Thesis.
SECTION XIX: ON THE BLESSEDNESS OF GOD
Thesis.
§ 306. As God is most perfect, so He is most blessed and, in fact, is blessedness [beatitudo] itself.72 Blessedness is defined as “a state of life perfected by every aggregation of good things.” Thomas, [ST,] p. 1, q. 26, art. 1: “Blessedness is nothing other than the perfect good of the intellectual nature.”
Therefore when God is called blessed, it is understood that: (1) He abounds with all good things. (2) Because the perfect overflowing of every good thing does not take place unless evil (which is the opposite of good) is completely removed, therefore by the word “blessedness” it is also understood that He is free from all evils. (3) Because no one is perfectly blessed unless he is always blessed, therefore by the word “blessedness” as attributed to God it is understood that He is unchangeably blessed. (4) Because no one is unchangeably blessed unless he is blessed essentially (because an accident is in its subject separably and changeably), therefore by the word “blessedness” it is also understood that He is blessed essentially and in His nature and, in fact, is blessedness itself. (5) Because no one is blessed essentially unless he is blessed of and by himself (because anyone dependent on another cannot be blessed essentially), therefore by the word “blessedness” as attributed to God it is also understood that He is blessed of and by Himself and does not have a participated blessedness from another. (6) Because no one can be called blessed unless he understands, recognizes, and wills the good things with which he abounds, therefore the word “blessedness” is also understood as that by which God fully recognizes His own perfection and blessedness through His intellect, loves them supremely through His will, and rests in it quietly and serenely. From this resting arises the joy by which God delights in Himself as the highest good because of all His good works and delights more than one can say or think. As a result, Thomas concludes: “God’s blessedness formally consists in operation, namely, in His understanding, which is an utterly perfect operation.” (7) Finally, because blessedness includes the abundance of every good thing, therefore when God is said to be blessed it is also understood that He is sufficient to Himself, desiring no external good and lacking no good.
God’s blessedness is proved.
§ 307. Blessedness is attributed to God by: (I) Scripture essentially, and that: (1) Affirmatively. 1 Tim. 1:11: “in accordance with the glorious Gospel of the blessed God.” 1 Tim. 6:15: “the blessed and only Sovereign.” (2) Negatively. Job 35:6–7: “If you have sinned, what harm will you do to Him? If you have acted righteously, what will you give Him?” Ps. 16:2: “My good does not extend to You,” that is, God neither needs nor is helped by my good. Ps. 50:[12]: “If I were hungry, I would not tell you, for the world and all its fullness is Mine.” (3) Metaphorically. 1 John 1:[5]: “God is light and there is no darkness in Him.” The word “light,” when attributed to God, denotes His simplicity, immutability, majesty, virtue, sincerity, omniscience, etc. (4) Effectively. Ps. 16:11: “In Your presence You will fill me with joy.” Ps. [27:13]: “I believe that I shall see the goodness of the Lord in the land of the living.” Ps. 36:[8]: “They will drink deeply of the richness of Your house,” etc.
§ 308. (II) Rational arguments: (1) From etymology. When the Hebrews want to say that someone is blessed, they attribute to him 
, “beatitudes” (which is a plural noun that is only in the construct state and can be translated either in the abstract, just as the Aramaic [Targum] always renders it as “blessedness”; or in the concrete, as “blessed”; or even adverbially, because adverbs in the form “it will be well” generally are derived from nouns), because for perfect blessedness not just one or two but many—in fact, all—good things are required, as is evident from the definition. But God alone abounds with all good things, not through a sort of aggregation (as there are many good things in one man) but through an utterly simple act. They derive the Greek 
(“happy”) and 
(“blessed”) from the negative particle 
(which is the adverb of taking an oath and a particle for negating) and from 
(by which death is signified, which is the greatest of evils). But God alone is immortal of and through Himself, completely free of death, change, and all evils. Aristotle thinks that the word 
is like 
from 
, “to rejoice” (Ethic. Nicom., bk. 7, c. 11). But the joy of God is perfect, untainted, unchangeable, and independent. Therefore also He alone is perfectly blessed.
(2) From supreme entity. God alone is self-existent, self-living, self-from-self. He alone, then, is blessed. Those things that are from another have their blessedness, just as they have their being, from and in another.
(3) From God’s perfect goodness. God is the highest good; in fact, He is the good itself. Therefore He is also supremely blessed and is, in fact, blessedness itself.
(4) From activity. Blessedness consists in act, not in habit, and for this reason the Philosopher defines it as “activity” [
] (Ethic., bk. 1, c. 12). But God is pure and sheer act [actus].
(5) From the communication of blessedness. Whatever is and is said to be blessed is said to be blessed by the communication of divine blessedness. Therefore God is eminently and effectively blessed, the fount of all blessedness. Aristotle, on the basis of the light of nature, acknowledges that God is utterly happy and blessed (Ethic., bk. 10, c. 8). (See Scaliger, Exerc. 307, sect. 26.)
§ 309. (III) The fathers. Gregory of Nyssa, De beatitud., orat. 1: “What must be considered truly blessed is the divinity itself.”
Augustine, De civ. Dei, bk. 9, c. 2: “With the true God alone and in Him alone the human soul (that is, the rational and intellectual soul) is blessed.” De civ. Dei, bk. 10, c. 4: “He is the fount of our blessedness, He is the goal of every appetite.” De civ. Dei, bk. 12, c. 1:
There is no good for the rational or intellectual creature by which it is blessed except God. Therefore, though not every creature can be blessed (for beasts, trees, stones, etc., do not attain nor grasp this gift), yet that creature which can be blessed cannot be blessed of itself—because it was created out of nothing—but only by Him who created it. For it is blessed by having that which, if lost, it is miserable. But He who is blessed not by another good but of Himself cannot be miserable, because He cannot lose Himself.
De nat. boni contra Manich., c. 40: “According to the catholic faith, sound doctrine, and the truth that is clear to the understanding, no one can harm God’s nature, nor does God’s nature permit anyone to do harm unjustly nor to do harm with impunity.”
Gregory, Moral., bk. 32, c. 5: “When God is enjoying Himself fully, He needs no praise to come to Him.”
Antithesis.
§ 310. God’s blessedness is undermined by anyone who claims either directly or indirectly that He is the author of sin. For as there is nothing evil in the supremely Blessed One, so also there is nothing evil from the supremely Blessed One.
Questions about God’s blessedness.
§ 311. (I) The question arises: Does the fact that humans do not always fulfill God’s will undermine God’s blessedness? We respond. Whatever God wills happens; and in whatever way He wills, in that way also it is done. Therefore nothing happens against His will [ipso invito]. Consequently, His blessedness is not undermined by the fact that humans do not fulfill His will, because such people run from His commanding will to His punishing will. (See our commonplace [1610 Loci Theologici, locus 3 (On the Nature of God)], § 184.)
(II) The question arises: Does God’s blessedness lose something from the fact that humans are said to inflict Him with sorrow (Isa. 63:10), to arouse Him to bitterness (Hosea 4:1), to provoke Him (Ps. 90:3), etc.? We respond. These should not be taken affectively but effectively. God does not become angry by receiving into Himself the passions of disturbances but by severely punishing the sinners who offend Him. For whatever things of this sort are predicated of God never signify that the Unchangeable has changed, that the Inviolable has been violated, that the Impassible has suffered something bad, that the Most Blessed has been affected with misery. Rather, they uniquely emphasize the atrocity of the sin that offends God, namely, that so great is the gravity and atrocity of sin that to the extent that it is in Him, through it the utterly blessed God is affected with grief, sadness, and reproach, and that God detests sin so much that it appears to injure Him, to stir Him to sorrow and bitterness, and to do violence to His honor.
(III) The question arises: How is God the blessedness of the blessed? The Scholastics reply, God is the objective rather than the formal blessedness of the blessed, because the operation by which they reach the highest good (which is God and the object of their blessedness) is something created. Scripture asserts that God “will be all in all” (1 Cor. 15:28). He Himself will be the beatific blessedness of the elect with regard to object and the accomplisher of the act of the person who reaches toward the object and rests in it.
The practical use of the doctrine of the blessedness of God.
§ 312. (I) Consoling. The blessed God will also make us blessed with eternal life, and that is why “the dead who die in the Lord” are pronounced “blessed” (Rev. 14:13), because through death they come to the Lord, that is, to blessedness, and begin to be truly blessed.
(II) Exhorting: To seek our blessedness in God. God alone is truly and perfectly blessed; therefore let us seek true blessedness in Him. No created thing obtains all good things cumulatively but only part of the good. God, on the other hand, is blessed with an abundance of every good thing. “With Him is the vein of life” (Ps. 36:[9]) and the fountain of blessedness that refreshes and does not fail. Our communion and union with God, then, is true blessedness. Ps. 144:12 explains the judgment of the world concerning blessedness, that it consists of: (1) The prosperity of sons. (2) The comeliness of daughters. (3) The richness of wealth. (4) Peaceful tranquillity. However, the royal prophet opposes to it the judgment of the devout and reborn man regarding true blessedness, that it consists in the recognition and full enjoyment of God. V. 15: “O, the beatitudes of the people,” or the blessed people, “whose God is the Lord!”
To this one true God, the only blessed and good God, namely, the Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, be blessing and honor and glory and power forever and ever. Amen.
21 Est in potentia passiva, i.e., has the potential to be changed by something else. Cf. Scherzer, Vade mecum, 2.193.
22 That is, stated as belonging to God’s essence or quiddity. Schütz, Thomas-Lexikon, 626.
23 Primo et per se agens, that is, one who acts in the first place, not in reaction to something else; and one who acts by his own nature or power, not by the power of something else. For example, one who opens a window shade lights up a room, but not by his own power. However, the sun lights up the room by its own power. The sun acts per se, of itself. Schütz, Thomas-Lexikon, s.v. “agere.”
24 Voluntas signi, God’s will as it is revealed to humanity, as opposed to the voluntas beneplaciti, what God is well-pleased to do, which is not revealed to humanity.
25 That is, character of being.
26 Integritas. Cf. Vulg.: simplicitas.
27 Here we have followed Cotta’s text.
28 Or fallacy of the conclusion, committed by confusing the antecedent and consequent parts of a conditional sentence. For example, it is true that if Joe is a man, he is an animal. But it is a fallacy of the consequent to say that if Spot is an animal, he is a man. See Deferrari, s.v. “fallacia.”
29 That is, describing God as He is in Himself, not as He relates to the created world.
30 That is, in a relative sense.
31 That is, which constitute the distinguishing characteristics of the divine persons. Deferrari, s.v. “notio.”
32 That is, the measure of the duration of an unchangeable yet created being, such as an angel. Deferrari, s.v. “aevum.”
33 Personified, understood as God or as the Second or Third Person of the Trinity in particular.
34 Wenn Gott einmal etwas beschleust, so bedenket ers nicht erst hernach (WA DB 10.1:71).
35 See below, On the Nature of God, § 261.
36 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, p. 1, art. 11, q. 3, ad 2.
37 Here we follow Cotta’s text. Preuss does not print these texts of Augustine as quotations.
38 Formale, i.e., that which makes something what it is.
39 Or “and because there is nothing more powerful than God.”
40 The opposite of “material.”
41 That is, it transforms it from a union of essence to a mere union of function.
42 “Confession Concerning Christ’s Supper, 1528,” AE 37:151–372; WA 26:261–509.
43 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, p. 1, q. 52, a. 2. To be in a place “definitively” is to be there as angels are present—not in a way that can be measured but also not omnipresent.
44 That These Words of Christ, “This Is My Body,” Still Stand Firm Against the Fanatics, 1527, AE 37:3–150; WA 23:64–283.
45 That is, God’s power is active, producing effects on other things. He does not have “passive power” or the potential to be affected or changed by the acts of others.
46 Purely potential matter, without any form or actuality. When form and matter are combined, they produce actually existing beings. On the scale of beings, God is at the top, as pure actuality, and primary matter is at the bottom, as pure potentiality.
47 That is, the omnipotence of God limited only by His own nature.
48 Or “ordained power,” i.e., what God can do given the fact that He has created this world and wants to preserve it.
49 This quotation could not be located.
50 Or “character of being,” “that relation according to which it can be said of a thing that it is there or it exists.” Defarrari, s.v. “entitas.”
51 That is, character of being.
52 That is, something added to or connected with.
53 The “divided sense” is the meaning of a concept in itself, apart from its relation to other facts or concepts. Its opposite is the “composite sense,” in which a concept is considered together with other facts or concepts. For example, in the proposition “It is possible for one sitting to run,” if running is taken in the composite sense with sitting, the proposition is false because one cannot sit and run at the same time. But if running is divided, or taken in the divided sense, from sitting, the proposition is true because he who is now sitting can run later. Johann Adam Scherzer, Vade mecum, distinctiones, pp. 236–37.
54 That is, that God is the highest being, purely actual, without any potentiality.
55 Altenstaig’s Lexicon theologicum, a Roman Catholic theological encyclopedia published first in 1517, has a different understanding of “first grace.” For Altenstaig (pp. 366–67), it is understood as a gift given by God to humans, and thus as a created grace, not God’s uncreated essence as He is favorably disposed toward His creatures.
56 “Absolute” means “not having any relation to anything else, relationless,” “independant,” or “unconditional.”
57 Cotta’s reading.
58 That is, a durable, accidental quality in the nature of a thing, or a disposition or inclination toward something.
59 That is, God does not need to perceive external objects and have the images of them in His mind.
60 “Necessity of the consequence” indicates a necessity that is based on contingent circumstances. It is a necessity by which something is not necessary by its own nature but only on the supposition of something antecedent. For example, supposing that all the boys in Illinois own a ball, it is necessary that John, who lives in Chicago, owns a ball. In this way, supposing that God foreknew that Peter would sin, Peter will necessarily sin, yet he nevertheless sins freely.
61 That is, the evils that are constituted by deliberate fault or guilt. Deferarri, s.v. “malus” 3. m.
62 “Primary actuality” (actus primus) is the essence of a thing and its integrity, or the bare existence of a thing. “Secondary actuality” (actus secundus) is its function.
63 Cotta’s reading.
64 That is, things that distinguish the true God from others.
65 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1a2ae, q. 8, art. 1, reply to obj. 1; art. 2.
66 Here Gerhard also gives a Latin translation that varies slightly from the Damascene’s Greek: “The faculty of intelligence is divided among hypostases, the persons themselves [supposita], except in the holy, simple, uncompounded, indivisible deity. For there, nor is the will of the not altogether divided and differentiated hypostases separated, and there, because the nature is one, so also the natural will is one. Therefore, because the hypostases are inseparable, the will is one, and the motion of the three hypostases is one.”
67 Conjecture. Preuss and Cotta: quae in lege non mandat.
68 See Commonplaces XV and XVII, On the Law of God and On the Gospel.
69 Cf. Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, 1a, q. 18, art. 2, reply to obj. 1.
70 That is, a relation produced by the mind and existent only in the mind. Deferrari, s.v. “relatio.”
71 See Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologica, part 1, q. 11, art. 3 ad 2.
72 Beatitudo (blessedness or beatitude, being “blessèd”) should not be confused with benedictio (blessing, making someone “blest”). Beatitudo refers to a state of sacred happiness or bliss, while benedictio refers to the effectual speaking of a good thing upon someone else.