted, the same method which Hume employed to dismiss the miracles from the life of Jesus would also remove the unique elements from the life of Napoleon. Such reconstructing of history is correctly seen as being self-condemning and very problematical.
But as we have also found, Hume fails to do justice to miraculous events even when they have attained a high level of credibility because of the weight of the experiential testimony in their favor. Such evidence would most likely be sufficient to corroborate other historical events. Therefore it appears that we would be impelled to grant probability to certain miracles if they best account for the available evidence. And if Hume errs in his evaluation in cases such as the above, it is also reasonable to hold that other well-documented miracles can be held to be probable events if they are found to be the best explanations for what occurred.
The third major criticism of Hume’s essay revolves around the fact that this entire work depends upon an assumed uniformity in nature. Hume rejects miracles because of man’s experience of this uniformity. But in order to do this one must hold to the validity of cause and effect by assuming that the course of nature will continue (and that it always has continued) exactly as it is now perceived. However, the fact is that we know only a small part of nature and cannot be sure that what we do know will continue to be the same in the future (or that it has continued this way throughout the past).
What makes this argument all the more persuasive is that Hume himself recognized the fact that we cannot accept cause and effect as being valid. This is especially evident in his little work An Abstract of a Treatise of Human Nature, where Hume explains why we cannot reasonably accept this notion. It is customary to expect an effect to follow a cause, but there are no reasonable or logical grounds for it.
Since cause and effect are no longer held to be valid, there is really no logical reason for believing that the uniformity of the laws of nature can rule out the miraculous. Neither can we assert that the state of nature has ruled out miracles in the past, because the uniformity needed for such an assertion also cannot be demonstrated. In other words, Hume’s contention that the experience of mankind does not know of any valid cases of miracles because of the uniformity of nature is not only invalid, but it contradicts his own statements to the contrary.
This is actually a very powerful argument against Hume’s entire essay, which relies on man’s supposed experience of the uniformity of the laws of nature. This experience, based upon the reliableness of nature’s laws, is the very center of his polemic against miracles, as shown above. It is so central that it is held that no miracle could have occurred, simply because of this uniformity. Hume holds that even if one could find a probability or proof for a miracle, it would then run up against the “proof” of this uniform conception of nature, meaning that it could never occur anyway.
But now we find that this method can no longer be used as a basis for this rejection of miracles. There is not only a lack of proof that nature must act in this way, but we have even found that we cannot speak of this type of causality in nature because it is no longer a valid concept (see especially chapter above). This means that the entire basis of Hume’s system as it now stands must be abandoned. If such a probability for a miracle were found to exist, as postulated above, there is therefore no “proof” from nature left to oppose it. This would also apply to instances of miracle-claims in past history, if they were shown to be probable, because these new concepts of nature would have applied then as well. Once again we perceive that miracles cannot be opposed by a uniform, causal view of nature. Hume’s objection to miracles is therefore quite defective.
C. S. Lewis agrees in this critique of Hume. He states in a similar vein of thought:
The whole idea of Probability (as Hume understands it) depends on the principle of the Uniformity of Nature.… We observe many regularities in Nature. But of course all the observations that men have made or will make while the race lasts cover only a minute fraction of the events that actually go on. Our observations would therefore be of no use unless we felt sure that Nature when we are not watching her behaves in the same way as when we are: in other words, unless we believed in the Uniformity of Nature. Experience therefore cannot prove uniformity, because uniformity has to be assumed before experience proves anything.… The odd thing is that no man knew this better than Hume. His Essay on Miracles is quite inconsistent with the more radical, and honorable, skepticism of his main work.
Here Lewis also recognizes that Hume’s entire argument depends on the uniformity of nature. But there is no way we can know, much less prove, this belief. We observe nature by our senses and incorporate it into our experience. But all of the experience of mankind is but a small part of the whole. To say that nature acts completely uniformly with no interruptions (as Hume asserts) would be to know all of nature. This is once again circular reasoning because, as Lewis points out, one must assume uniformity in all of nature in order to say that we experience the same when we do not know the whole of it. We must simply believe it is the same. In other words, one must already have assumed that nature is completely uniform and acting in a causal way when the evidence indicates otherwise. Lewis also notes that Hume accepted similar arguments against the causality of nature in his other works.
Our two former conclusions must therefore stand in light of this knowledge. First, Hume’s basis for rejecting miracles is not valid. One cannot reject a miraculous event if it best fits the evidence simply because of an assumed uniformity in nature, especially when such uniformity has been shown not to exist. Cause and effect would have to be in operation before Hume’s arguments could even begin to be asserted. But even Hume himself rejects this view of nature. Thus nothing is left but to abandon the very basis of his reasoning. Second, this means that the question now concerns which facts best fit the evidence, turning us once again to an investigation of these facts. If a miracle in past history is found to offer the best explanation of the evidence, it can no longer be opposed because of the belief that these things simply do not happen or because nature opposes such an event.
Our fourth major criticism of Hume’s essay arises from the second and third criticisms. A positive aspect of Hume’s philosophy is that he relies heavily upon probabilities, which has been shown above to be the conviction of modern thought. In addition, Hume rejected many of the then-popular theories concerning cause and effect and the accompanying implications based upon a closed universe. In an age when it was popular to accept a mechanistic view of the universe, Hume insisted that it remain open. In this sense, at least, his thoughts may be viewed as a forerunner of some of the modern theories which also postulate an open universe.
However, a problem arises when we try to reconcile Hume’s belief in an open universe with his previous rejection of miracles. Rather than allowing the evidence to speak for itself (since evidence for miracles cannot be ruled out a priori or by an improper view of nature), as might be expected when one holds the above positions with regard to nature, Hume transgresses his own position to rule out miracles. He does not allow the miraculous even when the evidence is sufficient to point to a probability (criticism two) and then he dismisses the miraculous as a whole by accepting a view of nature which he himself has already dismissed (criticism three).
Therefore a fourth major criticism is arrived at here. While he accepts quite a modern view of the universe in many senses, he becomes a pre-modern in his treatment of miracles. In other words, he is not self-consistent in his philosophy. His treatment of miracles shows signs of a pre-modern critical consciousness, for he proposes to accept an open universe but rejects miracles because of a closed view of nature, and he proposes to base his work on probabilities but arbitrarily rules out a probable miracle. Thus he is internally inconsistent and reverts to this pre-modern consciousness.
We therefore hold that all four of these major criticisms of Hume are valid. He is first guilty of committing a series of logical blunders. He argues circularly several times, usually with regard to his definition of miracles and often begs the question by using unsupported assumptions, such as the negligible value of any experience of miracles. He also fails here in refusing to investigate any of these events when this very investigation could reveal a valid miracle. Second, Hume fails to accept miraculous events even when they are found to be well-attested by human experience. He still rejects them for arbitrary reasons even after he admits the high credibility of this attestation. Third, Hume rejects miracles because of a view of nature that not only was false, but that he even rejected himself. Yet the belief in this uniformity of nature is the center of his polemic against miracles. Therefore the very apex of his polemic against miracles must be rejected. Fourth, while Hume is modern in many of his conceptions of nature (opting for the use of probabilities and rejecting cause and effect and the subsequent uniform view of nature), he reverts to a pre-modern stage in his attempt to prove that no actual miracles have ever occurred. In arguing against miracles he gives little weight to miraculous probabilities and employs an incorrect view of nature which he even rejected. Thus he is both pre-modern and inconsistent here.
It is obvious that these criticisms invalidate Hume’s treatment of miracles. These errors and improper conclusions in Hume’s work were not as readily detected in the eighteenth century because the Enlightenment intellect continued to prevail in scholarly circles. As will become even more apparent in chapter , the desire was usually to reject miracles in the first place and Hume’s essay provided the needed authority for such a venture.
It thus goes without saying that Hume’s polemic against miracles, while appearing to be a strong argument at the outset, fails when closely investigated. This system cannot therefore be used at all to invalidate or rule out miracle-claims. A more proper approach may have been to define miracles without any inherent statement as to the possibility of their occurring. Then it would have been possible to investigate the available experience in order to determine the extent of its agreement. We are thus confronted once again with the need to investigate the evidence to better ascertain what has occurred. Such a historical investigation of the documents making such miracle-claims is therefore needed, as concluded in chapter above. In the specific case of the resurrection of Jesus, empirical claims have been made which report experiential evidence for the appearances of the risen Lord. These are the accounts which must be examined in order to ascertain if this event is the best explanation for the facts.
It is hard to estimate exactly the influence that Hume’s essay “Of Miracles” has had upon the intellectual world since its appearance in 1748. However, we may most assuredly determine that its affect upon theology has been extremely great. Many scholars have viewed it as the determining argument against the existence of any miraculous event. This is true both of the older nineteenth-century liberal theologians and of the more contemporary twentieth-century theologians. Some refer directly to Hume as the source for this rejection of miracles while others make anonymous references to their dismissal of the miraculous as being due to the belief that our experience of nature completely opposes any such violation of its laws. It is important to look briefly at both this direct and indirect evidence for Hume’s influence.
We are informed by John Hermann Randall, Jr. that since the appearance of Hume’s essay, religious liberals have rejected any belief in miracles. Nineteenth-century liberalism as a whole became convinced by this work that there could be no interference with nature from any miraculous events. Montgomery agrees with this assertion that nineteenth-century liberal theology followed Hume’s rejection of miracles.
An excellent example of this rejection is seen in the works of German theologian David Strauss, one of the most vigorous critics of the New Testament who ever lived. In his two-volumed work A New Life of Jesus (first translated into English in 1865, shortly after the German edition), Strauss specifically asserted that Hume’s essay was so conclusive in disproving miracles that the question had now been settled. Miracles simply could not be allowed to contradict nature.
Strauss’ stance on this question, one which follows Hume’s critique, is a typical one taken by nineteenth-century liberalism. Friedrich Schleiermacher was also of the opinion that a real miracle would involve the suspension of the laws of nature. Such miracles occur most often where there is little knowledge of these laws. We should abandon such miracles as being superfluous, for they are not able to bring us closer to a recognition of Christ. Besides, science and religion agree here that there are no absolute instances of such an event. A more perfect view of God, one requiring man’s absolute dependence, needs no such miracles to support its cause. For this reason, Schleiermacher preferred to see all events as being miraculous, including the most common and natural ones. In fact, events such as those which were supposed to have broken the laws of nature by Supernatural intervention are really not miracles at all.
Other instances such as these are common in liberal theology. Bruno Baur followed Strauss in strongly insisting that we can admit of no events which deny the laws of nature. Rather, nature’s laws are upheld by religion and not insulted by occurrences such as miracles. Ernst Renan postulated that Jesus was not aware that there were any laws in nature at all. Because of this lack of knowledge about the lawful pattern of nature, Jesus believed that miracles were very common occurrences and nothing about which one should be surprised. Adolf Harnack also held that ancient peoples had no concept of the strictures of the laws of nature. But today we realize that no events can occur which interrupt nature. As a result, miracles do not happen and we cannot believe in the accounts of them.
This rejection of the miraculous, revealing a dependence upon Hume’s thesis, is not relegated only to nineteenth-century theology, however. As shown above, contemporary twentieth-century critical theology has pursued a similar pattern of thought. It usually espouses either the belief that miracles cannot (and should not) be validated, or, often relying directly on Hume’s arguments, that all miracles should simply be dismissed as impossible.
For instance, Paul Tillich holds that miracles cannot interfere with the laws of nature. Any theology attempting to make them do such is distorting the Biblical view of God. Bultmann believes that our modern conception of nature has rendered miracles impossible. The natural laws are such that they make the world a reality that is closed to the miraculous. We are thus too advanced to believe in the New Testament accounts of such Supernatural workings. John A. T. Robinson likewise believes that miracles such as Jesus’ incarnation can only be described as myths because in our scientific age we realize that natural processes cannot be interrupted by Supernatural intervention. The entire New Testament cosmology must be ruled out for these reasons. We have briefly explored some major theories proposed by those who follow Hume in arguing against the occurrence of all miraculous events. Many scholars utilized these and similar views which opposed all miracles in deducing from them specific hypotheses against the belief in a literal resurrection of Jesus.
To be sure, the milieu of the eighteenth century, in which Hume formulated his anti-miraculous argument, was different from the milieu of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, in which these religious liberals applied Hume’s views. In the nineteenth century there were the philosophical systems of Immanuel Kant, stressing morality, and Friedrich Hegel, who emphasized a theology of reason and development. In the latter half of the nineteenth and on into the twentieth centuries, Darwinism extended its influence. Historical events such as the French Revolution and the two World Wars also added to this climate of change. The secularity of the twentieth century affected still more worldviews. In spite of these differences, however, on the question of miracles these liberal theologians ever since the eighteenth century continued to follow Hume, believing that such events were impossible.
Very possibly the most noteworthy scholar who endeavored to apply Immanuel Kant’s thought to New Testament studies was Heinrich Paulus. This German theologian also rejected miracles for reasons which were quite similar to those listed above. The Biblical witnesses are believed to have had a deficient knowledge of the laws of nature, especially in not knowing of nature’s secondary causes. Therefore they wrongly believed that Supernatural events actually occurred. However, when we discover the true workings of nature, we are said to find that the events which were once considered to be miraculous can no longer be considered as such. This is because these occurrences are found to proceed according to natural law. Thus Paulus proceeded to employ naturalistic explanations for the New Testament accounts of miracles.
The resurrection of Jesus was also given such a natural explanation. For Paulus, Christ did not die on the cross. He was taken down before death overcame him and later resuscitated gradually in the grave. The spear wound in the side had not immediately killed him, but had merely served as a blood-letting device and encouraged his recovery. Later an earthquake was additionally helpful in rolling away the very large stone from the front of the grave, thus enabling Jesus’ escape. He obtained the apparel of a gardener and then proceeded to arrange for a meeting with his disciples. After several visits with them, he realized that he was dying. He then held one last meeting on the Mount of Olives. As he moved away from them, he was obscured from their sight by a cloud and was not seen by them again. Jesus died, but in a place unknown to the twelve, who referred to this event as an “ascension.”
According to this conjecture, usually referred to as the “swoon theory” of the resurrection, Paulus plainly conceived of this event as one operating by natural processes. There was no Supernatural intervention involved. Thus Jesus was not believed to have risen from the dead.
The swoon theory did not originate with Paulus, but was quite popular with several other scholars throughout the first half of the nineteenth century. It was an especially common interpretation of the resurrection found in the so-called fictitious accounts of the life of Jesus which appeared during this same period of time. These works were imaginative portrayals of the life of Jesus, often very similar to novels. The use of fiction was quite apparent, as the author weaved various plots and counterplots into an attempt to portray Jesus’ life in a certain light. The nonhistorical ingenuity of the writer was usually quite noticeable. As a result, these works were seen as having little credibility or esteem. Paulus’ work differed in that it was not one of the above imaginative lives. His work was both more logical and more respectable than the fictitious lives and thus he was a more reputable exponent of this theory.
Strangely enough, various liberal theologians were some of the most ardent critics of the swoon theory. By far the most famous critique was given by David Strauss himself. He pointed out that in order for this theory to be true, Jesus would have come forth from the grave half dead, one who was quite visibly ill and weak, badly in need of medical help and care, later even succumbing to death because of these wounds. But Strauss persuasively argues that it would be impossible for such an individual to have convinced the disciples that he was the Conqueror of death, the Victor over the grave, or the Prince of life. If Jesus did not die on the cross, he could only have convinced his followers that he was someone to be pitied and cared for by them. They would have immediately perceived the facts as they were in reality. At any rate, Jesus’ condition could not have changed the disciples’ sorrow into happiness. Nor would it have convinced them to worship Jesus as the Messiah. Strauss’ criticism is a very pointed and accurate one. As we noted above, Paulus did indeed conceive of Jesus as a victim of blood-letting, one whose appearance was changed due to tremendous suffering and who still felt weak and sickly, finally dying of the wounds. And this is just how a survivor of a crucifixion would appear. But could such a limping, bleeding, stoop-shouldered individual convince even his loved ones that he had conquered death forever? The answer is obviously a negative one.
Most theologians have therefore agreed that Strauss’ critique has settled the issue for good. Indeed, Schweitzer even judged that Strauss’ reasoning was the absolute death stroke to the swoon theory. Renan was also careful to point out the assurance we have of Jesus’ death on the cross.
The New Testament records claim that Jesus was nailed to the cross (Luke 24:39–40; John 20:25–27). If this could be shown to be valid, Strauss’ view would be strengthened all the more. And we do find, in fact, that Strauss’ critique has received striking archaeological confirmation in recent years. Paul Maier reports the following:
In the summer of 1968, archaeologist V. Tzaferis excavated some stone ossuaries in East Jerusalem dating from the first century A.D. These were chests in which bones of the dead were reburied after the flesh had decomposed following original burial in a cave. One of the ossuaries, inscribed with the name Yohanan Ben Ha’galgol, contained the bones of a man who had obviously been crucified, the first such victim ever discovered. A large, rusty iron spike, seven inches long, had been driven through both heel bones after first penetrating an acacia wood wedge or plaque that held the ankles firmly to the cross. The nail must have encountered a knot on being driven into the cross, for the point of the spike had been bent directly backward. Slivers still clinging to it show that the cross was made of olive wood.… In addition to the iron spike, evidence of crucifixion included a deep scratch on the right radius bone, showing that a nail had penetrated between the two bones of his lower forearm just above the wrist, which abraded them as the victim writhed in agony.… Yohanan, at any rate, had his lower arms pierced with nails.
This is indeed important evidence bearing on this question. Maier further corroborates this evidence with three photographs which plainly show the affected bones of this victim. One displays a hind view of the heel bones as they were found, pierced by a large iron spike. The end of the spike is curved upward. A second photograph reveals the portion of the right arm where the radius bone was scared by another nail. The third photograph displays a side view of the left heel bone after the spike had been removed, clearly showing the very large hole thus created by the wound.
Strauss’ critique of the swoon theory therefore appears to be even stronger. There is no reason to doubt the New Testament accounts of the nail wounds inflicted upon Jesus, especially in light of this archaeological evidence.
It is possible to adduce other considerations against the swoon theory as well. For instance, secondly, there is strong evidence to demonstrate that Jesus was dead prior to the burial. We are told in John 19:31–35 that the legs of the other two crucified men were broken in order to hasten their deaths. But since Jesus was found to be already dead, his legs were not broken. Rather, a Roman soldier pierced his chest with a spear in order to make sure that he was not simply feigning it. This portion has both long and often been recognized as a proof that Jesus was dead by many scholars of differing theological positions. The general tendency by those who prefer this approach is to perceive this spear wound and the subsequent appearance of blood and water as signifying one of two medical explanations. It is thought either that the spear punctured the heart via the pericardium (a thin sac surrounding the heart, which contains a watery liquid) or that the heart had ruptured (in which case the pericardium would be filled with blood and fluid). In either case the presence of both blood and water is medically explained and Jesus would have been dead. The question here concerns whether this account in John is a reliable testimony as to crucifixion procedure.
Again we find some corroboration of these facts in the archaeological evidence already supplied by Maier. The bones of the crucified victim bring evidence to bear that this account of the spear wound and breaking of the legs is also based on historical information (as claimed in John 19:35). Maier relates that:
Even the detail of the two criminals having their legs broken at the close of Good Friday to induce death—the crurifragrium has an exact parallel here: Yohanan’s right tibia and the left tibia and fibula were all broken in their lowest third segment at the same level, indicating a common crushing blow, probably from a mallet or sledge.
Now it is true that this evidence does not mention a spear wound. But once the custom of breaking the legs of the criminals has been established, it is a short step to this next point. After all, the object of each was to insure the victim’s death. If one was found to be already dead, the logical thing to do would be to make sure. The spear, being a natural part of the Roman military repertoire, would be the most likely weapon. And where could one more likely kill a person with a spear than by piercing his heart? The Romans were responsible for making sure that the victim was dead, as he had been sentenced by a Roman official, and they were very efficient in such tasks.
In addition, since at least this first portion of this gospel statement has been verified, there is no sufficient reason to assert that the interrelated item of the spear wound was not also historical. The two belong together, because if Jesus had not been pierced, he would most likely have had his ankles smashed as well. Both meant that he died. The best conclusion is that both are fact.
A third great difficulty for this theory is that Jesus would have to have been an impostor of one sort or another. He would have been guilty of proclaiming his resurrection when such would clearly not have been the case. He, of all people, would certainly know the facts. To honestly ignore them would be to make himself worse than an imposter, as it would then most likely entail some sort of mental insanity. Yet, the world almost unanimously views Jesus at least as a great moral teacher, in all probability incapable of such a grand example of deceiving others. Whatever else might be postulated, he cannot be found to be such an impostor.
Thus the swoon theory fails as an adequate explanation of the facts. Other points could also be made against it. But suffice it to say that there is very little doubt among scholars today that Jesus was actually dead. First, as pointed out by Strauss, he could not have convinced his disciples that he had conquered death and was victor over the grave in his physical condition. They would have known immediately that he needed medical help, not that he was immortal. Second, the facts point strongly to his actual physical death on the cross, which occurred no later than the time of the spear wound (and actually before this time). Third, Jesus was certainly not an impostor of this sort.
It is therefore no wonder that the swoon theory appeared short-lived in its popularity. By 1908 Scottish theologian James Orr could remark that no one held this view any longer. Similarly, today this view is also rejected as being outdated and insufficient to account for the facts at hand. Frank Morison could even assert that the swoon theory is today best regarded as a theological curiosity of the past.
As noted above, Strauss was one of nineteenth-century liberalism’s most ardent New Testament critics. His Life of Jesus appeared in 1835 and occasioned a great theological furor. One result of this work was the immediate signaling of a raging battle concerning the nature of myth in the New Testament accounts. A second result was Strauss’ dismissal from his teaching post at Tübingen because of the radical nature of his work. Large amounts of criticism directed toward his theories were to follow, as much printed material opposed his efforts. One book even humorously demythologized David Strauss himself!
One element of the New Testament which was clearly rejected by Strauss was the accounts of miracles. Ever since David Hume’s essay on miracles, these occurrences could no longer be thought to be possible. Miracles cannot break the laws of nature. Explanations other than the Biblical ones must be found.
Concerning the resurrection of Jesus, Strauss is most explicit. Jesus was definitely dead and thus the swoon theory is inapplicable here. Rather, Strauss preferred and popularized the subjective vision theory of the resurrection. According to this view Mary Magdalene was probably the first to perceive psychological visions of the risen Christ. Next the apostles also had subjective visions convincing them that Jesus was indeed alive.
However, Strauss explains, the disciples were not in the proper frame of mind to be open to visions immediately after the death of Jesus or for even days afterward. They were too despondent to have any hope at all so soon. Therefore both a change of locality is needed (away from Jerusalem) and a period of “recovery” before the visions could begin. Strauss thus transfers the disciples’ first apparitions to Galilee in the north. The time which passed before the first “appearance” is also expanded to a much longer period than is stated in the New Testament narratives.
The result was internal visions which occurred because of the presence of fervent imagination and much excitement. Because of this deception on the part of the disciples when they mistook their subjective experiences for objective reality, Strauss asserts that the resurrection itself has therefore become a worldwide illusion.
This theory which Strauss developed gained popularity in the nineteenth century. Scholars such as Renan and Ghillany, among others, preferred it as the most probable explanation for the appearances of Jesus. Its popularity has diminished in the twentieth century.
However, several of the nineteenth-century liberals opposed this view as well. Schleiermacher asserted that any version of the vision theory was entirely unacceptable because its suppositions do not fit the facts. Another rejection of this theory was given by Paulus, whose own views we have discussed above. He likewise felt that visions were not possible in view of the available facts, for there was sufficient evidence to prove that Jesus was actually alive and present with the apostles. Therefore he preferred the swoon theory. This rejection of visions by Paulus is a very interesting one, because we have already pointed out that Strauss had likewise ruled out Paulus’ theory. Thus we see that each attempted to negate the theory of the other.
The most noteworthy nineteenth-century criticism of Strauss’ vision theory came from another liberal theologian, Theodor Keim. Schweitzer notes that Keim’s study of Jesus’ life, which was published in three volumes from 1867–1872, was the most important critical work on this subject that had appeared in many years. In it he presented a substantial critique of all hypotheses which made subjective visions and inner experiences the basis for the disciples’ belief in objective, outward appearances of Jesus.
Keim rejected the vision theory for several key reasons. First, the over-abundance of self-generated emotion and excitement which Strauss felt had to be present to produce these visions is not found in the early church. Other inward experiences and visions found in the early texts are likewise not characterized by this extreme excitement. Second, visions in the New Testament are numerous. But these are never confused with the resurrection appearances, so as to admit the difference between them. Third, the appearances of Jesus are characterized by calmness and reticence. Those involved are usually reserved and not at first ready to accept Jesus with joy and exuberance. Fourth, religious visions tend to multiply and grow more numerous. But the appearances of Jesus come to a sudden cessation. For these and similar reasons, this theory is rejected as not adequately explaining how the appearances of Jesus could possibly have been subjective visions. Some of Keim’s points are well-taken and are still employed today as negative evidence that opposes this theory, as we will perceive presently. At any rate, many scholars believe that Keim dealt the death-blow to Strauss’ theory of visions, just as Strauss had earlier done the same to Paulus’ hypothesis.
Today there are at least four major reasons why the subjective vision theory is rejected. First, the apostles were not in the proper frame of mind to presuppose visions. There is a needed psychological precondition for such hallucinations, this being the expectation of the event in question and a strong belief that it will happen. Otherwise there would be no impetus for the mind to produce such subjective projections. But the disciples were not in such a state of mind. They were very despondent and did not have such faith and expectation that Jesus would rise. Pannenberg expresses this point as follows:
To maintain, first, that the appearances were produced by the enthusiastically excited imagination of the disciples does not hold, at least for the first and most fundamental appearances. The Easter appearances are not to be explained from the Easter faith of the disciples; rather, conversely, the Easter faith of the disciples is to be explained from the appearances. All the attempted constructions as to how the faith of the disciples could have survived the crisis of Jesus’ death remain problematic precisely in psychological terms, even when one takes into account the firm expectation of the imminent end of the world with which Jesus presumably died and in which his disciples lived. It cannot be disputed that, in spite of all this, Jesus’ death exposed the faith of the disciples to the most severe stress. One could hardly expect the production of confirmatory experiences from the faith of the disciples that stood under such a burden. Certainly such psychological considerations by themselves are as little suited to support any conclusions as to support the criticism of the New Testament traditions.
As Pannenberg clearly states here, it is psychologically problematical to endeavor to explain how the disciples’ faith could have withstood the stress placed upon it by the death of Jesus. We could not expect the collectively forlorn faith of these men to respond positively by producing visions which, by their nature, require enthusiasm, excitement, and especially belief. Therefore we find that the appearances of Jesus gave rise to the post-Easter faith and were not produced by an already-existing faith.
This position is well-attested by various others as well. Eminent Scripture scholar Raymond E. Brown notes that most theologians also agree that faith in the resurrection of Jesus arose because of the appearances rather than the appearances being caused by a pre-existing faith. An examination of the facts will show that this is the case, thus making visions an impossibility.
The disciples were simply too despondent to have produced such hallucinations, especially in so short of a time. Even Marxsen realizes that the disciples’ faith was a result of external experiences and not inward impulses, thus making the vision theory untenable. William Barclay agrees that the disciples could not contemplate themselves into a situation where visions would be possible so soon. Therefore this theory itself is perceived to be unreasonable. Ramsey likewise asserts that any theory which proclaims that the resurrection appearances arose because of a prior belief of the disciples, as this theory does, can be dismissed because of the problems involved.
It is not overly difficult to comprehend this criticism raised against Strauss’ subjective vision theory. The disciples had expected Jesus to redeem Israel and bring in the heavenly Kingdom of God (see Luke 24:21). They had followed him for a few years, expecting this result. But now his death was unexpected and caused must despondency. Such a reaction is a natural psychological response when so much was at stake and believed to be dependent upon Jesus’ remaining alive. Their long-awaited hopes and dreams were dashed to pieces. To expect an ecstatic, enthusiastic faith-affirmation capable of producing inward visions from these men is therefore not very possible.
An interesting concession here was made by Strauss, who also realized that, as the facts stand, visions would not have occurred. The disciples could not have escaped such despondency in such a short period of time. Thus, unless one rearranged the available data, the theory would fall.
Therefore we find that the disciples were too despondent to have been subject to such excited visions entailing a believing frame of mind. As Marxsen concludes, we must reject the vision theory because it does not agree with the textual facts. McNaugher reminds us that such hallucinations have psychological rules and these had not been fulfilled.
In addition, we find that the disciples did not expect Jesus to rise from the dead. Ramsey notes that they were not able to anticipate this event at all because of their aforementioned doubt and bewilderment.
In fact, the disciples did not believe immediately even after the appearances, but doubted the evidence. Orr believes that this doubt on the part of the disciples is the most historical portion of the resurrection records. Reginald Fuller finds this doubt to be a part of the earliest tradition and a very natural inclination for these early witnesses. Both Marxsen and Ramsey note the effect of this doubt on the disciples. It is important to realize here that if the vision theory were true, such persistent doubt could not exist, because the supposed presence of the pre-existent faith would mean that the appearances would have already been regarded as genuine. In other words, if the disciples’ faith in a risen Jesus had produced visions, this same faith would automatically accept the resulting visions as true. But we find that such was not the case. The doubt was both genuine and persistent.
Thus we see that, first, the disciples were not in the proper frame of mind for visions to occur. They were too despondent to have had hallucinations in so short a time. In addition, they did not expect Jesus to rise and did not readily believe the appearances even after they occurred.
The second main reason that the vision theory is rejected is because of the problems involved concerning the number of people who claimed to have seen Jesus after his death and the different places and times in which these appearances were believed to have taken place. It is true that visions can be experienced by more than one person at a time. But we have been speaking of a theory which proposes subjective hallucinations—visions with no real objective stimulus. Therefore if one of the disciples (or others who claimed to have experienced the resurrection appearances) actually did hallucinate, it would not by any means be automatic that others would also experience the same vision. Rather, each would also have to go through the process of developing a prior faith and of being psychologically ready for such an experience. This is because hallucinations are essentially private events and are experienced by more than one person only when these above conditions are present for each individual. But, as Pannenberg notes, the narratives record several different appearances which occur under many different circumstances and times and even include different participants. This invalidates this theory which relies upon a mental reaction which spread from one individual to the next. The various conditions simply do not support such a view.
The above objections are persuasive especially when one remembers that in order for this theory to be valid, each individual would have to have responded to personal stimuli at each of these various times and places. The different personalities involved would mean that many would not be in the proper state of mind, especially when all the records indicate that exactly the opposite reaction prevailed, as shown above.
Surely some of the participants would not have experienced these appearances at all if they were due to visions, for they would not all be in the correct state of mind. But such was not the case. Even New Testament critics are agreed that all the disciples genuinely believed that Jesus had appeared to them after his death. In other words, whatever may have been the cause of the appearances, the disciples believed that Jesus had been raised from the dead. In fact, Johannes Weiss pointed out that the early proclamation of the resurrection would not have been possible at all had the disciples experienced even the simplest doubt in an objective resurrection. This undoubting belief would hardly be the consequence if we were to rely on visions to such large numbers of people as are recorded in the narratives. As mentioned above, all would not be prepared for such visions.
An instance where this would be true occurs in the oldest resurrection narrative. Here Paul relates that on one occasion Jesus appeared to over 500 people at once (1 Cor 15:6). That Paul cites this as a proof of Jesus’ resurrection is evident from his further explanation that most of these 500 witnesses were still alive at the time of his writing (and thus available to testify of the reality of this event). As Brown asserts, it is hardly possible to imagine a synchronized but personal experience which would convince each that Jesus had objectively risen. A collective hallucination in which all saw visions would be to ignore the above-mentioned evidence to the contrary.
Another instance where the vision theory appears especially improbable is Luke’s recording of the walk to Emmaus (Luke 24:13–33). This narrative, complete with proper names (such as Cleopas, Emmaus, and Jerusalem), convinced Martin Dibelius that the pure form of the event had been preserved at this point. This incident has received much respect from critics who have rejected other aspects of the resurrection accounts. Here we find that the shifting scenes, continual conversation, and the time element involved all militate strongly against the reality of visions. Paul’s list of appearances in 1 Corinthians 15:1–8 is also problematical for this viewpoint as well.
It would be advantageous here to recall two of Keim’s criticisms made last century which were discussed above. First, the New Testament writers distinguish between the resurrection appearances of Jesus and visions which occur at later times (such as 2 Cor 12:2–4; Acts 7:55–56; 18:9; 23:11; 27:23). This would not be the case if the resurrection appearances were of the same variety as the later visions, as all would be viewed as being of the same type. This is an acute point because it demonstrates that the resurrection experiences were regarded as being unique and were therefore not of a subjective visional character. Second, if these appearances of the risen Jesus had not been perceived to be unique, then one would not expect them to have ceased so suddenly. Rather, they would tend to have been related to the later visions. That they did stop indicates that the early church did not want them to be confused with spiritual visions.
Therefore we perceive once again the second chief criticism of the vision theory. Many factors have contributed to this probability that the number of visions, the number of people who saw them, and the way in which these occurred simply do not correspond to the required data for the disciples to have experienced such manifestations.
The third major criticism of this theory is that real subjective hallucinations are comparatively rare, as proper causes are usually lacking. They are, by definition, experiences in which something is perceived to be present, but for which there is no objective reality. Thus they differ from illusions, where a reality is mistakenly identified. Thus it can be ascertained that such occurrences are generally rare. The perception of something that not only is not present but for which there is no objective reality at all therefore requires an explanation. Usually such hallucinations are caused by mental illness of some kind, drugs, or extreme methods of bodily deprivation. To suppose that all of the witnesses of the resurrection appearances were in such a state of mind thus becomes nonfactual. We can now better understand how an extreme pre-conditioned hope and expectation must exist, combined with other factors. Such conditions as the above clearly did not exist in order for all of the disciples to imagine something that was only “thin air.” Therefore Pannenberg rightly concludes that to describe the resurrection appearances as hallucinations or subjective visions is completely unsatisfactory.
The fourth major reason why the vision theory is rejected today (and the last which we will deal with specifically) is that cautions were actually taken in order to demonstrate that the appearances were not hallucinations. We have already mentioned the theme of doubt in the gospels and the consequential conviction of contemporary scholars that the disciples were convinced that Jesus was actually alive only after the appearances and not before. We have likewise spoken of the conviction of the New Testament authors that the appearances of the risen Jesus were different from later visions. Reginald Fuller especially notes here that Paul did not confuse these appearances with the subjective visions which were experienced later.
In addition, we find that other steps were also taken to disprove visions as the origin of the appearances. We find these safeguards in both the earlier and the later narratives which deal with this subject. The emphasis in Matthew, Luke-Acts, and John on Jesus’ resurrected body being both spiritual and material is well-known. We find an emphasis on being able to see and handle the body of Jesus. In Luke especially it is related that it occurred to the disciples that they were seeing just such a spiritual hallucination—a bodiless apparition. Although these gospels were written later than Paul’s description of the resurrection appearances, it is recognized by many scholars that the description of Jesus’ body in the gospels may have been derived, at least in part, from the same source as Paul’s conception of a spiritual body. In other words, it is often recognized that both Paul and the gospels speak of a resurrected body composed of both spiritual and material qualities (with varying emphases) and that these concepts were in turn based on the reports of the original eyewitnesses.
What is often not realized is that Paul’s list of appearances in 1 Corinthians 15:1–8 also contains a polemic against theories such as that of subjective visions. As Brown properly notes, Paul’s reference to 500 people having seen Jesus at one time means that Paul conceived of the appearances as being other than purely internal experiences. Thus hallucinations were not possible in view of his testimony. This is especially true when we remember that Paul adds that most of these witnesses were still alive and thus could be questioned. Therefore, this testimony in 1 Corinthians 15:6 is regarded by Paul himself as proof against subjective visions.
Thus we see that there were precautions taken in both Paul’s account and in the gospels to guard against the view that the appearances were due to subjective visions and therefore not genuine. This motif is more developed in the gospels, where we are told that Jesus’ body was touched on various occasions, demonstrating its reality. But we have seen how Paul also includes a proof against such a theory as well. That this is the case in the New Testament is only natural when we consider man’s psychological impulse to investigate both strange occurrences and the testimony of others who claim to have experienced such.
Therefore we perceive that the vision theory cannot account for the resurrection appearances of Jesus. Several major points militate against such a view. The disciples were not in the correct psychological frame of mind. There is also a problem concerning the number who claimed to have seen Jesus and the time and place factors involved. In addition, real hallucinations and visions are rare and do not fit the facts. Lastly, the early sources explain that various cautions were taken to prove that visions were not applicable in these instances. Many minor points could also be mentioned against this theory. Most of these objections can also be applied to theories relying upon other subjective experiences of the apostles as well.
We thus conclude that the visional theory simply does not fit the narratives. For hallucinations to have occurred, all of the facts must be changed around. There are psychological laws which these hallucinations must abide by, and these were not present. No matter how inviting a theory may appear, if it fails to account for the evidence, it must be rejected.
Today the vision theory is held by comparatively few scholars. Brown notes that this nineteenth-century view is not even respectable any longer. Based upon the fear and dejection of the disciples, Bornkamm asserts that we cannot resort to any explanation which depends upon the inner, subjective experience of these men. McLeman agrees that the nineteenth-century vision theorists such as Strauss and Renan presented views which were quite extravagant in their claims. Even Schonfield rejects this theory as not fitting the evidence. Whatever theory may be proposed, it cannot validly be this one.
In the last portion of the nineteenth century a movement appeared from within the ranks of Protestant liberalism. It became designated as the History of Religions school of thought. It opposed several of liberalism’s suppositions, such as trying to find a “Jesus of history.” In fact, it was believed that very little historical information could be gathered about the life of Jesus. This was mainly due to the legendary growth which was said to have built up around the life of Christ. These legends were believed to have accumulated in stages until the embellished material became quite detailed.
The History of Religions school sought to study Christianity in terms of the other religions. The Christian faith came to be seen as being syncretistic and therefore it was not unique in the sense that it did borrow from the other faiths. It was now postulated by these scholars that Christianity borrowed quite freely from Judaism and from other systems of belief such as the Babylonian, Egyptian, and Persian religions. It was postulated that Christianity was especially influenced by the Old Testament and by the teachings of these other faiths. Myths were believed to be extremely prevalent at this time and were perceived to be spreading from one region and religion to another. Each then accepted ideas from the other that were advantageous to its own purposes. As a result, these scholars constantly compared almost every individual category of the Christian faith to similar ideas which were a part of other religions.
One scholar who had many beliefs in common with this emerging school of thought was German theologian Otto Pfleiderer. For instance, he also postulated that there were many affinities between Christianity and other ancient religions. The influence from Judaism was also noteworthy. Myths were said to be present in all of these faiths and there were similarities, especially in the transmission of events requiring Supernatural intervention. Especially noticeable is Pfleiderer’s tendency to compare different aspects of the Christian faith with similar ideas and occurrences in these other religions. Parallels are found, for instance, in Jesus’ relationship to Satan, in the miracles of Jesus, and in the accounts of the resurrection.
Pfleiderer also believed that very little could be known about the beginnings of the Christian faith. He likewise based this conclusion upon the thesis that legends grew profusely around the life of Jesus in the early church. It is now too difficult to know for sure which reported events actually occurred and which did not.
The History of Religions school rejected any belief in the resurrection of Jesus. Rather, they popularized the view that the narratives of this occurrence were later additions to the gospel, ones which grew mainly from the influence of stories of other such events found in other religions. At any rate, the resurrection was considered to be a legend which was added to the story of Jesus’ life.
Pfleiderer follows this pattern and also views the resurrection of Jesus as myth that did not occur literally. But he does so for two main reasons. First, the resurrection is believed to be legend added to the story of Jesus’ life by his earliest followers. It was not a real occurrence at all, for Jesus never actually rose from the dead. Rather, the narratives were added by the disciples, who were convinced that Jesus must be alive. The legends continued to grow until they were detailed accounts of a victory over death. In addition, stories of resurrected gods in other religions served as a basis for the rise of the Christian legends about Jesus. These more ancient myths provided the impetus for the formulation of the New Testament accounts of Jesus rising from the dead.
Second, Pfleiderer believes that this theory based upon the formation of legends must also be supplemented by the subjective vision theory of the resurrection. Visions apparently account for the source of the conviction that Jesus was alive, while the subsequent legends explain the present form of the narratives. We have already dismissed the vision theory above, and we will turn presently to the possibility that the narratives are due to legends. We will henceforth refer to this hypothesis as the mythical or legendary theory of the resurrection.
Even in the twentieth century the mythical or legendary theory of the resurrection can be found. Probably the best-known theologian today who advocates a somewhat related form of this theory is Rudolf Bultmann. He freely recognizes his indebtedness to the History of Religions school of thought, especially in his understanding of the meaning of myth. For Bultmann, New Testament mythology is made up of elements quite similar to concepts found in both Jewish apocalypticism and the redemption myths of gnosticism. All have several features in common. As a result, we find that many of the gospel miracles, for instance, are close to those in the Hellenistic narratives. Bultmann draws parallels between some of these gospel miracles and those of other ancient peoples in a way much reminiscent of Pfleiderer’s attempt spoken of above.
Also similar to Pfleiderer is Bultmann’s twofold treatment of the resurrection. First, there is a stress on the presence of legendary material in the New Testament accounts. For instance, this event is viewed as being a myth constructed by imagination and legend. But, second, while in his discussion of the resurrection Bultmann laid much more emphasis on the part played by this legendary growth, it is noteworthy that he also felt that the vision theory was also a very possible explanation, at least in part. While the narratives of Jesus’ rising from the dead do have significance when we view them as being pointers to the uniqueness of Jesus’ death, the resurrection is nonetheless a myth devoid of historical reality and thus not an actual historical event.
For Bultmann, the New Testament church combined and mingled Greek and Jewish (Old Testament) mythology. It is no surprise, therefore, that this scholar postulated that the resurrection also had similarities to beliefs in other religions and systems of thought. The affect of such beliefs upon this Christian doctrine of a risen Jesus might partially be realized, for instance, in Paul’s speaking of the resurrection in gnostic terms. The gnostic influence on such narratives is also found in other portions of the New Testament. Bultmann holds that Jewish sources also influenced the faith that the early church had in Jesus’ resurrection. Old Testament verses were reinterpreted as predictions of this event. In fact, one of the early proofs of this occurrence was what the Christians felt was just such Jewish Scriptural support. We therefore find that certain aspects of the New Testament’s teaching about the resurrection were influenced by other ancient faith systems. As a result of these and other legendary features involved in the Christian faith, little can actually be known about the historical Jesus with any degree of certainty.
Earlier we saw how nineteenth-century liberal theology as a whole followed Hume in its rejection of miracles. We should also note that Pfleiderer was no exception here. He likewise accepted the view that science had discovered the laws of nature which were so regular that they could not be violated. Even in the twentieth century this view was accepted by Bultmann (as shown above), who rejected the miraculous both because it was perceived to contradict the laws of nature and because we live in too modern of an age to accept such occurrences as fact.
It is apparent that there are several similarities between Bultmann and Pfleiderer on the concept of mythology, especially with regard to the treatment of the resurrection. Therefore Bultmann’s position will also be included in the discussion and critique in this section.
We will turn now to an examination of what we will term the legendary or mythical theory of the resurrection of Jesus. Ancient mythology relates various tales concerning “vegetation gods.” In their earlier forms these stories, in other words, celebrated the yearly death of vegetation during the fall season and the birth of the vegetation in the spring season. These myths originally dealt only with an expression of man’s observances of this yearly cycle of vegetation. Later they were transformed into narratives expressing religious beliefs about the gods.
Various versions of such myths circulated around the ancient world. The details vary from culture to culture, but they do appear to have the most prominent features more-or-less in common, as they revolve mainly around the death of a vegetation god. The god is in love with a goddess but becomes separated from his lover, often by death. She usually mourns for him and sometimes receives him back into the land of the living. The Sumerian form of this myth concerns the god Dumuzi and the goddess Inanna. The Babylonian version is about Tammuz and Ishtar. The Egyptian rendering speaks of Osiris and Isis. Other cultures depict their gods and goddesses directly patterned upon these major versions. For instance, Phoenician mythology presents Adonis and Astarte and Phrygian mythology concerns Attis and Cybele, both of which are the equivalent of the Babylonian Tammuz and Istar. The Greek equivalent to the Egyptian god Osiris is Dionysus.
It is generally asserted by those who hold the legend theory that these myths concerning the vegetation gods not only permeated Christian circles, but that they formed the basis for the Christian belief in the resurrection of Jesus. The foundation thus laid by the influence of these ancient myths then is believed to have provided the framework for later legendary accumulations, which continued to grow.
There are at least four major reasons (and several addition minor ones) as to why the legend theory of the resurrection attracts the attention of comparatively few scholars today. First, there is ample proof from contemporary theological studies that Jesus’ resurrection lies at the very roots of New Testament belief. In other words, it is not simply a flattering tale added to the origins of Christianity years after the death of Jesus.
It is agreed by all that Paul’s account of the resurrection in 1 Corinthians 15:3–8 is the earliest witness to this occurrence. It is also almost entirely unanimous that Paul is not passing on material which he has formulated himself, but rather is citing a much earlier tradition. In other words, the earliest account of the resurrection appearances was formulated before Paul actually wrote this book and thus it is earlier than the composition of the book in which it appears.
The key question is how near this ancient formulation of these appearances is to the actual events. Pannenberg believes that the creed is quite close to the original appearances of Jesus. Most others agree with him for several reasons. First, Paul’s words “I delivered” and “I received” are technical jargon referring to the Jewish custom of the transmission of ancient data. Second, there are words in this portion which are non-Pauline, pointing to an earlier formulation by others. Third, at least Jeremias believes that the origin of these words is Aramaic and not Greek, thus dating back to the earliest sources.
For these and other similar reasons, it is the belief of most theologians today that this formulation reported by Paul is about as close to the original appearances as is possible for such a formalized creed. This is because a little time would be required for this process of formalization into a list of appearances. We do not know if Paul preserved the list exactly in its original form or if he added to it or modified it, but the core material concerning the appearances of Jesus dates to just a short time after Jesus’ death.
In all likelihood, Paul received this information about Jesus’ resurrection from Peter and James when he visited Jerusalem after his conversion (Gal 1:18–19). This is especially likely when we remember that there are single appearances of Jesus to both Peter and James in this early traditional formulation (1 Cor 15:5, 7). Therefore, Reginald Fuller states that the very latest that this list could have been formulated would be five years after the original appearances, or about 35 AD when Paul made this visit to Jerusalem. Pannenberg dates this visit and the subsequent receiving of this information as occurring six to eight years after these events. But Fuller rightly notes that this is the latest that the tradition could have been formulated (so that Paul could have received it at that time). It very well could have crystallized much earlier.
Therefore, we find that the disciples taught the resurrection of Jesus from the very beginning. There was no period of inactivity when this was not their central theme for preaching. The early formulation cited by Paul demonstrates that the proclamation of the resurrection rests upon the testimony of the original eyewitnesses and not upon a legendary process. Therefore this carefully worded tradition in 1 Corinthians 15:3–8 reveals explicitly that the appearances of Christ were experienced by groups of early Christians and not invented as a part of later legendary development. This early date caused Pannenberg to conclude that
under such circumstances it is an idle venture to make parallels in the history of religions responsible for the emergence of the primitive Christian message about Jesus’ resurrection.
Thus we see, first of all, that myths in ancient religions in all probability cannot be made to account for the rise of the belief in Jesus’ resurrection from the dead because the New Testament accounts are simply too close to the events themselves to be legends, as we have seen here.
The second reason that the legend or myth theory is rejected is in some ways similar to the first. In addition to the very early date given to the earliest tradition which reports the appearances of the resurrected Jesus, we are also informed that we have the testimony of eyewitnesses to this fact. Above we discussed the probability that two of the original persons to whom Jesus appeared, Peter and James, were the ones who had passed this information to Paul. But there is additional New Testament evidence that must now be discussed which demonstrates that the original eyewitnesses agreed with Paul in teaching that Jesus both rose from the dead and that he appeared to them. To show that such eyewitnesses also believed and taught that this event occurred after Jesus’ death and that they witnessed the appearances would of course be an extremely strong point against the legend theory. We will deal more with this below, showing why this point is so acute.
In 1 Corinthians 15 we have not only the earliest testimony concerning Jesus’ resurrection appearances to the apostles and to others (vv. 1–8), but we also have Paul’s statement that these same apostles also preached these same facts. Paul thereby asserts that the message which he was preaching about the resurrection appearances was the same as that to which the other apostles were also testifying (1 Cor 15:11). Later he mentions three times that these original eyewitnesses to the appearances were also preaching of their experiences with the risen Jesus (1 Cor 15:14, 15). Even the critics admit that Paul is here witnessing to the content of the early disciples’ message—that both Paul and these other eyewitnesses were proclaiming a risen Lord who had appeared to them. In other words, those who had seen the risen Lord were now relating this to others. And they did so immediately after the events occurred. Paul additionally explains that the 500 who had also beheld an appearance of the Lord, while they perhaps were not themselves actively preaching about their experience, were still available for questioning, as most of them were still living (1 Cor 15:6). Therefore we see that a number of eyewitnesses were either preaching or available for questioning concerning their experiencing of various appearances of the risen Jesus. This testimony did not take place only years later, but immediately after the original manifestations.
We also receive confirmation of Paul’s testimony in the gospels and the book of Acts. Although some critical scholars do not believe that any eyewitnesses were the authors of any of the four gospels, most believe that at the very least some can be traced to eyewitness testimony. Therefore we can at least say that, in all probability, Mark received much material from the apostle Peter, Matthew from the apostle Matthew, Luke-Acts from various eyewitnesses (Luke 1:1–4) and John from the apostle John. These, then, also point to eyewitness testimony concerning the resurrection appearances of Jesus.
The importance of eyewitness testimony such as this is hard to overestimate. We have seen how virtually all agree that the earliest church, including those who were the original observers, proclaimed Jesus’ resurrection from the dead. That these first witnesses did not simply fraudulently invent the narratives, fully believing that Jesus was still dead, is evident and admitted by all. Men do not risk their lives and even die for what they know to be only a fabricated falsehood. Also, as J. N. D. Anderson points out, the quality of the ethical teaching of the early disciples and the fact that none ever recanted under the threat of losing their lives further repudiates any theory based upon such fraud. In addition, the psychological transformation of the disciples is left unaccounted for if they invented the stories. Thus they actually believed that Jesus had risen from the dead.
But under these conditions the legend theory is impossible. This is obvious not only because those who witnessed the appearances proclaimed the exact opposite. Of course, proclaiming something does not necessarily make it true. But since we have ruled out any chances of a fabricated story or lie on the part of the disciples, there has to be a reason why these men would come to believe that Jesus had risen from the dead. The other leading theories (the swoon and the vision theories) have also failed as adequate solutions, as shown above. Therefore these cannot be used as the impetus for this faith. So the legend theory also fails because some event had to have happened at the very beginning to convict the disciples that a resurrection had actually occurred. There could have been no gradual build-up of legends because these events were reported from the very first to be true. Neither do other naturalistic theories help to explain this conviction and unquestioning belief on the part of the earliest witnesses.
To proclaim that other ancient myths are the basis for these appearances merely begs the question. To proclaim that Jesus rose because ancient mythology relates such a scheme for the so-called “vegetation gods” does not solve the problem of the origin of faith which convinced the disciples that this event had actually occurred. It also fails to account for the need of the disciples to fabricate appearances of the risen Jesus as narrated in the early formulations. They would obviously know that Jesus had not risen unless they were otherwise deceived (as by a swoon, or by visions). But the conditions for such deception are obviously lacking and this therefore renders such suppositions useless. We are thus caught in a hopeless bind.
The third major criticism of the legend or myth theory (as well as the fourth) even challenges the supposition that any parallels at all can be drawn between the New Testament proclamation of Jesus’ resurrection and the resurrection claimed for the vegetation gods of other ancient religions. The main difference between Christianity and the myths of the vegetation gods centers in the fact that Jesus was a historical person, but these gods and heroes were not. The person of Jesus is historically accessible, whereas those of the mythical characters such as Dumuzi, Tammuz, Osiris, and the others live only in the tales spread about them. For instance, many claimed to have seen the resurrected Jesus, but not so with these mythical figures.
Therefore we perceive that there are no historical grounds upon which we can compare the two types of resurrection stories. Neither are there any historical grounds upon which to compare even the lives of Jesus and of these other gods and heroes. Here we find no close connections. In fact, in none of these mythical characters do we find belief in a historical resurrection from the dead as is presented in the New Testament concerning Jesus. This is an important point because it means that, far from having so many resurrection tales after which the disciples could have “patterned” Jesus’ resurrection as some of these theorists would have us believe, there were no previous stories of a historical person among these vegetation gods being raised. Jesus’ story is therefore unique.
The fourth major criticism against the legend or myth theory is that there is considerable doubt about just how much the teaching of resurrection is found in this ancient mythology at all. Therefore the question yet remains as to the extent that the New Testament was influenced by the resurrection myths of other religions. For instance, Orr feels that these ancient myths are too vague and fluctuating to determine the amount of their influence. Their lack of historical reality adds to this confusion.
In addition, the assumed diffusion of ideas of the resurrection of gods into Judaism and Christianity has anything but been proven. Even the critic Kirsopp Lake believed that the difficulty with the legend theory was in ascertaining how much was based upon real fact and how much was due to overzealous guessing. Pannenberg agrees that this diffusion has not been proven. In first-century Palestine there are almost no traces whatsoever of any influence from these ancient cults of resurrected gods.
It was this last point that once baffled Oxford scholar C. S. Lewis when he was an atheist. After coming to accept the dependence of the New Testament upon ancient mythology, he was nonplussed by the so few times that any reference was made to any death and rebirth patterns similar to those in ancient mythologies. He also found that such elements were essentially absent from Jesus’ teachings as well, which was hard to comprehend if the aforementioned influence was so great.
Orr also believes that the legend theory is too arbitrary, as well. It desires to choose points of similarity while disregarding differences. He feels that it is not hard to use the imagination in order to find isolated areas of agreement. Pfleiderer agrees that the mistake is often made where points of difference are neglected in order to bring about a connection between the facts which are more similar. An example here is appropriate. Pfleiderer himself seems to lay a certain emphasis on the myths which present the resurrection of a god on the third day. But he fails to stress as much the celebration of Adonis’ acclaimed resurrection on the first day after the period of mourning or Attis’ acclaimed resurrection on the fourth day.
But even after all of these doubts, the key matter concerns the problem of the extent to which a resurrection from the dead is really found in any of these myths. For instance, the key manuscripts in the Sumerian Dumuzi-Inanna myth break off before the ending and therefore contain no account of a resurrection at all. In fact, a recent discovery of one fragment reveals that Inanna allows Dumuzi to be taken to the underworld rather than rescuing him from this realm of the dead. In the Babylonian myth of Tammuz-Ishtar there is also no specific mention of a resurrection. Rather, Tammuz is only inferentially (not explicitly) thought to have been raised, and some even question this. In addition, it has been shown that there is no sign of any resurrection in the early accounts of Adonis. The texts which refer to such an event date from no earlier than the second century AD and thus after the time of Christ’s resurrection. Likewise, the god Attis is not presented as being resurrected until after the middle of the second century AD. One early critic who preferred the legend or myth theory, P. Jensen, cited the Gilgamesh myths as providing a background for Jesus’ resurrection, when these myths say nothing at all about such an occurrence.
For these reasons, it is doubted just how much the idea of resurrection can be found in such ancient religion. The references that we do find are fewer than expected, somewhat ambiguous, and not enough to account for the prominence that this belief supposedly reached. Therefore Yamauchi asserts that the only god for which we have both clear and early evidence (before Christ’s life) of a resurrection is the Egyptian Osiris. However, this god provides no inspiration for the Christian concept of resurrection, especially since Osiris is always pictured as a mummy. He did not stay on earth after his return to life, but rather descended to rule the underworld. This is a far cry from Jesus’ appearances to his followers in this world. We must look elsewhere to find any inspiration for the narratives of Jesus’ resurrection as depicted in the New Testament.
Therefore we perceive that there is actually much less of a basis for the ancient belief in the resurrection of gods than was originally thought. A few questionable references to such occurrences do not provide the needed proof. There is especially little basis for the theory that these beliefs in other cultures were just “floating around” and that they are the foundation and background for the Christian teachings.
Thus we see here a converging negative result when the legendary or mythical theory of Jesus’ resurrection is examined. First, the earliest narratives concerning this occurrence are too close to the events themselves to allow any time for legends to have formed at all. This is especially true of Paul’s list of appearances in 1 Corinthians 15:3–8. There was no gradual build-up of legends here. Second, the direct and indirect testimony from eyewitnesses is a very strong objection to this view. That these witnesses were not lying is agreed by all, for men do not suffer tremendous discomfort and even death for what is known to be a lie. It is also agreed by all that they at least actually believed that they had really seen something. Therefore it is impossible to assume that they reported a legend or ancient myth as having actually occurred, for they would both know that they were lying when they narrated literal appearances of Jesus and they could not have actually believed that they had really seen him. Some event had to have occurred which convinced them that Jesus was risen, otherwise there would have been the need to invent the narratives. This is why this theory is usually coupled with another. A legend does not provide such realistic impetus. But the other key theories (swoon and visionary) were also found to be inadequate.
Third, there are some primary differences between the nonhistorical resurrection of vegetation gods and the resurrection of a historical person. The parallels between the two types of beliefs have very little in common. Fourth, a comparison of the New Testament narratives with the stories of these vegetation gods reveals further that the supposedly similar characteristics are usually missing. In addition, there is real doubt as to the presence of real resurrection stories in ancient mythology and the extent to which they appear. There is certainly no actual basis to believe that these myths were simply “floating around” in Jesus’ time. For these and other reasons, this theory must be rejected as being inadequate to explain Jesus’ resurrection. As Orr asserts, it simply lacks any historical foundation and relies too much on highly questionable comparisons. We cannot dismiss facts just by pointing to artificial mythical origins.
Bultmann’s modification of this theory also fails for similar reasons. First, his reliance on gnostic influences upon the resurrection of Jesus must be rejected for almost the same reasons as those raised above for rejecting the influences from other ancient mythologies. The comparisons are not as close as might be expected with regards to the resurrection and these myths surely could not have given rise to the belief in this event, as already explained. Bultmann must have realized this himself, however, because he does not try to make gnostic sources account for the basic foundation of the New Testament resurrection narratives. Rather, we have noted above that he utilizes these myths to explain periphery portions of the resurrection such as Jesus’ exaltation over all cosmic powers. This does not explain the core proclamation of a risen Jesus at all and thus cannot be the basis of these claims in the earliest church.
Second, Bultmann’s scientific worldview is outdated. We can no longer rule out miracles a priori because of a belief in a mechanistic, closed universe that rejects the miraculous from the outset (as pointed out in chapter above). Yet, this is what Bultmann does, as we have already seen. Physicist Werner Schaaffs and philosopher Gordon Clark both agree in this criticism. Miracles cannot be excluded in this way because of the modern scientific world in which we live today. Such an approach is not valid.
Third, theologian John Macquarrie also criticizes Bultmann for his arbitrary dismissal of the resurrection without any investigation whatsoever due to his lack of studying the historical evidence. As with Hume, just such an investigation may have revealed the resurrection to be a probable event. Macquarrie also notes the defective scientific view involved.
These second and third criticisms are very substantial ones indeed. They are some of the strongest arguments against Bultmann, who is seen as using an outdated and ineffective view of science, as well as neglecting any historical investigation at all. The resurrection of Jesus can no longer be rejected for these reasons. In order to ascertain if this event has actually occurred, it must be investigated. It cannot be ruled out a priori as done by Bultmann.
In addition, Bultmann’s view still falls prey especially to the first and second major criticisms listed above. The earliest narratives are too close to the events to refer to them simply as myths. Also, the eyewitness testimony rules out this theory. As mentioned above, to refer to the resurrection as a myth does not explain why the original disciples came to relate their experiences with the risen Jesus. Even Bultmann admits that they really believed that Jesus rose from the dead. But something had to cause this belief. Myths in other religions or the development of later legends cannot account for the beginning of this belief because this is no basis from which to project the original resurrection appearances, which would otherwise be pure lies. The disciples would not have actually believed that they had seen Jesus, no matter how prominent other such stories may have been (and we have seen that they were not that common). They could not therefore have believed that Jesus had actually appeared to them personally unless they had been otherwise deceived. This is probably why Bultmann suggests visions as the answer. But, as we have seen, this and other such theories of deception are also quite inadequate. But legends or myths are especially inept at providing the needed impetus. Therefore Bultmann also fails in his attempt to explain away the literal resurrection of Jesus.
As pointed out by Brown, this legend or myth theory is rejected by most theologians today. Bornkamm points out that there is a decisive lack of common ground between this theory and the New Testament narratives. Pannenberg likewise asserts that such legends cannot account for Jesus’ resurrection.
A. SØREN KIERKEGAARD: AN INTRODUCTION
The second major possibility to be dealt with is that the resurrection of Jesus did occur, but that this occurrence cannot be demonstrated. We will first examine the views of a very significant scholar who held this opinion. This theologian and philosopher, Søren Kierkegaard (1813–1855), is probably the best-known representative of this viewpoint.
Although Kierkegaard was not the first scholar to formulate a hypothesis such as this, he popularized this view in a way which has influenced twentieth-century theology immensely. He has been chosen here as the primary representative of this view because of the affect which his work has exerted on many contemporary theologians. This influence is especially apparent, for instance, in this scholar’s treatment of miracles. Beginning with Karl Barth’s Epistle to the Romans in 1918, various theological schools of thought have followed Kierkegaard in postulating that the miraculous cannot be demonstrated to have occurred in any way. This is especially true of the resurrection. The occurrence of this event is often affirmed in various ways, with the understanding that there is no way that it can be verified or proven. In fact, it is probable that even most of the theologians since Barth who reject any belief in a real resurrection of Jesus still manifest the influence of Kierkegaard in their belief that this event was not meant to be proven anyway. Such miracles are simply not open to objective verification. We will deal with the reasoning behind such assertions below.
It is mainly for these reasons that Kierkegaard has been chosen here as the representative of this viewpoint. This Danish scholar has exercised much influence on twentieth-century theology. His view of miracles was especially influential. As will be shown in the next chapter, a very large portion of contemporary theology has followed Kierkegaard in holding that miracles cannot be demonstrated, whether these occurrences are accepted as really happening or not. He is thus an excellent example of one who believes that miracles such as the resurrection did occur but that any attempts at demonstrating their validity are fruitless and misleading.
Before we proceed to an examination of Kierkegaard’s views concerning miracles, it will be advantageous to look briefly at some of the intellectual background for his polemic. Perhaps more than with most other well-known thinkers, much of this scholar’s thought is derived from personal experiences, such as his observation of the conditions in his native land of Denmark.
Kierkegaard experienced a difficult boyhood. Apparently because of family problems and also because of a physical deformity (his back was crooked and he limped), he endured acute periods of melancholy which seemed to be continually present in his life. By his own admission he suffered greatly from this daily depression, which was complicated by the conviction that he had been singled out in order to suffer for others. These emotions caused him a great amount of consternation and kept him from the real joy in life which might otherwise have been attainable.
It was at least partially due to this intense melancholy and conviction that he must suffer for others that Kierkegaard encountered two other experiences which had a tremendous effect upon his life. First, he felt obliged to break off his engagement to his lover, Regina Olson. Although both loved each other very much, Kierkegaard felt that somehow the break was God’s guidance and will for his life. But because he still loved her, he struggled much with his feelings. His writings reveal this battle which he waged with himself. His action seemed to be attributable to the melancholy from which he still suffered. But nonetheless, this broken engagement led to an immense amount on writing on his part. His time was now spent in publishing his views on various subjects, especially theology and philosophy. His rate of production over the coming years has rarely been equaled, especially in the diversity of the subjects which were covered.
Second, Kierkegaard attacked a weekly news sheet named the Corsair. This publication openly denounced many public figures, embarrassing them in the process. Kierkegaard had hoped to expose this literary tirade with the help of other prominent men of Copenhagen who also disliked the methods of this paper. But he received no help and thus suffered all of the brunt of the return attack upon himself. And the Corsair was quite vicious in its presentations of this Danish thinker, deriding him because of his physical deformity. For instance, it made light of the unequal length of his two legs. This procedure continued in the paper for approximately one year and soon he was looked upon with much derision by the public. But Kierkegaard accepted this treatment as part of the suffering which was ordained for him. It caused him to become even more withdrawn from society and resolved to continue the work he had begun.
One conviction that Kierkegaard continued to act upon was his polemic against the presence of Hegelian-influenced theology in Denmark. The Hegelian version of Christianity encouraged people to reason clearly, as if this was all there was involved in becoming a Christian. The popular belief in Denmark was that being a good Danish citizen and being a Christian were almost synonymous. Kierkegaard attacked these presuppositions, pointing out that Christianity is much more than a life of easy living. Rather, it is a total transformation of the individual, based upon the personal recognition of one’s being a sinner. It involves a commitment to God through faith in the death of Christ to pay for one’s sins. The result is the imitation of Christ. In fact, the chief theme of all of his writings was to speak to those living in “Christendom” to inform them about how they could become true New Testament Christians.
This brief background will make the proceeding presentation of Kierkegaard’s arguments more comprehensible. After endeavoring to understand the reasoning behind his treatment of miracles, a critique of these views will then be presented in order to ascertain their ability to support Kierkegaard’s arguments. It should be mentioned before passing, however, that the two main texts which will be used here are Kierkegaard’s Concluding Unscientific Postscript and his Philosophical Fragments. This is for a few very important reasons. The Danish scholar himself relates to us that the former volume is both the turning point of his work as an author and the transition between his aesthetic works and his religious ones. In addition, quite a large portion of this work concerns one of the main topics which is to be discussed here and other related thoughts. On the other hand, the primary problem treated by the latter work concerns whether or not the Christian faith can be based on historical events and this is the key question to be dealt with in this chapter. After thus perceiving these introductory facts, it is now possible to proceed to our presentation of Kierkegaard’s views.
B. SØREN KIERKEGAARD’S ARGUMENT AND A CRITIQUE
As a theologian and philosopher, Kierkegaard’s writings were not overly popular beyond Scandinavia and Germany until the twentieth century. As pointed out above, he often reacted against both the “official Christianity” of his day, which was very defective in terms of the New Testament definition, and against the philosophy of Hegelianism. Both trends were leading people away from real Christianity. It was at least partially as a result of his bold stand taken against these ideas that he was not very popular in his own time. However, his works were revived in this century by both secular and religious existentialism, including such scholars as Karl Barth, Martin Heidegger, and Jean-Paul Sartre. Today one cannot even deal adequately with existentialism without noting the influence of Kierkegaard and the impetus which he gave to the beginnings of this philosophy.
Kierkegaard formulated and defended the well-known philosophical statement that “Truth is subjectivity.” Therefore, while several forms of philosophy teach that the way to knowledge is to seek objective truth in one form or another, this is viewed as being impossible. We can only achieve the truth by subjectivity. In fact, all eternal truth and values are based upon this subjectivity.
Do objective approaches have any validity at all? For Kierkegaard, objective reflection can yield objective truth, such as mathematics and history. In other words, objective facts can be true, especially in an objective sense as with the above disciplines. We might phrase it this way: a rational, objective approach to reality can yield true facts, but it cannot lead to eternal truth, which is a different concept.
An example which is introduced here by this Danish thinker will serve to illustrate this point. A patient from an insane asylum succeeded in escaping from the institution. He knew that he would have to express himself sanely when he arrived in a nearby city, lest someone perceive the truth of the matter and send him back. As he walked along he picked up a ball and put it into the pocket of his coat. This continually bounced against his body with every step that he took. Inspired by this, the patient began repeating to himself each time it happened, “Bang, the earth is round.” When he reached the city he attempted to convince one of his friends that he was sane by speaking objectively. So he again repeated, “Bang, the earth is round.” But, alas, instead of being able to convince the doctor that he was sane, he only impressed upon him that he was still sick and in need of medical assistance.
The point that Kierkegaard thus expresses is the questionableness of objective truths. The statement which the patient from the asylum made was true, even objectively true (the earth is round). But it was of little consequence. Therefore we are to see that, while such objective statements can indeed be true, they do not lead us to eternal truth. In this respect they fail, because “Truth is subjectivity.”
For Kierkegaard, this subjective factor finds its culmination in the idea termed “passion.” The highest of the passions of human subjectivity is faith. This concept is a central one in the thought of this scholar. It opposed that portion of Western philosophy which reached its apex in Hegel, a tradition which stressed the importance of reason as the basis for knowledge.
This understanding of faith (as the highest of the passions) as the basis of knowledge is an important factor when we are speaking of Kierkegaard’s approach to God. Since subjectivity is the way to truth and faith is the highest expression of subjectivity, it follows that we can only come to know the truth about God by this subjective, inward faith. It is an inner process, a faith-experience, by which we come to know about Him.
Since God can only be known by subjectivity such as is expressed in faith, it is therefore plain that we cannot gain such knowledge by any forms of objectivity, such as by reason. In fact, when we try to approach God by reason we find that He is inaccessible. It is plainly impossible to discover truth about God objectively.
The same is true of the Christian faith as a whole, because Christianity also opposes all objectivity. Kierkegaard even goes as far as to say what objective Christianity is paganistic.
The culmination of these thoughts is in Kierkegaard’s convictions that since God is a Subject, He can therefore only be known subjectively. Thus we cannot attempt any proofs for His existence, nor can we conjure up any arguments concerning God by the use of reason. It is little wonder that Kierkegaard does not try to demonstrate His existence.
This brings us to the crux of this presentation. It has been shown that Kierkegaard rejected verification and proof for the existence of God and for the Christian faith as a whole. Such an objective approach is clearly improper. Christian truth is achieved by subjectivity.
For these same reasons, Kierkegaard also rejected any attempts to base the truth of the Christian faith on historical knowledge. In this he followed his predecessor, Gotthold E. Lessing (1729–1781), who postulated that “accidental truths of history can never become the proof of necessary truths of reason.” By this Lessing explains his conviction and belief that one cannot support Christian doctrines by referring to historical events such as the resurrection. In other words, while Lessing asserts that he has no historical grounds on which to deny the resurrection of Jesus, this is no reason to believe other doctrines of the Christian faith as a result. One may, indeed, affirm the other doctrinal beliefs of Christianity (as Lessing claims that he does), but this must be on another basis other than that of the historicity of certain events. To argue from such events would be to reason from accidental historical facts to the necessary truths of one’s faith, and this is not allowable.
Lessing adds that this division between historical facts and religious faith “is the ugly, broad ditch which I cannot get across, however often and however earnestly I have tried to make the leap.” Thus we perceive that the gap between these two categories is what comprises the barrier over which Lessing cannot find a way. There is no means he can discover which will allow one to proceed from an argument in the first category to a belief in the second category.
It is doubtful, however, if Lessing actually believed in a historical resurrection like he appears to affirm (as noted above). For instance, when writing in another essay about eighteenth-century rationalist Hermann Reimarus’ rejection of the resurrection, he admits that even if the objections which were raised were valid ones, Christianity would still exist because the acceptance of Christian doctrines depends upon faith and not upon historical events. Even Kierkegaard realized that Lessing’s affirmations about events such as the resurrection were actually only concessions made by him to highlight the point he was making.
In addition, Lessing relates that historical truths cannot be proven anyway. Thus, even if it is held that events have occurred, it cannot be proven that they did. In a similar way, just because the resurrection is believed to have actually occurred, it cannot be proven to have been historical, but only accepted by faith. We can therefore better perceive how Lessing could seemingly accept an event even when it could not be demonstrated to have happened and when it could not be the basis for other beliefs.
Lessing’s formulation, whereby history is divorced from faith, has exercised much influence since his time. For example, Immanuel Kant borrowed from him in making a similar distinction between the truths of God and historical fact. Separating these two categories is “a mighty chasm, the overleaping of which … leads at once to anthropomorphism.” Thus we find once again that religious truths of faith cannot be supported by history. And, as with Lessing, neither can events of history such as the resurrection be proven. In fact, this event cannot be demonstrated to have occurred literally because as such it is an offense to reason.
Kierkegaard also followed Lessing in this belief that occurrences in history could not support religious truths of faith. Kierkegaard expressly states that “there can in all eternity be no direct transition from the historical to the eternal.” This is the case both for the eyewitnesses to the facts and for those who are removed by generations. Whether the believer was a contemporary of Jesus or not, he is not able to base faith on reason or history.
This stance by Kierkegaard is actually the key to this discussion. Since truth is subjective, then objective approaches such as the historicity of certain events cannot lead one to a decisive faith or to eternal happiness. To be sure, this scholar believes that Jesus was a historical person in that he entered the time sequence of this world as a man. It was also in history that Jesus lived, died, and rose again. But even though these events actually occurred, they comprise the supreme paradox of the Christian faith because the doctrine of the incarnation is seemingly inexplicable and difficult to grasp logically. Such events are contradictory because they assert that God has become man, contrary to all reason. Even though this incarnation really did take place in history, one cannot historically (or otherwise) demonstrate such events in Jesus’ life like the resurrection because it is impossible to demonstrate a contradiction (even one that really occurred). Historical proofs cannot make such events any less of a contradiction or paradox.
Therefore, Kierkegaard postulated that these events cannot be the basis of faith, as mentioned above. But, in addition, they are to be believed even though it is not possible to demonstrate that they have occurred. Thus it is not only impossible to base one’s faith on objective, historical events (since faith is subjectivity), but it is also impossible to prove these events. The various facets of Jesus’ incarnation are an enigma to history and the objective discipline of history is too suspect and inexact to yield such proof. For this reason, Kierkegaard discouraged arguing and debating about the truths of faith.
The direct result of this emphasis upon theology is the very important concept termed the “leap.” Kierkegaard, inspired here by Lessing, makes much use of this idea. For Kierkegaard, God cannot be determined to exist by “proofs,” as mentioned earlier. Neither can His existence be demonstrated by pointing to events in history such as the incarnation, as we have just seen. As long as we hold to such objective methods of verification, we will never understand God’s existence. It is only when we let go of such proofs and accept God by faith that we will realize that God does indeed exist. This act of abandoning all of our proofs and all of our attempts to reach God by reason, however brief a moment it may be, is termed a “leap.” This leap takes place when we let go of all of these objective attempts to prove God by our reason and accept Him by faith.
So it is very clear that, for Kierkegaard, the resurrection of Jesus provides no basis for faith. Although this event is believed to be true, it cannot be demonstrated to be such. It must simply be accepted by faith apart from any historical logic. Once again we are required to reject this proof and perceive God without such a crutch. Thus, we are to take the leap to God’s existence by faith, without any reliance upon historical fact. Lessing’s ditch is bridged by faith, as one leaps from the facts of Jesus’ life to faith in him apart from any verification.
So far, Kierkegaard’s position concerning subjectivity has been investigated. To repeat briefly, this concept is viewed as being the proper way to finding the truth. A very clear statement to this effect is “Subjectivity is truth, subjectivity is reality.” This inward quality of transformation reaches its apex in passion. In fact, passion itself is strictly a subjective factor which cannot be objective at all.
This obviously leaves very little room for objectivity. Indeed, Christianity is opposed to all that is objective. If we rely on an objective faith we are said to be reverting to paganism. There is actually even a limit placed on reason, dictating its boundaries. This is because Kierkegaard believes that reason can only advance to a certain point, beyond which it is not operative. For instance, it cannot prove God. But even when reason is taken to its limit in relation to God, He is still no closer than before.
We should also mention the personal quality of this faith. One believes in God even though this exercise of faith is not based upon any logical or other objective grounds. Neither does this faith attempt to prove its own validity. Rather, the decision to act in faith involves the leap and one’s subsequent embracing of subjective inwardness, which ultimately leads to a nonrational passion.
It now remains for us to attempt to ascertain the accuracy of these views. We concluded above (in chapter ) that in theological investigations, reason is temporally first while faith is more important, especially as an end result. But here we have seen that Kierkegaard gives no essential place to reason at all, while beginning and ending the theological process with faith. This leads to three major criticisms of Kierkegaard’s approach, all of which are directed at the very heart of his polemic. One criticism concerns his exclusive use of faith and the other two revolve around his resultant denial of any essential place being given to objective, reasonable approaches to Christianity.
The first major criticism concerns this scholar’s internal consistency, as it questions the very point of whether Kierkegaard was successful in his own attempt to leave the objective approach to Christianity out of his view of faith. It was concluded earlier (in chapter ) that reason, by definition, was the grounds for all convictions and decisions. Any defense of a belief is also reason. Even the ability to think coherently is reason. This definition clearly shows, in full opposition to Kierkegaard’s teaching, that rational thought (as opposed to subjective thought) is the very basis of our knowledge. In other words, Kierkegaard himself could not even provide such a polemic in defense of faith without relying on reason. This is because reason must be the basis of his conviction that faith is primary. Reason must likewise have compelled his decision to act through such a faith-commitment.
Kierkegaard even makes use of logic and reason in his polemic in favor of the way of faith, even though such an objective process also finds its basis in the rational. Thus there could not even be a defense of the primacy of faith apart from some sort of rational process. Even though Kierkegaard does see some value in the objective, as noted above, he does not believe that it occupies a place of importance in reaching God. Neither does he accept reason as being temporally primary. The objection here is not that he gives no place at all to the objective, but that he does not realize that he is making use of such reasonable approaches in his own approach to God. Therefore, even in his system, reason must be temporally first in order for Kierkegaard to assert the importance of faith.
This can be demonstrated more clearly when we remember how Kierkegaard postulated that truth is found in subjectivity and that objectivity was not the way to God. He could assert this, for instance, either by reasonable persuasion and rational argument or by intuitive conviction and knowledge. But now it is plain to see that reason, and not passion, is the origin of each. All processes of reasonable persuasion and rational argument obviously involve reason. But we have also seen that even the basis of such intuitive conviction or knowledge is reason. Should he try to demonstrate that this is not the case, this persuasion also becomes rational. One cannot show how subjectivity is central without utilizing reason.
Indeed, it would even be impossible for Kierkegaard to think in the sense that he was accustomed to at all, except by reason. He would be required to think through his position apart from the formulating of any convictions, without the formulating of any conclusions or without making any decisions in order to theorize apart from a rational process. It is therefore obvious that Kierkegaard did begin the process with reason, as he was not able to simply start with faith.
It is therefore somewhat ironic that the very element which Kierkegaard sought to separate from faith (namely, objectivity) was the basis upon which faith was built. His very arguments against this conclusion proved reason to be an essential element, since the very polemic was rational. Thus, however subjective or irrational the entire system may be, this subjectivity has been formulated upon a rational process, albeit a disguised one. Otherwise such a theoretical construction would not have been possible.
It is because of these factors that subjectivity, passion, and faith cannot be held to be temporally first. This position belongs to reason, even though faith is more important, especially in the end.
The second major criticism of Kierkegaard’s system is that he does away with all logical grounds which might support his thesis. Even though it has been shown that Kierkegaard himself relies on an objective foundation in spite of his protests to the contrary, he still insists that there be no objective verification of faith. It is, of course, this scholar’s express intention to do away with these grounds, but in so doing there is no objective criteria on which his claims may be based. In other words, Kierkegaard is in error by first denying a place to any objective basis for faith even when he unknowingly utilizes such a reasonable basis himself (criticism number one above). But second, he continues to insist that faith cannot be verified at all. Therefore, even though it is his intention not to base faith on any objective foundation, it is because of this that one cannot ascertain if the subsequent message should be accepted or not. Since such faith is a personal, subjective experience, there is no reason someone else should likewise be compelled to accept it.
Or further, how would it be possible for one to know whether the Christian faith was the right religion? One could likewise urge faith in another system of belief. If no reasonable persuasion exists, how could Kierkegaard differentiate and choose between these options?
As stated earlier, since this faith which Kierkegaard proposes is so subjective, it is even hard to differentiate between it and human emotions such as elation, love, or even heartburn. In other words, Kierkegaard’s subjectiveness is not capable of answering these questions and those raised above because it cannot demonstrate its own validity or tell if its own foundations are solid. In the end there is no real way to ascertain if such a faith has been exercised in the proper way.
Even if Kierkegaard prefers a subjective faith, this does not answer the question of how he might be sure that this faith is valid even for himself, let alone for others. Just because this scholar is not interested in any objective demonstration of the Christian faith, it is nevertheless very important to be able to know if the faith-commitment which he is expounding is valid or not. After all, faith is not simply a cerebral exercise devoid of consequences if it just happened to be false. Much is at risk for those who place high value (indeed, eternal value) in their faith if it is found to be illegitimate.
Kierkegaard speaks much of eternal truth, but it is hard to distinguish between real beliefs and false ones if there is no factual criteria. It is therefore essential to know if his system is probable. It becomes more obvious here that an objective, logical faith would thus be in a much better position to ascertain its trustworthiness than an irrational, subjective one.
For these reasons, for faith to be intelligible it must have some sort of objective groundwork. If the objective is rejected, as Kierkegaard does, then we must also abandon all hope of arriving at testable data about our beliefs. It is true that Kierkegaard was opposed to all such testing and demonstration, but without some criteria such as this, it would be almost impossible to know if such a faith was spurious or not. Therefore we see that Kierkegaard’s system of positing a faith which culminates in passion and inwardness is simply too subjective. There must be some reasonable basis upon which to build this faith.
There is also the problem that Kierkegaard claims that his method of faith is the only way that a Christian can find eternal happiness. But we submit that to abandon a rational basis for faith and to disregard intellectual demonstration can lead to eternal happiness only if one simply ignores any faith-related questions that might arise, such as these which have been raised here. One would have to wear earmuffs and blinders of irrationality in order to forsake all needs and desires to rationalize just so that one might achieve a temporary and fleeting “eternal happiness” which lasts only until the next doubt arises. And the questions raised here would still remain unanswered—one would never know if one’s faith-commitment was valid or even if it was warranted in the first place.
These first two criticisms alone are enough to provide an adequate critique of Kierkegaard’s view of the Christian faith. But it is now possible to apply these two to his system with regards to his rejection of proofs and historical demonstrations as the basis of his way to God.
The third major criticism of Kierkegaard is that his rejection of any objective approach to the Christian faith, including historical verification, is no longer warranted in view of the preceding two criticisms. It has been shown that reason must remain temporally primary. Subjective factors such as faith and passion are unquestionably important, but these are to be based on reason. There must also be some objective grounds for faith. There are some definite implications in these conclusions.
It was stated earlier that the resurrection of Jesus was held by Kierkegaard as not being a valid basis upon which to rest the theological truths of faith. The reason for this was that the subjective was thought to be the true basis for belief. Such objective events were believed to be of a different category and are thus rejected.
But all of these convictions must change when it is held (1) that reason is temporally first and (2) that faith should be objectively verified, both of which were concluded above. For instance, since reason is held to be temporally primary (criticism number one here and chapter above), one can no longer hold that the subjective stands alone and apart from this objective basis and neither can one negate the effectiveness of objective historical events as a result. In other words, with the former basis for religious truths dissolved (namely, subjective faith), the former reason for rejecting historical events must also disappear. This is because it can no longer be maintained that historical verification is opposed to an exclusively subjective faith, because it has been found that this faith is already based on an objective element, namely reason. And since this is the case, it must be realized that this reason can be historical reason, logic, or another means of reasonable verification. At any rate, one could not be opposed to such reasonable historical demonstrations when the objective element of reason is already inherent in the concept of faith, thereby requiring some such objective approach. In fact, the way is opened for faith to be verified by any reasonable approach (or even several at once).
It was also postulated above that faith must have some objective criteria on which to base its claims so that it can be verified (criticism number two here and chapter above). The use of historical research provides an excellent means by which such verification can be effected. Therefore, we perceive once again that Kierkegaard’s thesis of subjectivity cannot stand. When this scholar’s emphasis on the exclusiveness of subjectivity fails, so does his polemic against such proofs as are shown to be probable. It has been shown that faith must be confirmed as being the proper approach to God. Thus we can no longer rule out the confirmation which is provided by verification, such as that from past events which are found to be probable. Such objective demonstration is in fact demanded by the very nature of the two conclusions which we have reached here, as faith must be shown to be valid.
For these reasons, an exact inverse of Kierkegaard’s relationships has therefore occurred. Whereas it was formerly not possible to accept historical events as pointing to eternal truths (according to this scholar), we now understand that this is no longer true. Historical verification (and other such objective demonstrations) now becomes a help rather than a hindrance, as it serves to validate and strengthen faith. In this way both the subjective faith and the objective demonstration are perceived to compliment each other.
These three criticisms against Kierkegaard must therefore be accepted as being valid, as they apply to all stages of his polemic. It was found that his starting point was not subjective faith but reason (criticism number one). Thus Kierkegaard is internally inconsistent from the outset by postulating faith as the initial starting point, but not realizing that he failed in this task himself. Since the main body of his work is predominantly subjective, this leads to another problem, namely that there is no way to ascertain if his system is valid or not (criticism number two). With no objective criteria with which to test these views, one cannot know if subjectivity is the best approach to God. From these first two criticisms a third was deduced, that subjectivity is not solely the right approach to God, since we must start with reason and utilize some objective criteria to verify faith. Thus it was found that one possible approach would be to use history to investigate the Christian faith (and the resurrection in particular) to see if it offers a solid basis for faith.
Suffice it to say that the way has thus been opened for the historical examination of events such as the resurrection. If this occurrence is found to be historical, it could be used as a more rational basis for Christian faith.
Although Kierkegaard’s exclusively subjective basis for his system fails, his emphasis on a faith-commitment for salvation still remains valid. This is especially so if historical (or other) evidence is found to verify such belief. This is because Kierkegaard is correct in establishing this as the central component of Christianity. The same conclusion was also reached in chapter above, where it was found that even though reason was temporally first, faith was the most important and essential element. Therefore we should still accept this conclusion as authoritative, especially with an objective foundation. Kierkegaard’s concept of the faith that leads to salvation and an authentic Christian life involves an individual’s realizing that he is a sinner in need of repentance (a complete change of his life). This repentance is achieved by a complete surrender to God in faith, trusting the death of Jesus Christ on the cross to pay for all personal sins. The result is a total commitment of the individual to God for a life of obedience, based upon the death of the Son of God. This total transformation of the person, if genuine, leads to the joy of the Christian life. This is real faith.
This definition of faith set forth by Kierkegaard, as presented here, is quite a well-stated view. It also accurately portrays the New Testament teachings on this subject. We agree with this scholar that the summary just presented is the most important part of the reason-faith relationship and as such it is essential for the Christian belief in salvation. These teachings must therefore remain in our concept of Christianity. But we also believe that there are reasonable evidences which help to validate these teachings.
We dealt above with some of the immense influence that Søren Kierkegaard’s thought has had upon contemporary theology. His ideas were not very popular in his own day and did not become overly popular even in theological circles until the twentieth century. At this time his views were revived by Karl Barth in particular and by those who followed him (usually referred to as Barthians or neo-orthodox theologians). Especially influential was Kierkegaard’s emphasis on the subjective approach to God, which was discussed in the last chapter. Most of the neo-orthodox theologians agreed with him that God could not be approached by any rational means such as by proofs, historical demonstrations, or other means of verification. Many also accepted the belief that faith entailed an irrational “leap.”
It is in the works of Barth which one can probably see the strongest influence of Kierkegaard on this last point. Barth also believed that God must be approached by faith and not by objective means. In fact, his methodology revolves around the analogy of faith. This concept was perhaps developed most consistently in Barth’s work Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum, where this theologian concluded that Anselm’s ontological argument for the existence of God was not a philosophical proof formulated to induce faith, for Anselm needed no such impetus in order to believe. It is argued that Anselm admitted that the existence of God was known by faith and not by such demonstrations of His existence. This is true, Barth asserts, because it is impossible to learn of God by any kind of proof. We believe in Him not because He is known to exist by various procedures of verification, but because He has revealed Himself to us, especially by faith.
For this reason, Barth rejects the analogy of being, which attempts to argue to the existence of God by various demonstrations. This is an abortive attempt to gain knowledge of God apart from faith. Since faith is not primary in such a system, it must be replaced by the analogy of faith.
Thus, for Barth (as for Kierkegaard), faith is primary. The proper approach to God is the acceptance of faith without trying to verify this belief by proofs.
When one endeavors to examine Barth’s view of the resurrection of Jesus, it is important to keep in mind his method, centering in the analogy of faith. Because of this methodology, Barth (again like Kierkegaard) therefore does not believe that it is possible either to demonstrate this event or to use it as the reason why we should believe in God. This is because God can only be approached by faith and not by demonstrations such as those from historical events.
It is especially in the early period of Barth’s thought that the dialectical emphasis in neo-orthodox theology played an important role. The approach taken to the resurrection is a good example of how this dialectic might be applied to theology. Barth was, for instance, able to say “Yes” to Jesus’ resurrection being an actual event and “No” to its being a historical fact like other occurrences which can be historically verified. This sounds contradictory, but it is affirmed nonetheless:
In the Resurrection the new world of the Holy Spirit touches the old world of the flesh, but touches it as a tangent touches a circle, that is, without touching it … The Resurrection is therefore an occurrence in history … But … the Resurrection is not an event in history at all.
We have here an illustration which presents quite a seeming contradiction in terms. In the example chosen by the author, one must hold either that the tangent touches the circle or that it does not touch. But Barth affirms both. This example serves to illustrate a point in his theology, because in a similar manner he also affirms that the resurrection both is and is not an historical event. To the question of whether the resurrection is an actual event of history, we therefore receive both a “Yes” and a “No” answer.
But how is this possible? Barth holds to the essential evil character of the world, which is tainted by sin. As such, the world is opposed to God and His purposes. If Christ was really to enter the actual history of the world, then he would likewise participate in this evil. For Barth, “if the Resurrection be brought within the context of history, it must share in its obscurity and error and essential questionableness.”
The only possible conclusion is that the resurrection occurred on “the frontier of all visible human history.” It is a historical occurrence, but not in the normal sense of the word “history.” In fact, it may be considered in some ways to be a nonhistorical occurrence.
Barth continued a similar type of reasoning in other early works as well. In 1920 he taught that the resurrection of Jesus was “not in time. It is not one temporal thing among others.” An important distinction is made as follows:
The resurrection of Christ … is not a historical event … though it is the only real happening in is not a real happening of history (Italics and wording are Barth’s).
Again we see the distinction between an event occurring and its being a part of history. The resurrection can really have occurred and yet not happen like other events for this scholar. Barth even goes as far as to say that we should not ask whether it is historical or not, for this event is a good example of the nonhistorical and the impossible. Even though it is an actual event, it cannot be proven or demonstrated to have occurred.
In 1924 Barth published his work The Resurrection of the Dead. Herein is contained essentially the same view of the resurrection as was present in his earlier works. This event is again presented as occurring on history’s frontier (or boundary) in such a manner that it can only be understood as God’s revelation and not proven or demonstrated by history.
An additional opinion is further given and clarified in this work. Barth boldly asserts that alternate critical theories concerning the resurrection might even be true, for it makes no real difference if the tomb was closed or open that first resurrection morning. We accept Jesus’ resurrection by faith and not because of any historical evidence. Thus this occurrence cannot be investigated or tested. It cannot be proven to have occurred. Therefore, if there were news reporters present at the tomb of Christ on that first morning, they would not have been able to verify this event.
This last interpretation has been confirmed by American theologian Carl F. H. Henry, who questioned Barth on this very subject when he visited America some years ago. When Henry asked if our news correspondents could have reported the resurrection had they been there to investigate it, Barth responded by saying that it was a private event for the disciples alone. As the meeting broke up, one of the reporters remarked to Henry that the other writers had clearly understood Barth’s answer. They knew that Barth was denying that they could have witnessed or investigated this event.
Thus we perceive the view of the early Barth on the resurrection of Jesus. While this event is surely believed to have occurred, it is not an event of real history that can be investigated and demonstrated like other historical facts. Rather, it is an occurrence of superhistory. Therefore the resurrection also happened in a different kind of history than has other events.
Did Barth’s position change substantially after his new emphasis on the analogy of faith in his work on Anselm? According to Daniel Fuller, he did give more attention to the question of historicity, but he continued to reject the resurrection as an event which can be verified in any way. One does readily notice this change, however, as it appears that more credence is given to the historical character of this occurrence. The objectivity of the resurrection is even stressed more, especially the fact that the disciples actually did see Jesus. But Barth made it plain that he still did not hold that the facts of the historical Jesus should be stressed.
In spite of this new emphasis, however, it is still obvious that Barth relegates the resurrection of Jesus to something other than the history in which other events happen. Sacred events like the resurrection cannot be subjected to an already existing view of history. Rather, God’s revelation through such occurrences demands a particular type of history, a somewhat nonobjective, nondemonstrable variety. For Barth, there is such a definition of history which differs from the modern understanding of this word, and it is in this “metahistory” that Jesus is held to have risen from the dead. This event is judged to be nonhistorical by those who try to force the contemporary meaning of history upon it.
In Barth’s chief work, Church Dogmatics, we can plainly perceive the continuation of this stance. The resurrection is said to have occurred in a peculiar kind of history. As “we pass from the story of the passion to the story of Easter we are led into a historical sphere of a different kind.” This is because the “death of Jesus can certainly be thought of as history in the modern sense, but not the resurrection … the history of the resurrection is not history in this sense.”
Barth does give some vague indication as to the nature of the history in which he believes that the resurrection occurred. He relates several facts which serve in helping one to understand this peculiar mode of ascertaining certain incidents of the past. First, since this event is part of God’s revelation (and thus an act of God), it is different from other occurrences from the very outset. But this is not the only reason we are given as to why the resurrection is perceived to occupy a different kind of history. We are told, second, that this event is perhaps more properly viewed as being a “saga” or a “legend.” As such it is termed “prehistory” because it cannot be understood historically in the modern sense of the word. Here Barth identifies his concept more closely. There are also other differences between this prehistory and the modern concept of history. For instance, third (as we have remarked above), not only can the resurrection not be proven to have occured, but such a proof should not even be attempted. It is thus unlike other events which can be verified by historical research. Fourth, Barth boldly announces that it makes no difference if Jesus’ tomb was open or closed on the first resurrection morning, for faith can follow from it nevertheless. In this way he asserts that the historical character of this event provides no foundation for faith.
Barth’s understanding of the resurrection therefore appears to be quite an elusive concept to grasp. Not only the initial revelatory character of this event but even the event itself is prehistory or metahistory. It cannot be verified like other incidents and is construed in such a way that faith in it can remain even without various elements of the narratives. In spite of these characteristics which tend to point away from the historicity of this event and in spite of the insistence upon a different kind of history, Barth still states that we cannot therefore say that Jesus did not rise, or that he did so only in a spiritual sense. We must understand that this scholar still believed that Jesus rose from the dead in time and space in an objective way. Jesus had a body and he could be seen, heard, and perceived to actually have risen from the dead. While this conception of the resurrection appears quite contradictory, it is another example of Barth’s use of dialectic. He answers both “Yes” and “No” to the question of whether Jesus rose from the dead in actual human history.
We have seen that, whether we speak of the early or of the late Barth, we are dealing with a view of the resurrection that is essentially the same. Although a new stress is placed on the actual occurrence of this event in the later stages of this scholar’s work, the belief that the resurrection is not history in the same sense as other events, and therefore not provable, still persists. It is noteworthy that Kierkegaard also accepted this occurrence as an enigma for history, a paradox that cannot be understood or demonstrated by historical research. It can only be embraced by faith and not by the intellect.
Barth’s view of the resurrection has been discussed in depth, with the emphasis being laid primarily upon his understanding of this event as a type of prehistory which is not the old liberal view of myth, but neither is it one of complete historical objectivity. It has been our endeavor to be fair in this presentation, striving to deal adequately with both sides of this emphasis. It now remains for us to evaluate this approach.
Four major criticisms of Karl Barth’s view of the resurrection will now be offered. The first, and one of the most comprehensive criticisms, involves the belief that the resurrection occupies a sort of parahistory which includes some aspects of objective history, while other facets of history are abandoned. Herein lies a main problem of Barth’s interpretation.
An event must either be some kind of a myth which never literally occurred in actual human history, or it must have occurred in this same history. But Barth asserts that the resurrection is neither myth nor actual history in the modern sense. Rather, this event occurs in some sort of redemptive or religious history. However, history simply knows nothing of such an inbetween ground, whether it is termed prehistory, saga, or legend, or referred to as the boundary or frontier of history. As Wand so perceptively points out,
History is concerned only with such events as happen within the space-time continuum. Events, real or imagined, which occur in an eternal or spiritual sphere are not the proper subject of history. The reason is that history has no tools by which it can deal with such events.
In other words, history can only be concerned with events which occur in space and time in such a way that they can be investigated by the tools of historical research. Since there are no means whereby events which occur in a spiritual in-between sphere can be so investigated, they are not actually within the scope of history. As Wand asserts, religious events which are perceived to have happened only in such an elusive realm cannot be properly regarded as history, whether these were real events or not. Historical facts must therefore be open to verification and research.
Admittedly, the resurrection (if it is found to have occurred) would have a different origin from other events because as such it would enter history as a direct act of God. The fact that Jesus’ resurrection was not produced by any natural means, such as historical causation, should not be belittled. Barth is correct in asserting that it is possible for an event to have its cause in Divine action and still be a part of history. Thus the resurrection would be unique in the sense that this event would have to have originated with God.
But there is an immense difference between saying that this occurrence would be unique because of its being a direct result of God’s revelation and saying that as such it cannot be investigated. This is where Barth’s polemic fails quite noticeably. The point here is that once this occurrence enters the realm of history (even though the actual entering is unique), it must be open to historical investigation. To forego such verification means that it does not become normal history at all. Thus, removing such an event from investigation, as this scholar does, is not valid. One would have to also remove it from the scope of history in order to isolate it from such historical procedures.
Therefore, one cannot assert that certain events actually occurred and then add that we cannot speak historically about them or investigate them. Either the resurrection really happened in verifiable history or it did not happen in normal history at all. But let us not employ fancy theological verbiage to affirm its occurrence in an unverifiable, unobservable, contradictory realm of thought!
Pannenberg agrees in this criticism of Barth’s view. He expressly states:
If we would forgo the concept of a historical event here, then it is no longer possible at all to affirm that the resurrection of Jesus or that the appearances of the resurrected Jesus really happened at a definite time in our world. There is no justification for affirming Jesus’ resurrection as an event that really happened, if it is not to be affirmed as a historical event as such. Whether or not a particular event happened two thousand years ago is not made certain by faith but only by historical research, to the extent that certainty can be attained at all about questions of this kind.… The only method of achieving at least approximate certainty with regard to the events of a past time is historical research.
As pointed out here, it is impossible for a theologian like Barth to say that an event occurred but not in the same objective history as other events occur. As Pannenberg adeptly points out, it is incorrect to claim to be speaking of Jesus’ resurrection as a historical event if, as such, it can only be known by faith and not by historical research. If one asserts that something is not even able to be investigated, neither can one say that the event still happened at a certain time in this world. We thus see that it is impossible for Barth to affirm that the resurrection really occurred while still having the understanding that this occurrence is not in objective, verifiable history. Such an event is not really history because no such concept of history exists. Therefore it is also impossible merely to claim that this event still happened just like other incidents in the past.
As a historian, Montgomery also objects to Barth’s use of prehistory. The following illustration is introduced to demonstrate the folly of such a concept:
I wonder what you would say—what Barth would say—if I claimed that in my backyard there is a large green elephant eating a raspberry ice cream cone, but that there is no way by empirical investigation to determine that he is there. Nonetheless, I maintain, as a matter of fact, that it is there in every objective and factual sense. Now I have a feeling that you would either regard this as a claim that the elephant is there and is subject to empirical investigation, or contend that it isn’t there by the very fact that there is no way of determining the fact. I wonder if this doesn’t point up the problem. To claim objectivity, but to remove any possibility of determining it, is by definition to destroy objectivity.
Montgomery’s criticism is well justified. A historical event must either be open to investigation or not claim to be history at all for the very reason that it cannot be investigated. We destroy the concept of historical objectivity when we endeavor to rule that this objectivity itself cannot be tested. Any claim to a historical “middle ground” of prehistory removed from such processes of verification is about as accurate and acceptable as the claim concerning the existence of the green elephant. Montgomery thus agrees with others that the idea of parahistory is foreign both to history itself and even to the Biblical records.
Other theologians have also noted Barth’s tendency to rely on the concept of prehistory and the subsequent weaknesses in his approach to the resurrection which have resulted. They realize both that historians recognize no such realm of history and that the very assertion that such a realm exists with both historical and nonhistorical characteristics is itself contradictory.
The second major criticism of Barth is quite similar to one of the main objections to Kierkegaard and will therefore not be labored overly much here. Even though Barth claims that the resurrection literally occurred, we have seen how he denies any possibility of verifying this event. In fact, such a procedure should not even be attempted. Thus, in spite of his emphatic assertions that the resurrection occurred, his view also falls prey to the criticism that there is no way for one to ascertain if the Christian faith is valid or not. We have already seen that faith cannot stand alone and be its own criteria and proof for belief. These subjective, personal qualities provide no reason why someone else should believe this particular system or accept Christianity over alternative views. Faith simply is not a panacea for all theological problems because there is no reason to accept this faith if there are no grounds upon which its claims may be based. In spite of Barth’s defense of faith as the only way (as opposed to any historical research or other rational approach), it still remains that this faith cannot verify itself or demonstrate its own validity. This can only mean that one cannot know if the grounds for belief are solid or not. There is no logical reason to accept such a faith.
In other words, to say that Jesus really rose from the dead but that this event can only be accepted by faith (without verification) is to leave one’s entire faith open to question. Barth is of course not interested in verifying the grounds for Christianity. But without such objective criteria one can never know if one’s faith is completely in vain or not.
Montgomery also realized the strength of such a criticism. Appropriating a fact by faith cannot make this belief factual. Simply by starting with faith we are not assured of arriving at a truthful, viable solution because the admonition to “have faith” cannot guarantee that one’s beliefs are any more correct. Therefore, if faith does not have its starting point in objective, verifiable events, there is no way that one may ascertain if Christianity is the preferable faith-system in which to place one’s trust.
Therefore we perceive that which was stated earlier. Faith cannot create truth, no matter how intense it might be in the individual. Thus, faith cannot make itself valid by its intensity or by the fervency with which it is exercised. Because of this, it is important for the individual to know if his faith is valid, and objective criteria are best suited for this purpose.
The last two criticisms of Barth are internal critiques. The third major criticism concerns Barth’s understanding of God’s revelation in human events. It has been shown how this scholar contends that God reveals Himself in certain revelatory acts which occur in man’s prehistory and not as an actual part of verifiable history. But if revelation is not given objectively in historical facts which are open to historical research, then Jesus’ death cannot be revelatory because even Barth believes that the crucifixion is history in the modern sense of the word. But Barth also holds that the crucifixion is part of God’s revelation, since Jesus died a substitutionary death to pay for the sins of those who surrender their life to God in faith. Here we find an internal inconsistency. If one holds that the death of Jesus is part of God’s revelation to man (as Barth is correct in doing), then one must abandon the previously held idea that God never acts meaningfully in this kind of history. And if we reject this, it also means that the resurrection could likewise be objective, verifiable history and still be a revelatory event as well.
The fourth major criticism of Barth’s treatment of the resurrection is that this theologian holds that the New Testament itself does not make any attempt to demonstrate or prove that the resurrection did occur. He holds, rather, that the earliest Christians were only interested in accepting this event by faith. Thus Paul, for example, was not trying to present a proof of this occurrence by citing the witnesses in 1 Corinthians 15.
It has already been noted above that this portion makes it quite plain that although Paul is speaking of the faith of the first-century Christians, he is also explaining how this faith has its basis in objective, historical fact. The text clearly shows that Paul does intend to cite proof here, especially in verse six, where we are informed that most of the witnesses were still alive and could thus provide testimony concerning these events. This testimony would, in turn, provide historical eyewitness corroboration for Paul’s claims.
Even Bultmann disagrees with Barth here, also noting that Paul does mean to use the list of the appearances of Jesus as proof for the resurrection. Bultmann notes that there were two current proofs for this event, both of which are found in 1 Corinthians 15. There was the appeal to eyewitness testimony, as we have perceived here (especially 15:5–8) and the appeal to the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy (15:3–4). Bultmann’s testimony is valuable at this point mainly because it is apparent that Barth is desiring to use the Scripture to reinforce his polemic, whereas Bultmann actually objects to Paul’s using such a proof in spite of believing that he does just this. This desire of course does not in itself mean that Barth is necessarily wrong. But it does appear that Bultmann is more accurate in ascertaining Paul’s obvious motives here.
Reginald Fuller is somewhat close to Barth in his view on this question. He holds that Paul’s primary intention was to identify his preaching of the resurrection with that of the earliest eyewitnesses. But he also believes that Paul intended to relate the eyewitness accounts in order to prove that Jesus actually appeared to his followers. He likewise agrees that 1 Corinthians 15:6 is the main pointer to the fact that Paul is establishing evidence to be used as proof for these appearances.
But there are other portions of the New Testament which also establish the fact that other authors besides Paul endeavored both to prove the resurrection and to use this event as the basis for the establishing of other beliefs, contrary to Barth’s view. It has been shown above how the gospels in particular sought to demonstrate the reality of Jesus’ resurrection by stressing that he appeared to his disciples in bodily form. Although the new body had undergone some changes, it is reported that Jesus allowed his followers to examine and investigate this new body. We are even told that Jesus was touched and “held,” thus demonstrating that he was alive. This emphasis is especially evident in passages like Luke 24:36–43, where ample evidence of this attempt to prove that Jesus had risen is readily available. We are even told in Acts 1:3 that Jesus “presented himself alive after his passion by many proofs” (RSV). In fact, the Greek word used here for “proof” (tekmeriois) literally means a positive or certain proof. Thus we see that it was the intention of several New Testament authors to prove that Jesus had risen.
In addition, it should be mentioned that the resurrection is also used in the New Testament as a proof for other Christian doctrines. For instance, Acts 17:30–31 shows that the earliest church believed that God verified Jesus’ earthly teachings by raising him from the dead. Acts 2:36 and Romans 1:4 are other examples which point to Jesus’ being accepted as the Lord, Messiah, and the Son of God, based upon the resurrection.
Thus we see that Barth also cannot rely on Scripture for support of his thesis. The claim that the New Testament does not seek to prove or demonstrate that the resurrection actually occurred is simply not supported by the facts.
For the reasons we have given above, it becomes evident that Barth’s thesis fails. These four criticisms of his view on the resurrection point out the key weaknesses to which this view is most vulnerable. They also reveal the inadequacies of this approach.