Chapter XIII:
CHAPTER XIII: WHICH PROVIDES THE RESPONSE TO THE ARGUMENTS OF THE PHOTINIANS
§ 166. Up to this point we have been discussing the first part of the factual material, which was constructive. Now follows the second part, which will be destructive and opposed to those who deny the mystery of the Trinity. The Photinians not only stubbornly deny this mystery but also attack it bitterly and blaspheme it shamelessly. We can place their arguments into two classes. (1) Some have been taken from statements of Scripture, which they have twisted badly. (2) Some have been taken from philosophical principles, which they have applied badly.
The statements of Scripture that they urge against the trinity of persons are those in which the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ is called “the one and only true God” (John 17:3; Eph. 4:6; 1 Cor. 8:6; etc.). However, we have shown in our immediately preceding treatise that the exclusive adjectives “one,” “only,” etc., are not opposed to the other persons of the Godhead but to created and fictitious deities that are outside the essence of the Godhead.
Earlier, in the preface, thesis 6, we showed the general response that should be given to the philosophical principles that they have applied badly to this mystery. We set forth a special explanation of the cunning of the Photinians in our commonplace On the Three Elohim [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 4], § 83. Therefore here we shall examine only three of their subtleties in particular.
§ 167. (I) From the unity of the divine essence. “An essence one in number cannot be common to plural persons, for ‘person’ is an intelligent individual substance. Therefore where there are three persons, there are three essences.” We respond. (1) Galatino provides this objection in De arcanis cathol. verit., bk. 2, c. 2: “If the divine essence, one in number, can, without a multiplication of itself, be in several places, surely the same can, without a multiplication of itself, be common to several persons.” He says:
Scripture asserts clearly, and the Jews admit, that God is everywhere. This cannot be confirmed according to diverse parts because, since God is spirit and supremely simple, He does not have any diversity or composition of parts. We must also not say that He is successively in diverse places because He would then be changeable with respect to place, which certainly does not befit God because—since He is eternal, immense, and supremely simple—He cannot be changed according to time or place or form. They (the Jews) must admit on account of this that, though God is one, He can be whole at one and the same time in various places with the truth of His unity. Therefore they must also concede that, though the Divinity exists as only one in number, it can be entirely in several persons at the same time. But if they concede that former, why do they deny the latter—since they should concede the one no more than the other?
However, God is in many places in a far different way than His divine essence is in plural persons. God is in many or, to say it more accurately, in all places freely and voluntarily, but the divine essence is not and cannot be outside the three persons. God and the creatures to whom God is present are distinguished in reality from each other, but the divine essence and the three persons of the Godhead are not distinguished in reality; otherwise there would be a quaternity.
(2) It is true when speaking about an essence that is finite, created, and immersed in corporeal matter to say that an essence one in number cannot be in several persons. However, this cannot be applied to the divine essence, which is infinite, without measure, uncreated, utterly simple, and completely immaterial, for because of its infinity and simplicity it can be in plural persons without any division, composition, multiplication, etc.
(3) Christian faith responds quite simply: We must acknowledge, worship, and invoke God in the way that He reveals Himself in His Word, and we dare not listen to the shrewd arguments of human reason contrary to this revelation given in the Word. But God has revealed Himself in the Word in such a way that He is one in essence and three in persons. Therefore we must acknowledge, worship, and invoke Him in this way and not listen to the shrewd arguments of human reason contrary to this revelation.
(4) Justin tries to prove with some sort of simile that the modes of existence [
] do not change the essence itself, for he writes (QQ. et resp., q. 139, p. 377): “Just as there is one kind of essence in Adam, Eve, and Seth—a rational soul and a mortal body—but the modes of existence vary, for Adam was made from the earth, Eve from his rib, and Seth from the genital seed, even in diverse modes of existence one and the same kind of essence continues and in this essence distinction and change do not occur. So it is also in the case of God: Because the essence of the persons is the same, we believe that there is one God: Father, Son, and Holy Spirit. God is one by the coexistence of the three divine persons [
] that differ from one another not in essence but in their modes of existence. The distinction of the modes of existence does not remove what is in the essence.” Meanwhile, we must note that the unity of the human essence in Adam, Eve, and Seth is merely one of species. However, the unity of the divine essence in the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit is numeric; therefore that simile is not adequate nor does it explain the magnitude of the mystery.
§ 168. (II) From the simplicity of the divine essence. “The simplicity of the divine essence excludes every compounding. Yet where person and essence exist, there is a compounding.” Socinus, Defens. animadv., p. 45: “If from the fact that the essence of God is utterly simple every compounding of the same essence is necessarily excluded, it clearly follows that in the essence of God there cannot be plural persons distinct from each other, unless we take the essence of God as a species or as a nature common to several persons.”
We respond. (1) Essence and person in God do not make a compounding because essence is not distinguished from the persons in reality, as Sommer falsely charges we believe (Refut. Carolini, p. 25). Rather, the three divine persons in reality are nothing other than the divine essence common to the three persons, and the divine essence in reality is nothing other than the three divine persons; otherwise a quaternity would be introduced instead of the Trinity.
(2) Although the persons are distinguished from each other in reality, that cannot make the simplicity of the divine essence fraudulent, because as Thomas argues ([ST,] part 1, q. 39, art. 1):
Just as relations are in created things according to accident, so the divine essence is in God. From this it follows that in God essence is not something other than person according to the thing and, nevertheless, that the persons are distinguished from each other in reality. You see, “person” signifies a relation as it subsists in the divine nature. Moreover, a relation compared to essence does not differ in thing but only in manner; and when compared with the opposite relation, by virtue of the opposition it does have a real distinction. Consequently, there continues to be one essence and three persons.
Some respond that relations of category create a compounding, but transcendental ones do not. But now in the case of God it is not a relation of category but a transcendental relation that occurs.
(3) The Christian faith responds most simply. Scripture teaches both: that the divine essence is utterly simple without any compounding and that the same essence is common to the three persons who are distinct from each other in reality. Therefore reason must be held captive under the obedience of faith and both must be believed, though we cannot comprehend how the simplicity of the divine essence remains with a trinity of persons. (See our De gloria Dei, disp. 10, § 36; and our locus On the Nature of God [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 3], § 85.)
§ 169. (III) From the majesty of the heavenly Father. “The confession of the Trinity weakens the glory of the one true God, who alone is the Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.”
We respond. (1) The glory of God consists of being confessed and worshiped in the same way as He reveals Himself in His Word. But God has revealed Himself in His Word in such a way that He is one in essence and three in persons.
(2) Therefore we invert the argument: “All people should honor the Son 
[“just as”] they honor the Father. Whoever does not honor the Son does not honor the Father who sent Him” (John 5:2). Therefore by denying the Trinity the glory of the Trinity is weakened. Athanasius: “The Father does not accept honor toward Himself with the insult of His Son.” Augustine, Serm. 51, de verb. Dom.: “When you honor the Father and insult the Son, you offend both the Son and the Father.” Prudentius: “Do you not violate the Father when you refuse to know His Son? Nor are you able to call upon the Father when you cheat Him out of His Son.” (See our De gloria Dei, disp. 10, § 33.)
As concerns the rest of the clever arguments of the Photinians, which they have woven out of the judgment of reason like threads of sand, we respond with the words of Augustine: “If reason were unable to refute these arguments (the arguments formed against the mysteries of faith revealed in the Scriptures), faith should laugh them to scorn” (De civ. Dei, bk. 12, c. 17); and with those of Chrysostom: “Human reason, when compared with divine matters, has nothing in common with them. Therefore it is blasphemy to wish to examine divine matters with reasonings” (homily 5 on 1 Timothy). In and with this pronouncement we conclude our treatise on the mystery of the Trinity.