7: A Definition of Miracle
7
A Definition of Miracle
Strangely enough, just formulating a definition of a miracle is far from an easy task. As Yujin Nagasawa explains, “The concept of a miracle is an elusive one. We all know roughly what it is and we can easily cite some well-known examples. Yet we struggle to state a precise definition. In fact, the proper definition of a miracle has been a matter of dispute among philosophers for centuries.”1 Robert Bruce Mullin concurs: defining miracles “is a surprisingly difficult question, particularly when the question is directed to modern miracles.” Throughout this process, “no unanimity was ever achieved.” In fact, Mullin reports that he has assembled “forty-eight separate contemporary definitions of the term, all slightly different.”2 As we will perceive here, many of these differences arise from un-believers and believers alike lining up across an entire spectrum on several key issues.
Probably the best-known discussion of the subject, including a definition of miracle, was formulated by the famous eighteenth-century Scottish skeptical philosopher David Hume, who explained, “A miracle may be accurately defined, a transgression of a law of nature by a particular volition of the Deity, or by the interposition of some invisible agent.”3 In this essay, Hume added a number of other assertions and clarifications regarding the topic, but this definition should be sufficient as we begin. Many of Hume’s notions will be mentioned and critiqued in other chapters.
Nagasawa lists eight “common features of a miracle” that may contribute to a definition. These aspects include ideas of “wonder and amazement” exceeding the expectations of individuals; being “beyond human control,” including deep, mysterious aspects; having positive outcomes; involving “religiously significant” meanings; being performed intentionally by an agent; and being “a violation of the laws of nature.”4 Of course, many nuances and differences exist among commentators, along with perhaps still additional ideas, such as which scholars prefer which notions or perhaps wish to incorporate still other ideas.
Nagasawa simplifies and assimilates this list of aspects into his brief definition: “A miracle is a violation of the laws of nature that is caused by an intentional agent; and it has religious significance.”5 By this definition, Jesus changing water to wine or raising someone from the dead would indeed be miraculous. But someone narrowly avoiding a serious accident would not be a miracle—not because God could not have caused the escape, but because it fails to meet other qualifications of a miracle.6
Even though Nagasawa utilizes a fairly straightforward definition of miracles, just reading his first chapter indicates there are still numerous twists and turns that are not initially obvious. Perhaps this is partially the advantage of constructing a simpler, uncomplicated notion that does not involve some of the tougher issues. C. S. Lewis chose to define a miracle as just “an interference with Nature by supernatural power.”7 It would be difficult to conceive of a briefer definition!
One of the most prominent philosophers of this generation, Richard Swinburne, defines a miracle this way: “A miracle is an event of an extraordinary kind, brought about by a god, and of religious significance.”8 Such religious meaning could be to “contribute significantly toward a holy divine purpose for the world” or to approve doctrine.9
Canadian philosopher Robert A. Larmer specializes in this topic. Emerging from his years of study is his definition of miracle as “an unusual and religiously significant event which reveals and furthers God’s purposes, is beyond the power of physical nature to produce, and is caused by an agent who transcends physical nature.”10 Larmer takes careful aim at definitions of miracles, like that of Nagasawa, that define these events so that they violate the laws of nature.11
Mixing and Matching Definitional Aspects
Obviously, many other definitions of miracle could be stated and developed here. But these provide some key ideas as well as several approximate parameters as to where these discussions might head. One of the most intriguing items to emerge even from a short overview is that definitions of miracle are not easy to parse or identify based on whether the scholar providing the comments favors or disfavors the actual occurrence of miracles, even as the above definitions have already shown.12 Two theists (even two Christian theists) or two skeptics could easily take issue with each other over items like starting points, preliminary definitions, or even final conclusions.
Hume is a significant case in point. It is sometimes remarked, especially by those who do not know Hume’s philosophical works or his skeptical reputation, that his definition of miracles at least leaves him open to their occurrence or that he even favors them! These thoughts seem to occur to those who think Hume ought not to have held that these events require the act of God or other invisible agents (perhaps like angels?), almost as if he were bringing supernatural ideas into the issue strictly by definition! But few scholars have disfavored miracles more than Hume, at least according to the more traditional interpretations of his essay.13 True, his definition attempts to set the restrictions for such an event—in effect, to point out where the problem areas lie. But he does not think there are events that can overcome these problems.
Regarding the idea that there is a range of views expressed that often separate even those who otherwise agree on the larger overall picture, certainly a chief or even forceful disagreement pertains to a central issue here. Namely, must miracles break or violate the laws of nature? R. F. Holland remarks, “Most people think of a miracle as a violation of natural law; and a good many of those who regard the miraculous in this way incline to the idea that miracles are impossible.”14 True to form here, Paul Tillich concurs on the popularity of this notion: “The word ‘miracle,’ according to the ordinary definition, designates a happening that contradicts the laws of nature.”15 Then, just as suggested by Holland, Tillich almost immediately adds that these events do not occur.16
If Holland’s above comment is correct, his audience might read further into it, concluding that skeptical scholars might purposely take a “hard” position by positing miracles as being largely or strictly at odds with nature to posit or even create a higher mountain for these “events” to overcome! To be sure, skeptical scholars may argue from a plethora of different angles and even oppose each other at times. Still, a quick survey of some scholars who accept the notion that miracles would either break (or seem to break) the laws of nature or natural law in some sense does indicate that a high preponderance of them do indeed oppose the existence of miracles.17
Likewise, those researchers who favor the existence of miracles also tend to gravitate toward rejecting the idea that miracles must necessarily break the laws of nature. Once again, there are a wide number of viewpoints here, some of which even disagree strongly with each other.18 Further, many other recent scholars whose publications oppose Hume’s essay “Of Miracles” would add various additional comments on whether miracles would need to break the laws of nature.19 Certainly the relationship between miraculous events and the laws of nature is one of the most central and crucial issues in this dialogue, if not the chief question.20
The Laws of Nature
So what are the laws of nature then? And how would we know an exception to them even if one occurred? Intriguingly, comparatively few philosophers, theologians, historians, or scientists—both pro or con on the miracles spectrum—appear to want to weigh in on these basic, often definitional, matters. They are far from simple questions.
Flew’s short definition of a law of nature is “a regularity or symmetry in nature.”21 Flew calls for a strong notion of natural law as well as evidence of real exceptions to those laws,22 though this move and other similar ones actually led Flew to later change worldviews!23 Citing Ninian Smart, Swinburne explains the pro-Humean perspective on violating a law of nature this way: “Those who, like Hume, have used this or a similar expression have intended to mean by it an occurrence of a non-repeatable counter-instance to a law of nature.”24
For his part, Swinburne defines his notion of nature’s laws like this: “Laws of nature are principles embedded in nature determining what happens. They may be fundamental or derivative.” These derivative laws “are consequences of fundamental laws, which determine what happens under limited conditions (e.g. in certain spatio-temporal regions) in the absence of intervention. Exactly what the fundamental laws of nature are we do not know yet.”25
Further, these natural laws may be either deterministic or indeterministic (i.e., probabilistic). It needs to be remembered that even the deterministic variety can be set aside by a superior power, such as if God exists and chooses to act in the natural realm.26 Even less would indeterministic or probabilistic laws impede miraculous events because these “regulations” spell out what happens on most occasions. Even odd natural events, let alone miraculous ones, would just get mixed into nature when or if they occur. Anomalies then, either of a natural or a supernatural variety, are not an issue. And again, any of these laws may be exceeded by a God who acts.27
Skeptical readers might judge that such comments have less force because these are the views of a prominent theist. But it should be added here that Antony Flew even in his atheist days,28 atheist J. L. Mackie,29 and naturalistic philosopher Larry Shapiro,30 plus other skeptical scholars,31 allow that the laws of nature potentially could be trumped by a God with particular characteristics and will. Of course, theists would have to show that such a situation has obtained. But the point here is that even skeptics may allow that the laws of nature, however they are contrived, do not provide some automatic, impenetrable barrier against miracles since they could possibly be “defeated” by a stronger power.32 So, “all claims about what are the laws of nature are corrigible. However much support any purported law has at the moment, one day it may prove to be no true law.”33
Of the many examples of this truth that might be chosen, a case in point is the discovery and identification of electrons by J. J. Thompson, for which he won the Nobel Prize in 1906. The research of Niels Bohr on electrons also earned him a Nobel Prize in 1922, though in the process he disagreed with some important areas of Thompson’s views. However, the current model for research on electrons used by recent quantum physicists has moved beyond Bohr in crucial concepts involving the electron, including whether the basic universal constituents are even physical at all. Did Thompson’s electrons ever exist? Did Bohr’s electrons ever exist? Do electrons even exist at all today?34
This is a simple reminder that scientific views in general, including the current concepts of the laws of nature, are almost assuredly not the last word on these subjects.35 Fascinatingly, Swinburne thinks that Hume “would, I think, have been satisfied with my amended understanding of a law of nature.”36
Major changes and new understandings have emerged through the years then. “From the eighteenth to the beginning of the twentieth century most men believed that all natural laws were universal. . . . In this century many scientists have come to hold that the fundamental natural laws are statistical.”37 David and Randall Basinger add that at least since the time of Hume, natural laws “have basically been understood to be descriptive generalizations.”38 German physicist Werner Schaaffs concludes that “even the physicist must officially concede the possibility of intervention by God.”39 All definitions and clarifications aside, Swinburne and Mackie agree that we can still apply a sort of “eye test” to potential miracle claims and recognize them as such, with both of these influential philosophers gazing across the “conceptual fence of miracles” while still providing brief lists of occurrences that, if they obtained, could be considered as miracles, at least until someone moves the goalposts!40
To consider the matter further, there are some major limitations to what the laws of nature actually can and cannot “do.” In the long, footnoted list of skeptical scholars above who prefer the “breaking the laws of nature” definition of miracles, many of them appear to make this move basically to serve as insurmountable objections to the existence of miracles.
But how many scholars have taken the time to actually think through these matters in detail? The laws of nature actually do nothing! This is obviously a facetious question, but can one of these laws simply reach out and club a miracle to death before it manifests itself? Or may a law of nature (as is probably more often the case) be visualized as some sort of barrier which, like the Great Wall of China, keeps both barbarian marauders and miracles from invading its territory? As C. S. Lewis states so well, “However far you traced the story back you would never find the laws of Nature causing anything. . . . In the whole history of the universe the laws of Nature have never produced a single event.”41
As we have already stated, the laws of nature are generally viewed by scholars today as statistical generalizations that state or describe what usually occurs in the course of nature under this or that condition. But as is widely known, no matter how high the probability that water does not on its own turn into wine, there is also at least a slight statistical possibility that it could indeed happen immediately. As Schaaffs explains the matter, “Though a miracle is a rare, or perhaps even unique, event or experience, quite out of the ordinary, it can with comparative ease, as our example shows, be placed in a statistical framework.”42 Or as Schaaffs explains elsewhere, “Even the greatest improbability cannot rule out the possibility that the event will occur tomorrow.”43
A last, very crucial point to mention here is that whether the scholars in question support or oppose the historicity of miracle claims, there is almost unanimous agreement from researchers on both sides of the debate that historical research can be a very positive endeavor and can be conducted in such a way as to yield strong, factual results.44 In other words, even exceptionally skeptical scholars—such as the logical positivists up through the first half of the twentieth century, the radical idealists from the late nineteenth century up through the mid-twentieth century, or other postmodern strains like those developed by various French scholars in contemporary European forms—all still find much value in good historiography.45 As Mackie states, certain categories of independent testimonial research “can be more powerful evidence than Hume’s discussion would suggest.”46
These are crucial matters, in that when pro-miracle scholars introduce the inevitable versions of historical arguments in either old or new guises, they may well be opposed by their anti-miracle counterparts, but not because the latter reject historical arguments per se. Thus, there is at least some decisive common ground on the nature of historiography here, though the relevant dialogues could be over the theory itself as well as the nature of the miracle claim.
A Contemporary Definition of Miracle
The preceding background allows us to move ahead and propose a definition of miracle that incorporates many of the relevant items already discussed in this chapter. For the purposes of this research project we will define the concept this way: “A miracle is a dynamic, specialized event that nature is incapable of producing on its own, that temporarily supersedes (or appears to supersede) the normally observed, known pattern of nature. Such an event would be brought about by the power of God or another supernatural agent for the express purpose of acting as a sign or pointer to verify or draw attention to a person or message.”47 Several key phrases and concepts are featured in this definition and each could be debated.
A dynamic, specialized event: Though perhaps the least crucial of the phrases in this definition, these words still make a clarifying statement concerning the nature of miracles. Rather than being static, inert manifestations seemingly subject to or simply fitting into line as with nature’s other happenings, miracles may be described rather metaphorically as dynamic events that have the potential to energize creation. This capacity is due to their ontological status as higher-order events sent more or less directly from the hand of God and thus being capable of invigorating the everyday world. In this sense, miracles are like full-color occurrences that can perk up an otherwise black-and-white reality. This is not to be taken in the sense of the world being ugly, drab, or inert, for it too is the Lord’s creation.
The point is rather that when God touches the world, it is simply not going to be the same place again. This is all because the world, at least in the most affected areas, has morphed into a statelier domain than was previously the case.
Beyond their dynamism, this energizing capability of miracles is also derived from their specialized character. Following creation, the New Testament speaks of the sustaining power of Jesus Christ in the world as the Lord, again metaphorically, unifies, cements, arranges, and orders his handiwork. To be sure, this is a beautifully fine-tuned world and process in itself. Still, what occurs in a miracle may be described as zeroing in on a particular situation with a new power, focused on perhaps rectifying a particular problem or enabling creation to move to the next step—what it cannot do apart from the miracle. The miracle has the advantage in comparison because the building blocks that are part and parcel of these supernatural events are of a higher magnitude and order.
As C. S. Lewis delineated in his classic text on this subject, the miracle’s “cause is the activity of God. . . . In the forward direction . . . it is interlocked with all Nature just like any other event.” But as Lewis goes on to state, the miracle is interlocked in the backward direction to the hand of God.48 That is what has been referred to in this chapter as the miracle’s chief dynamistic and specialized characteristics.
That nature is incapable of producing on its own: Since a miracle would, by definition, be an act of God or another supernatural agent (as is the general description from both friends and foes alike), though miracles may fit into nature once they occur (even quite naturally so), miracles do not originate in or by nature. So these supernatural events cannot result from purely natural causes inside a natural system.
This supernatural-natural division is quite relevant in deciding whether nature could or could not produce miracles. Of course, any potentially miraculous events would have to be shown evidentially rather than just be assumed to have occurred. But if any distinctive species of miracles were established, the recognition of their nonnatural cause would presumably follow. For example, it is difficult to argue that nature could produce life that has been so radically changed from nonlife or from seriously ill bodies, as in the biblical accounts involving the true healing of dead organs and terminally diseased bodies. Moreover, the inability of nature to produce such a cause would be even more obvious with a stepped-up case like the raising of Lazarus or another person from the dead. Even far beyond these examples would be an ex nihilo original creation where the universe appeared suddenly out of absolutely nothing (even given a modern scientific scenario). After all, such an event could hardly come from nature when there was no nature from which it could come!
Potentially moving up another level still, it could be argued that it would even be more incredible yet if an additional sort of miracle obtained, one that involved the appearance of an entirely new, transformed order of life—immortal heavenly life—as it broke into the universe for the first time. This might be the case in several instances, while being most obvious in the event of the resurrection of Jesus. Rather amazingly, Hume, Mackie, Flew, and other skeptics on one side, along with Swinburne and most other theistic scholars on the other, all attest from almost totally different perspectives that no power in nature is capable of raising the dead.49 To this end, even a case like that of Lazarus’s would be very special in spite of the individual being required to die again. In contrast, the utter uniqueness of Jesus’s resurrection, where he would never have to undergo death again, living in his resurrected immortal body, would be far more incredible.50
The upshot of this reasoning for both sides is that the potential event of Jesus’s resurrection, if it happened, would fit the definition of a miracle occurring as an act of God and not originating with nature. Philosopher Stephen Davis asserts, “It must be admitted that with the resurrection we are talking not just about a highly unusual event but an event which, given our best knowledge of the workings of the world, seems causally impossible.”51 Then Davis continues, “The resurrection of Jesus appears to be a hard miracle—skeptics apparently cannot agree that it has occurred (not as the event is recorded in the Gospels, at any rate) without abandoning religious skepticism.”52 Though strictly beyond our immediate topic, Davis makes an incredible comment that the occurrence of Jesus’s resurrection could be instrumental in challenging and even changing worldviews—in this case, skepticism of one sort or another.
If such a scenario obtains, then it would seem certain that nature would be entirely incapable of producing on its own at least some miraculous events, especially like creation or the resurrection of Jesus. Such scenarios would fulfill the above definition of a miracle, even according to the agreement of key atheistic and other highly skeptical scholars. But further, as we have seen in Davis’s second quotation above regarding the nullifying or changing of one’s worldview, the resulting conclusions of such recognition could indeed be far-reaching.
Temporarily supersedes (or appears to supersede) the normally observed, known pattern of nature: Many scholars consider this to be the major, or at least the most difficult, question in defining a miracle. What is the relationship between these purported events and nature’s laws?
We have seen that scholars who disfavor the actual occurrence of miracles seem to prefer the wording of a “violation” or “breaking” of a law of nature, probably because these more difficult terms would seem to make the theistic task more difficult to accomplish. As C. S. Lewis testifies, when he was an atheist, he considered the idea of a God who broke his own laws of nature to be absolutely repugnant. Why would anyone wish to spoil such a beautiful world? A miracle seemed like a sort of forced entry foisted upon an otherwise gorgeous reality that Lewis thought could get along quite well by itself and that he dearly wished would remain pristine.53 Viewed from this angle, the words violate and break are quite derogatory, not to mention the rougher prerequisites seemingly intended for the theists to overcome.
On the other side, proponents of miracles more often favor the “softer” idea of setting aside nature’s laws momentarily without employing more forceful language. After his conversion, Lewis arrived at the view that it is “inaccurate to define a miracle as something that breaks the laws of Nature.”54 Though some may perceive the change to be slight, or nothing more than a matter of emphasis, or even just a plain confusing contrast of ideas, Lewis came to view miracles as suspensions or interruptions in nature’s normal process, adjustments that improved and actually made an already good reality even better.55
Broken things usually need to be repaired to function properly. Yet the laws of nature have never required mending or recreating, since nothing natural has been broken, shattered, or in any way destroyed at any time due to miraculous intervention or insertion. As Lewis points out later, it might even be asserted that nature would be better off following the interventions.
So perhaps it is better to arrive at a sort of amalgamated position or idea here. Stronger terms like violated or broken may be employed on one side, and temporarily suspended or set aside may be the favorites on the other, but it appears the same potential exceptions are being described similarly. Call it whatever is preferred, but the main question concerns whether events have occurred that set aside nature’s laws in some fashion. After all, it is agreed across the board that regularities in nature definitely exist. As Mackie asserts, both sides, pro and con, “need the notion of a well-established law of nature.”56
Swinburne described such miraculous events rather succinctly:
For these latter reasons it seems not unnatural to describe E as a non-repeatable counter-instance to a law of nature L. . . . To say that a certain such formula is a law is to say that virtually invariably its predictions are true and that any exceptions to its operation cannot be accounted for by another formula which could be taken as a law . . . it is clearly a coherent way of talking . . . in such a case the conceptually impossible would occur.57
For our purposes, then, miraculous intervention will be defined and described as the manifestation or presence of divine actions that temporarily or momentarily overrule or supersede nature’s normally observed, lawful pattern of events, or that appear to do so. In these cases, nature’s laws can be suspended or interrupted for a brief time by a stronger power while remaining unbroken.58
Such an event is brought about by the power of God or another supernatural agent: Much of the foregoing discussion has already been directed to the general subject of God’s possible intervention in history. Antony Flew’s philosophical dictionary notes that, most commonly, a miracle has been thought of as “an act that manifests divine power.”59 Should such an event occur, what can be said about the nature and characteristics of such a being? What sort of God would seem to be required by the preceding discussion?
It would certainly seem that the impersonal god of mainline pantheism would not be much of a candidate for producing miracles. A god described as the world process itself is not much of a contender for being personally concerned about human affairs or acting in history! As C. S. Lewis states, “The Pantheist’s God does nothing, demands nothing. He is there if you wish for Him, like a book on a shelf. He will not pursue you.”60 This does not fit anything like the scenario that has been outlined in this study.
The God of classical deism is somewhat closer, having created the world apparently miraculously. Further, the deistic God could potentially exhibit some characteristics of a personal being too, given that the world’s creation probably would have some relationship to the human beings within it. But that single supernatural event in the beginning, no matter how monumental, would not seem to invoke anywhere near enough actions and interest in human life to qualify for the utter lack of miraculous intervention ever since that time. The deistic God simply does not get involved with the everyday affairs of mice and men, let alone manifest any concern for the rest of the universe.
But if miracles have indeed occurred, especially if they have done so fairly regularly and continuously through the ages, it would definitely appear that God would need to be a theistic being of some variety who could and did choose to act in meaningful ways—like creation, but far beyond. God would have to be personal as well, if the sort of events that we have envisioned so far are fairly representative of the whole, for these occurrences clearly were intertwined with human life and growth. However, since there are many different religious expressions, writings, and teachings around the world regarding the characteristics of who this divine being is, as well as what was done, taught, and required, much additional work will have to be done to decipher the very best answers. These issues remain for other discussions beyond our definitional issues here.
One other ingredient on this definitional point also allows that the miraculous agent could be another supernatural being beyond God, such as an angel or a demon. That many persons do not believe in one or both of these entities is beside the point. This idea goes back to David Hume as well as to other skeptics, and so it does not require that these entities actually exist. This is merely a definition of what a miracle might involve if one would obtain. If not, it remains a definition in words only. For that matter, other beings could be involved, including humans, but this would involve still more demarcating beyond our intent here.
For the express purpose of verifying or drawing attention to a person or message: Lastly, what is the purpose of a miracle? Some commonly mentioned and key definitional ingredients are most commonly mentioned among a number of wide-ranging ideas presented here. One of these is the prevalence of power (the Greek dunamis and related concepts).61 These terms may be related to the person who wields the power (indicated by the stem duna-, as in dunatos), including God. In a Greek or larger Hellenistic context, God could be taken in pantheistic or transcendent senses but often as unrelated, disconnected from creation, or as “neutral” or more as a force. Demons or magicians may be in view as well. The overall notions tend to indicate dynamic rather than static power.62
In the Old Testament world, God is portrayed quite differently. The emphasis is monotheistic and related to God’s personal involvement with creation. The sense in which God’s power is most manifest encompasses creation, sustaining the created order, and particularly with God’s actions in history.63 In the New Testament, this power is revealed most of all in the person of Jesus, especially in his death and resurrection. Power is also revealed in demonic activity and in other persons, though the demonic forces are defeated by Jesus’s power as revealed especially in his resurrection from the dead. In both Testaments, these words are often translated from the Hebrew and Greek (such as dunamis) as “miracle” and other similar terms that indicate and emphasize the mighty, even explosive, force behind such supernatural demonstrations.64
Besides a miracle involving a great power being exerted through events and manifestations (as indicated by dunamis above), there is another key linguistic concept to highlight here. This feature involves a word picture that appears even closer to the definitional point at hand: namely, miracles are called “signs” or “pointers” (Gk. sēmeion).65
In the Old Testament, as with the mark on Cain in Gen 4:15, such a sign potentially drew or directed the onlooker (or the reader) away from the reality of the event at hand (or from the words) to something “which was not present before.” Hence, the sign guides one to posit a meaning that “points beyond itself.” Further, the term concerns something in reality that extends beyond the immediate appearance to something else and usually involves eyewitness perception.66 The immediate sense is often to cause observers to search for something nearby or to consider a deeper sense of meaning elsewhere, with the goal being to locate the inherent purpose of the event that just happened.
In the New Testament, the context often concerns the request for or the providing of a sign that some teaching or message was true, as with the angels who spoke to the shepherds in the fields in Luke 2:12 (also sēmeion). A potential, much debated case is the “sign of Jonah” to which Jesus referred for those Jewish leaders who demanded a heavenly sign, presumably, for how they could ascertain that Jesus was indeed Israel’s Messiah (Matt 12:38–40; 16:1–4; Luke 11:29).67
Like the term dunamis above, sēmeion is also translated as “miracle” or “wonder.” These concepts may be seen, respectively, to embody the notions of power and pointing in the sense of a special event that harnesses huge outlays of force or shifts one’s attention in other directions to focus on additional truth. The notions could also presumably be combined to encompass both aspects of an extraordinary power that points beyond itself to truth. It might be described as a sense of wondering why this event just happened or what it means.
Of course, at this point some may wonder why biblical word studies are setting the pace for our discussion of the philosophical nature of miracles. So why is this the case, it may be objected, when such linguistic studies do not necessarily tell us why something should operate in a certain way today? Initially, it should be recalled that when we looked at the meaning of the terms power and sign, we looked way beyond the biblical text alone, searching Hellenistic and gnostic contexts too. It must be allowed that this range of meaning encompassed a good part of at least the northern portion of the Mediterranean world!
Further, atheists and other skeptical philosophers and theologians recognize from precisely our own modern contexts the importance of a concept where miracles do not happen simply willy-nilly but to express a purpose, goal, or confirmation of one sort or another. Whether or not the notion ultimately obtains, Mackie points out, “The full concept of a miracle requires that the intrusion should be purposive, that it should fulfill the intention of a god or other supernatural being.”68 Flew goes even further, acknowledging that if a miracle such as Jesus’s resurrection occurred, it could serve to evidence a message with respect to Christian beliefs.69 Tillich thought that a definition of miracle would introduce some notions of pointing beyond themselves to truth(s) of some sort, though he shied away from delineating any concrete expressions of what he had in mind.70 Other examples could be mentioned as well.
So in both the ancient Mediterranean and biblical worlds, as well as jumping forward to several of today’s skeptical thinkers, not to mention a probable majority of current pro-miracle scholars, it certainly cannot be called at all odd or prejudiced to end our own definition of miracles by including the idea that miracles would occur for a purpose, such as pointing beyond themselves to truth(s) of some sort. Such is far more likely than these events being done capriciously or whimsically.
The particular nature of the message(s) that might be confirmed would depend on which truths flow best from the notion of God, the miraculous events themselves, the uniqueness of the events, the power involved, and so on. But this last topic takes us well beyond a definition of miracle. This still adds more to the value of our study here. For if the best argument at the end of this study is that the resurrection of Jesus really did occur, then that ultimate message could lead to some crucial discussions!
Conclusion
The chief purpose of this chapter was to survey and arrive at a fair definition of the term miracle including some of its component parts. Having done that, we postulated that on this notion, God or another supernatural agent causes or performs an event in nature which temporarily supersedes, transcends, or sets aside nature’s laws, though without “breaking” them in the process. The end result is the goal of verifying, drawing attention to, or otherwise commending a person or message. Now we must push on to several additional, crucial discussions and conclusions that build on this definition of miracles and keep working forward toward the goals.
Notes
1 Yujin Nagasawa, Miracles: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), 1; David Basinger also makes the point regarding the challenges of defining miracles in Basinger, Miracles, Elements in the Philosophy of Religion (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 1–18.
2 Robert Bruce Mullin, Miracles and the Modern Religious Imagination (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1996), 5–6.
3 Section 10, titled “Of Miracles,” in David Hume, An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, in The Essential Works of David Hume, ed. Ralph Cohen (New York: Bantam, 1965), 1:129n3 (Hume’s emphasis).
4 Nagasawa, Miracles, 17.
5 Nagasawa, 18.
6 Nagasawa, 12–18.
7 Lewis, Miracles, 5 (see chap. 4, n. 82).
8 Richard Swinburne, The Concept of Miracle (London: Macmillan, 1970), 1. Swinburne also repeats this definition in his “Introduction” to his later edited volume Miracles, ed. Richard Swinburne (New York: Macmillan, 1989), 2.
9 Swinburne, Concept of Miracle, 7–10.
10 Robert A. Larmer, The Legitimacy of Miracle (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2014), 3, 36.
11 Larmer, 36–40. Larmer continues this discussion in a later, very helpful fictional dialogue format that draws out many of these ideas; see Larmer, Dialogues on Miracle (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2015), particularly 1–44. Basinger offers some helpful introductory comments regarding the issue of a miracle being a violation of nature’s laws in Miracles, 6–7, 18–28. Craig Keener defines a miracle in this fashion: “For the general purposes used here, a ‘miracle’ may be defined as an extraordinary event with an unusual supernatural cause, although this definition is problematic from a number of vantage points. It is problematic from conventional theistic perspectives because all that is natural has an ultimate supernatural cause; indeed, even aside from creation, some dramatic biblical miracles such as the parting of the sea include proximate natural causes (such as the strong east wind, Exod 14:21). It is also problematic because ‘extraordinary’ and ‘unusual’ (the adjectives by which I seek to adjust for the first problem) are normally a matter of degree.” See Keener, Miracles: The Credibility of the New Testament Accounts (Grand Rapids: Baker Academic, 2011), 110. Keener comments further, “Granted, a biblical theist would see God typically working through the created order. In biblical narratives, God might do extraordinary acts through a powerful wind (Exod 10:13; 14:21; Num 11:31); some have offered plausible arguments that even the plagues in Egypt intensified the local ecosystem in an extraordinary way” (181, Keener’s emphasis).
12 German physicist Werner Schaaffs seems to be making a similar point with regard to friends and foes alike and how they sometimes line up on these issues. See Schaaffs’s very thoughtful volume, Theology, Physics, and Miracles, trans. Richard L. Renfield (Washington, DC: Canon, 1974), 17.
13 Although as will become more obvious in later chapters, there is a substantial amount of disagreement over exactly what Hume is attempting to argue or pertaining to his reasons for holding that miracles do not occur.
14 R. F. Holland, “The Miraculous,” in Swinburne, Miracles, 53. Holland’s essay was originally published in the American Philosophical Quarterly 2 (1965): 43–51.
15 Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1951), 1:115.
16 Tillich, 1:116–17. Tillich also points out that the concept of a true miracle involves at least three other ideas: it is “an event which is astonishing, unusual, shaking,” it points to the mystery of being, and lastly it serves as a “sign-event” (1:117).
17 Besides Hume in his essay, “Of Miracles,” others would include Antony Flew, God and Philosophy, rev. ed. (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005), 149–50; Flew, “Introduction,” in Of Miracles by David Hume (La Salle, IL: Open Court, 1985), esp. 7–9; also Flew, Hume’s Philosophy of Belief: A Study of His First Inquiry (London: Routledge, 1961), see chap. 8, “Miracles and Methodology,” in particular; Richard Otte, “Schlesinger and Probability,” Faith and Philosophy 10 (1993), 93–98; Jordan Howard Sobel, “On the Evidence of Testimony for Miracles: A Bayesian Interpretation of David Hume’s Analysis,” Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1987): 166–86; Sobel, “Hume’s Theorem on Testimony Sufficient to Establish a Miracle,” Philosophical Quarterly 41 (1991): 229–37; Christine Overall, “Miracles as Evidence against the Existence of God,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 23 (1985): 347–53; J. C. A. Gaskin, “Contrary Miracles Concluded,” Hume Studies (1985): 1–14; Alastair McKinnon, “‘Miracle’ and ‘Paradox,’” American Philosophical Quarterly 4 (1967): 309; J. L. Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 24, 26 (see chap. 1, n. 68); Patrick Nowell-Smith, “Miracles,” in New Essays in Philosophical Theology, ed. Antony Flew and Alasdair MacIntyre (New York: Macmillan, 1955), 251–53; George Chryssides, “Miracles and Agents,” Religious Studies 11 (1975): 319–27; Guy Robinson, “Miracles,” Ratio 9 (1967): 155–66; Malcolm Diamond, “Miracles,” Religious Studies 9 (1967): 320–21; David Owen, “Hume versus Price on Miracles and Prior Probabilities,” in Swinburne, Miracles, 129–32; Francis J. Beckwith, David Hume’s Argument against Miracles: A Critical Analysis (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1989), 7–8. Though Beckwith is not a skeptic, he is at least willing to work within the Humean parameters. For an intriguing stance that disagrees with perhaps even a majority of Hume’s interpreters, see Chris Slupik, “A New Interpretation of Hume’s ‘Of Miracles,’” Religious Studies 31 (1995): 518–36. We may need to be reminded again that the arguments in this note come from a wide variety of angles and it may not be immediately obvious why a few of them are listed here.
18 For several of these works, see Larry Shapiro, The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 18–19 (in spite of his unqualified dismissal of miracles); Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate (Oxford: Clarendon, 2003), particularly 17–26; Mullin, Miracles, 6–7; Richard Purtill, “Defining Miracles,” in In Defense of Miracles: A Comprehensive Case for God’s Action in History, ed. R. Douglas Geivett and Gary R. Habermas, (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1998), 72; cf. Purtill, “Proofs of Miracles and Miracles as Proofs,” Christian Scholar’s Review 6 (1976): 39–51; William Lane Craig, “The Problem of Miracles: A Historical and Philosophical Perspective,” in The Miracles of Jesus, vol. 6 of Gospel Perspectives, ed. David Wenham and Craig Blomberg (Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 1986), 27, 43; Norman L. Geisler, Miracles and the Modern Mind: A Defense of Biblical Miracles (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1992), 14; David Basinger and Randall Basinger, Philosophy and Miracle: The Contemporary Debate (Lewiston, NY: Mellen, 1986), 23; David Basinger, “Christian Theism and the Concept of Miracle: Some Epistemological Perplexities,” Southern Journal of Philosophy 18 (1980): 137–38; Dennis Jensen, “The Logic of Miracles,” Journal of the American Scientific Affiliation 33 (1981): 145–53; Holland, “The Miraculous,” in Swinburne, Miracles, 53, 69; Paul J. Dietl, “On Miracles,” American Philosophical Quarterly 5 (1968): 236–45; Schaaffs, Theology, Physics, and Miracles, 27; Colin Brown, Miracles and the Critical Mind (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1984), 290–92. The final footnote in Chris Slupik’s essay, “A New Interpretation of Hume’s ‘Of Miracles,’” which is cited in footnote 17 just above, also contains some points that are helpful for this perspective. Earlier in this chapter we already viewed the positions of Larmer and Lewis.
19 For a number of these scholars, see Rodney D. Holder, “Hume on Miracles: Bayesian Interpretation, Multiple Testimony, and the Existence of God,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (1998): esp. 60–62; George Mavrodes, “David Hume and Probability of Miracles,” International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 43 (1998): 176–77; Benjamin F. Armstrong Jr., “Hume on Miracles: Begging-the-Question against Believers,” History of Philosophy Quarterly 9 (1992): 319, 327; John Earman, Hume’s Abject Failure: The Argument against Miracles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), esp. the entire host of critiques found in part 1; Earman, “Bayes, Hume, and Miracles,” Faith and Philosophy 10 (1993): esp. 293, 305–6; George N. Schlesinger, “Miracles and Probabilities,” Nous 21 (1987): esp. 219, 230–32; Schlesinger, “The Credibility of Extraordinary Events,” Analysis 51 (1991): 125; Roy A. Sorensen, “Hume’s Scepticism concerning Reports of Miracles,” Analysis 43 (1983): 60; Timothy J. McGrew, “Of Miracles,” in The Nature Miracles of Jesus: Problems, Perspectives, and Prospects, ed. Graham H. Twelftree (Eugene, OR: Cascade, 2017), 152–73.
20 Such as N. T. Wright, History and Eschatology (see chap. 2, n. 1), as repeated throughout his early chapters. Keener adds here, “Likewise many cultures today do not accept the Western dichotomy between natural and supernatural.” See Miracles, 7, also 134. For a discussion of the relationship between the natural and supernatural, see Benjamin Shaw, “Historical Epistemology and Divine Action,” in Raised on the Third Day: Defending the Historicity of the Resurrection of Jesus Essays to Honor the Life’s Work of Gary R. Habermas, ed. David Beck and Michael R. Licona (Bellingham, WA: Lexham, 2020), 263–88.
21 Flew with Varghese, There Is a God, 96 (see chap. 1, n. 68).
22 Flew, God and Philosophy, 153. Mackie is similar at this point. The Miracle of Theism, 26. In our first of three debates on the resurrection of Jesus, Flew delineated even more forcefully his principle of strong laws with real exceptions; see Gary Habermas and Antony Flew, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?, 34–35 (see chap. 1, n. 68).
23 Years later, in 2004, Flew, the best-known philosophical atheist in the world, announced that he had become a theist/deist, interchanging the terms in different contexts. See Antony Flew and Gary Habermas, “My Pilgrimage from Atheism to Theism: A Discussion between Antony Flew and Gary Habermas,” Philosophia Christi 6 (2004): 197–211. Oddly enough, of the three intellectual reasons that Flew gave for his “conversion” to theism, asking where the laws of nature came from was one of these factors. He knew that, with Hume and others, he had employed the laws of nature over his entire career to offset miracle claims, only to realize that these laws themselves demand order, precision, and especially a grounding other than a one-time chance explosion in the universe, where these laws might even have changed over time! See Flew with Varghese, There Is a God, chap. 5.
24 Swinburne, “Violation of a Law of Nature,” in Swinburne, Miracles, 78.
25 Swinburne, Resurrection of God Incarnate, 17–18.
26 Swinburne, 18. Mackie defines the laws of nature similarly (The Miracle of Theism, 22).
27 Swinburne, Resurrection of God Incarnate, 19–23.
28 Flew, God and Philosophy, esp. 156, also 153; Habermas and Flew, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?, 3, 34–35, 49–50.
29 Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 22–26, 28.
30 Shapiro, Miracle Myth, 22, 152–53.
31 Such as Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 343–47 (see chap. 1, n. 30), for example; Basinger and Basinger, Philosophy and Miracle, 13–14, 88, 100.
32 According to Thomas Huxley, Hume’s definition “cannot be justified.” Huxley, “The Order of Nature: Miracles,” in Hume on Miracles, ed. Stanley Tweyman (Bristol: Thoemmes, 1996), 161.
33 Swinburne, Resurrection of God Incarnate, 23.
34 For a brief encapsulation of this scientific progression, see J. P. Moreland, Scientism and Secularism: Learning to Respond to a Dangerous Ideology (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2018), 81–83.
35 Thomas S. Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions (see chap. 3, n. 5).
36 Swinburne, Resurrection of God Incarnate, 23; cf. also Swinburne, “Violation of a Law of Nature,” 83–84. Mackie likewise agrees on the corrigibility of inductive hypotheses, depending on the strength of the data. Miracle of Theism, 23.
37 Swinburne, Concept of Miracle, 3; similarly, see Swinburne, Resurrection of God Incarnate, 18.
38 Basinger and Basinger, Philosophy and Miracle, 7.
39 Schaaffs, Theology, Physics and Miracles, 66.
40 Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 22–24; Swinburne, Concept of Miracle, 31–32; Swinburne, “Violation of a Law of Nature,” 84.
41 C. S. Lewis, “The Laws of Nature,” in God in the Dock: Essays on Theology and Ethics, ed. Walter Hooper (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1970), 77 (Lewis’s emphasis).
42 Schaaffs, Theology, Physics and Miracles, 45.
43 Schaaffs, 56. In answer to the question concerning whether science’s current understanding changes, Schaaffs responds, “The indeterminacy relation may have to be refined, but the principle behind it will remain” (67, emphasis added).
44 History assists in our ability to understand how agents act within the perceived natural laws.
45 Some of the various examples of even skeptical scholars (some quite radically so) who treat historiographical studies in an optimistic and/or constructive manner include the following: David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, section 5, pt. 1; Wilhelm Dilthey, “The Understanding of Other Persons and Their Life-Expressions,” in volume 7 of Dilthey, Gesammelte Schriften, republished in Patrick Gardiner, Theories of History: Readings from Classical and Contemporary Sources, The Free Press Textbooks in Philosophy, ed. Paul Edwards (New York: Macmillan, 1959), 224–25; Benedetto Croce, “History and Chronicle,” in History—Its Theory and Practice, republished in Gardiner, Theories of History, 228–30; Bertrand Russell, “Dialectical Materialism,” in Freedom and Organization, re-published in Gardiner, Theories of History, 287–92; Russell, “Truth and Falsehood,” in The Problems of Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon, 1912), 284; A. J. Ayer, Language, Truth and Logic (New York: Dover, 1946), 16, 18–19, 40, 101; R. G. Collingwood, Idea of History, 97, 134–51, 246–82, 292–94 (see chap. 1, n. 56); Collingwood, “Limits of Historical Knowledge” (see chap. 1, n. 68); Beard, “Written History,” 141–51 (see chap. 1, n. 66); Beard, Economic Interpretation (see chap. 1, n. 68); Carl L. Becker, “What Are Historical Facts?,” 121–37 (see chap. 1, n. 68); Becker, Heavenly City, 17–21, 28–39, 83–84 (see chap. 1, n. 68), for some examples. It should be noted that the theme of this entire book by Becker involves a historical argument, chiefly comparing ideas in the eighteenth and thirteenth centuries (31). Other skeptical sources include Karl Mannheim, “The Sociology of Knowledge,” in Ideology and Utopia, republished in Gardiner, Theories of History, 247–49; Foucault, Archaeology of Knowledge, 149–65, 195 (see chap. 1, n. 68); Mackie, Miracle of Theism, esp. 23–28; Flew, God and Philosophy, 146, 150–58; Flew in Habermas and Flew, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?, 5–8; Flew, There Is a God, 185–87, 213.
46 Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 26.
47 A very similar definition can be found in Habermas, Philosophy of History, 10 (see chap. 4, n. 28).
48 Lewis, Miracles, 60.
49 Hume, “Of Miracles,” part 1; Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 24; cf. Flew in Habermas and Flew, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?, 3; Swinburne, Concept of Miracle, 32; Swinburne, “Violation of a Law of Nature,” 84, cf. 133; Swinburne, Resurrection of God Incarnate, 23, 27.
50 Again, we are not simply assuming or postulating the reality of such miraculous scenarios here. These cases would have to be established rather than just be asserted. Thus, we are speaking hypothetically in this present, definitional context.
51 Stephen T. Davis, “Is It Possible to Know That Jesus Was Raised from the Dead?,” Faith and Philosophy 1 (1984): 151.
52 Davis, “Is it Possible to Know,” 152.
53 Lewis, Miracles, 63–64. Intriguingly, Lewis attests that he did not notice until years later that the Christian view of the matter is “more vivid and more concrete” (64).
54 Lewis, 59.
55 Lewis, 46, 61 for examples.
56 Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 25.
57 Swinburne, “Violation of a Law of Nature,” 80–81; very similar wording is found in Swinburne, Concept of Miracle, 27–28.
58 Intriguingly, we have seen that this notion of being superseded by a superior power is even acknowledged by atheistic philosophers should such an event obtain. See Flew, God and Philosophy, 153, 156; Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 24.
59 Antony Flew, ed., A Dictionary of Philosophy, 2nd ed. (New York: St. Martin’s, 1984), 234.
60 Lewis, Miracles, 93.
61 For a technical and detailed study of the relevant material here, see Walter Grundmann, “δύναμις,” in Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, ed. Gerhard Kittel and Gerhard Friedrich, trans. Geoffrey W. Bromiley (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1964), 2:284–317. For a popular source, see W. E. Vine, An Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words with Their Precise Meanings for English Readers, 4 vols. (Old Tappan, NJ: Revell, 1966), 3:75–76.
62 Walter Grundmann, “δύναμις,” 2:284, 286–90; cf. 297, 307.
63 Grundmann, 2:290–94.
64 Grundmann, 2:299–302, 304 in particular.
65 A technical and comprehensive examination is available from Karl Rengstorf, “σημεῖον,” in Kittel and Friedrich, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, 7:200–61; Vine also provides a popular treatment in An Expository Dictionary of New Testament Words, 3:75–76.
66 As in Kittel and Friedrich, Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, “σημεῖον,” esp. 7:213–16.
67 Kittel and Friedrich, 7:231, 233–36.
68 Mackie, Miracle of Theism, 22; cf. 19–20. Richard Taylor helpfully identifies two types of explanation that would be relevant here. See Taylor, “Two Kinds of Explanation,” in Swinburne, Miracles, 103. See also Swinburne, Concept of Miracle, 53–57.
69 Flew, God and Philosophy, 156; Habermas and Flew, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?, 49–50 and elsewhere.
70 Tillich, Systematic Theology, 1:115, 117.