William A. Heth
William A. Heth
As one might suspect, since I occupy the middle position in this book, I am drawn to each of the other two views to varying degrees. I found a kindred spirit when I first came across Gordon Wenham’s writings on divorce and remarriage back in the early 1980s, and I credit Craig Keener’s 1991 book with planting the seeds that have led me to where I am today. On the one hand, I fear that some remarriages after divorce may be prohibited where Jesus and Paul might have permitted them; on the other hand, I fear that an increase in divorces and remarriages may occur for inadequate or insignificant reasons. However, since I believe that Craig takes the tragedy of broken marriages as seriously as anyone — probably even more seriously — I know that nothing he writes would ever intentionally open up the door to more divorces and remarriages.
MY FORMER VIEW
Craig’s work, in fact, alerted me to a major problem with my former view. Where there is a truly innocent offended party in divorce (I know this is difficult to determine in many cases), do Jesus’ divorce sayings expressly require permanent singleness for divorced persons? Craig made it clear that he felt this was both unjust and unmerciful. I had to agree that Jesus’ heart would go out to those who have suffered divorce. I could see that Craig was not just making human happiness via remarriage the determinative criterion of what God would sanction. It seems that only if marriage is indissoluble this side of a spouse’s death, and any remarriage an offense against the Creator God, would Jesus deliberately seek to prohibit innocent victims of divorce from ever marrying again.
Craig begins by pressing the question, what is the outcome if we take Jesus’ sayings about divorce and remarriage in their most literal sense? Simply put, Jesus would be saying that everyone who remarries after any divorce commits adultery (Mark 10:11 – 12; Luke 16:18). If this is the case, then marriage must be indissoluble. If marriages are indissoluble, then remarried couples are living in adultery; i.e., every time they have marital relations, they are committing adultery. Since no one who habitually sins makes it into heaven (1 Cor. 6:9 – 10; my addition to Craig’s points), either remarried couples must refrain from marital relations (separation from bed and board), as the church father Jerome required, or pastors should seek to break up second marriages.
Craig sends a wake-up call to Christians who claim to read and apply the Bible at face value. Not only does common sense tell us that something is wrong with this picture, but Craig notes that we should have expected writers like Paul to address such concerns, but he does not. Further, Craig notes that there is ample evidence that Jesus commonly used hyperbole or rhetorical overstatement. Thus, we are in agreement on the point that Jesus’ divorce sayings may well employ preacher’s rhetoric to condemn strongly the abuses he saw around him.
AGREEMENT AND DISAGREEMENT
There is really very little with which I disagree in Craig’s chapter. We both make the point that Jesus’ statement, “What God has joined together, let no one separate” (Mark 10:9 TNIV), does not mean that the marriage covenant cannot be broken but that it should not be. We both agree that Scripture recognizes subsequent remarriages as valid marriages. Craig underlines Jesus’ testimony to this based on what Jesus says to the woman at the well (John 4:18). I have made this point over the years in correspondence based on Paul’s teaching in 1 Corinthians 6:9 – 11. “Adulterers” are included in the list of sins about which Paul says, “And that is what some of you were. But you were washed, you were sanctified, you were justified in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and by the Spirit of our God.” It seems likely that one or more of the new Corinthian believers had been adulterers before they were converted. It is also likely that some were already divorced and remarried when they became believers. Nevertheless, Paul can say, “and that is what some of you were.” The apostle did not think of remarried believers as adulterers or those living in a continual state of adultery. His remarks also implicitly connect a believer’s standing in God’s sight with his or her repentance (cf. 1 Cor. 1:2; 2 Cor. 7:9, 10; 12:21; 1 Thess. 1:9). Craig and I both agree that 1 Corinthians 7:15 is further evidence that Paul did not understand Jesus’ divorce sayings as exceptionless absolutes.
However, I still cannot find permission for divorced persons to remarry in Paul’s counsel in 1 Corinthians 7:27 – 28. The ESV now helps clarify Paul’s intent: “Are you bound to a wife? Do not seek to be free. Are you free from a wife? Do not seek a wife. But if you do marry, you have not sinned, and if a betrothed woman marries, she has not sinned” (emphasis added). There is a growing consensus, though it’s a view not without its problems, that Paul is speaking to the concerns of some engaged couples in verses 25 – 38 (cf. NIV, NRSV, RSV on vv. 36 – 38). The men were asking Paul whether or not to follow through with their promise to marry in view of the ascetic teaching they had come under in Corinth (7:1b). Paul’s initial (vv. 25 – 28) and final (vv. 36 – 38) remarks in this section are directed specifically to these couples. Though Paul personally prefers the single state, he wants them to know — contrary to what the ascetics probably taught — that it is not sinful to go through with their plans to marry (vv. 28, 36). Thus, I doubt that 1 Corinthians 7:27 – 28 contributes much to discussions of NT teachings on the ethics of remarriage after divorce.
What about additional exceptions beyond the two based on Matthew 19:9 and 1 Corinthi ans 7:15? Craig says, “If Paul had to reapply Jesus’ teaching in a new way for a situation Jesus did not directly address, we may be called on to do the same” (p. 111). The guiding premise for deciding which other exceptions qualify is consistency with the other two exceptions: “the believer is not free to break up the marriage but only to accept that the unrepentant partner has irreparably broken it” (p. 112). Within this framework, Craig argues that a pattern of physical abuse would qualify as an additional exception and considers other potentially analogous situations.
Given that I also believe Paul made an exception for a new situation not directly addressed by Jesus, and that “staying married” means fulfilling the covenant obligations expressed in one’s marriage vows, I cannot deny that a repeated pattern of physical abuse would be a violation of the marriage covenant. This is the antithesis of caring for and cherishing one’s wife (Eph. 5:29). David Instone-Brewer’s work may point a way to ground this scripturally. He identifies two additional biblical grounds for divorce based on Exodus 21:10 – 11, a text stating that a husband must give a wife food, clothing, and marital love/duty. Rabbinic sources classified these under two headings: material neglect (cf. 1 Cor. 7:32 – 35) and emotional neglect (cf. 1 Cor. 7:1 – 9). Instone-Brewer argues that both the rabbis and Paul applied these obligations equally to the wife and the husband. Not only that, but he shows how the three provisions of Exodus 21:10 – 11 became the basis for vows in Jewish marriage contracts and can also be found in the Christian marriage ceremony based on references to them in Ephesians 5:28 – 29. Since in Matthew 19 and Mark 10, Jesus was asked only about where he stood on the Deuteronomy 24:1 debated ground, he did not necessarily exclude the other recognized grounds. Thus, Instone-Brewer defends four grounds for permitting divorce and remarriage after marriage vows have been violated, extensive forgiveness has been extended in the hope that genuine repentance will follow (Luke 17:3 – 4), and yet the vow-breaker stubbornly refuses to repent of his or her actions. He believes that Hosea’s example shows that God finally ended the relationship only when it was totally destroyed. All of this is plausible but for me is not yet a conviction.
WHERE TO DRAW THE LINE
I admire Craig’s willingness to tackle the tough questions and the way he forthrightly challenges his readers with the very real dilemmas spouses face in tragic marriage situations. Craig admits that knowing “where to draw the line” is a problem for his position (p. 115). I can see that it is beginning to be a problem for mine as well; indeed, it will be for all who do not believe that marriage is inherently indissoluble; who hold that Paul, led by the Spirit, applied Jesus’ divorce sayings to a new situation; and who believe there are comparable breaches of the marriage covenant today that need to be pastorally addressed — situations where, for all practical purposes, the restoration of the marriage is impossible. On the one hand, I have suggested that the offended, repeatedly sinned-against spouse is the one who should be the one to say when “enough is enough,” and he or she might decide this too soon; on the other hand, I see the need for prayerful church leaders to come alongside, to guide, and to help financially support truly victimized spouses reticent to remove themselves from tragic situations because they know that God hates divorce.
Chapter 3: Remarriage for Circumstance beyond Adultery or Desertion
1. Craig S. Keener, . . . And Marries Another: Divorce and Remarriage in the Teaching of the New Testament (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1991).
2. Craig S. Keener, A Commentary on the Gospel of Matthew (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1999), 189 – 92, 462 – 72.
3. Craig S. Keener, 1 – 2 Corin thi ans (NCBC; Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), 64 – 67, 70.
4. In an earlier book, Bill and Gordon characterized the view that allows remarriage after adultery as “the evangelical consensus”; it was the dominant view of the Reformers. Although Roman Catholic tradition historically has opposed remarriage (despite the disagreement of some Catholic biblical scholars), the Eastern tradition allows remarriage for some divorced persons (cf. Anthony C. Thiselton, The First Epistle to the Corinthians [NIGTC; Grand Rap-ids: Eerdmans, 2000], 542).
5. When I refer to “innocent” in this essay, I mean those who did not break their marriage covenant, not, as the position has been caricatured, perfect spouses (a title that applies to God and Christ alone).
6. See Keener, . . . And Marries Another, 50 – 52.
7. Other Jewish teachers also recognized that by making divorce more difficult, they would protect the woman (e.g., t. Ketub. 12:1).
8. See documentation for its dangers in David P. Gushee, Getting Marriage Right (Grand Rapids: Baker, 2004), 21 – 83.
9. See Myrna and Robert Kysar, The Asundered: Biblical Teachings on Divorce and Remarriage (Atlanta: John Knox, 1978), 43; R. T. France, Matthew (TNTC; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1985), 280; Margaret Davies, Matthew (Readings; Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 54; if one pressed the saying literally rather than as hyperbole, however, it would have the opposite effect (cf. Rudolf Schnack-enburg, “Matthew’s Gospel as a Test Case for Hermeneutical Reflection,” in Treasures New and Old: Recent Contributions to Matthean Studies, ed. D. R. Bauer and M. A. Powell [Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1996], 253). Klyne R. Snod-grass (“Matthew and the Law,” in Treasures New and Old, 118) argues that Jesus agrees with the purpose of OT laws, some of which forbade (Deut. 22:19, 29) and others of which required (Exod. 21:11; Deut. 21:14) divorce, both to protect the wife.
10. See, e.g., W. D. Davies and Dale Allison, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Gospel According to Saint Matthew (ICC; Edinburgh: T&T Clark 1988), 1:532; France, Matthew, 106; cf. M. J. Down, “The Sayings of Jesus about Marriage and Divorce,” ExpTim 95 (1984): 332 – 34; Mark J. Molldrem, “A Hermeneutic of Pastoral Care and the Law/Gospel Paradigm Applied to the Divorce Texts of Scripture,” Int 45 (1991): 43 – 54; David Parker, “The Early Traditions of Jesus’ Sayings on Divorce,” Theology 96 (1993): 372 – 83.
11. By applying the requirement to both genders, Jesus implicitly prohibits polygamy as well — but this was rare in Jewish Palestine and illegal in the Greek and Roman world.
12. For this view, see, e.g., Robert H. Stein, The Method and Message of Jesus’ Teachings (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1978), 8 – 12; Stein, “Is It Lawful for a Man to Divorce His Wife?” JETS 22 (1979): 119; Stein, “Divorce,” 192 – 99, in Dictionary of Jesus and the Gospels, ed. J. B. Green and S. McKnight (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1992), 198; James M. Efird, Marriage and Divorce: What the Bible Says (Nashville: Abingdon, 1985), 57 – 59; Keener, . . . And Marries Another, 12 – 25.
13. See, e.g., m. ,Abot 2:8; ,Abot R. Nat. 36A; Aristotle, Rhet. 3.11.15, 1413a; Rhet. Her. 4.33.44; Quintilian, Inst. 8.6.73 – 76.
14. See discussion in Keener, Matthew, 182 – 89; and in . . . And Marries Another, 12 – 20.
15. One alleged exception, Origen, who is said to have castrated himself, incurred the church’s censure.
16. The point of calling a saying “hyperbole” is not so we can dismiss it by claiming, “That is ‘just’ hyperbole.” The point of hyperbole is to grip our attention.
17. For discussion, see Craig S. Keener, The Gospel of John: A Commentary (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 2003), 1:606 – 8.
18. Cf. esp. David R. Catchpole, The Quest for Q (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1993), 238.
19. See fuller discussion in Keener, Matthew, 189 – 92, 462 – 72; and in . . . And Marries Another, 21 – 49.
20. See documentation in Keener, Matthew, 466 – 69; . . . And Marries Another, 28 – 37. If any narrowing is possibly suggested in the context, it is adultery (because the original couple is married).
21. See, e.g., S. Safrai, “Home and Family,” in The Jewish People in the First Century, ed. S. Safrai and M. Stern (Philadelphia: Fortress: 1974 – 76), 2:790; John J. O’Rourke, “Roman Law and the Early Church,” in The Catacombs and the Colosseum, ed. S. Benko and J. J. O’Rourke (Valley Forge, Pa.: Judson, 1971), 182; Keener, Matthew, 91.
22. Especially m. Git.. 9:10; Sifre Deut. 269.1.1; cf. also m. Ketub. 7:6. On this issue (unlike some others), the more liberal Hillelite view was dominant (Sir. 25:26; Philo,Spec. Laws 3.30; Josephus, Ant. 4.253; Life 415, 426). The Sham-maite position is a little broader than “adultery,” apparently including obvious immodesty (viewed as attempted seduction). This might be one reason Jesus uses porneia rather than moicheia here (though porneia sometimes represents marital infidelity in the LXX, e.g., Jer. 2:20; 3:2, 9; Ezek. 16:15; Hos. 2:2, 4, 6; Amos 7:17; Sir. 23:23).
23. Qumran texts (CD 4.20 – 5:2; 11QT 56.18 – 19) use the same text to prohibit royal polygamy, not (against some interpreters who read Jesus’ teaching into Qumran) divorce (see Keener, . . . And Marries Another, 40 – 41). “Concession” was an established legal category in Jewish law (see David Daube, “Concessions to Sinfulness in Jewish Law,” JJS 10 [1959]: 1 – 13).
24. In addition to the term’s lexical meaning, note ancient usage, e.g., in m. Git.. 2:1; 9:3; CPJ 2:10 – 12, §144. If “except for infidelity” modifies Jesus’ statement about divorce rather than remarriage, as some (esp. Gordon Wenham and William Heth) have argued, it does so precisely because, in Jesus’ graphic statement, it is the validity of the divorce that is in question.
25. Indeed, if remarriage is “adulterous,” then an abandoning spouse’s remarriage would de facto constitute a qualifying case of porneia (cf. 1 Cor. 7:15)! Matt. 5:32 specifies only the divorced wife and whoever marries her as involved in adultery; this, however, fits the hyperbolic image in a PalestinianJewish setting where only the husband had a normal right to divorce (cf. Keener, . . . And Marries Another, 35, 47 – 48, 51; Burton Scott Easton, “Divorce in the New Testament,” AThR 22 [1940]: 78 – 87, esp. 82; Robert A. Guelich, The Sermon on the Mount: A Foundation for Understanding [Waco, Tex.: Word, 1982], 200 – 201).
26. See fuller discussion in Keener, . . . And Marries Another, 50 – 66, esp. 53 – 56.
27. Also recognized by others, e.g., Craig L. Blomberg, Matthew (NAC 22; Nashville: Broadman, 1992), 111 – 12; Geza Vermes, The Religion of Jesus the Jew (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1993), 34 n. 34.
28. Other principles in Jesus’ teaching, such as not condemning the innocent (Matt. 12:7) or the principle of mercy (Matt. 23:23), may have invited qualifying the saying as well.
29. See Keener, . . . And Marries Another, 22 – 25; cf. Robert C. Tannehill, The Sword of His Mouth (SBL Semeia Supplements 1; Missoula, Mont.: Scholars Press, 1975), 95 – 98; Stein, Method and Message, 11. Maxims and proverbs, general statements of principle requiring qualification (cf., e.g., Prov. 18:22 with 11:22; 12:4; 21:9; see other examples below), also appear in Greek and Roman sources (e.g., Isocrates, Demon. 12, Or. 1; Aristotle, Rhet. 2.21.1 – 2, 12 – 15, 1394a – 95b; Rhet. Her. 4.17.24 – 25; Petronius, Sat. 4; Plutarch, Poetry 14; Mor. 35EF).
30. E.g., Quintilian, Inst. 7.6.1, 5; frequently in rabbinic texts.
31. Cf., e.g., Plutarch, Ages. 21.4 – 5; Statecraft 7; Mor. 803CD; Sayings of Spartan Women, passim; Diogenes Laertius 1.35; 2.72; 6.2.51.
32. E.g., Prov. 26:4 – 5; Publilius Syrus 162 – 63 with 178; 211 with 212.
33. See, e.g., m. Git.. 9:3; CPJ 2:10 – 12, §144; P. Grenf. 2.76.10 – 11; for rabbinic sources, see esp. the excellent work by David Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible: The Social and Literary Context (Grand Rapids: Eerd-mans, 2002).
34. See fuller discussion in Keener, . . . And Marries Another, 63 – 64.
35. Some interpret “wife” (v. 27) in view of the later discussion of (probably) betrothals (vv. 36 – 38); but (1) that is an issue Paul explicitly raises only after this context; (2) Paul uses “wife” in the preceding context only for marriage; and (3) morally speaking, Paul would not assume that a betrothed Christian must be readily distinguishable from a “virgin” in verse 28 (cf. also v. 36, where the betrothed is the latter).
36. As noted, the term Paul uses for “wife” in v. 27 is also his usual one, not to be confused with his different term for a betrothed virgin afterward.
37. See other examples in Craig Keener, The IVP Bible Background Commentary: New Testament (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1993), 235.
38. Blomberg ( Matthew, 293) rightly points out that exceptions beyond those stated in Scripture must be governed by the principle that unites the two biblical exceptions: (1) both infidelity and abandonment destroy central components of marriage; (2) both leave an innocent party unable to save the marriage; (3) both use divorce only “as a last resort.” He is aware that some will abuse this freedom, but we cannot for that reason punish the innocent party who genuinely needs it.
39. For example, when Paul instructs slaves to submit to slaveholders (Eph. 6:5 – 8), we understand that, while the principle of submission is universal, Paul is not sanctioning the institution of slavery itself. See, e.g., discussion in Craig S. Keener and Glenn Usry, Defending Black Faith: Answers to Tough Questions About African-American Christianity (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1997), 36 – 41.
40. Cf. my comments in Matthew, 180 – 82.
41. See Keener, . . . And Marries Another, 67 – 82. Some apply Matt. 19:10 – 12 only to divorced persons, but in view of the immediate fl ow of context, it addresses the disciples’ concern about initial marriage if it cannot be escaped (see fuller discussion in my Matthew, 470 – 72).
42. Gushee, Getting Marriage Right, 81.
43. Chrysostom (Hom. 1 Cor. 19.4) applied 1 Cor. 7:15 to abuse as well as to abandonment. Although Christians must face suffering, God does not require us to remain in it unnecessarily (cf. Matt. 10:23; Mark 13:14; Acts 14:6).
44. Certainly intercourse is critical to the marriage covenant as at least its initial consummation; see Gordon P. Hugenberger, Marriage as a Covenant: Biblical Law and Ethics as Developed from Malachi (Biblical Studies Library; Grand Rapids: Baker, 1998), 216 – 79; cf. 1 Cor. 6:16. Cf. further discussion of exceptions in David Instone-Brewer, Divorce and Remarriage in the Church: Biblical Solutions for Pastoral Realities (London: Paternoster, 2003), 82 – 93.
45. The sometimes-cited case of Michal was technically different, since (apart from political considerations) David had never legally divorced her (2 Sam. 3:14 – 16; cf. Deut 24:4; 1 Sam. 25:44).
46. Discipline is appropriate if we can be certain that the abandonment was unjustifi able — though it is better to err on the side of mercy if we cannot be certain. Certainly all literal adultery, including all divorcing for the purpose of marrying another, is properly subject to church discipline until repentance is forthcoming.
47. For the full argument, see my . . . And Marries Another, 83 – 103. Immorality was also a problem in Crete (Titus 1:6; see Bruce W. Winter, Roman Wives, Roman Widows: The Appearance of New Women and the Pauline Communities [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2003], 163).
48. See my “The Almost-Unpardonable Sin: Is Divorce Treated as a Justice Issue in Your Ministry?” in Building Unity in the Church of the New Millennium, ed. Dwight Perry (Chicago: Moody Press, 2002), 329 – 33; . . . And Marries Another, 6 – 10; esp. “Blaming the Victim?” Moody Monthly (November 2002): 40, 42; “Divorce as a Justice Issue,” Prism 5 (1998): 6 – 8, 20.
Chapter 3: A Response to Craig S. Keener (Gordon J. Wenham)
1. Andrew Cornes, Divorce and Remarriage: Biblical Principle and Pastoral Practice (paperback; Inverness: Christian Focus, 2002); Johann Christoph Arnold, Sex, God and Marriage (Farmington, Pa.: Plough, 1996).