Conclusion: From the Disciples’ Experiences to REAL Appearances
Conclusion:
From the Disciples’ Experiences to REAL Appearances
As observed often throughout this study, virtually all critical scholars who address the issue indicate how rarely questioned it is that Jesus’s disciples had some sort of real experiences that made them absolutely sure that Jesus had appeared to them after his death, enough so to change their lives completely.1 Given this fact, the vast amount of space in these volumes is still committed to arguing for even more evidence on behalf of such views even though it is such an admittedly critical given. Why? This has been done because views change periodically; plus this recognition is the baseline premise that moves into the discussion in this chapter.
To illustrate this previous point, even Ehrman reminds us that without the proclamation of Jesus’s resurrection appearances and the subsequent faith response by the disciples, there would not have been any Christianity.2 Ehrman adds that he would hardly oppose the notion that the disciples thought they saw the risen Jesus. He affirmed this “with complete certainty” because “this is a matter of public record. For it is a historical fact.”3 Dale Allison goes further, asserting that even very critical New Testament scholars have long conceded the disciples’ experiences at least as far back as the famous mid-nineteenth-century German skeptic David Strauss and presumably even before that.4
These scholars are correct that there is actually a very long and honorable history of critical scholars who have agreed that key experiences of some sort actually occurred among Jesus’s disciples, followed by their major transformations. Nonetheless, a few brief responses should be made here to the question of the amount of attention in this study devoted to these events. It is truly well established in modern theology with different degrees of confidence that Jesus’s disciples had real experiences that they sincerely believed were resurrection appearances. This has been the case going at least back to Friedrich Schleiermacher’s role at the beginning of German liberalism and even well before that, to the beginning of higher criticism. Even the majority of atheist, agnostic, and self-identified non-Christian scholars today in relevant areas of study almost always concede this truth as well. So, if Ehrman, Allison, and almost all other critical scholars concede this, why devote this much discussion to establishing such a well-accepted point?
Though the critical scholarly agreement here is exceptionally strong, caveats appear from time to time. Some influential skeptical scholars of late have made passing references that would include at least some of these disciples, or to hint that the accounts were not reported immediately but only later, perhaps just a few years before the time of Paul’s writing, and so on. It occasionally seems as though these almost lone efforts attempt to drive just a slight bit of a wedge wherever and whenever possible to cause doubts. Although the overall case has grown more confidently optimistic in recent years, skeptical scholars have occasionally raised questions off the beaten paths.5
It often seems that when the evidence grows increasingly positive—especially when it closes in on more critical scholars and their views—many skeptics will either change or adjust their earlier allowances of the data that they previously reported as being established. This presumably leaves more room for unbelief. It almost seems as if anything else can change except their ultimate position against the resurrection, which must remain in place at all costs. Pannenberg once remarked revealingly regarding then-atheist philosopher Antony Flew’s denial of the resurrection that Flew had virtually admitted several times that if it were not Jesus’s resurrection that hung in the balances, he would have agreed readily with the strength of the historical case!6
One reason that could strengthen the case for the disciples’ experiences concerns the actual cause and nature of those experiences. Can it be known whether the disciples and other early believers were correct in their reports that they truly witnessed appearances of Jesus after he had been raised from the dead? Conversely, it can work the other way too. Can it be known that the disciples were in error here? In other words, in addition to the disciples’ utter convictions that they had seen the risen Jesus, can it be known whether they were mistaken? True, the disciples’ tireless commitment to communicating the message is remarkable, made even more so in that it was a belief in a unique resurrection teaching that motivated their commitment. But after all, the critics retort, experiential information has often been mistaken. Yet again, the disciples could have been correct as to the ultimate grounding of their convictions too.
However, perhaps both sides fail to proceed far enough. What else can be posed to answer the question of whether Jesus’s disciples actually saw him? This issue is precisely what is being addressed in this chapter to get to the heart of the matter. In light of the basic agreement regarding the disciples’ experiences, we need to push ahead to a legitimate and likely conclusion to these occurrences.
So, can the disciples’ complete and total convictions that they had witnessed appearances of the risen Jesus help in answering whether or not they had actually done so? Could they simply have been mistaken? Was Jesus really present before them? Are there some ways to narrow this gap significantly? Are there some helpful indications that may assist in breaking through and adjudicating this impasse in this chapter?
In volume 2 of this study, almost two dozen a priori philosophical and historical objections to miracles will be entertained and addressed in a tremendous amount of rather tedious detail. Additionally, many far lengthier chapters in the second volume are also devoted to treating a posteriori issues, chiefly consisting of individual naturalistic alternative theses that have been aimed at the resurrection down through the years.
Tabling for now the evaluations of these individual naturalistic theses that are considered in hundreds of details in the next volume, we will take up in the remainder of this chapter two major questions. Perhaps the two most prominent prior categorical challenges to the resurrection as mentioned by the critics will be addressed. The first question concerns a general belief regarding the naturalistic scenarios. More specifically, it is sometimes charged that virtually any of these alternative responses should be preferred over an actual resurrection, since the latter event involves a miraculous occurrence. This comment is based on a second, background objection that the supernatural realm either does not exist at all, as realized by a lack of evidence, or that it is at least highly unlikely to interfere with this world.
Both questions will only be addressed here generally, due to the hundreds of relevant pages that can be viewed in these volumes and elsewhere, where these issues will be divided into very narrow particulars over a wide range of hypotheses being singled out and treated separately within them. What can be stated regarding the first thought that any natural thesis is better than a supernatural one? The second issue concerning the very existence of another world also needs to be approached here briefly from more than one direction, though it must be understood that only hints along with brief comments will be made, since this subject has neither been argued nor solved in this text. Hence this will take us beyond the parameters of this volume. Some considerations will be introduced in the remainder of this discussion, with additional aspects being raised in later chapters in this study, unpacking many additional details.
The Present State of Naturalistic Responses to the Resurrection
It should be noted once again that the hundreds of individual particulars that are part of the alternative options to Jesus’s resurrection will be taken up in the entire second volume of this study. This is only mentioned briefly here to provide hints regarding some preliminary considerations to this question in light of the historical evidence that has been discussed in this volume.
This multivolume resurrection study may be the longest on this topic ever attempted. Likewise, the investigation and critique of these individual anti-miraculous options in the second volume (at nearly 1,000 pages) without much doubt has probably devoted far more space and details to evaluating the key natural alternative hypotheses to Jesus’s resurrection than has any other major study of the past.7 This page count obviously does not guarantee that all the natural options have been considered and eliminated, though potentially the most thorough effort has been made to do so. This nearly exhaustive survey of the major options has even included more than one variety of several of the single hypotheses. Numerous specific and multifaceted critiques regarding the naturalistic responses are found elsewhere throughout this present volume too.
Note that the refutations are almost always drawn from the minimal facts as well, hopefully making these rejections even more valuable in critical terms. However, it is also quite clearly the case that the longest treatments of particular subjects do not necessarily guarantee by the sheer number of pages alone that they are exemplary. That should be determined by others.
The upshot of such evaluations in recent decades, including from other researchers, is that the general scholarly sentiment has grown somewhat more opposed to these natural theses. The swing in this direction has been especially more noticeable in the last decade or two. It might be surmised that there should be plenty of critical scholars who would wish to embrace one of the the alternative views, perhaps even enthusiastically, if they were considered to be supported better by the data. But there appear to be fewer scholars at present who are embracing these options, apparently due to the strength of the contrary data.
Further and quite surprisingly, this change of direction may be observed in a number of distinguished critics at present who prefer not to embrace a single alternate thesis by itself, preferring a general “shotgun” approach that basically presents several alternatives where the critic can switch back and forth between the options if one or two become problematic in the aftermath of the ensuing discussion. Thus, the older one-thesis critics of the past appear to be dwindling severely in number. One way to observe and check this is to consider how many major, influential scholars in relevant fields in recent years have endorsed and defended a single naturalistic view of the resurrection and stuck with it come what may. Choosing just one alternative was more common in the previous couple of decades, but that approach seems to be disappearing somewhat at present.8
For example, Ehrman asserts in How Jesus Became God (164–65) that unbelievers “should not feel compelled to come up with an alternative explanation for why the tomb was empty.” Why add this last assertion? This sounds as if the critics are admitting a bit of a disadvantage here, similarly to someone who asserts, “You know that you don’t have to answer that question!” But wouldn’t a knock-out natural view or two be ventured or perhaps even asserted loudly at this point if such were available? If so, then not to respond with an alternative thesis, as Ehrman recommends, in itself appears to be a retreating move.
These considerations seem to hint, if not shout loudly, that the alternative critiques have fallen on tough times and for more than one reason. While a scholarly head count and similar considerations of course do not refute these natural options, a surer approach is that it is almost undeniable that the historical facts that are agreed upon even by quite critical scholars are very difficult for these natural views to explain well, as critics themselves admit.9
Another indication of this change is the large number of well-known critical scholars themselves who refute and even disparage these natural hypotheses, sometimes giving additional details that explain their reasons for doing so.10
In fact, it is occasionally commented that the number of critiques that can be leveled against each natural supposition even when utilizing only the data derived from a smaller number of critically endorsed facts of history basically amounts to overkill. Angus Menuge declared that “Habermas’ ‘minimal facts’ approach . . . does explain why, over time, one skeptical alternative after another to the historical fact of the resurrection has been abandoned, leaving critics with shrinking cover to hide.”11
Bart Ehrman’s stance on naturalistic resurrection options seems to have been redirected in recent years, given some of his latest comments on the possibilities. He has stated while addressing this subject, “I don’t subscribe to any of these alternative views.”12 This actually appears to confirm the sort of trend that has been addressed here because once again it may be assumed that a thesis would be chosen and defended if there were a viable candidate available. Natural theses have fallen on rough times of late,13 but they are still preferred by some scholars.14
Thus, times appear to have changed in this area. There does not seem to be much of a rush at present to embrace specific natural alternative views and stick with that option to explain the resurrection appearances of Jesus. That quite critical researchers have even produced various critiques of these natural options is another indication against these moves. These efforts have been minimized of late, perhaps out of deference to the recognized historical data that dispute each of these options.
When pitted against the evidenced and admittedly knowable historical facts regarding Jesus, even as recognized by very skeptical scholars, the present trend seems to indicate less than a positive climate for feasible alternative challenges to Jesus’s resurrection. This may well provide some strong hints so far, though without any as yet final confirmation that these hypotheses will fail. Since it centers precisely on these questions, the next volume should provide many robust indications and in-depth examinations of these options. But unless one or more viable natural options arise to challenge the resurrection, this would reveal a probable end for these suppositions.
Is There a Supernatural Realm?
This leads to the second major question mentioned above. In place of proposing a natural replacement option for the resurrection event,15 it is worth noting once again that Ehrman makes the additional move noted above. He responds: “As I’ve argued, any other scenario—no matter how unlikely—is more likely than the one in which a great miracle occurred.”16 Even one of Jesus’s own followers stealing Jesus’s dead body and then lying about it, as unlikely as that would be, is more likely than is an event where God raised Jesus from the dead, because such an occasion would involve God performing a non-researchable miracle.17 Specifying what he meant, he surmised that even an improbable natural event is more likely than a “Christian miracle” that involves God, “the power of God,” “the supernatural realm,” or “theological beliefs.”18
Ehrman is definitely not alone in this approach among his naturalistic peers, who often seem to rest the strength of their individual critiques of separate miracle claims on the assumed nonexistence of any supernatural sphere.19 Actually, this is one of the most common naturalistic retorts of late, as if to follow almost any natural suggestions whatsoever with statements like, “Besides, there is no reason to think that another world exists anyway.”
There are several powerful rejoinders to follow up this critical response, though in this chapter we will just briefly list a few directions that will need to await later discussions. It should be noted that while these considerations will be crucial pieces in formulating an overall worldview case later, they were not factors in showing that Jesus’s resurrection was a historical event. However, each of these avenues will be developed in detail in future portions of this study.
First, naturalistic and similar views such as those of Ehrman, Carrier, and Shapiro along with many others sometimes exhibit a startling lack of philosophical perspective and introspection. Why should their assumption of naturalism’s truth be allowed to stand solely because they have repeatedly asserted that this is so?20 Further, how can such a fideistic “foundation” then be allowed to judge all other worldviews, including those that are supported by arguments? This is simply a stunningly evasive maneuver. As I wrote in response to Shapiro’s volume:
His backdrop employs a highly slanted perspective throughout, one that seemingly assumes some version of naturalism, although without a speck of “proof” on its own behalf. Yet it is the measure of everything else, as an all-pervasive assumption. Shapiro’s table tilts downward from his own unproven world-view (which may well be unprovable altogether). But it remains seriously and alarmingly ubiquitous. Why should any unproven thesis act as a trump card? This background attitude seems like a thinly veiled disgust with anything regarding supernatural items or religious revelatory beliefs.21
For starters, can these critics demonstrate that naturalism is the proper underlying worldview perspective? Many philosophers (including non-Christians) have asserted that establishing the truth of naturalism by evidential arguments is a hopeless assignment, not to mention its most likely being a self-refuting perspective.22 In such a case, this approach to doubting the supernatural would itself be nullified. What is the underlying grounding for the ability to rule out God, miracles, the afterlife, or the supernatural world without a single evidential pronouncement? For several reasons then, naturalistic theories aimed at Jesus’s resurrection that begin here occupy exceptionally weak grounds, at least the large number that often tend to be illogical and fideistic, or that use their own unanchored positions to oppose well-evidenced views.
Second, few issues are more convuluted than that of pursuing arguments for God’s existence or formulating a theistic worldview. These matters arguably do not have to be solved before establishing the historical case for Jesus’s resurrection and will by no means be solved here. Still, several considerations will be presented, as mentioned earlier. For instance, if God hypothetically does exist, and especially if there are any arguments that could indicate this existence,23 then this could change dramatically the entire issue regarding Ehrman’s, Carrier’s, and Shapiro’s similar assertions about theological truths, God’s power, and so on. Reasons for God’s existence are also critiqued, but placing positive arguments on the table may well counter the naturalistic approach that often offers very little if any solid positive reasons for its own confirmation.24
Naturalists have even occasionally recognized the force of this approach. Owen surprisingly concedes outright that if the argument for God obtains, it could solve the miracles question in the affirmative.25 Even more stunningly due to his perhaps seeming to be the most dogmatic of the naturalists mentioned here regarding his opposition to miracles, Shapiro still conceded that “the existence of a god who wanted to resurrect Jesus would increase the probability of Jesus’s resurrection. Indeed, if that god were omnipotent, I would say it raises the probability of the resurrection to one.”26 While Shapiro goes on to state here that he is open to miracles, it is also clear that he does not think that either God or miracles obtain. Nonetheless, his hypothetical concession of a 1:1 ratio for the resurrection given the existence of an omnipotent God after his foregoing highly negative argument remains incredibly stunning. Again, this is a very involved and difficult subject, but it potentially leaves one or more doors ajar. Then how can the subject of God’s existence be largely ignored when the result could change the entire scenario?
Third, there exist several exceptionally powerful empirical arguments for the existence of some sort of realm beyond this present one and at least a minimal afterlife. To take just one of the options here, near-death experiences (NDEs) have opened a non-miraculous avenue in recent years that very few saw coming. For starters, NDE data have been presented in more than 100 peer-reviewed medical, psychological, and other reputable journals. Many millions of people claim to have experienced them.27 Documented cases of patients with neither measurable brain waves nor heartbeats have clearly reported rather incredible data during these times that were actually verified by others, both from their own vicinity as well as far away.28 Over 300 cases of highly evidenced NDEs have been reported, with many being catalogued as well.29
For our purposes here, a relevant benefit can be derived from the existence of the most highly evidenced NDE cases. These select examples may indicate the likelihood of another reality beyond this one, with the data pointing to the existence of the same metaphysical territory being addressed by Jesus’s resurrection—that of the afterlife. Thus, if the best NDE evidence argues strongly for at least a minimal notion of life after death, this could serve well as a bridge to another realm, making Jesus’s evidenced resurrection appearances even more likely.30 Granted, the mention of NDEs here is too brief and lacks too many important details.31 Still, we will return to this matter momentarily.
Fourth, since historical events are not self-interpreting, this means they never stand alone, and thus are incapable of revealing at least their ultimate significance in and of themselves. Rather, events must be interpreted within a specific context—more precisely, as part of a worldview. Drawing from a larger picture than the event alone is necessary, since such a framework helps to provide meaning for the occurrence in terms of its structure and perspective within overall reality. The additional information helps shape its significance and meaning.
This is the case with miracle claims as well. Unusual events are not catapulted to miraculous status simply by virtue of their oddness. David Basinger is one of several philosophers and theologians who have pointed out that particular and even intricate realities can exist that may be described as being a part of “an accepted divine action pattern” that surrounds occurrences, concepts, teachings, and so on in ways that may potentially illumine and explain these events and ideas to a greater extent than is manifest by these phenomena alone.32 Such an additional assemblage of information beyond the initial event itself may serve to identify it as a potential miraculous act that is linked with God. These circumstances surrounding events might constitute something approaching an intersecting pattern that further informs its meaning.
Basinger offers several instances of such occurrences that might happen, for example, in the presence of answered prayer, that may constitute just such “a recognized divine action pattern.”33 Circumstances may coalesce in various ways to fulfill such scenarios, such as answered prayer in conjunction with specific medical healings, especially in cases that occur in a precise, timely manner. The prayers could be in the form of individuals invoking God’s actions for healing or in other, nonmedical circumstances. Very difficult medical conditions could exist where positive results are specifically quite contrary to the expectations, especially when the results occur at the precise time when they are most required.34
In other scenarios, less acute medical conditions or even altogether nonmedical needs may be viewed. In these or other scenarios, especially if multiple such background confirmations are part of the overall study, the persons involved may be on decent grounds to conclude that there are enough quality considerations and attending data to recognize that God may have allowed a healing to occur.35 Basinger cautions that there may be “no epistemological certainty” that this is the case, but at least a personal conviction of God’s action may remain.36
In Jesus’s case, frequent descriptions of many extenuating events or circumstances before his resurrection might point to this occurrence being more than just some stand-alone, extraordinary event. In other words, a composite picture may work together here to establish the possibility or even the likelihood that what happened to Jesus involved more than his resurrection alone, as great a sign as that might have been in the first century. The reported healings by Jesus are largely accepted even by very critical specialists as well, as noted below and elsewhere in this volume.
In the case of the resurrection reports, there are other pointers that occurred beyond this singular event that many think could potentially serve as crucial indications of special knowledge or power. For example, it was reported that Jesus predicted this grand event before it occurred,37 which could have indicated that he was part of the overall plan of which he had previous knowledge. Moreover, many scholars think that Jesus made extraordinary claims about himself, such as those pertaining to his own deity and his being God’s specific path of salvation,38 which are other examples. As just mentioned, further background provided by Jesus’s physical healings that are even generally acknowledged by critical scholars to be historical occurrences,39 the quality of Jesus’s ethical teachings, and so on help to fill out even more of this overall picture. Each of these events was recorded in the earliest historical reports. They may be precisely the sorts of factors that need to be evaluated along with Jesus’s resurrection in concert with evaluative principles provided by the likes of Bayes’ Theorem and/or other evaluative tools.40
In sum, numerous scholars have amassed many considerations that this may be a theistic universe, although these were not argued in this volume. Their reasons have included the failure of naturalistic hypotheses to explain the resurrection as a natural event even according to many critical scholars themselves, as already mentioned;41 the overall weaknesses of philosophical naturalism as a whole, including its apparent inability to demonstrate its own views; the possibility of God’s existence; NDEs; and still other indications of a supernatural universe, such as present-day double-blind prayer tests, evidence of medical healing, plus indications that specifically involve a meaningful afterlife all weave a greater-than-necessary probable pattern of divine action. Moreover, other unique areas in the life of Jesus, such as his predictions of his death and resurrection, his personal claims to deity and his being the salvific path to eternal life, and his exceptional ethical teachings all build on the resurrection event and contribute to this overall nexus and pattern.
Going even further, that these are singular, unmatched emphases among the founders of the world’s major religions adds to the sense of Jesus’s overall uniqueness.42 Each of these areas coincides to point strongly to Jesus being a part of an overall picture that argues for more than a mere happenstance in Christian theism. This combination of data and application leads us to conclude that Jesus’s disciples actually did see him alive after his death by crucifixion. However, we have not concluded in this volume that the resurrection was a miracle. This was done purposely. The views of others have been expressed, and trends here and there have been mentioned. But we are not there yet because these considerations have not yet been argued and developed.
Thus, it should be carefully noted once again that the topics outlined in this section of the chapter were not part of the historical argument for Jesus’s resurrection that has been defended in this initial volume. Rather, these subjects were only mentioned here briefly, without strict argumentation or further elaboration, awaiting additional discussion and development in the ensuing volumes in this series.43
As for the chief argument in this context, we do not want to lose track of the immediate conclusion at this point. The theme at the close of this initial volume concerns the pathway to answering the decisive question by making a crucial move from the virtually unanimous critical view that after Jesus’s death by crucifixion, the disciples had real experiences that they thought were appearances of Jesus to the further conclusion that these followers did in fact truly witness the presence of the risen Jesus.
A Last Consideration
A final item should be added to the argument. Initially, Ehrman repeats the objection often that historians qua historians cannot investigate miracles, since such occurrences by definition would involve two different realms of knowing, namely, those of history and faith. If God raised Jesus from the dead, this supernatural action would be outside the sphere of historical research and thus not open to such investigation. As Ehrman states, “Historians have no access to the supernatural realm.”44
Ehrman of course does hold that there are many strong reasons to believe that Jesus died by crucifixion.45 In fact, the historian can even acknowledge that Jesus “was seen alive, bodily, afterward. A historian could, in theory, argue this point without appealing to divine causality—that is, without saying that God raised him from the dead.” Therefore, the line that the historian cannot cross is that seeing Jesus “alive, bodily, afterward” was something that happened because God worked a miracle in time and space. Apart from knowing that these events involved God’s miraculous intervention, then, this potential scenario of Jesus dying by crucifixion and then being seen alive and bodily afterward may be affirmed by historians.46
However, at the beginning of this volume, as well as a few times throughout this volume and elsewhere, I also posed very similar scenarios long before this that match quite closely Ehrman’s formulation here. This is a fair and worthwhile starting place. In other words, it has been mentioned often in this text that two rather straightforward questions are in view: Did Jesus die by crucifixion? And was Jesus actually seen again sometime later? These are ground-level theses that, as Ehrman notes, may be determined by the historian without introducing the question of miracles.47 From many years ago in my research, this served as a personal means of bracketing cognate questions like Ehrman’s by arguing that historians researching strictly within their field cannot answer the possibility of God’s existence, God’s potential actions in history, and thus the occurrence of real miracles caused by God. Then Ehrman’s two prior historical questions about Jesus’s death by crucifixion and his potentially being seen alive again bodily may be answered. This seems to be a fair reading of his words. And it was this view that I likewise defended as well.
Ehrman and other unbelieving scholars are correct that historians are within their range of academic competence to inquire about the historicity of Jesus’s death and whether he was seen later alive, apart from references to miracles such as God having raised him.48 It is clear to virtually all scholars, pro and con, both that Jesus died by crucifixion and that his followers had experiences that convinced them that he was seen again afterward. But this goes further yet—that historians who agree with the possibility mentioned by Ehrman may even affirm that Jesus was seen again later, walking and talking in a non-miraculous sense. It remains in the next volume to investigate the final issues involved as to whether specific alternative theses can explain these data in natural terms, though many comments have already been discussed in this volume.
It likewise should have been clear from the arguments over hundreds of pages throughout this first volume that there are many indications that Jesus was seen again after his death. However, any potentially miraculous side of the resurrection question was not even pursued in this volume.
A strong indication regarding this non-miraculous data needs to be considered in this context. Near-death experiences (NDEs) are not miracles. They require neither God’s existence nor his intervention. Neither do they argue for the truth of any particular religious persuasion; thus, they have been interpreted variously. NDEs are simply what has been repeatedly reported when people come close to dying.49 NDE studies are among the most clear-cut areas of investigation indicating that there is probably an afterlife of some sort, as supported by very strong empirical evidence.50 Therefore, such a conclusion should present a head start in answering our second question regarding whether Jesus was seen again after his death. If there is an afterlife, then the truth and existence of such a metaphysical category raises the odds further, particularly in light of the many evidences like those presented in this volume that Jesus was, in fact, seen alive after his death. In other words, since after-death phenomena are quite well evidenced,51 Jesus’s appearances would provide additional data for an afterlife. As such, they should be recognized by critical scholars, since they are also both well evidenced, occupy the same corroborated category of the afterlife, and can be evidenced apart from the miracles question.
Conclusion: From the Disciples’ Experiences to Really Having Seen Jesus
Scholars have worldviews and should be able to argue strongly for the truth of their own positions and assertions. Although naturalists have offered responses to theistic arguments and claims, as well as analyzing opposing critiques of several sorts, often quite briefly, these exercises still fail to indicate that the background perspective of naturalism itself is actually true.52 In other words, how does even potentially refuting theistic claims indicate either that God does not exist or that there is no afterlife?53 As already noted, a recurrent and sometimes quite popular response by recent atheists is that the term atheism only indicates the denial of belief in God, and no more. Other nontheists, such as Bertrand Russell in the footnote below, deny that any positive arguments showing naturalism to be true in fact could be provided.54
Perhaps even more amazing is the recent report that approximately one-third of atheists and agnostics now believe in an afterlife, which was one of Russell’s marks of Christian belief.55 But how does a naturalistic view or system produce or even allow for an afterlife? Naturalism seems to have fallen on rough grounds of late, as indicated voluntarily by such overhauls and challenges by its own adherents.
Against this background, a priori dismissals of Jesus being seen after his death (even if considered apart from miraculous intervention, as noted earlier) now look ever more clearly like unsupported assertions. Further, in a universe where an afterlife of some sort is not only quite likely (as per the impressive evidence for NDEs along with other considerations), as apparently admitted by a fair percentage of naturalists, denials of Jesus’s resurrection and an afterlife appear to be at a major disadvantage. That Jesus truly appeared to his followers after his death (again, apart from the question of miracles) should no longer even be an issue. Alternative theories to the resurrection in all probability seem to be less likely anyway, and I will argue in volume 2 of this series that this is more significantly the case. The actual evidence available establishes the resurrection and appearances of Jesus, as presented in this volume.56
Therefore, concluding this matter for now, the original two natural responses considered above are seriously mistaken. In brief, not only is the first assumption patently false, that any old natural theory works just fine. In fact, most likely, no natural hypotheses concerning Jesus’s resurrection fit the facts! The drop-off among critical scholars in this matter is an indication of this, especially when very few influential researchers of late are willing to choose just a single hypothesis and stick with it.
Second, no sufficiently well-evidenced naturalistic backdrop demands that we ignore either religious arguments or a reality beyond this one. Accordingly, numerous heavily evidenced empirical studies (including NDEs) indicate strongly that there is an afterlife, with the resurrection appearances being an integral part of this category on historical grounds alone (remembering that NDEs are not miracles). In short, one cannot assume the truth of naturalism as a basis for employing alternative theses; plus, the strong data for an afterlife further corroborate the reality that Jesus experienced. It has been commented by critics that the resurrection of Jesus is ad hoc, presumably because of there being no other realities except this one, without an afterlife.57 But strongly evidenced NDEs are just the sort of data that can provide a way through this impasse concerning both another reality plus the strong potential for an afterlife, as explained above. Hence, the details presented here provide several credible paths that establish the thesis that Jesus’s disciples actually witnessed literal appearances of the risen Jesus, even apart from consideration of the miracle question, as several critical scholars allow.
Notes
1 To repeat the earlier comment, Jesus’s central preaching of the kingdom of God, Jesus’s crucifixion, and the disciples’ experiences afterward are probably the three most clearly established historical facts during this time frame.
2 Ehrman, Apocalyptic Prophet, 231–32 (see chap. 5, n. 43); Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 131–32, 147, 151 (see chap. 6, n. 173).
3 Ehrman, Apocalyptic Prophet, 229–32, with the two brief quotations on pages 230 and 231.
4 Allison, “Explaining the Resurrection,” esp. 125 (see chap. 4, n. 10).
5 An older example is that of New Testament scholar Norman Perrin, who, without being more specific, breaks with the scholarly ranks to date the proclamation of 1 Cor 15:3-7 to the 40s; see Perrin, The Resurrection according to Matthew, Mark, and Luke, 79-83 (see chap. 5, n. 40). In contrast, from the same time as Perrin’s comment, Gerald O’Collins notes that while he holds to an early date for this creed, he knows of no commentator who dates this creedal statement in 1 Corinthians 15 after the late 40s. See O’Collins, What Are They Saying about the Resurrection?, 112 (see chap. 4, n. 16). Much more recently, Reza Aslan dates the formula in 1 Cor 15:3–8 to the early 40s in Zealot: The Life and Times of Jesus of Nazareth (New York: Random House, 2013), 175. Granted, these cases are quite rare, as well as far outside the norm, and dates such as these have virtually disappeared in recent years.
6 See Pannenberg, “Response to the Debate,” 134 (see chap. 10, n. 70).
7 My previous coauthored volume with Michael Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus, treated and critiqued both the major as well as several other, sometimes-wild speculations during well over 100 pages of entertaining and evaluating alternative suppositions. For examples of the really different sorts of suppositions that were entertained, we treated the possibility that Jesus was an extraterrestrial (including other related ideas), comparing Jesus’s appearances to the Mormon claims of the golden plates being observed, or even likening Jesus’s appearances to Elvis Presley sightings! (These last few options are found on pages 185–87.) Further, Licona’s superlative and lengthy treatment of these other views are found in his volume on this same subject, where he spent more than 200 pages on these alternative approaches. See Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, most notably pages 465–610 besides additional discussions throughout (see chap. 2, n. 13). Honorable mention must go to James Orr’s excellent study, The Resurrection of Jesus (1908; repr., Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1965), especially with his detailed treatments of the hallucination, objective vision, and legend theses, among others.
8 If a natural route is supported in recent studies, it is often as a generalized combination of possible responses, as if the scholar does not desire to narrow the options to just a single view alone, leaving them with too little wiggle room in case their single thesis is either disproven rather thoroughly or shunned and perhaps castigated by the historical or other data that even their critical colleagues acknowledge. Two of the major single-theory adherents both passed away in 2021—Gerd Lüdemann and John Shelby Spong.
9 Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 164, recalls from his own experience as a believer how Christians “typically have a field day” when they challenge unbelievers to produce a natural thesis against the resurrection, and then the believers frequently shoot down the resulting answer with multiple responses.
10 Examples of a mixed group of sometimes quite-critical scholars who criticize these natural hypotheses (in whole or in part, but often altogether), from approximately 1975 on, including primarily self-identified non-Christian or otherwise skeptical authors plus a few other very influential researchers include Vermes, Resurrection, 143–49 (see chap. 5, n. 14); Lapide, The Resurrection of Jesus, 120–26 (see chap. 6, n. 173). Despite raising many intriguing questions, Dale Allison also makes many astute observations against alternative theses in Resurrection of Jesus, esp. 346, 356 (see chap. 2, n. 15); Allison, Resurrecting Jesus, 203, 207–8, 284–85, 334, 340 (see chap. 1, n. 30). Others include Cohn-Sherbok, “Resurrection of Jesus: A Jewish View,” 199–200 (see chap. 17, n. 173); Crossan, “Dialogue,” 33–34, 38; and Crossan, “Appendix: Bodily-Resurrection Faith,” 177 (see chap. 10, n. 94 for both); Sanders, Historical Figure of Jesus, 278–80 (see chap. 1, n. 44); Dunn, Jesus Remembered (see chap. 1, n. 3), 59, 63, 831–32, 838, 873–79; Brown, New Testament Christology, 163–66 (see chap. 8, n. 17); Wright, Resurrection of the Son of God, 27–28, 77, 80–81, 318, 686, 697–706, 709–10 (see chap. 6, n. 44); Robinson, Can We Trust the New Testament?, 123–25 (see chap. 1, n. 43); Wilckens, Resurrection, 117–19 (see chap. 8, n. 17); Macquarrie, “Keystone of Christian Faith,” 18–22 (see chap. 15, n. 28); O’Collins, Jesus Risen, 100–109 (see chap. 15, n. 28); Richard Swinburne, “Evidence for the Resurrection,” in The Resurrection: An Interdisciplinary Symposium on the Resurrection of Jesus, ed. Stephen T. Davis, Daniel Kendall, and Gerald O’Collins (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 200–201; Francis Watson, “Historical Evidence,” 365–72 (see chap. 12, n. 34); Davis, Risen Indeed, 36 (see chap. 1, n. 16); Lorenzen, Resurrection and Discipleship, 61, 117–19, 122–24, 135 (see chap. 5, n. 49). A few pre-1975 scholars who have been quite influential during their time and since, and who are also critical of naturalistic resurrection theses include Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971), esp. 2:155–56; Günther Bornkamm, Jesus of Nazareth, trans. Irene and Fraser McLuskey with James M. Robinson (New York: Harper and Row, 1960), 185; Joachim Jeremias, “Easter: The Earliest Tradition and the Earliest Interpretation,” in New Testament Theology: The Proclamation of Jesus, trans. John Bowden (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1971), 302; Moltmann, Theology of Hope, 186, 198–200 (see chap. 17, n. 167); Pannenberg, Jesus: God and Man, 88–97 (see chap. 1, n. 19); Brown, “Resurrection and Biblical Criticism,” 233 (see chap 6, n. 184); A. M. Hunter, Bible and Gospel (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969), 111–12.
11 See his review of Debating Christian Theism by J. P. Moreland, Chad Meister, and Khaldoun A. Sweis in Philosophia Christi 16 (2014): 456. Steve Cowan contends that the minimal facts method presents responses to “a veritable encyclopedia of objections to the Christian belief in Jesus’s resurrection.” See his review of The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus by Gary Habermas and Michael Licona, in Philosophia Christi 9 (2007): 484; also, Kenneth Konyndyk, “Proving the Resurrection,” The Reformed Journal 39 (March 1989): 30.
12 Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 165; cf. 186–87.
13 In volume 2 of this series as noted, virtually the entire text deals with the success or failure of naturalistic as well as other alternative theories. It might be wondered why so much detail must be spent on what may even be considered as excessive. However, giving a plethora of reasons against adverse ideas can be helpful for more than one reason. For example, not everyone is convinced by the same reasons. Further, others often need just a few extra arguments to finish the job. Plus, there are always those who do in fact hold the disputed views in question and require even more thorough convincing. As I argued several times in my PhD dissertation on the resurrection in 1976, yet another consideration is because “the more thorough such a refutation is, the more probable the resurrection becomes.” The reason here among more or less opposed views is that as the contrary likelihoods recede, the positive possibilities oftentimes increase. The immediate context indicates that the comment refers to the major naturalistic theories taken as a whole rather than to just one or two of the theses in particular, as pointed out by an explanation in the original (262–64). See Habermas, Risen Indeed, 262, emphasis in the original (see chap. 4, n. 1).
14 On some related and important issues, Ehrman notes that a historian qua historian cannot determine if God, particular theological beliefs, or “the supernatural realm” were involved in the case of a particular miracle-claim. The chief conclusion that a historian can determine is whether natural explanations can better explain the data that we know regarding the resurrection or if these alternatives themselves are mistaken; see Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 132–33, 143–51, for example. But also crucially, Ehrman emphasizes that historians are unable to determine that Jesus’s resurrection did not occur in history (132, 143).
15 So, if Ehrman thought a single alternative hypothesis were plausible, it is difficult to imagine that he would not have argued on its behalf. Further, this appears to provide at least a hint that Ehrman is familiar with the problems in each natural view, as he alludes to above.
16 Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 173.
17 Ehrman, 165.
18 Ehrman, 147–48.
19 For example, very clear and similar comments are made by Richard Carrier, “The Plausibility of Theft,” 364 (see chap. 16, n. 71); Carrier, “The Burial of Jesus in Light of Jewish Law,” 470 (see chap. 16, n. 15), where the problem for Christians is in “resorting to a supernatural explanation” since there is “no good evidence that any form of supernaturalism is true.” Another recent effort devoted chiefly to this sort of response is philosopher Larry Shapiro’s text, The Miracle Myth: Why Belief in the Resurrection and the Supernatural Is Unjustified (New York: Columbia University Press, 2016), 25, 29–31, 48–49, 55–57, 71, 73, 77–78, 84, 133, 142, 157. Making some similar comments to Shapiro on denying the historicity of miracles is David Owen, “Hume versus Price on Miracles and Prior Probabilities,” Philosophical Quarterly 37 (1987): 187–202, also reprinted in Richard Swinburne, ed., Miracles (New York: Macmillan, 1989), 115–32. While Davis definitely eschews this option, he lists these denials of another realm as a common naturalistic comeback; see Habermas, Risen Indeed, 171. For a detailed critique of Shapiro’s volume, see Gary R. Habermas, “A Recent Attempt to Disprove the Resurrection of Jesus and Supernatural Beliefs,” 191–97 (see chap. 10, n. 75).
20 A very popular move that many (often more radical) naturalists have increasingly made in the past few decades is to assert that they do not have to make the case that their worldview is true, because all they are doing is objecting to theism and simply saying that they are not theists! In other words, many of these naturalists assert that they have discharged their epistemic duties by attempting to give reasons against theism, miracles, an afterlife, and so on, but without arguing (or perhaps without even recognizing) the influence of their assumptions which stand behind their objections! But especially in the case of these atheists, not to give arguments in favor of their own atheistic stance per se has the effect of not defending their chief (worldview) reasons as to why they reject the supernatural and the miraculous in the first place. We will not linger on this highly objectionable maneuver here, which is gaining in popularity (but not in philosophical acumen), except to say that it appears that this move is designed specifically to do at least a couple of things. For starters, with this maneuver the naturalists strive to place virtually the entire argumentative burden upon theists while owning no such duty themselves. However, making critiques of this nature clearly derives from presuppositions (in this example, very opinionated ones) that emanate from their own worldview perspectives, therefore requiring a defense. So, they are clearly stating worldviews while failing to evidence them, whether or not they realize it. Further, it is perhaps also the case that these critics may realize full well that their naturalistic worldview cannot be proven by good arguments, so what is left is to attempt to tip the scales in their favor from the outset, hoping that their strategy is not discovered or recognized. For several of the many rejoinders that are available in such egregious cases of poor philosophical thinking, including reversing the naturalists’ own argument against themselves, see philosopher Paul Chamberlain’s work, Why People Stop Believing (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2018), particularly chap. 6, “The Changing Face of Atheism,” where many of the examples are taken from actual debate situations. Among other retorts, Chamberlain points out that more classical, philosophically trained naturalists such as Bertrand Russell and Kai Nielson objected to these more recent maneuvers by their colleagues (61-62, 65-68)!
21 Habermas, “A Recent Attempt to Disprove the Resurrection of Jesus and Supernatural Beliefs,” 192.
22 For starters, see philosophers Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro, Naturalism (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2008), who charge among other critiques that “strict naturalism is self-defeating (self-refuting). . . . Any argument for strict naturalism entails the falsity of strict naturalism” (119; cf. 117–22). Philosopher J. P. Moreland argues many similar points in Scientism and Secularism: Learning to Respond to a Dangerous Ideology (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 2018), esp. chap. 4, as does yet another philosopher, Stephen Parrish, Atheism? A Critical Analysis (Eugene, OR: Wipf and Stock, 2019), 39–44.
23 For arguments on essentially all sides of the subject, see W. David Beck, Does God Exist? A History of Answers to the Question (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2021). Regarding a classical defense of God’s existence, see Richard Swinburne, The Existence of God, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Clarendon, 2004). A more recent treatment is by Jerry Walls and Trent Dougherty, Two Dozen (or So) Arguments for God: The Plantinga Project (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018).
24 Moreover, entirely different routes altogether might be taken to the possible occurrence of events like Jesus’s resurrection.
25 Owen, “Hume versus Price,” Miracles, 131–32.
26 Shapiro, The Miracle Myth, 84, in the context of 84–86. When Antony Flew was still probably the world’s most celebrated atheist philosopher, he made a few similar comments. See Habermas and Flew, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?, 3, 49–50, cf. 173–75 (see chap. 1, n. 68).
27 John Hagan, ed., The Science of Near-Death Experiences (Columbia, MO: University of Missouri Press, 2017), 4.
28 Titus Rivas, Anny Dirven, and Rudolf H. Smit, The Self Does Not Die: Verified Paranormal Phenomena from Near-Death Experiences, ed. Janice Miner Holder, trans. Wanda J. Boeke (Durham, NC: IANDS, 2016) cites the accounts of over 100 evidenced NDEs that were substantiated by the testimonies of others.
29 For details, see Gary R. Habermas, “Evidential Near-Death Evidences,” in The Blackwell Companion to Substance Dualism, ed. Jonathan J. Loose, Angus J. L. Menuge, and J. P. Moreland (Oxford: Wiley Blackwell, 2018), 227–46; Habermas and Moreland, Beyond Death: Exploring the Evidence for Immortality (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1998; repr., Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2003), esp. chaps. 7–9; cf. Habermas, “A Recent Attempt to Disprove the Resurrection of Jesus and Supernatural Beliefs,” 194. For many other significant details here, see the appendix in this volume by Habermas, plus especially the Rivas, Dirven, and Smit volume The Self Does Not Die, esp. chaps. 1–3; Janice Miner Holden, “Veridical Perceptions in Near-Death Perceptions,” in The Handbook of Near-Death Experiences: Thirty Years of Investigation, ed. Janice Miner Holden, Bruce Greyson, and Debbie James (Santa Barbara, CA: Praeger, 2009), 185–212; Hagan, The Science of Near-Death Experiences, particularly the introduction plus chapters 4, 7, and 8.
30 Intriguingly, NDEs quite often point clearly to another reality beyond this one. In literally thousands of ND cases, some of which are heavily evidenced, the ND individual regularly and repeatedly reports watching living family members and medical personnel, calling out and asking them variously not to grieve, to stop beating on their chests, or explaining that they simply wish to be left alone so that they may be free to explore the new reality that they have already observed. But there are never any responses from among the living individuals stationed in the area because although the ND persons can watch and hear them, sometimes repeating the conversations below them in minute detail, the NDEr cannot be seen or heard by anyone; they are totally ignored. This phenomenon strongly suggests that they are located in some other realm at least in some sense, especially in those cases where exceptionally accurate information is given even while their hearts and brains may measurably be nonfunctioning at that time.
31 See the appendix in this volume that presents many summarized, quite evidential NDE cases.
32 Basinger, “Christian Theism and the Concept of Miracle,” 142–49, quotation on 142 (see chap. 7, n. 18).
33 Basinger, 143.
34 Double-blind prayer studies performed under select conditions have provided some potentially intriguing instances. For two examples published in peer-reviewed medical journals, see Harris et al., “A Randomized, Controlled Trial of the Effects of Remote, Intercessory Prayer on Outcomes in Patients Admitted to the Coronary Care Unit,” 2273–78 (see chap. 8, n. 84); and Byrd, “Positive Therapeutic Effects of Intercessory Prayer in a Coronary Care Unit Population,” 826–29 (see chap. 8, n. 83). Also, for a number of carefully documented cases including several medical photographs, see H. Richard Casdorph, The Miracles (Plainfield, NJ: Logos International, 1976), where specific cases are described.
35 Cf. also the fascinating controlled studies by Candy Gunther Brown, Testing Prayer (see chap. 8, n. 14), including two recommendations from two Harvard Medical School professors, one current and one former. Cf. also Rex Gardner, Healing Miracles: A Doctor Investigates (London: Darton, Longman, and Todd, 1986), with examples provided throughout. Note that there is overlap in the cases described in this and the previous footnote.
36 In this and other similarly worded comments in this chapter, it is not being concluded that a miracle actually occurred. As Basinger states clearly, such a “personal conviction” may be drawn by the person to whom these things occurred. Basinger, “Christian Theism and the Concept of Miracle,” 148–49. Notice Basinger’s carefully nuanced conditions on pages 143–45 as well.
37 See Licona, The Resurrection of Jesus, 284–302, for an excellent treatment of Jesus’s predictions of his fate, pro and con. After his critical evaluation, Licona concludes that these predictions came to pass. Additionally, from his historical evaluation, Licona thinks that Jesus’s projections indeed “supercharged” the resurrection event (301). Licona’s research on these predictions was also published as “Did Jesus Predict His Death and Vindication/Resurrection?,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 8 (2010): 47–66.
38 This and other relevant subjects are among the many that are discussed, evidenced, and evaluated in detail in volume 4 of this study, complete with numerous attesting considerations in accordance with critical principles.
39 As noted by Harold Remus, Jesus as Healer, Understanding Jesus Today, ed. Howard Clark Kee (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), esp. 106–18; Marcus J. Borg, Jesus: A New Vision, 15, 47, 65–67, 70–71, particularly 59–61 (see chap. 2, n. 32). Meier, Marginal Jew, 2:507–1038; Twelftree, Jesus the Miracle Worker, as well as in many other critical studies.
40 See especially Richard Swinburne, The Resurrection of God Incarnate, with key arguments in chapters 5–8 and 13 (see chap. 7, n. 18); also, McGrew and McGrew, “The Argument from Miracles,” 641–44, 658–59 (see chap. 12, n. 48).
41 Including any upcoming and lengthy substantiation of these comments in volume 2 of this series.
42 On this last argument, see just a few of the following comparative studies: Anderson, Christianity and World Religions, primarily chaps. 2–3 (see chap. 8, n. 14); Neill, Christian Faith and Other Faiths, especially the summary and conclusions on 224–34 (see chap. 8, n. 102); Neill, The Supremacy of Jesus, chap. 8 (see excursus 2, n. 123); Kenneth Richard Samples, 7 Truths That Changed the World: Discovering Christianity’s Most Dangerous Ideas (Grand Rapids: Baker Books, 2012); Gwynne, Buddha, Jesus, and Muhammad, 6, 18, 127–31, 239–44 (see chap. 6, n. 187); Habermas, “The Uniqueness of Jesus Christ among the Major World Religions.”
43 For details as well as further hints, see Habermas, The Risen Jesus and Future Hope, esp. chap. 3; also Habermas and Benjamin C. F. Shaw, “The Historical Uniqueness of Jesus Christ among the Founders of the World’s Major Religions,” Christian Research Journal 41 (2018), 40–45.
44 The examples include Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 132–33, 143–51, 165, 172–73, 203–4; quotation on 148. Intriguingly, my own published comments and lectures have come close to agreeing with Ehrman’s stance here regarding the historian’s ability (as historian) to draw further conclusions, albeit with several crucial caveats.
45 Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist?, 74, 163–64, 173, 290–91, 327–31, cf. 156–58.
46 Ehrman, How Jesus Became God, 149; cf. 143.
47 Even going back decades, this has been one of the chief ways that I preferred to frame the opening questions, due to answering similar issues to those raised by Ehrman regarding the range of the historian’s research, with perhaps only a few less substantial differences between us.
48 Besides Ehrman, numerous other atheist, agnostic, and non-Christian researchers in relevant disciplines have also pursued a similar approach, carrying out their own investigation of these resurrection questions. Examples include Lüdemann, The Resurrection of Jesus (see chap. 6, n. 173); Wedderburn, Beyond Resurrection (chap 1, n. 42); Elliott, “The First Easter” (see excursus 2, n. 111); Vermes, The Resurrection; Lapide, The Resurrection of Jesus (see chap. 6, n. 173).
49 In this respect they are much like arguments for intelligent design, or fine-tuning, which have also been adapted by different religious adherents.
50 Again, see appendix 1 in this volume, which presents many evidential considerations regarding five different categories of NDE data.
51 For another example of a few nonmiraculous areas of corroboration of an afterlife, see J. Steve Miller, Deathbed Experiences as Evidence for the Afterlife, vol. 1 (Acworth, GA: Wisdom Creek, 2021).
52 Of course, the best-known philosophical argument offered against theism is the problem of evil. But these interactions, even if taken strictly from among the most influential naturalistic philosophers themselves, include a variety of significant disagreements among them regarding the strength and application of the arguments from evil, leading to impasses of one sort or another in the conclusions. Some think the argument likely disproves theism, as argued in Paul Draper, “The Problem of Evil,” in The Oxford Handbook of Philosophical Theology, ed. Thomas P. Flint and Michael C. Rea (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), chap. 15; and Draper, “Pain and Pleasure: An Evidential Problem for Theists,” Noûs 23 (1989): 331–50. Before Draper, J. L. Mackie utilized another version of the argument in his volume The Miracle of Theism, particularly 172–76 (see chap. 1, n. 68). Yet Mackie concluded that “we cannot, indeed, take the problem of evil as a conclusive disproof of traditional theism, because, as we have seen, there is some flexibility in its doctrines” (176). Another atheist, William Rowe, rejected Mackie’s original deductive argument, going so far as to call himself a “friendly atheist” because he concluded that “some theists are rationally justified in believing that the theistic God exists.” Rowe, “The Problem of Evil and Some Varieties of Atheism,” American Philosophical Quarterly 16 (1979): 335–41, quotation on 340. Much more recently, leading nontheist philosopher Graham Oppy argued against theses such as those by Draper, Mackie, Rowe, and other atheists. “The Evidential Problem of Evil,” in A Companion to Philosophy of Religion, 2nd ed., ed. Charles Taliaferro, Paul Draper, and Philip L. Quinn (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2010). Oppy thinks the philosophical arguments both for and against God’s existence are, on all sides, inconclusive in the end, especially from the perspective of neither side changing minds across the aisle. Arguments against Gods (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), xv, plus sections 1.2, 8.3. William Lane Craig responded to these ideas on several grounds in “Arguing Successfully about God: A Review Essay of Graham Oppy’s Arguing about Gods,” Philosophia Christi 10 (2008): 435–42, and also in Craig’s upcoming volume, Systematic Philosophical Theology, vol. 2, “Excursus on Natural Theology: The Problem of Evil and Suffering” (forthcoming.Thanks are due to Bill Craig for highlighting some of these sources and ideas here on the problem of evil). Greg Ganssle also responded well to Oppy on a topic that is closer to some of the critiques being raised at the end of this chapter. See Ganssle, review of The Best Argument against God by Graham Oppy, Philosophia Christi 18 (2016): 503–6. For many, perhaps even the best response to these issues was written by Alvin Plantinga in God, Freedom, and Evil (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977). Plantinga holds that the bottom line regarding the problem of evil’s force for the theist “is not that his beliefs are logically or probabilistically incompatible” (63). The remaining issues are more often of a personal, pastoral nature. Thus, Plantinga declared that the “Free Will Defense . . . solves the main philosophical problem of evil” (64).
The specific topic addressed in this footnote concerns opposing viewpoints where even influential naturalistic philosophers frequently have opposed their own colleagues’ viewpoints on whether and to what extent the argument from evil demonstrates naturalism and/or disproves theism. As mentioned, evil admittedly remains a serious problem, actually for all positions. But evil is not necessarily thought even by some of the major naturalists above to verify naturalism. Further, many scholars do not think that evil refutes theism. Some theists have adjusted their views of God as a result, and others like Plantinga have made additional moves to answer the issues. Naturalists like Mackie and Rowe have pointed out that theists are within their epistemic rights to make moves like these. Evil neither proves naturalism nor disproves theism; too many other options are available. So for a variety of reasons, the problem of demonstrating the truth of naturalism remains a problem for naturalists.
53 An example of the classic approach where anti-theistic arguments are lined up and made is found in Bertrand Russell, Why I Am Not a Christian and Other Essays on Religion and Related Subjects, Routledge Classics (Oxon, UKL: Routledge, 1996), esp. essays 1 and 3, with the theistic critiques in the chief essay occupying just a few pages depending on the version. Yet even here, attempting to dismantle several arguments for theism quite briefly is not the same as showing that neither God nor an afterlife exist. Russell realized this as well, for when asked about God’s existence, he stated, “I don’t think it’s certain that there is no such thing. . . . I can’t prove they don’t [exist].” Russell, Bertrand Russell Speaks His Mind (New York: Avon, 1960), 20.
54 See Paul Chamberlain, “The Changing Face of Atheism,” in Why People Stop Believing, 60–72.
55 This is reported by Michael Shermer, the atheist scientific author and the editor of Skeptic magazine. See Shermer, Heavens on Earth: The Scientific Search for the Afterlife, Immortality, and Utopia, repr. ed. (New York: St. Martin’s, 2019), 2–3. Moreover, 6 percent of these atheists and agnostics even affirm bodily resurrection!
56 Mentioned at various times throughout this text, some scholars hold that while Jesus definitely rose from the dead and appeared to others, he did so in less than a fully bodily sense. The specific views vary. The initial item to note carefully here is that these are pro-resurrection appearance views and sometimes still involve Jesus having had some sort of a resurrection body. In fact, some very conservative Christians even hold that this is like Paul’s conversion experience, when he actually saw the risen Jesus, as contrasted with Jesus’s earlier appearances. Quite influential, scholarly versions of this view include Hans Grass, Ostergeschehen und Osterberichte, 2nd ed. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Rupert, 1962); Reginald H. Fuller, The Formation of the Resurrection Narratives, 2nd ed. (New York: Macmillan, 1980); and Pannenberg, Jesus: God and Man (1977). A critique of this view is treated in a chapter in volume 2 of this study. Each of these three scholars, for example, affirms that Jesus did rise from the dead.
57 An example is C. Behan McCullagh, “The Resurrection of Jesus: Explanation or Interpretation?,” Southeastern Theological Review 3 (Summer 2012): 47.