Gordon J. Wenham
Gordon J. Wenham
It is an odd experience to have to critique colleagues’ works in public! I am, of course, accustomed to commenting on students’ papers in private. What makes this occasion even more unnerving is that over a number of years Bill Heth and I have corresponded, and eventually we wrote Jesus and Divorce together (or to be candid, he did most of the writing and I helped, mostly by offering comments on his text). But now I fi nd myself opposing him. I am sorry to be in this situation, but I appreciate that the atmosphere in America on this issue is somewhat different from the atmosphere in the United Kingdom, where many in the mainline churches have resisted the idea that the New Testament permits remarriage after divorce. Thus, it is easier for me in the UK to stick my neck out on this matter than it is for an American. Furthermore, anyone who honestly investigates a complicated issue like this may well conclude that we dare not be too dogmatic. And then, last but not least, all of us in Western society have friends or relatives who have become divorced and have remarried. We know how they suffered in their first marriage, and now they have married again and have found a happiness they did not know in their first marriage; who are we to say that they are wrong and that God disapproves of their present arrangement?
All of us need to tread very tactfully in this area. So I sincerely hope that where I take issue with Bill and those who sympathize with him, they will not take it personally. Clarity demands simplicity; but simple, clear statements may seem harsh in print, whereas the right tone of voice would have conveyed a gentler message. I do, therefore, hope that readers, including Bill, will understand that I am trying to speak the truth in love, however far I fall short of that ideal.
MINOR POINTS WHERE I SEE THINGS DIFFERENTLY
Bill begins by describing Old Testament views of marriage. Here he is greatly indebted to the work of Gordon Hugenberger and Raymond Westbrook, two excellent scholars. In this area I basically agree with what he says. There are just a few minor points where I would take a different approach.
Bill appeals to Jeremiah 31 to argue that, under the new covenant, God would never break his covenant with his people. This is not what the text says is new about the new covenant; its novelty is that Israel will not break the covenant (31:32). Jeremiah is adamant that God has not broken his covenant with Israel and never will (31:35). Applying this to marriage, I ask: If the people of the new covenant are not going to break their covenant with God, and God for his part is not going to break it, is it not fitting that human marriage, which is supposed to mirror God’s love for his people and vice versa, also should not be broken?
My next quibble with Bill is over his use of the ESV translation of Malachi 2:16: “For the man who hates and divorces . . . covers his garment with violence” instead of the traditional “For I hate divorce, . . . and I hate a man’s covering himself with violence.” As one of the ESV translators, I can assure readers that there was no idea in the translators’ minds that this meant Malachi approved of some divorces. This is one of the most diffi cult passages in the whole Bible to translate, so no one can be sure about what the text means precisely. However, along with Bill and Gordon Hugenberger, I do think the new translation is more probable than the earlier English translations. But it is unwise to build a case on this problematic text. From the narratives and laws of the Old Testament, I think it is plain that God tolerates some divorces but never approves of them. How could he, when one considers the disloyalty, vow breaking, and bitterness divorce often involves? But, as Jesus put it, “Moses permitted you to divorce your wives because your hearts were hard” (Matt. 19:8). This is not justifying or approving divorce, but tolerating it.
BILL’S TREATMENT OF THE NEW TESTAMENT
In his treatment of the New Testament texts, Bill reiterates several times the fundamental fallacy in the permissive position, namely, that first-century people all held that divorce entailed the right to remarry. Therefore, he argues that this is what Jesus and the New Testament writers assume as well. In my chapter I have tried to show why this is wrong. However, Bill does admit that in certain cases the ancient world did forbid remarriage after divorce (see n. 20, p. 98). An adulterous spouse, after being divorced, could not marry the third party with whom he or she had had an affair. This rule, if applied today, would rule out a very high proportion of second marriages, from the British heir to the throne on down. But neither Romans nor first-century Jews tolerated such unions.
Permissive interpreters are also forced to admit that Jesus did use the word apolyein (“divorce”) in a sense different from usual first-century usage, where the separation is not justified. They understand Matthew 19:9 to say, “In the case of sexual immorality, whoever divorces his wife and marries another does not commit adultery; in other cases, whoever divorces his wife and marries another does commit adultery.” In the second case, the man concerned has given his wife the divorce certificate, telling her that she is free to marry, but according to Jesus, though the law allows both parties to marry, to do so is to commit adultery. In other words, the divorce proceedings are ineffective: the divorced couple are still husband and wife in the eyes of God. John Murray (who, like Bill, allows divorce and remarriage for adultery or desertion), puts it clearly: “If the woman commits adultery by remarriage, this is so because she is still in reality the wife of the divorcing husband. And if so, the divorcing husband is still in reality the husband of the divorced woman and consequently may not marry another.”1
Bill is aware of this chink in his armor as he discusses the passages in Mark 10 and Luke 16, but he does not make much of it. It is clear, though, on the permissive interpretation, that Jesus uses apolyein in two different senses. When it is used without the exception clause, it means “separate” (without the right to remarry). When it is used with the exception clause, apolyein means “divorce” (with the right to remarry). On the no-remarriage view, Jesus always means “separate” when he uses apolyein.
Some other points: Bill does not show why, on his reading Some other points: Bill does not show why, on his reading of Matthew 19:10 – 12, Jesus goes on to speak about “eunuchs,” people who do not marry, whereas on a no-remarriage view, Jesus’ further comments arise naturally. Neither am I persuaded that Hillelite divorce “for any cause” was a first-century novelty. I think such divorce was allowed in Old Testament times and in earlier Near Eastern cultures. Repayment of the dowry was the means of discouraging “any cause” divorce from prebiblical to modern times in the Middle East. Bill’s possible readings of 1 Corinthians 7, which he describes as “most natural” or “compelling,” also fail to persuade me. I would allow that the texts he quotes might mean what he says they mean, but the evidence for taking them this way is far from compelling. I much prefer the interpretations we espoused in Jesus and Divorce.
DOES THE PERSON WITH THE MOST POINTS WIN?
This brings me to one final consideration. Anyone who reads books and articles about the Bible soon becomes aware that it is very difficult to know which arguments are right. Some years ago, two eminent New Testament scholars, E. P. Sanders and J. M. G. Barclay, argued that it was no good just counting arguments for and against a particular view but that all arguments should be weighed. If scholar A puts forward ten arguments in favor of a point of view and scholar B puts forward seven arguments against that view, it does not follow that A is right and B is wrong. B’s arguments may be strong ones, while A’s arguments may be weak. I think we need to discriminate between weak and strong arguments when it comes to the issue of remarriage after divorce.
Different people will evaluate the arguments differently, and where this occurs, we may well want to regard some arguments as weak, as merely possible rather than as probable or compelling. Into this iffy category, I put most of the interpretations offered by Bill (and Craig) with regard to the texts in Matthew and Paul. Their interpretations could be right, but the no-remarriage view also makes sense and therefore it could be right. It is hard to know.
I think the no-remarriage view has three arguments that are stronger than any the permissives can offer. First, outside of Matthew’s gospel, there are no texts that hint at remarriage after divorce as being a possibility. Second, in Matthew 19:3 – 12, only a no-remarriage view makes sense of the sequence of thought; it fi ts with the pattern of debate between Jesus and his opponents, and it explains why Jesus moves from speaking about divorce to “eunuchs,” people who do not marry. Third, a no-remarriage view explains why the early church refused to sanction remarriage and often excommunicated those who did marry after divorce. A permissive interpretation of the New Testament texts has the impossible task of explaining how the early church came to adopt this stance when the surrounding cultures were permissive in this regard. Only someone with the authority of Jesus or Paul could have persuaded the early church to take such a counterculturalstance. Some evangelicals may be reluctant to give so much weight to early church tradition, but our founding fathers, the great reformers, often appealed to the early church in support of their views. And in recent times we have done the same with regard to abortion. There are no New Testament texts that unequivocally ban abortion, though there are various ethical and theological texts that suggest that the New Testament writers would not have approved it. But early church writers are forthright on this subject, and we quote them freely in their condemnation of abortion. Is it not sensible to look at what the early church taught about divorce and remarriage too?