4: The Minimal Historical Facts about Jesus

4: The Minimal Historical Facts about Jesus

4

The Minimal Historical Facts about Jesus

Since the early 1970s, my approach to resurrection studies has been to apply my minimal facts methodology to the New Testament writings and other early sources regarding the death and resurrection appearances of Jesus. This outlook initially attempts to employ vital tools and studies to ascertain any potentially well-verified, chiefly historical framework of data surrounding a knowable number of probable events pertinent to the crucifixion, burial, and resurrection appearances of Jesus. A somewhat lesser, clearly secondary goal seeks to identify the amount of scholarly recognition among specialists in relevant fields that exists for these same data, as a sort of common groundwork. This latter task is pursued in the next chapter, where lists of the data may be found.

Going back to at least nineteenth-century German studies, many critical scholars have attempted to ascertain which early reports can be utilized to compile a picture of the historical Jesus. During especially the last decade, an increasing number of other historical studies have also begun employing minimal amounts of data to understand what can most likely be known regarding events from the end of Jesus’s life.

In this chapter, we will define and examine the minimal facts method in more detail, concentrating on the nature, distinctiveness, and value of this approach in studying chiefly the resurrection appearances of Jesus, including what it might achieve and what it is not attempting to accomplish. This examination will precede later chapters that organize and examine a highly detailed number of historical data favoring these facts along with many recent critical scholars who agree or disagree. This will also include contrasting this method with other general approaches that defend these events in generally reliable ways, though these latter approaches may still be helpful. Nonetheless, establishing the historicity of individual Gospel texts would be an additional, independent approach to establishing the historical foundation for the resurrection. This second tactic strengthens the case for Jesus’s resurrection. But the minimal facts approach has the advantage of potentially indicating that Jesus’s resurrection occurred even if the New Testament texts are thought to be unreliable.

The Minimal Facts Method

For five decades,1 my contention has been that at the end of Jesus’s life there is a significant body of evidenced data that specialist scholars of almost every religious and philosophical persuasion who publish on these areas recognize as being historical.2 As the method employed throughout my writings, I have detailed this approach elsewhere on numerous occasions. The chief reason for this widespread agreement among scholars on the historicity of each of these facts is the excellent attesting support that each has in its favor, usually from a variety of historical and other considerations.3

The Criteria

As the central motif from my pre-dissertation days ever since, the foregoing has also served as the persistent theme in virtually my dozens of publications on this subject.4 For example, in my second of three debates on the resurrection of Jesus with philosophical atheist and miracles specialist Antony Flew, the dialogue began with Flew’s general acceptance of my larger list of a dozen historical facts.5

What are the prerequisites for an occurrence to be designated as a minimal fact? From the outset of my studies on the death and resurrection of Jesus, my thesis has been that there are at least two major requirements for an occurrence to be designated in this manner. Each of these events must be established by an abundance of strong evidences, usually by multiple critically ascertained, independent lines of historical argumentation. In addition, the vast majority of published contemporary scholars with credentials in relevant fields of study have to acknowledge the historicity of the event.

Of these dual criteria, I have always specified that the first is by far the most crucial, especially since this initial requirement even by itself is the one that actually establishes the historicity of the event. So if the case for historicity already has been resolved, this is an independent conclusion that stands regardless of whether any particular head count of scholars agrees. It is well-known that scholarly acclamation frequently changes, and even erudite opinions may be mistaken.6 In such a case, the minimal facts argument would miss the nearly unanimous agreement on the data by scholars, but it would still have the more crucial, factual portion of the argument on its side, assuming the plethora of evidence remained.7

Which Facts?

As for the historical facts themselves, my research has produced two lists of data. The shorter list has always been drawn from the longer set, this briefer collection being the minimal facts. The slight variations in number and details between these lists has been due to the current strength of the evidence plus the amount of scholarly recognition for each fact, especially since scholars have generally recognized more than just the shorter list of minimal facts alone. In other words, since scholars have conceded more than just these two listings of events, there was no necessity in always keeping them the same.

The longer catalog of events has usually been termed the “known historical facts” and typically has consisted of a dozen or so historical occurrences pertaining to the death and resurrection of Jesus that more generally meet the above criteria of facticity and scholarly agreement, but somewhat more leniency was occasionally employed in applying these two standards. Thus, less stringency is sometimes what has separated the two lists, especially in being less severe in achieving such high percentages of scholarly agreement than the near-unanimous requirements for the events in the shorter list. From this longer list, a lineup of four to six minimal facts were extrapolated.8 This slighter, stricter list is the major focus of this chapter as well as this entire study.9 More crucially, this shorter catalog of occurrences has almost always consisted of the harder-hitting data as well.

What purpose is served by providing both lists? Based on surveying and charting this material for decades, it can be asserted that many contemporary critical scholars, based on their own perspectives, may respond variously, perhaps by either happily recognizing, willingly allowing, or simply conceding far more facts than simply those included even in the long list, let alone recognizing a greater number beyond just the few minimal facts alone. The problem, however, is obviously that as the numbers of events expand, fewer scholars agree on all of them. Thus, sometimes having both a longer and a shorter list can be helpful when discussing greater or lesser amounts of scholarly agreement, even if longer lists might sacrifice having the highest percentage of scholarly participation, as would the minimal facts.

Hence more agreement from an even larger number of critical scholars could be gained by actually shortening both lists. Many, even among very skeptical scholars, have often voiced their agreement when their works were unpacked as well. These methodological moves have the benefit of bypassing much of the often-protracted preliminary discussions which frequently take place regarding which data are permissible by beginning with a sort of “lowest common denominator” approach. If I am correct in holding that the data that support these smaller bases are still sufficient to settle the most pressing historical issues pertaining to the death and resurrection of Jesus, then this is indeed a crucial contribution to the discussions. We will return below to some of the resulting ramifications of this methodology.

What Is Meant by the “Vast Majority” of Scholars?

An oft-asked question relates to my repeated references that the “vast majority” of scholars or “virtually all” of these experts agree with this or that conclusion. Can these phrases be identified in more precise terms? In some contexts, I have already been more specific. At least when referencing the shorter list of minimal historical facts, I most frequently think in terms of a 90-something percentile head count. Of course, this only applies to those scholars who publish their views and accept the historical fact or a close approximation of it. But researchers will not necessarily agree with one another regarding the particular interpretations that may be thought to accompany these occurrences. In other words, more than one interpretation may exist for most or even all of these facts, and various angles can be discussed.10

Nonetheless, these high percentages of agreement on many foundational core historical data still provide some common starting grounds in spite of different outlooks on these data. Even Allison does not dispute the minimal facts or the historical bedrock events while still raising many questions.11 Yet, some common basis is better than none. As Allison also states concerning the use of this minimal core, “The strategy makes sense in principle,”12 though of course it does not solve every issue.13 It remains the case that these facts are one of the most crucial reasons why the notions utilized here have gained a significant amount of positive attention in recent years.14

How closely do other scholars approximate when they report quite frequently that “most scholars hold that . . .” or “the majority view here is . . .”? Of course, it is almost impossible to differentiate what each author intends and how they estimate their numbers, but when similar phrases are found in the literature, we may wonder how the knowledge of such conclusions was established. Those who specialize in the particular topics being discussed are probably the best to consult on such matters. But even here, as illustrated well by Michael Licona, even very well-respected scholars can and do disagree in their evaluations of the scholarly head count—as revealed when estimations seem to be at odds with each other.15

Still, the regularity of citing majority views, and even the popularity of detailed scholarly surveys and overviews, serves to illustrate how much importance we attribute to such outlines and synopses of pertinent researchers, especially where such conclusions could be reasonably established. There is an incessant search for a methodological starting point. Studies of what most scholars think and precisely why they hold these positions can be very helpful.16 My own publications feature surveys of resurrection scholarship, often according to the various subtopics.17

How Is “Critical Scholars” Defined?

This raises a vital cognate question: Who should be included in such discussions as “critical scholars”? My tendency is to lean toward requiring such an academic to hold a research doctorate in a relevant field, to occupy a related teaching position, and to have peer-reviewed publications. In reality, however, many exceptions have been allowed here and there in my own surveys. For example, an increasing number of pastors now hold research doctorates and possess a good publication record. More commonly, the document in question may be someone’s only publication. For the most part exceptions should be allowed, especially if one’s research is viewed as authoritative or helpful by others with scholarly credentials.

Some have questioned whether or not evangelicals should count as critical scholars.18 However, when tough qualifications are delineated and satisfied, such as terminal degrees being gained in highly reputable contexts, how can authors be denied on any side other than by fiat or on account of adverse views? This is especially the case if research doctorates were earned from critical universities, seminaries, or graduate schools, and perhaps even more so when peer-reviewed publications have appeared in critical venues. Such credentials would indicate that, conservative or liberal or in between, the scholars have dealt at a high level with alternative positions. This likewise applies to atheist, agnostic, non-Christian, and other skeptical scholars as well. This at least seems fair. It cannot be denied that prejudicial views are held on all sides of these debates.

Further objections to including evangelicals sounds too much like prejudice: “Well, they’re conservative and they already believe the resurrection.” As we will point out below, everyone wears blinders of some sort, and skeptics or liberals who do not believe in Jesus’s resurrection are no more exempt from prejudice than are conservatives. Further, this criticism of evangelicals would also apply in the opposite direction, especially to the skeptical “mythicists” regarding Jesus’s very existence (where we most often encounter the lack of scholarly credentials), as well as to some other radical scholars.19 If we were only to include a more centrist study of critical scholars alone, what would be the result? Would it truly be an overview of current research, views, and critiques?

Breadth of This Research

To explain the particulars of my detailed overview of the death and resurrection of Jesus, my postdissertation research began about 1995 as a rather modest attempt to update my research bibliography beyond many of my earlier publications on the subject, chiefly from 1975 onward. This project slowly expanded in larger increments until it developed into a full-blown attempt to catalog a synopsis of recent resurrection scholarship. The study dominated five straight years of my full-time research followed by lengthy intermittent stretches of a few more years beyond that. In 2013, Ben Shaw became my research assistant.20 Quite remarkably, the project seemed to lack boundaries, and it continued to grow into a very large document of critical views alone, without critiques.21

The initial stage of the research involved the largest group of overall sources. In the beginning, the study began with classifying the major publications on each of the relevant resurrection topics. This included cataloging the majority of these publications and charting the representative authors, topics, positions taken, and so on, concentrating on both well-known as well as obscure scholars alike across the entire spectrum of skeptical to liberal to moderate to conservative assessments.

This survey moved to the next group of representative sources and then further. In each case, an exceptionally large document was being built by tabulating a very wide spectrum of positions and stances. The scholarly responses were divided into approximately 170 subissues and questions, all being related in some way to the death, burial, and resurrection of Jesus. Throughout each grouping, the interest coalesced above all around the most influential writers, their sources, and their responses to the central historical issues.

For the most part, no groups were favored or ignored, with one major exception. Above all, a key emphasis was placed especially on the works of critical scholars who postulated naturalistic or other alternative hypotheses to Jesus’s resurrection, or who raised similar skeptical questions. Somewhat aligned with this emphasis, many critical ideas were also sought out and tracked because they were quite creative and had influenced many others. Occasional critiques of these options, naturalistic and otherwise, were sometimes included as well, but almost entirely as they arose from fellow critical researchers who disagreed.

Of special note given the emphasis above, many of these naturalistic theses were postulated by writers with very little or no scholarly expertise to speak of, especially in the specific areas in which they were writing, though their views had received attention in certain limited circles. These nonspecialist hypotheses were nonetheless incorporated into the study as exceptions to the scholarship rule stated above due to their “creative emphases.” This was about the only exception to that rule. As a result, this aspect weighted portions of the entire work somewhat in terms of these far more radical proposals.22

Though neutrality is clearly impossible and will never be achieved, especially on highly charged subjects, one goal throughout this study was to endeavor to be more than fair to each of the potential positions. As just mentioned, if anything, one potential fault in the opposite direction included the cataloging of many of the most radical positions in the survey here. This was the only classification of sources where many of the authors rarely had the specialized scholarly credentials or relevant peer-reviewed publications to be counted in the first place. It is this group, too, that often tends to doubt or deny that Jesus ever existed and is heavily criticized for this among all of the other groups.23

However, given that many sources in this skeptical category and other liberal categories were included, this study could actually be judged as having been skewed in the skeptical direction far more than if the original requirements had strictly been maintained, namely, of citing only those with scholarly credentials in relevant areas of study, accredited faculty positions, and peer-reviewed publications. Still, many of these mythicist publications have been cited quite liberally here, even when the wide majority of mainline scholars, “liberals” included, rarely even footnoted these materials.24 Of course, this practice has probably even skewed the numbers of those who propose naturalistic resurrection hypotheses, since this group is easily the one that most frequently poses these views. Yet, these suggestions were purposely sought out here. This should be kept in mind when considering the portions of this work on these naturalistic alternative views.25

At the time of this writing, the overall bibliography in this study presently numbers approximately 4,500 sources and counting, the vast majority from 1975 onward published originally in French, German, or English.26 The result of these years of study was a private manuscript numbering approximately 1,500 pages that did little more than just line up the scholarly positions and details on these 170 key questions from the end of Jesus’s life. Very little commentary or additional interaction was included, thereby creating a catalog of current positions and the critical reasons for these views. By far the vast majority of this material has remained unpublished,27 though I have steadily released some of the results in essays that specifically attempted to provide overviews of some of these current academic discussions.28

To repeat, regardless of how much agreement there is across the scholarly spectrum on the nature of particular data, the interpretations will often differ. Otherwise, we would have no skeptical-to-conservative spectrum. But another point should also be noted here too: no scholar is simply “neutral” in their beliefs and opinions. A majority of skeptical scholars today often agree with conservative scholars that all writers, skeptics and conservatives alike, have their own “angles” or biases on what they report.

Therefore, we each wear our own “worldview glasses.” Believers may indeed assess the world with “Christian glasses” but atheists are no less guilty in looking at the world with “atheist glasses.” All individuals have their own perspectives.29 Liberal professors would theoretically be no less opinionated or prejudiced than conservative scholars, and vice versa, each bringing their preformulated opinions to the issues. Too often, virtually everyone believes something (especially in the areas of religion or politics) because they dearly wish that perspective to be true. The upshot is that although we will never reach unbiased perspectives, we need reasons for holding and reporting what we do.

Concerning the death and resurrection of Jesus, then, the attempt was basically made to take the time to go back and study the major ideas first of all. Scholars and sources across a broad spectrum of views could often be lined up in groups with similar views. Of course, it must be realized that such tracking does not “prove” anything about what actually occurred. It is too frequently missed in responses that this research simply cites trends, opinions, and views rather than indicates how we know that particular historical facts actually happened. That is why it is absolutely critical to recall that the minimal facts approach is thus a methodological procedure laying down the parameters. The epistemological portion of the study that deals with the evidence is the most crucial and follows in this volume.

Thus, knowing the scholarly “lay of the land” can provide an important methodological technique from which to discuss many of the key issues related to Jesus’s death, burial, and resurrection. After all, if even skeptical scholars were to agree with a basic outline of particular, knowable data, then such a foundation may probably be due to a well-evidenced and underlying “common ground” upon which the major questions may proceed. But that still must be determined, so we cannot stop here.

We must inquire as to what scholarly reasons may lie behind these agreements—it must be known why virtually all scholars hold particular data in common. This, in turn, will allow further discussions concerning which meanings make the most sense of these data, but this takes us too far down the road for now. Good data plus ascertaining where the chief agreement may lie are two helpful parameters around which this study will progress. But to assert the order again, knowing if there is evidence and where it may lie will provide a prior and more reliable indication of the reasons for any scholarly agreement on particular historical facts that may exist.

How Strong Is the Minimal Facts Method?

The minimal facts method exhibits several outstanding strengths, though only a few of these will be emphasized here. Its principal reliance on using many positive arguments per fact is its single most impressive feature. Chiefly due to there being a previous evidential foundation, the high percentage of critical scholarly agreement that may exist on each of the core data is also very impressive. These two components also allow us to begin with a small number of facts concerning which many or even most scholars may agree, at least in a general way.

Further, often missed or overlooked is that the minimal facts method does not begin with or require in any way some sort of prior belief in the supernatural quality or the inspiration of Scripture before this enterprise can be launched. Although this additional point may be even less apparent, this method does not even require that the New Testament be generally reliable. Any sense of a “high” view of Scripture is beside the point in establishing the central tenets of Jesus’s death and resurrection. Some sort of high view of Scripture may be the case, but the point is that it is not a part of this argument or approach. The method requires that the facts themselves be true on the grounds of probable historical research, such as those that have already been set forth earlier in this volume.

So the New Testament is not required to exist at some particular, prior level of verity before it can be utilized here. In other words, to ground these efforts, neither reliability nor inspiration must be the required underlying belief structure before further construction can proceed. To take this matter a step further, the New Testament texts could even be generally untrustworthy and still yield truths, among which could be these well-established data.30 It might be a little like a scholar who thinks that Homer’s Iliad is not especially reliable in general historical terms, but that some individual reports in it may quite likely be true.

Definitely, such a methodology has a wider opportunity of succeeding with those who reject supernatural notions of inspiration or even lesser views, such as the general reliability of the New Testament texts. Therefore, even rejecting a largely reliable or inspired New Testament text will by no means nullify the specific path of arguments put forward here. The critic may have a very low view of the New Testament text, and the argument here may still proceed.31

To gain a better perspective on this matter, consideration could be given to the position taken by Bart Ehrman and perhaps most skeptical scholars. Since the vast majority of these researchers presumably deny the inspiration and likely the general reliability of the New Testament as well, how do they arrive at the facticity of these same facts as well as a good many other New Testament data? As Ehrman states clearly, “Whatever one thinks of [the Gospels] as inspired scripture, they can be seen and used as significant historical sources . . . the Gospels can and should be treated as historical sources, no different from other historical sources infused with their author’s biases.” Hence, when skeptical scholars use these texts, it is “not because the Gospels say so.”32

Other examples from skeptical scholars are pointed out elsewhere throughout this study.33 Just a few examples of the many such researchers who acknowledge the likelihood of all sorts of relevant items regarding these areas include John Dominic Crossan, Marcus Borg, and Bart Ehrman, who asserted the assured facticity of Jesus’s crucifixion. Gerd Lüdemann, Michael Goulder, and Ehrman have all acknowledged the historicity of the disciples’ real experiences after the death of Jesus as well as their very early reports of these events. The members of the Jesus Seminar along with A. J. M. Wedderburn and Hans Conzelmann likewise concede the exceptionally early date for the disciples’ reported experiences. John Kloppenborg, John Alsup, and J. K. Elliott have all accepted early creedal statements in the Acts sermon summaries. Thomas Sheehan and John A. T. Robinson are among those who recognize the probability of the empty tomb discovery.

Another example of a slightly different sort is that virtually all (even skeptical) New Testament critical scholars, such as Helmut Koester, consider at least the seven accredited Epistles of Paul to be both genuine and very helpful in determining these early historical events. Ehrman even refers to these seven texts as “undisputed.”34

How can these moves be made (with many cases being affirmed strongly) by researchers who usually distrust the Gospels along with many other New Testament books, especially when many additional instances and scholars could be provided? After all, this is the most common tendency in extrapolating data from these first-century sources. Or again, these instances indicate how readily individual events and beliefs are affirmed as well as the conclusions being drawn regarding authenticity and historicity, even when these researchers support the items from sources that they usually consider to be unreliable. The chief point in all of this is that something similar to Ehrman’s statements above must be the case: that well-evidenced data often reside in texts still thought to be biased. These moves by critical scholars, even very skeptical ones, exhibit some similarities to aspects of factual arguments being developed in these present studies.

This does not at all deny that a strong case could be argued for the reliability or inspiration of the New Testament.35 But at this point, while still being a very important topic, it would be a protracted argument that would draw us far away from the stated topic of this present research. Nonetheless, general reliability views are listed below. Such a case can be defended well, and has been by many recent scholars, as we shall observe. It is simply not the main method in this context.

Thus, due to the present audience and wishing to challenge a broad swath of readers, the minimal facts approach begins with separate historical details that fulfill the qualifications that have been mentioned here. This allows us to put forward our best case when arguing for the central tenets of Christian theism—the Gospel data.

But what about those who concede all or most of the unadorned data but suggest a different hypothesis for the origin or cause of the events? Or how about those who agree with the facts but take an alternative interpretation of the material? Since there are differences between events and both their causes as well as their interpretations, such will often arise and are not to be avoided at all. Moreover, the reasons for some of the alternative options here quite often extend very far beyond the mere data at hand, such as being due to social, religious, or emotional reasons. But if the subjects are to be discussed at all, the alternative views will simply have to be explained and then researched through to the end of the options, as will be done in extended form in later volumes of this work, until the most satisfactory solutions can be established.

But what if a skeptical critic, such as a Jesus mythicist, denies some or all of the minimal facts used in a particular case? Initially it needs to be emphasized that the current list of recognized facts pertaining to Jesus’s resurrection are so widely admitted that even the most radical critical scholars generally accept their historicity.36 But someone may simply be unwilling to admit them, perhaps simply out of stubbornness. Conceivably, the individual may not be a scholar who knows the area of study. Yet, one can always argue in reverse. Recalling that the first and most crucial criterion above is attestation by multiple evidences, each individual fact could be examined in detail. In other words, discussions may begin with zero minimal facts, if need be, and then work up to the half dozen or so minimal facts needed by building the particular case in question and utilizing the available data along the way.

At each step, the deniers are free to respond regarding how they would work through any factual or other binds. The defenders should be prepared to respond to the resulting critical comments as well.37 Additional minimal facts could also be introduced, serving as an even more specific basis for certain related ideas.38

The Minimal Facts Method Contrasted with General New Testament Reliability Positions

Often among conservative scholars of various stripes, perhaps even the most widespread approach is to precede a study of the historicity of Jesus’s death and resurrection with a sweeping, detailed set of arguments showing that the New Testament is at least a generally reliable or trustworthy document.39 This is then developed as the basis that buttresses the historical framework undergirding the study of these events.

Overview of General Reliability Arguments

In the sense that I am referring to it here, general trustworthiness is the attempt to employ various arguments for the reliability of significant portions of Scripture without producing large amounts of specific evidence for particular historical events or passages. For example, one might argue that the overall text of the Gospel of Mark is generally reliable before moving to more particular conclusions regarding a specific miracle claim or doctrinal teaching of Jesus within this Gospel. These latter inferences are thought to follow largely because of the prior foundation provided for the Gospel as a whole.

For example, it might be argued that Mark’s Gospel is based in whole or in part on the testimony of the apostle Peter or on any other early and accredited sources.40 Or perhaps Mark’s text at many key places accurately reports specific data from this time, such as historical, political, geographical, religious, or social insights. Or maybe it is simply the case that Mark’s text is the very earliest Gospel account, and it may be dated even by very critical scholars to a much earlier date than normally assigned to this work.41 This could assist in placing the author in potentially the right place and time to write such a work, and so on. Of course, nothing keeps many of these items from potentially being combined as well. Based on such an argument, many scholars have concluded that we have reason to think that Mark may also have been correct when he narrated events or reported Jesus’s teachings.42

Which Scholars?

More commonly in recent decades, the chief argument for the general reliability of the biblical text has included the customary avenues of addressing manuscript quality and quantity, the early dates of the copies, various examples of relevant archaeological confirmation, perhaps some attestation from extrabiblical sources, and so on. Some scholars, especially New Testament specialists, then move on to more specific matters, such as the authors of the books, potential sources, and the dates of composition. These strategies often occur in both scholarly as well as more popular treatments, where even a sampling would be massive.43

Neither are evangelicals the only ones to pursue New Testament reliability arguments.44 Although not as commonly employing fascinating and sometimes more nuanced arguments, mainline critical scholars have also contributed some excellent studies to these textual discussions. Some would even argue that Richard Bauckham’s Jesus and the Eyewitnesses may well be the single best book of all here.45 But other volumes also certainly deserve to be mentioned.46

Strangely enough, even more radical scholars have made some particular points that are used in the arguments above despite them being unwilling to hold to the general reliability of the text itself. Such aspects would include recognizing the large number of excellent, ancient copies supporting the original text as composed by the New Testament authors.47 As mentioned already, contemporary skeptical scholars almost unanimously recognize seven of Paul’s Epistles as “undisputed”48 or as “generally accepted as genuine without doubt.”49 As such, skeptical scholars allow that these critical Pauline Epistles may be cited freely in discussions,50 not as inspired documents but nonetheless as authoritative, honest, good reports and descriptions of early Christian beliefs and practices written by an ancient scholar who was there and who knew personally many of the original eyewitnesses.51 In fact, Ehrman acknowledges that Paul knew and conversed with Peter, James the brother of Jesus, and John as one of the “Two Key Data for the Historicity of Jesus.” Then Ehrman asks quite surprisingly, “Can we get any closer to an eyewitness report than this?”52 This is an amazing question!

How Strong Is the General Reliability Argument?

The purpose here is definitely not to condemn or even to severely criticize such reliability approaches, especially if they are constructed carefully. Volumes of worthwhile research have appeared in these attempts, and the exploration should definitely continue. The author has also argued in several of these directions on different occasions, though not always in the more regular ways that this is often done.53 Again, these efforts can be very positive. Some strong arguments have emerged from studying the general reliability of the New Testament texts and their sources in relation to other ancient religious and historical texts.54 But in spite of the popularity and importance of these sorts of methods, we also must proceed very carefully too. It appears that, in some instances, this approach can fail to bear all of the weight that is sometimes placed on such a foundation. At the very least we need to avoid some potential and common hazards.

The chief concern regards how these arguments are commonly employed, as well as what conclusions are often drawn from the data. Some authors might proceed from the conclusion of general textual reliability to particular, often major, theological conclusions. Thus, after the initial conclusion is reached concerning particular indications that certain authors or texts are trustworthy writings, the researcher may move immediately to several central Christian beliefs. Regularly it is postulated that since the New Testament texts are reliable, we may now make a case for what these documents reveal regarding doctrines such as the inspiration of Scripture, the deity of Jesus Christ, Jesus’s miracles, salvation, or even the resurrection of Jesus. It is then concluded that this path is sufficient to indicate these doctrines should be taken at face value as established truths.55

How strong is the argument that, given certain levels of general textual reliability, the historicity of particular historical events and teachings of specific doctrines actually occurred? In short, could the overall, largely historical reliability of the New Testament texts yield the major beliefs of Christian theism? In this common approach, much of the detailed work is done at the outset, with the resultant conclusions filtering down to substantiate both regular and miraculous events as well as major doctrines.

Of course, this methodology has been challenged by critics, and on more than one ground. For example, more radical scholars assert that the data for reliability itself, such as the case above for the Gospel of Mark, should be contested, contending that counterarguments exist. More moderate critics might argue that while much of the data produced by this method might indeed be true, the overall conclusion that the New Testament as a whole is reliable is simply too broad and does not follow.

Another frequent challenge to the argument for textual reliability occurs in debates where the critic attempts to produce a list of shortcomings in Scripture. While New Testament scholars have often done quite admiral jobs of responding to such issues, the length of these lists can be overwhelming, given normal time and space allotments. While it can always be responded that such tactics are unfair or beyond the proper bounds of present constraints, even producing answers can sidetrack a discussion until it deviates from the main issue being discussed. The sheer number of necessary details needed to answer such questions can bog down a discussion severely. Further, to readers or audience members, it often appears that the critic has scored some crucial points simply from the number of questions raised.

Incidentally, this critical debate or dialogue strategy can often be reversed in more than one way as well. For instance, an entire list of major challenges can be posed to the skeptic as well—specially designed as equally unanswerable within brief time allotments! This entire subject calls for exceptionally careful debate parameters to be set beforehand over very specific content agreed upon by all participants and made known to the moderator.56

Still, it seems that the most important potential challenge to this entire procedure is that general reliability arguments may even be incapable of producing the necessary basis for the strong arguments required to establish some of the supernatural claims in Scripture. The central issue may be this: just because a publication is generally reliable, it does not necessarily follow that everything in it is automatically true. “Generally reliable” means exactly what it claims—that in most instances, this source is sufficient to answer the questions. But even normal, everyday occurrences in largely trustworthy volumes could be mistaken. If that is the case, then what about any supernatural claims that may also be recorded there? It would quite obviously involve and even require much more cautious treading here, not to mention specific evidence, to establish particular miracle claims. Would a Christian accept the historicity of an incredible non-Christian miraculous declaration mentioned in the pages of an acknowledged, reputable volume published by a superior scholarly press?

The chief problem is that a generally reliable book does not even necessarily or automatically ensure every report between its covers. Think of it this way: our best libraries are filled with huge numbers of generally trustworthy historical volumes. Still, we often do not hesitate to challenge specific issues or claims here and there in these otherwise satisfactory texts. As the art of reviewing books regularly reveals, specialists will definitely challenge this or that report within a writing while still proclaiming that this is the best, most informative, or even the most accurate textbook around.

Test Cases from Greco-Roman History

Now, if this is true of normal, everyday history books, what happens when these volumes include reports of miracles? A test case might be helpful. When studying ancient Greco-Roman history, it becomes obvious that virtually all of these ancient authors recorded various miracles and other supernatural occurrences, such as healings, prophecies, omens, portents, and the like.57 Presumably, when such supernatural claims are then used as the basis for insuring the truth of an entire anti-Christian belief system like polytheism or emperor worship, Christians may be the first ones to point out that these claims do not follow. As a matter of fact, when reading accounts of Greco-Roman miracles, Christians might even read right past these accounts, not even slowing down to consider whether or not the miraculous element could possibly be true. But why not, if the ancient historian is a generally trustworthy source?

Now let us complicate the matter a little further. Perhaps it is not simply an either-or case regarding such events. The “supernatural” occurrences in question may not have occurred at all. Then again, they could have happened too. In any of these cases, the author’s religious beliefs could simply have been tacked on to a truly historical nucleus. So, far from being a minor point in the overall equation, if we fail to employ some skeptical distinctions here, believers and nonbelievers alike could be faced with some severe problems.

Nonetheless, Christians often respond in reverse when they think that critics are not giving biblical miracles a fair chance. “Just look at all of the evidence,” believers plead. But while some may simply be cautious regarding such Greco-Roman claims, it may be more accurate to guess that the majority of Christians would reject these events outright. So why do believers largely seem to employ the same methods that they dislike by denying or ignoring the miracle claims in other religious traditions, usually without being open to such reports, while pleading for openness toward their own cases?

To illustrate the major point here, we could examine some instances from two Roman historians who wrote just a decade or two after the completion of the New Testament. Tacitus has been called the “greatest historian” of ancient Rome, and we are told that he “never consciously sacrifices historical truth.”58 But in the Annals, Tacitus reports many instances of, or at least made allowances for, the work of fate (Ann. 1.55), the interplay of supernatural omens (1.28; 12.43; 14.22), and the divinity of some of the Caesars (1.19, 42). Tacitus also notes the worship of both the gods and the Caesars (1.11).59

Supernatural occurrences are far more common in the work of the Roman historian Suetonius, who is described as being “trustworthy enough.”60 Five of the twelve Caesars that Suetonius depicts in his major history (Julius Caesar, Augustus, Claudius, Vespasian, and Titus) are said to have been divinized apropos to the belief in emperor worship. Further, Suetonius was well known for frequently relating various sorts of omens,61 the worship of the gods,62 and other religious beliefs.63

Suetonius also narrates more miraculous or supernatural events in The Twelve Caesars than Tacitus, some of which might disturb Christians. These include the apotheosis of Julius Caesar’s soul into the heavens after his death, as the appearance of a comet was taken to be the emperor(!) (Jul. 88).64 Suetonius also repeats an account from a book by Asclepias of Mendes, which taught that Augustus’s mother experienced a strange encounter with a snake at the Temple of Apollo, afterwards conceiving Augustus apart from her husband (Aug. 94). Later, while he was with a group of senators, a former praetor reported that he saw Augustus’s spirit ascending through the flames of his cremated body after death, though apparently no one else saw anything (Aug. 100). Other supernatural signs include predictions of the future that were later fulfilled,65 as well as dreams and other actions caused by the gods or supernatural agents.66

So once again, how might a Christian respond to major supernatural reports like a conception apart from a man or the apotheosis of the spirit of Julius Caesar or Caesar Augustus reported by a generally trustworthy Roman historian? Does it emphasize the question at hand here when these Roman scholars are frequently deemed by Christian apologists to be reliable enough witnesses when they confirm New Testament matters? Even so, it may be fair to say that it would almost surely still be concluded by most Christians without much fanfare that especially Suetonius’s miracle reports are simply false. Likely, this would be the verdict even with little or no evidence against the Roman writer. But on what grounds can such a conclusion be fairly delineated?

One promising pathway here might be to assert what perhaps many conservative and more moderate scholars noted above might also retort. Namely, a large contingent of these researchers agree that the New Testament writings were largely written by, under the general control of, or made good use of eyewitness sources and testimony. The New Testament texts were also written fairly early and contain a number of elements that date to exceptionally soon after the teachings and events in view. Even though our earlier lineup of scholars was admittedly brief, this approach could feature some good arguments and turn out favorably. Can we challenge Suetonius or Tacitus on the same grounds regarding their supernatural claims?

This critique could be significant. If we inquire into the time between the Roman writings and some of the occurrences they describe, we find on many occasions that there were some significant problems with the state of their testimony. A major instance comes from another noteworthy Roman historian, Livy, who discusses the founding of Rome by the brothers Romulus and Remus.67 The reported material is not only rather supernatural in nature, but it supposedly occurred literally hundreds of years before the historian’s time. Suetonius’s two mentions of apotheosis and Augustus’s insinuation of a virgin birth are also dated a significant number of years earlier than the historical records. Both Julius Caesar’s death and Augustus’s birth precede Suetonius’s work by more than a century and a half. Augustus’s death occurred over a hundred years before Suetonius first wrote. Given that these supernatural accounts may be the most fantastic Roman claims, the substantial time gap in each case is certainly significant.68

Here we are greeted with another potentially major consideration: both Tacitus and Suetonius wrote approximately AD 112 to 120, or some eighty to ninety years after the crucifixion of Jesus. This is a significantly later time frame than the Gospel of John is usually dated. Could the previous Christian traditions have inspired any of the similarities for Suetonius’s remarks about Augustus’s strange conception or the two reports of apotheosis? From his apparent comments about Jesus and early Christians, Suetonius knew at least some items about Christian beliefs. After all, if Julius Caesar and Augustus Caesar were later divinized, as Suetonius relates, and lived within the same empire as Jesus of Nazareth, would it not make sense for divine Roman emperors to surpass a lowly Jewish messiah?

Even more so, what about the fact that these Roman authors apparently agree that Christian teachings broke out anew after Jesus died, especially while reports were still circulating of a resurrected Savior as witnessed by the earliest Christian believers?69 Of course, we cannot be sure and can only offer these conjectures here. But the clear fact that this later Roman duo wrote almost a century after the birth of Christianity might just be a good reason for them to speak in this way about their own empire’s religious beliefs. If it were the other way around and the Roman sources were far earlier, what would critical scholars be telling us about the New Testament accounts?

Let us put the larger problem of the time gap between our two main Roman historians and their major miracle claims in some comparative perspective. For example, if the major Gospel accounts of Jesus’s birth, significant teachings, death by crucifixion, and his reported resurrection appearances were all dated at least 80 to 90 years after our earliest sources, skeptics would no doubt rejoice gleefully! After all, critical scholars have long criticized the Gospel of John for being written some 65 years after the crucifixion, although Tacitus and Suetonius wrote about the first two Caesars approximately 100 to 160 years after their deaths! The distance from the death of Julius Caesar to these Roman historians is more than double the distance from Jesus’s crucifixion to the composition of John.70

So while the time gaps and other similar concerns are certainly weighty issues and ripe for comparison to the Gospels, this will not totally solve the issues by themselves, especially with each of the Gospel traditions including more religious contexts. Yet, even a majority of New Testament scholars might potentially counter with the more recent emphasis on the Gospels being considered examples of Greco-Roman bios.71

However, both Tacitus and Suetonius were temporally closer to an intriguing case involving another Caesar than any of the Gospels except Mark were to Jesus’s ministry (according to critical dating). This example, recorded by both Roman historians, is that two men in Alexandria came to Emperor Vespasian for healing. According to Suetonius, one man was blind and the other one was lame, and “apparently the god Serapis had promised them in a dream” that they would be healed. However, expounds Suetonius, Vespasian “had so little faith in his curative powers that he showed great reluctance in doing what he was asked.” Still, he healed both of them, in the first case by spitting in the blind man’s eyes. He performed these actions “in the presence of a large audience” (Ves. 7). This report occurred only about forty-five years before Suetonius wrote.

According to Tacitus, the first man was indeed blind and asked Vespasian to use spit on his eyes, but the second was said to have a diseased hand instead of being lame.72 Intriguingly, we are told that at first Vespasian “ridiculed and repulsed them.” Further, Tacitus then relates that physicians were consulted, who replied that the men “were within the reach of human skill,” for the first man was not totally blind and the second could perhaps be restored by some “healing influence.” But perhaps Vespasian could help them by “divine will.” Consequently, Vespasian healed both of them before a crowd who reportedly had no reason to lie (Ann. 4.81).

Moreover, both Tacitus and Suetonius had superb opportunities to check out and confirm their historical data. Tacitus held administrative posts in the Roman government and consulted crucial sources such as memoirs, biographies, and even official Roman records. He states that he was personally promoted by three Caesars—Vespasian, Titus, and Domitian (Ann. 1:1). Hadas affirms that, given ancient standards of historiography, Tacitus was a responsible scholar.73

On the other hand, Suetonius served personally as the foremost secretary to Emperor Hadrian and had access to the official imperial and senatorial records. Additionally, he received much of his information on several of the Caesars directly from eyewitnesses.74 Suetonius sometimes notes that he examined other material to secure his information (Jul. 87; Cal. 58). On occasion, he even lists or cites the sources he checked.75

Suetonius’s use of other information in this instance might even be likened to the comment in Luke 1:1–4 regarding checking out various resources to gain information. At any rate, it must be admitted that data such as these on behalf of the historical writings of Roman scholars Tacitus and Suetonius would be welcomed by apologists if these scholars could report a similar line of support in addition to what was already possessed from the New Testament authors.

Since miraculous claims still appear in these Roman historians’ writings even when they seemed to have some clear and early access to the material they were reporting, it would therefore appear that these items cannot always be dismissed strictly due to the time gap between these authors and their sources. However, the lengthy period would seem to address quite well the reports of apotheosis and the allegedly fatherless conception of Augustus. Further, even beyond the time aspect alone, such criticism in these latter cases is also due to the reported nature of the occurrences themselves with the definite lack of more direct attesting evidence on behalf of these specific claims, plus the potential similarities with earlier Christian reports. So how might a response be made to Tacitus and Suetonius regarding the Vespasian healing cases that boast the earlier time gaps along with some at least claimed corroboration?

Critiquing the Roman Cases

One useful retort could be to inquire concerning the extent to which it might be ascertained that it was precisely at those points that Suetonius and Tacitus had good evidence for their supernatural claims. In other words, beyond the general historical backdrop for these historical writings, it should rightly be inquired as to the specific historical evidence that those particular Roman miracles had actually occurred. After all, skeptics can and do ask Christians for exactly the same data, and far more specifically as well.

But now we have arrived at what may be the crux of the issue pertaining to textual trustworthiness and miracle claims. If Christians cast their nets too widely and are satisfied to settle for general indications that the New Testament is reliable in order to move to Jesus’s miracles, then they may be too hard pressed to address the question concerning why a similar strategy might not work for the best cases where the Roman historians also record miracles within approximately the same time distance as some of the Gospel information. But there is a worse problem here. Presumably for most scholars, even this decent parameter of research for ancient historians who have recorded everyday events within a good time window would be insufficient to clear the bar to convince them in supernatural cases where miracle claims are being made.

But if we require that specific evidential details be provided in favor of particular Roman miracle accounts, which would seem necessary to even get us started for such supernatural claims, now Christians may have backed themselves firmly into a corner, that is, unless believers are also willing to provide specific historical backup for similar claims regarding, say, the miracles of Jesus’s to which the Gospel accounts testify. It would appear that, in either case, arguments for the general reliability of the text simply do not take us to the heart of the precise issues. This is especially so in the case of miracle claims, which are often thought to require much more data, let alone even for fairly mundane events concerning which we would simply like factual assurance.

Yet, judging from the way they develop their arguments, many conservative authors seem satisfied to leave the issue right here. They often think that after they have successfully shown several reasons why the New Testament text is generally trustworthy, they basically only need now to unpack what the text asserts, both concerning extraordinary events as well as theological doctrines. When these are uncovered, they may assume that the goal has been reached.76

But as mentioned above, this move is often simply ignored when ancient secular writers have conducted similar levels of research. But as much as this practice may appear to be either prejudicial or just due to plain oversight, both sides need much more historical spadework to accomplish these goals. For example, if an archaeological discovery provides some backup for a place or event, it could confirm that an ancient report may be at least partially correct. But how would such a find indicate that something else from this same source was likewise true, that the event was perhaps actually an act of God, or that a theological teaching followed from it?

Once again, this problem is further aggravated when we recall a common notion among Christian scholars that both Tacitus and Suetonius are trustworthy historians who provide some assistance in determining the reliability of the New Testament! So the main issue here is that these Roman writers are apparently trustworthy enough to help us make our claims, which may even extend to our miracle claims, but we basically do not think that this trustworthiness extends to their miracle claims! If we are not careful here, this may sound more and more just like special pleading.

However, before we get too far from the Roman accounts, perhaps it is time to make several critical remarks. We need to consider the following concerns regarding these two ancient texts. First,Vespasian had no ancestral, marital, or political claims to being in line as the next emperor of Rome. As such, “his healing miracles became a key part of his campaign.”77 These occurrences, whether true or false, thus take on a wholly different perspective. In fact, Tacitus explains that Vespasian at first feared some sort of “set-up” here (Ann. 4.82).

Second, we learn the most about Vespasian from the historians Josephus, Tacitus, Suetonius, and Cassius Dio. The last three record these healing events in roughly similar accounts, as we have seen briefly. But in spite of Josephus being the earliest writer of the four, plus his close personal relation to Vespasian including his very lofty comments concerning him fulfilling Jewish prophecy,78 Josephus does not record these Alexandrian healing events. This does not rule out these events in themselves, for this would smack of an argument from silence. But there are worthwhile considerations here in light of Josephus’s date, personal familiarity with the Flavians, and willingness to ascribe Jewish prophecy to Vespasian.

Third, it has been suggested that there is marked similarity between Vespasian’s healing and Jesus’s miracles in the Gospels, especially Jesus healing a blind man by using spittle on his eyes (John 9:1–7). This might produce some additional pause.

Fourth, we saw that the Roman physicians reported that the men could be treated by physical means and that the first man was not totally blind. Regardless, physical healings are well attested and are often affected by cognitive means, so they do not necessitate supernatural events.79 Regardless, several extenuating considerations here should at the very least make us cautious.

So we have suggested several approaches to the supernatural claims made by Roman historians such as Tacitus and Suetonius, depending on the type of challenge that is offered. Concerning such beliefs as the deification of certain Roman emperors or their records of supernatural occurrences like apotheosis or healing, most of the rather stupendous claims in these texts were written far too long after the original events to be of much value.

On the other hand, the minimal facts argument will differentiate far more significantly the two sorts of claims between the New Testament data and the Roman histories. For events such as Jesus’s resurrection, for example, we will construct in this study a very specialized and strong case, including data from much closer to the events in question plus abundant and varied historical evidence even allowed by critical scholars.

Regarding the Roman texts, virtually no specific evidence favors the reports of supernatural events like the healing claims of Vespasian in the examples of the two men from Alexandria. True, there are multiple accounts with the comment that other persons were present. But as we just mentioned briefly, Vespasian stood to gain from such occurrences in a major way, since these events apparently served as one of the bases for his political campaign to be the Roman emperor. Moreover, the similarity to the earlier New Testament miracle claims of Jesus, as well as the plain fact that healing events can actually occur without any supernatural intervention at all, leave these accounts without any real differentiation from the individual arguments for the New Testament data.

In short, there are no specific data here on which to construct an historical argument that can ground the Roman religious worldview. The quality of the different sorts of accounts is quite apparent.80 So most significantly, we are back where we were before: at the need to examine the evidence that could potentially favor miracle claims. Yet the traditional apologetic approach, based on general reliability, often provides less of a basis for either a critique of the Roman cases or a defense of Jesus’s healing events.

However, what if critics simply retorted that all miracle claims, especially from the ancient world, are false regardless of what support they may have?81 While we may understand the interest in further evidence, the claim that there can never be enough information smacks of some a priori prejudice. How does anyone know that miracles can never occur?

Beyond this, interestingly, our next answer is similar to that for the last question concerning Vespasian’s healing miracles. We do need standards of evidence and to clearly ascertain which claims may just possibly make the grade. Again, this is precisely where the minimal facts method excels.

Lastly, several other options, in whole or in part, may apply here. As we just pointed out in the case of Vespasian, it is important to remember that Christians do not necessarily have to disprove all other miracle claims.82 This is a false dilemma. As both Testaments point out, God helped and healed many unbelievers, and never in the Gospels does Jesus ever give someone a theology exam or inquire what they believed before healing them! Additionally, other miracle claims, such as physical healing in particular, can sometimes be real events without necessarily being supernatural. Further, godly power was not the only species of supernatural strength that manifested itself during biblical times. Lastly, some events in question may be real, natural events falsely interpreted as miracles.

What if the critical scholar grants some decent arguments for the reliability of the New Testament text (though most of them will not do so) while still rejecting most of the supernatural claims? Or what if she asserts that general reliability and establishing supernatural claims are like mixing apples and oranges, so that the former is insufficient to establish the latter? Will believers conclude that she is being overly critical in requiring them to produce specific evidence for our events and doctrines, just as we required of the Roman authors? Or could skeptics think that these or other supernatural events or teachings were interjected at some later time into an otherwise decent tradition?

The chief point here is that, while perhaps conceding a few arguments, many critical scholars will almost surely argue that we still have an insufficient basis for the text’s actual supernatural claims.83 Conservatives usually conclude that the critics are mistaken, but it should be remembered that they probably challenge the supernatural claims made by Roman historians on roughly the same grounds! Even worse, many believers would presumably just respond that the Roman miracle reports are simply erroneous and leave it at that!

It is at precisely this point that the minimal facts method may come to the rescue. We have just summarized the presence of some intriguing questions regarding Vespasian’s miracle reports, such as their “convenience” in his quest to become Roman emperor in the absence of his possessing the normal credentials, Josephus’s potential lack of knowledge of these events in spite of his relation to Vespasian’s family, their similarity to Gospel miracle claims, and the somewhat ambivalent medical evaluation by the local physicians. Yet, we will argue in this study that Jesus’s miracle claims in general, and his resurrection in particular, are grounded far better in factual terms than are the Greco-Roman claims by ancient historians. We will simply have to ascertain later which, if any, such miracle claims come close to the necessary data.84

Minimal Facts and General Reliability Arguments in Tandem

The special strength of the minimal facts method, as clarified above, is its ability to zero in on textual minutiae and provide many valuable, specialized arguments for historicity. Of its two major criteria, the first is certainly more crucial. Multiple evidences may come from disciplines beyond history. They build from the ground up, often establishing one historical fact at a time. The second criterion is that the vast majority of critical scholars agree that the event is historical. Of course, even scholars could be mistaken, or the academic climate could change at any time, or scholars could also dispute the particulars. Still, while less crucial than the earlier evidential step, the result is an exceptionally helpful methodological procedure that builds on the commonly held foundation that recognizes the presence of strong evidence. The central thrust of the minimal facts method is to argue wherever possible on more limited grounds for the purpose of establishing an exceptionally firm, factual argument as well as challenging a broader spectrum of thinkers.

As will be observed as we move along, it is even a methodology quite often preferred by the critical scholars themselves, in that most who study the subject acknowledge the data.85 On the other hand, the distinctive contribution of the general reliability argument is in providing an overall, wide-ranging backdrop in favor of a large body of data. It moves from the top down and provides a more complete textual panorama. Though the broader reliability approach has without much doubt been the most popular method in past studies of this topic, it was remarked above that Lydia McGrew, a critic of the minimal facts method, still asserts that it now enjoys “near-exclusive use in Christian apologetic circles.”86 Both may be pursued together and can complement each other.

The minimal facts method is a far superior species of research that majors in providing evidence in minute studies. It supplies a stronger and tighter case that emphasizes producing a variety of factual angles all arguing for fewer historical events, as well as attracting the recognition and agreement of the vast majority of critical scholars. Such near unanimity testifies to the powerful foundation behind this historical framework. It is also superior in answering more sophisticated objections. As with the test cases that we just pursued above, this method is much more suited to indicating how the case for New Testament events may actually be superior to the Roman historical examples of miracle claims that we just studied. But there may be other occasions when it is additionally advantageous to return periodically in an effort to reexamine the basic background upon which the more specialized studies may be based.

Summary and Conclusion

We have argued that the problem with cases based on the general reliability of Scripture is not that these are illegitimate or always unhelpful. The chief issue is that it is very difficult to make them bear the weight of specific evidential arguments. Further, one result is the backlash against the believer when non-Christian miracle claims are viewed according to the same general criteria.

Thus, it has been proposed that we either amend the reliability arguments or just use outright what we have termed the minimal facts argument. It builds on multiply evidenced facts accepted as historical by virtually all critical scholars and thus it has the chief advantage of offering very specific evidence for particular events and doctrines. The large percentage of critical scholars who agree also make this a much more useful option.

In closing this preliminary look at the minimal facts method, it should be carefully noted that the reliability and even the inspiration of Scripture are still crucially important in an overall case for Christian theism and especially in building theology. There are places where these truths are very helpful and even necessary.87 Thus, arguments for Scripture are far from illegitimate, expendable, or useless. It is also the case that there are strong responses to critical objections to the biblical texts. But we should utilize the best arguments, especially on subjects of central concern, such as the Gospel reports. They were central in the earliest church and it remains so today. That is precisely where the minimal facts argument is at its very strongest and makes its most impact. Making use of the most powerful arguments will develop the most forceful case directly at these crucial points. As far as I am concerned, the minimal facts method is more robust, harder-hitting, and far more specific than the traditional approach, and therefore it is preferable. That the general reliability method fails at certain critical points helps to indicate that the minimal facts approach can even be more powerful.

Notes

1 This time frame extended from the prior research that led to my PhD dissertation, The Resurrection of Jesus: A Rational Inquiry (Ann Arbor, MI: University Microfilms, 1976), esp. chaps. 13–14, to the present. This dissertation along with a 2021 update on resurrection scholarship since 1976 has recently appeared as Gary R. Habermas, Risen Indeed: A Historical Investigation into the Resurrection of Jesus (Bellingham, WA: Lexham, 2021). This update contains a brief explanation of my pre-dissertation research on what became the minimal facts method. Cf. also the comments in W. David Beck and Benjamin C. F. Shaw, “Gary R. Habermas: A Minimal Facts Ministry for Disciples and Doubters,” in The History of Apologetics: A Biographical and Methodological Introduction, ed. Benjamin K. Forrest, Joshua D. Chatraw, and Alister McGrath (Grand Rapids: Zondervan Academic, 2020), 772n15 in particular.

2 For this topic in light of a comparison to Michael Licona’s methodological approach to the resurrection, including caveats on questions such as the possibility of expanding the list of minimal facts, see Gary R. Habermas, “The Minimal Facts Approach to the Resurrection of Jesus: The Role of Methodology as a Crucial Component in Establishing Historicity,” Southeastern Theological Review 3 (2012): 15–26, as well as Licona’s response to me in the same journal, “In Reply to Habermas, McGrew, and McCullagh,” esp. 55–56. We have also addressed this subject together, such as Habermas and Licona, The Case for the Resurrection of Jesus (Grand Rapids: Kregel, 2004), see 43–77. For Licona’s major work on this subject, see Resurrection of Jesus, particularly 277–464 (see chap. 2, n. 13). That volume is a revised and updated version of his PhD dissertation at the University of Pretoria, South Africa (22). A number of other Habermas sources on this methodology appear in this chapter and elsewhere in this study.

3 The discussion here concerns specialized scholars who have researched relevant areas in this discussion, rather than other scholars outside these particular fields of research or simply anyone who writes or blogs on these subjects. Below I will define this first group more clearly, since it is the group of researchers with which we are most concerned throughout this study.

4 Some additional examples of these ideas can be found in my publications The Resurrection of Jesus: An Apologetic (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1980), 22–41; Ancient Evidence for the Life of Jesus: Historical Records of His Death and Resurrection (Nashville: Nelson, 1984), 124–34; with Antony Flew, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?, 19–27, 42–46, 155–58 (see chap. 1, n. 68); Historical Jesus, 152–70 (see chap. 3, n. 48); “Resurrection Research from 1975 to the Present: What Are Critical Scholars Saying?,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 3, no. 2 (2005): 135–53; “Experiences of the Risen Jesus: The Foundational Historical Issue in the Early Proclamation of the Resurrection,” Dialog: A Journal of Theology 45, no. 3 (2006): 288–97; “Tracing Jesus’ Resurrection to Its Earliest Eyewitness Accounts,” in God Is Great, God Is Good: Why Believing in God Is Reasonable and Responsible, ed. William Lane Craig and Craig Meister (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 2009), 202–16; “Remembering Jesus’ Resurrection: Responding to James D. G. Dunn,” in Memories of Jesus: A Critical Appraisal of James D. G. Dunn’s Jesus Remembered, ed. Robert B. Stewart and Gary Habermas (Nashville: B&H, 2010), 267–85; “Jesus Did Rise from the Dead,” in Debating Christian Theism, ed. J. P. Moreland, Chad Meister, and Khaldoun A. Sweis (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 471–83; Evidence for the Historical Jesus: Is the Jesus of History the Christ of Faith? (Cambridge, OH: Christian Publishing House, 2020).

5 Gary R. Habermas and Antony G. N. Flew, Resurrected? An Atheist and Theist Dialogue, ed. John F. Ankerberg (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 1–7. As indicated in the title of the volume, Flew was still an atheist when this discussion occurred.

6 A few instances of my emphasizing such qualifications on this second point, even in my earlier works, include Habermas, Resurrection of Jesus, 33, 38; Ancient Evidence, 133–34; Historical Jesus, 169–70, 269.

7 Besides, if the ideas of Thomas Kuhn and other like-minded theses are correct, paradigm shifts in thinking often occur for reasons other than the discovery of new information, or in spite of being unable to fully answer all the contrary data in a satisfactory manner; see Kuhn, Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 147–48, cf. 205 (see chap. 3, n. 5). Strangely enough, even C. S. Lewis, in one of his more technical volumes that delineated literary indications of various thinking shifts from the Middle Ages to the Renaissance, argued that worldview changes often occur without reference to the discoveries of new facts, but instead due to an attitude change or one simply growing tired of old expressions and desiring new ones! See C. S. Lewis, Discarded Image, 220–23 and especially the epilogue (see chap. 1, n. 7). If such ideas and other related ones are correct, the potential upshot of this is that rejections of ideological positions, even by scholars, are quite often based on anything but the state of the data. From another influential perspective, many studies have argued that religious doubt may arise from a variety of factors that are largely unrelated to the current state of the evidence, such as one’s emotions. For just one example, cf. Neil Krause and Keith M. Wulff, “Religious Doubt and Health: Exploring the Potential Dark Side of Religion,” Sociology of Religion 65 (2004): 35–56. Then why should we even employ the second criterion regarding the large amount of critical agreement of scholarship? To get back to the original point of the minimal facts argument, the first criterion concerning the evidence is indeed the key to historicity. But the less crucial second criterion concerning the large percentage of agreement among scholars on the events we will raise may still allow many worthwhile benefits, such as a certain amount of agreement when conversing about the current state of the research, where the best evidence lies, what practical or other results can be derived from these conclusions, and so on. A large percentage of scholarly agreement on the historical status of the key queries helps to further the discussion more quickly, often cutting through many potential roadblocks, although it neither decides nor settles the factual or truth questions. Many individuals simply do not have the time or inclination to study the research personally, so it can be helpful to obtain a sort of overview or “lay of the land,” realizing that credible scholars have done such research and arrived at these conclusions. Yet again, the facts themselves are not solved by scholarly head counts.

8 My earliest publications sometimes termed this shorter list the “core facts,” but I settled soon afterwards on the designation of “minimal facts,” which is a bit more descriptive.

9 Both lists are provided in the next chapter and discussed in the context of contemporary scholarship.

10 One example here might be that of Dale Allison, at least as taken from a response of years ago. While referring specifically to my research, Dale referred to my survey of recent resurrection scholarship that was published in the pages of the same journal issue by averring that he was “incurably incurious” regarding scholarly surveys and the like, while still acknowledging that there could be some benefits to such exercises; see Allison, “Explaining the Resurrection: Conflicting Convictions,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 3 (2005): 125. Since that time, both an oral and a written dialogue on the subject, along with some friendly discussions between us, may have moved us closer in some respects on various of these relevant questions. Such is also a reminder of how two-way, understanding communication can also prove valuable in these exchanges!

11 Allison, Resurrection of Jesus, 358 (see chap. 2, n. 15). Quite surprisingly, Richard Carrier notes that his naturalistic approach “is consistent with all but one” of my list of twelve historical facts, with the exception being the empty tomb. Carrier’s essay is “The Spiritual Body of Christ and the Legend of the Empty Tomb,” in The Empty Tomb: Jesus beyond the Grave, ed. Robert M. Price and Jeffrey Jay Lowder (Amherst, NY: Prometheus, 2005), 197.

12 Allison, Resurrection of Jesus, 357–58. It should be noted here that this latest volume by Allison appeared in print at the same time that the current volume was being edited, so while references to Allison’s important new work will be made whenever possible during this process, large-scale interaction will not be possible in the first volume of this series.

13 For example, that is why the second volume of this set is committed to discussing naturalistic and other objections.

14 For instance, though she considers the minimal facts method to be deficient, Lydia McGrew still attests that it enjoys “near-exclusive use in Christian apologetic circles.” See McGrew, Hidden in Plain View: Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels and Acts (Chillicothe, OH: DeWard, 2017), 220–21.

15 Licona’s illustration here concerns the contrasting estimates from Raymond Brown, N. T. Wright, Ben Witherington, and others pertaining to current estimates on the authorship of Colossians. See Licona, Resurrection of Jesus, 278–79.

16 In terms of our study here, there are many well-known examples of both surveys and overviews which include statements here and there on the scholarly lay of the land. Among these works are the following: Albert Schweitzer’s famous volume The Quest of the Historical Jesus: A Critical Study of Its Progress from Reimarus to Wrede, trans. W. Montgomery from the first German edition in 1906 (New York: Macmillan, 1968); Karl Barth, Protestant Thought from Rousseau to Ritschl, trans. H. H. Hartwell, rev. ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1969); and Stephen Neill and Tom Wright, The Interpretation of the New Testament, 1861–1986, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988). A few other surveys among many other possible examples include Albert C. Knudson, Present Tendencies in Religious Thought (New York: Abingdon, 1924); G. C. Berkouwer, A Half Century of Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1977); John K. Riches, A Century of New Testament Study (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity International, 1993); plus Gerald O’Collins’s small volumes, such as What Are They Saying about Jesus? (New York: Paulist, 1977) and What Are They Saying about the Resurrection? (New York: Paulist, 1978).

17 Some examples from my own work include “Resurrection Research”; “Mapping the Recent Trend toward the Bodily Resurrection Appearances of Jesus in Light of Other Prominent Critical Positions,” in The Resurrection of Jesus, ed. Robert Stewart (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2006), 78–92; “The Late Twentieth-Century Resurgence of Naturalistic Responses to Jesus’ Resurrection,” Trinity Journal 22 (2001): 179–96; and the older but still useful “Jesus’ Resurrection and Contemporary Criticism: An Apologetic (Part I),” Criswell Theological Review 4 (1989): 159–74; “Jesus’ Resurrection and Contemporary Criticism: An Apologetic (Part II),” Criswell Theological Review 4 (1990): 373–85.

18 Quite intriguingly, this and related questions were debated in the pages of volume 9 of the much-respected Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus in 2011. Interested readers may consult this particular dialogue and the various stances that were taken, all from the pages of that issue of the journal, with authors listed alphabetically: Darrell L. Bock, “A Brief Reply to Robert Miller and Amy-Jill Levine,” 107–11; Bock, “Faith and the Historical Jesus: Does a Confessional Position and Respect for the Jesus Tradition Preclude Serious Historical Engagement?,” 3–25; Craig S. Keener, “A Brief Reply to Robert Miller and Amy-Jill Levine,” 112–17; Keener, “Assumptions in Historical-Jesus Research: Using Ancient Biographies and Disciples’ Traditioning as a Control,” 26–58; Amy-Jill Levine, “Christian Faith and the Study of the Historical Jesus: A Response to Bock, Keener, and Webb,” 96–106; Robert J. Miller, “When It’s Futile to Argue about the Historical Jesus: A Response to Bock, Keener, and Webb,” 85–95; Mark Allan Powell, “Editorial Foreword,” 1–2; Powell, “Evangelical Christians and Historical-Jesus Studies: Final Reflections,” 124–36; Robert L. Webb, “Methodological Naturalism: Engaging the Responses of Robert J. Miller and Amy-Jill Levine,” 118–23; Webb, “The Rules of the Game: History and Historical Method in the Context of Faith: The Via Media of Methodological Naturalism,” 59–84. A later, related response in the same journal was Benjamin C. F. Shaw, “What’s Good for the Goose Is Good for the Gander: Historiography and the Historical Jesus,” Journal for the Study of the Historical Jesus 15 (2017): 291–309.

19 On this last point, see atheist New Testament scholar Bart Ehrman’s comments in “Did Jesus Exist?,” Huffington Post, March 20, 2012, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/bart-d-ehrman/did-jesus-exist_b_1349544.html. Ehrman quite straightforwardly states this stinging comment: “Of the hundreds—thousands?—of mythicists, two (to my knowledge) actually have PhD credentials in relevant fields of study. But even taking these into account, there is not a single mythicist who teaches New Testament or Early Christianity or even Classics at any accredited institution of higher learning in the Western world. And it is no wonder why. These views are so extreme and so unconvincing to 99.99 percent of the real experts that anyone holding them is as likely to get a teaching job in an established department of religion as a six-day creationist is likely to land on in a bona fide department of biology.” Incidentally, Ehrman’s requirements here for consideration as a “scholar” seem to be very similar to the sort that I just outlined above.

20 Ben went on to complete his own PhD in the philosophy of history, focusing on the question of whether historians qua historians could at least potentially recognize whether Jesus was seen again after his death by crucifixion, in whatever form, without all the theological trappings.

21 It should also be mentioned that, especially toward the end of the research process, a number of earlier research assistants were also exceptionally helpful, especially in gathering bibliographic sources, but also in the overall project. Besides their grading responsibilities, Joel Oates, Jason Hauffe (PhD, Dallas Theological Seminary), and Sean Turchin (PhD, Edinburgh University) read dozens of books and journal articles, making careful notes. David Pensgard (PhD, Catholic University of America) kept up my website with much of this material. Ronnie Campbell (PhD, Liberty University) added crucial data from my notes as well as charted much of it in a very practical spreadsheet. He has since published a number of books with major publishers. Ben Shaw has also gone on to edit a book and author or coauthor well over a dozen articles. Campbell did much work on the question of miracles as well as the resurrection, and Shaw now specializes in this same field.

22 These very critical emphases should be kept in mind amid complaints that will no doubt arise from those who object to more conservative voices also being included in the counts. Volume 2 of this study is presently projected as being chiefly occupied with these naturalistic and other very critical ideations.

23 Besides Ehrman’s biting comments above, more rather intriguing examples are contained in James K. Beilby and Paul Rhodes Eddy, eds., The Historical Jesus: Five Views. In spite of Robert M. Price being one of very few mythicists with excellent academic credentials, after he explained his position against the historical Jesus, exceptionally influential critical scholars John Dominic Crossan, Luke Timothy Johnson, and James D. G. Dunn all make some very strong comments in this volume about both Price and his position. Johnson states concerning Price’s position, “It does lack the capacity to convince any but those who despair of history altogether” (93). Dunn offers still stronger language: “Gosh! So there are still serious scholars who put forward the view [of the mythical Jesus]. . . . But, no! Robert Price raises the banner once again” (94). Further, all three of these critical scholars agree on the next step as well, claiming that there is more than ample positive historical evidence to both indicate Jesus’s existence as well as to disprove Price’s position on the nonexistence (or virtually so) of Jesus (Crossan, 85–86; Johnson, 89, 159–61; and Dunn, 94–96, 98, 221, 223).

24 Strangely enough, despite bending over backward to include so many radical writers who do not possess the indicated scholarly credentials, I have received frequent emails plus other notes over the years complaining that either the skeptics as a whole had probably been ignored or at least neglected simply to make the positive numbers look better! These kinds of responses seemed often to be accompanied by anger or to border on some species of conspiracy theory. It would be understandable if these often emotional responses frequently make more moderate researchers want to drop the entire noncredentialed group altogether! It is no fault of scholarship if, even after counting many of their major writings in the tallies, the research still did not favor either the mythicists or their theories! As somewhat of a case in point, in a polite debate between long-time atheist Carl Stecher and evangelical New Testament scholar Craig Blomberg, Stecher acknowledges the hostility of some atheists (51) and refers to “modern, so-called aggressive atheists” (100). See Stecher and Blomberg, Resurrection: Faith or Fact? A Scholar’s Debate between a Skeptic and a Christian (Durham, NC: Pitchstone, 2019).

25 Cf. as an example, Gary R. Habermas, “Resurgence of Naturalistic Responses,” 179–96.

26 As explained elsewhere so that the purpose and extent of this study are clear, no claim has been made that an exhaustive study was conducted of all resurrection sources from 1975 to date. The research figures began with and largely reflected the most representative and highly influential sources no matter what view was taken, especially those that were written by major scholars. A large number of these have been cataloged in all their significant, exhausting details. Other texts were surveyed more briefly but still in detail. Less extensive publications were simply noted or otherwise listed in the ongoing bibliography. Furthermore, many of the included sources are not exclusively or even predominantly on the subjects of Jesus’s death or resurrection but may simply have contained a chapter or a smaller discussion on an important subaspect of one of the many study areas represented in this large study. As for relevant sources, they are listed in the bibliography too. This large collection of total sources accounts for why it seems that my lifelong study of the resurrection is always ongoing!

27 This entire document is projected for the third volume of this series.

28 For some instances where aspects of this research have been included, see esp. my essays “Mapping the Recent Trend,” 78–92, 199–204; Risen Jesus and Future Hope, chap. 1 (see chap. 2, n. 33); “The Resurrection of Jesus Time Line,” in Contending with Christianity’s Critics: Answering New Atheists and Other Objectors, ed. Paul Copan and William Lane Craig (Nashville: B&H, 2009), 113–25; “Resurrection Research,” 135–53; “Experiences of the Risen Jesus,” 288–97; “Late Twentieth-Century Resurgence,” 179–96; with Licona, Case for the Resurrection, chiefly chaps. 3–4; “Tracing Jesus’ Resurrection,” esp. 212–15; “Remembering Jesus’ Resurrection,” 272–85 in particular; “Jesus Did Rise from the Dead,” notably 472–83; Philosophy of History, Miracles, and the Resurrection of Jesus, 3rd ed. (Sagamore Beach, MA: Academx, 2012).

29 One may find helpful here the work of Thomas L. Haskell, “Objectivity Is Not Neutrality: Rhetoric vs. Practice in Peter Novick’s That Noble Dream,” History and Theory 29 (May 1990): 129–57.

30 These comments may be very easily misunderstood and are in no way a denial, mistrust, or sidestepping of the reliability or inspiration of the New Testament texts, as will be discussed momentarily. There are many additional ways to make these arguments. My research assistant Ben Shaw has developed a PowerPoint presentation titled “12 Considerations Regarding the Reliability of the New Testament” that is very much directed to the broader subject here. Further, the author has delineated arguments as well, mentioned directly below. But the overall thrust here is basically to say that the minimal facts method is one argument among several routes for treating the topics of the death, burial, empty tomb, and resurrection appearances of Jesus, besides other select topics.

31 Of course, this by no means coerces any sort of conversion from those who are un-inclined to believe.

32 Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist?, quotations on page 74 (see chap. 2, n. 15). On this same page Ehrman explains further: “Consider an analogy. We don’t dismiss early American accounts of the Revolutionary War simply because they were written by Americans. We take their biases into consideration and sometimes take their descriptions of events with a pound of salt. But we do not refuse to use them as historical sources.”

33 These instances are found on many occasions throughout this research, often in later chapters in this same volume.

34 Bart D. Ehrman, The New Testament: A Historical Introduction to the Early Christian Writings, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 290.

35 See Habermas, Risen Jesus and Future Hope, chap. 10; Habermas, Resurrection of Jesus, appendix 2; Habermas, “Jesus and the Inspiration of Scripture,” Areopagus Journal 2 (2002): 11–16.

36 Recall here that we are discussing scholars according to the above definition, including being at least willing to study these issues in a fair amount of detail. As such, we are definitely not addressing every blogger or other individual who just appears to want to “blow off steam” or otherwise “go off” on these things no matter where their opinions lie, or simply deny everything so as not to have to respond to anything. It is likely that progress may still be made with these techniques with the help of listening, sharing, and dialogue. This has been observed repeatedly in a variety of circumstances. The minimal data and how they function have proven to be a powerful method.

37 For an example of how this is done for the specific facts mentioned above, see Habermas and Licona, Resurrection of Jesus, 19–77; Habermas and J. P. Moreland, Beyond Death: Exploring the Evidences for Immortality (Wheaton, IL: Crossway, 1998; repr. Eugene, OR: Wipf & Stock, 2003), 133–36, and esp. the corresponding endnotes, 404–7; to extend the list a bit see 126–33, 141–47, along with the endnotes. My debates, such as those with former atheist philosopher and specialist on the question of miracles Antony Flew, along with other scholars, may also provide details of how this was done on those occasions. For details, see part 3 of Habermas and Flew, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?, or compare our dialogue years later in Habermas and Flew, Atheist and Theist Dialogue, 1–7. In the latter case, the debate actually began with the participants assessing twelve historical events as mentioned earlier in this chapter and then pushing each other on the best explanations for these events. For my follow-up essay, I chose to zero in on closing ambiguities in the skeptics’ arguments, such as hallucinations, other naturalistic options, resurrection agnosticism, and moving on to elements of theism; see Habermas, “Applying Resurrection Research and Closing Loopholes,” 89–95.

38 For extensions of the resurrection argument to other crucial Christian events, see these entire volumes: Habermas, Risen Jesus and Future Hope; Habermas, Resurrection of Jesus. For the possibility of adding a few more minimal facts to our list, see Habermas “Minimal Facts Approach,” particularly 25–26, as well as Licona, “In Reply,” esp. 55–56.

39 Although these two terms are sometimes differentiated, I will refer to them here in a more general sense, as roughly dealing with some of the same data and conclusions.

40 An example of the latter would be the fairly popular tenet that Mark utilized a pre-Markan passion narrative. If this were the case, this material would obviously date earlier than the Gospel itself. For further research results on this point, Marion Soards’s survey of thirty-four scholarly works concludes that there was such a pre-Markan passion source. See Soards, “The Question of a Premarcan Passion Narrative,” in Raymond Brown, The Death of the Messiah, Anchor Bible Reference Library (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1994), 2:1523–24.

41 For the examples of two agnostic New Testament scholars who date Mark approximately AD 40 for different reasons, see Maurice Casey, Aramaic Sources of Mark’s Gospel, Society of New Testament Studies Monograph Series 102 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Casey, Jesus: Evidence and Argument or Mythicist Myths? (London: Bloomsbury, 2014), 66–90; James G. Crossley, The Date of Mark’s Gospel: Insight from the Law in Earliest Christianity (London: T&T Clark, 2004), particularly chaps. 4–5. While this is not the normal date that either conservative or skeptical scholars assign to Mark’s Gospel, the arguments here need to be considered.

42 Joshua Pelletier, “The Modern-Day Scholarly Opinion of the Dating of Mark’s Gospel” (master’s thesis, Houston Baptist University, April 9, 2020), esp. 1, 32–38. This thesis is a survey of 207 scholars whose publications dated from 1965–2019. These researchers all held doctorates in relevant fields and their views included conservative to very skeptical positions. Pelletier reported concerning the Gospel of Mark, “A large majority of those scholars hold to a dating of A.D. 70 or earlier.” Additionally, the views that the traditional author was Mark and that the apostle Peter was the chief source behind the author were very popular with a respectable number of these scholars.

43 For both scholarly as well as popular examples, see Michael R. Licona, Why Are There Differences in the Gospels? What We Can Learn from Ancient Biography (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), chaps. 1–5; Craig Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of the Gospels, 2nd ed. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Academic, 2007); Blomberg, The Historical Reliability of John’s Gospel: Issues and Commentary (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Academic, 2011); Craig S. Keener, Acts, New Cambridge Bible Commentary (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2020), section 1; Andreas J. Köstenberger, The Jesus of the Gospels: An Introduction (Grand Rapids: Kregel Academic, 2020), chap. 1; Daniel B. Wallace, ed., Revisiting the Corruption of the New Testament: Manuscript, Patristic, and Apocryphal Evidence, Text and Canon of the New Testament (Grand Rapids: Kregel Academic, 2011), chaps. 1–2 for example; Paul Barnett, Is the New Testament Reliable? A Look at the Historical Evidence (Downers Grove: InterVarsity, 1986); F. F. Bruce, The New Testament Documents: Are They Reliable?, 5th ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1960); John Warwick Montgomery, History and Christianity (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1965), chaps. 1–2; Norman Geisler and Ron Brooks, When Skeptics Ask: A Handbook of Christian Evidences (Wheaton, IL: Victor, 1990), esp. chaps. 6–9; Norman Geisler, Christian Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1976), chaps. 16–18; J. P. Moreland, Scaling the Secular City (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1987), chap. 5; Winfried Corduan, No Doubt about It: The Case for Christianity (Nashville: B&H, 1997), chaps. 10–11; A. J. Hoover, The Case for Christian Theism: An Introduction to Apologetics (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1976), chaps. 10–11; Clark H. Pinnock, Set Forth Your Case (Chicago: Moody, 1967), esp. chaps. 7, 9–10; Josh McDowell and Sean McDowell, Evidence That Demands a Verdict: Life-Changing Truth for a Skeptical World (Nashville: Nelson, 2017), esp. chaps. 1–5, 14–26; John W. Wenham, Christ and the Bible (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1984), chaps. 2–7; R. Laird Harris, Inspiration and Canonicity of the Bible (Grand Rapids: Zondervan, 1969), parts 1 and 3. For the latest count of the crucial statistics pertaining to our most ancient manuscript portions of the New Testament compared to ancient classical writings, as well as the numbers of quotations from the early church fathers and other gems, many of which have changed significantly in recent decades, see Clay Jones, “The Bibliographical Test Updated,” Christian Research Journal 35 (2012); available at www.equip.org/articles/the-bibliographical-test-updated/. For a newer and much larger version, updated even further, including many charts and colored photographs, see Josh McDowell and Clay Jones, “The Bibliographical Test,” May 20, 2014, available at https://www.josh.org/wp-content/uploads/Bibliographical-Test-Update-08.13.14.pdf. For a Roman Catholic study, see Peter Kreeft and Ronald K. Tacelli, Handbook of Christian Apologetics: Hundreds of Answers to Crucial Questions (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1994), particularly chap. 9.

44 Note that it may be difficult at times to know if any of the authors below prefer to be counted as evangelicals, or, for that matter, if they assuredly do not wish to be included as such.

45 Richard Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses: The Gospels as Eyewitness Testimony (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006).

46 Another hugely influential volume in this discussion is James D. G. Dunn, Jesus Remembered (see chap. 1, n. 3); see also John A. T. Robinson, Can We Trust the New Testament? (see chap. 1, n. 43); Robinson, Redating the New Testament, rev. ed. (London: SCM, 2012); Howard Clark Kee, What Can We Know about Jesus? (Cambridge: Cambridge University, 1990), particularly chaps. 3–5 and the conclusion; C. F. D. Moule, The Birth of the New Testament, 3rd ed. (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1982); Birger Gerhardsson, The Reliability of the Gospel Tradition (Peabody, MA: Hendrickson, 2001); Samuel Byrskog, Story as History—History as Story (Tübingen: Mohr, 2000); Kenneth E. Bailey, “Informal Controlled Oral Tradition and the Synoptic Gospels,” Themelios 20 (1995): 4–11; C. H. Dodd, Apostolic Preaching (see chap. 2, n. 22); Ulrich Wilkens, “The Understanding of Revelation within the History of Primitive Christianity,” in Revelation as History, ed. Wolfhart Pannenberg, trans. David Granskou (London: Collier-Macmillan, 1968), 55–121; A. M. Hunter, Bible and Gospel (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1969), chaps. 2, 3, 8, and 10; Hunter, Jesus: Lord and Saviour (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1976), chaps. 5 and 12; Vincent Taylor, New Testament Essays (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1972); Oscar Cullmann, The Earliest Christian Confessions, trans. J. K. S. Reid (London: Lutterworth, 1949); Alan Richardson, Christian Apologetics (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1947), chaps. 6 and 9 on “Special Revelation” and “The Inspiration and Authority of the Bible”; William Manson, Jesus the Messiah: The Synoptic Tradition of the Revelation of God in Christ: With Special Reference to Form Criticism (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1946). On the Old Testament, see K. A. Kitchen, On the Reliability of the Old Testament (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2006); Sigmund Mowinkel, The Old Testament as the Word of God, trans. Reidar B. Bjornard (Nashville: Abingdon, 1959).

47 Helmut Koester almost sounds like some conservative authors when he states that the New Testament manuscripts have a base that is “far more advantageous than that for the textual criticism of classical authors.” See Koester, Introduction to the New Testament, trans. Helmut Koester (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1982), 2:15–17; John A. T. Robinson is even closer to the apologist’s style above when he provides a large number of salient details and then declares that the extant New Testament copies “make it by far the best attested text of any writing in the ancient world.” See Robinson, Can We Trust the New Testament?, 33–38 (quote on 36). Antony Flew, during his atheist days, agreed with such an assessment of the manuscript evidence in Habermas and Flew, Did Jesus Rise from the Dead?, 66–67.

48 Ehrman, New Testament, esp. chap. 20 (290 provides some particulars), along with a helpful chart and overall early dates of composition on 44.

49 Koester, Introduction to the New Testament, 2:52, which also includes the early dates of these epistles and other very helpful information on 102–4.

50 Actually, this is one of the most widely misunderstood elements with regard to the contemporary critical mindset. Quite often at popular university lectures, after defining the minimal facts method and then moving on to a text such as 1 Cor 15:3–7, I frequently hear the remark, perhaps equally from Christians and skeptical unbelievers, “Hey, I thought you said that you were not going to use the New Testament in making your case.” Of course, I never made any such comment. But that is often what is “heard” in my comment about utilizing only data that are well evidenced and that critical scholars will allow. Somehow it is very difficult to convey the explanation that it is not whether the New Testament gets cited, but how it is cited and what authority is allowed regarding the text. But these ideas must be communicated because it is often unknown to many on both sides that if the relevant New Testament texts are ignored, critical scholars such as Ehrman, Crossan, or someone else will be perfectly willing to quote the same passages! Thus, it is not that someone cites an accredited text, but how, why, or to what end they are cited! Besides, if the passages were being used so erroneously, why would critical scholars virtually always agree with the resulting data?

51 As a bit of a major and noteworthy aside, Luke Timothy Johnson agrees with Ehrman, Koester, and others on the “broad consensus” among critical scholars regarding these genuine Pauline Epistles (255, with group dates given on 144). But then he states the “positive bias for the authenticity of all the [thirteen Pauline] letters” and provides his reasons for this conclusion (255–57) in The Writings of the New Testament: An Interpretation (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986).

52 Ehrman, Historical Jesus, chap. 5, quotation on 145; cf. 148.

53 Gary R. Habermas, “New Testament Is Historically Reliable,” 147–60 (see chap. 2, n. 16); Gary R. Habermas, “The New Testament,” in Why Believe? God Exists! Rethinking the Case for God and Christianity, ed. Terry L. Miethe and Gary Habermas (Joplin, MO: College Press, 1993), 247–59; Habermas, Resurrection of Jesus, appendix 2; Habermas, “Reliability of the Gospels” (see chap. 2, n. 16).

54 Sometimes critical scholars have made rather surprising positive comments regarding the reliability of the biblical text compared to other ancient texts. For example, eminent Buddhist scholar and former Oxford University lecturer Edward Conze points out the strong tradition in support of Christian origins. Then he asserts, “Buddhist tradition differs fundamentally from that of Christianity. . . . Buddhists possess nothing that corresponds to the ‘New Testament.’ . . . The bulk of the selections in this book was written down . . . about 600 to 900 years after the Buddha’s demise. . . . Some of it must represent the direct and actual sayings of the Buddha himself. At present we have, however, no objective criterion which would allow us to isolate the original gospel. All attempts to find it are based on mere surmise, and the discussion of the subject generally leads to nothing but ill will and fruitless disputes.” See Conze, ed. and trans., Buddhist Scriptures (London: Penguin, 1959), 11–12. Another Oxford University fellow, P. A. Brunt, discussed the exemplary research practices of the ancient Greek historian Thucydides as he sought out eyewitness data and strove for accuracy in his writing, when later historians of antiquity did not do such a fine job. Then Brunt adds seemingly out of nowhere that the art of good research and documentation “reappeared” with Jewish and Christian writers regarding the treatment of their Scriptures. See P. A. Brunt, “Introduction,” in Thucydides, The Peloponnesian Wars, trans. Benjamin Jowett, rev. ed. (New York: Washington Square Press, 1963), xxii–xxiii. Ancient historian Edwin Yamauchi’s comments provide yet another comparative example of this sort, relating the New Testament–accredited reports of Jesus to the writings of other well-known religious figures of antiquity. See Yamauchi, Jesus, Zoroaster, Buddha, Socrates, Muhammad, rev. ed. (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity, 1972), 20, 39–41. Incidentally, Yamauchi’s comments on Buddha’s teachings (6–7) and later, legendary miracle accounts (7, 18) sound quite similar to Conze’s demarcations above.

55 This is not to say that these sorts of approaches have only emerged during the past few decades. Strangely reminiscent are the ideas of Enlightenment philosophers like Blaise Pascal, Pénsees: Thoughts on Religion and Other Subjects, trans. William Finlayson Trotter, ed. H. S. Thayer and Elisabeth B. Thayer (New York: Washington Square Press, 1965), comments 564, 838, 843, 846; and John Locke, On the Reasonableness of Christianity, ed. George W. Ewing (Chicago: Regnery, 1965), paragraphs 58–61.

56 Or, perhaps a minimal facts strategy could be employed from the outset!

57 One major exception is the Greek historian Thucydides, who unlike Herodotus and others, eschewed supernatural involvement in history in his Peloponnesian Wars.

58 See Moses Hadas, “Introduction,” in The Complete Works of Tacitus, trans. A. F. Church and W. J. Brodribb (New York: Random House, 1942), ix, xiv, xvii–xviii.

59 The nuances are added here since reporting what some individuals may be thinking, believing, or doing personally could well be different from agreeing with the report(s). It should be noted, however, that Tacitus clearly seems to accept at least some of these supernatural reports.

60 See translator Robert Graves’s comment in “Foreword,” in Gaius Suetonius Tranquillas, The Twelve Caesars (Baltimore: Penguin, 1957), 7.

61 Some examples from The Twelve Caesars include Aug. 81, 94, 97; Tib. 74; Cal. 57; Claud. 46; Ves. 5; Tit. 10; and Dom. 23.

62 Other instances include Aug. 1; Tib. 75; and Dom. 23.

63 These comments include Aug. 97; Cal. 59; and Nero 56.

64 Suetonius also reports that a “Thessalian” once stopped Augustus on his way to Philippi and claimed that he had met Julius Caesar’s ghost while traveling on a lonely road (Aug. 96)!

65 Some examples can be found in The Twelve Caesars, Aug. 94, 97; Claud. 46; Ves. 5, 25.

66 More cases are mentioned as well: Aug. 5, 6, 94, 96; Cal. 57; Ves. 5.

67 See Tacitus, Ann. 1.3. Translation in Titus Livius, The History of Rome, trans. D. Spillan (London: Bell and Daldy, 1872), bk. 1:3.

68 While it may be countered that Suetonius’s accounts could have been based on earlier reports, scholars quite regularly draw that same conclusion regarding the Gospels, including still earlier gaps. For detailed examples of this recognition, see Dunn, Jesus Remembered; Bauckham, Jesus and the Eyewitnesses.

69 See esp. Tacitus, Ann. 15.44; cf. Suetonius, Nero 16; Claud. 25.

70 While the critical issues with John of course go beyond the issue of the date alone, these two Roman authors, as we have seen, also have additional problems beyond the much later time distance. Scholars will debate these subjects in various ways, but what if Mark, Matthew, and Luke were used instead of John?

71 Such as Richard Burridge, What Are the Gospels? A Comparison with Greco-Roman Biography, 2nd ed. (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2004), 250. See also Licona, Resurrection of Jesus, 201–4, whose discussion is very helpful here regarding the responses of other major New Testament researchers, reporting that the scholarly consensus has “shifted significantly” on this issue (202).

72 Another Roman historian, Cassius Dio, though writing approximately a century later than Tacitus and Suetonius, agrees with the former that the second man’s problem was a withered hand (Hist. rom., 65.8).

73 Hadas, “Introduction,” x, xviii.

74 Graves, “Foreword,” 7.

75 Some of these examples are found in Suetonius, Tib. 73; Galb. 21; Otho 10.

76 Periodically, some apologists have even moved from the indications that we have excellent manuscript evidence for the New Testament text itself (which even a goodly number of critical scholars allow, a few of which were mentioned above) straight to thinking that this justifies the events and doctrines which are recorded in them. But this alone mistakes the confirmation of the wording for establishing the reports within them. While it is indeed crucial to know that we have as accurate of wording as possible from the originals, the words alone do not indicate that we likewise have confirming knowledge of the historical events or theology reported therein. The latter does not simply follow automatically. For example, even if we knew that we had Homer’s precise wording in the Iliad, this would not then prove that the events recorded in the volume really occurred. What if we have a very high percentage of Homer’s own words but Homer only simply meant to write fiction? Or what if the miracle claims were hearsay at best?

77 Some of this critique is indebted to a 2013 research essay by one of my PhD students, Garret Robinson, “Evaluating the Healing Miracles of Vespasian and Jesus,” in the Liberty Baptist Theological Seminary Apologetics 920 course. This paper was later expanded significantly and approved for reading at the Southwest Regional Meeting of the Evangelical Theological Society at Southwestern Baptist Theological Seminary, Fort Worth, Texas, March, 2014.

78 For some details here, see Suetonius, Ves. 5.

79 Of course this critique can cut more than one way, hence the need, once again, to evaluate specific details in miracle claims.

80 As ancient historian Edwin Yamauchi reminds his readers: “If we exclude later legendary and apologetic accounts, we find that early accounts attribute miracles only to Jesus.” See Yamauchi, Jesus, 40.

81 An intriguing text worth noting here briefly is found in the account in John 12:27–30. We are told that Jesus prayed to his Father, who spoke to him audibly. But rather than going wild with fear or amazement, the folks in the crowd had different opinions as to what was happening. Some thought an angel was speaking to Jesus—a fair guess but ultimately incorrect. Rather incredibly, many of these superstitious people (at least supposedly) apparently thought it was merely thundering! Here we have one of our earlier naturalistic assumptions! Jesus has to identify the voice as his Father. Whatever readers make of this text in historical terms, the point is that the author did not seem to think the variety of opinions, and even a very natural one at that, was too out of the ordinary.

82 Interestingly enough, while mentioning the report of Vespasian’s healing miracles, C. S. Lewis remarked: “I do not think that it is the duty of a Christian apologist (as many sceptics suppose) to disprove all stories of the miraculous which fall outside the Christian records. . . . I am in no way committed to the assertion that God has never worked miracles through or for Pagans or never permitted created supernatural beings to do so.” See Lewis, Miracles: A Preliminary Study (New York: Macmillan, 1947), 137–38.

83 This objection is exceptionally common and will be addressed in much detail in latter chapters. But simply to whet the appetite in just one of several key areas, what if there were a plethora of reported miracle claims today, including many high-caliber cases that were exceptionally well evidenced with scientific testing both before and after?

84 Especially in distinction to the equivalent attitudes regarding the Greco-Roman cases, probably even a majority of the most influential skeptical New Testament scholars concede that, on the basis of the data alone, Jesus was at least a healer. In fact, Marcus Borg argued very strongly that “despite the difficulty which miracles pose for the modern mind, on historical grounds it is virtually indisputable that Jesus was a healer and exorcist.” Borg, Jesus: A New Vision, 61 (see chap. 2, n. 32); see also 59–61, 65–71, which include the extended context. Though not as skeptical, major researcher John Meier clearly affirmed, “In sum, the statement that Jesus acted as and was viewed as an exorcist and healer during his public ministry has as much historical corroboration as almost any other statement we can make about the Jesus of history.” Meier, Marginal Jew, 2:970 (see chap. 1, n. 27). These two comments are indeed stated strongly. Back to the heavily skeptical and non-Christian researchers: these affirmatory views concerning Jesus’s miracles are clearly stated on this point by Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus and the Word, trans. Louise Pettibone Smith and Erminie Huntress (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1934), 146; Bultmann, Theology of the New Testament, trans. Kendrick Grobel, 2 vols. (New York: Scribner’s Sons, 1951, 1955), 1:61; Robert W. Funk and the Jesus Seminar, The Acts of Jesus: The Search for the Authentic Deeds of Jesus (New York: HarperCollins, 1998), esp. 25, 566; Ehrman, Did Jesus Exist?, 261, cf. 315–17; Geza Vermes, Jesus in His Jewish Context (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2003), 5–6, 97; Harold Remus, Jesus as Healer (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997), 106–18.

85 In his unpublished PhD dissertation, Benjamin C. F. Shaw summarizes the research efforts of almost two dozen critical researchers who provided various compilations of recognized historical data from Jesus’s life. Noteworthy here regarding lists pertaining more generally to Jesus’s life as a whole, more than half are from generally nonconservative scholars. See Shaw, “Philosophy of History, Historical Jesus Studies, and Miracles: Three Roadblocks to Resurrection Research” (PhD diss., Liberty University, 2020), 153–68. Another work that both affirms and provides more confirmation for the minimal facts approach is that of Justin Bass, The Bedrock of Christianity: The Unalterable Facts of Jesus’ Death and Resurrection (Bellingham, WA: Lexham, 2020).

86 McGrew, Hidden in Plain View: Undesigned Coincidences in the Gospels and Acts (Chillicothe, OH: DeWard, 2017), 220–21.

87 A last thought should be emphasized from my essay “The Minimal Facts Approach to the Resurrection of Jesus,” 26, as well as several other of my publications. Even when one employs a rather critical, even skeptical (indeed, “minimal”) approach, Jesus’s resurrection can be shown historically to be the best conclusion for the data. It appears that critical scholars who choose to disbelieve the resurrection have some explaining to do. But this does not change anything regarding the minimal facts method being just that—a useful approach. This should be clear from the subtitle of my essay “The Role of Methodology as a Crucial Component in Establishing Historicity,” as well as from the central emphases throughout other writings. Methods are more like practical techniques and should not be taken as the substance itself. (For example, an axe is an instrument that may be utilized to cut timber to build a home, but it is not the only way to split or cut the wood. Neither is it the wood itself, but rather, only the instrument that may be used. The wood is the key ingredient.) So not only is the approach here not a replacement for a stronger view of Scripture, but since the method and the doctrine occupy different classifications, as just mentioned, confusing them would be a category mistake. That is precisely why this journal article ended with these words: a strategy “is not a prescription for how a given text should be approached in the original languages and translated, or how a systematic theology is developed, or how a sermon is written. So it should never be concluded that the use of such methods in an apologetic context indicate [sic] a lack of trust in Scripture as a whole, or, say, the Gospels in particular. Nor should it cause others to question or doubt their beliefs. Thus, it should only be understood and utilized in its proper context” (26).

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