Gordon J. Wenham
Gordon J. Wenham
I have met Craig Keener only once — very briefly at a conference — so the following comments may be quite misguided, but both his book and his article give me the impression that he is very strongly motivated by pastoral concern for divorced persons who remarry. This is admirable. We are instructed to “carry each other’s burdens, and in this way . . . fulfill the law of Christ” (Gal. 6:2). Those who have suffered the terrible emotional trauma of divorce need all the compassion and support the church can muster. So I share Craig’s revulsion at the crassness of some who have applied the New Testament teaching on divorce with insensitivity and harshness. My father was once asked about the recipe for successful ministry. He replied, “90 percent tact!” Preeminently, in the realm of broken relationships, immense wisdom and tact are needed. Unfortunately, Craig seems to have experienced too many situations where grace was not present.
THE NO-REMARRIAGE VIEW NEED NOT LEAD TO INSENSITIVITY
The mistaken application of a sound principle does not invalidate the principle. Those who believe that no-remarriage views inevitably lead to pastoral insensitivity should read Andrew Cornes, Divorce and Remarriage, or the more popular Johann Christoph Arnold, Sex, God and Marriage.1 These writers demonstrate that strong principle and compassion are not opposite poles; but just as our Lord dealt compassionately with the adulterous woman without condoning her sin (John 8:1 – 11), so the modern church can handle the complex issues thrown up by divorce and remarriage in a sensitive and loving way.
In my response to Craig, I propose to say more about the pastoral implications of his views than about his biblical arguments, as many of these I’ve already covered in my response to Bill.
THE BIBLICAL TEXTS
I begin with the biblical texts. I agree with Craig that the exception clauses in Matthew cannot be restricted to adultery. Porneia (“sexual immorality”) covers a wide range of sexual sin, which in ancient times may have required the divorce of the guilty party. However, I do not believe that Jesus thereby gave the right to remarry. With the apostle Paul (1 Cor. 7:11) and Bill Heth (see his chapter), I think that Jesus hoped for forgiveness and reconciliation in such a situation. The point is that Jesus recognized there were circumstances in which society required divorce, and in this situation Jesus did not call the divorcer an adulterer, but neither did he grant the right to remarry. We can well envisage other situations today where separation is required because of the spouse’s behavior, and this would be a legitimate extension of the porneia exception. However, if remarriage is not envisaged, and Jesus’ demand that we should forgive those who sin against us is taken seriously, separation would become a last resort.
For the most part, I find Craig’s exegetical arguments rather weak. He draws in various verses from 1 Corinthians 7 that have no relevance to the issue, while ignoring the obvious text of Romans 7:2 – 3. Frequently he argues that divorce entails the right to remarry, a view I have tried to refute in my essay and in my response to Bill. But at the same time Craig admits that divorce for the wrong reason is invalid in God’s sight, which is to allow that a divorce may be legal yet ineffective. It apparently entitles a person to remarry without in fact terminating the first marriage, so that any subsequent union is termed adulterous. This is an important concession to the no-remarriage view.
Craig argues that Jesus’ statement, “anyone who divorces his wife and marries another woman commits adultery against her” (Mark 10:11), is hyperbole because it cannot be taken literally. There is no doubt Jesus loved colorful speech and used vivid imagery to make his teaching memorable. So how can we distinguish hyperbole from literal language? I would suggest three tests. First, we assume that Jesus’ words are to be taken literally unless there are indications to the contrary; a literal interpretation is thus our default reading. We cannot take literally camels going through the eye of a needle or suppose that Pharisees could swallow them, so we conclude that these remarks are hyperbole; but there is nothing to tell us that remarriage after divorce could not be viewed as adultery. You only have to suppose that the speaker views the first union as still binding on both parties to take it literally.
The second test is one of genre: does the remark sound like a wild prophetic image, or like a sober law? Anyone who reads Exodus 21 – 23 will find numerous laws formulated like Mark 10:11 (e.g., Exod. 21:13 – 17). So this again points to the statement’s literalness. Laws are to be taken literally. Finally, the context suggests the same. In Mark 10 the disciples are asking for an explanation of his harsh dismissal of the Pharisees’ views on divorce. They wanted a straightforward explanation, not a riddle. Clearly the early church found no difficulty in taking Jesus literally, so I do not see why the modern church should either.
WRESTLING WITH PASTORAL ISSUES
I now turn to some of the pastoral issues Craig raises. He begins with cases where pastors have attempted to break up second marriages. I have never advocated this. My view is that people should be discouraged from remarrying after divorce; but where such marriages exist, it would be tactless in the extreme to suggest that the couple break up. The OT gives many examples of how to react to difficult ethical situations (e.g., bigamy); clearly, bigamy was not God’s intention, for he gave Adam only one wife (Gen. 2:22). Subsequent stories about bigamists (e.g., Gen. 4:19 – 24; chs. 29 – 50) show that their family lives were complicated, but there is no suggestion that Jacob, for instance, should throw Leah out. Bigamy was tolerated in OT times despite its problems, and it seems to me that the church today has to tolerate couples who have remarried while at the same time discouraging others from going that way. It is a task that demands immense tact and wisdom.
Toward the end of his chapter, Craig presents many heartbreaking cases where first marriages have broken up. He asks whether we can deny the victims of such tragedies the chance to find happiness in a second marriage, especially where the victim is not responsible for the divorce. Of course, our instinct is to say, “Yes, they must be allowed another chance.” But I think we need to pause to reflect before we give a spontaneous yes to such pleas for remarriage. We should consider how difficult it is in many cases to know who is responsible for the first marriage’s failure. Bill Heth gives an example from his experience as to how he was taken in, and Craig acknowledges this in passing. Then there is the question of what happens if the second marriage breaks up, as it is statistically more likely to do. Do we allow a third marriage, or a fourth, or a . . . ? What happens to a doctrine of lifelong marriage if the principle of remarriage is freely conceded?
Craig focuses on the plight of the divorced person who would like to remarry. But we must not be so individualistic in our ethics. We must think of the effect of such a decision on others. Children of divorced people are very upset by divorce, but even more by remarriage; it destroys their last hope that their parents will be reconciled. The divorcée who does not find a new partner is aggrieved when her former husband remarries, especially where they all belong to the same church.
There are also the wider costs to society — not simply the huge welfare costs of supporting single parents and their children, but the way in which our whole social fabric is undermined by the destabilization of marriage. The whole idea of commitment and honor is undermined when promises made before God “to have and to hold from this day forward, for better, for worse, for richer, for poorer, in sickness and in health, to love and to cherish, till death do us part” may be set aside and then repeated to someone else.
Hard cases make bad laws. We see this in the abortion debate. Heartrending cases are used to justify the principle of abortion, and then the door is opened for abortion on demand. The same is true once the principle of remarriage is conceded. So although it may seem very unkind if a church refuses to marry a divorced person, in the longer term it is, I believe, for the good of our society. Such a policy will benefit children. It will encourage couples who have difficulties in their marriages to work at them. It will give the watching world a glimpse of God’s undying love. But to implement this policy in today’s society will be extremely difficult. It demands conviction, wisdom, tact, and prayer. I pray that you, the reader of this book, will be given grace to know how to proceed in your situation and that you will have the strength to carry it out.