17 Dedicatory letter to Melanchthon's Epitome of Moral Philosophy CR III, 359–61
17 Dedicatory letter to Melanchthon's Epitome of Moral Philosophy
CR III, 359–61
Greetings from Philip Melanchthon to Christianus Pontanus of Wittenberg1
Among other crimes, Socrates was reproached with mocking the inquiry into nature and rejecting physics, since he had transferred the studies of men to discussions of morals. Xenophon most weightily refutes this false accusation, and gives evidence that Socrates did not lure men away from physics, but rather he added to it that more learned teaching of morals, which was neglected by the others, since that part, too, being most useful for life, had need of method and art [Memorabilia I.1.11–13]. Common precepts on morals are known generally, and some are born with us, but, nevertheless, there is doubtless the need for art and some more learned teaching for the purpose of deliberating on many duties, of grasping the true distinction between just and unjust actions and of understanding their origins. The nature of man needs to be examined; thought needs to be given to what is the order of the parts and what duty is ascribed to each by nature; furthermore the proper causes of actions are to be investigated. Socrates himself, discussing providence in Xenophon, assembles and points out the traces of divinity in nature in order to show not only that there is a god, but also that the god cares for human affairs [Memorabilia 1.4]. The origins of these disputations lie in physics. Just as Xenophon absolves Socrates, so, when we teach this part of philosophy concerning morals, we too do not want the young to be lured away from the rest of philosophy, but rather we want them to be attracted to it; I thought that by this beginning of the work readers should be enjoined to consider that there was also a need for art in teaching about morals, and that this art is like a small brook flowing from natural philosophy. Therefore they should not reckon that anyone can become a master in this field without the other parts of philosophy.
One needs to take pains with this part which contains the origins of the laws and of justice – from which not only lawyers borrow many precepts, but also theologians, whenever they discuss morals and the civic
1 Christianus Pontanus was the son of Gregor Brück (1483–1557), jurist and chancellor to successive Electors of Saxony. For Melanchthon's oration on the life of Gregor Brück, see CR XII, cols. 350–60.
customs of life – as certainly its great usefulness demands, if we strive not for a shadow of the art, but for a firm knowledge, and therefore it will truly be necessary to join it to the rest of philosophy. Accordingly, although I did not want to stray too far afield, I related many topics in this Epitome to reasonings of natural philosophy for that purpose, so that the examples might show that these discussions of morals are mutilated and maimed without the rest of philosophy. I also declare that the customs will not become milder, nor can what is properly called moral (ēthikon), that is, moderation and gentleness, be achieved, unless liberal teaching is added to the common precepts – a teaching by which those of us who are accomplished and inured can discern the causes of duties, moderate all actions through reason, and temper them by some gentleness and elegance. The power of this matter is such that, if a person of mediocre disposition were instructed and inured in this way, he would not only be gentler in private company, but he would also be more moderate and diligent in the most important business of the state. For how many storms and how many tempests do foolish men not set in motion occasionally for no other reason than that they are not polished in this kind of learning, or, as the Greeks say, they are unprincipled (anēthopoiētoi) [Cicero, Letters to Atticus X.10.15]. Therefore, since I expounded Aristotle's Ethics,2 I have added this commentary in which I follow not only Aristotle's meaning, but also his method. It is true that I have added some disputations that are more suited to our times, which I have collected because I considered them to be beneficial for morals, because they form one's judgements on much public business, and they prepare the students for civil law and for that part of theology that contains precepts on civic duties. I know that some admire other sects. For some look up to the Stoics as if to demi-gods. Valla attacks the other philosophers furiously, while he nevertheless gives Epicurus obvious approbation.3 I, however, who have been engaged in these disputes among the sects for a long time and often at length turning them upside down (anō kai katō strephōn), as Plato enjoins one to do [Gorgias 511a], urgently admonish the young to reject Stoics and Epicureans and embrace the Peripatetic school. For even if Epicureanism and Stoicism are defended zealously and, so to speak, advertised, in order to do so it is necessary to mix
2 Although the Eudemian Ethics, Magna Moralia, and On Virtues were available in this period, the Nicomachean Ethics was considered the central text of Aristotle's moral philosophy. C. B. Schmitt, ‘Aristotle's Ethics in the Sixteenth Century: Some Preliminary Considerations’, in his The Aristotelian Tradition and Renaissance Universities (London, 1984), VII, p. 94.
3 See note 5, oration 3, p. 25.
in much sophistry, according to the saying by Euripides: ‘The unjust word, sick in itself, needs wise remedies (ho de adikos logos, nosōn en autōi, pharmakōn deitai sophōn)’ [Fragment 354]. Furthermore, false beliefs also harm morals, and the very habit of sophistry is destructive in many ways: it corrupts one's judgement, lures minds away from the love and study of propriety and simple truth, and accustoms the intellect to loving monstrous beliefs, and to striving to obfuscate rather than to explain things. In Aristotle, however, method governs the disputation and, so to speak, forces it within boundaries, so that it does not stray from demonstrations and the right path. For that reason it elicits true opinions and explains them in order and properly. Therefore Peripatetic philosophy is more useful, because of both the true opinions and the example of method. Aristotle himself said that beliefs that have no usefulness for life or morals should be rejected. Many Stoic ideas are of that kind, namely those on freedom from emotions, on fate and several others. When someone boasted that he had heard Carneades'4 lectures for many years, someone else replied that one needed to bear in mind not for how long he had heard him, but whether he heard him when Carneades was an old man, as then his disputations were not prepared for idle show and for attracting applause, but for usefulness and the explanation of things – or, as Plutarch says: ‘For what is useful and sociable (pros to chrēsimon kai koinōnikon)’ [Moralia 791B]. Therefore, since in choosing a type of teaching one has to choose what is correct, true, simple, steadfast, well ordered and useful for life, I believe that young minds need to be instructed chiefly with Aristotelian doctrine, which in these qualities surpasses all other sects. Why? Because Aristotle's Ethics should also be loved, because he alone saw and understood that the virtues are middle states. By that description he instructs us most learnedly that the impulses of the mind must be bent to moderation and held back. Although I lacked the time for perfecting this little book, since I included very useful things, I nevertheless did not resist those who were demanding its publication. However, since in disputing I have always imitated limited and trivial dialectical forms, I made the decision to set out examples of method and of dialectical precepts also in these more pleasant subjects. And I reckon that this system of teaching is useful for schools. For it accustoms the mind to accuracy in expounding, which is particularly necessary in great and serious matters.
4 Carneades of Cyrene (214–129 BC), a Greek philosopher of the Academy who argued that certain knowledge was not attainable but conclusions of varying degrees of certainty could be drawn. See, for instance, Cicero, De natura deorum, I.ii.4; I.V.11f.
To you, however, my Pontanus, I have dedicated this short treatise – first, because I owe much to your father, a most illustrious man, I thought that this expression of my fondness for you would please him; furthermore, since I also think well of your intellect, I particularly wanted to write to you in order to advise you and your peers, our students, that this kind of teaching particularly concerns the young. For truly, it cannot be understood what honour and what beauty there are in that moderation in morals, which we accurately call ethical (ēthikēn), unless our minds are imbued from adolescence with that liberal teaching, and they learn to curb and rule their impulses. Furthermore, the beauty can be understood more easily if, put in mind of the precepts, we also understand the examples in which uncommon virtue shines. And you have been given a most perfect example in your family, that is, the outstanding moderation and virtue of your father in every duty. Since in him to the excellence of his intellect were added the knowledge of many great arts, eloquence rewarded with every oratorical praise, and the knowledge of guiding the state, what great honour does his action, if I may say so, add to these qualities? For in him there shines a special modesty and elegance in the performance of every duty, because of which the other ornaments of his intellect have more dignity and grace. Even though his nature has great power, nevertheless without a variety of knowledge or erudition he would not have achieved this moral (ēthikēn) elegance. You see how he is on fire with enthusiasm for what is greatest. To the knowledge of law, in which he excels, he also joins the study of Christian doctrine, in order that he may understand it exceedingly well, and cherish it with the greatest piety. What eagerness he has to know the history of all ages! Just as Homer proclaims the fluency and richness of Ulysses' speech so much that he compares it to the snows of winter, so the eloquence of your father, Gregor, equipped with great fluency and variety of knowledge, is held in the greatest admiration among all the intelligent. The harmony and modesty in his behaviour, which we call moral (ēthikēn), wonderfully adorns these many successes. Whenever I look at him, it seems to me that I see one of these ancient heroic men who, because of their wisdom, knowledge, eloquence, political knowledge, seriousness of behaviour and elegance, held the first place in the state – as we read that Laelius, Crassus or Cicero did in Rome and Pericles and some others in Athens.5
5 Gaius Laelius (b. c. 186 BC), a soldier who achieved heroic feats under Scipio in the Third Punic War. He was also a learned orator: see Cicero, De amicitia. Lucius Licinius Crassus (140–1–91 BC) was an outstanding orator and a supporter of aristocracy, and Cicero's exemplar: see Cicero, De oratore; Marcus Tullius Cicero (106–43 BC), Roman orator and statesman, supporter of Pompey the Great; Pericles (c. 495–429 BC), Athenian statesman who dominated politics.
Therefore, my Pontanus, look at your father with all your mind and all your heart, and when you learn to understand the beauty of his behaviour, attempt also to fashion it for yourself. For although his example is common to all nevertheless, since it touches you more closely, it must move your heart more powerfully. May the authority of your father's name spur you on! I believe that some seeds of these virtues continue in you, too, which it behoves you to cherish with art and reason, and to rouse and form. At the same time you should consider also that your father could not have achieved such honour – however powerful his nature – if he had not perfected it by erudition and a variety of knowledge. For that reason devote yourself, with all the powers of your intellect and your mind, to this discipline, the most perceptive study of which you see at your home. The state, too, should encourage you to do so with great concern; since it has need of the erudition and art to which your father has destined you; prepare yourself with all the effort of your mind, so that some time your intellect may be of use to the state, and you may add to your father's great offices. Farewell. In Wittenberg, 1537.