Craig S. Keener
A RESPONSE TO GORDON J. WENHAM
Craig S. Keener
I appreciate the points of agreement that Gordon rightly articulates in his opening section. Certainly, exceptions must remain exceptional and not the focus, or some will exploit as loopholes for sin our arguments originally meant to defend the innocent or to extend mercy.
Yet, on the practical, pastoral level, Gordon’s universal prohibition of remarriage has implications more serious than he himself would probably acknowledge. We must reckon with the demands of what his own argument should, if followed consistently, imply. If remarriage is always and literally adulterous, it is so because it is a new union while the former union remains in effect in God’s sight. Although Gordon may not wish to draw this conclusion in practice, this view logically entails that the marriage, not the wedding, must be adulterous. If this were the case, it would hardly be sufficient to merely offer forgiveness to those who are sorry, as Gordon seems ready to do. If remarriages are adulterous, we should break up the adulterous unions; to do less is to tolerate the intolerable, namely, continuing adultery. While such a solution may appear tenable in the case of, say, a recent marriage that culminates an affair, its pastoral implications are daunting for those remarried years earlier and now raising children.
EVALUATING GORDON’S ARGUMENTS
The truth of a view cannot be determined simply by how painful its demands are, however, so I now address Gordon’s supporting arguments. His strongest argument is actually not biblical (see the discussion below) but is his argument from early church history. I respect the church fathers and learn from their wisdom wherever possible, but this is one of the cases where an appeal to them is vulnerable. The no-remarriage view is first attested in the fourth mandate (1:6) of the Shepherd of Hermas, a work that heavily influenced later interpretations. Hermas reflects a rising current of asceticism that goes beyond the apostolic witness; he prefers celibate singleness after widowhood and introduces the notions of penance and only one permissible repentance.1 Many of the writers on which Gordon depends also endorsed priestly celibacy; Augustine sent away his concubine, the mother of his son, and broke an engagement to follow this ideal. Such developments reflect the widespread rise of sexual asceticism in late antiquity; the church fathers, just like the biblical writers, addressed cultural settings often different from our own.
The Greek fathers (unlike some Western writers like Augustine) did know Greek, but only a few of the Fathers were very familiar with the Jewish context of Jesus and Paul. While Jerome and Hippolytus were such exceptions, the philosopher Justin, whom Gordon cites, is less so (though raised as a Gentile in Samaria, he claims no knowledge of Judaism before his adulthood). Although Justin shows acquaintance with many Jewish traditions (e.g., details about the scapegoat; polygamy; the hidden Messiah; “Man” as a divine title), he often misunderstands or misrepresents Judaism (e.g., lack of law-keeping before Moses; the Messiah’s divinity or suffering; application of Psalm 110 to Hezekiah [rather than to Abraham]). Contrary to Gordon’s implication, even Justin’s Trypho does not know Hebrew and generally handles Scripture in a nonrabbinic way (though this is not too surprising for a second-century Diaspora Jew).2 Gordon’s claim that Akiba was a convert from Christian ity is simply false. Few today would endorse some ideas, including the anti-Judaism, of some of the Fathers, borrowed from common Gentile stereotypes of Judaism. Yet even the tradition-respecting Byzantine church did not, in fact, prevent all remarriages.
When the Reformers revisited the biblical texts in question, respectful of but no longer dependent on intervening centuries of tradition, most concluded in favor of remarriage in the case of divorce for adultery. Characterizing this view as “the permissive Erasmian view” rhetorically biases the case; why not call it the “Reformation view” or call its alternative the “legalistic” view?
As to whether there are exceptions or not, exceptions are explicitly stated. The question is not, against Gordon here, making Jesus contradict himself — exceptions by definition qualify general rules; the real question is whether we should read, as Bill Heth and I do, the smaller number of texts (that merely assume exceptions) in light of the larger number (that state them); or, as some no-remarriage proponents do, read the larger number of texts in light of the smaller number. That is, should we explain Jesus’ generalized and terse statements as general principle and hyperbole (demonstrably common in his teaching), or as exceptionless rules that make nonsense of the normal meaning of the exceptions?
But do the exceptions apply to divorce, or to remarriage? The exception clause is appended to divorce rather than to remarriage because it is the validity of the divorce that establishes the basis for acceptable remarriage. If the text allows a divorce as valid, it also allows the remarriage to be valid. A remarriage is “adulterous” by definition if — and only if — the divorce was invalid (Matthew refers only to remarriage, not to divorce itself this way, because “adultery” by definition involves a different union).
Valid divorce, by ancient definition, conferred the right to remarry, as Gordon grants. That Jesus could redefine “divorce” if he wished to do so, as Gordon suggests, is not in question; but that he could do so hardly proves that he did do so. In fact, unless we wish to throw all of Scripture into lexical confusion, the burden of proof must remain on those who argue for novel word meanings (beyond their otherwise-attested semantic range), and I do not believe that such proof has been offered. Without compelling evidence, we cannot make the exception clause mean something other than what it meant in ancient sources. To counter by saying that we argue that Jesus allowed divorce simply because his contemporaries did so, or to reduce our entire argument to that claim, caricatures our argument. (For example, I did argue that Jesus spoke more radically than the school of Shammai, though he agreed with their exception.)3
Gordon reads Jesus’ invitation to singleness in Matthew 19:11 – 12 as a reaffirmation of 19:9 (apparently regardless of that verse’s exception), but this is possible only by dramatically reinterpreting the intervening verse. The disciples in verse 10 fear not remarriage but marrying to begin with, if such marriage cannot include an escape clause. (Many ancient marriage contracts included arrangements in case of divorce.) Jesus answers their radical solution (singleness) with another radical statement addressing not specifically divorced people but anyone with the gift of singleness (cf. 1 Cor. 7:7 – 9); the general context is not only divorce but family (cf. Matt. 19:13 – 15). Gordon compares 13:9 as a summons to all; but its context is quite different (and Matthew also includes some statements to limited groups; e.g., 13:52; 16:17 – 18, 28).4 Although Gordon cites some commentators who support his position, most Matthew commentators (of whom I am one) do not find this line of argument persuasive.
Paul does, as Gordon notes, quote Jesus’ prohibition of divorce and remarriage in 1 Corinthians 7:10 – 11; but then Paul immediately qualifies this prohibition for a special situation in 7:12 – 15 — something Paul can do precisely and only because he takes Jesus’ words as a general statement that can be qualified. (If the Fathers knew Greek better than we do, Paul knew Jesus’ context better than the Fathers did.) Gordon quotes Gordon Fee in support; but as the latter himself reminded me recently, his commentary denies only that the text speaks to the issue, yet he points readers to the larger context of Scripture and argues that remarriages can be redemptive.5
RESPONDING TO GORDON’S
PRACTICAL IMPLICATIONS
Regarding the pastoral implications Gordon draws, I appreciate his sensitivity to the loneliness of those who face divorce and who, on his view, cannot find solace in another marriage. I also concur with his insistence on church discipline (especially in the sort of example he mentions); if divorce is a justice issue that requires support for an aggrieved party (where one exists), it also demands discipline for the party (or parties) who have acted unjustly.
I further recognize that other cultures are appalled by Western family values, though I would suggest that most of those cultures are more appalled by sexual immorality than by the thought of divorcing a sexually immoral partner. Rampant divorce is indeed appalling, but does remarriage fall into the same category? May it not often reduce the problems Gordon associates with single-parent households? Legal no-fault divorce is likely part of the problem; but I would argue that remarriage for a party wronged by a partner’s persistent adultery, abandonment, or abuse is not part of the problem. The “sexual revolution” has increased all these problems, as it has increased divorce, but we ought not to confuse cause with effect.
Chapter 1: No Remarriage after Divorce
1. See Meic Pearse, Why the Rest Hate the West (London: SPCK, 2003).
2. The full arguments for this view are set out in W. A. Heth and G. J. Wenham, Jesus and Divorce (3rd ed.; Carlisle: Paternoster, 2002). See also G. J. Wenham, “Does the NT approve remarriage after divorce?” Southern Baptist Journal of Theology 6 (2002): 30 – 45.
3. The definitive discussion of what the early church believed about divorce and remarriage is found in Henri Crouzel, L’Église primitive face au divorce (Paris: Beauchesne, 1971). The material that follows is drawn primarily from this important work.
4. See Crouzel, L’Église primitive, 360.
5 . Gordon D. Fee,The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rap-ids: Eerdmans, 1987), 296.
6 . See G. J. Wenham, “Gospel Defi nitions of Adultery and Women’s Rights,” ExpTim 95 (1984): 330 – 32.
7. The case of Herodias is often cited, but, as J. Dupont ( Mariage et divorce dans l’évangile [Bruges: Desclée de Brouwer, 1959], 63) observes, she just abandoned her husband. It could be that Jesus is just aware of what was possible under Greek and Roman law (so C. E. B. Cranfield, The Gospel according to St Mark [Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1963], 322).
8. For a discussion of the meaning of the Greek word porneia, see Heth and Wenham, Jesus and Divorce, 183 – 84. Porneia covers a wide range of sexual sins condemned in the OT law.
9. So Raymond F. Collins, Divorce in the New Testament (GNS 38; College-ville, Minn.: Liturgical Press, 1992), 167.
10. Dupont (Mariage et divorce, 131 – 32) sets out the illogicality most lucidly: “If, according to v.32a, remarriage is allowed after divorce for porneia but in no other situation, v.32b has absurd consequences. It must be paraphrased ‘Whoever marries a divorced woman is adulterous if this woman has not behaved culpably towards the husband who divorced her. But he is not adulterous if this woman has been divorced for misbehaving.’ Such conclusions are manifestly absurd.” Dupont points out that this difficulty is reduced if the innocent husband has the right to remarry but not his guilty wife. But if she is not allowed to remarry, it implies she is still bound to her husband, and he to her. Thus when he remarries, he is effectively taking a second wife and is thus, at least in the eyes of God, a polygamist.
11 . See G. J. Wenham, “Matthew and Divorce: An Old Crux Revisited,” JSNT 22 (1984): 95 – 107; Wenham, “The Syntax of Matthew 19:9,” JSNT 28 (1986): 17 – 23.
12. H. D. Betz, The Sermon on the Mount (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1995), 257.
13. Other examples in Matthew include 15:1 – 20; 20:20 – 28. Briefer examples of the pattern include 9:10 – 17; 12:10 – 13; 19:13 – 15; 21:23 – 27.
14 . Q. Quesnell, ‘“Made Themselves Eunuchs for the Kingdom of Heaven’ (Mt. 19:12),” CBQ 30 (1968): 342.
15. Ibid., 343.
16. Ibid., 346.
17. Ibid., 347.
18. C. S. Keener (. . . And Marries Another [Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1991], 44) writes, “A valid divorce by standard ancient definition implied the right to remarry. . . . No ancient Jewish reader would have read Matthew otherwise.” The same insistence that Jewish convictions about divorce must determine the interpretation of the New Testament texts is at the heart of David Instone-Brewer’s arguments in Divorce and Remarriage in the 1st and 21st Century (Cambridge: Grove, 2001) and Divorce and Remarriage in the Bible: The Social and Literary Context (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2002).
19. M. D. Goulder notes, “The radical Jesus disappears in qualifying phrases, and emerges as a rabbi of the school of Shammai” (quoted in Collins, Divorce in the New Testament, 185).
20. The linguistic situation is even more complicated than this. Clearly Jesus and the Pharisees were debating not in Greek but in Aramaic or possibly Hebrew. So they probably used the term šalmah., not apolyo What is important to notice is that by themselves these terms are quite general; šalmah. means to send, and apolyo mto loose, or undo. The precise sense of “divorce” or “separate” is given by the context in which the word is embedded. Compare the English word wash. We can picture washing one’s face, a car, a dish, or whatever. In each case, quite different actions are involved, and it would be wrong to imagine that a person washes his face in the same way as he washes a car. It is the context of car washing that determines exactly what washing involves in this case.
21. See, e.g., John Murray (Divorce [Philadelphia: Presbyterian & Re formed, 1976], 25), who writes, “It follows from what has been said that the man who divorces his wife (except for the cause of fornication) is not thereby at liberty to remarry any more than the divorced wife. If the woman commits adultery by remarriage, this is so because she is still in reality the wife of the divorcing husband. And if so, the divorcing husband is still in reality the husband of the divorced woman and consequently may not marry another.”
22. One may well argue that it is awkward, to say the least, to have Jesus using apolyein in two different senses simultaneously, and that this is another argument against the permissive interpretation; the early church view is free from this problem, for, in that view, when Jesus uses the word apolyein, it always means “separate from.” But this is not my main point. I want to stress that permissive interpreters must admit that Jesus is using apolyein in a different sense from his Jewish opponents. Because permissive interpreters do allow that Jesus taught that divorce in non-porneia cases is adulterous, they are saying that this is not real divorce but merely separation.
23. See Dupont, Mariage et divorce, 145 – 47.
24. In personal conversation.
25. This is David Instone-Brewer’s argument, namely, that Christians were cut off from Jews after the first century and were ignorant of Jewish practices. This is nonsense. Justin Martyr’s dialogue with Trypho is a debate between a rabbi and a Christian. Akiba, the second-century rabbi, was a convert from Christian ity. J. N. D. Kelly (Early Christian Doctrines [San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1978], 17 – 22) notes the enduring influence of Jewish thinking on second-century Christology. Alexandria, home of Clement and Origen, was full of Jews. When Origen moved to Caesarea in the third century, he held public debates with local rabbis. The Antiochene school’s methods of exegesis are often said to owe much to Jewish approaches. Chrysostom was well aware of Jewish thinking and warned his people not to convert. Jerome learned Hebrew from the Jews so that he could translate the OT from Hebrew. See also Robert M. Grant, A Short History of the Interpretation of the Bible (2d ed.; Philadelphia: Fortress, 1984), and C. A. Evans and J. A. Sanders, The Function of Scripture in Early Jewish and Christian Tradition (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1998).
26. Andrew Cornes, Divorce and Remarriage (London: Hodder & Stough-ton, 1993), 336 – 37.
27. Ibid., 381.
28. A recent British report (January 2005) estimated that a single mother with two children receives £11,000 ($20,000) a year in welfare benefits, whereas a married couple with two children on average earnings pays £5,000 ($9,000) in taxes!
Chapter 1: A Response to Gordon J. Wenham (Craig S. Keener)
1. See my “Marriage, Divorce and Adultery,” in Dictionary of the Later New Testament and Its Developments, ed. Ralph P. Martin and Peter H. Davids (Downers Grove, Ill.: InterVarsity, 1997), 713 – 14. In a distortion of Hermas’s meaning, some Christians in later centuries postponed baptism until their deathbeds, fearing the consequences of postbaptismal sin.
2. See discussions of Justin, e.g., by L. W. Barnard (“The Old Testament and Judaism in the Writings of Justin Martyr,” VT 14 [Oct. 1964]: 395 – 406); B. Z. Bokser (“Justin Martyr and the Jews,” JQR 64 [1973/74]: 97 – 122, 204 – 11); and H. P. Schneider (“Some Reflections on the Dialogue of Justin Martyr with Trypho,” SJTh 15 [June 1962]: 164 – 75).
3. Gordon is probably correct in his note that Jesus and the Pharisees were using a scribal language (Aramaic or Hebrew) in their debate (though Greek was well known around Jerusalem). But if God inspired our canonical gospels in Greek, how the inspired authors report Jesus in Greek is part of God’s message. What is most important here, however, is that the context is divorce; hence both the Semitic and Greek terms should carry their normal sense as used in divorce contexts.
4. Gordon also emphasizes the disciples’ propensity to object, though this is far less characteristic of Matthew than Mark, who omits their complaint.
5. Gordon D. Fee, The First Epistle to the Corinthians (NICNT; Grand Rap-ids: Eerdmans,1987), 306. Fee also wrote these words before I and others had pointed out the relevant parallel in ancient divorce contracts.